Ignorance & Ideology MPSA

8/7/2019 Ignorance & Ideology MPSA

1/73

1

Ignorance, Ideology, and International Politics:

Public Support for Missile Defense in Four Nations

A. Trevor Thrall, University of Michigan - DearbornDominik A. Stecula, University of Michigan Dearborn and McGill University

Michael Maclean, University of Michigan Dearborn and University of Windsor

Prepared for the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science AssociationChicago, IL March 2010


2/73

2

Introduction

A 2008 survey found that 87% of Americans agreed that the United States should

develop a missile defense system with the ability to protect the United States from an

attack by missiles that might contain weapons of mass destruction.1 This figure raises a

puzzling question for many security analysts. Since 1983 when President Reagan

challenged the scientific community to invent a defense alternative to Mutual Assured

Destruction, the vast majority of security analysts have opposed ballistic missile defense

(BMD). There is little evidence that BMD is technically feasible, it has been outrageously

expensive even though it has spent most of its life as research projects, it has scuttled the

ABM Treaty and upset relations with first the Soviet Union and now Russia and China,

and had the potential, even if it were to work, of being dangerously destabilizing to

international security by presenting the possibility that the US could safely attack its foes

without fear of nuclear retaliation.2 Since 9/11 when fears of nuclear proliferation and

terrorism rose to a peak, analysts have also noted that the primary nuclear threat comes

from weapons smuggled directly in to the US, rendering a missile shield irrelevant

(several cites here as well). Why, despite such an array of solid scientific and expert

arguments, do so many people keep supporting missile defense?

The standard hypothesis from the political communication and public opinion

literature would be that the American public likely supports missile defense either

because they are predisposed ideologically to support defensive security measures,

1Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance July 2428, 2008

2Glaser, York and Lakoff, Lewis et al. etc.


3/73

3

especially in the wake of 9/11, or because pro-missile defense elite cues have dominated

the public debate. Evidence from three of the nations approached by the Bush

administration to participate in the U.S. missile shield system, however, muddies this

picture considerably. In Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic, majorities of the public

opposed participation in the U.S. missile shield plan from the beginning despite broad

elite consensus in support of the program. And given the woeful technical history of

missile defense and considerable potential international turmoil the U.S. missile shield

might create, one also has to wonder why in the world these European political elites

supported the system in the first place.

In this paper we propose that instrumental calculations of the missile shields

value as a missile shield per se were almost completely irrelevant to both elite and public

attitudes towards the U.S. missile shield plan. Using case studies that combine content

analysis of leading national newspapers, close analysis of elite debates, and public

opinion polls in the United States, Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic, we propose

that instead, the critical question is how elites and their publics interpreted the U.S.

missile shield in light of a mix of international and domestic political considerations that

varied across countries and over time.

The importance of this topic is both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical

side, we believe that both explanations have merit but that a more satisfying approach is

to integrate the two. On the practical side, foreign policy has grabbed the U.S. with a

vengeance since 9/11. How well the U.S. public is able to discern the wisdom foreign

policy alternatives in the near future matters to the entire world. Just as critically, it has

also become more clear than ever that international opinion plays a large role in the U.S.


4/73

4

foreign policy process. From ensuring cooperation in the fight against terrorism, or

building alliances to confront Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, to deploying a missile shield

abroad, the United States needs to understand how and why international publics think

the way they do.

In the next section we present our analytical framework. In the four case studies

that follow, we apply that framework in an attempt to explain elite and public attitudes

towards the U.S. missile shield during the Bush administration. Finally, we conclude with

thoughts about the implications of the case studies.

How Do People Think about Missile Defense?

The starting point for discussion is to acknowledge that the mass public in these

four nations knows very little about the technical arguments involved and has very little

or no ability to adjudicate them. First off, most people arent very interested and pay little

attention to such issues. Second, in large part as a result of this, the commercial news

media in most countries, most of the time, also pays little attention to missile defense.

What news there is tends to provide information without enough context to make sense to

the average reader or viewer, or features academic experts criticizing each other on the

basis of claims that go well beyond what the average citizen can understand. Thus,

whether or not people might use such information about missile defense to come to an

opinion, the fact is that very few have the information necessary to assemble what one

might call a well-informed opinion.


5/73

5

In such a situation, the predominant scholarly view is that people are likely to rely

on their own worldviews and predispositions, or turn to elite cues to determine whether to

support a policy.3 In other words, with appropriate cross-national variations, we would

expect hawkish conservatives to support missile defense because it plays to their

inclination to view the world as a dangerous place and to support military spending of

various kinds. Likewise, where ruling governments are promoting missile defense, we

would expect their partisans to support missile defense on the same general principles

being espoused by party leaders, while opposing partisans should tend to oppose, having

adopted the contrary arguments articulated by opposing party elites.

The cases here, however, force us to amend this general theoretical approach and

offer some suggestions about how to do so. Though the U.S. case follows the pattern

fairly closely, the cases of Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic highlight significant

disconnects between the mass public and the ruling party. In all three nations a majority

of the public opposed participation in the U.S. missile defense system despite strong

support from the ruling governments and, in Poland and the Czech Republic, support

from elites across the political spectrum. And although conservatives tended to be more

supportive than others, only in Poland did a bare majority of conservatives ever support

the program. This disjuncture appears to run in the face of the theoretical expectations.

We attempt to resolve the puzzle here by adding the concept of framing. As we

will discuss in greater detail in the case studies, the theories are fine as far as they go.

What they miss, however, is a mechanism to help us understand when people will rely on

any particular predisposition, elite cue, or instrumental calculation to form an opinion.

3Hurwitz and Peffley, Zaller, short cuts and heuristics people and similar stuff here


6/73

6

Framing theory provides just such a mechanism. Framing theory, of course, suggests that

the framing of a choice or a policy issue is critical for guiding people toward choosing

one or another element as the most salient concern of the moment, a choice which in turn

determines how people will make sense of available information in forming an opinion. 4

The key question here, then, becomes: how did elites and their publics interpret

the U.S. missile shield and why? Asked another way: what did the shield mean to the

elites and publics thinking about it? Though as we will see in the case studies, the

answers are complex and highly varied, we discovered two important sets of factors

influencing their interpretations.

Before discussing those factors, we should briefly explain that our framework

does not include a rational calculation about the military value of a missile shield. As

noted above, after already spending roughly $60 billion on research and development, the

United States has yet to deploy anything resembling a national missile defense system,

and there remains little evidence to suggest that the central technical challenges will be

solved any time soon. As obvious a consideration as this might seem, however, we find

almost no evidence that this type of calculation has seriously affected attitudes towards

the U.S. missile shield plan. In fact, for example, when asked if the United States should

continue to develop missile defense even if scientists say that it is unlikely ever to work,

60% of Americans say that research should continue.

The first set of critical factors flowed from the international political context.

Here, the questions include: What are the key threats to the nations security, both

4Various framing citations here


7/73

7

historically and at present? What does the nation stand to lose or gain internationally

from participating in the missile shield system? And finally, what are the intentions of the

United States? Here we saw wide variation in what the shield meant to elites. For those in

Poland, the missile shield was a shield, not against missiles, but more broadly against

potentially hostile Russian intentions. In both Poland and the Czech Republic, the shield

also represented a badge of honor, a sign that both nations would play an important role

in the European Union and in NATO. For Canada, on the other hand, the shield was not a

shield at all. Dismissive of the actual threat of missile attack, for Canadian supporters the

shield represented a key link to the United States. For Canadian opponents the shield

represented an American leash with which the U.S. could dictate Canadian foreign policy

and many mistrusted U.S. intentions and viewed the missile shield as a tool the U.S.

might use to launch upon even more aggressive foreign policies.

The second set of factors emerged from the domestic political context. Here we

see the effects of ideology and partisan politics. In the U.S. case, missile defense has long

since become fairly polarized along party lines. As a much newer and less familiar issue

in other nations, however, other domestic political factors were more important. In

Poland the program became a test of the governments general competence. In the Czech

Republic the shield came to be interpreted as a major environmental hazard. In Canada

the shield became an election issue thanks to the governments inept handling of the

negotiations with the United States and its misreading of Canadian opinion.

