Hearing Transcript - 23 September 2003 Afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 23 September 2003 Afternoon

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4 JIC itself does not produce documents for public5 dissemination and there had never been any intention6 that it would do so. So it is ownership in that sense7 and it is a forward looking statement.8 Q. Could we look at CAB/27/5, please? This is a further9 meeting in your office on 20th September. What was this

10 meeting about?11 A. Well, it was a continuation, there was a series of12 rolling meetings on this, as we progressed the13 production.14 Q. That is --15 A. Sorry.16 Q. Sorry.17 A. It also, I see there, on the first bullet point,18 addressed the question of how arrangements at the19 printers and proofreading should be managed and that20 action lay with me.21 Q. CAB/27/8. The same question, what was this about?22 A. Is that the same document?

23 Q. No. The last one you saw was CAB/27/5.24 A. This is another date, this is the 23rd. Again, same25 subject, and this was after the proofreading. I should

1071 add that I had been made responsible for or I had made2 myself responsible for the proofreading, even though the3 production and the ownership point passed to No. 10.4 The proofreading was so intimately linked to the text5 that clearly I needed to stay in charge of it.6 Now here at the bottom, on a similar point, I think,7 the aspect of that which arose on 23rd September related8 to the liaison between my staff and No. 10 for the

9 management of the website, to make sure that the website10 was in line with the printed text of the document. It11 was the same principle, that my staff and I myself12 needed to be in charge of anything to do with the text.13 Q. Is there anything in these three documents which you14 regard as relevant to the question whether you had15 ownership of the process of drafting the dossier?16 A. Well, I think both those points. The emphasis on my17 personal involvement with the proofreading, where18 I signed off the proofs for each page, and then also the19 rather small point of the website on the 23rd.20 Q. Turning to a different question: have you read the21 transcript of the evidence given to the Inquiry by

22 Dr Jones?23 A. Yes, I have.24 Q. I would like to ask you for your comments on the25 evidence of Dr Jones. First of all, what was the role

1081 of the DIS and Dr Jones in particular in relation to the2 preparation of the dossier?3 A. Well, the DIS of course played a key role in the4 formulation of the dossier. They are a major source of5 military expertise, advice and input and also scientific6 and technical expertise with a military angle to it.7 Dr Jones was the head of one of three of the -- he was

8 assistant director in one of the directorates at DIS.9 He was there responsible for three branches within DIS


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10 which the assessment staff consulted during the process11 of putting together the dossier. Altogether assessment12 staff consulted ten branches in three different13 directorates.14 Q. What was Dr Jones' role in relation to the intelligence15 about the 45 minutes point in particular?

16 A. Well, the role of his staff was advising on the17 capability of Iraq to produce chemical agent and to fill18 munitions. That was relevant, in this particular19 context, to his responsibility.20 Q. What would he have known about the intelligence on which21 the 45 minutes point was based?22 A. He and his staff, relevant staff, would have seen the23 intelligence. If I can just add there, an addition --24 Q. The raw intelligence or the assessment?25 A. No, they would have seen both. If I could just add

1091 there a relevant point, that I referred to the role of

2 his branch in relation to the capability to produce3 agent and fill munitions. The lead branch on the4 45 minutes point was not one of Dr Jones' branches, it5 was another branch in another directorate of DIS which6 took the lead in relation to doctoring, deployment,7 command and control and firing mechanisms, and they had8 the lead role on advising on the 45 minutes point.9 Q. Yes. Now, Dr Jones said that the DIS had expressed10 concerns that intelligence received about the 45 minutes11 point was second-hand and possibly unreliable and about12 the strength of the language in which the draft referred13 to chemical weapons production. Were you aware of those14 concerns at the time?

15 A. I was not aware of concerns about the source being16 second-hand or the information being unreliable. I was17 aware of the concern about -- briefly aware of the18 concern about the CW agent production.19 Q. How did you learn of that concern?20 A. That was reported to me by Julian Miller, the Chief of21 Assessment Staff, following the meeting of the drafting22 group on 17th September.23 Q. Yes. What had they received to alert them to these24 concerns?25 A. Well, that was just one of the many points that was

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1 raised in the drafting meeting; and the reason that2 particular point was mentioned was that it related to3 the existence of additional compartmented intelligence.4 Q. Additional?5 A. Compartmented or especially sensitive intelligence --6 Q. Yes.7 A. -- which was underpinning the judgment.8 Q. Was that compartmented intelligence available to9 Dr Jones?10 A. No, it was not.11 Q. When you and the assessment staff learnt of the DIS's12 concerns on this point, what did they do about them?13 A. They arranged for the management in DIS to be briefed on

14 the compartmented intelligence which came from SIS and15 I was told that that was being done.


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16 Q. What was the outcome of that process?17 A. That briefing took place.18 Q. Yes, but was any change made to the dossier in response19 to the DIS's concerns about this point?20 A. The draft that was circulated on 19th September retained21 the wording which had been there on 16th September. No

22 comment on that point came back from DIS amongst the23 three pages of comments that they submitted on24 19th September; and in accordance with the normal25 silence procedures we took that as assent.

1111 Q. Dr Jones gave evidence also about another matter, namely2 the definition of weapons of mass destruction, the3 definition of weapons of mass destruction.4 A. Yes.5 Q. And, in particular, he gave evidence about whether they6 included battlefield munitions. Is there an accepted7 definition of weapons of mass destruction?

8 A. Well, the best I can do here is to quote the most recent9 statement made on behalf of the British Government on10 this issue which was by the Foreign Office Minister11 Mr O'Brien in answer to a Parliamentary Question on12 28th January this year, in which he said there is no13 universally accepted definition of the phrase "weapons14 of mass destruction" but it is generally held to refer15 to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.16 Q. Does that include battlefield munitions or not?17 A. Yes, it does.18 Q. Can I ask you briefly to comment on the evidence of19 Mr A? Have you read that?20 A. Yes, I have.

21 Q. Mr A gave evidence that at the time of the DIS meeting22 on 19th September he thought that too much was being23 made of the al-Qa'qa' phosgene plant. Were you aware of24 any reservations on that point in September 2002?25 A. No such reservations were passed to us.

1121 Q. Do you have any comments to make on the point now that2 you are aware of it?3 A. I would say this: that this phosgene of course is an4 example of dual use and has been quoted in that sense.5 It has industrial uses but it also can be used as6 a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent.

7 This particular plant had been bombed in 1991 and it was8 subsequently dismantled under UNSCOM supervision. After9 1998, and the inspectors having left, it was rebuilt;10 and in that context, given its dual use status and the11 fact it had been rebuilt, it was an object of interest.12 That is why it was mentioned.13 MR SUMPTION: Thank you.14 LORD HUTTON: Yes Mr Caldecott.15 Cross-examined by MR CALDECOTT16 MR CALDECOTT: Could I pass up to Mr Scarlett these hard17 copies. I have the same for his Lordship. (Handed).18 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.19 MR CALDECOTT: Mr Scarlett, can you help me a little,

20 please, about the status of final JIC assessments?21 First of all, they are what go to the Prime Minister and


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22 Ministers; is that right?23 A. Yes, that is right.24 Q. And they would not go to them in draft form, they get25 the final version only?

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1 A. That is correct.2 Q. Obviously if the public are to be put in the position of3 the Prime Minister, it is the final assessments which4 the public would expect to see reflected in the dossier.5 A. Yes, that is correct.6 Q. A final JIC assessment, as I understand from your7 evidence this morning, has broadly two parts: some main8 text and some key judgments, I think you said, at the9 front?10 A. Yes. Correct.11 Q. Obviously the main text may itself contain a degree of12 assessment and judgment?13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And these judgments, whether they are in the main text15 or in the key judgments, will have been reached after16 going, if I can use the phrase "round the houses",17 central intelligence groups, SIS, DIS --18 A. Full drafting and assessment process.19 Q. Can we just look please at the 45 minute claim in the20 context of the final assessment? Just to help21 everybody, the guidance that I have on this is drawn22 from the ISC report, because we have very little else to23 go on.24 Firstly, I am right, am I not -- just to give the25 reference, I take this from paragraph 50 of the ISC

1141 report, at BBC/30/4 -- that the 45 minutes claim nowhere2 appeared in any key judgment in the 9th September final3 assessment?4 A. That is correct. The 45 minutes claim was not in the5 key judgments on the 9th September assessment.6 Q. And the assessment started with a proviso, I think I am7 right in saying, which I actually do not have the8 reference to, but there is a proviso about the9 importance of distinguishing between assessments,10 judgments and the like. I seem to have the wrong11 reference.12 A. Sorry, I do not see it there.

