Hearing Transcript - 16 September 2003 Afternnon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 16 September 2003 Afternnon

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22 UNSCOM.23 Q. Pausing there for a moment: would that have reduced the24 cost to UNSCOM?25 A. That should have reduced the cost to UNSCOM, yes,

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1 because the Foreign Office would have charged at cost2 rather than cost plus overhead plus profit element.3 Q. So that was one idea that was put forward. What were4 the other ideas that were considered?5 A. The other idea that was considered was transferring him6 permanently to PACS; and that also was not possible.7 There were no vacancies in PACS and no funding,8 essentially, from the Foreign Office to do that.9 Q. So what was it eventually decided to do?10 A. A very loose secondment to PACS. That had the benefits11 of getting rid of the overhead charge. I am not12 a financier, so I do not really understand the ins and13 outs of this, but it lowered the cost to DERA's bottom

14 line, essentially.15 Q. So Dr Kelly becomes seconded to PACS and therefore16 becomes seconded to the Ministry of Defence. Was this17 arrangement ever formalised in any way?18 A. Certainly not in my time. It may have been formalised19 since then.20 Q. When people such as Dr Kelly are seconded to PACS or to21 the Ministry of Defence, what is the usual length of22 time for which the secondment will last?23 A. It is normally about three years. After that the24 individual would either return to his parent department25 or would transfer permanently to the employing

1231 department.2 Q. In the case of Dr Kelly, for how long was he seconded to3 the MoD?4 A. I suppose you could start off in 1991 and certainly go5 through to 1998, if not to 2003.6 Q. Would it be fair to say the secondment, therefore, was7 rather notional?8 A. It was very notional, certainly in the early days.9 Q. Can I move on to Dr Kelly's dealings with the press?10 When Dr Kelly visited Iraq, in what capacity did he11 visit? Did he visit, for instance, as an MoD employee12 or a United Nations weapons inspector or in some other13 capacity?14 A. He visited as a United Nations weapons inspector on15 a United Nations passport.16 Q. Do you know if he had a particular contract with UNSCOM?17 A. Yes. Inspectors signed a contract of confidentiality18 before they were allowed to travel as part of a team.19 Q. Do you know what the broad terms of that contract20 involved?21 A. The broad terms were that any information gained as22 a result of UNSCOM activity were the property of the23 United Nations.24 Q. So effectively information Dr Kelly obtained in that25 capacity belonged to the United Nations rather than to

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1 the Government; is that correct?2 A. Certainly under the terms of the contract that would be3 true.4 Q. Do you know if Dr Kelly was encouraged to talk to the5 press at all?6 A. He was actively encouraged to talk to the press. He had

7 been doing it since 1991; and in 1995/1996, with the new8 change to DERA, we decided or I decided to formalise9 that and it became one of his annual key results,10 a target, if you like.11 Q. And what specifically did this mean he had to do?12 A. To provide briefings to the press and to Government13 bodies, learned societies, as and when required by14 the -- essentially the people employing him. This would15 be the United Nations, the Foreign Office and PACS.16 Q. Dr Kelly, it would seem, therefore had three masters,17 you might say; one was UNSCOM, one was the MoD and the18 final master was DSTL. What were the consequences of19 having three masters when it came to his dealings with

20 the press?21 A. It meant that in clearing his dealings, either his22 publications, his presentations or contacts, he would23 have to consider which piece of information he was24 likely to be asked about and to, ideally, seek clearance25 from the appropriate --

1251 Q. I am sorry. Did you ever discuss this position with2 Dr Kelly?3 A. We discussed it informally several times.4 Q. What did Dr Kelly say to you was his view of what he5 should be doing?

6 A. His view was -- and it was a very pragmatic view -- that7 he should be targeting his requests for clearance to the8 most appropriate authority. For instance, if it was UN9 work, he would try to clear this with the UN. If it was10 treaty related work, he would clear it with the Foreign11 Office. If it related to his other areas of expertise12 which had been gained whilst employed with the MoD, he13 would go to the MoD.14 LORD HUTTON: Dr Shuttleworth when you say that Dr Kelly was15 encouraged to provide briefings, can you elaborate16 a little on what subjects the briefings would be? Would17 it be of a technical nature relating to WMD?18 A. During my time most of the interest was related to Iraq;19 and he was asked to give briefings on the work of20 UNSCOM, which covered not only technical issues but also21 issues relating to the personalities who had been22 involved on the Iraqi side, the scale of activity;23 essentially assessing and assessments of the Iraqi24 programme.25 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

1261 MR KNOX: Do you know if Dr Kelly sought advice from the MoD2 or from the Foreign Office as to how to handle requests3 made to him by the press?4 A. Yes, he did seek advice, initially on a regular basis.5 Obviously many of the requests for Iraq related material6 were essentially for the same information over and over


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7 again. So him seeking advice for those issues gradually8 fell off.9 Q. Who would he seek that advice from?10 A. If he was talking to the Foreign Office he would be11 talking to NPD, now CPD. If it was MoD he would talk to12 PACS.

13 Q. Did you know what advice he was given, did he ever tell14 you?15 A. Occasionally he was given rather conflicting advice. He16 also sought advice internally within Porton and was also17 offered advice. It was usually if confusion arose as to18 who was the owner of the information. There were19 situations that could arise, for instance dealing with20 Iraq, which might bring in some of his more general21 knowledge.22 Q. Can you think of any particular instances of which you23 are aware when there was a conflict as to the advice he24 was getting?25 A. Yes, I can. On one occasion, I guess this would be in

1271 1997, as a general review of security at Porton, David's2 involvement with the press came up, in general terms.3 It was suggested that David perhaps ought to broaden the4 requests he made for permission to talk to journalists5 or permission to publish. It was suggested that perhaps6 MoD ought to be brought in more often. David tried to7 comply with that. The very first occasion he did so,8 the reaction from the security office was: well, this is9 really UNSCOM business, none of ours.10 Q. So they passed it on back to: well, you had better go11 and talk to UNSCOM?