Finally, we note a fairly obvious point that nonetheless helps explain the

disconnects between elites and the public. Simply put, elites and the mass public do not

always pay equal amounts of attention to various information sources and thus do not


8/73

8

always share the same frame on policy issues, especially ones fairly distant from public

attention or which get little attention in the press. Though elite cues have been shown to

be powerful predictors of mass opinion, their impact (as Zaller has shown) is mediated

significantly by public attentiveness. Elite cues can only impact those who attend them

and rate them as more salient than other incoming cues. Thus, the first source of the

disconnect between elites and the public in all four nations is the general lack of interest

and concern about missile defense. As we will show, the least informed citizens were the

least likely to follow their partys position on missile defense.

The second source of the disconnect, however, is one that is less often mentioned

in the public opinion literature. Throughout the period in question here, elites and their

publics gave primary weight to different concerns despite elite efforts to sell the policy to

the public. Thanks to their intense exposure to the international arena, elites tended to be

most concerned with the international context of the missile shield. Status in the E.U.,

reputation, and their nations relationship with the United States across a wide range of

issues were foremost in their minds. The public, on the other hand, was far more likely to

view the shield through the lens of domestic politics or in light of the rising levels of anti-

American sentiment that had arisen in the wake of the invasion of Iraq. As a result of

these different foci, governments in Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic were never

able to win majority support for the missile shield despite very high levels of elite

consensus.


9/73

9

Support for Missile Defense in the United States

The Policy Process and Chronology

The Clinton administration, never enamored of the concept of missile defense,

nonetheless found itself pressed by a Republican Congress to push ahead with research

and testing of missile defense throughout the 1990s. In 1998 the pressure for missile

defense mounted in the wake of the Rumsfeld Commissions report. The commission,

formed out of republican unhappiness with the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

on the missile threat facing the United States, issued a report that suggested the missile

threat facing the United States was much more urgent than the NIE had concluded.

Unable to avoid dealing with missile defense, Clinton signed the 1999 National Missile

Defense Act, which required the deployment of a limited national missile defense system

as soon as it was feasible. Although Clinton was initially supposed to make a

determination on the feasibility of deployment by the summer of 2000, the presidential

campaign and troubles in the testing of the system made it too politically charged a

decision to make. Clinton thus postponed the decision, leaving it to his successor to

make.

During the presidential campaign of 2000, George W. Bush and the other

republican candidates all supported national missile defense. As Bush cemented front-

runner status and sought to distinguish himself from his democratic opponent, Al Gore,

Bush announced that he supported a national missile defense far more expansive than the


10/73

10

one envisioned by the Clinton administration, one that would not only protect the entire

United States but also US allies in Europe.

"America must build effective missile defenses," Mr. Bush said, "based on thebest available options at the earliest possible date. Our missile defense must be designedto protect all 50 states and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas frommissile attacks by rogue nations or accidental launches."5

In addition, Bush also indicated that he was ready to pull out of the Anti-ballistic

Missile (ABM) Treaty if it could not be amended with Russian approval, because the

treaty prohibited the development of missile defense beyond a single installation covering

a single small area.

I'll tell you this: If the president negotiates a treaty that really doesn't free upthe United States and or Russia to develop an anti-ballistic missile system, fully explorethe options of an anti-ballistic missile system, I would rather have no treaty."

Even during the campaign Bushs readiness to leave the ABM Treaty behind was

widely criticized by liberals in the U.S. and governments around the world. Russia, in

particular, continued to view the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of its arms control

negotiations with the United States, and China worried about the impact of a missile

defense system on its relatively small arsenal of nuclear weapons.

As promised, Bush moved quickly on missile defense, despite (or perhaps spurred

on by) the events of September 11 and run up to the war in Iraq. On December 16, 2002

President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 23, calling for deployment

of a national missile defense system by 2004. Throughout 2002 the United States also

held informal discussions with both Poland the Czech Republic about hosting missile

5Alison Mitchell, Campaign 2000: The Texas Governor; Bush Says U.S. Should Reduce Nuclear Arms,

New York Times May 24, A1, p. 1


11/73

11

interceptor sites. The formal negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic were

made public in 2007. Despite majorities in both nations opposing the bases, the

governments of Poland and Czech Republic signed agreements with the United States in

2008. A year later, after completing a review of the system, President Obama scuttled the

Bush missile shield plan in favor of a ship-based system that would not put interceptor

missiles so close to Russia. Though publicly Obama denied that he had altered the

program to get Russian cooperation on U.S. efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear

program, most observers believe that Obama used missile defense as the very bargaining

chip that many Republicans had claimed it could be back in the 1980s.

Shield, Bargaining Chip, Wedge Issue: Elites and Missile Defense

Republican perceptions of and plans for missile defense have changed very little between

1983 and today despite the sea changes in the international arena, despite the shift from

the Cold War to terrorism as the nations focal security concern, and despite decades of

failures to produce even a rudimentary missile defense capability.

In the 1980s, Republicans supported SDI for a mix of reasons. First, some believed that a

missile defense system was highly desirable and supported the pursuit of the long-term

goal of a perfect defense. Second, some realized that whether the project ever worked or

not, it could be a useful bargaining chip with the Soviet Union, which would have to

spend money to ensure that it did not accede any nuclear advantage to the U.S. or else

potentially make concessions in arms control negotiations. Finally, still others believed


12/73

12

that the issue had political utility regardless of its military potential, both as a useful way

to counter the anti-nuclear movement and to peel off conservative Democrats and

independents at election time.

Democrats, on the other hand, saw the shield first as a science fiction folly (Star Wars),

then as a threat to arms control progress and to nuclear deterrence, and finally as an issue

that could cost them votes as Republicans built momentum for missile defense in the mid

to late 1990s. As of the late 1990s, Democrats agreed that some form of missile defense

system was a done deal, thanks to Republican pressure and success in Congress.6

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat had little impact on

GOP enthusiasm for missile defense, merely shifting the rationales for the missile shield.

By the time of the Rumsfeld report in 1998, missile defense had a much narrower

portfolio, but Republican efforts in fact seemed to increase. In fact, the efforts

conservatives made to hype the threat and keep the issue alive in the wake of the collapse

of the Soviet Union suggest a commitment more religious than rational. Tellingly, the

missile defense system preferred by the Bush administration had not changed

substantially from Reagans initial vision despite the much more limited threat

environment facing the U.S. at that time. Republicans during the 2000 election decried

the limited missile defense plan being pursued by Clinton.

6An excellent history of missile defense under Reagan is Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue.


13/73

13

Missile defense continued to appeal to Republicans as another way to strengthen its hand

in international politics, extending U.S. military dominance and the unipolar moment

after the Cold War. Just as Reagan was willing to pursue SDI despite the highly negative

responses from Europe and the Soviet Union, Bush was also ready from the beginning to

pull out of the ABM Treaty despite the widespread concern and anger the issue had

already provoked in Russian, Chinese, and European circles.

As the 1990s and the 2000 presidential campaign showed, missile defense was still an

issue that worked for the Republicans. A poll in spring 2000 showed that 58% of the

public wanted missile defense, including many conservative democrats and independents

whose votes count so much at election time (CBS/NYT/Whatever Polls 2000).

The fact that Republican interest in missile defense has not dimmed despite the obvious

change in the threat and the huge cost of pursuing a non-viable system suggests that it

was conservative worldview and ideology, along with the continued usefulness of missile

defense as a political issue, that propelled the Bush administration to pursue the shield in

the way it did, rather than signals from the international arena.