13 Q. I will come back to that, if I may.14 In the main body of the chemical and biological15 capability section, but not in any key judgment, appears16 the 45 minute claim as it has been given to the Inquiry.17 A. Yes, it is there on the document.18 Q. The word "indicates" in that claim represents a judgment19 by the assessment staff having gone round the houses, if20 I can continue to use that shorthand.21 A. It represents a statement included in the assessment of22 9th September, drawn up by assessment staff having23 coordinated the draft in a normal way, through the CIG,24 as to how this point is best expressed in that document.25 Q. Yes. But it does represent a judgment --

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1 A. No it does not.2 Q. Does it not?3 A. No it does not. It is a statement, "Intelligence ...4 indicates that...".5 Q. Well it could be a firm statement, "intelligence shows6 that", or a qualified statement that it "indicates

7 that". Which of the two it is is a matter of8 assessment, is it not?9 A. That is one of the ways in which intelligence that is10 being put into an assessment is described in documents11 of this kind; and that says what it says.12 Q. But the use of that way is an exercise of choice, is it13 not?14 A. Yes.15 Q. They could have said "shows", they chose to say16 "indicates".17 A. That is right.18 Q. Which is less strong. We have had almost unanimous19 evidence about this that "indicates" is the normal

20 language for possibility and "shows" is the normal21 language for certainty.22 A. If you are referring to what intelligence is telling you23 about that point. This relates purely to what the24 intelligence report says.25 Q. But I suggest to you, again, that this includes an

1161 element of assessment. It could equally have said2 "intelligence also shows that" and that is an exercise3 of choice.4 A. It reflects a decision by the assessment staff and the5 CIG when drawing up that assessment as to how that piece

6 of intelligence on this particular point was to be7 described in that assessment.8 Q. In the way it is here presented it carries with it9 a message for anybody reading it, does it not?10 A. Yes, it describes the intelligence.11 Q. Yes. And it describes it as amounting to an indication12 rather than a certainty?13 A. With regard to that particular piece of intelligence?14 Q. Yes.15 A. Yes.16 Q. Thank you. And the Prime Minister, who no doubt is17 alert to these nuances, reading that final assessment18 would have so read it?

19 A. In that assessment, yes.20 Q. Thank you. Now --21 LORD HUTTON: When you refer to "in that assessment",22 I think you drew a distinction before as to the23 difference in meaning between the dossier and the24 assessment. But are you using the word "assessment"25 there as referring to the dossier?

1171 A. Well, my Lord, I am referring to that document there;2 and in my comments at the moment I am purely referring3 to what is in the classified JIC assessment of4 9th September which I think is what is referred to here

5 in this -- yes, it is indeed, in this extract from the6 ISC report.


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7 LORD HUTTON: I see. So that is definitely a normal type8 JIC assessment --9 A. That is drawing --10 LORD HUTTON: -- as opposed to a draft of the dossier11 itself?12 A. Indeed, my Lord.

13 MR CALDECOTT: That is how I had understood your evidence,14 Mr Scarlett.15 A. That is right.16 Q. We are not talking about the dossier at the moment, we17 are talking about how this JIC final assessment would18 have been understood?19 A. That is quite right.20 Q. What I want to be clear about this -- I can well21 understand that the dossier would refer to key judgments22 taken from JIC assessments it was presenting to the23 public.24 A. Yes.25 Q. I can also well understand that it would report what

1181 appears in the main text; but can I tell you what my2 difficulty is: I do not understand, at the moment, how3 the dossier could add a judgment which never appeared in4 any JIC assessment previously and which was, in fact,5 inconsistent with the wording of the only judgment that6 did appear in any previous JIC assessment on the point,7 namely "indicates".8 A. No. The first point on your last point is it is not9 inconsistent with what appears there, it adds to it.10 Q. It strengthens it, does it not?11 A. No, it does not. It takes it from a different point of

12 view. In the draft of 11th September, the intelligence13 report, which is also referred to here on the14 9th September assessment which was a very recent15 intelligence, it had only come in at the beginning of16 September, was referred to purely in the context of the17 intelligence report. Intelligence "indicates" that is18 normal.19 In the draft of the 16th September it was expressed20 for the first time in the executive summary as21 a judgment. That judgment is not just drawing on the22 intelligence, it is drawing on standing JIC assessment23 about the command, control and logistical arrangements24 of the Iraqi armed forces for the deployment of chemical

25 and biological weapons. It is based and is drawing on

1191 the long-standing overall assessment of the capability2 of the Iraqi armed forces in this area; and it is also3 drawing on the intelligence.4 In other words, it goes beyond that specific5 intelligence report. It is a classic example of what6 I mean by "judgment" as opposed to a specific reference7 to specific items of intelligence.8 Q. You see, that is to treat the dossier as if it were9 a new JIC assessment itself.10 A. The drafters were under instructions from the JIC to

11 make use of the most recent intelligence, incorporate12 it, absorb it, and by logic where necessary consider the


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13 standing assessments.14 Q. You see when the Inquiry asked about the JIC's15 conclusions on the 45 minute point, they were supplied16 with the draft JIC assessment of 5th September.17 A. Yes.18 Q. And the final JIC assessment of 9th September.

19 A. Yes.20 Q. And an account was given as to how they were reached;21 but there was no suggestion that there was any further22 JIC assessment of the 45 minute claim in the dossier23 itself.24 A. The ISC were told that on 16th September in the draft of25 the dossier and in the context of the dossier a draft

1201 executive -- a draft judgment was prepared by assessment2 staff.3 Q. Are you saying that members of the public would have4 understood from the term "executive summary" that the

5 dossier was a wholly new JIC assessment, freestanding6 from earlier JIC assessments?7 A. Since the dossier quite clearly stated that it is8 drawing on standing JIC assessments, and incorporating9 the most recent intelligence, I think it was quite10 reasonable for that -- in fact absolutely reasonable for11 that conclusion to be drawn.12 Q. Can I show you how the Prime Minister introduced the13 dossier at in the House of Commons at BBC/30/27? At the14 top of the page, please:15 "The dossier is based on the work of the British16 Joint Intelligence Committee. For over 60 years,17 beginning just prior to WWII, the JIC has provided

18 intelligence assessments to British Prime Ministers.19 Normally its work is secret. Unusually, because it is20 important we explain our concerns over Saddam to the21 British people, we have decided to disclose these22 assessments."23 A. Yes.24 Q. Those are the assessments as supplied to the25 Prime Minister.

1211 "I am aware, of course, that people are going to2 have to take elements of this on the good faith of our3 Intelligence Services."

4 A. Yes.5 Q. The plain impression given there is that what they are6 getting in the dossier is the intelligence assessments7 as given to the British Prime Minister and, no doubt,8 including the very latest on Iraq.9 A. Yes.10 Q. But nothing more. It is not suggested that the dossier11 itself is some wholly new JIC assessment and update, is12 it?13 A. The executive -- the judgment that was made in draft on14 16th September was discussed explicitly in the drafting15 group with representatives from various members of the16 JIC on 17th September. It was discussed explicitly as

17 a draft executive judgment. That indeed was the18 discussion which was taking place around the comment of


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19 the DIS, so that those representatives took that away20 for discussion, as necessary, in their agencies.21 We happen to know that it was specifically discussed22 within DIS in that context and accepted as an executive23 judgment from the comments and evidence from24 Mr Tony Cragg, the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence

25 at the time; and it was then circulated to the whole

1221 members of the JIC in that form on 19th September, and2 accepted by members of the JIC. It was a judgment, it3 became a judgment of the JIC and entirely consistent,4 therefore, with what the Prime Minister is saying in his5 foreword.6 Q. Your evidence this morning was that the assessment staff7 said: you could not have a judgment that says "suggests"8 or "indicates"; do you remember saying that?9 A. Yes, I do indeed.10 Q. But you can certainly have a judgment which says "may",

11 can you not?12 A. You could, but in this case it did not because it did13 not need to.14 Q. But we know, from early drafts, that the word15 "indicates" was interpreted as "may", do we not?16 A. The word "indicates" relates to the intelligence report.17 It does not relate to the standing JIC assessments18 already there from March 2002, for example, on the19 command and control capabilities of the Iraqi armed20 forces and the long-standing overall assessment of21 Iraq's capabilities which were rather exceptional an22 experience in this area. So it goes beyond that23 specific intelligence report.

24 Q. I am, at the moment, on specifically the 45 minutes25 claim --

1231 A. That is what I am referring to.2 Q. -- where it is clear that the word "indicates" was3 interpreted as "may" by your assessment staff in early4 drafts of this dossier.5 A. Because it is referring, in that context, to one6 intelligence report. The judgment goes beyond that one7 intelligence report.8 Q. There was no new intelligence at all after 9th September9 which related to the 45 minutes claim, was there?

10 A. There was not.11 Q. I want to move on in this context just to explore it12 a bit further. What was agreed on 17th September?13 LORD HUTTON: Before you go on, Mr Caldecott, may I ask you14 this: are you making the point to Mr Scarlett that where15 there is an assessment issued to the public which, of16 course, would include Members of Parliament and17 interested persons, that members of the public would in18 their own minds draw a distinction between a JIC19 assessment which was made public and a dossier based on20 intelligence information which came with the authority21 of JIC?22 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, the central point I am putting is

23 this: members of the public were being told: you are24 here being given effectively a digest of what I, the


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25 Prime Minister, have received in JIC assessments up

1241 until now.2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.3 MR CALDECOTT: Those are obviously the final JIC

4 assessments. Therefore, we say that the key to what the5 public were being told must lie in the language of those6 final JIC assessments, not in the language of the7 dossier in terms of the core text but in the language of8 the JIC assessments, final JIC assessments.9 Now, the 9th September was the last final JIC10 assessment on the 45 minutes claim. There is no11 statement of certainty at all in any key judgment. The12 only reference is "indicates" in the main text.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes.14 MR CALDECOTT: That as we know translated as a possibility,15 not a certainty. That is how I put it to Mr Scarlett,16 his own assessment staff read it in the early days of

17 the drafts.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I quite appreciate that was the19 distinction you were drawing. What I just want to20 understand is: are you suggesting to Mr Scarlett that in21 some way the public is misled if they are issued with22 a dossier which has in fact been authorised by the23 Chairman of JIC with the authority of JIC itself? In24 other words, that the average member of the public would25 think to themselves, if they directed their minds to the

1251 matter in detail: I am being misled, because I took this2 dossier to be an exact statement of JIC assessments as

3 opposed to a document on intelligence matters issued4 with the authority of JIC?5 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, yes, because there is, we would say,6 a real distinction between the formality of final JIC7 assessments as given to the Prime Minister, which is8 what the Prime Minister is saying I am presenting --9 LORD HUTTON: Quite, yes.10 MR CALDECOTT: -- and a rather looser point of something11 which the JIC have said: yes, we can produce this12 dossier, we are fine with it. Of course it is rather13 more important when you get to a specific claim and its14 specific language. Then the point becomes rather more15 intense. I am not sure I put it very elegantly.

