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Human Capital, Inequality and Tax Reform: Recent Past and Future Prospects
Richard Blundell*
University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies**
* Thanks to Monica Costa-Dias, Jonathan Cribb, Ben Etheridge, Andy Hood, Michelle Jin, Rob Joyce, Helen Miller, and Cormac O’Dea for helpful discussions.
** This research is funded by the ERSC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy at IFS.
Coase Lecture
LSE
March 10th 2015
• Even before the recent crisis, many governments around the developed world faced growing inequality and pressure to increase employment and earnings.
• The depth of the recent recession has added to pressure on government revenues.
• I focus here on the UK and ask three general questions:
1. What has happened to living standards and inequality?
2. Where might we expect tax/welfare reform to have most impact?
3. How has this changed in the light of the great recession?
Human Capital, Inequality and Tax Reform
• The emphasis will be on the labour market and on personal tax and welfare reforms.
• Many of the key determinants of trends in income inequality and in overall living standards over the past 25 years, including since the financial crisis, have been driven by changes in the labour market, including:
– huge increase in entry cohorts with at least a BA degree during the 1990s and early 2000s,
– large relative rise in top ‘earnings’ percentile since the early 1990s,
– dramatic fall in real wages since 2008, ….
• To which we can add changes in asset prices, in particular housing; immigration; and, of course, reforms to taxes and welfare benefits
Human Capital, Inequality and Tax Reform
1. What has happened to living standards and inequality?
To dig a little deeper into this and the other questions, I look at three measures that all have something important to say:
A. Earnings: Employment, Wages, Human Capital (and Productivity)
B. Incomes: Working-age mainly
C. Consumption: Durable and Non-durable Expenditures
Draw on four references from recent IFS research:
Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in the UK. IFS Report Series
What Can Wages Tell Us about the Productivity Puzzle? Economic Journal
Household Consumption through Recent Recessions. Fiscal Studies
Female Labour Supply, Human Capital and Tax Reform, NBER WP
• I will conclude with some prospects for the UK economy and for reform…
Prospects preview….
• Younger workers and families are acting as if they expect a long-run fall in relative living standards
– the pattern of low real wages at the bottom is set to continue, but with buoyant employment,
– longer term earnings growth will mostly come from high-skilled occupations.
• With growing earnings inequality there is increasing pressure on the tax and welfare system.
– current tax systems raise revenue and redistribute inefficiently and unfairly.
– some potential big gains from tax/welfare reforms to enhance human capital and earnings, and address inequality.
• Productivity though is still the key.
• But first let’s look at some facts….
A. Earnings: wages, employment (and productivity)
• Average real hourly wages fell back strongly after the onset of the recession
– even though workforce composition has shifted towards more productive types.
• Real wage falls occurred within individuals:
– unprecedentedly high proportions of employees experienced effectively nominal wage freezes.
• The education premium survived the large increase in those with BAs
– but real wages have fallen for all groups since the recession.
• ‘Effective’ labour supply was higher than during previous recessions
– due partly welfare policy changes and partly to wealth and long run real wage declines.
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Changes to total output, employment and hours worked since 2008Q1
90
95
100
105
Ind
exed
to
10
0 in
20
08
Q1
Output Employment Total hours
Source: Cribb and Joyce (IFS, 2015)
Changes to productivity since 2008 (2008Q2=100)
90
95
100
105
Ind
exed
to
10
0 in
20
08
Q1
Output per worker Output per hour worked
Source: Cribb and Joyce (IFS, 2015)
In contrast to previous recessions, real output per hour has at best been quite stagnant since 2008
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Quarter since the labelled one
Real output per hour
1979Q4 1990Q2 2008Q1
Mean weekly earnings since 2001 adjusted for RPIJ inflation (indexed to 100 in 2008Q1)
85
90
95
100
105
2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1 2006Q1 2007Q1 2008Q1 2009Q1 2010Q1 2011Q1 2012Q1 2013Q1 2014Q1
AWE LFS ASHE
Source: Cribb and Joyce (IFS, 2015)
Changes to real median hourly wages by age group
Notes: Results adjusted for methodological changes in 2011. Earnings observed in April of each year.
