Hearing Transcript - 15 September 2003 Afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 15 September 2003 Afternoon

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Hearing Transcripts

841 A. No, none whatsoever. 2 Q. And is there anything else you would like to say?3 A. No.4 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Air Marshall.

5 Do you want me to rise now, Mr Dingemans?6 MR DINGEMANS: Yes. I am sorry, we have finished a wee bit7 early.8 LORD HUTTON: We will sit again at 2 o'clock.9 (12.45 pm)10 (The short adjournment)11 (2.00 pm)12 SIR RICHARD BILLING DEARLOVE (called)13 Examined by MR DINGEMANS14 LORD HUTTON: Good afternoon Sir Richard. I hope you can15 hear me clearly.16 A. Yes, I can my Lord.17 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name and

18 occupation.19 A. Richard Billing Dearlove. I am the Chief of the Secret20 Intelligence Service popularly known as MI6.21 Q. How long have you held that position?22 A. Since 1st August 1999.23 Q. Very briefly what was your career before that?24 A. Before that I was an officer, in the service since 1966.25 Q. Can I ask you about the intelligence leading up to the

851 45 minutes claim. When did you first become aware of2 this?3 A. Can I just say, you use the word "claim"; I think

4 I would prefer to refer to it as a piece of well sourced5 intelligence.6 Q. Right. When did you first become aware of this well7 sourced piece of intelligence?8 A. It first came to my attention when it was reported9 towards the end of August. I think the precise date is10 29th August.11 Q. And what was the process which this intelligence12 underwent after it was reported?13 A. Well, the normal SIS procedure would be to put this into14 what we call a CX report and send it out to customers15 who would be on the distribution, normal distribution16 for this type of intelligence.

17 Q. In the Foreign Affairs Committee report at FAC/3/26 we18 can see, at paragraph 62, that the Foreign and19 Commonwealth Office had told the Committee that the20 intelligence on which the claim was based came from "an21 established, reliable and long-standing line of22 reporting". Can you comment on that?23 A. Well, I can except I would not normally comment in24 public on the status of an SIS source; but a certain25 amount of this is already in the public domain.

861 Q. I am only seeking comments that are already in the2 public domain.

3 A. Yes, it did come from an established and reliable source4 equating a senior Iraqi military officer who was


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5 certainly in a position to know this information.6 Q. That is at the end of August. On 3rd September we have7 heard that the Prime Minister announced his intention to8 publish a dossier in relation to intelligence. What was9 the first you knew about the proposed publication?10 A. As far as I recall, David -- well, I had known of plans

11 to publish for some considerable time. In terms of this12 project as it was announced, David Manning, the13 Prime Minister's foreign affairs adviser, called me on14 the morning of 4th September to discuss this.15 Q. Sir Richard, I am not sure if you are moving to or from16 your microphone because I cannot see you. It sounds as17 if you are. Do you think you can speak a little more18 closely to your microphone?19 A. I can. I will pull it closer towards me.20 Q. Did you have any comment about the proposed publication21 of intelligence material?22 A. Yes, I certainly did. I discussed with David Manning to23 what extent it would be possible to put intelligence

24 from my service into the public domain; and I said that25 I thought it would be possible to put some of this in

871 the public domain, but that I would insist on grounds of2 source protection on having the last word in withholding3 material from publication, if necessary.4 Q. And was that agreed?5 A. Yes, it certainly was.6 Q. As a result of your position, are you a member of any7 Cabinet Office Committees?8 A. Yes, I am a full member of the Joint Intelligence9 Committee, as are all the heads of the agencies. That

10 is the Director General of the Security Service and the11 Director of GCHQ.12 Q. Did you attend any Joint Intelligence Committee meetings13 relating to the drafting of the dossier?14 A. Yes, I certainly did. I think that the two key meetings15 I attended were on the 11th and 18th of September; and16 there was also another important JIC meeting at which17 Iraqi issues were discussed on 4th September.18 Q. Can you help me with 4th September? Was there any19 mention of the dossier and drafting of the dossier about20 which the Prime Minister had made his announcement the21 day before?22 A. I do not recall specifically whether the dossier was

23 actually discussed at that meeting. I do not think it24 was a formal item.25 Q. We know that the intelligence that you have referred to

881 relating to the 45 minutes source formed part of a JIC2 assessment. If we look at CAB/17/3 we can see the draft3 of 5th September and then of 9th September. Were these4 drafts considered at the JIC meeting on 4th September5 before being finalised?6 A. What happened was on 4th September it was clear that7 there was a certain amount of new material produced by8 my service which had not arrived in time to be included

9 in the original draft that was put together. I think,10 as far as I recall, I recommended that the draft be


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11 reworked to take account of this new material.12 Q. Was that on 4th September?13 A. The discussion was on 4th September. A new draft,14 I think, was then put together and circulated to JIC15 members, because there were quite a few changes, on16 5th September and the resulting assessment was issued on

17 the 9th.18 Q. We can see that at CAB/17/3.19 A. Yes. Yes. And, in fact, what we are looking at there20 is a change in the drafting, which I think was21 recommended by my staff to ensure that the inclusion of22 intelligence on 45 minutes reflected more accurately the23 wording of the original CX report -- CX is the phrase we24 use to refer to the intelligence reports produced by25 SIS.

891 Q. On 10th September, at CAB/33/131, Mr Scarlett produced2 a memorandum commenting on Alastair Campbell's note of

3 9th September, in which he said this in paragraph 1:4 "Alastair did not refer to an additional section,5 which I have agreed with him, would be considered for6 inclusion in the 'dossier'. This would give an account7 of the JIC assessment of developments in Iraqi WMD8 programmes since UNSCOM inspectors were withdrawn in9 late 1998."10 Did that reflect any discussions you had had amongst11 members of the JIC?12 A. Well, it was certainly my strong view that if there was13 to be a section which drew heavily on intelligence, that14 this should be under the control of the JIC; and I was15 aware, from the attendance of SIS staff at meetings in

16 No. 10 before that was written, of what was intended.17 Q. The dossier, or the next draft of the dossier is dated18 10th/11th September 2002. We can see that at DOS/2/2.19 A. Okay.20 Q. And I think you have the material available to you. At21 DOS/2/37, we can see what was then said about the22 45 minute source:23 "Within the last month intelligence has suggested24 that the Iraqi military would be able to use their25 chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an

901 order to do so."

2 Did you see the dossier drafted on 10th or3 11th September?4 A. Yes, I certainly would have done, in preparation for the5 JIC meeting that took place on 11th September. I mean,6 it is normal practice for me to be closely briefed by my7 staff before attending the full JIC meeting; and, in8 fact, the process of putting together the dossier was9 covered very closely on a day-to-day basis by the team10 that I had working on it. Although it is some time ago11 and I do not have a precise recollection of every12 exchange, I was kept closely involved.13 Q. Was there any discussion of the draft dossier on14 11th September?

15 A. At the JIC meeting?16 Q. Yes, sorry, at the JIC meeting.


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17 A. Yes. There certainly was.18 Q. What was the nature of that discussion?19 A. As far as I recall, it was how to incorporate into the20 dossier the previous JIC judgments on Iraqi WMD and the21 addition to that picture of any new intelligence that22 might be available.

23 Q. Was there any unhappiness expressed at the JIC meeting24 in relation to the dossier and the drafting process?25 A. No, I do not think there was. I mean, there was obvious

911 concern on my part, as the chief of the service, that2 the fact of moving in the direction of publication3 should take full account of our concerns on issues of4 operational security.5 Q. And at that stage had anyone mentioned any comments on6 the 45 minute section of the dossier which had been7 included for the draft of the 11th September JIC8 meeting?

9 A. No, they certainly had not. I think it is worth me10 adding that when we circulate a report there is11 a procedure by which any reader can comment on the12 report or question its contents; and that is a mechanism13 that is frequently used. The circulation of the report14 that included the piece about 45 minutes did not evoke15 any comment from customers at all.16 Q. After the 11th September meeting there were new drafts17 of the dossier prepared on 16th September, together with18 a draft foreword which we have heard evidence was19 prepared by Mr Campbell with the Prime Minister's20 approval and comments and an executive summary which21 I think was prepared for Mr Scarlett. Can I take you,

22 first of all, to the foreword? That is at CAB/11/38.23 A. Yes. Can I just -- I am just turning that one up. Yes,24 we have it.25 Q. You can see "Foreword". Felicity Hatfield on

921 16th September.2 If you go to page 40, towards the end of the3 foreword it says this at the top:4 "Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the5 possession of WMD as vital to his strategic internal of6 regional domination. And the document discloses that7 his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be

8 ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them."9 That was the foreword. If we go to the executive10 summary, which is at CAB/11/141 --11 A. Yes.12 Q. -- we see over the page at the top:13 "Has military plans for the use of chemical and14 biological weapons, some of which could be ready within15 45 minutes of an order to use them. Saddam and his son16 Qusay have the political authority to authorise the use17 of these weapons."18 Can I take you to DOS/2/58, which was the dossier19 part or the main part of the dossier dated20 16th September 2002. We can see that in the top

21 right-hand corner. We get the 45 minute source at22 DOS/2/72 at the bottom:


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23 "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical24 or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to25 do so."