12 A. They passed it back to the pragmatic approach that had13 been adopted several years before that.14 Q. You say "the pragmatic approach"; that is the pragmatic15 approach adopted by Dr Kelly?16 A. Yes.17 Q. What, in summary, was that pragmatic approach that he18 adopted?19 A. To try to target the requests for permission to the20 appropriate part of Government or to the United Nations.21 Q. What was the greatest press interest, or rather what was22 the field where the greatest press interest was shown in23 Dr Kelly's work?24 A. For all the time I was his resource manager it was Iraq.25 Q. Any particular aspect of Iraq?

1281 A. Well, the work of UNSCOM and the achievements UNSCOM2 were making.3 Q. And on what type of occasions did the press make4 approaches to Dr Kelly in that connection?5 A. Frequently in the margins of briefing sessions that he6 was giving on behalf of UNSCOM. These were frequently7 held in New York and occasionally in Europe.8 Q. Do you know if the Foreign Office made any objections to9 Dr Kelly's talking to the press on receipt of such10 approaches?11 A. I have never heard of any objections at all to him12 talking to the press. Inevitably, because of time


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13 delays, he was not able to seek permission in advance of14 speaking to the press. But he was very, very reliable15 in seeking permission afterwards or at least informing16 that he had had those contacts.17 Q. Were you aware, at any stage, of Dr Kelly having got18 into trouble with the Foreign Office or with the

19 Ministry of Defence for having spoken to the press?20 A. No; and as his first reporting officer I would have21 expected to have heard of any indication that that was22 the case.23 Q. Do you have any general observations that you would like24 to make about Dr Kelly and the circumstances leading to25 his death?

1291 A. No, I do not.2 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Dr Shuttleworth.3 A. Thank you very much.4 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I am afraid you will need

5 two minutes just to allow the disconnection.6 LORD HUTTON: Of course. I will rise very briefly.7 (2.22 pm)8 (Short Break)9 (2.24 pm)10 MS KATE WILSON (called)11 Examined by MR DINGEMANS12 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?13 A. It is Katherine Elizabeth Wilson.14 Q. What is your occupation?15 A. I am the chief press officer at the Ministry of Defence.16 Q. You are in the slightly unusual position of coming to17 give evidence for the first time. I am going to examine

18 you neutrally. There will then be cross-examination by19 the family and the BBC, and you are aware of that?20 A. Yes.21 Q. How long have you been at the Ministry of Defence?22 A. Since July of last year, 2002. Although I did work23 there previously, between 1996 and 2000.24 Q. What was your employment before that?25 A. In the time in the middle I was at the Home Office press

1301 office.2 Q. So how long have you been a press officer?3 A. Since 1996.4 Q. As a result of that, do you have regular dealings with5 the media?6 A. Daily, yes.7 Q. Were you on duty on 28th May?8 A. No, I do not do duties because I am the chief press9 officer but I was in the office until about 20 to 8.10 Q. Did you have any contact with Mr Gilligan on that day?11 A. Yes. I spoke to him at about 7.30.12 Q. Did you know Mr Gilligan beforehand?13 A. Yes. I have known him since I first started doing press14 office work in 1996.15 Q. At 7.30 what was said?16 A. He called me to say that they were looking for an17 interview with Adam Ingram the next morning which was18 about cluster bombs, which was quite a topical issue.


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19 We talked through various issues around the subject of20 cluster bombs, things like the detonation rates of21 different weapon systems and things like that.22 At the end of the conversation I asked him whether23 there was anything else running on the programme and he24 said he had something he was working on on WMD and a

25 dodgy dossier. He said that was not a matter for the

1311 MoD, so I did not pursue it.2 Q. How long do you think this conversation lasted?3 A. I have heard since that it was about 7 minutes. That4 sounds about right.5 Q. It accords with your recollection?6 A. Yes.7 Q. How many minutes, estimating, do you think you were8 talking about the cluster bombs for?9 A. At a guess -- it was most of the conversation, 6 minutes10 or so. It was only when I asked him at the end of the

11 conversation whether he was working on anything else,12 which is standard practice, so that I could brief the13 Minister if there was anything else he needed to know14 about, he mentioned the WMD story.15 Q. So far as you can recollect, what exactly did he say16 about the WMD story?17 A. He said he had -- he was working on a story about WMD18 and the dodgy dossier, which I took at the time to be19 the February dossier.20 Q. Did you make any notes of that conversation?21 A. I did not make any notes of the conversation. The22 reason I did not is because I was working from a Q and A23 document on cluster bombs. I tend to make notes if

24 I have something new or different that I need to go away25 and look into or research. There was not anything new

1321 or different in what he was talking about so I did not2 make any notes.3 Q. If we look at MoD/18/15, we can see part of a log.4 Perhaps you can just help me with this: what is this5 document?6 A. Yes. That is the duty officer's log from the 28th which7 was written by Richard Whalley, who is the duty press8 officer.9 Q. We can see at the top an entry timed at 8 o'clock.10 A. Yes.11 Q. And the caller is Ian Watson.12 A. Yes.13 Q. Was this his note or someone else's note?14 A. No, all of this was written by the duty press officer.15 These were all calls he took.16 Q. Who was the duty press officer that night?17 A. It was Richard Whalley.18 Q. After the discussion that Mr Gilligan had with you, it19 looks as if someone else has called in; is that right?20 A. Yes, that is standard practice though. You often find21 that Andrew Gilligan is working on something, perhaps22 not from the office, and somebody else who is actually23 putting the programme together will give you a call to24 confirm what time they want the Minister, how long they


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25 want him for. So that was Ian Watson's call.

