Herodotus' Storytelling Speeches: Socles (5.92) and Leotychides (6.86)

Herodotus' Storytelling Speeches: Socles (5.92) and Leotychides (6.86)Author(s): David M. JohnsonSource: The Classical Journal, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Oct. - Nov., 2001), pp. 1-26Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and SouthStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3298431 .

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HERODOTUS' STORYTELLING SPEECHES: SOCLES (5.92) AND LEOTYCHIDES (6.86)

Sosicles may be an historical person, like the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 80f.), but his speech is incredibly inapt to the occasion, and is no more historical than the political essays put in their mouths. The one good point is the inconsistency of Sparta's hostility to tyranny at home and support of a tyrant abroad, and this might have been improved by recalling the Spartan suppression of tyrants.... Of the stories told, that of Cypselus childhood is not in point, since it does not illustrate the evils of tyranny, nor is there any attempt to show that a tyranny at Athens would injure Sparta or her allies. H., even in his set speeches, does not cease to be a story-teller, using the narrative style (Eipop•vr) MEt) suitable to the matter; he cannot, like Thucydides, give us the weighty political argument demanded by the crisis.1

Herodotean scholarship has come very far indeed since How

and Wells, but when we think of speeches and Greek historians, it is still Thucydides who comes to mind.

Herodotus has not left us with anything like the programmatic statement of Thucydides (1.22) to entice us with its obscurity, and the main theme of scholarly debate about Thucydidean speeches, their historicity or lack thereof, is less relevant for an historian whose defenders have had a difficult enough time demonstrating the historical value of his narrative. But of course Herodotus' speeches are an important part of his work, especially in his later books; they are a central part of his debt to Homer and of his legacy to subsequent ancient historians.

Most of Herodotus' set speeches come in his last three books, and, while not without their difficulties, follow a fairly straightforward pattern. Speakers present arguments on behalf of a course of action, arguments which fit the circumstances in which the speakers find themselves. Such speeches also allow Herodotus to make scenes more vivid for his audience, to present the sort of general ideas he usually prefers not to give in his own voice, or both. The fact that the speeches seem to reflect Herodotus' concerns as much as those of his speakers, scholarly doubts about

'How and Wells, 1912, 51.

THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 97.1 (2001) 1-26



2 DAVID M. JOHNSON

the possibility of Herodotus' gaining accurate information about many original speeches, and more general questions about the function of direct speech in ancient historians make the historicity of Herodotean speeches even more questionable than that of Thucydidean ones.2 Here, though, I will consider two speeches which are still more problematic, both because of their form and because of their content. They are the only speeches in Herodotus in which a speaker makes his point entirely through the use of a lengthy narrative rather than through argument.3 And while these narratives are clearly connected to the points the speakers are making, on closer examination much of the narrative seems irrelevant or even contradictory to the speakers' argument. The first speech we will consider is the longest speech in Herodotus, that given by the Corinthian ambassador Socles to the Spartans and their allies as they debate whether to restore Hippias as tyrant of Athens (5.92). The second is that given by the Spartan king Leotychides as he asks the Athenians to return Aeginetan hostages (6.86). Socles' denunciation of Corinthian tyranny contains much that appears positive. Leotychides' pious condemnation of financial wrongdoing is highly ironic given his own scandalous career, and his account of Glaucus, I will argue, appears to tell against his request to the Athenians.

Both speeches, then, are puzzling. They are also potentially of great value for our understanding of Herodotus' method, for in each case a speaker presents us with a narrative similar to Herodotus' own narrative. But since for these speeches the audience, the precise historical context, and the speaker's purpose are given, we should be better positioned to interpret them than we are to interpret the Histories as a whole. I will argue that the apparent dissonance between these speeches and their immediate contexts is only apparent. Each speaker makes use of an oblique storytelling approach that is an ideal method for facing the complex diplomatic situation in which he finds himself. Whether or not, then, each speech reflects what was actually said on the occasion, the speeches do meet the other condition Thucydides sets for historical speeches: each speaker says the sort of things he ought to have said, albeit in a Herodotean rather than a Thucydidean manner.

2 On Herodotean speeches see Solmsen 1943 and 1944, Waters 1985, 63-70, and Lateiner 1989, 19-21. Lang (1984, 73-171) includes an analytic listing of Herodotus' speeches, where 'speech' includes any example of direct or indirect discourse.

3 Immerwahr 1966, 122.



HERODOTUS' STORYTELLING SPEECHES 3

Approaches to the speech of Socles

Much of what Socles says does not seem to fit his goal. How, to name only the most glaring point, does telling of the amazing escape of the smiling babe Cypselus show the evil of tyranny? "The usual explanation is that Herodotus has given too free a rein to his liking for a good story and has not succeeded in making Socles say what he ought to be saying."4 Scholars have attempted to deal with the discrepancy between what Socles ought to say and what he seems to be saying in at least three different ways. The traditional approach has been to look to what lies behind Herodotus, his sources. Inconsistencies in the speech reveal the various pro- or anti-Cypselid sources which Herodotus, overcome by their narrative charm, all too often failed to reconcile with each other, the immediate context, or both; by sorting through the sources one can hope to recapture the historical reality behind them.5 In another approach, scholars compare the speech with other passages in an attempt to identify Herodotus' general position on tyranny.6 The approach most prevalent today aims to interpret the speech as Herodotus' contemporary audience would have. In this view the Socles scene is not so much about the events before the Persian Wars as about those before the Peloponnesian War, as we are to gather from anachronistic hints in the speech and surrounding narrative.7

Each of these approaches is reasonable. Herodotus clearly had sources, which we must investigate if we are to learn about the tyranny at Corinth; he certainly had more general ideas about the nature of tyranny; and he had a contemporary audience whom he wished to reach, presumably by making his narrative relevant to

4 Thus Gray (1996, 362), who gives numerous examples of this reaction to the speech.

s Andrewes (1956, 45-48), Oost (1972), and Salmon (1984, 186-230) all make this sort of attempt.

6 For extensive discussion of the Cypselids in these terms see Stahl 1983 and McGlew 1993, 61-74; Gray (1996) ably shows how these patterns are varied in accordance with the context. More general studies of Herodotus' view of tyranny include Hartog 1988, 322-329 and Lateiner 1989, 172-179; contrast Waters (1971), who denies that Herodotus departed from objectivity by imposing any such pattern.

7 Strasburger 1955, 7-15, 22; Raaflaub 1979, 239-241 and 1987, 223-225; Stadter 1992, 781-782; Wecowski 1996; Gray 1996, 384-385. Lang (1984, 104-105) also notes the "prefiguring" of the rivalry between Athens and Corinth. For a general critique of this approach see Gould 1989, 116-120; for criticism of Strasburger's interpretation of the Socles scene, see Waters 1971, 13n29.