16 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. I am sure Mr Scarlett17 has, himself, fully appreciated the distinction much18 more readily than me. Yes thank you. I did not mean19 that in any sarcastic way.20 MR CALDECOTT: I hope not my Lord. I do not know whether it21 was a swinging ball or not.22 LORD HUTTON: No, not at all.23 MR CALDECOTT: Can I go back to what you said this morning24 about the 17th September meeting. I do again on this25 same point wish to be clear about this.

1261 A. Hmm.

2 Q. This was not a meeting you attended but a meeting3 chaired by Mr Miller?


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4 A. That is right.5 Q. It was decided that after the end of the discussion the6 assessment staff would go away and look at the7 9th September classified assessment --8 A. Yes.9 Q. -- and also at the intelligence --

10 A. Yes.11 Q. -- and bring the wording of the text, the two middle12 sort of points, into line with what the assessment and13 the intelligence said?14 A. Yes.15 Q. Now the only assessment element of the 45 minute claim16 in the 9th September final assessment is in the main17 text, is it not?18 A. Yes.19 Q. And it says that it is merely an indication.20 A. Yes.21 Q. If that was the agreement, how is it reflected by22 strengthening the word "may" to the word "are"?

23 A. Because the intelligence contained no indication of24 "may", no indication of uncertainty. It was a statement25 in the intelligence report that they had this

1271 capability. But the JIC assessment of the 9th September2 put it in terms of intelligence indicates that they have3 that capability, and that was therefore reflected in4 exactly those terms in the main body of the redrafted5 text, which is what the assessment staff said they would6 do.7 Q. But that, with respect, is to -- I do not know what the8 wording of the raw intelligence is but of course I take

9 it from you.10 A. Yes.11 Q. But --12 A. Thank you.13 Q. -- that is slightly to look, is it not, at the wording14 of the raw intelligence without taking into account the15 assessment element and the choice of the word16 "indicates"? We have had a lot of evidence about the17 importance of precision and the significance of words18 like "indicates".19 A. Indeed.20 Q. If you do go back you do not just look at the raw21 intelligence, you look at how it was assessed; and it

22 was assessed as "indicates", not "shows". Why does it23 therefore get put up to "are" if you are implementing24 this agreement?25 A. The 9th September assessment that intelligence indicates

1281 that chemical and biological munitions could be with2 military units and ready for firing within 20 to3 45 minutes -- that was the wording, the sense of which4 was accurately reflected in the redrafting on the5 17th September of the dossier. That is the point I am6 making. They went back to the intelligence, the7 original intelligence, which contained no caveat of

8 uncertainty. They went back to the way in which it was9 phrased in the 9th September assessment and they


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10 redrafted their main body of the dossier to come into11 line with that, which it had not been before, including12 the words "intelligence indicates that".13 Q. You say there was no element of uncertainty in this14 intelligence?15 A. Report, yes.

16 Q. Report. Well, can I just put to you some possible17 elements of uncertainty which might have influenced the18 assessors to say "indicates" and not "shows"? Firstly,19 you did not know what munitions the Iraqi officer was20 specifically referring to, did you?21 A. No, that is right.22 Q. You did not know from where or to where the munitions23 might be moved within 45 minutes?24 A. That is right.25 Q. Indeed, it was thought at one point that it must mean

1291 that these munitions were at forward depots but it was

2 thought that was too uncertain so it was removed?3 A. No, that was removed because it was not stated as such4 in the intelligence report; but that was the assessment5 at the time of what it did refer to, and indeed remains6 the assessment of what it did refer to, that these were7 munitions at forward deployed points.8 Q. You see, "forward deployed points" is removed. If they9 are not at forward deployed points, one asks oneself:10 where are they?11 A. At forward deployed points, that is where we assessed12 them to be.13 Q. Why remove "forward deployed points" in that sense?14 A. We were being accurate and precise and not putting into

15 the 9th September assessment wording which was not16 actually in the assessment. We could have left it in,17 it was a fine point but it was decided not to put it in,18 so it was not.19 Q. Do you accept that assessors could have regard to the20 fact, for example, that they did not know from where to21 where exactly what was covered by this period of22 45 minutes? They did not know the specific weapons23 referred to. It was relayed to them through an24 intermediary -- I appreciate a reliable one, but25 nonetheless it is second-hand. All these were matters

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1 properly to take into account in deciding whether it2 indicated or showed a particular state of affairs.3 A. You are talking as if the assessors sit there and4 operate in a vacuum. They do not. They are assessing5 individual intelligence reports against the background6 of their knowledge. This was a point of precision which7 was being given, a timing which was being given for the8 first time with precision, to an assessment which9 already existed about the capability of the Iraqi armed10 forces in this area. That is what assessment is about.11 There is too much emphasis on sources, single reporting.12 Assessment is a much more complicated thing than that13 and it takes many aspects into account, as has been

14 explained many times to this Inquiry.15 Q. Mr Scarlett I am entirely with you about that and


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22 superior to that of Mr Campbell, is it not?23 A. It is indeed.24 Q. He may not agree with you, but I do.25 You, presumably, regarded it as important to get

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1 across the message that you were in charge of this2 dossier?3 A. I did, yes.4 Q. And you asked Mr Campbell, as we know -- I think you5 said to him: it would be helpful if you set out the6 process, and that was one of the points he was to7 include in it?8 A. Yes.9 Q. Why did you not chair that first planning meeting in10 order to get across the clear message that you were in11 charge and not the communications side of12 Downing Street?13 A. That meeting was held to discuss the overall structure,

14 format, presentation of the dossier; and15 Alastair Campbell, as the Prime Minister's16 representative and very clearly representing his17 views -- and the Prime Minister was commissioning this18 document -- chaired that meeting in that role. At that19 meeting we did not in any way discuss intelligence20 matters or anything in terms of intelligence content,21 intelligence reports, intelligence items, which fell22 within my area of responsibility. Therefore it was23 natural for him to chair it.24 Q. Did it discuss the use of JIC assessments in the dossier25 in any form?

1341 A. In very general terms, at my instigation the idea was2 put forward that the dossier should include an account3 of the history of JIC assessments over the previous4 three years because, indeed, it was those assessments5 over the previous three to three and a half years which6 were underpinning the judgments or going to underpin the7 judgments in the dossier. That was a general concept,8 which I put forward.9 Q. Now I --10 A. There was no discussion of detail at all.11 Q. I just want to ask you about this: at this stage, after12 your discussion on 9th September, and I am not going to

13 re-enter our old dispute, but did you have in mind that14 the dossier would include, as it were, new judgments by15 the Joint Intelligence Committee on the 45 minutes16 point? By which I mean judgments that had not appeared17 in the 9th September assessment?18 A. At that meeting on 9th September I was not thinking19 about the 45 minutes point and my thinking was not going20 that far. At that meeting I was thinking about the need21 for the dossier to include, as far as it was safe to do22 so, specific reference to individual items of23 intelligence. It would be, you know, intelligence-based24 explicitly and also refer explicitly to JIC assessments.25 Q. The 9th September JIC assessment had been sent out on

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1 5th September with a deadline for reply of the 9th.2 A. Yes.3 Q. Was there any time on the 9th when the replies had to be4 in by?5 A. What I can tell you in answer to that is that the last6 written comments, I am almost certain, came in by the

7 close of play on the 6th, which was the Friday. The 9th8 was a Monday. There may have been one or two telephone9 comments early on the Monday. What I can tell you is10 the JIC assessment of 9th September issued at11 1400 hours.12 Q. Could you look, please, at CAB/6/3 which is the second13 page of Mr Campbell's subsequent minute of this meeting.14 It is the first paragraph of any length:15 "The media/political judgment will inevitably focus16 on 'what's new?'..."17 Do you see that?18 A. Yes.19 Q. Knowing Mr Campbell's interest in the latest headlines,

20 he must have asked you, must he not: what is the21 up-to-date position on JIC assessments on Iraq?22 A. Sorry to disappoint you, he did not.23 Q. He restrained himself, did he?24 A. I do not know. He did not.25 Q. When did he first ask you about the up-to-date JIC

1361 assessments on Iraq?2 A. I do not recall him ever doing so in the terms that you3 have just indicated.4 Q. You are sure about that, are you?5 A. I do not recall him ever doing so in the terms you have

6 just indicated. The first that he saw of our drafting7 and latest intelligence and the way we were expressing8 it in the dossier was late on the evening of the9 10th September, which was the following day, that I do10 know for certain. That gave him, of course, quite a lot11 of detail.12 Q. Did you understand him to be saying on 9th September13 that he and others from Downing Street, Foreign Office14 press staff would be making drafting recommendations and15 suggestions to you?16 A. What I understood from that meeting was that there would17 be interest from him, certainly, in No. 10, on the way18 that the dossier was eventually presented. In fact

19 I think he says in his record that whilst the assessment20 staff, with the authority of the JIC, are drafting the21 dossier, he would head a small group which would22 consider presentation. That is what he put in the23 minute.24 Q. I just want to deal with one very short point. I think25 it was your own conclusion, I do not know whether it is

1371 reflected in the full JIC paper, which I have not seen,2 that the 9th September 45 minute claim related to3 battlefield munitions?4 A. It did, yes.

