22
IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major 5 World-Known Major Accidents Accidents Evaluation Evaluation Feyzin , France, 1966 Flixhborough , UK, 1974 Mexico City, Mexique 1984 Bhopal, Inde 1984 SEVESO, Italie , 1976 Enseignements Evaluation Glossaire

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Apprehend Industrial RisksApprehend Industrial Risks

from past accidents : from past accidents :

5 World-Known Major 5 World-Known Major AccidentsAccidents

EvaluationEvaluation

Feyzin, France, 1966

Flixhborough, UK, 1974

Mexico City, Mexique1984Bhopal, Inde1984

SEVESO, Italie, 1976

Enseignements

Evaluation

Glossaire

Page 2: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Understand the FEYZIN Accident Understand the FEYZIN Accident (France) (France)

Course of the accident

Home Page

Context :

Refinery with in particular:

- 4 propane spheres of 1.200 m3

- 4 butane spheres of 2.000 m3

- two horizontal tanks (butane and propane)

Storage of LPG are located at 450 m of the refinery and 300 m from the first houses (dwellings)

Date of the accident : January 4, 1966

Lessons learnt from FEYZIN

Page 3: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

1. The Operator opens the A valve

2. The operator opens the B valve and tries to

control the flow

6. Valve A freezes in open position(effect of the expansion of gas),preventing its closing and the mitigation of the leakage

3. A stopper of ice prevents the liquid from leaving

4. The stopper moves under the pressure

5. The stopper exits and the LPG is rejected

into the atmosphere

Next

Page 4: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

6. Dispersion of a propane cloud (h=1m)

8. Fire goes up to the sphere 7 A vehicle ignites the mixture of propane/air at 160 m from the leakage point

The sphere at the origin of the leak is engulfed in flames

Whereas the firemen try to cool the nearby tanks, the sphere explodes (BLEVE)

A few moments later, a second sphere explodes causing the rupture of pipes connected to a third sphere in a draining process.

Three other tanks open without explosion

Home Page

Understand the BLEVEPenomena

Lessons learnt from FEYZIN

Page 5: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Understand the BLEVE Understand the BLEVE PhenomenaPhenomena

Boiling Liquid Vapour Explosion

A BLEVE corresponds to the complete ruin of a pressurized tank containing a liquid stored at a higher temperature than its boiling point at the atmospheric pressure

Home Page

Pint

GPL

R

Ball of fire

Projectiles

Page 6: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Lessons learnt from FEYZINLessons learnt from FEYZIN

18 persons died and 84 were wounded primarily at the time of the first BLEVE

On the whole, 11 tanks were destroyed

Projectiles were found within more than 800 m away from the initial location of the vessels

THERE IS NO EASY OPERATIONS

Home Page

Page 7: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Understand the FLIXBOROUGH Understand the FLIXBOROUGH Accident (UK)Accident (UK)

Company NYPRO specialized in the synthesis of caprolactam, a component of Nylon

In the process, the caprolactam is synthesized from cyclohexane circulating in reactors at a temperature of 155°C

NYPRO only owns this site. Size relatively limited with a particularly hazardous process

NYPRO faces economic difficulties and has a sharp productivity approach

Home Page

Course of the accident

Lessons s learnts from FLIXBOROUGH

Page 8: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

12 3

465

1. A leak starts on reactor 5 (27/03/1974)

2. Decision to by-pass n°5 and link reactors 4 & 6 by a bended pipe

Home Page

On 1/06/1974, the link gives away, under great mecanical stresss and is detached from the bellows, releasing large quantities ofcyclohexane

Lessons learnt from FLIXBOROUGH

Page 9: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Lessons learnt from Lessons learnt from FlixboroughFlixborough

Home Page

An explosion followed suit, causing broad damage

and killing 28 people including 18 in the control room

No calculation concerning the resistance of the pipe was carried out

No diagram of the by-pass was carried out

No test of the system was carried out

Page 10: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Understand the SEVESO Understand the SEVESO AccidentAccident

Constraints related to the TCDD

Home Page Context :

Company Icmesa Chemical Company specialized in particular in the production of 2,4,5-trichlorophenol (TCP) used in the manufacture of weedkillers and disinfectants

The TCP is synthesized in a reactor in 2 stages:

- Hydrolysis of tetrachlorobenzene (TCB) with sodium hydroxide in presence of glycol ethylene (solvents) at a temperature of 180°C.