4 DAVID M. JOHNSON

the events of his own day. But before we investigate these complex matters, we should attempt to make sense of the speech in its own terms, as a speech given by a particular Herodotean character in a specific context which presents him with a clearly definable goal.8 Unlike the approach which attempts to identify the sources behind Herodotus, this contextual approach, as I will call it, does not require that we identify sources by their bias for or against the Cypselids. Unlike readings which aim at determining Herodotus' view of tyranny, this approach does not require difficult decisions about what is Herodotus' own view and what the view of his characters, or what applies to tyranny in general and what only to the particular tyrant under discussion. Unlike the approach which reads the Socles scene as a commentary on the events of Herodotus' own day, the contextual approach does not require complex arguments about the date and manner of the composition and publication of the Histories or the views of Herodotus' audiences. The contextual approach is also a necessary preliminary for the other sorts of interpretation, for most attempts to identify Hero- dotus' sources, views on tyranny, or pointers to his contemporary audience have been based on elements in the passage which apparently cannot be understood fully in their immediate context. I will argue that many elements in Socles' speech which have seemed irrelevant to its context are relevant. This is not to say that Herodotus is not working on different levels at once, or that readers of Herodotus should not investigate those different levels. It is rather that the seams between the levels are not as visible as they are sometimes made out to be, and that readers who jump too quickly from the immediate context to Herodotus' sources, to his

8 While the importance of this approach to the speech of Socles has certainly been recognized, it has not been successfully applied to all the major units of the speech. Wecowski, for example, calls explicitly for study of the speech as a speech (1996, 210), but soon enough leaves this study behind to concentrate on ironies apparent only to Herodotus' contemporaries. Gray's study (1996) of how Herodotus manipulated the images of tyranny at his disposal to fit their context is close in spirit to my effort here, and includes insightful comments on the speech's impact on its dramatic audience (1996, 382-384); but we often differ in our detailed interpretation of the speech (see note 38 below for one example). In her study of Herodotean discourse, Lang (1984, 104-106) briefly discusses both speeches studied here in terms of their contexts. She classifies each as a part of a "Challenge-Response-Synthesis" triad, Socles replying to the Spartans, Leotychides synthesizing after the Athenians reject his request to return the hostages. Such triads do not motivate or explain actions, she argues, but rather "serve both as a commentary on the action and an interpretation of the considerations important to the people involved" (106). While both speeches certainly do perform these functions, I will argue that Socles' speech, at any rate, was instrumental in motivating the allies to reject the Spartan offer.




ideas about tyranny, or to his message for his contemporary audience may miss an important part of what he has to say.

The Herodotean Context

Many have argued that Socles' speech fits its Herodotean context poorly because they have defined that context too loosely. If we content ourselves with saying that Socles speaks against tyranny, his speech does seem odd. The first half is given over largely to the story of the escape of the baby Cypselus rather than to attacks an his mature tyranny (5.92a1-E2). Socles covers the crimes of Cypselus in a single sentence, and concludes his account of the tyranny with the remark that Cypselus ended his life well (5.92E2-(1). The oracles that play such a large part in the account of Cypselus have often been considered favorable to the Cypselids.9 Perhaps Herodotus' Socles does the best that he can with a favorable tradition toward Cypselus,'o but if his purpose is to condemn tyranny we can readily see why many think he has made a mess of it. His account of Periander, while ugly and striking, has appeared anti-climactic to some." "Herodotos was not a fool, and would not have perpetrated these elementary mistakes in a sermon against tyranny. His interest lay in the logoi; he uses here those which he had not previously had occasion to introduce."12 Perhaps How and Wells were right: Herodotus is simply telling stories.

Socles, however, does not need to convince the allies or the Spartans that tyranny is a bad thing. The Spartans argue before the allies that Athens under Hippias will be weak and subservient rather than strong (5.91.2), in keeping with Herodotus' own verdict that it was because Athens was freed from tyranny that she became powerful (5.78). The Spartans themselves were cautious to avoid tyranny at home, as Socles reminds them (5.92a.2); they knew well enough what an evil tyranny is, at least to those under it. But Socles' most important audience is the allies. Socles is diplomatic enough to address himself overtly to the Spartans, but this is

9 So Oost (1972, 17-18) who gives further references on the oracles. 0o Unfortunately, our main source for this tradition, Nicolaus of Damascus (FGH

90 Frag. 57), is very late, and the historicity of his rather favorable account of Cypselus is questionable, though even a skeptic such as Salmon concludes that "the tradition was remarkably favourable to Cypselus and hostile to the Bacchiads" (1984, 188). " Hart 1982, 52; Waters 1971, 14.

12 Waters 1971, 14.



6 DAVID M. JOHNSON

largely to preserve the appearance that they are being persuaded to change their mind instead of being vetoed by their allies. Even before Socles speaks, the majority of the allies do not accept the Spartan proposal. Neither, though, does any of them speak up against the Spartans (5.92.1). Thus Socles' most pressing goal is not to show that the Corinthian tyrants Cypselus and Periander were bad for Corinth, or to prove that tyranny is evil, but to lead the allies to speak and act on beliefs they already hold about tyranny. To do so he needs to do two things: strengthen the allies' abhorrence of tyranny, and give them the courage to speak up against the Spartan proposal. What is needed for the first is not an historical analysis of the evils of the tyranny at Corinth, but an emotionally powerful account which will goad the allies into acting an their preexisting beliefs about tyranny. This Socles does mainly in his account of Periander. The second goal is more complex, as both Socles and the allies must be careful to remain respectful of the Spartans, whose leadership of the alliance they do not wish to challenge-and probably could not afford to challenge-so much as to place under certain constraints. He therefore does it indirectly, by implying that mute acceptance of the Spartan proposal would risk allowing the Spartans to treat the allies oppressively.

Herodotus tells us that when Cleomenes led an expedition against Athens a few years before Socles' speech, he gathered a large army from the Peloponnese without telling the allies what he intended to do with that army. After the Corinthians learned that they were headed to install Cleomenes' Athenian xeinos Isagoras as tyrant, they went home, believing Cleomenes' plan was unjust. When Demaratus, the other Spartan king, also turned against Cleomenes, the remaining allies abandoned him as well (5.74-75). This first revolt, then, "was against Cleomenes, not against Sparta.""3 Now the Spartans have called a meeting with their allies before launching a campaign to restore Hippias as tyrant at Athens and are calling for a "common purpose and common expedition" (5.91.3). The Spartans present a united front: the allies will not be able to rely on discord between Cleomenes and Demaratus. It is thus not clear whether the allies-at least those not as powerful and independent as Corinth-will have the courage to speak up against the Spartans.

Socles' speech was a success in large part simply because he set an example by speaking freely.

'3 Cawkwell 1993a, 374.