Source: Cribb and Joyce (2015), calculations using Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
85
90
95
100
105
110
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Re
al e
arn
ings
ind
exe
d t
o 1
00
in 2
00
8
22-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
Change in real median hourly wages by age group since 2008
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Figure 2.11b of Cribb and Joyce (2015) “Earnings since the recession”
-9.0%
-5.8%
-2.6% -2.7%
0.2%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
22-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 +
Cu
mu
lati
ve c
han
ge in
re
al m
ed
ian
ho
url
y w
age
s fr
om
20
08
to
20
14
Change in real median hourly wages by sex since 2008
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
-7.3%
-2.5%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
Men Women
Cu
mu
lati
ve c
han
ge in
re
al m
ed
ian
ho
url
y w
age
s fr
om
20
08
to
20
14
Source: Figure 2.10 of Cribb and Joyce (2015) “Earnings since the recession”
% annual change to real hourly wage, by period
Falls in Real Earnings even greater after allowing for composition changes in mean real hourly earnings
1.1%
-0.4%
-0.6%
0.7% 0.6%
0.6%
0.5%
-1.0%
-1.2%
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2002-2007 2007-2012 2012- 2014
Ave
rage
an
nu
alis
ed c
han
ge
Actual change Compositional effect Underlying change
Source: Cribb and Joyce (IFS, 2015)
Growth in proportion with degrees or above by age: all
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2014)
Ratio of BA (equiv.) median wage to that of A-level (equiv.)
Remarkably… no cohort effects!
BA premium stayed constant, even through the recession.
Excluding immigrants Including immigrants
Female Male
Source: Blundell, Dias, Meghir and Shaw (2014)
‘Experience’ wage profiles show strong complementarity between schooling and on the job human capital - UK Women
Employment and labour market participation
• Labour market participation held up better during this past recession than previous ones. For example:
– Employment rates fell less (and unemployment rates increased less)
Female employment stronger than male employment since the recession
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%2
00
5Q
1
20
05
Q3
20
06
Q1
20
06
Q3
20
07
Q1
20
07
Q3
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q3
20
09
Q1
20
09
Q3
20
10
Q1
20
10
Q3
20
11
Q1
20
11
Q3
20
12
Q1
20
12
Q3
20
13
Q1
20
13
Q3
20
14
Q1
20
14
Q3
Emp
loym
en
t ra
te (
age
16
-64
) (%
)
Male Female
Source: Fig 2.1 of Cribb and Joyce (2015) “Earnings since the recession”
Employment and labour market participation
• Some increase of participation can be attributed policy changes, e.g. :
– Labour supply has increased among lone parents as a result of job search conditions attached to benefit claims
– Older workers are retiring later as a result of increased SPA for women
Change to lone mothers’ participation rate since policy change
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15Quarter since the last quarter before policy change
youngest kid 12-15, 2008Q3 youngest kid10-11, 2009Q3
youngest kid 7-9, 2010Q3 youngest kid 5-6, 2011Q3
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2014)
Impact of SPA increase for women on employment
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
Counterfactual male 60-64 employment rate
LFS employment rate 60-64 men
Counterfactual female 60-64 employment rate
LFS employment rate 60-64 year old women
Note: counterfactual employment rates are estimated. See Cribb et al (IFS, 2013) “Incentives, shocks or signals: labour
supply effects of increasing the female state pension age in the UK”
Focus on employment rates of older women, 2003 to 2014
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Em
plo
ym
en
t ra
te
Age 58
Age 60
Age 61
Age 62
Source: Fig 1 of Cribb, Emmerson and Tetlow (2014) “Labour supply effects of increasing the female state pension age in the UK from age 60 to 62” IFS Working Paper WP 14/19
Employment and self-employment rate of older people (wealth and wage effects?)
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
20
01
Q1
20
01
Q3
20
02
Q1
20
02
Q3
20
03
Q1
20
03
Q3
20
04
Q1
20
04
Q3
20
05
Q1
20
05
Q3
20
06
Q1
20
06
Q3
20
07
Q1
20
07
Q3
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q3
20
09
Q1
20
09
Q3
20
10
Q1
20
10
Q3
20
11
Q1
20
11
Q3
20
12
Q1
20
12
Q3
20
07
Q4
= 0
employment rate 60-74 male self-employment rate 60-74 male
employment rate 60-74 female self-employment rate 60-74 female
Employment rate for older workers: women aged 60-64
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro area (13 countries)
Germany (until 1990 former territory of theFRG)
Spain
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2014)
Employment rate for older workers: men aged 65-69
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro area (13 countries)
Germany (until 1990 former territory ofthe FRG)
Spain
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2014)
For the young employment fell back.... Employment rate: men aged 25-29
60.0
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Euro area (13 countries)
Germany (until 1990 former territory of theFRG)
Spain
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2014)
B. Income Growth and Income Inequality: setting the scene
• Leading up the recession:
• income growth had slowed in early 2000s.