1331 Q. If we look at the enquiry in the middle:2 "Bid for Minister to talk about clearance op for3 cluster bombs etc."

4 Is that the extent of the note on that aspect of it?5 A. Yes, that is what he was talking about. I think it was6 Ian who was putting the package together.7 Q. If we look at MoD/31/3, there is another log here, which8 is dated 29th May at the top.9 A. I cannot see it at the moment.10 Q. Sorry, MoD/31/3. You can see at the top it is 29th May.11 But if you go down to the bottom, you can see 28th May.12 Is that the continuation of that log, is it?13 A. Yes, all it is is a rolling database.14 Q. Is there any relevant entry here in relation to the15 programme the next day?16 A. I mean, what it reflects is that Chris Howard rang us

17 later on to say did we want -- or be prepared, rather,18 for the Minister to do a couple of minutes on WMD at the19 end of his interview on cluster bombs, and then20 Martin Sheahan calling back to say: here are the WMD21 lines, which I think you have.22 Q. The first entry is three up from the bottom. There is23 Chris Howard -- he works for the Today Programme, does24 he?25 A. Yes.

1341 Q. -- calling Mr Whalley:2 "Discussed programme for morning. Be prepared to

3 answer some questions (2 mins at end) on WMD."4 A. Yes.5 Q. Then the response was:6 "Thank you. Will arrive at Millbank at 0800 ready7 for live at 0810-0815."8 That is for the Minister; is that right?9 A. Yes.10 Q. Going up, Downing Street press office appear to have11 called?12 A. Yes, that is right.13 Q. He says:14 "Discussion over WMD lines for tomorrow's [Radio 4]15 interview. He will send fax. Are we happy? If Rumsfeld16 issue arises remember to ensure that the full context is17 used. Confident that we will uncover evidence of the18 WMD programme. Stick with the jigsaw argument [whatever19 that may be]."20 But it appears, from that, that there had been21 contact with the Downing Street press office. Who had22 initiated that contact?23 A. I think it was probably me, because if Richard had24 called them he would have logged it. I cannot remember.25 It is unusual but not sort of remarkable if the

1351 machinery of just putting together the briefing, you2 would not necessarily log everything. The purpose of3 the log is so that various people around the department


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4 can see what was happening overnight. So press officers5 do not always put every single call on if it does not6 give them anything particularly new.7 Either Richard or I would have called Martin. It is8 standard practice, if we are doing an interview on the9 Today Programme, to let No. 10 know and to double-check

10 there is not another Minister going on, because we would11 not put two Ministers on the same programme. So when12 I -- I think it was me, I cannot remember -- spoke to13 Martin I would have said that Adam Ingram was going on14 on cluster bombs and they are doing something on WMD,15 just so that you are aware.16 Q. Right. When would you have made that call?17 A. It would probably have been just after I spoke to18 Andrew Gilligan.19 Q. Right. Do you know what you said, so far as you can20 recall, to Downing Street about the WMD issue?21 A. I mean, all I could have said is that Andrew Gilligan is22 working on something on WMD and the dodgy dossier,

23 because I did not know any more than that.24 Q. Can we turn to MoD/32/22? You said you were working25 from some Q and A material or material in relation to

1361 cluster bombs.2 A. Yes.3 Q. Is this the material?4 A. Yes.5 Q. Was this something you had already prepared anyway?6 A. Yes. We already had a briefing pack on cluster bombs7 because it was an issue that had come up several times8 during Operation TELEC.

9 Q. So when Mr Gilligan calls, you pull out your briefing10 pack on cluster bombs and you run through it?11 A. You do not run through it, you draw from it depending on12 what he is asking you.13 Q. Whose notes are these on this document?14 A. I think they are the notes Adam Ingram made just before15 he gave the interview.16 Q. If you go down to the bottom of the page, for example,17 you can see:18 "GH [which I take to be Mr Hoon] not indiscriminate19 targeted on [something] area."20 This Q and A material was handed to the Minister21 then?22 A. Yes. What happened was before I left the office, and23 again this is standard practice, I asked Richard Whalley24 to pull together all the information that we had on25 cluster bombs. He will then have gone through and

1371 highlighted the bits he wanted the Minister to flag up,2 plus the material that we had on WMD.3 Q. So if we go to 23, we can see:4 "UXO clearance in Iraq."5 A. Yes.6 Q. And Q and A. And 24, the document continues through and7 concludes on 25 with the issue of children playing with8 UXO.9 If we then go to 26 there is another document which


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10 is headed "Current Issues":11 "Rumsfeld: Iraq may have destroyed WMD prior to12 invasion?"13 What document was this?14 A. This was an existing piece of information that we had15 had. I think the day previously Donald Rumsfeld had

16 been quoted as saying: we may never find WMD. That was17 the story that I thought Andrew Gilligan was talking18 about because it was a huge story and lots of media were19 pursuing that story.20 Q. Rather like you had the briefing pack on cluster bombs,21 you had already put together a briefing pack on this22 issue on WMD?23 A. That is all we had because it was not really MoD that24 were in the lead on that issue, it was more a Foreign25 Office issue. I think that is a line that came from the

1381 Foreign Office. But again, it would be routine for them

2 to circulate that round to all the relevant Government3 departments.4 Q. If one goes to 27, there is another document with some5 handwriting on it. Do you know what this is?6 A. That is also notes that Adam Ingram made just before he7 went on to the programme.8 Q. Do you know who supplied Mr Ingram with the Q and A9 material on cluster bombs? Your press office?10 A. Richard Whalley supplied the whole pack which he pulled11 together during the course of the evening before. He12 then went over and briefed the Minister at about 7.30.13 Q. So he pulled together the Q and A material on cluster14 bombs?

15 A. Correct.16 Q. The current issues on Rumsfeld and WMD?17 A. Yes.18 Q. And then this little extract, is that right, looks like19 from Hansard?20 A. Yes, it was faxed over from the No. 10 press office.21 I think it was from one of the Prime Minister's press22 conferences.23 Q. We can see some notes in the bottom right-hand corner.24 Do you know who made those notes?25 A. Yes, they are Adam Ingram's notes.