5 Q. I think we can see how you might well have reached that6 conclusion if we look at BBC/30/3, very quickly.


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7 This is an extract from the Intelligence and8 Security Committee report.9 A. Hmm.10 Q. It deals with delivery systems.11 A. Yes.12 Q. The potential systems are set out in 46.

13 A. Yes.14 Q. A number of serious doubts about almost all of them,15 except for artillery shells and so on, are expressed in16 47.17 Then in 48:18 "The JIC assessed that the Iraqis might use chemical19 and biological weapons against neighbouring states or20 concentrations of Western forces. We were told that the21 weapons systems most likely to be used to deliver22 chemical and biological munitions against Western forces23 were artillery and rockets."24 A. Yes.25 Q. "These are battlefield weapons, which can be used

1381 tactically to great effect, but they are not strategic2 weapons."3 Firstly, was that made clear to the Prime Minister?4 A. There was no discussion with the Prime Minister that5 I can recall about the 45 minutes point in connection6 with battlefield or strategic systems. Indeed I do not7 remember a discussion with the Prime Minister about the8 45 minutes point at all.9 Q. Who, apart from the internal assessment staff, was this10 message conveyed to?11 A. Sorry, what message?

12 Q. Only battlefield munitions, not strategic weapons.13 A. You say "only battlefield munitions". Do you know what14 a battlefield munition, a battlefield weapon, might15 actually involve? I can tell you the assessment from16 the DIS of what the most likely delivery system for17 chemical and biological, particularly chemical weapons,18 would be, and this was based on the experience of the19 Iran/Iraq War. Multiple rocket launchers, in particular20 the BM21 with a range of 20-kilometres or artillery up21 to the 155 millimetre artillery, which would have22 a range of 40 kilometres. In the Iran/Iraq War 20,00023 Iranians were killed or wounded through the use of24 chemical weapons, so the difference between strategic

25 and tactical in those contexts is quite difficult to

1391 draw, particularly as Iran's use of chemical weapons in2 the Iran/Iraq War had a strategic effect of halting3 a major Iranian advance. I just thought I would say4 that.5 Q. Mr Scarlett, I totally take the point but you are well6 aware, are you not, of the distinction between range and7 casualty?8 A. Yes.9 Q. Yes. Strategic weapons have a far longer range, they10 could reach British bases in Cyprus, for example, which

11 is what the newspaper said on 25th September.12 A. A small number of newspapers said it on 25th September


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13 and not thereafter.14 Q. A small number of newspapers with a readership of15 millions.16 A. On the 25th September there were a small number of17 headlines about that; and afterwards virtually no18 reference to it.

19 Q. Were you concerned that that should be corrected,20 Mr Scarlett?21 A. No, I was not and I will tell you why not. First of22 all, as regards my own assessment staff, we were ready23 to field enquiries from the press offices of No. 10, the24 MoD, the FCO with anything relating to issues of this25 kind. We received no enquiries whatsoever about the

1401 45 minute point.2 The second point was I was of course following the3 press coverage of the dossier and I was interested to4 note that immediately after the headline flurry on

5 various points on the 24th and 25th September the press6 coverage fell quickly into assessing the dossier as7 a sober and cautious document that most explicitly did8 not make a case for war, if anything it made a case for9 the return of the inspectors and it focused in10 particular, quite rightly in my view, on the importance11 of what the dossier had to say about the nuclear issue.12 I was content with the way that coverage came out; and13 that is -- that was my attitude over many months indeed.14 Q. Do I understand you to say that you do not correct it15 because no questions had been asked about it?16 A. No, you may understand it but that would be wrong, but17 I have explained that the reason why that was not an

18 issue in my mind was because of the very sober and19 sensible way in which media coverage of the dossier fell20 into place immediately after the 25th September.21 Q. Well, what about the 25th September itself? This is the22 day it is announced in the House of Commons by the23 Prime Minister, and certainly a number of newspapers,24 with mass readerships throughout the country, have25 misunderstood it. Why was it not put right and why were

1411 you not concerned to put it right?2 A. Because it was a fleeting moment and then the underlying3 assessment by the media of the dossier was as I have

4 just described, and beyond that, of course, it is not my5 immediate responsibility to correct headlines and if6 I did that, I certainly would not have time to do my7 job.8 Q. Can we just look, please, at the wording of the first9 draft? I think probably BBC/29/9 I hope is our10 constructed document on this.11 LORD HUTTON: I am sorry, BBC?12 MR CALDECOTT: 29/9, my Lord, I am sorry.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you very much.14 A. Yes.15 MR CALDECOTT: Now, this is your first -- I say your first16 draft.

17 A. Yes.18 Q. You were drafting the executive summary personally, is


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19 that right?20 A. No, that is not right.21 Q. I am sorry about that.22 A. Yes.23 Q. Was that also drafted by Mr Miller under your24 supervision?

25 A. The executive summary and the text, the main text of the

1421 dossier, was all part of the drafting process taking2 place under the leadership of Mr Miller but of course3 under my overall supervision.4 Q. And you saw this draft before it went out, therefore,5 for comment?6 A. I did, yes.7 Q. We see the word "indicates" in the executive summary --8 A. Yes.9 Q. -- which is the word which is taken directly, I think,10 from the main text of the 9th September draft?

11 A. Yes.12 Q. Your assessment staff have used a different word for it13 in the main text. We see three lines up from14 paragraph 13 "within the last month intelligence has15 suggested"; right?16 A. Yes.17 Q. That word "suggested" reflects, does it not, the18 judgment element in the word "indicates" in the19 9th September draft?20 A. Well, so would "indicate"; and "suggests" normally tends21 to be slightly weaker than "indicates".22 Q. And certainly weaker than "shows"?23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can I just ask you: much later you did a briefing note,25 I think to assist Mr Campbell in briefing the

1431 Prime Minister for Question Time. Do you remember that2 on 4th June?3 A. No, I do not remember that.4 Q. I am sorry, it is a very recent document we have just5 seen.6 A. I think I can help you if that is all right. No, that7 is all right, there was not a note for Mr Campbell to8 assist him with the Prime Minister, it was a letter from9 me, as Chairman of the JIC, personally to the

10 Prime Minister of 4th June.11 Q. You are quite right, it is my fault. It is headed12 "Prime Minister".13 A. That is fine.14 Q. CAB/45/2 is where it starts. I just wanted to ask you15 about some words at CAB/45/4 which is page 3 of the16 document.17 A. Fine.18 LORD HUTTON: This is dated, Mr Caldecott?19 MR CALDECOTT: 4th June my Lord.20 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.21 MR CALDECOTT: I promise I will be brief about this, we will22 not go back over old territory.

23 I just wanted to ask you about one line.24 A. Please.


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25 Q. About five lines in on that page.

1441 A. Hmm.2 Q. "The report was highlighted in the same terms in a JIC3 assessment of 9th September."

4 All I want to ask you is this: is the report there5 the dossier or is it the original intelligence report?6 A. Let me just read it. No, it is the original7 intelligence report.8 Q. I thought that was right. Thank you.9 Can I just move, please, to your circulation of this10 draft to JIC members which we find at CAB/33/133. You11 attach a current draft. Third line:12 "Nevertheless, you need to see where we have got to.13 I would be grateful if you could study the14 intelligence-related sections (essentially15 section 6)..."; do you see that?16 A. Yes.

17 Q. "... and let me or Julian Miller have your views by18 midday tomorrow, if not at this afternoon's JIC19 [meeting]."20 A. That is right.21 Q. It is right here, is it not, that you are asking them to22 focus specifically on the main text? Do you see the23 words there "essentially section 6"?24 A. Which in that draft was what became the intelligence25 section on current capabilities in the final version.

1451 It changed quite a bit of course in terms of structure.2 Q. You say in the last sentence:

3 "We also need to be sure that overall the balance of4 the judgments remain consistent with those previously5 reached by the [Joint Intelligence Committee]."6 A. I do.7 Q. You then have a meeting on 11th September at 6 o'clock?8 A. Yes.9 Q. I went through this with Mr Campbell.10 A. Okay.11 Q. I am going to try to take it quite briefly.12 A. Yes.13 Q. Those present are Mr Kelly, Mr Smith, two14 Prime Minister's Official Spokesmen --15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- Mr Bassett the special adviser and Mr Pruce.17 A. Yes.18 Q. Can I ask you about this: Mr Pruce, who Mr Campbell said19 was "punching above his pay grade" was his expression,20 he was in fact someone whom the agencies were21 specifically asked, were they not, could be admitted to22 these meetings?23 A. To the meetings of the drafting group on 9th and24 17th September, that is correct.25 Q. I do not want to go through these e-mails in great

1461 detail. You have been through them before.