The remainder of the allies kept their peace for this long, but when they had heard Socles speaking freely, each and every one, breaking into speech, chose the view of the Corinthian, and appealed to the Lacedaemonians not to do anything radical concerning a Greek city. (5.93.2)

Once Socles had spoken, the allies were unanimous in their

opposition to the Spartan plan. Each expresses his opposition by "breaking into speech" (qpc•v

iv 'as)--a striking phrase. Herodotus uses it elsewhere only of the first words of Croesus' heretofore speechless son (1.85.4), and of the first words spoken by the children whom Psammetichus had isolated in order to discover what language is the most ancient (2.2.3). The situation in which

only one member of an audience has the courage to speak up is a common one, but is here adapted to make a particular point. Herodotean autocrats regularly limit the access of their subjects to

political speech.'4 The closest Herodotean parallel is perhaps the Persian council in book seven (7.10-11), where all the other Persians remain silent, not daring to reveal their views about the expedition Xerxes has proposed: only Xerxes' uncle Artabanus, protected by his

kinship with Xerxes, dared to speak of the importance of hearing opposing opinions and then to oppose Xerxes' plan. Xerxes never- theless threatened to leave him behind with the women to punish him for his cowardice.'5 When Herodotus paused to attribute Athens' growth to her freedom, he characterized that freedom in terms of equal access to political speech (iorlyopirl), "a thing worthy not in one way alone but in all respects" (5.78.1).16 At this council this sort of freedom of speech is again at issue, but this time it is the freedom of the Greek allies of Sparta to speak against the interest of their leader. The ability of the allies to defeat a

Spartan proposal set important limits to Sparta's power over her allies." It was the setting of such limits, as much as the defeat of

"4 Hohti 1974; Lateiner 1989, 183-184. 15 Hohti (1974, 21-26) well compares Xerxes' interactions with Demaratus (7.101-

104) and with Artemisia (8.67-69). 16 Herodotus was aware of the limitations of democracy, of course, and remarks

that it seems easier to fool many than one, as Aristagoras fooled 30,000 Athenians but not one Spartan, Cleomenes (5.97.2). But it seems to me to be going too far to say that "he praised iorlyopfrl only for having given Athens that liberty which enabled her to lead the Greeks in the fight for their freedom" (Ostwald 1991, 142). iarlyopirl was a constituent part of that liberty, not only a means to an end. 5.78.1 is the word's only occurrence in the Histories.

17 Cartledge (1979, 147), Salmon (1984, 249), Adshead (1986, 44-45), and Cawkwell (1993a, 374) agree that this occasion marked an important development in



8 DAVID M. JOHNSON

the attempt to restore Hippias, that was the purpose and achieve- ment of Socles.

Sparta as Oppressor?

But is this worry about an oppressive Spartan hegemony really plausible? Aren't the Spartans, with their famous bradutes, their conservatism, particularly their slowness to go to war (Thuc. 1.118.2), unlikely objects for such worry-especially as compared with Athens, the Athens of Herodotus' own day? Thucydides confirms in his own voice, at least in part, what his Corinthians say about Spartan slowness as they urge the Spartans to declare war on Athens.18 How ironic, then, if Socles the Corinthian once saved Athens from tyranny! Such thinking has led scholars to emphasize the meaning of Socles' speech for Herodotus' contemporaries, rather than its impact on Socles's audience. I have no quarrel with the argument that the speech gains additional depth because it depicts a situation parallel to that of Herodotus' day.19 My point is rather that the speech also succeeds admirably in facing Socles' immediate situation. I must therefore show that Sparta's allies would have had ample reason to fear oppressive Spartan hegemony when Socles spoke, and, if we are to face this objection in terms of Herodotus' contemporary audience, that this fear would have seemed plausible to Herodotus' contemporaries.

The wider Herodotean context of Socles' speech raises the question of just how conservative Sparta's foreign policy was, but i t is not clear which way this evidence cuts. Cleomenes declines Aristagoras' request for Spartan aid when Aristagoras slips up and tells him that Sardis is three months' march from the coast, but he had previously considered such a move, and would subsequently consider it, until shamed by his daughter's reaction to Aristagoras'

Sparta's relationship with her allies, though they differ on whether or not we are to see this as the foundation of the so-called Peloponnesian League.

18 Thuc. 1.68-71, 8.96.5; Crane 1992. 19 Among scholars emphasizing what Herodotus' contemporaries would have

made of this passage, Raaflaub usually restricts himself to the position that the speech gains "its full historical relevance" only when read in terms of Herodotus' day (1987, 224); but see the quotation below. Wecowski, though, goes rather too far when he speaks of the blindness of Socles and the Corinthians to the threat that Athens would pose decades after Socles gave his speech: "Le sentiment anti-tyrannique, qui, en lui- meme, n'est pas une chose mauvaise, rend Soclks aveugle aux faits" (1996, 252). At a certain point emphasizing one level of the speech's meaning renders one blind to the others.




attempted bribery (5.49-51). The tale of the disastrous overseas career of Cleomenes' rival, Dorieus (5.42-48), seems to reinforce the idea that such meddling was not prudent for Spartans, but the fact that Dorieus undertook such ventures with considerable Spartiate support shows that many a Spartan-and not only friends of Cleomenes-was eager to act cn the wider international scene. During the Persian Wars, the Spartans would be slow to venture out of the Peloponnese to fight (6.106; 8.63; 9.6-11), but slowness to come out and fight in defense of one's allies is a rather different matter than acting aggressively in one's own interest.

The careers of Cleomenes and Pausanias show that Sparta, or at any rate some leading Spartans, were interested in vigorously expanding and exploiting Spartan power. Cleomenes' puzzling career contains many difficulties, but he was certainly often active overseas, and had three times intervened at Athens. While his failed expedition against Athens (5.74-76), discussed above, gives us our only glimpse of how he treated the allies, it is seems clear that he advocated an ambitious and interventionist Spartan foreign policy.20 Pausanias' career postdates Socles' speech, but his example would have been before Herodotus' audience, and is every bit as relevant as the bradutes we see in Thucydides. Herodotus himself implies that the claim that Pausanias' arrogant treatment of the allies justified Athens' taking command of the alliance was a pretext (8.3.2). But he confirms that the charge was in the air, and it is accepted at face value by Thucydides (1.95; 1.130-134).21 Thucydides also has Athenian ambassadors claim that the Spartans would have ruled the Greeks every bit as oppressively as Athens did (1.76.1), and has Pericles deny that Sparta's Peloponnesian allies were autonomous (1.144.2). And Thucydides blames the Spartans, not the Athenians, for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.22 Again, these charges may be largely without

20 So, recently, Cawkwell (1993b), though he seems wrong to believe that Herodotus' failure to give Cleomenes a role in the attempt to restore Hippias shows that it was directed against Cleomenes and his expansionist program. The return of Hippias was meant to expand Spartan power, not to restore some pristine status quo ante, and was thus perfectly in keeping with Cleomenes' policy (Crahay 1956, 166-167; Carlier 1977, 77). On Cleomenes, see also Cartledge 1979, 143-154; Munson 1993, 45- 46.