1391 Q. If we go to 28, what is this? This is continuing the2 point, is it? It is continuing the briefing note, is3 it?4 A. I think it must be. I am not sure if I have seen this5 before or not. It does not look familiar. Yes, sorry,6 yes, that is the continuation of the press conference,7 I think.8 Q. It certainly relates to weapons of mass destruction and9 uncovering their weapons programmes et cetera.10 Then if we go to 29, we come to some handwriting11 with "Ian Watson -- Cluster bombs" at the top. Whose is12 this document?13 A. That is a document that Richard Whalley wrote in the14 morning once he had heard the first piece on cluster15 bombs. That was so he could tell the Minister, in


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16 addition to the briefing he had already given him,17 exactly what the allegations were.18 Q. What time had Mr Watson started work? Was he on duty19 that night then?20 A. I do not know if he was on duty or not. It was him who21 was putting the package together, so he would have been

22 in the studio working on it.23 Q. The studio?24 A. Presumably, yes.25 Q. At the Today Programme?

1401 A. Yes.2 Q. Accompanying the Minister?3 A. No, sorry. Ian Watson is from the Today Programme.4 This is -- sorry, this is Richard Whalley's note of5 exactly what Ian Watson had put in his package that went6 out -- was broadcast on the Today Programme the next7 morning.

8 Q. Whose handwriting is this? This is Richard Whalley?9 A. This is Richard's, yes.10 Q. When did he make this note?11 A. I have spoken to him. This is to the best of his12 recollection, he is in Iraq at the moment so he could13 not look at it, he made these notes once he heard the14 first piece on cluster bombs in the morning. It is15 possible he made it the night before when he spoke to16 Ian Watson, but he does not think so because he would17 have put that in the log.18 Q. So Richard Whalley was on duty all night then?19 A. Yes.20 Q. What time does the Today Programme start?

21 A. 6 o'clock.22 Q. If you scroll down we can see there is a bit about23 cluster bombs, mine action, tragedies of war, et cetera.24 "WMD.25 "None found: difficult task, 12 years".

1411 "Extensive searching...", reference to the jigsaw2 again, "PM ... why Rumsfeld?"3 A. Hmm, hmm.4 Q. Then we can see this halfway down:5 "Unnamed sources.6 "Single source (corroborative) -- no expose.7 "45 minutes.8 "TB. Under threat.9 "Went 2 war. Evidence ...", et cetera.10 Do you know what that relates to?11 A. Yes. This one is certainly -- Richard wrote the note12 after he had heard the first two pieces on WMD that had13 gone out on the programme the next morning. Also he has14 got in there the denial that No. 10 put out as soon as15 the piece had been broadcast.16 Q. Where can we see the denial?17 A. "No pressure [from] No. 10".18 Q. No pressure; that is the No. 10 report?19 A. Yes, I mean --20 Q. This is Richard Whalley's handwriting again, is that?21 A. Just to clarify, these are the notes he will have taken


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22 over to the Minister -- this one certainly is -- in23 order to brief him before he went on to the programme.24 Q. Then finally at 31 we can see another document headed25 "Directorate of news, Ministry of Defence.

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1 "WMD.2 "No. 10.3 "Allegation untrue.4 "Not one word of dossier rewritten by No. 10.5 "No pressure applied."6 Whose note is that?7 A. The note was actually written by Richard, which was when8 No. 10 called him having heard the allegation in the9 morning, to say that this is what they had already said10 to the Today Programme so that Adam Ingram could11 reiterate what No. 10 had said. The capital letter bit12 in the middle is again Adam Ingram's notes before he13 went onto the programme.

14 Q. If we scroll down a wee bit, you can see "Security15 Services doc" appeared, certainly on the photocopy, to16 be different handwriting, is that right?17 A. Yes.18 Q. At the bottom it says "A Gilligan single source"; whose19 handwriting is that again?20 A. It is Adam Ingram's.21 Q. That was made in the morning?22 A. Yes.23 Q. Did you have any other dealings, apart from your24 telephone call with Mr Gilligan, you think at about25 7.30, and you say you think you contacted Downing Street

1431 afterwards?2 A. Well, either Richard or I did. I think it was probably3 me, as I say, because Richard would have logged the4 call.5 Q. Did you have any other dealing in relation to the6 broadcast that went out on the 29th May?7 A. No. I left at about 7.45 and Richard followed it8 through because he was on duty.9 Q. So what was the next dealing that you had in relation to10 this particular story?11 A. I mean, I heard the piece, the Adam Ingram interview, at12 8.10 the next morning. I rang No. 10 shortly13 afterwards, I think, to say I thought the interview had14 been quite hostile, but they were already putting in15 a letter of complaint so we did not bother to write one16 ourselves.17 Q. Right. You would have complained that the questioning18 was hostile?19 A. Yes.20 Q. Right. After hearing the piece and hearing the21 Minister's performance and the questioning, did you have22 anything further to do with this particular broadcast?23 A. No, not until the next month when the Ben Bradshaw24 interview was broadcast.25 Q. We have heard and seen a copy of the transcript. That

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1 appears to have been on Saturday 28th June; is that2 right?3 A. Yes.4 Q. Were you contacted about that?5 A. Yes. I did not hear the interview myself but I was6 called by No. 10 press office and then our own press

7 office shortly afterwards.8 Q. What did the No. 10 press office ask you or say to you?9 A. They said: did you hear the piece? I said no. So they10 explained what it was all about and the fact that11 Andrew Gilligan said he had checked the story with me.12 Q. Checked the?13 A. The WMD story with me before it went out.14 Q. What did you say to the No. 10 press office.15 A. I was confused to start with because I had not heard the16 piece, so I was not sure what they were all talking17 about. I said I would double-check but he certainly did18 not check it with me, but I wanted to be clear that he19 had not checked it with Richard at some point later on

20 in the evening.21 Our press office then rang me about five minutes22 later I think, again on the Saturday morning. There23 were two press officers there because it was a handover24 period, as the Saturday person arrives and the Friday25 person leaves on Saturday morning.

1451 Q. What time do you hand over at the press office?2 A. Between 9 and 9.30. And it was Howard, I think -- there3 were two people there who said that the other press4 officer there had just had a call from Andrew, which was5 quite bizarre.

