How to Lose Germany

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How to Lose GermanyAuthor(s): Jonathan DeanSource: Foreign Policy, No. 55 (Summer, 1984), pp. 54-72Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148381 .

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HOW TO LOSE GERMANY

by Jonathan Dean

Quite suddenly, the German question, in its modern guise the problem of how to deal with the postwar division of Germany, has re- turned to roil relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and its Western allies. A series of remarkable developments has recent- ly revived fears on both sides of the Atlantic that Western Europe's most powerful country, increasingly determined to wear away the barriers that have divided Germans for 40 years, may be turning away from the West. These developments fall into two major cate- gories: public dissatisfaction with North At- lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense and arms control policy, which is reviving talk of neutralist solutions; and the nearly feverish pace of West German relations with East Germany, which the West German government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl is pressing in order to combat the first trend.

In July 1983 during his first official visit to Moscow, Kohl jolted both his hosts and foreign observers with a blunt affirmation of Bonn's resolve to bring about the peaceful reunification of Germany. Also in July, conservative leader Franz Josef Strauss, long the most vociferous opponent of communist East Germany, visited its leader, Erich Honecker, to discuss arrangements for the largest private loan ever made to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a 1-billion deutsche mark (DM) transaction for which Strauss claimed credit. And in February 1984 Kohl himself met Honecker at the Moscow funeral of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. The encounter, de- scribed by West German participants as unex- pectedly cordial, marked the first meeting between a Christian Democratic chancellor and the head of the GDR. In March Honecker

JONATHAN DEAN, political counselor in the U.S. embassy in Bonn during the governments of chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, is a resident associate of the Carnegie Endowment.

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accepted Kohl's invitation to visit the Federal Republic, probably sometime in fall 1984. This visit too will be the first of its kind.

At the height of the dramatic confrontation in fall 1983 over deploying American intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in West Ger- many, Soviet representatives hinted that Mos- cow might consider a de facto incorporation of West Berlin into West Germany and even move toward acceptance of German reunification if the Federal Republic rejected the deployment.

Some Western observers fear that the West German Left is becoming less resistant to neutralist solutions to the division of Germa- ny. In a stunning reversal of position, the Social Democrats in November 1983 over- whelmingly repudiated the NATO decision to deploy the American missiles, an action ini- tially urged by their own leader, Helmut Schmidt, when he was chancellor. Together with the rejection of American nuclear deployment by the British Labour party, the Social Democratic action is the most serious blow to the strength and cohesion of the NATO alliance in the 18 years since France left NATO's integrated military command. And for the first time in a generation, a party actively supporting West German neutrality-the Greens-sits in the Bundestag.

Western apprehensions about such developments are likely to intensify in coming months as German disappointment over the collapse of the INF talks leads to a search for new solutions. Ironically, these concerns will also be fed by the Kohl government's strategy of defusing neutralism by actively seeking closer ties with East Germany.

For years, most West German and allied leaders have feared the neutralization of the Federal Republic as a direct route to Soviet domination of Western Europe. Consequent- ly, the Kohl government and its predecessors have seen membership in NATO and close alliance relationships as indispensable requirements both for the security of the Federal Republic and for a long-term effort to influence developments in East Germany and throughout Eastern Europe.

But despite this sincere belief, some

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grounds for Western concern about official policy still exist, principally because the ultimate success of the West German government's reunification policy would logically require West Germany to withdraw from NATO, barring a complete collapse of the Soviet system. In addition, West Germany's increasingly extensive political and economic

dealings with East Germany and the rest of the Soviet bloc could create a degree of

dependence that might make the Federal Re-

public vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Succes- sive West German leaders have tried hard to cope with the paradox that West Germany must stay in NATO to conduct an active Eastern policy yet must leave NATO to achieve reunification. They generally argue that reunification is very far in the future and that

they cannot at this time foresee any specific solution-and certainly none in the absence of a general settlement of the division of

Europe. But this answer is vague and uncon-

vincing. Partly as a consequence of these develop-

ments and partly because of a continuing underlying divergence of views between the Federal Republic and the United States on how to deal with the Soviet Union, it appears that the German question in all its many aspects and dimensions--reunification of

Germany, relations between the two German states, German policy toward the Soviet Union, and neutralism as a potential solution to the division of Germany-is joining the missile deployment, defense, and arms control issues as an important source of misunderstanding and friction between the Federal Republic and its allies, especially the United States.