21 For more on Herodotus and Thucydides on Pausanias, see Patterson (1993), who argues that Thucydides was setting the record straight, and Fornara (1971, 62- 66), who argues that Herodotus expected his audience to contrast his positive account of Pausanias' rise with their own knowledge of his tragic fall.

22 Even Ste. Croix (1972), who is regularly friendly toward Athens and hostile to Sparta, and Badian (1993), who regularly takes the opposite tack, are agreed on this.



10 DAVID M. JOHNSON

historical substance, but they are evidence for attitudes con-

temporary with Herodotus if not with Socles. So much, briefly, for the Herodotean context and some other

facts known to Herodotus' audience. The history of Sparta's dealings with her Peloponnesian neighbors also provides ample ground for fear that she could push her rule too far. Sparta's internal stability gave her the ability, rare to Greek states, to interfere in the affairs of other states (Thuc. 1.18.1). The Spartans began by enslaving the Messenians and reducing their closest

neighbors to Perioikic status. When they met strong resistance at

Tegea, they shifted to more diplomatic means of extending their

sway (Hdt. 1.66-68). But as Socles spoke the terms of Sparta's relationship with her allies were still undetermined. It was only through his speech that "the allies of Sparta had won a collective

right of veto denied to the Perioikic towns, whose relations with

Sparta in other respects provided both the precedent and the model for the series of individual, unequal alliances Sparta had built up in the Peloponnese and outside."23 Socles and the allies were not worried only about the Spartans installing a puppet tyranny at Athens, but about the Spartans installing tyrannies in Greek cities (5.92al, 2; 5.92n5; cf. 5.93.2, quoted above), presumably including the allies' own cities. The fact that Sparta's hegemony did not become oppressive (at least not until after the Peloponnesian War) hardly rules out a prior concern that it could become oppressive. Indeed, it is in part thanks to the speech of Socles that Spartan leadership did not become harsh.

Cartledge has good reason to say that the Spartan proposal to restore Hippias "destroys the myth of Sparta's principled opposition to tyranny."24 But, like many myths about Sparta, this one is tenacious, and as it was known to Herodotus' contemporaries, it is relevant to their understanding of Herodotus. One, can, however, go too far. Consider what Raaflaub has to say about that same

Spartan proposal, viewed from the perspective of Herodotus' contemporaries:

Sparta, traditionally the liberator from tyranny, intended in this one case to violate its own principles, to prevent tyranny on a large scale [i.e., Athens as the tyrant city] by imposing it on a small scale and to sacrifice the freedom of one city in order to save that of all the others.2

23 Cartledge 1979, 147. 24 Cartledge 1979, 148. 25 Raaflabu 1987, 224.




This is to attribute to the Spartans of the late 5th century insight into the events of the middle of the next century, and to credit them with the most idealistic motives-quite a stretch even for those of Herodotus' contemporaries who were favorably in- clined to Sparta. The tradition of Spartan opposition to tyranny abroad, despite Thucydides (1.18.1), is of dubious historicity, as there are few known cases of Spartan action against tyrants, and no early case in which hostility to tyranny was clearly the motive for Spartan action.26 Sparta's real policy, at least when it comes to her allies, was that of supporting oligarchies, whether against tyrants or democrats. Herodotus' audience would have been aware of Sparta's claim to stand for the freedom of the Greeks, but to many of them, especially Athenians and those sympathetic to Athens, the claim would have been hollow. And where Socles and his audience were concerned, the most relevant evidence regarding Sparta's posture toward tyranny would have been the failed campaign under Cleomenes to install Isagoras as tyrant (5.74). Herodotus' characterization of the intentions of Cleomenes and Isagoras may be ahistorical, but it does set the context for Socles' speech.

But what about the speech of Socles itself? Heaven will be below earth, earth above heaven, Socles begins, men will make their home in the sea and fish cn land, when you, men of Lacedaemon, prepare to destroy free governments and restore tyrannies to cities (5.92a.1). These lines have been cited as evidence of Sparta's opposition to tyranny.27 But, as we have just seen, the Spartan Cleomenes was attempting to destroy Cleis- thenes' regime and install a tyrant just a few years previously, so there would be nothing supernatural or contradictory in the Spartans doing that. The next few lines of Socles' speech reveal his real point. Try tyranny out for yourselves before imposing it cn others; as it is you guard carefully that it not occur at home, and disregard your allies, who have experienced what it is like (5.92a.2). The contradiction is between Spartan domestic policy, which is aimed at avoiding tyranny, and her foreign policy, which, at least in the case of Athens, has supported and continues to support tyranny. It is this contradiction which Socles wishes to present as unnatural. His use of the adunata to characterize a state of affairs which is actually taking place is doubly tactful: it

26 Bernhardt 1987, 261-270. 27 Cawkwell 1993a, 371.



12 DAVID M. JOHNSON

allows him to avoid directly charging the Spartans with what they are in fact attempting to do, restoring tyrants, by assuming it away-assuming, that is, that his position has prevailed. But his contrafactual assumption is hardly support for the anti-tyrannical tradition about Sparta. The tradition is present in Thucydides, but that does not show that it ought to provide the primary framework for our reading of Herodotus.

All this is not to deny that the Socles scene gains added depth when we consider it in terms of Herodotus' contemporaries. I have argued above and will show in more detail below that Socles was worried about Sparta becoming a tyrant city of sorts by limiting the role of her allies. But the Socles scene also alludes to the tyrannical nature of the Athenian empire. By the early years of the Peloponnesian War, if not before, Athens was sometimes characterized, even by the Athenians themselves, as a tyrant city.28 It is indeed ironic, then, that Athens is here saved from tyranny, and by the very city that would complain most bitterly of Athenian imperialism at the outset of the Peloponnesian War. Scholars have shown that Herodotus was implicitly critical of the expansion of Athenian power, just as he was more openly critical of the expansion of Persian power.29 But he was also willing to say that the Athenians were the saviors of Greece, despite the disapproval of many in his audience (7.139); and he criticized both Athens and Sparta for their conflict after the Persian Wars (6.98.2). There are ironic allusions to the imperialism of contemporary Athens in the Socles scene. But Socles' speech is, first of all, entirely convincing as what it seems to be: a rebuttal of a rather dishonorable Spartan proposal to put Athens under a tyranny.

Socles on Cypselus

Positive evidence for the claim that Socles' speech ought to be read first in its own immediate context must come from the speech itself. And the speech soon presents us with a problem, for the story of the miraculous survival of the baby Cypselus hardly appears to

28 Athenian speakers: Thuc. 2.63.2; 3.37.2; 6.85.1; cf. Knights 1113. First in Thucydides by the Corinthians at 1.122.3. See Raaflaub 1979, Tuplin 1985.