6 Q. So what had happened on the Saturday morning?7 A. The Ben Bradshaw interview had run. Andrew Gilligan had8 called our press officer immediately after the interview9 had run to say he wanted to put on record that he had10 spoken to me and that is what he said. But he hung up11 at that point and Liane did not know what he was talking12 about.13 Q. So what was your reaction to all this?14 A. Well, initially I was quite confused. I asked the duty15 press officer, which by this stage was Howard because he16 had taken over.17 Q. Howard?18 A. Howard Rhodes. I asked him if he could go back and19 double-check the logs, again to check that Andrew had20 not spoken to anyone else. He checked the logs. I21 spoke to Richard, who had been on duty, to make sure22 that he had not spoken to him about it and then I went23 back to No. 10 and said it was not right. Then24 I discussed with No. 10 whether we should put out25 a statement; my view was that we should. Then I spoke

1461 to the Secretary of State's office and also to2 Pam Teare --3 Q. Yes.4 A. -- and put together a statement from home.5 Q. And what was the gist of that statement?6 A. I mean, it was as I have said: I did speak to


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7 Andrew Gilligan but the conversation was about cluster8 bombs. He mentioned WMD when I asked him if there was9 anything else running on the programme the next morning10 but he did not, you know, put the specific allegations11 to me. It was Andrew who said several times that it was12 not a story for MoD, so to me that is not checking the

13 story with MoD.14 Q. Right. We have seen some correspondence that then15 ensued between the BBC and Mr Bradshaw and others. Were16 you involved at all in that correspondence?17 A. I was aware that Ben Bradshaw was going to write18 a letter.19 Q. Who told you that?20 A. I think No. 10 told me that. Then some time on Saturday21 afternoon there was a conference call between No. 10,22 Ben Bradshaw and me. I cannot remember exactly who from23 No. 10 was involved.24 Q. Would that have been Mr Kelly or Mr Smith?25 A. It may well have been, I cannot remember. It would be

1471 unusual if neither of them were involved in the2 conversation. And they basically read through what they3 thought Ben Bradshaw should say in his letter to make4 sure that it was actually correct in terms of what5 I recalled the situation to be. I said it was and the6 letter went.7 Q. So Mr Bradshaw wrote. There was a response to that8 letter?9 A. Yes.10 Q. And were you involved at all in dealing with the11 response?

12 A. I got a copy of the response from No. 10; and because13 the times that the Today Programme said they had called14 were all wrong so far as our log showed, our Secretary15 of State, Geoff Hoon, wrote back to point out that the16 calls did not sort of tally up, really.17 Q. We have heard that there was, in fact, a meeting between18 Mr Hoon and Mr Sambrook on 8th July. Were you a party19 to that meeting?20 A. Yes, I attended the meeting.21 Q. What was said in relation to the giving of notice point?22 A. I mean, I attended so I could tell Richard Sambrook23 myself exactly what I had said. As I remember,24 Richard Sambrook said he thought it was unusual that25 Andrew Gilligan would call on somebody else's story

1481 because it was Ian Watson who was putting the package2 together. What I said was I did not know whether it was3 unusual or not, but cluster bombs was a story that4 Andrew Gilligan had certainly followed in the past and5 when he was on the Sunday Telegraph he did a lot of6 stuff on land mines and the Ottawa treaty. It would not7 seem odd to me that we had a conversation about it8 because we had so many conversations about it in the9 past.10 Q. You must have numerous conversations with journalists.11 How many conversations a day do you have with12 journalists?


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13 A. It depends on what I am doing really, you know, or how14 busy it is.15 Q. On a busy day?16 A. On a busy day, 20/30.17 Q. You have not, for the reasons you have given, kept18 a note of the conversation you had with Mr Gilligan.

19 How clear is your recollection of the conversation with20 Mr Gilligan?21 A. It is very clear. I mean, I went back and checked all22 of my records, and the thing that reassured me about it23 the most is if I had known at the time what the24 allegation was when Richard spoke to No. 10, we would25 have flagged it up to them but we did not do that. The

1491 only reason we cannot have done that is because we did2 not know about it.3 Q. What had you flagged up to No. 10?4 A. The main reason for ringing them was to let them know

5 that Adam Ingram was going on to the programme and to6 tell them what he was talking about, but I also7 mentioned that Andrew Gilligan was working on something8 on WMD and the dodgy dossier because that was a story9 for them, not for MoD.10 Q. Can I then turn to your dealings with Dr Kelly? When11 did you first become aware of Dr Kelly's name?12 A. On Friday 4th July I was called over to a meeting at the13 Permanent Secretary's office and shown a copy of the14 letter that Dr Kelly had written to Bryan Wells.15 Q. I think if we look at MoD/1/19 that is it; is that16 right?17 A. Yes.

18 Q. We can scroll down. So you were called over to the19 office. Who else was there?20 A. Initially the Permanent Secretary and his private21 secretary, and then a bit later on Martin Howard and22 Richard Hatfield arrived.23 Q. So that is Sir Kevin Tebbit; and who is the private24 secretary?25 A. Dominic Wilson.

1501 Q. I think that is in fact your husband as well, is that2 right?3 A. It is, yes.4 Q. Who else was there?5 A. Initially it was -- I was called over because Pam was6 not around to have a look at the letter and there was7 nobody else there to start with.8 Q. Is Pam Teare more senior than you?9 A. Yes she is, she is my boss.10 Q. She is your line manager and boss?11 A. Yes.12 Q. What was discussed on 4th July?13 A. Initially I was just told to have a read of the letter.14 Q. So you read the letter?15 A. I read the letter a couple of times. Then I had a brief16 discussion with Sir Kevin and Dominic about what we17 thought it meant in terms of whether this meant he was18 the source or he was not the source. Of course, at that


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19 point nobody really knew; and then, as I say,20 Martin Howard and Richard Hatfield arrived. Richard had21 just conducted an interview with Dr Kelly so we had22 a meeting around the table about, you know, how the23 interview had gone.24 Q. And what was reported?

25 A. Richard said that on the basis of the interview he was

1511 not at all convinced that he was the source. In fact,2 he thought he probably was not. We had a discussion3 about whether we all agreed with that. My view, and4 Martin's view at the time, was that if that were the5 case then it did not explain why in his FAC evidence6 Andrew Gilligan had said he only had one source.7 Q. Right. So it was your reading of Dr Kelly's letter that8 there had been a meeting, put together with what you9 knew Mr Gilligan had said to the Foreign Affairs10 Committee?