How much emphasis one should put on each of those causes is unclear. Some cynics

might argue that Republicans are happy to spend money on defense that also helps them

win elections. Less cynically, it can be argued that Bush and supporters of missile


14/73

14

defense simply valued U.S. security from missile attack so highly that they were willing

to spend vast amounts of money to buy a small chance of successfully defending against

the very low probability that some nation would someday launch a nuclear tipped

ballistic missile at the United States.7 As a former Republican member of Congress said

in the documentary Missile Wars, When people ask me, How much are you willing to

spend on missile defense, I say, How much are you willing to spend to save New

York? (PBS Frontline 2003, Missile Wars).

We believe the answer likely lies somewhere in between. Even if Republicans truly care

that much about U.S. security, it does not follow that spending $60 billion or more on

missile defense is the best way to ensure national security, especially when there is such

good reason to doubt the effectiveness of missile defense and when so many other less

expensive alternatives to enhancing U.S. security can be imagined. The continued

Republican fascination with missile defense may thus stem from its political utility. Or,

more speculatively, it may be that nuclear weapons are such a vivid and dread threat that

they produce an irrational response from those predisposed to worry about them most.8

Dont We Already Have One of Those? Wake Me When Its Over. The US Public and the

Shield

7This mind set is well summed up by a report by the Center for Security Policy, a promissile defense think

tank. Missile Defense: A Bargain at Twice the Price cite here8

On how dread risks can produce irrational responses, see Jessica Stern, IS piece. Also see Paul Slovic, et

al, various foundational stuff on risk.


15/73

15

Historically a majority of the U.S. public has been supportive of the concept of

missile defense, but it has rarely followed the issue closely enough for opinions to

run very deep. As Figure US1 illustrates, over the period from 2000 to 2008, the

bulk of poll questions elicited majority support for missile defense but that support

was sensitive to question wording. On the one hand, Pew Research Center found

that over 70% of the public believed that building a missile defense system was an

important priority in a series of identical questions asked from 2001 to 2005.9

Similarly, the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance found greater than 80% support

when asking questions that asked whether the U.S. should have a system for

shooting down missiles armed with WMD.10 However, across the twelve questions

that offered respondents either zero prompting or presented arguments both for

and against missile defense, support was far more modest, averaging 51% between

February 2000 and February 2002.

Making analysis of those poll figures difficult is the fact that the U.S. public was

fundamentally ignorant of and unconcerned about the issue throughout the period.

In the heat of the 2000 presidential election campaign, more people thought Gore

was the candidate who had proposed to build a missile defense system, and 61%

acknowledged that they had no idea which candidate had done so. In September

2000, 58% of the public answered that they thought the United States already had a

missile defense system deployed, a figure that rose to 64% by March 2001, after

9See Pew Research Center surveys from January 37, 2001; August 21September 5, 2001; January 913,

2002; January 812, 2003; January 611, 2004; January 59, 2005.10

MDAA surveys from July 1922, 2007; July 2427, 2008


16/73

16

Bushs election and additional news coverage about the new administrations plans

for missile defense.11 This ignorance is not surprising in light of the Pew Research

Center finding in February 2001 that roughly half of all Americans had never heard

anything about missile defense, a finding that Pew replicated several times over the

years.12 The publics disinterest in following missile defense seems to have reflected

its priorities at the time. Even when offered a list of legislative priorities to consider

that included missile defense, just 3% said that missile defense should be the

highest priority, good for last on the list.13

The rough split in support and opposition for missile defense in the unprompted

and balanced argument questions suggests that most Americans simply did not have

strong opinions one way or the other and just guessed at an answer. At the very

least it is clear that most people could not be basing their answer on considered

analysis of the pros and cons of a system they had not heard of and knew nothing

about.

Figure US2 supports this interpretation. Here we see the polarization of

Republicans and Democrats over the issue of missile defense as peoples level of

knowledge about the missile defense debate rose. In this 2001 Pew Research Center

survey, among those partisans who were least aware, ideology (or at least

11CBS News/New York Times surveys September 911, 2000; March 812, 2001

12Pew Research Center survey February 1419, 2001

13NBC/Wall Street Journal survey December 810, 2001


17/73

17

partisanship) appears to play no role in directing attitudes toward missile defense,

as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all fall near the 50% support mark.

However, as partisans became more informed, Republicans and Democrats were

more likely to adopt the positions of their party elites. Independents attitudes

toward missile defense were unchanged with greater exposure to information.

Taken together, Figures US1 and US2 suggest that to the extent that U.S. citizens

spent any time considering missile defense, they did so primarily through a lens of

domestic politics, which is unsurprising in one sense, since the Republican party had

been beating the Democrats over the head with it since the mid1990s when Newt

Gingrich included it as the only military system in the famous Contract with

America. If the international context had been more important we might have

expected to see greater support for missile defense after 9/11 as Americans became

generally more securityminded, regardless of whether they paid any attention to

missile defense and regardless of ideology. However, we see almost no change in

support after 9/11.

It is true, nonetheless, that Republicans and Democrats were also more likely to find

their own partys arguments about missile defense most compelling when

confronted with them. In the 2001 Pew study, Republicans found the threat of rogue

state missile attacks more compelling, while Democrats tended to see the potential

for upsetting Russia and for a new arms race as more important. This suggests that


18/73

18

had there been a fuller debate about missile defense, the public would eventually

have polarized more firmly into competing camps on missile defense thanks to the

competition between Republican and Democratic elites over the issue.


19/73

19

Support for Missile Defense in Canada

Analytical framework for Canada:

Neither the Canadian elites nor the public spent much time interpreting the shield through

a military/technical lens. Most proponents and opponents seemed to feel that the threat

upon which the system was based was more or less irrelevant to Canada's decision to

participate or not. The other military benefits of participation may have been interesting

to the military, but not to anyone else. Neither opponents nor proponents worried much

about this (the weaponization of space argument that made an early appearance was not a

military argument, but an international political one - see below).

International political level:

1. With the background of 9/11 and the Iraq War and the view that Bush was out of

control in foreign policy, for opponents the shield represented a threat to Canada's

preferred international agenda (humanitarian, PK, multilateral, etc) and its sovereignty or

self-determination in foreign policy. This threat was all the more pointed because of how

distasteful Bush's policies were. For example, if Canada wanted to work on keeping

space free from weapons, how could it do so while participating in the US BMD system

which would potentially place weapons in space?

2. On the other hand, for proponents, the shield represented maintenance of the status quo

in the US/Canada relationship and, by extension, of Canada's ability to pursue its


20/73

20

economic and foreign policy goals. Being tight with the US meant not having to spend a

lot of money on defense, leaving Canada free to spend its money on humanitarian

missions, etc., as well having the freedom to export to the US market. Turning down the

shield meant risking that status quo (especially dangerous at a time when the status quo

was already under some duress).

Domestic Political Level:

1. The Canadian governments saw BMD as a toxic hot potato thanks to growing public

opposition and Martin tried to avoid it at every turn and to spin the issue carefully when

they could not avoid talking about it. This was especially problematic because of the

minority government situation and the Liberal scandals that made them weak at the polls.

Not a good time to go against public opinion.

2. The public saw BMD not only through the international sovereignty issue noted above,

but also and relatedly as an opportunity to define themselves politically as Canadian

through not being American.

America tilting at technologically based defense windmills is nothing new. From

the entertainingly named, but wholly inadequate Star Wars Missile Shield, to the recently


21/73

21

debunked nuclear Bunker Buster explosive14, useless technology has been a mainstay

of the American military industrial complex. If this is so, one cannot help but question

why Ballistic Missile defense (BMD) became such a serious issue to Canadians in 2004-

2005? Especially considering that Canadas objections to weapons systems in the past

was noticeably absent, and that many more clandestine and sinister activities were being

agreed upon and implemented throughout these years and onwards in the name of

American security; boarder biometrics programs, American air security standards and

similar infringements on Canadian sovereignty and privacy.15 The glib answer to why

BMD became a national issue while others languished in obscurity would seem to be

domestic politics and Anti-American sentiment. A more in-depth deconstruction of this

event, though predominantly centering around these two issues, reveals the imposition of

identity politics fruitlessly expelled on a conflict that was essentially an exercise in

semantics.