To cope with these sources of mutual es-

trangement and to return to a closer relation-

ship with the Federal Republic and other West European allies, a deliberate adjustment in current American policy toward the Soviet Union is needed.

Resolving the Dilemma

West German policy toward East Germany had a slow start. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, West Germans and their political

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leaders, encouraged by theories about the

possible internal collapse of the Soviet system, hoped for the disappearance of the East Ger- man regime. They considered in addition that they were confronted by a mutually exclusive choice between staying loyal to their Western allies and reaching out to their Eastern compa- triots by developing some ties with Soviet bloc

governments. Motivated by a strong fear of the Soviet Union and keenly aware of Western distrust of postwar Germans, especially Ger- mans who advocated dealing with the Soviets, the vast majority gave priority to security and the Western connection.

The passage of time and the continuation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe led to a gradual shift in West German attitudes. Soviet repression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising and, in particular, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 convinced West Germans that the Soviet Union was willing and able to maintain its hold over East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe-and that Washington was powerless to contest it. They concluded that the division of Germany was lasting and that the only practical course was to try to lessen the burden that division imposed on individual East Germans by dealing with the Soviet and East German governments. But the growing numbers of West Germans wanting to act on this conclusion were inhibited by their allies' still strong mistrust.

The Kennedy and Johnson administrations reached similar conclusions about the long- term durability of the Soviet system, however; and as Washington began its own policy of political engagement with Moscow, the barriers to a more active West German policy toward the East were lowered. After hesitant beginnings in the late 1960s under Christian Democratic chancellors Ludwig Erhard and Kurt-George Kiesinger, the Social Democrat- ic-Free Democratic coalition that came to power in 1969 pressed the Eastern policy- called Ostpolitik-with vigor and determina- tion and achieved considerable success. Nego- tiating through its main Western allies on Berlin and directly with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, the Federal Republic reached agreements during the early

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1970s that guaranteed the right of West Ger- mans to travel between the Federal Republic and Berlin, gave millions of residents of the Federal Republic and West Berlin access to East Germany, and permitted the immigra- tion to the Federal Republic of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Moreover, Bonn was able to maintain close ties with its West- ern allies, even though the rapidly unfolding developments did cause some strains.

Ostpolitik was a genuine and decisive break- through. It resolved the long-standing and increasingly resented dilemma of having to choose between NATO and modestly improved relations with the East. Combining both elements in a single policy gave the Federal Republic a distinctive foreign-policy identity that reflects its history and geopoliti- cal situation and provides a channel for practical activities serving West German interests.

The extent to which this role has been embraced across the entire German political spectrum is demonstrated by the alacrity with which the Christian Democrats, who had opposed the Social Democrats' treaties with the East while in opposition, pursued the policy after assuming power in October 1982. Kohl never seriously considered any other course. The new chancellor quickly invited his GDR counterpart Honecker to visit the Federal Republic and arranged a trip to Mos- cow. The DM 1-billion loan came soon after Kohl's March 1983 election victory. Indeed, more precedent-shattering high-level visits to once taboo East Berlin have taken place under the new Kohl government than at any previous time in the history of the Federal Repub- lic. The Kohl government's policy is not

merely a tactic but reflects a genuine acceptance of a new West German role. The Chris- tian Democrats have put the reunification label back on the Social Democrats' Eastern and inter-German initiatives while continuing and intensifying that policy.

There are sound political reasons for this intensification. In 1982 when the Kohl government took office, one-fourth of West Ger- many's population had been born in German settlements in present-day Eastern Europe, 3

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million in East Germany proper. In addition, the anti-Soviet uprisings that have periodically shaken Eastern Europe--particularly the emergence in Poland of the now-banned inde- pendent trade union Solidarity-have encouraged West Germans in their efforts to promote change in East Germany by highlighting the

continuing failure of the Soviet system to take hold.