931 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did you pick up any differences or inconsistencies3 between the foreword and the executive summary, on one4 side, and the main text of the dossier on the other?5 A. My understanding is that these were discussed in the6 drafting committee and in fact I was briefed for the JIC7 meeting on 17th September. My reaction was that all of8 these statements are in fact, despite the differences of9 nuances, they are consistent with the original10 intelligence report.11 Q. The meeting on 17th September, was that a full JIC12 meeting?13 A. Yes, it was a full JIC meeting.14 Q. Are you sure about the date? We have had one on

15 4th September, one on the 11th. I think we heard from16 another witness --17 A. Yes, I am sorry, it is the 18th. It is the 18th. My18 apologies.19 Q. Was this considered on the 18th September in committee?20 A. Yes, it was, at the end of the meeting, as far as21 I recall.22 Q. We have seen a number of memoranda that were produced on23 17th September, one from Mr Campbell, which was24 CAB/11/66, and he introduces it by saying:25 "Please find below a number of drafting points. As

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1 I was writing this, the Prime Minister had a read of the2 draft ... and he too made a number of points."3 Then some specific general comments are made. More4 detailed comments are made later on in the memorandum.5 We know that there was a reply to that memorandum by6 Mr Scarlett on 18th September. That is CAB/11/70. We7 can see the first page of that there. Did you see8 Mr Campbell's memorandum?9 A. I did not see that memorandum; but in fact I was aware,10 from my senior officer who was working on the drafting,11 that there had been, for example, a debate over the12 amount of time it might take the Iraqis to develop13 a nuclear weapon; and I know that there was, let us say,

14 a rigorous response to questions in terms of sticking15 with the original intelligence in recording those issues16 in the dossier.17 Q. We are not interested in any disputes beyond the18 45 minutes source because that was what Dr Kelly appears19 to have commented on. Were you aware of any commentary20 in relation to the 45 minute point, at this stage?21 A. When you say any commentary, any commentary exactly --22 Q. Any commentary from Defence Intelligence Staff, for23 example?24 A. No, I was not.25 Q. Was that raised at all at the JIC meeting on

951 18th September?


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2 A. Not that I can recall. It was not raised.3 Q. After the meeting on 18th September, was there another4 JIC meeting at which the dossier was considered before5 publication?6 A. No. The last formal meeting of the JIC at which it was7 considered was the 18th.

8 Q. Do you know whether or not it was considered by your9 service after 18th September?10 A. Yes. After the JIC meeting I met the senior officer11 involved in the drafting committee and expressed to him12 satisfaction from the SIS point of view at the state of13 the draft at that stage. He then had authority14 delegated from me to agree the dossier but subject to15 the fact that there were no further what I would16 describe as substantive changes in the text.17 Q. From what you have seen of the draft which you18 considered on 18th September and the draft as published,19 did you consider that there had been any substantive20 changes in the text?

21 A. No, I do not think after that there were substantive22 changes that changed it significantly.23 Q. We know that the wording in the dossier, the24 inconsistency or apparent inconsistency between the25 executive summary and the foreword having been pointed

961 out, we know that the wording of the dossier was2 strengthened to mirror that within the foreword and the3 executive summary. Did you know of that at the time?4 A. I was aware what the final version was going to be, yes.5 Q. And how were you made aware of the final version?6 A. Well, by talking to my -- I had copies of it, plus the

7 amount of contact I had with those SIS staff working on8 the dossier.9 Q. We have heard from Sir Joe French this morning about10 some silent procedure for final authorisation of the11 dossier. Is that your recollection?12 A. My recollection -- yes, it is normal practice in the JIC13 that a final JIC assessment can be, as it were, signed14 off under that procedure.15 Q. On 19th September 2002 at MoD/22/1 we know that16 a memorandum was produced in which some comments were17 made about the wording of the dossier. This appears to18 have been distributed internally within the Defence19 Intelligence Staff. Would you have seen that at the

20 time?21 A. No, I certainly would not have seen it.22 Q. We have been told that the wording of this in23 intelligence circles is quite strong in terms of24 expressing unhappiness with the wording of the draft25 form of dossier. Is that a fair reflection?

971 A. Well, I think it is a fair reflection of the way that2 the DIS approach such drafts and were very careful in3 the words that they used.4 Q. And we have seen, now, another memorandum which is dated5 20th September at CAB/33/114.

6 A. Yes.7 Q. Which I think you have got a copy of?


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8 A. Yes.9 Q. Which again deals with those matters, but also deals10 with the 45 minutes order. It said this at the bottom11 of the page:12 "A similar statement appears in the dossier. This13 is reported as fact whereas the intelligence comes from

14 a single source. In my view the intelligence warrants15 no stronger a statement than 'intelligence suggests that16 military planning allows...'"17 Did you agree with that? First of all, did you see18 this memorandum at any time before this Inquiry?19 A. No, I did not. I have to say I am rather bemused by the20 sentence "this is reported as fact whereas the21 intelligence comes from a single source". It rather22 implies that a single source cannot report a fact.23 I mean, if I can add to that.24 Q. Yes, of course.25 A. CX reports as produced by my service are essentially

981 single source; and much high quality intelligence which2 is factual or proved to be factual is single source3 material. So I do not really understand that comment.4 Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness with the 45 minutes5 point within your service?6 A. No, I certainly was not.7 LORD HUTTON: Sir Richard, could we just go back a little,8 please, to the final draft? You said that you delegated9 to one of your officers the signing off of the draft10 provided there were no substantive changes in it. Did11 you in fact see a copy of the final draft? Was it12 circulated to you or was it the earlier draft of

13 18th September which you saw?14 A. I would have seen a final draft, my Lord.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. Thank you.16 MR DINGEMANS: Did you have any personal contact with17 Dr Kelly at all before his death?18 A. No, I did not.19 Q. Did your service have any contact with Dr Kelly?20 A. Yes, my service did have contact with Dr Kelly.21 Q. Are you able to tell us what the nature of that contact22 was?23 A. Well, as a leading WMD specialist with particular24 knowledge of chemical and biological programmes in Iraq,25 he was in touch, from time to time, with people in SIS

991 dealing with the same issues.2 Q. Was anyone as far as you know aware of his views on the3 dossier in September 2002?4 A. No, I do not think that they were.5 Q. Can I take you to a document which is CAB/3/21. This is6 an e-mail that appears to come up through Defence7 Intelligence Staff, so not through your service, talking8 about Dr Kelly and a specific comment that he makes in9 relation to growth media. There is then a further10 comment at the end:11 "The existing wording is not wrong -- but it has

12 a [someone has suggested] lot of spin on it."13 That was apparently made by the person who made the


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14 e-mail. Were you aware of any of those type of views15 being expressed about the dossier at the time?16 A. No, I certainly was not.17 Q. Can I take you to another document which is CAB/23/15,18 which I think you will find in the prepenultimate page19 in the bundle you are working from.

20 A. Yes.21 Q. This is an e-mail that was sent round on22 11th September 2002 saying that the first draft of the23 dossier has been received back. There are further24 questions and areas they would like expanded. Then the25 main comments are set out. It said this at the end:

1001 "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around2 at least some of these buoys before, particularly3 item 4. But No. 10 through the Chairman want the4 document to be as strong as possible within the bounds5 of available intelligence. This is therefore a last(!)

6 call for any items of intelligence that agencies think7 can and should be included."8 Were you aware of this e-mail at the time of the9 drafting of the dossier?10 A. Not specifically, no, but I would say that a message11 like this from the assessment staff is common practice12 when they are engaged on an important piece of work and13 it is a signal to my staff to make sure that they have14 made every effort in the field to collect relevant15 intelligence in time for the conclusion of a paper being16 worked on by the JIC.17 Q. Can I ask you about some criticisms that have been made18 of the 45 minutes source and take you to FAC/3/28? This

19 is paragraph 69 of a report from the Foreign Affairs20 Committee.21 A. Hmm.22 Q. And at the bottom of the page, paragraph 69, they say23 this, having reported what the Foreign Secretary says:24 "This answer begs the question why the 45 minutes25 claim was highlighted by the Prime Minister when he

1011 presented the dossier to the House, and why it was given2 such prominence in the dossier itself, being mentioned3 no fewer than four times, including in the4 Prime Minister's foreword and in the executive summary?

5 We have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question.6 We have been told that the entire document, including7 the executive summary, was prepared by the Chairman of8 the JIC, except for the foreword, which he approved. We9 note with disappointment that we were unable to find out10 why Mr Scarlett chose to give the 45 minutes claim such11 prominence, as we have been prevented from questioning12 him."13 Did you consider that the 45 minutes -- and they say14 "claim" -- was given undue prominence?15 A. Well, I think given the misinterpretation that was16 placed on the 45 minutes intelligence, with the benefit17 of hindsight you can say that is a valid criticism. But

18 I am confident that the intelligence was accurate and19 that the use made of it was entirely consistent with the


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20 original report.21 LORD HUTTON: Would you just elaborate what you mean by the22 misinterpretation placed on the 45 minutes claim,23 Sir Richard?24 A. (Pause). Well, I think the original report referred to25 chemical and biological munitions and that was taken to

1021 refer to battlefield weapons.2 I think what subsequently happened in the reporting3 was that it was taken that the 45 minutes applied, let4 us say, to weapons of a longer range, let us say just5 battlefield material.6 MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you to comment on paragraphs 108 to7 112 of the Intelligence and Security Committee report.8 We do not have that yet scanned in. I think you have9 a copy of the conclusions from 108 to 112; is that10 right?11 A. Yes, I have.