- Acidification of the TCB by hydrochloric acid At the end of the first stage, 50 % of the glycol ethylene is distilled

and the temperature in the reactor is lowered with 50-60°C by addition of water

Lessons learnt from SEVESO

Course of the accident

Page 11: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Constraints related to the Constraints related to the use of TCDDuse of TCDD

In the process, it is impossible to avoid the formation of TCDD(tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin)

TCDD: one of the most toxic substances Exposure by ingestion, inhalation, or cutaneous contact Effects: chloracnea, burns, damage to the kidneys, liver, nervous

system... Substance very stable, insoluble in water and resistant to high

temperatures In a normal operating system, the formation of TCDD is

negligible (if T <180 °C) and the great majority is collected and incinerated on site

If T goes up, the production of TCDD can strongly increase

Home Page

Course of the accident

SEVESO Assessment

Page 12: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Course of the SEVESO AccidentCourse of the SEVESO Accident

On July the 9th, 1976: the operation of synthesis begins Following Stage 1, only 15 % of the glycol ethylene is distilled

(instead of 50 %) No addition of water to cool the temperature in the reactor Operations are stopped for the weekend and the reactor is left

without action to reduce the temperature of the mixture An exothermic reaction takes place in the reactor and heats the

mixture more and more A few hours later, a rupture disc bursts, releasing a gas cloud

containing a few kg of TCDD

Home Page

Constraints related to the TCDD

SEVESO Assessment

Page 13: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Lessons learnt from SEVESOLessons learnt from SEVESO

Ten km² contaminated and several hundreds of people had to be evacuated

No immediate deaths associated to the TCDD but

- Death of animals in the following days

- Diseases catching several people

- miscarriages Extremely lasting and expensive decontamination plan

Home Page

Page 14: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Understand the MEXICO CITY Understand the MEXICO CITY Accident (Mexico)Accident (Mexico)

Terminal PEMEX is used for the storage and distribution of LPG

The LPG is conveyed by pipelines from three refineries

The storage capacity is 16.000 m3 with six spheres and 48 horizontal rolls

There are many dwellings near the production site

Home Page

Course of the accident

Mexico City Assessment

Page 15: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Course of the MEXICO CITY Course of the MEXICO CITY AccidentAccident

On the 19/11/1984, the installation is in the course of filling, a 200 mm pipe breaks down releasing the flammable gas

The cloud : surface on the ground of approximately 200 X 150 m² and height 2 m

It ignites on a flare. This ignition causes the destruction of several houses

At 5:45, a first BLEVE occurs followed, one minute later, by the BLEVE of two spheres giving place to a 300 m diameter fireball

BLEVEs occurred in series (nearly 15 explosions in 1hour 1/2)

Home Page

Mexico City Assessment

Understand the BLEVEPhenomena

Page 16: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Lessons learnt from MEXICO CITYLessons learnt from MEXICO CITY

In a radius of 300 m, all the people were killed or wounded More than 500 died, 7.000 wounded, 39.000 evacuated people

and 6.000 people implied in the first-aid organizations. Only 4 tanks over the 48 present remained intact

Fragments were found at distances from of over several hundred meters. The most remote fragments was projected to 1.200 m of its place of emission

Home Page

Many people were killed or injured due to the presence of crowded places in the vicinity of the

plant

Page 17: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Understand the BHOPAL Accident Understand the BHOPAL Accident (India)(India) The company Union Carbide India Ltd is specialized in the manufacture of

pesticides Located in a dense urban environment Following the strong competition of another company, the closing of the factory

is considered by the American head office The activity is held thanks to drastic economies Qualification of the operators is lowered, the framing is reduced, work of

maintenance reduced to bare essential. For its production, Union Carbide handles very dangerous products of which methyl isocyanate

Methyl isocyanate = gas very toxic by inhalation: Effects : pulmonary oedemas. This gas can also set in the system to form cyanide Following the refitting, several accidents occurred causing nearly 50 people

poisoned among the workmen over one period one year

Home Page

Course of accident

BHOPAL Assessment

Page 18: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Course of the BHOPAL Course of the BHOPAL AccidentAccident

Home Page

1. Water penetrates in a tank. An exothermic Reaction starts with the CMI

2. The pressure increases in the tank

a leak is detected around the tank

4. Decision to send the gas to the flare

Impossibility to light the flare

5. Opening of the valve ; discharge of gas to the atmosphere

3. Decision to start the soda treatment . The pump

is faulty

Soda

BHOPAL Assessment

Page 19: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Lessons learnt from BHOPALLessons learnt from BHOPAL

The leak happened in the early morning of the 3/12/1984

At 2 km of the site, in 4 minutes, 150 died, 200 paralysed people, 600 people lose conscience, 5.000 people seriously affected.

In the end, nearly 2.000 died and 10.000 people were poisoned.

Home Page

The safety level of a plant strongly relies on a efficient safety organization

Page 20: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

Proximity of industrial activities and centres of population can be a real issue if it is not controlled

First victims = often the operators of the plant at the origin of the accident

Much can be learnt from industrial accidents and even the incidents. Need for managing the experience feedback to progress

The major industrial accidents often led to revisions of the regulation. Case of the SEVESO directive

Drawing lessons from Major AccidentsDrawing lessons from Major Accidents

Home Page

Page 21: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

EvaluationEvaluationHome Page

Page 22: IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Evaluation Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974

IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

GlossariesGlossariesHome Page

INERIS Lexic : Insitut National de l’environnement Industriel et de Risqueshttp://www.ineris.fr/outils/lexique.htm