Ostpolitik has also been spurred by the broad revival of nationalistic feeling in the Federal Republic as the passage of time has slowly dissipated the pervasive sense of responsibility for and humiliation over the Nazi era that many West Germans felt at the end of World War II. A sound, natural kind of national pride has become respectable in the Federal Republic and, with it, the idea that Germany has interests of its own that do not always coincide with those of NATO or of the Europe- an Community. The Social Democratic slogan for the March 1983 general election captured the spirit of the times: "In the German Inter- est." The widespread feeling of German impo- tence in the face of U.S.-Soviet confrontation also encourages Germans on both sides to seek their own special inner-German preserve.

German Neutrality The INF controversy and the antinuclear

movement to which it gave rise have height- ened West Germans' interest in the inter- German relationship and in possible alterna- tives to the Federal Republic's present role in NATO. To many West Germans, the disap- pointing failure of East-West arms control justifies seeking a "political solution" to the defense dilemma, that is, a solution of the underlying problems of East-West confrontation. Many of those proposals involve neutrality for both German states. In some versions neutrality is to be achieved in stages, with the two Germanies remaining in their respective alliances while American and Soviet forces implement a negotiated agreement to withdraw from central Europe.

Although Social Democratic leaders are pleased that their latest convention still strongly endorsed continued membership in the Atlantic Alliance, the tenor of discussion

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at the convention and in preceding regional party conferences in the West German linder made clear that many individual party members support some form of neutralism. Allens- bach Institute public opinion polls have shown that over the years about 30 per cent of West Germans would prefer a neutral status for the Federal Republic if it could be achieved, although few currently think it even remotely feasible.

For the moment, however, public support for neutralist positions in West Germany is likely to become more vocal and more percep- tible rather than more widespread. The great majority of West Germans remain too cau- tious, too security conscious, and too hard- headed to accept mere talk from the Soviets on German unity. That majority will want con- crete changes that relax Soviet control over East Germany. And everything known about the Soviets today indicates that they cannot deliver specific moves of this kind. Change in the Federal Republic's international orienta- tion, whether for good or ill, will result far more from Washington's actions and views than from Moscow's.

Despite the vast increase in Soviet military power since World War II, the Soviet leader-

ship still has an inordinate fear of even trun- cated West Germany. Repeated military and

political interventions in Eastern Europe make it clear that the Soviet Union considers the East European buffer zone essential to its

security. Moscow cannot genuinely loosen its hold over East Germany without facing the loss of its influence in all of Eastern Europe. In addition, the demise of communist systems in Eastern Europe would undermine the legit- imacy of Soviet political values and of the Soviet system itself.

Visiting Soviet officials can drop informal hints of a more accommodating attitude. But propaganda maneuvers designed to play on German interest in reunification are subject to narrow restrictions. Such efforts, if not care- fully controlled, could have disastrous effects on shaky communist governments and antiregime public opinion throughout Eastern Eu- rope. In fact, the Soviets are so intent on maintaining their position in East Germany

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that the greatest risk of Soviet attack on Western Europe today is from a panicked Soviet response to rebellion in East Germany.

But even when they accept that major Soviet moves to loosen the Soviet hold over East Germany are highly improbable, some Western observers are also concerned that, by pursuing its separate interests, West Germany is tampering with the intricate mechanism of East-West relations and distracting itself from its other alliance obligations. They fear that the developing ties to East Germany are creating sensitive pressure points that could be activated by Soviet actions to restrict access to West Berlin and East Germany or to withdraw the contact privileges of East Ger- mans. They worry that, in Bonn's 'desire to

improve human contacts with East Germany, its political will could be overcome by a creeping paralysis that would gradually turn the Federal Republic into a less active member of NATO.

The record, however, shows that these Western observers underestimate the common sense of the West German public and political leadership and overestimate Soviet capacity to play on West German psychology. Today's West German leaders do not expect the So- viets to negotiate a settlement to the division of Germany. Instead, their Deutschlandpolitik, or Germany policy, is a long-term effort, using West German economic, technological, and cultural resources to influence political, social, and economic developments in the GDR, and to a lesser extent in the other Warsaw Pact countries, from a base of continued membership in NATO.