12 Q. At 108 it is made clear that there were a wide range of13 departments and agencies commenting on the draft and14 they say that the dossier was not sexed up by15 Alastair Campbell or anyone else.16 At 109 it is said that Alastair Campbell did not17 chair meetings on intelligence matters.18 At 110 it is said that the use of the phrase19 "continued to produce chemical and biological weapons"20 could give the impression that Saddam was actively21 producing both chemical and biological weapons and makes22 comments about the JIC knowledge there.23 At 111 it deals with the question of whether or not24 Saddam Hussein was considered a current or imminent

25 threat.

1031 With that introduction can I turn to 112 which says:2 "The dossier was for public consumption and not for3 experienced readers of intelligence material. The 454 minutes claim, included four times, was always likely to5 attract attention because it was arresting detail that6 the public had not seen before."7 It then goes on to say that it was unhelpful to an8 understanding of the issue. Do you agree with that9 comment?10 A. Well, not entirely. But I think I would repeat what

11 I said in answer to the last question. Given the12 misinterpretation of the original piece of intelligence,13 particularly as it was not qualified in terms of its14 relationship to battlefield munitions, this now looks15 a valid criticism; but I think the intelligence was16 accurate and that it was put to legitimate use in the17 drafting process.18 Q. Can I take you back to the document I think you have at19 about page 3 of the bundle you have, which is CAB/17/3,20 extracts from the JIC assessment relating to 45 minutes;21 then just read to you the extract from the foreword to22 the dossier. Although I do not ask for this to be23 called up, it is at DOS/1/59 at the top. It says this:

24 "And the document [i.e. the dossier] discloses that25 his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be


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1041 ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them."2 Do you consider that to have been a fair reflection3 of the JIC assessments of 5th and 9th September?4 A. Yes, I think it is.

5 Q. And in what way would you reconcile the two statements?6 A. (Pause). Can you repeat that question?7 Q. Certainly. I am sorry you have not got it in front of8 you.9 "And the document [the dossier] discloses that his10 military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready11 within 45 minutes of an order to use them."12 A. I do not quite see what you are driving at in asking me13 this question, but in fact I think one has to see this14 piece of intelligence against the background of Iraqi15 armed forces having in the past used chemical munitions,16 and this, in that context, not being a surprising piece17 of intelligence.

18 Q. Can I then, finally, take you to some comments that it19 is said that Dr Kelly made to Ms Watts? These we have20 at SJW/1/39 and 40. I think those are at the end of21 your bundle.22 A. Yes.23 Q. Dr Kelly says this, after being asked about the24 45 minutes:25 "Oh that I knew because I knew the concern about the

1051 statement -- it was a statement that was made and it2 just got out of all proportion -- you know someone.3 They were desperate for information. They were pushing

4 hard for information which could be released."5 Was that an accurate statement insofar as it has6 gone, that people were desperate for information and7 pushing hard for information that could be released?8 A. No, I do not think it is. Obviously we were keen to9 collect authoritative intelligence on this problem, but10 that description of the situation is off the mark.11 Q. Then he is reported as having said this:12 "That was one that popped up and it was seized on13 and it was unfortunate that it was which is why there is14 this argument between the Intelligence Services and15 Cabinet Office/Number Ten, because things were picked up16 on, and once they've picked up on it you can't pull it

17 back, that's the problem."18 Was that an accurate reflection of what was going on19 in September 2002?20 A. No, it absolutely was not. Do recall what I said21 earlier, that when this report was circulated and22 distributed on 29th August it evoked no comment at all,23 particularly from the readers in the DIS.24 Q. And if I can go over the page to SJW/1/40:25 "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people saying

1061 don't put it in don't put it in. It's just it was in2 there and was seized upon -- rather than Number Ten

3 specifically going against?"4 Dr Kelly is recorded as having said this:


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5 "There were lots of people saying that -- I mean it6 was an interesting week before the dossier was put out7 because there were so many things in there that people8 were saying well, we're not so sure about that, or in9 fact they were happy with it being in but not expressed10 the way that it was, because you know the wordsmithing

11 is actually quite important, and the intelligence12 community are a pretty cautious lot on the whole but13 once you get people putting it/presenting it for public14 consumption then of course they use different words.15 I don't think they're being wilfully dishonest, I think16 they just think that that's the way the public will17 appreciate it best. I'm sure you have the same problem18 as a journalist..."19 Would you say that was in hindsight, now you know of20 the use that was made of the 45 minutes source, do you21 think that was an accurate comment?22 A. Absolutely not. Can I also say in respect of this23 recorded conversation here?

24 Q. Yes.25 A. As chief of the service, I am shocked to see someone

1071 discussing one of our CX reports, which is what he is2 discussing, with a journalist without authorisation.3 Q. I appreciate he was not within your specific area, which4 is why I have not asked you about it, but what would5 your reaction have been to finding out about these6 discussions?7 A. That it is a serious breach of discipline.8 Q. What was the last contact between Dr Kelly and your9 service?

10 A. I believe that the last occasion on which Dr Kelly11 visited Vauxhall Cross was in January 2003.12 Q. Had he been involved with your service in relation to13 the preparation of the dossier? We have heard about his14 involvement with the Defence Intelligence Staff.15 A. Not at all, as far as I am aware.16 Q. Is there anything else relating to the circumstances of17 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?18 A. No, I do not think there is. But I think the only one19 point I would like to make in relation to our earlier20 discussion, I reported to my directors I think on21 19th September that we had had full visibility of the22 process of preparing the dossier and that the whole

23 process had gone extremely well.24 Q. And did you do anything after the publication of the25 dossier to record that?

1081 A. Yes, I did. At the JIC meeting, I think on2 25th September --3 Q. Yes, we have heard there is one on the 18th, so it must4 be the 25th.5 A. -- I proposed a vote of thanks to the Chairman on behalf6 of the JIC members for the way in which he and the7 assessment staff had conducted a difficult exercise and8 the integrity with which it had been done, and it was

9 done spontaneously of course.10 Q. Was the vote of thanks passed?


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11 A. Yes, it was.12 Q. And is there anything else you would like to say?13 A. No, Mr Dingemans, I think that is all I have got to say.14 Thank you.15 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.16 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Sir Richard.

17 A. Thank you Lord Hutton.18 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord we will need two minutes simply to19 disconnect.20 LORD HUTTON: I will rise.21 (2.42 pm)22 (Short Break)23 (2.45 pm)24 DR RICHARD PETER SCOTT (called)25 Examined by MR KNOX

1091 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Dr Scott.2 LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you.

3 MR KNOX: Could you tell the Inquiry your full name.4 A. I am Richard Peter Scott.5 Q. Your occupation?6 A. I am Director, Science for the Defence Science and7 Technology Laboratory, an agency of the Ministry of8 Defence.9 Q. In very brief terms, what does your job involve doing?10 A. I lead a group of four departments of roughly 450 people11 involved in various aspects of defence research, mainly12 in the area of chemical and biological defence.13 Q. When did you first come to know Dr Kelly?14 A. I first knew Dr Kelly when he joined Porton Down in15 1984.

16 Q. Did you work closely with him at all?17 A. No, I did not, and I have never really known him18 socially.19 Q. I understand in March 2000 you became his line manager,20 is that correct?21 A. In March 2000 I became the Director of the Chemical and22 Biological Defence Sector of what was the Defence23 Evaluation and Research Agency and I was part of24 Dr Kelly's line management chain. Following a mix-up in25 an annual report, I took direct line management

1101 responsibility for Dr Kelly in July 2000.

2 Q. And what did that involve your doing in relation to3 Dr Kelly?4 A. Well, I am responsible for the work he undertakes under5 secondment, making certain that he is fulfilling his6 requirement, his duties under his secondment. I am7 responsible for his career development, his paying8 conditions and above all his welfare.9 Q. And you therefore oversaw Dr Kelly's secondment to the10 Proliferation and Arms Control Unit, is that right?11 A. Yes, from March -- essentially from July onwards.12 Q. Was that a secondment of unusual length or was it13 a normal type of secondment?14 A. It was a very unusual secondment. I do not know when it

15 started but normally secondments within DERA and DSTL16 are for a very much shorter period than that, three


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17 years or so.18 Q. How long was Dr Kelly's?19 A. I cannot tell you precisely when the secondment started.20 I believe Dr Kelly had effectively worked away from21 Porton for a large period of his time since just after22 the first Gulf War.