29Fornara 1971, Ostwald 1991, Stadter 1992, Moles 1996.




help Socles denounce tyranny.30 It is, however, clearly related to many other such tales told about the survival of future leaders. Sargon of Akkad is the earliest known, Cyrus the closest Hero- dotean parallel (1.107-130); in myth Oedipus, Perseus, and Paris survive similar travails. The amazing salvation of the future leader shows that he is a 'divine child.'31 Such tales also legiti- mate a leader's status as an outsider and man of the people, but one who has some connection to the old regime, which wins him legitimacy of a more traditional sort as well.32 Thus Cypselus has some Bacchiad blood, but is also connected to another group of citizens through his non-Bacchiad father.

The fact that such tales were traditionally told about leaders makes the story of the foundling's rise to power less surprising than it may initially seem to us; it thus shows that this part of Socles' speech is in keeping with Herodotus' ideas about tyrants, who by definition reach power through extraordinary means. But this particular story centers on the smiling baby Cypselus, who seems to be a sort of poster child for tyranny. The Greeks were well aware of their propensity to pity children: consider the frequent, and frequently attacked, technique of dragging one's wife and children into court to seek the pity of the jury.33 Cypselus' smile has been compared to the moving but ultimately futile smiles of Medea's children and to the smile of the divine child of myth.34 But smiles in Herodotus, if Lateiner is right, tend to mark the derisive over- confidence of rulers destined for a fall, although Lateiner himself makes this smile "uniquely innocent.""35 It would certainly be bizarre to claim that the infant Cypselus himself intended to charm and fool his would-be murderers. But his smile does fall into the pattern of tyrants' disguising their true nature until their rule is secure. Cypselus' name, which derives from this incident, alludes to his ability to hide.36 McNellen suggestively compares the lionlike Cypselus' smile to the soft glance the lion cub of the

30 This part of the speech is equally difficult to read if one assumes that the speech is first and foremost a comment on the dangers of Athenian imperialism, of course.

31 Immerwahr 1966, 194-195. 32 Murray 1993, 148-149.

33 Compare Socrates' praeteritio in Apology 34c with Burnet 1924, 225, where the parody of this procedure in Wasps 976 is cited, together with references to its use in Lysias 20.34; Demosthenes 19.310, 21.99, 188; and Hyperides pro Euxenippo 41.

34 Nenci (1994, 292-293) cites Medea 1040-1045; Immerwarh (1996, 195) discusses the divine child motif.

3 Lateiner 1977, 176n9. 36 It probably means "beehive" rather than "chest" (Nenci 1994, 293-294).



14 DAVID M. JOHNSON

Agamemnon (742) employs to fool the Trojans.37 Consider also a comment Plato has Socrates make about the typical tyrant (Republic 8.566d5-el):

So then, I said, does he not in the first days and time [of his rule] smile at and welcome anyone he happens upon, and declare that he is not a tyrant and promise many things both in private and in public...?

Socles' speech as a whole and in its two major parts reflects this

pattern. Most of his account of Cypselus, save the oracular threats about the future, treats him positively, until we get the report of his killings and prosecutions. Periander's rule begins more mildly but very quickly takes a turn for the worse when he reveals

(EcqpatvE 5.92r1.1) his evil character. This is the normal course of a

tyranny, and so would not surprise Socles' audience. Imposing a

tyranny on Athens may seem innocuous enough, as Hippias is a xeinos of the Spartans, after all, and a tame Athens would serve the interest of many of the allies; but it will end up grievously harming the Athenians just as Cypselus and Periander harmed Corinth. And the precedent could be dangerous for any other Greek

city which dared to oppose Sparta.38 But the key to the story of Cypselus, in my view, is not the

smiling baby himself but the Bacchiads sent to kill him. It is this

angle on the story which is relevant to Socles' deeper purpose, encouraging the allies to resist Sparta. We with our distaste for

oligarchy are immediately unsympathetic to the Bacchiads, but Socles' audience need not have shared this particular view.39

37 McNellen 1997, 18. The lion cub was certainly no more aware of what it was doing than was baby Cypselus.

38 Gray (1996, 376) attempts to reconcile the smile with Socles' anti-tyrannical purpose by arguing that the Bacchiads' pity "highlights Cypselus' lack of compassion." But had Socles wished to emphasize Cypselus' lack of pity he would have portrayed Cypselus in a situation in which we would have expected him to show pity.

39 Our only Herodotean evidence for the nature of Bacchiad rule comes in Socles' speech. While that evidence is negative, there is precious little of it, and we do not know enough from other sources to judge what the audiences of Socles or Herodotus would have thought of them (see Salmon 1984, 55-74 for the limits of our evidence and an attempt to put together an account of the Bacchiad period). Socles tells us, in a detail necessary for the plot of Cypselus' story (or perhaps even invented for that story), that the Bacchiads only married among themselves; this would have made their rule narrower than most other oligarchies (Salmon 1984, 56). The term mounarchoi applied to the Bacchiads in the first oracle (5.9232) is certainly negative (McGlew 1993, 65-66 well assembles the evidence for this), but comes in an oracle addressed to Eition, the father of Cypselus, who would no doubt have no positive view of the Bacchiads himself. As Wecowski (1996, 220-228) has pointed out, the oracles in the speech are carefully tailored to their recipients. Had Herodotus (or




While their mission is distasteful, and the smiling infant innocuous, the Bacchiads' pity for the child humanizes them as well. And the failure of the Bacchiads to stop Cypselus before he can become a tyrant is parallel to the situation Socles and the allies are facing. Like the allies, the ten Bacchiads know what they want to do. Like the allies, who hesitate to speak, they hesitate to act. But, unlike the Bacchiads, the first of the allies to act, Socles, does so decisively, and the rest are able to follow. Had Socles not spoken up, the allies would have looked to one another as the Bacchiads had passed the child from one to another, and done nothing as the Bacchiads did nothing. The first plan of the Bacchiads was that the first of their number to have the chance ought to kill the child; they realize the weakness of this approach and decide that all should take part (5.92y.2-4). So too Socles desires to get the rest of the allies involved in opposition to the Spartan proposal. The hesitation of the ten Bacchiads when confronted with the smiling baby allowed Labda to hide the child, foiling their attempt; they decided to report back that they had accomplished their mission, thus preventing any further attempts against the young Cypselus (5.928.2). So too the current Spartan proposal has its appeal. It is in the immediate self-interest of the allies-at least those who are rivals of Athens-and by silently acquiescing in the Spartan plan they would leave the appearance, at least, that the action was Sparta's doing, and save themselves the shame of taking an explicit role in imposing a tyranny on a Greek city. But by failing to voice their opposition to Sparta's attempt to have her way with Athens they would make it easier for her to have her way with them. Socles thus turns the story of Cypselus' escape into a tale about the dangers of allowing any would-be tyrant to escape. There is, then, at least one implicit tyrant city in Socles' speech: Sparta.