A European Formula

Bonn's main goals are to alleviate the hard- ship of individual West and East Germans

arising from the division of Germany, to promote gradual evolution in the policy of the East German government, and to do business with East Germany for normal, profit-making reasons. Reunification as a practical prospect is not part of the picture. Every country tries to use its resources to influence developments in areas important to it. But the Federal Republic's Eastern policy does so in a more

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deliberate, focused, and long-term way. Al-

though their top priority is East Germany, West German leaders understand that their

policy cannot succeed without improved relations with other Warsaw Pact states or against the will of the Soviet Union.

West German leaders are careful to reject calls for formal reunification both because

they are realists about the Soviet position and because they are well aware of traditional fears of Germany, both in NATO and in Warsaw Pact countries. Thus they speak of

improving relations between two German states that will continue to exist indefinitely. For domestic political reasons, they cannot

wholly discount the possibility of some ultimate coming together of the two Germanies. In insisting that such a resolution can take

place only in the context of some integration of Eastern and Western Europe, they realize that this all-European solution is just as un-

likely as German reunification in isolation, if not more so. They have chosen this Europe- wide formulation to allay fears of a united

Germany. Yet it seems clear that the main reason that

West German political leaders have not for- mulated any specific outcome for their inter- German policy is not because the details would be too unsettling to Germany's neighbors but because they honestly cannot visual- ize an outcome. They are engaged in an active German unity policy both because the Ger- man people want it and because it has yielded immediate improvements in personal contacts and economic relations with East Germany.

Moreover, it is often overlooked that as long as Soviet military strength is offset by the alliance with the United States, the West German government brings many strengths to this effort to affect political developments in the East: a powerful economy that is keeping the East German economy afloat, superior technology and scientific knowledge, and a free society whose advantages East Germans learn about daily on television and radio. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic shares a common history, language, and cul- ture with East Germany. Every year millions

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of West German visitors to East Germany keep these ties alive.

Soviet assets are imposing as well: the

military power to maintain a hold over the hostage populations of Eastern Europe, vast natural resources, and not least, a skillful group of younger foreign-policy experts and

publicists who understand the German out- look and can put the best face on Soviet policy. But Moscow's inability to establish self-sus- taining political systems in Eastern Europe reveals a weakness that could in the long run be crucial in this competition for influence in Germany.

Compared with the near total mutual isolation of the two Germanies during the 1950s- like that between the two Koreas now-the extent of relations today, after the first decade of inter-German ties, is phenomenal. In spite of deliberately high East German currency exchange requirements, about 5 million West Germans and West Berliners visit East Ger- many and East Berlin each year. West Ger- mans and West Berliners make roughly 23 million telephone calls a year to the GDR. And in 1983 slightly less than 2 million East Germans, mainly pensioners, visited the Fed- eral Republic or West Berlin. To increase these contacts, the Kohl government in 1983 concluded a new postal agreement with the East Germans, which will cost Bonn DM 200 million annually. This payment will be part of the roughly DM 2 billion Bonn already pays the GDR each year for road, rail, water transport, and communications fees. In an ultimate application of economic strength to help individual East Germans, the West German government is buying the freedom of about 1,000 prisoners a year from the GDR.

At the Federal Republic's insistence, the European Community has agreed to suspend all customs duties and restrictions on East German goods entering the Federal Republic. Indeed, inter-German trade has grown despite the recession in both economies. The annual total rose 8 per cent in 1983 to an all-time high of about $6 billion. For years Bonn has financed the East German trade deficit on terms favor- able to the GDR. Trade has been closer to balance since the early 1980s. Nonetheless,

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large new Federal Republic credits to the GDR are a distinct possibility.

Honecker and Kohl each supervise the

intensifying official interaction between the two Germanies from their own offices. At one

point in mid-1983, nine separate negotiations were under way between Bonn and East Berlin concerning river pollution, nuclear facilities in border areas, air pollution, science and technology, cultural exchange, and further improvement of transport routes.

For its part, the GDR has indicated a will-

ingness to remove some of the automatic guns on the inner-German border, although they will apparently be replaced by equally formi- dable obstacles deeper in East German territo-

ry. While maintaining the extortionate cur-

rency exchange that must be made by all West German visitors to East Germany, the GDR has reduced this requirement for children. In

early 1984, however temporarily, it greatly increased the number of East Germans permitted to join relatives in the Federal Repub- lic.