2 A. Hmm.3 Q. But you did say in your evidence last time that


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4 certainly the gist of them was mentioned to you in the5 6 o'clock meeting.6 A. I think what I said last time was that I did not see7 those e-mails at the time, in fact I did not see them8 until they came before the Inquiry. But now that I had9 seen them, and I had a recollection, but no record, of

10 the 11th September 6 o'clock discussion, that some of11 the main themes were represented in the very general12 advice that was given to me by Alastair Campbell13 himself.14 Q. Can I just ask you, briefly, about this question of15 records? There has been a very important planning16 meeting on 9th September.17 A. Hmm.18 Q. Did you make any notes of that meeting?19 A. The note was made by Alastair Campbell.20 Q. Oh, Mr Campbell did make a note of that meeting at the21 time?22 A. That was the record that was sent out, two and a half

23 pages.24 Q. I do not think so.25 A. Yes, it was. You just quoted it on the screen.

1471 Q. He said he was asked to do that by you after the event.2 We have seen no contemporaneous note of that meeting.3 A. That note which was written immediately afterwards4 recorded the outcome of that meeting and the meeting of5 5th September. As far as I was concerned, that was more6 than adequate.7 Q. Nobody was making a contemporaneous note as this8 discussion about structure proceeded on 9th September?

9 A. As far as I was concerned, of course this was not my10 business, I was not chairing this meeting, but as far as11 I was concerned, all the relevant points at that12 discussion were recorded immediately in that I think two13 and a half page minute.14 Q. But the answer to my question is that you are unaware of15 anybody making a contemporaneous note of that meeting of16 9th September planning the structure of the dossier?17 A. I cannot answer for the organisation of18 Alastair Campbell's own directorate. I am not aware of19 it, no, nor am I concerned about it.20 Q. Can we now look at the 16th September draft, please?21 BBC/29/10. I will try to take this reasonably quickly.

22 This has now, has it not, gone around, as it were, the23 agencies for comment? Indeed it has also gone to JIC24 members.25 A. Yes.

1481 Q. We see that there is a conclusion.2 A. Yes.3 Q. Was that suggested to you by Mr Bassett?4 A. No, it was not.5 Q. Never mentioned by him?6 A. Not that I recall.7 Q. We see the word "may" in the main text twice.

8 A. Yes.9 Q. And that I think probably again seems to relate to an


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10 interpretation of the word "suggested". We see it going11 down the queue from "indicates" to "suggested" and now12 put in as "may".13 A. I know you might think that, that is understandable. In14 fact I do not think it does. As I explained to15 the Inquiry last time, I having consulted the people who

16 drafted this particular draft, they have no17 recollection, still have no recollection of why that was18 phrased as "may" rather than as it was phrased on the19 11th September.20 Q. Can I make a suggestion to you? You referred this21 morning to a concern to put the language of the JIC into22 layman's language. I appreciate nobody seems to be able23 to remember how this word "may" arose but it would be an24 obvious explanation as to why it was used.25 A. But not necessarily a truthful one.

1491 Q. Not necessarily but we are having to do our best because

2 you cannot remember.3 A. I cannot say that that is correct because I have no4 knowledge of it at all. Therefore I cannot say it and5 therefore I cannot give my authority to that6 interpretation and I am not doing so.7 Q. What we do know is, and I need not go to it because you8 were taken to it in evidence, there is the e-mail that9 goes out from a member of your assessment staff at about10 midday on the 11th about the question of being round the11 buoys before and the "last" with an exclamation mark.12 A. Yes.13 Q. A degree of weariness with requesting more intelligence.14 A. Hmm.

15 Q. That goes out at about midday on the 11th. The message16 from Mr Bassett after that last request had gone out we17 see at CAB/11/23 in one of his e-mails that was read to18 you before. In pretty strong terms he is saying that he19 wants more, better, more convincing intelligence. He20 even seems to think that intelligence is being held21 back.22 He sent that e-mail only two and a half hours before23 a meeting that he attended with you.24 A. Yes.25 Q. Did he not express that sentiment to you?

150

1 A. I have no memory at all of -- I remember Phil Bassett2 being at the meeting. I do not remember what he said3 and I do not remember taking any notice of it.4 Q. You see that actually was the e-mail read to you5 immediately before you gave your answer first time round6 that you did remember the gist of these e-mails being7 put to you orally at the meeting.8 A. What I said the last time round was the general advice9 that I took away from Alastair Campbell, from nobody10 else at that meeting, was that the 11th September draft,11 as we continued to work on it, needed, ideally, to have12 more detail in it, it needed to be less assertive, less13 rhetorical, that that was the broad outline of the

14 advice. And I happen to agree that I thought that was15 good advice and I took that away. And indeed the


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16 16th September draft was clearly striking a slightly17 different tone in its language.18 Q. Can we just quickly look at the terms in which you sent19 the next draft, the 16th September draft round to JIC20 members? CAB/33/134. Paragraph 2, please, Mr Scarlett.21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Again you are drawing the attention of JIC members in23 particular, are you not, to the main text, the second24 sentence?25 A. (Pause).

1511 "This includes the reference to JIC's assessments2 which were discussed at our meeting", on the 11th, yes.3 What I am drawing attention to there is the passages4 in this new draft referring to the history, the5 developing history of JIC assessments over the previous6 three years which we had specifically discussed on7 11th September. That is what I am referring to there.

8 Q. Can I just ask you a small point, which you may be able9 to help me with? Could we, first of all, please, have10 on screen CAB/11/142? Paragraph 4, please, towards the11 very bottom. Do you see there:12 "These judgments have been endorsed by the Joint13 Intelligence Committee."14 Do you see that?15 A. Yes.16 Q. Can we now, please, have CAB/3/26 which is the17 19th September version. About a third from the top,18 paragraph 6, please:19 "These judgments reflect the views of..."20 So, for some reason it has been changed from

21 "endorsed by" to "reflect the views of".22 A. Sorry, this refers to which draft?23 Q. The second one, the rather weaker one, "reflect the24 views" is 19th September. The stronger one, "endorsed25 by", 16th September. Can you remember why that

1521 happened?2 A. No, I cannot and I do not -- can you scroll up to the3 top of the bullet points, the previous page, sorry.4 Q. I think you will probably have to go to the previous5 page for that.6 A. There we are:

7 "As a result of this intelligence we judge that Iraq8 has..."9 So it is explicit that these are the judgment. They10 reflect the views of the JIC. That is very firm11 wording, I think.12 Q. Can we just look at CAB/11/141, please? Towards the13 bottom of the page, the last line:14 "... and it allows us to judge that Iraq..."15 A. That is right.16 Q. Do you see, both these versions are plainly referring to17 judgments but one says "endorsed" and one says "reflect18 the views of", but you cannot remember any debate19 leading to that change?

20 A. No, and I see no difference between them either.21 Q. So there would be no point changing it then?


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22 A. Well one thing means -- both are saying that these23 judgments carry the authority of the JIC. That, for me,24 is good enough.25 Q. We then get the 19th September draft. I have debated

153

1 with you the effect of the meeting of the2 17th September --3 A. Yes.4 Q. -- which I think is your explanation for why "may" goes5 up to "are". I put to you the doubts we have about6 that.7 A. Yes.8 Q. I am not going to go around it again.9 A. Okay.10 Q. I am neither, in the time available, going to go through11 all the changes that Mr Sumption went through. But12 I just want to see the extent to which the changes being13 canvassed by Mr Campbell were actually discussed at the

14 JIC Committee meeting of 18th September. Could we,15 please, have BBC/30/24?16 This is a response or a holding response, one might17 describe it as, to Mr Campbell's minute to you of18 17th September. I imagine it is from your assistant,19 a secretary or someone similar, it is redacted:20 "John Scarlett has seen these comments and is taking21 account of them in the revisions now in the process of22 being incorporated. Both he and Julian Miller are now23 at the regular Wednesday JIC meeting and will be unable24 to move drafting forward for the next hour and a half or25 so. He will revert later."

1541 So it does look, does it not, from this, that the2 suggestions by Mr Campbell, subject to the debate3 between us about the 17th September meeting on point 10,4 were not, cannot have been raised at the 18th JIC5 meeting; is that right?6 A. Well, actually this e-mail is not referring to the7 17th September memo, it is referring to an e-mail8 message from Mr Campbell to me or my office on the9 18th September. But I do not have the e-mail in front10 of me here, so I cannot tell you exactly what was in it.11 But I did subsequently receive, as I said, I think three12 e-mails after the 17th September from him. So that is

13 what that is about.14 Q. Right. Can we, please, move on to the 19th September?15 A. Yes.16 Q. I just want to ask you -- CAB/23/1, please -- one17 question about paragraph 3. This is for circulation to18 JIC members, the last on the copying list there, you19 will see.20 A. Yes.21 Q. "Copies go to JIC members on a personal basis,22 reflecting the continuing sensitivity of the document23 and the imperative need to avoid leaks."24 A. Yes.25 Q. Does that mean that the 19th September draft did not go

155


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1 round the system but was only seen by the JIC members?2 A. No, it does not. That is a call for JIC members to be3 especially careful as to how this draft is handled4 within their organisations, given the fact that, you5 know, it is about to become public and you are into that6 area of sensitivity. This draft would have been --

7 certainly was seen by the normal representatives on the8 drafting group. That is what that refers to. It is --9 you know, obviously it is a fair question but that is10 definitely what it refers to.11 Q. What limitation did you have in mind by the word12 "essential"?13 A. Well, what I meant by that was comments they felt, the14 members felt, were weighty and important. I was not15 defining it any more carefully than that and I think16 they would have understood that, although, as I have17 said, we did receive three pages of detailed comments18 from DIS, most of which we incorporated.19 Q. It was not very long to consider this draft, was it,

20 because the deadline was 3 o'clock the same day?21 A. No, but the JIC is used to working, and the coordination22 mechanism and the support mechanism is used to working23 within very tight deadlines. It does it all the time.24 Q. Even the computer illiterates like me understand this25 concept of tracking changes.