23 Q. That would be since 1991?24 A. Yes.25 Q. What about Dr Kelly's personnel management? Did DSTL

1111 remain responsible for that or was he taken over by the2 MoD?3 A. He was a DSTL employee so we maintained responsibility4 for his personnel management.5 Q. Did that mean you had to do anything for Dr Kelly?6 A. Certainly did.7 Q. And, broadly speaking, what was that?8 A. I used to meet with Dr Kelly on an infrequent basis,

9 four or five times a year when he would visit me at10 Porton, update me on the work he was undertaking within11 central MoD and for the FCO. I would then pull together12 an annual record of achievement and be responsible for13 setting his pay.14 Q. Would you liaise with the MoD about this as well?15 A. I would liaise with the MoD and the FCO.16 Q. Can you recall when you last met Dr Kelly?17 A. My diary shows I last met Dr Kelly on 16th April at18 Porton Down in my office.19 Q. Can you remember what that was about?20 A. I think Dr Kelly was -- it was one of his routine visits21 to Porton Down, where he was briefing me on his

22 activities during his secondment. Therefore we would23 discuss Iraqi CB weapons. I am pretty certain at that24 stage we talked about his activities that were planned25 in support of the Iraq Survey Group. And after that

1121 I really cannot give you any more detail. I just cannot2 recollect it.3 Q. We know on 8th July in the evening a press announcement4 was put out --5 LORD HUTTON: Can I go back a little, Dr Scott. There has6 been some evidence that Dr Kelly felt dissatisfied with7 his salary scale. Were you conscious of that? Because

8 he was doing extremely important work and doing a great9 deal of travelling.10 A. That is true, my Lord. When I completed his annual11 report, as I said, I had to pick -- an annual report had12 gone missing and I just took up the responsibility in13 July 2000. I filled it in and set his salary.14 David Kelly, I suppose, in the early autumn of 2000,15 had come to terms with the fact that DERA had gone away16 from MoD grades to a competence based levels framework.17 He had also become aware -- he then became aware that he18 had been assigned a level in late 1999 and he19 understood, in a very, very broad way, that this could20 impact on his pay and conditions.

21 When I am saying all this I think you have to22 realise that my impression of Dr Kelly was that he was


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23 a man who did not actually believe he was a member of24 either DERA or DSTL, it was an administrative25 convenience. So therefore he was not fully engaged with

1131 his parent organisation. He did not understand the

2 challenges it was facing or the changes it was3 undergoing, and he certainly was not au fait with the4 processes. At times it made managing Dr Kelly on5 a personal management level quite difficult because he6 was not engaged with the process. And both parts, the7 organisation and the individual have to be engaged in8 the process.9 Having said that, Dr Kelly then decided that he was10 the wrong level and I have some sympathy with him that11 his level had been set by others incorrectly. And12 Dr Kelly wanted that level changed. But we had13 a process and a timeframe associated with level review;14 and it was not appropriate to make an exception here

15 because we would have had to have then made exceptions16 throughout the organisation. So I suggested to Dr Kelly17 that he should apply for a levels review in the18 following year, in 2001.19 MR KNOX: Can I just stop you there Dr Scott. It may help20 if I take you to one or two documents at this point. If21 we can call up MoD/3/41.22 This is a letter from Dr Kelly to you on23 18th November which I think picks up on one of the24 points you were making recently.25 A. Yes.

114

1 Q. Would you like to look down the page as it scrolls down2 and read that to yourself?3 A. (Pause). That is fine.4 Q. And this is a letter addressed to you by Dr Kelly?5 A. Yes.6 Q. He is referring to his campaign to be reviewed and7 considered for a level 9 grading. Pausing there for8 a moment, level 9 grading would be the top grading9 within that --10 A. Yes. There are only 12 level 9s in the whole of DSTL.11 Q. And you would be given a level 9 grading on what type of12 basis?13 A. It is a competency based framework, so it is associated

14 with the individual. We are looking at a person who15 operates strategically, who is an international expert16 who is operating at an incredibly high level, as was17 Dr Kelly.18 Q. Dr Kelly in this letter refers to his campaign to be19 reviewed. That rather suggests he had been trying for20 some time. Does that sound right?21 A. No, I think that he became aware of the process and he22 had now started to engage with the process and he wanted23 it changed there and then; but the process, the24 organisation's process had a timescale associated with25 it, and levels are reviewed and changed at a set time of

1151 the year.


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2 Q. Just scrolling down this page, you will see towards the3 foot of the page some handwritten scrawls. I do not4 know if these are yours or not. If they are, could you5 say what they are?6 A. They are not my -- it is not my writing.7 Q. You do not know what these are about at all?

8 A. I know who Patrick Lamb is and you know who Patrick Lamb9 is. No, I cannot throw any light on it.10 Q. If we go now to MoD/3/40 there is a letter which is not11 a very good copy. It says it is from Martin Earwicker.12 Do you see that? If you scroll down to the bottom of13 the page, I think what it says is:14 "Following my review of the evidence you submitted15 and our discussion on 7 February, I am pleased to tell16 you that you have been advanced to Career Level 9.17 I would like to congratulate you on this significant18 achievement and to thank you for the very important work19 you have been undertaking over the last few years."20 So it looks as if Dr Kelly was promoted to career

21 level 9 on 18th February 2002.22 A. He was considered as part, as it said, of 2001.23 Dr Kelly did not engage with the normal DSTL process, so24 I intervened for Dr Kelly with the human resources25 section of DSTL, ensured that a late application could

1161 be forwarded. I supported that application and he was2 successful at the review.3 Q. While we are on the same subject still, MoD/3/39, there4 is another letter again from Dr Kelly to you. You have5 mentioned having a discussion with Dr Kelly in the6 spring of 2003?

7 A. Hmm.8 Q. This letter appears to be a letter from Dr Kelly9 questioning whether he is being paid in accordance with10 his pay rise. Would you like to look at the body of11 this letter?12 A. Yes.13 Q. You may recall it. As I understand, what he is saying14 is: I am not quite sure if I have actually received the15 money I am entitled to receive.16 A. That is right. I was not clear from looking at this, so17 I asked David to write to me with the details so I could18 take it forward with the human resources section in DSTL19 and get some action taken on it.

20 Q. Do you know if anything was done about this letter and21 about the points he was raising in it?22 A. The process was applied properly. David Kelly's pay had23 been properly assessed. But unfortunately that was not24 passed back to David Kelly before he unfortunately died.25 Q. Do I take from that, therefore, that he was being paid

1171 61,038 salary?2 A. Yes.3 Q. And that is all he was supposed to be being paid?4 A. That is correct.5 Q. Can I just move forward now to 8th July? We know in the

6 evening the MoD put out a press announcement saying an7 individual had come forward who worked in the MoD who


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8 had said he had had a meeting with Mr Gilligan. Do you9 remember hearing about or reading that press10 announcement on 8th July?11 A. No, I was not aware of it on 8th July. A colleague of12 mine mentioned it to me in the morning, said he had seen13 a Newsnight report. He told me some information and

14 I said to myself: well, that sounds very much like15 David Kelly.16 Q. Can we stop there for a moment? At CAB/11/140 we can17 see one of the things the Newsnight report said.18 I wonder if you could help us with this. You will see19 the first thing that is said:20 "Martha Carney said the individual was an MoD WMD21 expert paid for by the FCO on Newsnight last night, so22 she was very quick off the mark."23 Can you remember if that was what made you think24 this might be Dr Kelly?25 A. Yes.

1181 Q. And so that is what you inferred from that. Did you ask2 for any action to be taken as a result of this?3 A. I did. I asked DSTL's corporate section to get me4 a transcript of the programme so I could actually look5 at it in detail, because you have to remember I did not6 see the programme. But before that could arrive I had7 to go to London; and then I read another report in the8 Independent newspaper which again was consistent with it9 being Dr Kelly.10 Q. Can we call up CAB/1/504? This is an extract from the11 9th July report in the Independent. You will see that12 the second paragraph refers to:

13 "The MoD said that the middle-ranking official met14 Mr Gilligan ..."15 It may be that what would have alerted you most16 there is towards the end of the page, three paragraphs17 up:18 "The official was an expert on weapons of mass19 destruction ..."20 A. That is correct.21 Q. "... who had advised Ministers on the issue and had22 contributed towards drafts of the historical accounts of23 UN inspections ..."24 A. That is right.25 Q. That was the sentence that made you think: well --

1191 A. Again the whole document said this could be David Kelly.2 Q. When you say it could be David Kelly, did you think it3 was just a matter of could or most probably was?4 A. My view was it probably was.5 Q. You say you were travelling down on the train, you were6 going to London; is that right?7 A. Yes.8 Q. And when you got to London did you meet anyone?9 A. I immediately sought a meeting with Dr Bryan Wells, who10 was line manager within CPAC for Dr Kelly's work, that11 Dr Kelly undertook for them to ask him about this, and

12 he confirmed that Dr Kelly had come forward and admitted13 to a meeting with Andrew Gilligan.


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14 Q. Did he say what else had happened?15 A. He told me that Dr Kelly had been interviewed by16 Mr Hatfield and that the outcome of that meeting was17 that provided Dr Kelly had told the truth, he would be18 issued with a verbal warning about his inappropriate19 behaviour, but no other action would be taken.

20 Q. Did you express any concerns to Mr Wells yourself?21 A. What I said to Mr Wells was: I would have appreciated,22 Bryan, if you had told me this -- as I was his line23 manager -- you would have informed me of this activity,24 as I had a role as his line manager. I asked Mr Wells25 to keep me informed of any further significant

1201 developments.2 Q. What did Mr Wells say to that?3 A. He said he would.4 LORD HUTTON: When you say you were his line manager, it is5 obviously a somewhat complicated situation. Was it the

6 position that you were the line manager as regards his7 salary and his general welfare and Dr Wells was his line8 manager as regards the work he was doing at that time9 for the MoD?10 A. That is correct, my Lord.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Yes. Thank you.12 MR KNOX: After you had had your conversation with Dr Wells,13 did you do anything else?14 A. I phoned my secretary and asked her to get in touch with15 David, so I could set up a meeting with him the next16 morning, and she did. She arranged this for 9 o'clock17 the next morning. That was on the 10th.18 Q. I think if we go to COM/4/83 we can see some indication

19 of that.20 LORD HUTTON: Was this a meeting at Porton Down?21 A. That is correct. We arranged for David to come and meet22 me at Porton Down.23 MR KNOX: Your secretary is Mrs Morgan, is that right?24 A. That is correct.25 Q. We can see here an e-mail from Dr Kelly sent at 3.37 in

1211 the afternoon of 9th July, and I think we can take it2 for present purposes that this is to Mrs Morgan, this3 e-mail.4 A. Yes.