More precedent-shattering high- level visits to ... East Berlin have taken place under the new Kohl

government than at any previous time in the history of the Federal

Republic.

In fact, East Germany is deliberately coop- erating with the Federal Republic in building a cushion of agreements to insulate the inter- German relationship against the repercussions of the Euromissile deployment. In late No- vember 1983, after the Bundestag approved the missiles, Honecker made explicit in a

speech to the Central Committee of the East German Communist party his intention to maintain the relationship with Bonn despite the deployment.

The GDR leadership's rising self-confidence has helped solidify inter-German relations from the other direction. After the shock of the 1953 Berlin uprising, the leadership learned how to use a flow of economic benefits

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from the Federal Republic and the broader

personal contacts it permits East Germans to have with the West to provide a safety valve for antiregime dissatisfactions. It has also drawn on the German historical tradition and rekindled some degree of national pride in the East German population. Although the still small peace movement and broader public concerns over East-West confrontation on the missile issue represent a new challenge, the GDR government has learned how much or how little police control is needed to keep order among its relatively disciplined population. Its riot police are effective, well trained, and kept loyal by economic benefits. Nineteen Soviet divisions in East Germany provide final insurance for the regime. Thus, despite unremitting public pressure from the East German people to relax controls over contacts with West Germans, the government's mo- nopoly on force and its West German economic connection are likely to keep the GDR more stable than the other countries of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union has strong motivation to condone the developing inter-German relationship: its interest in the political stability and economic survival of the GDR and the collateral benefits it draws from the relationship. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union could at some future point threaten to cut off West Germans' access to the East. But reversion to coercive tactics would ruin the image of reasonableness Moscow has worked so hard to cultivate in Western Europe. Further, a Soviet crackdown on inter-German ties would cause resentment and unrest not only in East Ger- many but in all of Eastern Europe, where governments and peoples alike support d&tente. Indeed, the Soviets have been direct- ing their angry response to the INF deploy- ments mainly at the United States, not the Federal Republic and the rest of Western Europe. Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov reassured the West German minister of eco- nomics in November 1983 that "objective prerequisites" favored continued improvement of Federal Republic-Soviet relations.

Even if the Soviets did try pressure tactics, the record suggests that West Germany would

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not cave in. Public opinion polls show that support for the United States and NATO rose during the Berlin blockade of 1948, the second major Berlin showdown in 1958, and the crisis surrounding the construction of the Berlin Wall. Observers agree that Moscow's dire warnings of the consequences for inter-Ger- man relations of a Christian Democratic victo-

ry in the March 1983 elections only helped Kohl and his party. And despite repeated Soviet and East German threats that a Bundes- tag decision confirming deployment of the American missiles would seriously damage the inter-German relationship, not a single government coalition party deputy voted against the U.S. Pershing II missiles in November 1983. The Federal Republic made the traditional choice, placing security and the alliance above the inter-German relationship.

Moreover, the Soviet leadership seems to have realized quite some time ago that its actual attempts-as opposed to mere threats-to bring pressure on the Federal

Republic, such as moves to cut off access to Berlin, produced more West German soldiers, not West German compliance. Today, addi- tional pressure would ultimately reinvigorate German support of NATO, spur a build-up in West German and other NATO armed forces, as well as cut off the West German economic benefits flowing to the East. The Soviet Union is unlikely to revert to such coercive action

except in extreme situations. Thus, in this first decade of its existence, the inter-German

relationship has already developed to a point where it cannot be broken off by either

superpower without prohibitive political costs.

Most signs indicate that the relationship will continue to develop for the foreseeable future. Numerous close contacts among indi- viduals, churches, and government agencies will continue to nurture feelings of national unity among a large group of people on each side. Trade between the two German states should continue to expand as well. Inter-Ger- man trade features a series of innovative economic links, such as the $222-million agreement announced in February 1984 to produce Volkswagen engines in East Germany under

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license. The $6-billion-a-year trade total amounts to only 2 per cent of West German but roughly 12 per cent of East German

foreign trade. The beginnings of economic

interdependence already exist, but for the next decade this interdependence will probably not increase enough to decisively affect either side's policies.