• pensioners/ working-age childless were doing relatively well/badly
• During recession and immediately afterwards:
• real earnings for those in work fell
• employment rates fell for low skilled young adults but not for older ones
• benefits/tax credit incomes were working harder
• As a result
• income inequality fell (despite rise in earnings inequality among workers)
• low educated young adults did worst; pensioners did best
• Average incomes have now stabilised
• but significant falls in previous years leave mean income 8.5% below peak
• reflects sharp drop in real earnings, large falls in pre-tax earned income of households between, despite higher employment
100
105
110
115
120
125
19
97
–98
=10
0
Mean income Median Income
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Figure 2.3 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: IFS 2014
Income growth slowed from the early 2000s...
Income growth slowed from the early 2000s...
100
105
110
115
120
125
19
97
–98
=10
0
Mean income Median Income
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Figure 2.3 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014
... followed by large falls in 2010–11 and 2011–12...
100
105
110
115
120
125
19
97
–98
=10
0
Mean income Median Income
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Figure 2.3 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014
... before average incomes began to stabilise
100
105
110
115
120
125
19
97
–98
=10
0
Mean income Median Income
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Figure 2.3 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Table 2.3 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014 Notes: This is a very slightly different sample to the overall income statistics. Households with negative incomes are dropped. This makes a small difference to falls in income
Income sources, 2007–08 to 2009–10: steady income growth due to benefits/tax credits
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Total income
Taxes and other deductions
Other
Self-employment income
Savings and private pension income
Benefits and tax credits
Earnings
Contribution to income growth between 2007–08 to 2009–10 (in percentage points)
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.2
2.4
2.2
-0.7
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Table 2.3 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014 Notes: This is a very slightly different sample to the overall income statistics. Households with negative incomes are dropped. This makes a small difference to falls in income
Income sources, 2009–10 to 2012–13: large income falls due to falling earnings
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4
Total income
Taxes and other deductions
Other
Self-employment income
Savings and private pension income
Benefits and tax credits
Earnings
Contribution to income growth between 2009–10 to 2012–13 (in percentage points)
-8.1
-1.7
-0.2
3.2
-8.6
-1.0
-0.8
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Table 2.3 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014 Notes: This is a very slightly different sample to the overall income statistics. Households with negative incomes are dropped. This makes a small difference to falls in income
Income sources: 2007–08 to 2012–13
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
Total income
Taxes and other deductions
Other
Self-employment income
Savings and private pension income
Benefits and tax credits
Earnings
Contribution to income growth between 2007–08 to 2011–13 (in percentage points)
-8.2
-1.4
0.1
3.5
-6.4
1.2
-1.5
-14.0%
-13.0%
-12.0%
-11.0%
-10.0%
-9.0%
-8.0%
-7.0%
-6.0%
-5.0%
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Cu
mu
lati
ve r
eal
ch
ange
Percentile point
Weekly earnings inequality (among workers) rose between 2007-08 to 2012-13...
Note: Excludes self-employment income
Source: Family Resources Survey, various years
...but net result was still a fall in income inequality
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
-12%
-8%
-4%
0%
4%
8%
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Inco
me
ch
an
ge
2007–08 to 2009–10 2009–10 to 2012–13 2007–08 to 2012–13
Percentile point
Source: Family Resources Survey, various years
Transfer system doing more work: Real private and net income growth, 2007–08 to 2012–13
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014
-18%
-16%
-14%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Cu
mu
lati
ve
in
com
e c
ha
ng
e
Percentile
Net income Private income
Will it continue? Future benefit and tax changes are important drivers in income distribution, Simulations up to 2015–16:
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Inco
me
ch
an
ge
2007–08 to 2012–13
2012–13 to 2015–16
Percentile point
Note: Figure is an update of that in Brewer et. al. (2013), Fiscal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 179–201.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Ma
rgin
al in
com
e t
ax +
NIC
s ra
te
Employer cost (£000s)
Income tax + NICs
Income tax
Source: Mirrlees Review
Two aspects of the Tax System: 1. Effective taxes on Higher Incomes. Marginal tax rates by income level 2011
Two aspects of the Tax System: 1. Effective taxes on Higher Incomes. Marginal tax rates by income level, UK
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
$0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000
Gross income
Earned income
Self employment income
Dividend income
Note: assumes dividend from company paying small companies’ rate. Includes
income tax, employee and self-employed NICs and corporation tax.