5 Q. "I have just checked with London and I am free to see6 Dr Scott at 9.00 tomorrow."7 A. That is correct.8 Q. On the following day, 10th July, did that meeting take9 place?10 A. No, it did not. At about 9 o'clock or just before we11 received a telephone conversation from David to say that12 he could not make the meeting. He said that he had been13 told by the press office, and I inferred the MoD press14 office, that his name was likely to become known and15 that he should leave home to avoid press intrusion.16 Q. Did you say anything to Dr Kelly?17 A. Yes, what I said to Dr Kelly was that DSTL would not be

18 taking any disciplinary action of its own; any19 disciplinary action which would be taken would be that


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20 which would be decided by the parent department MoD,21 knowing what was likely to happen.22 I also sensed -- I also said to Dr Kelly at that23 time that DSTL was available to provide pastoral care if24 required because I do not know why I said it but25 I sensed that Dr Kelly was upset at having to leave

1221 home, not unnaturally, and if we could be of any2 assistance, I would like to put that forward.3 LORD HUTTON: Do you know from where he was speaking?4 A. I think he was speaking from home my Lord, but I could5 not be certain.6 MR KNOX: He rang you?7 A. Yes he did.8 Q. Can you remember what time it was?9 A. It was about 9 or just before. I also asked David again10 to keep me informed of any significant developments.11 Q. How did Dr Kelly seem to be in this conversation?

12 A. He was calm but, as I say, I sensed that he was under13 some -- he was under some pressure and that is why14 I made the offer of pastoral assistance. The reason15 I say that was because the conversation was very brief.16 He wanted to get the telephone conversation over and17 done with, which was not really like David.18 LORD HUTTON: What did he say when you offered him pastoral19 care?20 A. He did not say anything, my Lord.21 MR KNOX: Did you have any further contact with Dr Kelly on22 that day?23 A. No, I did not.24 Q. Or any further involvement with the Dr Kelly situation

25 on that day?

1231 A. None whatever.2 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you: it is very understandable3 you should offer him this care. I appreciate you just4 said it to him very quickly. Had you thought at all5 what that pastoral care might involve?6 A. No, because I said it in response to the feeling I was7 getting from the telephone.8 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate that, yes.9 A. And it could range from anything like involving the10 welfare service, providing administrative support in

11 booking hotels or something like that, anything like12 that.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.14 MR KNOX: On the following day, Friday 11th --15 A. Hmm.16 Q. -- did you have any involvement with Dr Kelly?17 A. The only involvement was on the Friday, the 11th,18 I received a copy of the letter that Mr Hatfield sent to19 Dr Kelly about his inappropriate behaviour in talking to20 the press.21 Q. And you opened it and you read it?22 A. Yes.23 Q. We know that Dr Kelly went to give evidence to the

24 Foreign Affairs Committee on 15th July. Did you know25 anything about that?


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1241 A. No, I knew nothing about it. I was in America. I left2 for America on 14th July, early in the morning.3 I believed the situation with respect to David Kelly was4 quite stable at that time, but when I was in America on

5 the Tuesday, a colleague of mine who was at the same6 meeting from the Defence Intelligence Staff told me that7 Dr Kelly was going to appear before the Foreign Affairs8 Select Committee on that day. It came as a shock to me.9 Q. Did you read any newspaper reports about the matter?10 A. I read the newspaper reports on the plane on the way11 home. I was quite shocked by some of the lurid comments12 that I read, but I got back into office just after13 midday on the Thursday. I had received no14 communications about or from David Kelly.15 Q. You mentioned the lurid comments you read in the press.16 Roughly what were they?17 A. You know, there were a number -- couple of the papers

18 equated him to a Harold Shipman lookalike character and19 things like that. And I think people would have found20 them quite distressing.21 Q. Were you aware that Dr Kelly did have contact with the22 press as part of his job?23 A. I certainly was. He made no secret of it and he24 actually highlighted it in his annual reports.25 Q. Did he talk to you about his contacts with the press?

1251 A. Only in general terms, about, you know, that he was2 called upon to give unattributable briefings, to provide3 supporting evidence for the Government's policy and

4 position in certain areas, especially on Iraqi chemical5 and biological weapons and in the area of biological6 weapons arms control.7 Q. Dr Kelly said in a letter he wrote to Bryan Wells on8 30th June that to a certain extent matters were left to9 his discretion in talking to the press. Were you aware10 of that?11 A. I sensed that there was a fair degree of latitude, but12 I was never involved with the process of clearance for13 Dr Kelly to talk to the press. That would have been an14 issue for central MoD, CPAC and the FCO.15 Q. Did you talk to Dr Kelly again after the discussion you16 have already mentioned on 10th July?

17 A. No, I did not.18 Q. And is there anything else you would like to say which19 you know about which led to the circumstances which20 brought about Dr Kelly's death?21 A. No, I do not think so. I was as shocked as anybody22 else.23 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Dr Scott.24 A. Thank you.25

1261 MR GREGORY DYKE (called)2 Examined by MR DINGEMANS

3 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?4 A. Gregory Dyke.


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5 Q. Your occupation?6 A. I am the Director General of the BBC.7 Q. And how long have you been the Director General for?8 A. Since February 2000.9 Q. And, very briefly, your previous career?10 A. I started in television -- I was originally a newspaper

11 journalist, started in television at the age of 30,12 worked my way up to become the chief executive of London13 Weekend Television. Left there and ran one of the14 world's largest independent production companies until15 I took the job with the BBC.16 Q. What does your role as Director General involve?17 A. Well I am appointed by the BBC Governors and the BBC18 Governors alone. I chair the BBC's Executive Committee,19 which is the equivalent of a board of management, and as20 Chairman I am responsible to the BBC's Board of21 Governors for the day-to-day running of the BBC within22 the terms of the charter and the agreement. I am23 responsible for delivering by the appropriate means, the

24 appropriate budget, the strategic objects of the25 organisation as set by the Governors.

1271 Q. And again in outline, what are the other main aspects of2 your role?3 A. Well I am the editor-in-chief of the BBC's output which4 means I have to oversee the editorial standards of the5 BBC on radio, television and on-line, including the6 setting of and the compliance with the BBC's rules on7 editorial policy. I suppose the other key component of8 that role is to ensure at an operational level that the9 BBC both maintains its independence from Government and

10 other vested interests.11 I am also ultimately -- I oversee the operation of12 the BBC complaints unit --13 Q. Yes.14 A. -- which is part of the BBC but separate from programme15 making. There is a right of appeal against any decision16 made by the programmes unit directly to the Governors'17 Programme Complaints Committee.18 My job is also involved in ensuring that the major19 matters, particularly those with a strategic or20 significant budgetary dimension or which are21 particularly controversial, are brought to the attention22 of the Chairman and the Governors as a whole.

23 Q. What is your role vis a vis the Governors? Do they have24 any day-to-day responsibilities?25 A. I have a weekly meeting with the Chairman of the

1281 Governors, sometimes the Deputy Chairman as well, in2 which I update him on what is happening across the BBC3 and then there is a monthly Governors meeting which4 is -- and normally a private session the night before.5 The private session, it is normally the Governors and6 myself; and the following day it is the Governors and7 some of the other executive directors.8 I also see my role as leading and motivating the

9 staff right across the BBC. You have to understand that10 the staff is -- well, sorry --


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11 Q. How many employees are there?12 A. We employ something like 27,000 people but of course we13 have freelancers coming and going on top of that who14 work on dramas and entertainment. We have a relatively15 devolved management structure. There are 16 members of16 the BBC's executive team. They each report to me.

17 There are nine programming and broadcasting divisions,18 which include radio, television, news, World Service19 et cetera.20 Q. We have heard from Mr Sambrook. Where does he fit into21 this organisation?22 A. Mr Sambrook is one of the 16 people who report directly23 to me.24 Q. And his role is?25 A. His role is Director of News. He is therefore

1291 responsible for the output of national news and current2 affairs across the BBC.