1561 A. Yes.2 Q. Was any attempt made in the draft sent round to indicate3 the changes in later drafts from the previous draft,4 because we have seen no copy which indicates that was5 ever done?

6 A. No, I do not think that was so, and it was not necessary7 because the members of the drafting group were following8 this in detail and were in frequent contact with each9 other, and they were all well-qualified and expert in10 this field.11 Q. This deadline of 3 o'clock was an effective deadline,12 was it not? It was the closing of the shutters as far13 as JIC members were concerned?14 A. I would not use that expression. In fact, it was not15 quite. Comments were coming in after 3 o'clock and were16 absorbed without difficulty by the assessment staff17 during the course of that working day, which again is18 quite formal for them. I agree that is quite a tight

19 deadline but that is a normal one for them.20 Q. I want to ask you about a change we have not yet looked21 at in evidence. Could we, please, look at CAB/11/103?22 This is a suggestion that comes in from23 Downing Street --24 A. Yes.25 Q. -- after your deadline of 3 o'clock. It is timed at

1571 3.45 from Mr Powell, the Downing Street Chief of Staff.2 A. Yes.3 Q. Sent only to you and Mr Campbell and copied to Sir David4 Manning.

5 A. Yes.6 Q. "Found my copy. I think it is good.


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7 "I agree with Alastair you should drop the8 conclusion."9 That we know is done.10 A. Yes.11 Q. "Alastair -- what will be the headline in the Standard12 on day of publication?

13 "What do we want it to be?"14 I will not ask you about that.15 A. No.16 Q. "I think the statement on page 19 that 'Saddam is17 prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if he18 believes his regime is under threat' is a bit of19 a problem. It backs up the Don McIntyre argument that20 there is no CBW threat and we will only create one if we21 attack him."22 Now, Don McIntyre is a chief political columnist at23 the Independent.24 A. Yes.25 Q. "I think you should redraft the para. My memory of the

1581 intelligence is that he has set up plans to use CBW on2 Western forces and that these weapons are integrated3 into his military planning."4 Right?5 A. Yes.6 Q. The suggestion there, is it not, is that the dossier7 should be redrafted to remove an express suggestion that8 Saddam Hussein is a defensive threat?9 A. Hmm.10 Q. And leave an implication that, in fact, he is an11 offensive threat; is that right?

12 A. No. It is not right. It is not to leave the13 implication that he is an offensive threat, it is to14 take away the explicit, as it were, limitation that it15 is a defensive -- not a defensive threat, but it is16 a defensive sort of point.17 Q. Do you accept you can transform a dossier by omission,18 Mr Scarlett?19 A. Well, omission is --20 Q. Taking out what was in it before?21 A. Of course, that is -- it is important what you take out22 as well as what you put in.23 Q. You see, such a change would make a great effect, would24 it not, on the threat in fact presented by

25 Saddam Hussein in the eyes of the public?

1591 A. Shall I say what I did about this?2 Q. Yes, please do.3 A. Yes. This e-mail did prompt me and the assessment staff4 to look again at that particular passage. Now, we were5 acting under the instructions from the JIC to keep what6 we were writing in line with standing JIC assessments7 and also with recent intelligence. As I recall this8 particular paragraph -- obviously this particular9 paragraph was under the heading of what recent10 intelligence was showing. Now, there had been an

11 intelligence report which made that point, I mean12 a recent intelligence report which is why it was phrased


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13 like this.14 When we looked at it again, we also realised two15 things: first of all, that there was no standing JIC16 assessment which made it clear whether we were defining17 Saddam's threat, if you like, as defensive or CW posture18 as defensive or offensive. More to the point, there was

19 recent reporting, in addition, which was not reflected20 here, but which was quite clear reporting, which placed21 his attachment to CBW and the importance that he placed22 on it very much in the context of his perception of his23 regional position, his plans to acquire and maintain24 regional influence and, as one report, and maybe more,25 put it: dominate his neighbours. In other words, the

1601 recent intelligence was more complex than that phrase2 implied.3 Bearing those points in mind, we concluded that this4 was not right, the way this was phrased; and therefore

5 we took that out. That is what I did.6 Q. This formula had appeared in the draft of the7 11th September, circulated to JIC members and approved.8 It had appeared in the draft of the 16th September,9 circulated to JIC members and approved. It appeared in10 the draft of the 19th September, circulated to JIC11 members and approved. Why the change? Only the reason12 you have given.13 A. Well that is an important reason and I was acting under14 JIC instructions, and within our authority and delegated15 authority, as I have explained, in basing what we did on16 the recent intelligence.17 Q. Can we, please, look at BBC/30/8 as to what the

18 intelligence did say on this subject, so far as we can19 work it out? This is an extract, again, of the ISC20 report.21 A. Hmm.22 Q. BBC/30/8, please. Scroll down a little bit, please, to23 119.24 "The assessments staff produced an intelligence25 update on 27 November 2002."

1611 That is obviously after publication.2 A. Yes.3 Q. "It reiterated an earlier JIC assessment that if Saddam

4 were to be faced with the likelihood of military defeat5 and removal from power, he would be unlikely to be6 deterred from using chemical and biological weapons by7 any diplomatic or military means."8 A. Yes.9 Q. Now that is consistent, is it not, with the original10 wording?11 A. What that says -- it says what he would do if he was --12 and he would use these weapons if he were faced with13 these circumstances. It does not say, at all, that14 those are the only circumstances in which he would use15 those weapons and the reporting definitely did not say16 that.

17 Q. Can we look at what I assume is, in fact, the later18 intelligence update on 27th November at paragraph 120?


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25 Saddam Hussein was intending to develop.

1641 A. Hmm.2 Q. The change of title on the 20th is to "Iraq's weapons of3 mass destruction", the emphasis being on the weapons he

4 in fact has.5 A. Yes.6 Q. Who suggested that change at the very last minute?7 A. It was not a suggestion, it was me. I decided it,8 because the title "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction"9 was an accurate reflection of the contents of the10 dossier. For no other reason. What I remember more was11 lingering on whether I was going to say the British12 Government assessment or the assessment of the British13 Government. That is true. I do remember thinking that14 if -- the first line is simply a description of what the15 dossier actually contained.16 Q. It is probably answered by that, but I think just for

17 everybody's assistance, I draw your attention to18 something Dr Kelly said to Ms Watts in his telephone19 conversation that was recorded at BBC/1/60. It is just20 a couple of sentences at the very bottom of BBC/1/60.21 The bottom three lines almost:22 "I think that was the real concern that everyone23 had, it was not so much what they have now but what they24 would have in the future. But that unfortunately wasn't25 expressed strongly in the dossier because that takes

1651 away the case for war."2 Do you have any comment to make about that?

3 A. That is not a completely accurate assessment of what4 I understood or certainly what indeed was the attitude5 of the JIC for which Dr Kelly was not in a position to6 speak. The attitude of the JIC was that both points7 were relevant. It was of concern what they had at that8 stage as assessed by the JIC and it was of concern as to9 what was going to happen in the future.10 Q. I want to turn, please, to a completely different topic11 which is various dealings you had with Parliament or12 Parliamentary Committees.13 The BBC's allegations, I think I am right in saying,14 you perceived as a very serious attack on the JIC as15 well as a serious attack on those like Mr Campbell and

16 others in Government, as I understand it?17 A. Well --18 Q. That is right?19 A. I perceived the allegation, in particular the allegation20 in the 6.07 broadcast on the 29th May, as completely21 wrong. That was my point, that it was a false22 allegation and one that I was in a position to deny23 straightaway.24 Q. Am I right that you to some extent briefed the25 Prime Minister on Question Time on the 4th June?

1661 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. Can we please look at CAB/1/238? There are four points.3 This is the first one, Question Time on 4th June.


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4 A. I briefed him before Question Time, of course.5 Q. Yes of course. Four lines in:6 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute7 claim..."8 A. I cannot see it.9 Q. Sorry, I beg your pardon. My fault, it is not up yet.

10 CAB/1/238. Top of the page, please, four lines in:11 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute12 claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence13 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the14 dossier -- I have discussed it, as I said, with the15 Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- is also16 completely and totally untrue. Instead of hearing from17 one or many anonymous sources, I suggest that if people18 have any evidence, they actually produce it."19 Who did you consult about whether or not there was20 any disquiet about the 45 minute claim before briefing21 the Prime Minister in this very strong language that he22 uses?