The other major element in the account of the rise of Cypselus are the oracles predicting his rise. The sanction they appear to give to Cypselus seems to undermine Socles' attack an tyranny. But oracles and other signs are common enough in Herodotus, especially when it comes to the birth of a leader. Consider, in addition to

Socles) meant us to understand that the tyranny at Corinth arose from the cruelty of Bacchiad rule, we would expect this to have been made more clear. Overall, Herodotus says rather little about oligarchy, as traditional oligarchic regimes play a small role in his narrative (Lateiner 1989, 168-169).



16 DAVID M. JOHNSON

Agariste's leonine dream about Pericles (6.131),40 the portents observed by Hippocrates (1.59.1-3), father of Peisistratus, and

Astyages' dreams about Cyrus (1.107-108.2). As Lavelle has argued in the case of Peisistratus, oracles are a lasting part of the story of the rise of tyrants because they show how divine support made the

tyrant's rise inevitable, and thus let the people who allowed the

tyrant rise to power off the hook.41 The Cypselid oracles "stress the fearfulness, rather than the advantages, of tyranny" and are thus a natural part of Socles' attack on tyranny.42

The oracles motivating the Spartan proposal have also played an important part in the argument making the Socles scene first and foremost a commentary on contemporary events. Strasburger was

apparently the first to note that the oracles cited by Hippias allude to events surrounding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

(5.93.1):43

Socles the ambassador from Corinth said this, and Hippias answered him, after calling upon the same gods he had, by saying that it would be the Corinthians most of all who would miss the Peisistratids, when the days came for them to be harmed by the Athenians. Hippias answered in this way as he was the man who had the most accurate understanding of the oracles.

So the role of the Corinthians is neatly reversed from that they will play in 432 (Thuc. 1.67-88), where it is they who will have been harmed by the Athenians and will urge the Spartans to declare war. But note that the oracles cited by Hippias are also

entirely at home in their immediate context. As is true of a rather

high proportion of oracles, these are in the best interest of those who report them.44 We hear before Socles speaks that oracles

brought back by Cleomenes and previously in the possession of the Peisistratids predicted that the Athenians would harm the

Spartans (5.90.2). These oracles thus support the Spartan attempt to impose Hippias as their puppet. Hippias makes his warning to Corinth only after Socles' speech, so Hippias' reference to the

40 Gray (1996, 386-387) argues the references to lions in the oracles surrounding Cypselus tie him to Pericles and Athens, but the image of the lion is just as appropriate for Cypselus: each man has power which will appear regal to his friends and vicious to his enemies. Compare also the lion cub imagery of the Agamemnon (717-781); and see McNellen 1997 on lion imagery and Pericles in Herodotus.

41 Lavelle 1991, 324. 42 McGlew 1993, 71; cf. Gray 1996, 372-375; Wecowski 1996, 215-235. 43 Strasburger 1955, 12. 44 Wecowski (1996, 220-228) makes this point about the oracles within Socles'

speech.




Corinthians, who are proving the main obstacle to his return, is also motivated by the immediate context. And Herodotus reminds us that Hippias was the man who knew the oracles best-naturally enough, given his family's interest in oracles in general and in these oracles in particular. The Peisistratids and Cleomenes elsewhere show themselves entirely willing to manipulate oracles (7.6.4; 6.65). Here this would only be fair, as Hippias had been deposed thanks to corrupt pronouncements from Delphi (5.63.1). It seems clear enough, then, that the oracles foretelling doom to come from Athens were concocted by the Peisistratids, Cleomenes, or both, or were at least selectively released from a larger store of oracles, by the time of Socles' speech.45

Socles on Periander

Socles' account of Periander is clearly negative, and so this part of his speech has not proved as troubling as has the story of Cypselus. We have instead a series of different but at least partially complementary accounts of why Socles chose to say just what he says about Periander. Stahl has argued that the point here-and for Herodotus' account of Cypselus and Periander as a whole-is that power corrupts even good individuals. While Stahl's view that Cypselus and Periander were good men before they were corrupted by power is too charitable, he is clearly right to note that Socles' wishes to show not that this or that tyrant had a bad character, but that absolute power is always harmful.46 Thrasybulus' lesson for Periander is thus of general importance to all tyrants, and Periander's implementation of that advice shows

45 Similarly Crahay 1956, 167-168. For more general remarks on the appropriation of oracles by the Peisistratids and other tyrants, see Nagy 1990, 158-168.

46 Stahl 1983. We know nothing, from Herodotus, of the character of Cypselus or Periander before each became tyrant, and so cannot observe any corruption in them. Stahl argues that Cypselus is treated positively in the first part of the speech, an impression I have tried to counter above. If Nenci is right to follow A and TT4 in reading jv in place of D's EyEVETO at 92E.2, we have no reason to assume any change in Cypselus upon taking power. The best that can be said about Periander's treatment earlier in the Histories (Thrasybulus and Arion: 1.20, 23-24; Lycophron and Corcyra: 3.48-53) is that Herodotus fails to condemn actions that might seem to warrant condemnation. Periander does begin his reign more mildly than Cypselus had, but he asks Thrasybulus not only how he can govern most finely (K6•,•lTa),

as Stahl notes, but most securely (oaqpaX~aTaTov), which Stahl does not mention (Stahl 1983, 215; 92?.2). Thrasybulus' advice leads Periander to reveal (iqipalVE 5.92r.1) his evil character to his fellow citizens: it does not create it.



18 DAVID M. JOHNSON

more about tyranny, and about any man or any state with an excess of power, than it does about any individual's personal character.

A major part of the lesson about tyranny concerns the tyrant's characteristic sexual excess.47 Melissa's ghost explicitly complains only about lacking clothing, not about Periander's necrophilia or even about the fact that it was he who killed her, but the connection between his necrophilia and his failure to bum her clothes with her body seems clear enough. Melissa's role, as is true of much of this part of the speech, is elliptical; but there are reasons for Melissa's silences. In part her desire for a proper burial, rather than with how her improper burial came about, is natural for a ghost.48 And there is something to be gained in leaving the connections between Periander's necrophilia, the nakedness of Melissa, and his stripping of the women of Corinth vague: through his dry presentation of the facts Socles can move his audience without disgusting them with the details. Periander's decision to strip the rest of the women of Corinth gives his private mistreatment of Melissa public relevance: he shows that he has the power to treat all the women of Corinth as he treated his wife. Moreover, in looking at what is not his own Periander breaks one of Herodotus' central rules of propriety. Compare the similar failings of other Herodotean autocrats, Candaules at the outset of the Histories and Xerxes at its end.49

Periander also strips the women of Corinth for the same reason he killed and prosecuted the men. Periander had asked Thrasy- bulus how he could rule most securely (&aopaX•oraTaov) and best

(K6•,Xo1Ta 5.92.12); Thrasybulus responded by cutting down the best

(K6)XX1oTOv) ears of wheat in the field. The message is clear

enough: stability, for a tyrant, is incompatible with ruling in the best way.5" Socles does not tell us much about Periander's use of this principle where the men of Corinth are concerned. Thrasybulus' graphic sign was enough, and, with the generalization that Periander finished off all those left standing by Cypselus, Socles ties father and son together. The evil of the tyrant is instead revealed by Periander's more striking application of Thrasybulus' advice to the women of Corinth. The women had come as if to a festival, decked out in their best clothing (92rl.3 K6OCPC TCo KaXXiaTcp); he strips them, reducing all, free and slave alike, to

47 3.80.5; duBois 1988, 111-115. 48 Loraux 1993, 8-10. 49 1.8-12; 9.108-113. For this rule of propriety see Lateiner 1985, 96-97. 50o Benardete 1969, 149.




shameful nakedness. Thus Periander shames all the women of Corinth, as he had shamed his own wife, and Socles reveals the true nature of tyranny.