3 Q. Do you get involved in individual programmes or do you4 have enough time to get involved in individual5 programmes?6 A. Generally not, but obviously by exception at times. But7 generally not, no.8 Q. And is there anything you want to say generally about9 the role of BBC news and current affairs?10 A. Well what I would say, before I get into that, is11 I would say the BBC is a very large broadcaster and12 a very large organisation. There are something like13 40 hours of broadcasting for every hour of the day. So14 therefore the opportunity -- it would be wrong of me to15 try to be involved in anything like that sort of breadth

16 the whole time. Therefore my involvement in programming17 is by strategic planning and by exception.18 Well, it does involve -- in terms of news and19 current affairs, my leadership role includes the 3,40020 staff in BBC News, where, as you can imagine, news is21 a highly pressurised world and that part of my role is22 to ensure that our news staff -- (1) we have the best23 possible news staff we can have and (2), of course, that24 they are following procedures and guidelines.25 Q. We have seen some of the historical correspondence

1301 between Mr Campbell and Mr Sambrook about the coverage

2 of the war in Afghanistan. Is there anything you wanted3 to say in relation to that?4 A. Well, as I say, one of the BBC's roles is putting5 information into the public domain. It has to be6 performed carefully and responsibly. Where we make7 mistakes I believe we should apologise and have said so8 on many occasions. I think the most high profile9 example of an apology directly from me came from an10 edition of Question Time programme in the week of11 September 11th where I felt the tone of the programme12 was inappropriate given the disaster that had just13 happened and I explained that to my staff and explained14 that to -- I hope to the general public and apologised.

15 In terms of the reporting of the --16 Q. Well, of war generally.


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17 A. War generally. Well, of course, in times of war it is18 inevitable, I think -- certainly since the Second World19 War, at times of war governments put pressure on the BBC20 to publicise the line they wish the public to21 understand, in terms of war. I think this has happened22 ever since Suez really. The first big controversy in

23 terms of war I think came with Suez, that the BBC took24 the lead -- something we would see as automatic today,25 but was not there. The leader of the opposition was

1311 entitled to broadcast following the Prime Minister's2 broadcast the day before. That created an enormous3 amount of concern at the time.4 I think in most wars since then, certainly5 Falklands, certainly Kosovo, Afghanistan and the first6 Gulf War -- less, to an extent, the first Gulf War --7 there has been a difficult relationship between8 Government and the BBC.

9 Q. And do you get criticism from those who oppose the war?10 A. Well, Iraq was a particularly difficult situation.11 I think it was Hugh Weldon 5who was the BBC's director12 of television back in 1976 who said that a Britain13 divided puts the BBC on the rack. And I think that is14 certainly what happened at the time of Iraq.15 Q. Can I take you to a document, BBC/4/142?16 LORD HUTTON: I wonder, just before we do that, could we17 just go back a moment Mr Dyke where you said that if the18 BBC are wrong, you should accept that and apologise for19 that, and you refer to the Question Time programme.20 A. Yes.21 LORD HUTTON: Will that sometimes occur without there being

22 a formal procedure through the complaints process?23 A. Yes, the Question Time programme did not go through the24 complaints process.25 LORD HUTTON: I see. So sometimes if the BBC recognises

1321 from the volume of complaints, let us say, and the2 complaints were regarded as being valid, the BBC would3 take the view then that it should --4 A. I think the Question Time programme was a judgment.5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.6 A. Actually that particular Question Time programme7 broadcast two weeks later would not have been a problem

8 I do not think, but actually coming two days after9 September 11th and the shock of September 11th,10 I thought it was inappropriate. We looked into why it11 had gone wrong and where it had gone wrong; where it had12 gone wrong was actually, for perfectly valid reasons,13 people had one intention and what happened was14 different.15 So, yes, sometimes we would apologise. If it comes16 to me, there have been occasions when I have apologised.17 But most of the time I would refer serious complaints to18 the PCU, the Programme Complaints Unit.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes. How long would that process take? If20 the BBC were not disposed to accept a criticism and it

21 went up to the Governors, what would be the time period22 before a final decision was taken as to whether or not


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23 to correct a broadcast or to maintain it was a proper24 report? Just on average.25 A. Months. That could take months rather than days, yes.

1331 LORD HUTTON: I see. Thank you.

2 MR DINGEMANS: BBC/4/142. This is a letter we see from3 someone who appears at the bottom, Miss Mahon,4 complaining about your coverage being too pro-war in5 relation to --6 A. Well, we got criticisms from both sides throughout,7 particularly in the run up to Iraq and during the war in8 Iraq, during the war itself.9 Q. I think 23rd March is some four days after the start?10 A. Yes. We have had significant criticism from both areas.11 Q. Did you take any steps to anticipate the difficulties12 you might come into with the war in Iraq?13 A. Yes, we did the same in Iraq that we had done in14 Afghanistan. I set up a committee of the most senior

15 people in the BBC and we met on a regular basis, and16 during the war itself in both Afghanistan and in Iraq we17 met daily to discuss our output.18 I mean, we took a number of actions. I mean, before19 the war it was that committee that decided that -- we20 had a particular problem with, as you remember, there21 were a million people who took to the streets of London,22 an anti-war march. This gave us a particular problem23 that should we allow any of our people to go on this24 march. I mean, there is their civil liberties on one25 hand and their employer position on the other, the

134

1 integrity of the BBC on the other. The decision we took2 was we told most of our senior editorial figures that if3 they chose to go on the march they could not be involved4 in the coverage of the war at all.5 Q. Were there any other significant decisions?6 A. Well, others, yes. What we found in the period in the7 run up to the war was on Question Time, which is8 a controlled audience, we went out of our way to make9 sure we got a balanced audience. This is a time when of10 course it was quite hard to find people who were willing11 to support the war; there were many more people willing12 to come on who were against the war, possibly because13 that is their passion. On Question Time, therefore, we

14 tried to get a balanced audience.15 On phone-in programmes, which we have particularly16 both in local radio and network radio, we had17 a particular problem in the sense that the phone-in18 lines were being dominated by people from an anti-war19 persuasion. We decided that we had to try to get20 a balanced view on our phone-in programmes, so what we21 did was we opened up more lines which allowed us to get22 more callers. Then we tried to make sure we got some23 sort of balance.24 Q. After the war Mr Gilligan makes his broadcast on25 29th May. Were you involved at all in any process

1351 leading up to that broadcast?


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2 A. No, I was -- but I would not normally be. I mean this3 was not exceptional. I happened to be on holiday that4 week anyway, I was out of the country. I would not5 normally be. The nature of the news means if you are6 a editor-in-chief at the level I am with that sort of7 scale of operation, there is no possible way in news

8 that you could be involved.9 No, I was on holiday. In fact I was in touch with10 the office a lot during that week about another issue to11 do with the war.12 Q. Which was?13 A. Correspondent, the BBC 2 programme, international news14 programme on a Sunday night was planning to run15 a documentary that Sunday about Al Jazeera, the Arabic16 international news channel. The producers were using17 pictures or planning to use pictures in that of two18 bodies of British servicemen as well as pictures of19 Iraqi servicemen and pictures of American servicemen.20 This had become quite a big story in one or two

21 newspapers.22 Q. So you were involved in the process leading up to that?23 A. I was not in executive control, because when you are24 away -- Jana Bennett, who was director of television,25 was in charge. But I was involved a lot in talking

1361 about this, although in the end I had to leave -- the2 final decision was hers. Interestingly she decided --3 it might be relevant to this Inquiry that she decided we4 should broadcast the pictures, and when I came back5 I agreed with that decision. The relatives of the two6 soldiers then made an official complaint to the BBC.

7 I referred -- perhaps in answer to Lord Hutton's earlier8 question, I referred this direct to the Governors.9 Q. Cutting out the complaints --10 A. Because it seemed to me if the most senior people at the11 BBC had taken the decision, there was not much point in12 going through our complaints procedure, it should go13 straight to the Governors' complaints committee, which14 in turn actually supported the decision -- did not15 support the decision of the executive, it actually16 overturned and we issued an apology to the relatives17 involved.18 Q. When did you first hear of Mr Gilligan's broadcast on19 29th May?

20 A. My recollection is that in the first few days of June,21 when I returned to the office, I became aware in general22 terms of the story about the September dossier. And on23 5th June I certainly had a regular meeting with24 Stephen Whittle. Now Stephen Whittle is formerly the25 head of the Broadcasting Standards Commission but he is

1371 in charge of editorial, the editorial policy unit of the2 BBC. I would meet him -- and he is responsible for3 producing guidelines and all those sorts of things.4 I had met him on 5th June. And although my recollection5 is that we spent most of that meeting discussing the

6 ramifications of the correspondent programme, we did --7 I think it was same day that John Reid, who was then


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8 Chairman of the Labour party, had been on the Today9 Programme and I think -- talking about this issue; and10 I think we discussed the issue -- the two of us11 discussed the issue then. My recollection is that at12 that meeting I asked him just to update me and find out13 quite the provenance of this story, where it came from,

14 you know, and did we follow the correct procedures for15 it to go on air.16 Q. Did you ask, at this stage, to see any of the underlying17 material to justify the story?18 A. No, no. It was much more casual than that. This was --19 I mean, we have disagreements on stories with Government20 and others on a quite regular basis, so this was not21 particularly exceptional. I just happened -- the22 John Reid interview was quite remarkable, I thought.23 Q. Why was it remarkable?24 A. It was just a riveting piece of radio. Not remarkable25 in terms of things -- just as a piece of theatre it was

1381 remarkable. He had heard it. I had not heard it but he2 told me about it. I then got hold of the tape to listen3 to. We both -- I said: could you just go and check this4 out for me and make sure that we follow all our5 procedures.6 Q. Was Mr Reid complaining about the story that Mr Gilligan7 had run?8 A. Partly. But this was the day that Mr Reid, I think, was9 talking about rogue elements in the Security Services.10 Q. Partly in response to Mr Gilligan's story?11 A. Oh yes.12 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Dyke: you say you

13 discussed Mr Gilligan's story in general terms. Were14 you aware of the actual details of the report, of what15 he had precisely said?16 A. No. I was aware that there was a disagreement going on.17 LORD HUTTON: Yes. You were not aware that he had said that18 the Government probably knew that the 45 minute figure19 was wrong even before they decided to put it in?20 A. No, not at that stage at all.21 LORD HUTTON: When did you first become aware of the actual22 words of that report?23 A. I did not become aware of that for several weeks.24 LORD HUTTON: We can come on to that if you have --25 A. Not for several weeks.