23 A. Well, first of all, I would say that the key point in24 that sentence is the intelligence community which25 disagreed with its inclusion in the dossier.

1671 I consulted the head -- before that, I consulted the2 head of GCHQ, I consulted personally the head of SIS.3 Furthermore, I had written the Prime Minister a letter,4 in effect, a note, which I think you previously referred5 to, which I had circulated to all members of the JIC.6 So all members of the JIC had seen it and had approved7 it. And it was on the basis of that note that I was8 briefing the Prime Minister.

9 I was therefore confident, as I had been all along,10 that the representatives of the intelligence community11 were not aware of disquiet about the inclusion of the12 45 minute point in the dossier, and that there was13 nobody in a position to represent the intelligence14 community, that is at the level of the JIC and senior15 members of the intelligence community, who had raised16 any difficulty with this point at all.17 It was on the basis of those points that I briefed18 the Prime Minister with a note of the 4th June which, as19 I said, I had circulated and agreed with all members of20 the JIC and is important in that regard.21 Q. There are two elements to that statement, Mr Scarlett,

22 are there not? One is disquiet about the 45 minutes23 claim and the other is its inclusion in the dossier.24 But anybody listening would have thought there was no25 disquiet about the 45 minutes claim as it appeared in

1681 the dossier.2 A. I briefed the Prime Minister in the terms that I have3 just said. In fact that sentence as written there links4 the two, "... provoked disquiet amongst the intelligence5 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the6 dossier". There was no disagreement, and even now,7 after we have heard about some disquiet in one

8 particular section of one particular part of the9 intelligence community, that is not about its inclusion


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10 in the dossier. So actually that statement is a solid11 one. I briefed the Prime Minister in the terms I have12 just said.13 Q. I just want to make it clear that I do not accept that14 is the limited meaning which the ordinary listener would15 place on those words and certainly Mr Campbell accepted

16 that there were two elements to it.17 A. You asked the question who did I consult and I think18 I did reply.19 Q. Did you consult DCDI?20 A. DCDI and CDI saw my letter before I sent it.21 Q. I see. The second question is your involvement in22 talking to Mr Campbell about his oral evidence to the23 Foreign Affairs Committee.24 A. Hmm.25 Q. He did discuss it with you before he gave it, did he

1691 not?

2 A. He did, yes.3 Q. And he did discuss with you the issue of drafts?4 A. Well, I do not actually remember that, but maybe he did.5 Q. Did you follow his evidence closely?6 A. Not line for line, no I did not.7 Q. Have you read it subsequently?8 A. Not in full, no.9 Q. You see, what he says, FAC/2/279, in answer to question10 987, he is being asked here whether the 45 minutes claim11 was inserted against the wishes of the intelligence12 agencies:13 "Was it put in at your suggestion?"14 Answer:

15 "No, otherwise -- it existed in the very first draft16 and, as far as I am aware, that part of the paper stayed17 like that."18 That was demonstrably wrong, was it not?19 A. That is Mr Campbell speaking. I am not saying that and20 I cannot answer for him.21 Q. We have been through the drafts, Mr Scarlett. It is22 demonstrably wrong, is it not?23 A. I do not know whether Mr Campbell had seen all the24 drafts and I did not know when he said that. I cannot25 answer for what he says there. That is for Mr Campbell

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1 to speak on that, but I am sure he did.2 Q. He told them he had seen all the drafts. But let us3 look at question 988:4 "I can assure you that I have had many, many5 discussions about this issue with the Chairman of the6 JIC, not least in preparation for this hearing."7 Were you aware that he had told the Foreign Affairs8 Committee that the draft on the 45 minutes point never9 changed?10 A. I have to say no, I was not.11 Q. If you were aware of it, it would plainly have to be12 corrected, would it not?13 A. Well, I was not aware of it so I cannot say more.

14 Q. Very well. Let us move on to the written supplemental15 memorandum which was prepared.


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16 Can I just remind you about this? Mr Campbell gave17 evidence on 25th June. On 27th June, he had a meeting18 with you, as I understand it, to prepare a supplementary19 memorandum to be submitted to the Foreign Affairs20 Committee?21 A. To discuss one, yes.

22 Q. He says this in his evidence at the first round of23 evidence:24 "I spent most of the morning having to work with25 John Scarlett and others putting together

1711 a supplementary memo to the FAC that had to be in by2 lunchtime."3 Who were the "others"?4 A. In No. 10, as I recall, the other person at the meeting5 was Clare Sumner; and there may have been one or two6 others as well, I am not absolutely certain.7 Q. Was Mr Howard there?

8 A. No.9 Q. As I understand it, you did not know that Mr Campbell10 had told the FAC that the drafts had never changed.11 A. No, I was not aware of that.12 Q. What you, however, obviously did know was that there had13 been an exchange of minutes between Mr Campbell and you14 on 17th September and 18th September, and you had them15 in front of you, did you not, when you prepared this16 memorandum?17 A. When we discussed the memorandum, yes.18 LORD HUTTON: Mr Caldecott, we need to give the19 stenographers a break, I think. Is this a convenient20 moment?

21 MR CALDECOTT: Certainly.22 LORD HUTTON: I will rise at this stage for five minutes23 I think.24 (3.30 pm)25 (Short Break)

1721 (3.35 pm)2 MR CALDECOTT: Mr Scarlett, you did read this memorandum3 before it went in to the Foreign Affairs Committee,4 I assume?5 A. Yes, I did.6 Q. Can I, please, just ask you to look at FAC/3/131? If we

7 could just scroll down a little bit, please. Do you see8 about halfway into that page:9 "The JIC Chairman first sent me a draft of the10 dossier on 10 September.11 "To the best of my recollection, and that of12 Chairman of the JIC, I did not make any comments on the13 text of the draft at that stage.14 "On 17 September, he sent me a further draft."15 Right?16 A. Yes.17 Q. "As far as we recall, our discussions on the text took18 place over 17 and 18 September."19 Why was that an exercise in recollection when you

20 had the documents in front of you, Mr Scarlett?21 A. Because that would assume that I was confident that


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22 those documents did indeed reflect the full extent of23 our exchanges. I was not actually quite confident of24 that. I thought it was possible that we had had other25 exchanges, possibly before, more likely afterwards. But

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1 I simply did not remember all that time afterwards. So2 I wanted to be cautious. As it has turned out, of3 course, now, we have found e-mails which show that there4 were further exchanges, so this was not quite complete.5 Q. Do you accept that without any reference to any6 document, the words "as far as we all" and "our7 discussions" suggest that you were trying to remember8 oral conversations between the two of you?9 A. No, I do not. I do not think it excludes a document.10 I do not think it does suggest that.11 Q. Why did you not simply provides the documents to the12 FAC? Why go to all this trouble to summarise them?13 A. Because the documents on their own, which were written

14 in shorthand, were very informal and were between two15 people who knew the subject they were discussing, would16 have been virtually meaningless. Secondly, it had been17 explained to the FAC that original documents were not18 being provided to the Committee. So there was no19 question of doing that.20 Q. Of course, if the documents had been disclosed to the21 FAC, they would have seen that Mr Campbell had suggested22 a change or commented on a change to the 45 minutes23 claim, would they not?24 A. Well, except that he did not request a change on the25 45 minutes.

1741 Q. I changed -- I added "or commented on".2 A. He commented on an inconsistency on that point, that is3 what the comment was.4 Q. And you replied that you had tightened up the language?5 A. In response to his query.6 Q. But if the FAC had seen the document they would have7 discovered that, would they not?8 A. Well they might have concluded I tightened it up in9 response to Alastair Campbell. In fact, as I have10 already explained, I did not.11 Q. Why not include that point in your list of the12 discussions? You had the document in front of you and,

13 as we all know, point 10 disappears.14 A. Alastair Campbell, as he has explained, I think, chose15 to answer the specific question that he was asked, which16 was an account of the changes which he had requested.17 It was clear to me that this was not a change which he18 had requested. That was the view that he took in19 choosing to answer this; and I thought that was an20 accurate view.21 Q. You see, the whole controversy was over the 45 minutes22 claim, yet that is the one point -- well not quite the23 one point --24 A. No.25 Q. -- but a conspicuous point that is left out.

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1 A. Well, I can repeat that he was asked to give an account2 of his request for changes and that was -- first of all3 it was not the only point left out and secondly it was4 not a request for a change, that is --5 Q. I suggest to you, Mr Scarlett, I want there to be no6 doubt about this, that in the context of what the FAC

7 were looking at candour clearly required that that8 exchange on the 45 minutes point should have been9 disclosed to the FAC. Do you agree or disagree?10 A. I, as I have said, thought that the -- I concluded that11 the reply which went back was an accurate reply to the12 question that he had been asked. The letter also said13 that he had made a number of other comments including14 referring or pointing out inconsistencies and making15 some grammatical corrections or something like that.16 Q. The FAC were bound to assume that this was a full and17 complete account, were they not?18 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, forgive me, you say the letter there19 refers to inconsistencies somewhere, Mr Scarlett?

20 A. Yes, my Lord. Somewhere in this reply Mr Campbell21 refers to drawing attention to inconsistencies.22 MR CALDECOTT: The top of the page, my Lord.23 A. Yes.24 LORD HUTTON: Just a moment, Mr Caldecott.25 MR CALDECOTT: It is the top of page 3/131, I think, the

1761 fourth line.2 LORD HUTTON: "... checked that the text was consistent3 throughout..."; is that what you are referring to,4 Mr Scarlett?5 A. Yes, it is my Lord.