The event itself was not a case of an informed public reaction to a flawed military

strategy. Rather, it was a political power struggle/Liberal strategic belly flop (one of

many to come) that was taken up by the media to propagate scandal (or ratings). This

media strategy met with easy success due to public susceptibility to any messages

holding anti-US-foreign policy/anti-Bush sentiments.16 A war of elite frames crystallized,

fueled by misinformation, political power struggles and unpopular American foreign

14Scheer, Robert. Earning his nobel prize. in CBS News [database online]. New York, 2010 [cited 04/07

2010]. Available from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/07/opinion/main6373169.shtml

(accessed 04/07/10).15

Sokolsky, Joel. 2006. Suspenders and a belt: Perimeter and border security in canadaUS relations.

Canadian Foreign Policy12, (3).16

Beier, J. Marshall. 2005. Canada: Doubting Hephaestus. Contemporary Security Policy26, (3): 431.


22/73

22

policy which drove public opinion resolutely against missile defense and left the Liberal

government to play catch-up.

The Canada Case in Context

The issue of BMD compliance in Canada officially became notable after Prime

Minister Paul Martin, while on the campaign trail, responded to an innocuous question

about the BMD program by saying that he would not sign any document that would allow

the weaponization of space.17 It is unclear whether Mr. Martin was attempting to be

politically clever by playing on the widely held misconception that the BMD program

involved deploying weapons in space18 while having already agreed to comply with the

ground based BMD program, or whether it was merely a poor response to an unexpected

question. It is known that prior to Martin becoming PM he was openly in favor of the

BMD program19 but in light of a strained Canada/US relationship and a nation

disenchanted with all things American Military20, Martins modus operandi on the issue

remains unclear. Regardless of the motive behind the statement, it led to a veritable

media feeding frenzy in the following months and years.

The backdrop of the BMD debate in Canada came at a time when the government

was at its weakest. In the context of the Canadian/American relationship, tensions were

already high in part because the Americans had used an outbreak of mad cow disease in

17 Indepth: Ballistic missile defence. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2006 [cited 01/17 2010].

Available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/timeline.html (accessed

01/17/10).18

Wolfwood, Terry. "Wake up call" on BMD. in Vancouver Island Public Interest Research Group

[database online]. Vancouver, 2007 [cited 01/19 2010]. Available from

http://www.vipirg.ca/publications/pubs/speeches/0406_tw_missile_demo.html (accessed 01/19/10).19

Staples, Steven. 2006. Missile defence: Round one. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company

Ltd., Publishers. p. 3738.20

Beier, Marshall. 2005. Canada: Doubting Hephaestus. Contemporary Security Policy26, (3): 431. p. 436.


23/73

23

Alberta to exclude Canadian beef and strengthen American domestic consumption.21

Similar controversies regarding Canadian softwood lumber exports to America were also

under scrutiny, with the free trade partner levying significant duties, which put pressure

on the Canadian government to take action in protecting a staple (and a government

subsidized) regional industry.22 These two trade disputes provided acute focal points to a

cross boarder relationship that was admittedly already under some stress.

Martins predecessor, Jean Chretien, had made a point of distancing himself from

the Bush administration, making top-level negotiation more difficult still.23 Relationships

were further strained by Chretiens decision not to send troops to Iraq in 2003, and the

subsequent cancelling of Bushs scheduled first official visit to Canada soon after.24

Though the Martin government was seen as a fence mender in this relationship he was

never properly able to champion the role. Growing anti-American sentiments within the

Canadian electorate,25 Americas unilateral and hard nosed trade policy with Canada, an

official visit in 2004 that was interpreted as an insult to Americas largest trading partner,

and a complete lack of understanding of Canadas domestic political realities hindered

the improvement of relations.26

21Cooper, Andrew F., and Dane Rowlands. 2005. Canada among nations 2005: Split images. 1st ed.

Montreal: McGillQueen's University Press. p. 211212.22

Softwood lumber dispute. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/21 2010]. Available

from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/softwood_lumber/ (accessed 01/21/10).23

Cohen, Andrew. 2005. The impact of the 2004 elections: On the canadianamerican relationship.

International Journal60, (2): 351. p. 353. p. 353354.24

Ibid. p. 354355.25

Compas Inc. 2005. Missile defence: Small, soft, quebecbased majority opposes it in practice while

backing it in principle, big majority condemns ottawa's lack of public discussion. Toronto, ON: National

Post, 1.26

Cohen, Andrew. 2005. The impact of the 2004 elections: On the canadianamerican relationship.

International Journal60, (2): 351. p. 355356.


24/73

24

All of the tensions surrounding the Canadian/American relationship were

compounded by domestic political strife. The Liberal government was in the midst of a

sponsorship scandal that threatened to topple the government and siphoned away public

trust in the party.27 This controversy also eroded the publics faith that its government

was acting with full transparency, making rumors of a public and private government

position on BMD more resonant. With all of this impacting the government it is

unsurprising that in the 2004 election Martin was reduced to a minority government,

which in turn created further problems for the Liberals. All of these factors made BMD a

more crucial public issue than it would otherwise be. However, this was not immediately

realized by the administration, as was made evident by the Martin governments take note

debate in the House of Commons four months before the 2004 election.28 This debate (a

parliamentary practice developed in 1994 meant only to inform parliament of the

governments activities) exposed the governments lack of concern for the issue as the

focus of the debate was to allay fears of a new arms race developing from the

construction (and presumed participation) of the missile defense system.29 Had the Martin

government to fully grasped the ultimate importance of this issue it is unlikely that the

liberals would have been so pacifying in tone or nonchalant about compliance.

Following the Liberal minority victory in 2004 the Martin government was quick

to sign an agreement with its NORAD partners, which allowed Canadian systems to share

27Federal sponsorship scandal. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/17 2010]. Available

from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/groupaction/ (accessed 01/17/10).28

Government orders: Ballistic missile defence. in The House Of Commons [database online]. Ottawa,

2004 [cited 01/17 2010]. Available from

http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1200288&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl

=37&Ses=3#SOB813753 (accessed 01/17/10).29

Ibid.


25/73

25

information with the BMD systems.30 This agreement was signed a little over a month

after the election, and is in keeping with the Martin governments stand prior to the

election that BMD was a positive move for Canada. Though this stance made sense on

many levels, most notably strategic, trade, and foreign policy, the Martin government was

wary even at that time of public opinion and the anti-American sentiment growing in the

nation. To pacify such concerns, Canadas Defense Minister explicitly noted that this

signing was not a step towards Canada joining the BMD system, but merely Canada

adhering to its NORAD obligations.31

The level of public disapproval for BMD hinted at by the Minister of Defense in

his statements manifested into a national day of protest against BMD in early October of

2004.32 Though this protest occurred throughout Canada, predictably the largest

representation was argued to be in Quebec.33 This result is consistent with the landscape

of displeasure in the nation. Quebec had a push back to this policy akin to issues in the

past like conscription, and maintained Quebecs historic disapproval to militarism and the

escalation of hostilities in general.34 The protest alone would have been enough to get the

minority governments attention, but the inclusion and strong showing from Quebec put

added pressure on the liberal government to take action. Indeed, these protests had an

impact as Defence Minister Bill Graham had stated that the governments position

30Fergusson, James. Shall we dance? the missile defence decision, NORAD renewal, and the future of

canadaUS defence relations. in National Defence and The Canadian Forces [database online]. Ottawa,

2008 [cited 01/19 2010]. Available from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no2/inter01eng.asp

(accessed 01/19/10).31

Indepth: Ballistic missile defence. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2006 [cited 01/17 2010].


01/17/10).32

Ibid.33

Martin, Pierre. 2005. All Quebecs Fault, Again? Quebec Public Opinion and Canadas Rejection of

Missile Defence. Policy Options 26, (4): 41. p. 41.34

Ibid. 42.