Widespread unrest in some areas of Eastern

Europe, and even Soviet intervention to

repress it, is possible in the coming decades. But, precisely because of the stabilizing inter- German relationship, it is less probable that such a situation would develop in East Germa-

ny. Soviet intervention to stamp out unrest in one of East Germany's communist neighbors would probably freeze inter-German ties for a time, but the relationship would recover. And while outright crisis could bring Soviet actions severing East-West German contacts, the West German political and economic system would not stagger. East Germany would be by far the bigger loser. Over the decades ties between the two German states may well become so advanced that the GDR, although not the Federal Republic, will become depend- ent on the relationship for its continued existence.

"Scandinaviazation" of the Feder- al Republic would ... create even more serious misunderstandings with the United States.

The frictions, misunderstandings, and sus-

picions arising from neutralist sentiment in the West German public and from the Eastern

policy of the Federal Republic would be a

manageable burden for U.S.-West German relations if they took place in isolation. But, of course, they do not.

Depending on the nature of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, the whole complex of conditions that is causing neutralist sentiment to surface in West Germany--dissatisfaction over NATO's overreliance on nuclear weapons, the ongoing U.S.-Soviet confrontation and concern over its possible conse-

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quences, frustration over the absence of East- West arms control agreements, and a deliberate Soviet policy of reasonableness toward the Federal Republic-will probably remain actively troublesome for several years to come. If so, one possible long-term outcome may be the slow drift of West German government policy toward a posture similar to that prevailing in Norway and Denmark: continued member-

ship in NATO, but a strong emphasis on conciliation and negotiation with the Soviet Union, and a refusal to play a role in nuclear strategy or to permit stationing of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic.

Already, the Social Democrats are asking for the withdrawal of all intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons, establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Germany, and veto rights on the use of nuclear weapons. This last point is even supported by so staunch and prominent a conservative as Franz Josef Strauss. The Social Democrats' demand for the removal of chemical weapons from West Germany could ignite another major public controversy like that over the deployment of American missiles.

Although the great majority of West Ger- mans do not currently favor either unilateral disarmament or neutralism, the opposition to the INF deployment illustrates how a vociferous minority can pull the opinion of the majority toward it by sparking active debate. The longer the nuclear issue is discussed in West Germany, the greater the chance that public opinion will gradually begin to support restrictions on the deployment and use of nuclear weapons and that even conservative West German governments will feel con- strained to slowly follow public opinion in their official actions. The consequences of the "Scandinaviazation" of the Federal Republic would be far-reaching and create even more serious misunderstandings with the United States.

Underlying most of the West German- American divergences over NATO's defense strategy, defense spending, and arms control, as well as misunderstanding over inter-Ger- man relations is a conflict about how to deal with the Soviet Union. Although agreeing

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with the United States on the nature of the Soviet system, political opinion in the Federal Republic accepts the Soviet Union as a given element in the international system. West Germans believe that the East and West are locked in a difficult, up-and-down relationship that will extend indefinitely into the future. And West Germans view the Soviets as a power whose agreement, or at least acquies- cence, is vital to the continuation of Ostpolitik. The Federal Republic with its Eastern policy is the prototypical supporter of the two-track approach of defense and dialogue with the Soviet Union. Yet the U.S. government has shown a recurrent desire to ostracize and isolate the Soviet system in order to precipi- tate its possible internal collapse. Although Washington now follows a declared two-track policy, most West Germans believe that the practical emphasis of American policy is more on the track of militant containment. It is to cope with strong concerns on this subject from the West German public that Kohl has so persistently pressed for a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting.

Concluding even a single arms control agreement with the Soviet Union would stop German neutralism in its tracks and do much to halt the erosion of pro-NATO feeling in the Federal Republic and the rest of Western Europe.