11 A. Yes.12 Q. Had you followed what Mr Gilligan had said to the13 Foreign Affairs Committee?14 A. No, not particularly. I was aware he was giving15 evidence but no more than that. But when I was shown16 the letter I was also given a copy of the transcript to17 have a look at.18 Q. Somebody had already downloaded or got a copy of19 Mr Gilligan's transcript?20 A. Yes.21 Q. Do you know who had done that?22 A. I do not know where it had come from but it was in the23 Permanent Secretary's office.

24 Q. That is in Sir Kevin Tebbit's office?25 A. In his outer office.

1521 Q. In the area that he occupies. Was any view taken on2 this Friday night -- this is Friday 4th July, is it not?3 A. Yes.4 Q. Was any view taken about what to do?5 A. I mean, the view taken at the end of the meeting was6 that we did not know -- we could not know whether or not7 he was the source or not at that stage and, therefore,8 we should alert David Omand, and a letter was drafted in9 the course of the meeting, but there was not anything we10 could or should do publicly.11 We were also quite concerned that because the letter12 said that Dr Kelly had himself realised that it was13 possible he was the source because it had been flagged14 up by somebody outside the department, and also that the15 letter mentioned the recent and varied contact he had16 had with journalists, that there was quite a strong17 possibility that somebody would put two and two together18 at some point, potentially quite quickly. So in the19 meeting Richard and Martin had already put together20 a draft reactive statement.21 Q. Can I take you a document, which is CAB/1/49? This is22 a document that is sent over on 7th July. If we go back23 to CAB/1/48 we can see that it is sent over by fax on24 the Monday saying:


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25 "Two draft statements attached. One based on the

1531 defensive lines prepared on Friday, the other reflects2 further discussions today."3 If I go back to 49, which is headed "version 1",

4 this appears to be the more defensive lines that have5 been prepared. Do you recollect that?6 A. Yes. It looks like the original version which Martin7 and Richard put together, I think.8 Q. Right. That original version --9 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you: in what circumstances did10 you envisage that that statement might be issued,11 Ms Wilson?12 A. The only occasion on which we would issue it is if13 journalists got the story from somewhere else and had14 come to us asking for a response.15 LORD HUTTON: Did you use the word "reactive" or16 "defensive"?

17 A. Reactive.18 LORD HUTTON: Reactive. Yes.19 MR DINGEMANS: This statement does not give any details of20 the official who has come forward. It just says "an21 individual working ..."; is that right?22 A. Yes.23 Q. And there is added in:24 "He is not a member of the Intelligence Services or25 Defence Intelligence Staff."

1541 That, we have heard from Mr Howard, got added in on2 the Monday.

3 Did you also work on some Q and A material?4 A. Yes. While I was in the Permanent Secretary's office --5 one of the reasons I was called over was to start6 thinking about a Q and A pack, which is just a standard7 bit of paper we have for anything that is newsworthy in8 the press office really.9 Q. What is the purpose of Q and A material?10 A. We have hundreds of them at any one time. All it is is11 a supplementary briefing, if an issue comes up, to try12 to predict the sort of questions that journalists might13 ask us.14 Q. Rather like you had the cluster bomb material you could15 pull out. Also I think you had something on WMD which16 someone had prepared.17 A. Exactly.18 LORD HUTTON: Was this question and answer material, at this19 stage, related to this reactive statement that you20 prepared?21 A. Yes. It was all -- because if the story had got out22 then even if we put the statement out to people in23 response to specific enquiries, we would still have had24 follow up questions from journalists quite quickly. So25 this was just the first draft at trying to predict what

1551 those questions might have been.2 LORD HUTTON: Would that question and answer material have3 been used if the reactive statement had not been issued?


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4 A. No, it would only be issued in support of a statement.5 That is not always the case. Occasionally you would not6 have a statement. But in this case we thought we would7 need both because it would be a big story if it did8 happen.9 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

10 MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to CAB/21/3? Someone has11 written in the top right-hand corner of this, but it is12 very cut off "Produced on the evening of 4.7.03".13 Your version is probably as cut off as mine. The14 Q and A material produced that evening says this:15 "Who is the official?16 "We are not prepared to name the individual17 involved.18 "Why not?19 "We have released all the relevant details. There20 is nothing to gain by revealing the name of the21 individual who has come forward voluntarily.22 "Can we interview the individual?

23 No.24 "Is it a senior figure?25 "It is not a member of the Senior Civil Service

1561 (steer -- a middle ranking official)."2 First of all, can I just deal with the first two3 questions? At that stage, it looks as if no-one was4 going to give Dr Kelly's name; is that right?5 A. My view certainly at the time was we were never going to6 volunteer the name unless at some point perhaps we could7 have been sure it was definitely the source. But the8 position from the very beginning was we were not in

9 a position to prevent the name getting out.10 Q. There does not appear to be on this Q and A material,11 prepared on 4th July, anything about: is the name12 Dr Kelly?13 A. No. A Q and A evolves -- this was just an early draft14 that was not shown to anybody else. It was our first15 stab at trying to put down on a bit of paper what the Q16 and A was. If the story had broken over the weekend we17 would have had to have spoken to a lot of people about18 it before we could have used any of it. But it just19 reflects the fact that, you know, we were asking20 ourselves questions but we had not dwelt on it long21 enough at that stage to get to the end of where we would22 need to be and what questions we would be asked.23 Q. Who was party to the preparation of this material on24 4th July?25 A. Myself and Pam Teare.

1571 Q. Had you left Sir Kevin Tebbit's outer office at this2 stage?3 A. Sorry, yes. I e-mailed it to Pam's machine from4 Sir Kevin's office and then went back to Pam's office5 and worked on it with her there.6 Q. So before you left Sir Kevin's office you were working7 on it?8 A. I was putting the questions together, yes, and a couple9 of the answers I think.