1391 LORD HUTTON: Yes. You asked to hear the tape of2 Dr John Reid's interview.3 A. Only because he had told me what a riveting interview it4 was.5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.6 A. And it was as part of that process I said to him could7 he just check out and make sure we had followed the8 proper procedures.9 LORD HUTTON: You did not do that at that stage with regard10 to Mr Gilligan's report?11 A. I asked him to look at the thing overall, which included

12 Mr Gilligan's report. I asked him, to say: look, this13 is clearly an issue going on here, could you go and make


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14 sure we have followed our procedures.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Yes.16 MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware at this time of my complaints17 that had been received?18 A. By that time -- well, I was -- not of a formal complaint19 to the BBC. Obviously there were complaints to the

20 programme because that is what was going on on air.21 I was not aware of a formal complaint --22 Q. Any correspondence?23 A. -- but I was later made aware there had been a written24 complaint from Ann Shevas in the Downing Street press25 office which had been replied to by Stephen Mitchell,

1401 the head of BBC Radio News. But that normally would not2 have come anywhere near me.3 Q. Can I take you to BBC/5/58, which is an e-mail from4 Mr Whittle to you. He says:5 "Greg.

6 "In response to your questions. This is the7 sequence of events."8 A. Yes.9 Q. Was this the e-mail that you received after you had10 raised matters with Mr Whittle?11 A. It was.12 Q. Then, halfway down, it talks about the checks that had13 been made.14 "With the dossier story Kevin Marsh's conversation15 was about the strength of the source (not the name) and16 about whether the Gilligan story was consistent with17 separate intelligence sources we were aware of ...18 "The programme editor thinks the story of sufficient

19 significance, potentially controversial, carries high20 legal risks etc he contacts Stephen Mitchell. In the21 case of the dossier, head of Radio News was tipped off22 in general terms ..."23 At the bottom of the page:24 "The live two-way at 06.10 was discussed in general25 terms by the programme with Gilligan while John Humphrys

1411 had a brief written overnight to work from. The 07.002 bulletin piece was scripted by Andrew Gilligan and3 checked by the Newsroom's Output team, the 07.304 illustrated package was scripted but played in live ..."

5 Then reference is made to that.6 Then:7 "Ingram had been booked by a programme producer the8 night before and the outline of the Gilligan story and9 the Cluster Bomb story outlined to his office...10 "Events often move on..."11 There is a bit I cannot read at the bottom of the12 page. I do not know if you have it there? Mine has13 been destroyed. There was a denial, effectively.14 A. Yes. My recollection of it is also that he said it was15 a sound story, well sourced.16 Q. Right.17 A. But it is --

18 Q. That is what you were told on 5th June?19 A. That is what I was told -- I can check actually. I have


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20 probably got the document here so I can just check the21 exact final form.22 Yes. The final line:23 "As you can see, a strong and well sourced story."24 Q. Sorry, it was chopped off my bit of the page.25 A. Yes.

1421 Q. So you were happy at that stage?2 A. Yes. I mean, this is something -- Stephen plays a role3 in the BBC whereby if I pick up concerns I often say to4 him: can you just make sure this is okay, can we go5 through the process?6 Q. Were you aware of later complaints made by Mr Campbell?7 A. Yes. Richard Sambrook had also been away and when he8 came back I remember him telling me that he had received9 a letter from Alastair Campbell about these reports and10 he said he would copy both the letter and the reply to11 me.

12 Q. That happened, did it?13 A. That happened.14 Q. We will not go to the reports, if that is all right,15 because we have seen them before on a number of16 occasions. Were you involved in the drafting of those17 letters?18 A. No, not at all. Again, this is normal practice. A19 complaint sent to Richard Sambrook would be dealt with20 by Richard Sambrook unless the complainant was unhappy.21 Q. We have heard there was a lunch at Downing Street on22 12th June. Did you go to that lunch?23 A. No. It was for senior people -- as I understand it was24 for senior people in news and current -- senior -- it

25 was an editor level lunch by and large, the people who

1431 day to day run the programmes.2 Q. People with influence over the stories?3 A. Yes. But --4 Q. The 25th June. Then there is a BBC -- where are you on5 25th June?6 A. Once again, similarly Alastair Campbell's reply of7 12th June. You want to pass over that?8 Q. We have seen that on a number of occasions and the9 lunch.10 A. I do not know if this is of any help, there is only

11 a point that I happened to -- I think as12 Richard Sambrook described to the Inquiry, these sort of13 letters coming out of the Downing Street press office14 are not unusual. But it is interesting, I think, on15 this one of 12th June just the final paragraph. I only16 say this -- it might be completely irrelevant to this17 Inquiry, but the final paragraph gives the sort of18 flavour of where Alastair Campbell is complaining about19 a story in the Sunday Telegraph the day before and that20 we had given considerable time in our news bulletins to21 it.22 Q. Yes.23 A. In which he basically -- he is talking about a Sunday

24 Telegraph story that he had written a letter of apology25 to the head of the SIS. He goes on to say: this is


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1441 untrue but the head of the SIS has also confirmed the2 story is untrue. I am currently seeking an apology from3 the Sunday Telegraph.4 It was just of interest when I spent my Sunday

5 morning reading this -- in some ways one wonders is that6 the way to spend Sunday mornings. However, I did spend7 Sunday morning reading this. On page 37 --8 Q. You are looking at the Intelligence and Security9 Committee report?10 A. Yes, the Intelligence and Security Committee report. It11 says quite clearly:12 "The Committee took evidence on this matter from the13 chief of the SIS ... Both agreed that making the14 document public without consulting the SIS or the JIC15 chairman was a cock up. Alastair Campbell confirmed16 that once he became aware the providence of the document17 was being questioned because of the inclusion of

18 Dr al Marashi's work ... he telephoned both the Chief of19 the SIS and the JIC Chairman to apologise."20 Which does seem to rather contradict what was in the21 letter of 12th June.22 Q. You obviously spend a lot of your time reading Committee23 reports. On 19th June Mr Gilligan appeared before the24 Foreign Affairs Committee and gave evidence about his25 story. Did you know that Mr Gilligan was going to

1451 appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee report?2 A. I knew that he was -- it had come on to my radar screen3 that he was going to give evidence, yes.

4 Q. He was going to give evidence about a story which was,5 rightly or wrongly, severely aggravating the Government;6 yes?7 A. Yes. Although it had gone quiet by then.8 Q. Did you follow Mr Gilligan's evidence with the same care9 that you have read the Intelligence and Security10 Committee report?11 A. No, I do not think it would be my normal practice to12 read the Intelligence and Security Committee report with13 the detail I did if -- it happened to be in the middle14 of this Inquiry. I have -- I did subsequently read15 Mr Gilligan's evidence.16 Q. Can I take you to a couple of those answers?

17 LORD HUTTON: Just before we do that, Mr Dingemans, would18 the stenographers like a break for 5 minutes? We will19 break for 5 minutes.20 (3.38 pm)21 (Short Break)22 (3.42 pm)23 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Dyke, I was about to take you to24 Mr Gilligan's evidence on 19th June at FAC/2/145.25 A. Yes.

1461 Q. I think you said it had come across your radar that he2 was going to give --

3 A. It had come across my radar he was giving evidence, but4 of course the story by then had become far less high


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5 profile. Of course Mr Gilligan's evidence got very6 little coverage actually.7 Q. Right. How many times, in recent years, has a BBC8 journalist given evidence to a House of Commons Select9 Committee?10 A. I do not know.

11 Q. Many times, or?12 A. I do not remember one in the three and a half years13 I have been there; but this would have been dealt with14 by Richard Sambrook and Mark Damazer. As you know, of15 course, Mark Damazer went with Mr Gilligan.16 Q. Yes. So were you made aware of anything that17 Mr Gilligan had said at the time?18 A. Not at that stage, no.19 Q. You see, if I may I will deal with it in chronology20 because we will come to it in time. If one scrolls down21 to the question at question 461, Mr Pope:22 "Just on this issue of the 45 minutes, I want to be23 very clear about what your source is alleging. Is your

24 source alleging that the 45 minutes did not exist in the25 assessment that was inserted by Alastair Campbell?"

1471 And the answer:2 "I will quote his words again. He said, 'It was3 real information. It was the information of a single4 source.' My source did not believe it was reliable. He5 believed that that single source had made a mistake,6 that he had confused the deployment time for7 a conventional missile with the deployment time for8 a CBW missile. He did not believe that any missiles had9 been armed with CBW that would therefore be able to be

10 fireable at 45 minutes' notice. He believed that claim11 was unreliable."12 Then at 148, at question 480 at the bottom,13 Mr Illsley asked:14 "Basically whichever committee holds an inquiry into15 this will have access to the raw data and they will find16 that claim somewhere in the intelligence reports from17 the intelligence community."18 Mr Gilligan:19 "It was not a claim that was in any way made up or20 fabricated by Downing Street. Another one of the21 reasons why this story took on the life that it did was22 that Downing Street denied a number of things which had

23 never been alleged. They denied, among other things,24 that material had been fabricated. Nobody ever alleged25 that material had been fabricated."