Complaints by critics like former U.S. Un- der Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and former Secretary of State Henry Kissing- er about parochial West European fixation on their own affairs arise in part from the fact that West Europeans and Americans are look- ing at two diverging Soviet policies: a concilia- tory policy toward Western Europe and a less restrained Third World policy, which is per- ceived as relentlessly expansionist by the Reagan administration and by broad segments of the American people. But, on closer exami- nation, the underlying divergence between West European and American views on Soviet

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policy in the Third World reflects less West Europeans' tendency to divide d6tente-in order to reap its benefits while leaving its problems for the United States-than West Europeans' continuing problem with Ameri- can overemphasis on containment of the So- viets to the detriment of political dialogue with them. Many Americans, including some senior administration officials, appear to believe that U.S.-Soviet relations are moving toward some ultimate and not-too-distant resolution with the one side or the other defini-

tively coming out ahead. Seen in this context, each Soviet step toward influence in developing countries appears to represent irrevocable Soviet progress toward world domination. The logical conclusion from such analysis is to

emphasize containment. But Soviet activities in Third World coun-

tries can also be viewed as less final. The attractions of the Soviet economic and social

example are weak. Not every nationalist revo- lution is Soviet-inspired, and not every Soviet

penetration or arms sale in Third World countries leads to enduring, dominant Soviet influence; there have been many reversals. More discriminating, selective containment may save more American resources and bring better results. Against the background of their own more tragic experience of historical vicis- situdes, many Europeans view Soviet pros- pects this way. It appears the more realistic of the two assessments.

Defusing Neutralism

The Federal Republic's policy toward East

Germany has some very solid benefits for the United States that are not of purely regional significance: It reduces tension between the two German states in the area of the world's

largest military confrontation; it promotes continued Soviet and East German restraint on West Berlin; and it stabilizes East Germany while promoting gradual change, reducing the danger that unrest there could ignite a general world conflict. The Federal Republic is also in a position to provide the sustained interest, economic contribution, and detailed activity the relationship will require in coming decades. Americans should consider this activity a

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constructive and practical West German contribution to Western policy toward the Soviet Union, a kind of political burden sharing.

Far from being vulnerable to increased Soviet influence, it is West Germany that is likely to exercise increasing influence over East Germany. The Federal Republic will not return to its 1950s policy of providing almost automatic support to the United States on East-West issues. Bonn's Eastern policy has established new West German interests and relationships that will not be abandoned and that, like West German dependence on Arab oil, limit its ability to give the United States automatic or enthusiastic support on any position it may take in East-West issues. By any measure, however, the compensating gain far outweighs this loss.

The United States can maximize this gain and also reduce U.S.-West German frictions

by bringing its own East-West policy closer to that of its European allies. That is, the biggest contribution Washington could make to de- fuse the forces underlying German neutralism and the ongoing erosion of the Atlantic Alli- ance in the whole northern tier of Europe would be to enter into a systematic, sustained

political dialogue with the Soviet Union. A consistent return to the two-track policy

of defense and containment combined with

political engagement, which has been U.S. policy since the second Eisenhower administration, would provide the continuity and enduring public support that Western democ- racies need to deal effectively with the Soviet Union. Concluding even a single arms control agreement with the Soviet Union would stop German neutralism in its tracks and do much to halt the erosion of pro-NATO feeling in the Federal Republic and the rest of Western Europe. Such a posture might also help the United States win greater West European understanding and support for the containment of Soviet activities outside Europe.

This shift might require relinquishing some preferred administration positions toward the Soviet Union, including positions in the INF, mutual and balanced force reduction, and other arms control negotiations that affect Europe most directly. Such steps should be

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considered rational moves in the U.S. interest, rather than unilateral concessions to the So- viet Union. If the adjustment is not made, the

long-term damage to American interests seems

likely to be far greater: a decrease in the strength of the alliance with the Federal Republic and other members of NATO needed to counterbalance Soviet power in the years ahead. If the United States continues on a

solitary path of containment, the only long- run result will be the further estrangement of the United States and Western Europe and an

increasing West European tendency to move to the sidelines in U.S.-Soviet disputes. This trend would not constitute neutralization in a classic military sense but a voluntary political distancing of Western Europe from the Unit- ed States on individual East-West issues. Americans have had a foretaste of this possibility in the case of Afghanistan, Poland, and Central America. It is this long-term possibility of which both the public opposition to the missile deployment and the rise of neutralist

thinking in the Federal Republic are warning signals.

72.



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How to Lose Germany