All of this shows that Periander was a thoroughly despicable ruler, and that he became so by following the advice of Thrasy- bulus, advice which would apply to any tyrant. But it does not show the particular relevance of these stories about the women of Corinth to Socles' situation. The fate of the women of Corinth, though, did not only affect themselves: their humiliation was also the humiliation of their husbands. They are introduced as the wives of the Corinthians, and by stripping them Periander humiliates their husbands by seeing what only they ought to see. Humiliation is closer to what the allies of Sparta face than the more overt murder and prosecution faced by the men of Corinth. They have been summoned to a meeting at which they had presumably expected to take part in the deliberations, but they were all silent until Socles spoke. So also the Corinthian women were summoned to appear in their best clothing expecting something other than humiliation. If the allies fail to speak up, they will admit that they, like women, must remain silent. Compare again Xerxes' uncle Artabanus, who was threatened with being left behind with the women for what Xerxes considered to be cowardly advice (7.11). As the first half of Socles' speech warned of the dangers of failing to stop an incipient tyranny, the second half depicts the humiliation faced by the silenced subjects of the tyrant.

Socles' attention to Melissa is also relevant to his own situation. It was a commonplace of Greek thinking about tyrants that the tyrant could have no true friends (3.80.5): even his own family had to be suspect. In keeping with this Periander treats his wife no less shamefully than he treats the rest of the women of Corinth. So too the allies of Sparta could take no comfort in being her friends, and could have no assurance that Sparta would not one day turn against them. Socles implies as much when he warns of the Spartans setting up tyrannies in Greek cities, not merely in Athens alone (92al, 2, 92r15; cf. 93.2). Luckily it does not come to that, for Socles succeeds. He makes his case not by concentrating on the sort of history Thucydides would have him stick to, or by making the abstract arguments about tyranny with which Otanes tried and failed to convince the Persians to adopt a free government (3.80), but by showing the evils of tyranny through telling stories. Socles' graphic depiction of the humiliation the allies would face as



20 DAVID M. JOHNSON

subjects of an oppressive Spartan hegemony, coupled with Socles' own willingness to speak up in opposition to the Spartans' plan, leads the other allies to break their silence, and the Spartan plan is defeated.

Leotychides

Leotychides' speech (6.86) is briefer and, as it does not contain information as historically significant as Socles' account of the tyranny at Corinth, it has generated much less scholarly interest. Most of what attention it has received has been scathing,51 but I will argue that this speech, like that of Socles, works both in its own immediate context and on the level of Herodotus' contemporaries.

Leotychides was made king through the machinations of Cleomenes, with the understanding that he would aid Cleomenes against the Aeginetans. They, encouraged by Cleomenes' royal colleague and rival, Demaratus, had refused to hand over Aeginetan medizers to Cleomenes on the ground that he was not acting on behalf of Sparta, but because he had been bribed by the Athenians (6.61-66, 49-51). To make Leotychides king, Cleomenes corruptly encouraged the Pythia to fuel doubts about the legitimacy of Demaratus (6.66). Once king, Leotychides accompanied Cleo- menes to Aegina, where the Aeginetans decided they had to turn over ten leading men to the two kings, who appeared as the united representatives of Sparta; Cleomenes and Leotychides then deposited the ten hostages with the Athenians, Aegina's bitter enemies (6.73). But soon enough Cleomenes' suborning of the Pythia became public, and, through divine vengeance for his sacrilege, or because of his Scythian style heavy drinking, he went mad and killed himself (6.74-84). The Spartans convened a court, which ruled that the Aeginetans had been treated wrongly by Leotychides, and that he should himself be handed over to them. The Aeginetans were about to take custody of him when a certain Spartan by the name of Theasides warned them that the Spartans might later change their minds and turn against them. They then

s5 How and Wells (1912, 98) note that the corrupt Leotychides was a strange speaker for such a moral tale, but "neither this nor the inexactitude of the parallel between Glaucus and the Athenians induces H. to sacrifice so good a story." Immerwahr (1966, 121-122, 213-215) is more positive, as we will see; he gives further references to criticism of the speech at 213n66.




agreed with Leotychides that he would go to Athens with them to secure the return of the hostages (6.85).

Leotychides then attempts to convince the Athenians to return their Aeginetan hostages by telling the tale of the Spartan Glaucus, who was grievously punished for even thinking about not returning a deposit (6.86). Immerwahr argues that the speech is ironic both in its relationship to Leotychides and to Athens.52 A speech which advocates probity in financial matters by citing the words of the Pythia comes strangely from a man who was made king thanks to corruption of a Pythia (6.66), and who would be banished from Sparta for taking bribes (6.72). And the speech fails in its purpose: the Athenians do not return the hostages and are not, as far as Herodotus tells us, punished for so doing. But if we look a t both the speech and its speaker more closely we can see that the speech is in fact admirably designed to meet Leotychides' goals, and, once we consider what Herodotus' audience would have known, we will see that the speech is far more prescient than Leotychides himself could ever have realized. Leotychides is speaking not only to the Athenians but also to the Aeginetans, and issues threats to each that are fulfilled only years after he spoke.