26/73

26

had, in effect, been determined by a peace camp working within the Quebec wing of

the Liberal party.35 Currying public favor in an attempt to return to a majority

government in the next election was heavily contingent on increased liberal support in the

populous francophone province.

Political opposition to the BMD plan was experienced across the political

landscape. Though the Bloc Quebecois and the NDP may have had ideological motives

for the stance, every party knew that with the prevailing public opinion resolutely against

BMD36 and a teetering minority government, the smart political stance was to oppose the

program. Even the Bush loving Conservatives, who were pro-BMD prior to and directly

after the controversy of 2004-200537, claimed that they would need to see the details of

an agreement38 before supporting it. Political posturing in light of public opinion was,

however, typified by the behavior of Liberal MP Carlyon Parrish.

Parrish, a Liberal backbencher, had made headlines in 2003 after being caught by

the press making disparaging remarks about Americans and the Iraq invasion.39 Having

received public support and national notoriety from the incident it was no surprise when

she spoke out about the BMD issue. In August of 2004 Parrish referred to those nations

35Rudd, David. 2005. Muddling through on missile defence: The politics of indecision. Policy Options 26,

(4): 30. p. 30.36 Compas Inc. 2005. Missile defence: Small, soft, quebecbased majority opposes it in practice while


Post, 1.37

Nossal, Kim. 2007. Defense policy and the atmospherics of canadaU.S. relations: The case of the harper

conservatives. The American Review of Canadian Studies 37, (1): 23.38

Barry, Donald. 2008. Defense against help: Explaining canadaU.S. security relations. The American

Review of Canadian Studies 38, (1): 63. p. 79.39

Parrish: The thoughts. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/17 2010]. Available from

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdngovernment/parrishcarolyn.html (accessed 01/17/10).


27/73

27

participating in the missile defense program as a coalition of idiots.40 Once again in this

case her comments were greeted with media attention and public support. The only party

to condemn these statements was the Conservative party.41 Parrish finally became a

victim of her own quest for attention and public approval two weeks after the 2004

presidential election when she appeared in one of Canadas most popular political satire

programs brandishing more anti-American sentiment and stomping on an action figure of

the newly elected president.42 This lack of party discipline, and tact, got her removed

from the liberal caucus, but made her publicly popular both in her own riding and

beyond. The fact that an attention seeking liberal backbencher, who never put forward

any type of argument towards her beliefs, but rather floated her popularity based on

tactless anti-American sound bites speaks volumes to the prevailing sentiment of anti-

American/Anti-Bush within Canada. Though it is hard not to see Parrish as an

opportunistic buffoon, it is equally hard to deny that she would have remained in

obscurity if the sound bites she lobed over Canadian airways did not hold significant

resonance with the public she spoke to.

Turning a bad situation to worse for the liberal government was the first official

visit by President G. W. Bush. This visit was already contentious without the BMD issue.

Indeed there was controversy about the visit before any official agenda was announced as

Anti-Bush/Anti-American sentiment was exacerbated by the fact that Canada felt

snubbed for not having already received an official visit, dispensing with the tradition

40Ibid.

41Ibid.

42Ibid.


28/73

28

that Canada was the first national visit by any newly elected president.43 Added to this

was the tense Canada/American relationship at the time, with the mad cow scare stalling

Canadian beef exports and the ongoing conflict over softwood lumber. In light of these

problems it had been agreed before hand that the BMD issue was not to be discussed.44

Bush, however, in keeping with his self-interested and often obtuse diplomatic style

(remember his attempted backrub on Angela Merkel?) did not hesitate to bring up the

taboo issue in the private meeting of the two leaders, in the press conference following

those talks and in his address to the House of Commons.45 This inspired new outrage

from the Canadian public. Beyond the open protests wherever Bush traveled, his

comments sparked a declaration by Quebec Liberals (excluding Martin, who represented

La-Salla) that they would not support missile defense in Canada.46 This forced the Martin

government, already pushed into a corner by Bushs tactless comments, even further

away from saying yes on the BMD issue. In his weak minority government position he

needed support from his MPs in the short term, and gains in Quebec in the long term if he

was to maintain power.47 This made BMD a necessary and symbolic sacrificial lamb.

The death rattle to Canadian participation in missile defense came in February of

2005 when the Martin government was meant to give its final decision. Canadas

ambassador to the U.S., Frank McKenna, drew further negative attention to the issue.

Speaking with reporters in Washington, McKenna asserted that Canadas participation in

43 Cohen, Andrew. 2005. The impact of the 2004 elections: On the canadianamerican relationship.

International Journal60, (2): 351. p. 353356.44

Ibid. p. 356.45

Ibid.46

Indepth: Ballistic missile defence. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2006 [cited 01/17 2010].


01/17/10).47

Jones, David T.. 2005. When Politics Trumps Security: A Washington Vantage Point. Policy Options 26,

(4): 45. p. 46.


29/73

29

missile defense had already been decided in the 2004 agreement, which allowed the

missile shield systems access to Canadian satellite systems.48 This declaration was

countered two days later by Martins official announcement stating that Canada would

not participate in missile defense.49 The incongruity in message was predominantly

interpreted in Canada as either a miscommunication within the Liberal party (a

miscommunication that was likely shared by the Whitehouse), the exposure of a

government that was publicly against and privately complicit with missile defense, or

simple indecisive dithering by a government in trouble.50 Though any of these

assessments could hold some truth, the discrepancy in message was merely McKenna

properly interpreting the missile defense situation as it stood. Practically speaking, if the

Martin government was interested in halting missile defense they would not have signed

off on the one area of authority Canada possessed that could halt missile defense

expansion into Canada. After allowing the Americans access to Canadas NORAD sites

all the official participation announcement meant was that Canada would have access to

the system and decision making about the use of the system, not whether the system was

going to be integrated and installed into Canadas NORAD sites.51 Thus, Canadas

decision to participate held no weight, as the system was going to happen with or without

the Canadians at that point. It was this reality that McKenna was outlining to reporters, it

was just not properly elaborated upon and came at the most inopportune time for the

48Barry, Donald. 2008. Defense against help: Explaining canadaU.S. security relations. The American

Review of Canadian Studies 38, (1): 63. p. 79.49

Ibid.50

Jones, David T. p. 46 48.51

Fergusson, James. Shall we dance? the missile defence decision, NORAD renewal, and the future of



(accessed 01/19/10).


30/73

30

Liberal government. The perceived incongruity between the rhetoric of the liberal party

and their senior-most diplomat in America forced the Martin government to clarify their

position. The Liberals could not be seen as indecisive, nor could they allow McKennas

assertion that missile defense in Canada was a foregone conclusion to permeate through a

public resolutely against the system. Forced to take action, the Martin government made

the only decision available to it, and the die was cast against Canadas official

participation in missile defense.

McKenna, in his comments to the media, exposed the reality of Canadas missile

defense decision and its inconsequential resolution. As Andrew Coyne outlined in a

National Post article on December 4, 2004, all this hyperventilating is over a question

of the emptiest symbolism: whether we will support in principle a system we are already

support in practice.52 Given this stark reality, the importance placed on the decision by

the Canadian public it implies either a flat ignorance as to what a no from Canada

would result in, or indicates self-awareness in the statement/identity politics underlining

Canadas BMD decision. This is because either the Canadian public did not understand

that its participation in BMD did not stop the system being deployed in Canada, or they

did and their decision on BMD was a symbolic political statement against America and

its policies. Given that political parties and the media were able to make such an issue out

of what was ultimately an inconsequential decision would imply a great deal of ignorance

on the part of the Canadian public. Ultimately, however, it was likely a healthy

combination of both ignorance and political statement on the part of the Canadian people

that motivated a lack of official participation on the part of the government.

52Cohen, Andrew. 2005. The impact of the 2004 elections: On the canadianamerican relationship.

International Journal60, (2): 351. p. 356.