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10 Q. Who else was contributing at Sir Kevin's office?11 A. Nobody.12 Q. It was just you while the others were chatting in the13 background?14 A. It was before Richard and Martin arrived, after I had15 read the statement and had a look at the FAC evidence.

16 I was just sitting down trying to think what the17 questions might be that we would get asked.18 Q. If one goes down the page, you pick up at the fourth19 paragraph, as I said:20 "Is it a senior figure?21 "It is not a member of the Senior Civil Service22 (steer -- a middle ranking official)."23 Who was responsible for that proposed steer?24 A. Sorry, I do not understand the question.25 Q. Do you see the fourth question?

1581 A. Yes.

2 Q. "Is it a senior figure?3 "It is not a member of the Senior Civil Service4 (steer -- a middle ranking official)."5 That rather suggests not a member of the Senior6 Civil Service and that, you know, in follow up7 conversations you are going to steer the journalists to8 believe he is a middle ranking official.9 A. Yes.10 Q. Who was responsible for putting that "steer" in?11 A. I cannot remember if it was me or Pam; it may well have12 been me. The point of it was to make it clear that he13 was not a junior official. One of the things that14 journalists often like to establish, you know, for good

15 reason is exactly where in the hierarchy somebody fits16 within a story. So if somebody's laptop has been stolen17 you try to establish how important they were, therefore18 what did they have on their laptop? It was that sort of19 question I was trying to predict, but it was important20 that people did not assume it was somebody very junior21 as well.22 Q. Did you know anything at all about Dr Kelly apart from23 the letter you had read at this stage?24 A. I knew that his boss was a grade 5, and I think I had25 probably asked what grade he was and been told a sort of

1591 6/7.2 Q. You were told he was 6/7?3 A. Something like that, yes.4 Q. Who had told you that?5 A. It would probably have been Martin. I cannot remember6 but it was something that came up during the meeting.7 Q. Martin being Mr Howard?8 A. Yes.9 Q. If we go down the page a bit further, you can see this10 question:11 "Are you suggesting that Andrew Gilligan has12 deliberately sexed up his story and twisted/exaggerated13 the information he received?14 "The MoD has drawn no conclusions and is not making15 any suggestions. We have simply given the facts. Only


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16 Mr Gilligan can know how he handled the information he17 received.18 "This is just spin -- you're releasing this19 information in order to help clear the Government's20 name?"21 And then this comment:

22 "MoD did not break this story. We have today put23 out a statement in response to clarify speculation."24 We know, for whatever reason, that no-one actually25 required the issuing of the statement over the weekend;

1601 and we know, in fact, that the Ministry of Defence2 issued the press statement on 8th July. Is it fair,3 then, to think that when it was issued on 8th July and4 the Ministry of Defence did break this story, that it5 was spin in order to help clear the Government's name?6 A. No, not at all. I mean, the reason that we put this7 Q and A brief together was because we thought there was

8 a possibility that it would come out that weekend, which9 would have been just before the FAC report was10 published. What we needed to do was, you know,11 establish, as far as possible, whether or not this was12 the source of the story. We were not in a position to13 put out a statement at all at that stage, but it14 certainly was not spin. There was a danger, if we had15 not said anything at all throughout, then the Government16 would be accused of trying to cover up something that17 was directly relevant to the FAC.18 LORD HUTTON: Are you saying that the suggested answer, "The19 MoD did not break this story", is to be related to the20 point you made a short time ago that this would only

21 issue if the press broke the story themselves over the22 weekend?23 A. Yes.24 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes.25 MR DINGEMANS: I think at the bottom it deals with the

1611 suggestion of the cover up story, is that right:2 "The letter was written on 30 June. Why did it take3 a week to deal with it?"4 Then you suggest some answers to be checked against5 Dr Wells' recollection.6 A. Yes, that is right.7 Q. Did you have any further involvement over the weekend?8 A. No direct involvement, only that I saw the Tom Baldwin9 piece on the Saturday, which I thought was quite10 interesting and, if anything, sort of put more pressure11 on the Department.12 Q. In what sense?13 A. In what sense did it put more pressure on?14 Q. In what sense was it both interesting and likely to15 increase pressure?16 A. I thought it was interesting because it quoted17 unattributable BBC sources, but it was the first time18 anyone had given any information out about who the19 source might be. It seemed to me that was almost a sort20 of watershed moment potentially and also suggested that21 there was, you know, still a lot of interest in it.


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22 Q. I have shown you the fax which sent two drafts of the23 statement over to No. 10. That was CAB/1/48. This24 appears to be sent over on 7th July. The first draft25 was said to be defensive lines. The other reflects

162

1 "further discussions today" but requires "further2 checking and represents a higher risk approach as we3 cannot be sure that he is Gilligan's single source".4 Can I go through 49 then to 50, which is version 2?5 This is the higher risk approach --6 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, Mr Dingemans, where are we at?7 MR DINGEMANS: CAB/1/50:8 "An individual working in the MoD has come9 forward ...10 "The official has volunteered that he had known11 Mr Gilligan for some time.12 "This individual was not 'one of the senior13 officials in charge of drawing up the dossier'..."

14 He is not a member of the Intelligence Services.15 Mr Gilligan raised the issue of the involvement of16 Mr Campbell:17 "The individual was not involved in the process, he18 did not comment."19 Mr Gilligan has made it clear he only had one20 source. It said this:21 "From the account we have received from the MoD22 official, this leads us to conclude that either there23 was more than one source, or Mr Gilligan misled his24 employers about the information the MoD official25 discussed with him.

1631 We assume the Intelligence and Security Committee2 will take this into account..."3 That was a higher risk version. Do you know who4 produced that? Had you been party to producing that on5 7th July?6 A. It is based on the version that Pam and I were working7 on on Monday night, but I do not recognise the final8 bit.9 Q. There are various bits which appear to have been added10 in. We can see some handwriting at the bottom; and 5111 and 52 there is more handwriting, and 53. Some of that12 we have heard about from Mr Powell and Mr Campbell and13 I think Mr Smith and Mr Kelly as to who was responsible14 for that.15 The next draft of the statement appears on 8th July16 at CAB/1/68. This is 9.16 in the morning. That is on17 Godric Smith's computer. We know, from the evidence,18 that he is at No. 10. You can see:19 "Dominic..."20 That is obviously to Dominic Wilson:21 "This is a revise of version 2 reordering a bit with22 a different penultimate para which asks the question but23 doesn't point the finger. Grateful if you could forward24 to Pam."25 That must be Pam Teare, is that right?