1481 I appreciate those are only two answers at the2 Foreign Affairs Committee. I am going to take you to3 them later on if I may. At the time were you aware,4 apart from the fact in general terms he was giving5 evidence, of the answers that had been given?6 A. No.7 Q. Were you aware that Mr Campbell gave evidence on8 25th June to the Foreign Affairs Committee?

9 A. Well, I became aware, as you can imagine. I think10 I remember being aware of the story that Mr Campbell had


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11 decided to give evidence or -- because if I remember12 rightly, he initially was not going to give evidence and13 then was encouraged to give evidence. So I was aware14 that he was going to give evidence, yes.15 Q. And did you become aware of some of his evidence?16 A. At what stage?

17 Q. Well, did you become aware of the content of his18 evidence?19 A. Oh yes, I became -- on the -- I think that was the20 25th June, if I remember --21 Q. Yes.22 A. On 25th and 26th June I was chairing a BBC -- we have23 twice a year a BBC Executive Committee conference, this24 was in Surrey -- when the news came through of a pretty25 ferocious attack which Alastair Campbell had launched

1491 not just against the particular report broadcast by2 Andrew Gilligan, but on the BBC's journalistic integrity

3 and in particular on our coverage of the war.4 Q. Your coverage of the?5 A. Of the war, sorry.6 Q. And what was your reaction to that?7 A. Well, I discussed it with Richard Sambrook who was also8 at the conference. He had been invited by that time to9 appear on the Today Programme the following day to10 answer Mr Campbell's allegations and we both agreed that11 he should leave the conference and go. I mean, an12 attack of this sort of scale from the Government's13 Director of Strategy and Communications was pretty near14 unprecedented, I would have thought.15 LORD HUTTON: Had you, by this stage, read the details of

16 Mr Gilligan's broadcast report on 29th May, Mr Dyke?17 A. (Pause). I do not remember.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes.19 A. I think probably not.20 LORD HUTTON: Yes.21 A. Probably not.22 LORD HUTTON: You see, I have read already part of the23 report which said that actually the Government probably24 knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong even before it25 decided to put it in. Would you regard that as a very

1501 grave charge indeed against the Government?

2 A. Well, of course it -- it was a charge being made not by3 the BBC but by a source to the BBC; but at that stage4 I would not have read that. I would have received5 Stephen Whittle's account of our process. The process6 was going pretty well. I would have talked about this7 with Richard Sambrook. By this time remember the story8 had died away. This had not been brought on to our9 radar screen over the previous 10 days at all, 14 days.10 LORD HUTTON: Whether the charge was made by the BBC or by11 a source which the BBC was reporting, would you regard12 it as a very serious allegation?13 A. Oh, it is pretty serious charge. But there is14 a distinction between a charge made by the BBC and

15 a charge made by a source to the BBC.16 LORD HUTTON: Yes.


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17 A. They are very -- a very different -- they carry18 a different degree of gravity.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes.20 MR DINGEMANS: We have seen some of the extracts from21 Mr Campbell's evidence where he said that the story was22 a lie and those aspects. I will not take you to those

23 because I think we have seen them enough before. But24 what was your reaction to those attacks on the stories?25 A. Well obviously this was a pretty unprecedented -- as

1511 I said, an unprecedented attack.2 LORD HUTTON: Well, did you consider, Mr Dyke, whether3 Mr Campbell's complaint to the FAC related to the4 entirety of Mr Gilligan's broadcast on 29th May or5 whether his complaint related, in particular, to this6 allegation: the Government probably knew that the7 45 minutes claim was wrong?8 A. Well, that had not been the nature of the complaints up

9 until that time, in the two letters that we had got.10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.11 A. So it seemed to me a much more general attack based12 around a particular story or based around a story, but13 a general attack on the BBC. So, remember he was14 accusing us of lying; he was saying that we had run an15 agenda against the war or certain parts of the BBC had16 run an agenda against the war. These are very serious17 charges to make against a broadcasting organisation.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes.19 A. So it seemed -- he had also said we had effectively20 accused the Prime Minister of lying, which21 Richard Sambrook said to me was not -- it would be

22 almost impossible to construe what we said as that.23 That is why I agreed that Richard should go back to24 London and go on to the Today Programme to put our case.25 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Campbell followed it up with a letter

1521 dated 26th June. Did you see that letter? It is2 BBC/6/61.3 A. There were two letters, I think, of the 26th. Yes,4 there was one to Richard Sambrook, which he released to5 that press today. It was released to the press at the6 same time as it was sent to Richard, I think. He sent7 a second private letter to me.

8 Q. Yes. And were you aware, then, of the letter that had9 been written to Mr Sambrook?10 A. I was aware of it on -- sorry, I am getting my days11 muddled up. The 25th. Yes, I was aware of it on the12 26th.13 Q. And the longer letter was the letter to Mr Sambrook, is14 that right?15 A. Yes. The second letter to me, which was a private16 letter sent to myself -- private in the sense it was17 sent directly to me, not released to the press, and18 copied to my Chairman -- was the more conciliatory of19 the two letters. When I received that I thought, by20 this stage, that this was too late really to send me

21 conciliatory letters to try to see if we could sort22 something out.


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23 I have to say to this day I do not understand why24 Mr Campbell did not write to me personally earlier or25 write to the Chairman personally earlier or asked to see

1531 either of us, but he did not. He sent me a more

2 conciliatory letter after he had launched the attack at3 the Foreign Affairs Committee the day before.4 Q. And the conciliatory letter having been sent after the5 attack had been launched?6 A. The attack was launched on the 25th. I suspect the7 other two letters went at roughly the same time.8 Q. Yes. Did that have any effect on what you perceived to9 be your room for manoeuvre?10 A. No. I thought that, as I say, if I had received the11 conciliatory letter some days earlier, saying look --12 because I had received nothing, then that might have13 done. By this time Mr Campbell had launched a broadside14 against the whole of BBC journalism. At that stage it

15 seemed to me it was an external attack and then we had16 to take some action.17 Q. Your letter we see at BBC/5/92. Did you reply to that18 letter?19 A. No.20 Q. And why was that?21 A. Because I thought, as I say, I think it was too late.22 We were under a pretty ferocious public attack at the23 FAC. We were under ferocious attacks at the Lobby24 briefings the following day. Now there was another25 letter being sent to Richard which was also a pretty

154

1 ferocious attack which had been released publicly. I am2 not sure that therefore there was an opportunity to, how3 can I say, put the genie back in the bottle, really.4 I think. It was then a very big public issue.5 Q. Going back to the letter Mr Sambrook received at6 BBC/6/62, a number of specific questions were raised at7 the top of the page.8 LORD HUTTON: Can we just scroll back to that letter that9 was up on the screen?10 MR DINGEMANS: Sorry my Lord, it is BBC/5/92.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Could we just look at this, Mr Dyke?12 You see in the second paragraph Mr Campbell says:13 "Put to one side our complaint about the BBC's

14 coverage of Iraq recently about which you were15 dismissive in your letter to the Prime Minister."16 Then there is a paragraph about the allegations17 about "my conduct in relation to the WMD dossier, it has18 been a disgrace."19 Then he says in the next paragraph:20 "This story is 100 per cent wrong."21 A. Yes.22 LORD HUTTON: Did you consider what Mr Campbell meant by23 "this story"?24 A. No. I read this letter, having read the letter to25 Richard first. The letter to Richard was sent to me

1551 when I was in Surrey. This came later to my office and


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2 it was faxed to me at home. It is interesting, "this3 story is 100 per cent wrong". Of course we knew if he4 meant this story, if he meant the Gilligan story --5 well, of course, we knew by then it was not 100 per cent6 wrong because a couple of important parts of it had7 already been shown to be factually correct.

8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 A. I saw this -- I do not know -- I know Alastair, I do not10 know him well and I do not know him much through my job.11 I have know him socially. Oddly I have met him more at12 football matches than anywhere else. It seemed to me13 that sending this letter on the day after the sort of14 attack, made an attempt to write a personal letter15 saying: please do this, a bit strange. But I presumed16 he meant -- this story is 100 per cent wrong, I presumed17 by that he meant the Gilligan story.18 LORD HUTTON: The entirety of Mr Gilligan's broadcast?19 A. Yes, the whole breadth of it. But of course the attack20 the day before of course had been much wider than that.

21 MR DINGEMANS: BBC/5/95 which is the questions that were22 asked.23 A. Well, can --24 Q. I think you had seen this, you said, before you had got25 your letter?

1561 A. Yes, I saw this. Then I got my letter.2 Q. Yes.3 A. That was on the Thursday the 5th, is it? Thursday the4 6th.5 Q. 26th June.6 A. Sorry, I am miles away. Thursday 26th June.

7 Q. Yes.8 A. On the following morning --9 Q. And he had actually asked -- he had released the letter10 publicly?11 A. Yes.12 Q. Had that had any effect on the temperature in relation13 to the dispute?14 A

Documents

Hearing Transcript - 15 September 2003 Afternoon