31/73

31

The Intentions Behind the Influencers: the Motives and Meanings Behind the Missile

Defense Decision in Canada

It is certainly valid to assert that many practical compounding factors resulted in

Canadas ultimate negative response to missile defense being a foregone conclusion. It is

equally valid to argue that the overarching frames espoused by those engaged in the

national debate identified what this issue was fundamentally about. The dominant frames,

likewise, are not so much stringently tied to the finer points of each frames individual

argument, but can be grouped into a few fundamental meanings relevant to the groups

engaged in the debate. These fundamental frames are synonymous with the motives on

which the Liberal government made its decision on national missile defense and expose a

decision made not on the merits and practicalities of the proposed program itself, but

rather a decision that acts as a proxy for domestic grievances.

Unsurprisingly the only positive voice in Canada for BMD was the military and

more hawkish members of the political right. The main arguments put forward by

supporters were military/treaty compliance, pragmatic defense realities, and improved

Canadian/American relations.53 The first of these reasons holds the most weight as an

argument. Canadian/American military integration and cooperation has been

53Macdonald, George. CanadaUS defence cooperation: Where to from here? in National Defence and

The Canadian Forces [database online]. Ottawa, 2008 [cited 01/20 2010]. Available from

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no2/intereng.asp (accessed 01/20/10).


32/73

32

institutionalized within the militarys modus operandi since the end of World War II.54 It

is that cooperative spirit that allows Canada to operate at such low capacity relative to its

size and boarder security realities. As such, the Canadian Forces (CF) is committed to a

strong cross boarder relationship and compliance on American military initiatives.55

The argument that NORAD made BMD an imperative was also heard from those

tied to, and in the rank and file of the CF.56 BMD was integrated into the NORAD

systems, and with the Canadians giving the use of their tracking systems to the project, it

was assumed that missile defense was the future of NORAD.57 Not signing on to the

project was both removing Canada from the future of the coalition and putting the

continuation of NORAD into doubt.58 Though this argument clearly overestimates the

precarious state of NORAD, exaggerates how easy it would be for Canada to be removed

from NORAD, and oversimplifies the future role of NORAD, it was still put forward as a

reason why Canadian BMD compliance was essential.

The rhetoric around the practical security benefits of the shield was also put

forward, mostly by right-leaning academics and officials. The argument here was

functionally reproduced from the American defense argument. Protection against rogue

states, the threat of Iran and North Korea, and the privatization of war producing

54Ibid.

55 Fergusson, James. Shall we dance? the missile defence decision, NORAD renewal, and the future of



(accessed 01/19/10).56

Macdonald, George. CanadaUS defence cooperation: Where to from here? in National Defence and


http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no2/intereng.asp (accessed 01/20/10).57

Ibid.58

Ibid.


33/73

33

unforeseen continental threats feature prominently.59 Though supported by some

segments of the population, this motive for BMD compliance was quickly countered by

the fact that modern rogue states and extremist groups lack the sophistication, capability,

and motivation necessary for the missile defense system to be of use.60

Attached to these arguments is also the good neighbor motivation for BMD

compliance. Such reasoning works in tandem with the underlying reasoning for

unwavering military compliance, the countries mutual interests. Foremost of these

interests is a lucrative trading relationship that has a majority of Canadas exports going

south, with the imperative being to safeguard this trade relationship by supporting

Canadas trade partner in their time of need on projects of importance to them.61 This

cooperation is seen as important not just to maintain the lucrative partnerships Canada

and America share, but is argued to be the natural course for two states that have such

resonant ties and commonalities culturally.62 Underpinning this reasoning is that similar

experiences, cultures and values bind the two nations as strongly as their formal ties and

good cooperation between these two nations is not just good policy, but a strong tradition

that has served both nations well. Interestingly, it is this attitude that stands in direct

opposition to one of the most influential frames that decided the fate of BMD in Canada.

These pro-BMD frames, it should be noted, were quite sound and rational.

Though to some degree glib, on the whole Canadian compliance with American military

interests (at least domestically, if not internationally) is a sound policy strategy given

59Harvey, Frank. 2001. National missile defence revisited, again: A reply to david mutimer. International

Journal56, (2): 347.60

Gizewski, Peter. 2001. The international politics of missile defence. International Journal56, (3): 527.61

Cody, Howard. 2003. U.S.canada trade, defense and border issues since september 11: The view from

canada. CanadianAmerican Public Policy(54): 3. p. 3 4.62

Ibid.


34/73

34

Canadas defense capabilities. So too is the argument that cooperation with Canadas

largest trading partner is in the best interest of the nation. These reasons hold more

weight when considering that relations between the two countries had become

increasingly adversarial as Americas self-interested unilateralism increased post-2001.

Indeed, this is the dominant frame responsible for Canadas (and the Liberal

Governments) clandestine participation in more stringent boarder security protocols63, the

creation of the Ministry of Public Safety in Canada to liaison with American security

counterparts more easily, the Martin created and appointed Secretary for Canada-U.S.

relations,

64

and up until it became a publicly debated issue, BMD.

65

These frames were

ultimately not accepted in the case of the BMD decision however, because it was not

sound political reasoning that guided Canadas no to BMD. Moreover, those presenting

this argument (i.e. the military and political right) were the antithesis of the groups

controlling the BMD debate; those in the peace lobby, the political left, and Canadian

nationalists/sovereigntists.

All the above arguments, sound as they may be, fail to fully encapsulate the

meaning missile defense had for its proponents. In this context missile defense was not

about continental security, military capability, or shared cultural ties, rather it was about

the continuation of a bilateral partnership that is integral to the nation; economically,

63Sokolsky, Joel. 2006. Suspenders and a belt: Perimeter and border security in canadaUS relations.

Canadian Foreign Policy 12, (3).64

Kitchen, Veronica. 2004. Smarter cooperation in canadaUS relations? International Journal59, (3)

(Summer): 693710. p. 709.65

Staples, Steven. 2006. Missile defence: Round one. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company

Ltd., Publishers. p. 3738.


35/73

35

militarily, and to a large degree a relationship that enables Canadas foreign policy and

international persona.66

The frame presented by political parties at the time was one of sovereignty, the

BMD decision as a tool of bilateral negotiations with America, and concerns about

advancements in global militarization.67 In this case however, political elites were

referencing sovereignty in the larger context of Canadian identity, Canadian foreign

policy, and Canadas incongruities with America.68 Contextualizing the BMD issue in

this light is extremely telling in relation to what groups held the most influence within the

debate, and what frames became dominant. Canadian identity and unconstrained

movement in making foreign policy and defense decisions was the core mantra of the

growing public unrest towards the issue,69 and adds to the growing evidence that the

missile defense decision was made for domestic political reasons (as opposed to being

motivated by sound and pragmatic foreign policy). Though it is true that political parties

were not without influence in the BMD debate, the fact that they used this position to

pander to the electorate implies that political authority was subjugated to popular opinion.

The frame that establishes BMD as a tool of statecraft has a lot of traction

publicly, but is much more contentious in a practical sense. At first glance this approach

has some traction politically, the softwood lumber dispute was languishing as the U.S.

66Macdonald, George. CanadaUS defence cooperation: Where to from here? in National Defence and


http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no2/intereng.asp (accessed 01/20/10).67

Indepth: Ballistic missile defence, canada's role. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited

01/19 2010]. Available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/canadasrole.html

(accessed 01/19/10).68

Cody, Howard. 2003. U.S.canada trade, defense and border issues since september 11: The view from

canada. CanadianAmerican Public Policy(54): 3. p. 4.69

Nossal, Kim. 2007. Defense policy and the atmospherics of canadaU.S. relations: The case of the harper

conservatives. The American Review of Canadian Studies 37, (1): 23. p. 26.