Leotychides' tale about Glaucus, while it begins in a way exactly parallel to the situation at Athens, diverges from that situation in a way which defeats Leotychides' apparent purpose. Glaucus had received a deposit from a foreigner, as the Athenians had received the Aeginetan hostages from the Spartans. When the rightful heirs to the deposit approached him, Glaucus pretended to have forgotten about the whole matter, asked for a long delay, and consulted Delphi to see if he could get away with stealing the money (6.86a.3-y.2). The Athenians also make excuses, arguing that two kings, Cleomenes and Leotychides, had given them the hostages, but that only one king was asking for them back (6.86.1); this is an ironically appropriate rejoinder, as the Aeginetans had used similar arguments to put off Cleomenes on his first attempt to seize medizers from the island (6.50.2). When Glaucus sent off to Delphi the Pythia reproached him (6.86y.2); we might expect that any Athenian appeal to both Spartan kings would also fail, given the complete change of heart at Sparta following the discovery of Cleomenes' wrongdoing. But now the connections between the story and Leotychides' overt goal begin to unravel. For after being rejected by the god, Glaucus asks for pardon, but is refused: to tempt

52 Immerwahr 1966, 214.



22 DAVID M. JOHNSON

the god is just as bad as to do wrong, the Pythia indignantly replies (6.86y.2). What are the Athenians to make of this? They have already considered not returning the hostages by refusing Leotychides' initial request. Leotychides attempts to patch things up at the end of his speech, it seems, by making a sort of a fortiori argument. He says that it is a bad thing even to consider not returning a deposit, implying, presumably, that following through on not returning a deposit would be even worse. But Glaucus' fate was most severe: his entire line was wiped out.53 And the god said that intending to do the wrong and actually doing it were exactly the same. What worse can the Athenians hope for if they follow through on their plan not to return the hostages?

Leotychides' speech, then, is only partially directed to the goal of getting the Athenians to return the hostages, for the dire fate the story threatens them with should await them whether or not they release the Aeginetans. But the fact that his speech is not entirely apt to that goal should not be surprising. It was Leotychides, after all, along with his backer Cleomenes, who gave the Athenians the hostages in the first place, so we would hardly expect him to be a warm advocate of their return. Leotychides is at any rate a poor candidate to give moral suasion on either financial or religious grounds. Why does he say what he says, then? I suggest he is also talking to the Aeginetans. For it is they, and not the Athenians, who are more precisely in the position in which Glaucus found himself: they have considered keeping something they should not keep, but have subsequently decided to let it go. They had considered accepting Leotychides himself when the Spartans offered to turn him over to them (6.85.1). They had done so, true enough, on the instigation of the Spartans, but this would hardly salve Leotychides' feelings about the matter. And they were convinced by the Spartan Theasides that they ought not to take Leotychides after Theasides warned them, in rather oracular terms, of a great evil the Spartans would send upon their land (6.85.2). They then relented, as Glaucus tried to do when he was warned by the Pythia. Leotychides agrees to go to Athens with them to get their hostages back, but while there he gives speech which ultimately turns against the Aeginetans. His message to them, then, is that it is too late for them to make him their ally.

53 For loss of offspring as the ultimate punishment for offenses against propriety like those of Glaucus, see Lateiner 1985, 99-100; 1989, 143-144. Munson (1993, 46n41) notes that Leotychides' own fate (6.72) will be similar.




Leotychides, therefore, does not simply give an ironically moral speech which fails in its persuasive purpose of securing the return of the Aeginetan hostages. He rather offers the same message to both Athens and Aegina, each of which was in a situation parallel to that faced by Glaucus: a plague on both your houses. His message would have been even clearer for Herodotus' contemporaries than for Leotychides' original audience. Soon after Leotychides' speech Herodotus notes that the rich Aeginetans would be driven from Aegina by the Athenians, a reference to the

expulsion of the Aeginetans by the Athenians in 431 (6.91.1; Thuc. 2.27).54 It is appropriate that Athens and Aegina lie under the same threat, for their long conflict has led each to commit impiety and injustice against the other.55 Contemporary scholarship has shown that Herodotus meant his critique of Persian imperialism to apply to Athenian imperialism as well; this critique carries with it the warning that Athens may someday meet the same fate. Leotychides' as yet unfulfilled threat against Athens should thus be compared with the similarly unfulfilled threats of punishment against Athens at 5.89.2 and 7.133.2: all hang over an Athens weakened, if not yet chastised, by the first years of the Pelopon- nesian War. Herodotus, then, does not clumsily attribute an ineffective moralizing speech to the immoral Leotychides. Rather, he attributes a speech to Leotychides that is almost too good to be true, by having Leotychides warn both the Aeginetans and the Athenians in terms that only Herodotus' contemporaries could fully appreciate.

Leotychides and Socles found themselves in difficult diplomatic situations. The Corinthian Socles was the ambassador from the only one of Sparta's allies powerful and independent enough to have unilaterally abandoned Cleomenes' unjust and secret expedition to install Isagoras as tyrant of Athens. But he now faced the task of persuading the rest of the allies of Sparta to stand up against her when there was no internal Spartan conflict to rely on. By telling his story about the tyrants of Corinth, Socles was able both to remind the allies of the horrors of tyranny and to allude to the sort of tyranny a hegemon could impose an them if they did not dare to speak for themselves. Leotychides was a Spartan king, but one in a most difficult spot. He had barely escaped being sur-

"4 Though Herodotus speaks of expulsion of the oligarchs, while Thucydides implies that the expulsion was total. See Figueira 1991, 126-128.

55 Immerwahr 1966, 211-215.



24 DAVID M. JOHNSON

rendered to his enemies on Aegina, when he had to plead on their behalf for the reversal of his own policy. He managed to turn this situation to his advantage by delivering a speech in which he first seemed to argue on behalf of the Aeginetans, but ultimately undercut their case. These speeches may strike us at first as simple and naive, particularly in comparison with the analytical speeches of Thucydides or the more Thucydidean speeches later in Herodotus. But they are ideally designed to meet situations that call for the sort of indirection and subtlety better provided by stories than by more abstract arguments. This same contrast between a seemingly naive narrative and deeper complexity, is, of course, to be found in Herodotus' work as a whole. One of the basic tools Herodotus uses to produce this complexity is thematic structural similarity between his tales: Croesus and Cyrus, to take only the most obvious example, follow the same basic pattern that Xerxes will."56 Socles and Leotychides make use of this same tool by telling stories rich in parallels to the situations they and their audiences face.

Now we need not limit ourselves to parallels between the speaker's story and his context. Both speeches also allude to events of Herodotus' day. And, indeed, the parallels between speech and context identified here are themselves evidence that Herodotus is quite capable of presenting us with multiple layers of meaning of the sort argued for by the contemporary scholars who believe that he crafted his account of the past as a commentary an the present. But with these speeches the first layer of complexity is already present at the level of the speaker himself. Herodotus' work is already multi-layered and ironic when read as an account of the past: we need not invoke contemporary events or political abstractions to find this complexity. And to get at all that Herodotus intended with his storytelling speeches we must begin with the intentions of the men who tell the stories, Socles and Leotychides.57

DAVID M. JOHNSON Southern Illinois University Carbondale

56 Immerwahr discusses this pattern (1966, 176-177) and many others; see also Lateiner 1989, 163-186, 191-196.

s7 I would like to thank Philip Stadter for his comments on several versions of this paper, which began its long life some ten years ago as part of a class of his at Chapel Hill; thanks also to CJ's editor and its anonymous referees.




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Documents

Herodotus' Storytelling Speeches: Socles (5.92) and Leotychides (6.86)