Bunching at the higher rate threshold, UK
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
Nu
mb
er
in e
ach
£1
00
bin
Distance from threshold
Composition of income around the higher rate tax threshold
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
-$1
$0
$1
$2
$3
$4
$5
$6
$7
$8
$9
Tota
l in
com
e p
er
£1
00
bin
(£
bill
ion
)
Distance from threshold
Interest
Property
Dividends
Other investmentincomeSelf employment
Other
Pensions
Benefits
Employment
Deductables
2. Effective Taxes at the Bottom: Complex but redistributive
Budget Constraint for Single Parent in UK in 2011
Notes: wage £6.50/hr, 2 children, no other income, £80/wk rent. Ignores council tax and rebates
Measures of inequality: 50/10, 90/50 ratios
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014
1.500
1.600
1.700
1.800
1.900
2.000
2.100
2.200
2.300
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
Ra
tio
50/10 90/50
But top 1% share continued to grow dramatically 90/10 ratio and top 1% income share
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
0
1
2
3
4
5
Shar
e o
f h
ou
seh
old
inco
me
he
ld b
y th
e to
p 1
% o
f in
div
idu
als
Rat
io o
f in
com
e at
th
e 9
0th
an
d
10
th p
erce
nti
les
(90
/10
rat
io)
90/10 ratio (LH axis) Top 1% share of income (RH axis)
Inequality in context • Since the mid 1990s over much of the income distribution, from the 10th
percentile to the 90th percentile, inequality is stable
– although this masks growing inequality for younger cohorts.
• At the same time the welfare benefit system has had to do more work to maintain the incomes of individuals and families with low earnings
– but will it continue to do so?
• Note too the remarkable increase in inequality at the very top of the income distribution
– in UK over two-thirds of the richest 0.1% of working-age adults work in ‘real estate, renting and other business activities’ or ‘financial intermediation’.
• Wealth transfers across generations accentuate inequality
– a growing proportion of younger individuals think they will receive inheritances, and are also those who already have the highest net wealth.
Income Inequality by Age and Birth Cohort – UK Younger cohorts facing increasing inequality:
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75
Age
1930s
1940s
1950s
1960s
1970s
Source: Blundell and O’Dea (2014).
Consumption Inequality by Age and Birth Cohort – UK Younger cohorts facing increasing inequality:
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75
Age
1930s
1940s
1950s
1960s
1970s
Notes: younger cohorts entering with much larger inequality than previous cohorts….
Source: Blundell and O’Dea (2014).
Source: Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014)
.1.1
5.2
.25
.3.3
5.4
var(
lnto
tco
ns)
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70age
Born 1930s Born 1940s
Born 1950s Born 1960s
Consumption Inequality by Year and Birth Cohort - US
Recent cohorts are also less likely to own a home
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Ho
me
ow
ne
rsh
ip r
ate
(%
)
Age
Born 1963–67 Born 1973–77 Born 1983–87
Source: Figure 3.13 of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014
C. Consumption – the final piece of evidence
• Expenditure falls were deeper than in previous recessions.
– Note that the start of the fall is coincident with the fall in GDP (not income).
– Saving rate rises.
• Unusually expenditure on consumer nondurables fell most
– Especially among the young and to some extent among the middle aged, less for the old.
– Temporary VAT reduction?
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Non- and semi-durables
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Qu
arte
r b
efo
re r
ece
ssio
n =
10
0
Quarters since start of recession
1980
1990
2008
Non- and semi-durables per head
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Qu
arte
r b
efo
re r
eces
sio
n =
10
0
Quarters since pre-recession peak in GDP
1980 1990 2008
Durables
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Qu
arte
r b
efo
re r
ece
ssio
n =
10
0
Quarters since start of recession
1980
1990
2008
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Percentage Change in Food Expenditure by centile: UK
Notes: Understanding Society
Source: Blundell and Etheridge, 2014
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 972012-2009
2012-2010
2010-2009
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Percentage Change in Food Expenditure: 2010-2012 UK
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97
Change in Food Expenditure by Centile and HH type: 2010 to 2012
All HHs
Pensioners
w/o children
with children
Notes: Understanding Society
Source: Blundell and Etheridge, 2014
Prospects for the Economy
• Younger workers and families are acting as if they expect a long-run fall in relative living standards
– evidence from consumption and saving.