6 MR CALDECOTT: If the FAC had known that checking that the7 text was consistent had included an exchange on the8 45 minutes claim, I suggest they would have been9 extremely surprised at the failure to mention it.10 A. The request was for an account of changes requested, and11 that was what the reply said.12 Q. You see, some of the other points are, in fact, more13 comments than requests, are they not?14 A. Well, for example --15 Q. I will have to go back to the original draft but point 216 in my recollection --17 A. I was going to say you could have drawn attention to18 point 2 which maybe could also be -- well, it clearly

19 was a reference to an inconsistency.20 Q. Yes.21 A. But it also rather more stated a reason for, as22 I recall, if you show me, a request for this -- an23 underlying request for this to be changed. That is24 a fine point.25 Q. Are you seriously suggesting that the FAC would have

1771 thought that there might be a change to the 45 minutes2 claim included in that prefatory statement "checked that3 the text was consistent throughout"?4 A. I can only repeat that the letter from the FAC had asked

5 for an account of a request for changes. The point you6 are referring to was not a request for a change. It was


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7 pointing to an inconsistency. No change was made as8 a result of that request and there was no influence9 exercised by Mr Campbell at any stage whatsoever on the10 45 minutes point in the drafting of the dossier.11 Q. Can we move on to some other changes to the memorandum?12 I am indebted at this point to the Inquiry rather than

13 our own researches. At PKN/1/2, please. Can I just ask14 you, please, about one or two of the italicised passages15 that are taken out of the draft, that were in it at one16 stage and then taken out?17 A. Can I ask what the status of this note is?18 Q. This is a construct, I think, comparing a draft of the19 memorandum with its final version.20 A. Why can I not see the draft?21 Q. I do not have the draft in front of me at the moment.22 If you scroll down, the italics are what was in the23 first draft but not in the final draft.24 A. I do not understand why I cannot see the draft. How can25 I comment on a document the status of which I am not

1781 clear about? I do not know what this means.2 Q. CAB/31/11 you will see the draft version.3 A. Okay, fine.4 Q. I shall have to take time to find the references using5 the document. I am sorry about this. Could we, please,6 find a passage starting "However, once the decision was7 taken..."8 LORD HUTTON: Mr Caldecott, if you could just assist me,9 what is this document? Who drew it up?10 MR CALDECOTT: No, my Lord, it is prepared by the Inquiry11 rather than us. It is a comparison between a first

12 draft, as I understand it, of the supplemental13 memorandum from Mr Campbell. The italics are words14 which were in the first draft but not in the final15 draft.16 LORD HUTTON: This is the memorandum for the FAC?17 MR CALDECOTT: That is right, my Lord, yes.18 LORD HUTTON: So there at least two drafts?19 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, that is right.20 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Yes.21 MR CALDECOTT: And the underlined passages were not in the22 first draft but added to the final draft.23 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes, thank you.24 A. I am still not quite sure what it is that I am looking

25 at here. Can I see the first page?

1791 MR CALDECOTT: The first page we will see is CAB/31/8.2 A. This is to the Prime Minister. It does not look like3 a draft to me.4 LORD HUTTON: It is from Mr Campbell to the Prime Minister5 re the FAC.6 MR CALDECOTT: If we look in the second line, do you see at7 the end of the second line of this document:8 "He will then write to him explaining this decision9 and will attach to his letter a supplementary memorandum10 from me to the Committee, which is attached."

11 Do you see that?12 Then at the bottom of this page, headed "Memorandum


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13 to FAC", we see a first draft of the memorandum. Do you14 see?15 A. Right.16 Q. I just have to find the passage that I want to show you17 because, for ease's sake, I had been ...18 A. This is not the draft, is it?

19 Q. I have found the second but I still need to find --20 A. This is not the draft, this is the covering note ...21 Q. Sorry, I still need to find it.22 A. No, I sympathise.23 Q. CAB/31/10. It looks on my copy as though it is24 contiguous, but it appears not to be.25 A. Sorry, there must be a page before this.

1801 MR CALDECOTT: I am trying to find "However, once the2 decision was taken ...", which at the moment I cannot3 see.4 My Lord, I am sorry, this is the problem of taking

5 a document from somebody else.6 LORD HUTTON: Well would you like to leave it for a short7 time and come back to it?8 MR CALDECOTT: Yes.9 LORD HUTTON: Perhaps the speediest way is if I rise for10 5 minutes rather than perhaps having to bring11 Mr Scarlett back.12 MR CALDECOTT: I am concerned about the Assistant Chief13 Constable, who I know would like to be away. In one14 sense the comments I can put can be made on the15 documents. This is not a case where I really need the16 oral evidence. I just felt in fairness to Mr Scarlett,17 I would prefer to put them.

18 LORD HUTTON: Provided Mr Scarlett has a full opportunity to19 understand precisely what the document is. Are you just20 proposing to put the gist of it now to Mr Scarlett?21 MR CALDECOTT: There are only two changes. He may not have22 known about them, in which case that will be the end of23 the matter. But the two changes I was interested in --24 LORD HUTTON: Just again so I fully understand this: it25 appears from the first document we saw up on the screen

1811 that this was a memorandum from Mr Campbell to the2 Prime Minister as to the question as to whether or not3 he should appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

4 MR CALDECOTT: Yes.5 LORD HUTTON: Is the memorandum that you are referring to6 a memorandum which the Committee asked Mr Campbell to7 submit to it after he had given evidence or before he8 gave evidence?9 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, the written statement itself is at10 CAB/1/257 as submitted to the FAC. The problem is11 I know there was a separate memorandum sent by12 Mr Campbell before he went to the FAC.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes, because it may be that insofar as14 Mr Campbell is explaining to the Prime Minister why he15 is going to appear, one might think that related to the16 first memorandum.

17 MR CALDECOTT: I think it is better if I do not question on18 something which I have assumed is a construct. One


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19 needs to know more. It is not fair to the witness --20 LORD HUTTON: I want to be clear. You are not making any21 point then to Mr Scarlett about these documents.22 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, I think I have to abandon that.23 LORD HUTTON: That can be totally ignored?24 MR CALDECOTT: Yes.

25 LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you.

1821 A. Thank you.2 MR CALDECOTT: One nil to you, Mr Scarlett, I think on that3 document.4 A. I did not do anything, I just sat here.5 Q. Can I go on to deal very shortly with a point which is6 the question of the drafts and not producing the drafts?7 A. Yes.8 Q. It was a request directed to the Joint Intelligence9 Committee.10 A. No it was not.

11 Q. It was not?12 A. No, it was a request addressed to Alastair Campbell, who13 said that he would pass it on to the Joint Intelligence14 Committee verbally.15 Q. Yes, but in terms of where it was going to end up?16 A. It is quite an important point actually because neither17 the Joint Intelligence Committee nor the18 Foreign Secretary nor any Minister ever received this19 request in any other form than a comment at the hearing20 to Alastair Campbell. So I never received anything.21 Q. I see. So did you get it passed on to you orally by22 Mr Campbell?23 A. Very briefly he mentioned it to me. The Committee had

24 said that they were going to send a written summary of25 the -- or written account of the requests which had been

1831 made at the Committee. A written account did come, it2 did not include anything to do with that.3 Q. I see.4 A. So I never received it.5 Q. And did that lack of a formal request influence your6 treatment of it or not?7 A. If I had received a formal request then I certainly8 would have placed it before the Joint Intelligence9 Committee and indeed to the Foreign Secretary. I know

10 in advance, as I have already explained, what my11 colleagues in the Joint Intelligence Committee would12 have advised very strongly indeed about this request;13 but as I never received it, the question never arose.14 Q. Can I move on to the last topic which I hope you are15 familiar with.16 A. Okay.17 Q. Because I want to take it shortly because of the time18 element. You will recall that in July of 2003 --19 A. Yes.20 Q. -- there came to your attention a letter from21 Dr Jones --22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- and a letter from a colleague of his.24 A. Yes.


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25 Q. They were both addressed to among others DCDI.

1841 A. Yes.2 Q. And they were both very late in the process.3 A. Yes.

4 Q. I am sure you have prepared for this and are aware of5 the criticism that we make about these not being brought6 to the attention, in terms, of the Intelligence and7 Security Committee. You understand the criticism?8 A. I understand the comment, yes.9 Q. What I want to ask you: you obviously read those10 minutes, because they were attached to the briefing note11 which you discussed with Mr Howard?12 A. Yes, I read them I think on 17th or 18th July which was13 then the first time I had ever heard of them.14 Q. The briefing note, I think you were called in by15 Mr Howard to discuss it with him before it was finalised16 and went to the Secretary of State?

17 A. No, that is not true. There was a meeting in18 Sir David Omand's office at which I was present, where19 Mr Howard was also present, where Mr Howard informed us20 of the existence of these letters which we had not21 previously heard about. And that was on 17th July.22 Q. Would you agree, first of all, that DCDI is not23 Dr Jones' immediate line manager?24 A. No, he is the line manager of Dr Jones' line manager.25 Q. Thank you. Still less is he the line manager of

1851 a member of Dr Jones' staff?2 A. Well, no, he is even further rem

Documents

Hearing Transcript - 23 September 2003 Afternoon