36/73

36

refused to abide by multiple third party rulings on the matter, their was some bilateral

dancing-about on the mad cow issue, and given the general bullish approach America

took towards bilateral relations at the time; best demonstrated through the softwood

lumber dispute70 Add to this the growing displeasure the Canadian government was

showing towards Americas foreign policy, and American interference in Canadian

domestic matters like marijuana legalization,71 and the stage is properly set for a grand

gesture against America by way of a missile defense snub. When look at in depth

however, such justifications loose credibility. On the flat face of the issue BMD was not

the place to form a line in the sand, as the system would be constructed with or without

Americas northern partner.

In the context of Canada and Americas bilateral relationship the Canadian denial

makes about the same amount of sense. If the issue was about growing displeasure with

the softwood lumber and Mad Cow disputes then why after a year of none compliance by

the Americans on both issues did Canada allow its surveillance systems to be integrated

into missile defense?72 Surely refusal to share tracking information with the missile shield

system would be a more effective leverage point, as it actually puts into question the

systems instillation. Further to this argument, if it was a foreign policy political

maneuver why did the U.S. believe that Canada was signing on to BMD up until the final

70Softwood lumber dispute. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2010 [cited 01/21 2010]. Available

from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/softwood_lumber/ (accessed 01/21/10).71

Kaste, Martin. In canada marijuana grows like, well, a weed. in National Public Radio [database online].

Washington, 2010 [cited 01/20 2010]. Available from

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4732092 (accessed 01/20/10).72

Jones, David T.. 2005. When Politics Trumps Security: A Washington Vantage Point. Policy Options 26,

(4): 45. p. 46.


37/73

37

no was given?73 If the decision was a foreign policy tool why was Frank McKenna not

properly briefed and in lock step with the Martin Government? These questions cannot

find substantive and reasoned answers, thus these motives must be brought into question.

Political parties like the NDP and a majority of representation from Quebec

framed the missile defense program as a slippery slope to deploying weapons in space,

and ultimately offensive weapons in space. The Liberals were also publicly concerned

about the weaponization of space, and likely fueled the fire of these fears by stating early

in the missile defense debate that they would not agree to any deal that saw weapons

deployed there.74 These concerns were raised to address Canadian organizations that were

proponents of disarmament and international peace. Concerns from these groups centered

on missile defense leading to the aggressive militarization of space, and highlighted their

contention with Americas militaristic foreign policy.75 Thus, party positions on missile

defense could be viewed as a proxy statement against the assumption that Canada was

similar to, or in any way under the thumb of Washington. As outlined above, however, if

this was the fundamental intent of the choice, it was not well thought-out, as the act

applied no real pressure or penalty to the Americans. Thus it is necessary to look at the

practical benefit of such a position to the political parties, and indeed what fundamentally

BMD meant to them. Given that all the motives framed by the Canadian political

73Ibid.

74Indepth: Ballistic missile defence. in CBC News [database online]. Ottawa, 2006 [cited 01/17 2010].


01/17/10).75

Chappel, Stacy. Missile defence: Bad for people, bad for peace. in Vancouver Island Public Interest

Research Group [database online]. Vancouver, 2004 [cited 01/19 2010]. Available from

www.vipirg.ca/publications/pubs/clippings/0404_tc_missile_defence.pdf(accessed 01/19/10).


38/73

38

machine can either be brought into question our debunked outright the only pure practical

upshot of political opposition to missile defense is public favor and ultimately votes.

In a minority government situation, with elections looming and political party

support more malleable than normal due to Liberal sponsorship scandal and a general

disillusionment with the political process the one thing that was clear was Canadians

growing distaste for the Bush administration.76 With overall decent towards America and

President Bush the norm in Canada, every negative statement against that administration

was a popular one with the Canadian people. These statements served a double purpose

in this case, as it subtlety outlined candidates presumed foreign policy leanings, which

were decisively contrary to those of America. It is fitting then that sovereignty was used

as the main frame under which Canadian politicians posed their objection to BMD.

Functionally, sovereignty means national self-determination or self-interest, and the

position against missile defense can be seen most purely through the lens of political self-

interest. Though many different frames were pose by the political elite as to the motives

of an anti-BMD stance, ultimately it is hard to see that the missile defense issue meant

anything to the political elite beyond domestic political popularity; adding more credence

to the argument that this decision was motivated by public opinion more than sound

statecraft.

The public framed the issue in terms of sovereignty, international image, and arms

control. Fundamentally, however, it was an expression of belief that Canada is not like,

nor does it condone, the unilateral, foolish, and dangerous policies of its largest trading

76Compas Inc. 2005. Missile defence: Small, soft, quebecbased majority opposes it in practice while


Post, 1.


39/73

39

partner.77 At its core then, the Canadian public made missile defense an argument about

identity. This is not to undermine the collective contributions of America-first policies,

the injection of support from peace activists, and a political landscape that had the Liberal

government on the defensive as significant influences in and of themselves, but even

these factors have aspects that connect to a larger sovereignty argument. Just as in the

political context, where sovereignty and disarmament were used as euphemisms of the

core motive of public support, these same avatars stand as proxies for what missile

defense truly meant to the Canadian public, complicity with American foreign policy. As

has often been the case in defining a national identity in Canada the public attempted to

establish what the nation believed in by saying who they were not rather than whom they

are. Kubbig addresses this when he states Ottawas clear No was meant to be a

politically powerful signal to its southern neighbour and to the international community,

opposing Washingtons hegemonic foreign policy in general and its MD policies in

particular.78 Missile defense became a national symbol with which to saying no to an

American administration that Canadians did not support, while in a larger international

context the stance was an attempt to express to the world the nations belief structures.

Missile defense also presented the opportunity to stand up, however ineffectually; to a

bullish nation that Canada believed was treating them unfairly. With all these meanings

and messages being applied to BMD compliance there was little room for any Canadian

support on the issue.

77Kubbig, Bernd. 2005. Introduction: The domestic politics of missile defence. Contemporary Security

Policy26, (3): 385.78


40/73

40

What have we learned?

Before the Missile defense issue became a public debate in Canada the Liberal

government were fully behind participation. Indeed, just at the time that the BMD debate

was heating up in Canada the government had already signed an agreement that made a

formal announcement of participation inconsequential in every practical and tangible

sense. Once the issue became publicly debated, however, the decision became of the

utmost importance. Canadian compliance still made the most sense strategically,

militarily and in light of the Canadian/American bilateral relationship, but participation

was put in significant doubt due to domestic political realities and identity politics. The

political landscape lent itself to a negative response to BMD, and consistently

deteriorated over the course of the issue. To attribute the failure of BMD in Canada solely

as a result of a weak minority government and a strained bilateral relationship, however,

is to miss a significant influence. Ultimately it was the frames espoused and the meaning

behind those frames that guided a non issue into a discourse on what Canadian identity is,

and what Canadians condone. When tested it becomes clear that public opinion was the

only influence of consequence, as the public outcry against BMD dictated the

governments position. Moreover, this foray into populace statecraft was not an issue

argued on its practical merits, but rather on how Canadians felt about America, the Bush

administration, and growing militarism. As Frank McKenna outlined in February of 2005

Canadas formal participation in missile defense had no impact on the Americans

deploying the system. This means that, either the Canadian public did not know what a

no to missile defense meant, or they did, and used it as a symbolic statement of decent

towards American foreign policy; likely both ignorance and political grandstanding


41/73

41

played their part in the final decision. Regardless of which was more prominent,

however, what is clear is that the decision was made based on domestic political issues

rather than a rational public making an informed decision based on the context and merits

of the proposed missile shield.


42/73

42

Support for Missile Defense in Poland

The Policy Process and Chronology

Polands leaders made clear early in the Bush administration that they would

willingly partner on missile defense. In 2001 Bronislaw Komorowski, the Minister of

National Defense and at that time the member of the Conservative Peoples Party (SKL),

noted that the geographical location of Poland would be an asset if the United States and

Europe decided to proceed with the construction of a missile shield.79 The feeling was

mutual. Key members of the Bush administration saw Poland as a good fit both

geographically and politically as the leader of New Europe and a strong supporter of

the United States in Europe more generally.80 Over the next seven years of official and

unofficial negotiations, Polish political leaders pursued a remarkably consistent path

toward missile defense despite three governments and sustained public opposition to the

plan.