• Real wages, productivity (and investment) have been slow to pick up
– we can expect the pattern of lower real wages at the bottom to continue, but with fairly buoyant employment due to increased supply.
• Most actual falls in real earnings have happened
– but fiscal contraction implies large benefit cuts
• Appears the number of routine jobs near the middle of the earnings distribution has declined steadily
– more jobs are now professional or managerial. In the 90s and 2000s wages grew fastest for high (and mid-skilled) occupations, and BA premium maintained.
• Suggests longer term earnings growth will mostly come from high-skilled occupations, with perhaps some at the very bottom.
Employment shares of occupation groups
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2014)
Prospects for the Economy II
• Still much to do in focussing on older workers in general, on return to work for parents/mothers, and on entry into work.
• There are still some potential big gains here,
– for example, as (higher skilled) women age in the workforce.
• Growing complementarity between human capital and ‘on the job’ wage/productivity
– little evidence of earnings progression for lower skilled and part-time workers.
• Productivity and wages are closely related
– but note the growing importance of pensions in the UK.
• Productivity (and education) is still the key.
Prospects for Reform
• With growing earnings inequality there is increasing pressure on the tax and welfare system.
– current systems raise revenue and redistribute inefficiently and unfairly
• Some potential big gains here with tax/welfare reforms to enhance earnings and address inequality (from Mirrlees)
– focus incentives on transition to work, return to work for women with children and on enhancing incentives among older workers,
– reduce disincentives at key margins for the educated - enhancing working lifetime and the career earnings profile,
– align tax rates at the margin across income sources to make taxation at the top more effective; e.g. dividends and capital gains
– reform taxation of housing and wealth transfers.
• But reform will not be easy! To quote Tim Besley, ‘high levels of inequality can skew the priorities of the state by limiting its capacity to act effectively’.
Human Capital, Inequality and Tax Reform: Recent Past and Future Prospects
Richard Blundell*
University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies**
Slides on my website http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctp39a/
Coase Lecture 2015
But that’s all for now!
Extra Slides
Business investment has been very slow to pick up
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Household consumption:non-durablegoods
Earnings in line with productivity growth, particularly when using LFS measures of earnings
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Output per worker Output per hour worked
Mean weekly earnings Mean hourly earnings
Source: Fig 2.7 of Cribb and Joyce (2015) “Earnings since the recession”
Output per hour and worker compared to mean earnings in LFS (GDP deflated) since 2008Q2
Self employment as a share of total employment
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Source: Authors’ calculations using Labour Force Survey (ONS series MGRQ and MGRZ).
Earnings for employees and the self employed
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Earnings (per week, April 2014 prices)
Self-employed Employees
Source: Figure 2.14 of Cribb and Joyce (2015) “Earnings since the recession”
Employment and unemployment rates since 2007
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Employment rate (LH axis) Unemployment rate (RH axis)
Source: Fig 2.1 of Cribb and Joyce (2015) “Earnings since the recession”
Changes to real median weekly and hourly wages by sex
Notes: Results adjusted for methodological changes in 2011. Earnings observed in April of each year.
Source: Cribb and Joyce (2015), calculations using Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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Male weekly earnings Male hourly earnings
Female weekly earnings Female hourly earnings
Average EMTRs for different family types 40
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Employer cost (£/week)
Single, no children Lone parent
Partner not working, no children Partner not working, children
Partner working, no children Partner working, children
Mirrlees Review (2011)
Employer contributions to pension funds – in constant prices terms
Source: Office for National Statistics
Notes: Data for Q4 2012 is not yet published so has been estimated based on Q4 2011 to Q3 2012 data
But recent falling membership of pensions schemes
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Private sector – any Private sector – defined benefit
Source: Fig 1 of Cribb and Emmerson (2014) “Workplace pensions and remuneration in the public and private sectors in the UK”
Particularly strong growth in private sector
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Source: Fig 2.2 of Cribb and Joyce (2015) “Earnings since the recession”
NEET rate among young people
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2014)
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18-21 GCSEs or above
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22-24 Degree level or above
22-24 GCSEs, A-levels, FE
22-24 without GCSE