Unofficial talks between the U.S. and Poland began in 2002, three years after

Polish accession into NATO and just months after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the

two reengaged on missile defense again in 2004 after the invasion of Iraq.81 More

concrete unofficial talks took place in December of 2005, two months after voters ousted

79Polska z Tarcza, Gazeta Wyborcza, May 18, 2001, Kraj Section, Pg. 8.

80Poland, as the largest among new member states of the EU, was often mentioned by Donald Rumsfeld

as the leader of the so called New Europe because of its support of the United States (see Andrzej Rocki,

Sojusz racji stanu,Wprost, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/78267/Sojuszracjistanu/, accessed March 20,

2010).81

According to Witold Waszczykowski, former Polish chief negotiator (see Amerykanska tarcza

antyrakietowa a interes narodowy Polski dyskusja, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego,

www.batory.org.pl/doc/tarczaantyrakietowa.pdf, Pg. 4.).


43/73

43

the government led by SLD and replaced it with a government dominated by the

conservative and pro-U.S. Law and Justice party (PiS) led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, whose

twin brother Lech won the presidential elections.82 After years of secrecy of the previous

cabinets, it was the PiS government that officially declared that hosting the U.S. missile

shield is one of the governments goals.83

These talks, for the first time, led to a discussion of the desired U.S. commitments

to Poland that the Polish government expected in return for the potential hosting of the

base for ten interceptor missiles as part of the missile shield system.84 During the meeting

with Donald Rumsfeld, new Minister of National Defense Radek Sikorski sought money

to help modernize the Polish military and a battery of Patriot missiles to enhance Polish

air defenses. The negotiations did not get far and Sikorski was disappointed by the lack of

American understanding of Polish positions and the poor cousin treatment. He was

dissatisfied with how little Poland would receive in return for hosting the base and with

the U.S overconfidence in assuming that Poland would accept the deal without

discussion.85 Sikorski later wrote an op-ed piece in the Washington Post in which he

described the American offer for the missile shield as having a long list of obligations

with few corresponding US commitments and that the US could either generate a

82 Marcin Bosacki, Amerykanska pycha i polskie piekielko, Gazeta Wyborcza, July 1213, 2008, Pg. 19.83

New Prime Minister, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, expressed this in the official program of his government

(see Marcin Gadzinski, Amerykanska baza antyrakietowa w Polsce? Gazeta Wyborcza, November 1213,

2005, Swiat Section, Pg. 7.).84

Marcin Bosacki, Amerykanska pycha i polskie piekielko, Gazeta Wyborcza, July 1213, 2008, Pg. 19.85

The Bush administration had been thoughtful enough to compose and include a Polish draft reply letter

with the initial U.S. offer (see Radek Sikorski, Dont take Poland for granted, The Washington Post,

March 21, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp

dyn/content/article/2007/03/20/AR2007032001427.html, accessed April, 25, 2008.


44/73

44

security partnership or weaken NATO, deepen Russian paranoia and cost the US its last

friends on the continent.86

After this short episode the talks stalled while both nations focused on other

issues. The missile shield offer returned officially on January 19, 2007 when both Poland

and the Czech Republic received an offer from the United States to begin the

negotiations.87 From there talks proceeded on and off over a year and a half, through

another round of parliamentary elections in Poland and the formation of a new, more

Europe-oriented government led by Donald Tusk and his Civic Platform party (PO).

Prime Minister Tusk, who unlike the Kaczynski twins was convinced that Poland could

not agree to a deal with the U.S that did not include significant security guarantees,

rejected the U.S proposal on July 4, 2008. In the wake of Russias incursion into the

South Ossetia region of Georgia during the Summer Olympics, Poland saw little

alternative but to sign on the U.S. proposal. The agreement was reached on August, 14,

2008 and documents were signed on August 20, 2008. According to the former Polish

chief negotiator Witold Waszczykowski, the agreement that was signed did not differ

86Radek Sikorski, Dont take Poland for granted, The Washington Post, March 21, 2007,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/20/AR2007032001427.html, accessed

April, 25, 2008.

87Tomasz Pawluszko, System obrony przeciwrakietowej USA a stosunki polskoamerykanskie, in Wplyw

tarczy antyrakietowej na pozycje miedzynarodowa Polski, eds. Michal Chorosnicki and Artur Gruszczak,

http://www.kssm.pl/images/stories/file/publikacja/03_%20Stosunki%20polskoamerykanski%20

%20T_%20Pawluszko.pdf, Pg. 162; see also Lukasz Kudlicki, Tarcza antyrakietowa w Republice Czeskiej:

Strategia Informowania Opinii Publicznej, Biuro Bezpieczenstwa Narodowego,

www.bbn.gov.pl/download.php?s=1&id=937, Pg. 201.


45/73

45

significantly from the previously rejected offer. US negotiator John Rood failed to

comment on the differences between the two offers.88

Three Governments, Two Presidents, One Shield: Polish Political Elites and Missile

Defense

From 2002 onward Polish elites were prone to support the American missile

shield across ideological and party lines. As a result, all three Polish governments of the

period supported continuing negotiations with the U.S., including the center-left SLD, the

conservative PiS, and the Euro-centric Civic Platform party. During the earliest stages of

the elite debate about the missile shield in Poland, the left-wing government of SLD and

President Aleksander Kwasniewski (also of SLD) was not particularly interested in

missile defense, but was willing to discuss the shield with the US government simply

because it was consistent with their policy of supporting the United States and

strengthening the relationship with America. It was under their leadership that Poland

became engaged in the US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it was during that time

that Poland remained a close ally of the United States on the continent submerged by a

wave of anti-Americanism. Throughout the period a majority of the left-wing politicians

in Poland took a pragmatic approach to the issue.89

88Tomasz Pugacewicz, System obrony przeciwrakietowej USA a stosunki polskorosyjskie, in Wplyw

tarczy antyrakietowej na pozycje miedzynarodowa Polski, eds. Michal Chorosnicki and Artur Gruszczak,

http://www.kssm.pl/images/stories/file/publikacja/04_%20Stosunki%20polskorosyjskie%20

%20T_%20Pugacewicz.pdf, Pg. 22889

Centerleft former Ministers of National Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Jerzy Szmajdzinski, said that

they oppose the shield, but could support it if they knew more about it and the negotiations (see Maria

Wagrowska, Tarcza antyrakietowa z polskiej perspektywy, in Amerykanska tarcza antyrakietowa w

Europie. Koniecznosc, warunki, akceptacja, ed. Stephan Raabe, www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_140835448

30.pdf, Pg. 46.) Former President, Aleksander Kwasniewski also chose a pragmatic approach. He was in

favor of the shield if Russia would be somehow included and hence less irritated about the project, as well


46/73

46

This consensus was largely the result of their shared interpretation of Polands

international political situation, which can by summarized by its unfortunate geographical

location and half a century of vegetation behind the Iron Curtain.90 Despite the

changing international political landscape of Europe in the late 20th and the early 21st

centuries, Polands historical experiences, and particularly Russias influence on the

region, continued to be a major concern of the Polish politicians and elites across most of

the ideological spectrum and led directly to the Polish push to become a member of

NATO and the European Union. Issues such as the German-Russian cooperation on the

Nord Stream pipeline, which highlighted Polish energy dependence and the Russian

embargo on the import of Polish meat served to keep Polish leaders alert to the potential

Russian threat. Perceived weakness within NATO, lack of progress on a unified defense

as making sure that the shield would eventually become a NATO system (see radio interview,

Kwasniewski o tarczy antyrakietowej, Radio TOK FM,

http://www.tok.fm/TOKFM/10,94829,5094723,Kwasniewski_o_tarczy_antyrakietowej.html, accessed

March 20, 2010.) Kwasniewskis foundation Amicus Europae published a report in March of 2007 in which

the authors underline that the

Documents

Ignorance & Ideology MPSA