164


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1 A. Yes.2 Q. "Let me know how things progress."3 CAB/1/69 is the statement. That says:4 "The individual is an expert on WMD but is not5 a member of the Intelligence Services or a member of the6 Defence Intelligence Staff."

7 It then goes on to deal with what is said.8 We have heard of various discussions that took place9 during the day and drafting of the press statement.10 CAB/1/63 appears to be the next version we get on11 8th July. Were you involved in looking at that press12 statement that had been faxed over or e-mailed over from13 No. 10 on the morning of 8th July?14 A. No. I was not involved on 8th July until we actually15 put the statement out.16 Q. Right. Well, this appears to be getting closer to the17 final version.18 Then at CAB/1/70 we get a document that is saved on19 Mr Smith's machine at 4.35. You were not party to any

20 of that; is that right?21 A. No.22 Q. The press statement is issued. In fact, because I have23 got confused before about which was the right press24 statement, can I take you to FAC/1/9, which is what the25 Foreign Affairs Committee say is the right one, so that

1651 I can be sure, because there are various changes. When2 did you see the press statement that was actually3 issued?4 A. I saw it just after 5 o'clock, when Pam Teare came back5 with the final version of the statement and the final

6 version of the Q and A -- sorry, came back to the press7 office.8 Q. Does this look like the final version that was issued?9 A. Yes, it does.10 Q. And you can see:11 "The individual is an expert on WMD..."12 Which we have had before:13 "... who has advised Ministers on WMD and whose14 contribution to the dossier of September 2002 was to15 contribute towards drafts of historical accounts of UN16 inspections. He is not 'one of the senior officials in17 charge of drawing up the dossier'. He is not a member18 of the Intelligence Services or the Defence Intelligence19 Staff."20 Do you know who had been responsible for inserting21 the greater detail about Dr Kelly or his role?22 A. No, I do not.23 Q. Did you not consider whether or not this was likely to24 lead to an identification of Dr Kelly, giving quite25 a degree of detail about his role?

1661 A. I mean, I was not involved in considering the final2 version; but I mean, you know, the point from the outset3 was that it seemed to be only a matter of time before4 somebody put 2 and 2 together, and we were not in5 a position to prevent his name coming out.6 Q. No, but do you agree there is a difference between not


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7 preventing someone's name coming out and giving it8 a healthy push?9 A. I do agree with that; but I mean, it was a small field10 to start with.11 Q. I have shown you the Q and A material I think you said12 you worked on on the Friday night.

13 A. Yes.14 Q. The next version of the Q and A material we have is at15 CAB/21/5. This is said to have been sent to the PUS16 office at 8.07 on 8th July, subject to discussion and17 approval.18 You can see, three lines down:19 "Is it X (the wrong name)?20 "No.21 "Is it X (the right name)?22 "If the correct name is put to us from a number of23 callers, we will need to tell the individual we are24 going to confirm his name before doing so."25 Did you see this material on the morning of

1671 8th July?2 A. I think this is the material that we were working on on3 the evening of the Monday, so I saw it then.4 Q. Who else was working on the material in the evening on5 the Monday?6 A. It was just me and Pam again.7 Q. We know the final version, as it ends up in the final8 version -- perhaps we can just leave that on screen --9 but in the final version it says: we will confirm the10 correct name if given. Do you know who was responsible11 from the change from "Is it X..." to "We will confirm

12 the correct name if given"?13 A. No, I do not.14 Q. From what you have said it must have been you or15 Ms Teare, is that right?16 A. Sorry, I thought you were talking about the final17 version.18 Q. Yes, the final version of the Q and A material. You are19 working on it on 8th July, is that right?20 A. No, on the 7th, on the evening of the 7th July.21 Q. Did you work on it after the evening of the 7th July?22 A. No, I did not.23 LORD HUTTON: You were not concerned with either the24 statement or the question and answer material until just25 a little before the statement was put out on the late

1681 afternoon of 8th July; is that your evidence?2 A. I was working on other things. Pam was working on this3 and she came back with both final versions.4 MR DINGEMANS: She came to you with effectively, as far as5 you were concerned, a fait accompli, because she is your6 boss and: here is the press statement and here is the7 Q and A material.8 A. Yes, they were the final versions.9 Q. The final draft version you were working on on Monday,10 7th July was pretty close to this type of material, is11 that right?12 A. I think this was it.


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13 Q. Right. By this stage you have obviously decided that14 a question you have to anticipate -- and that is the15 point of the Q and A material, is it not, to anticipate16 questions? A question you have to anticipate is: is it17 Dr Kelly?18 A. Yes. And other names as well.

19 Q. You have decided: "Is it other names?" "No." "Is it20 Dr Kelly?" "We will need to tell the individual we are21 confirming his name before doing so."22 Why had you put that in as a draft answer?23 A. Sorry, the second, is it the correct name?24 Q. Yes.25 A. At the time we did not know that Dr Kelly had already

1691 had a discussion about the fact that his name was2 likely, almost inevitable, to come out once the3 statement had been put out. Not because that was the4 position --

5 Sorry, if I start again. Because the statement6 would accelerate, you know, the interest in the story,7 and people that might have put two and two together at8 some point would probably put two and two together more9 quickly once the statement had gone out.10 Q. So what is the difference between Monday 7th July when11 you are drafting it, and Tuesday 8th July when it is12 decided, not by you but by others, that Dr Kelly is not13 going to be contacted before his name is confirmed?14 A. He had already been told that his name was likely to15 come out. This was before that had happened or before16 we knew that had happened. That conversation we would17 have had once the correct name was put to us had already

18 happened with Richard Hatfield.19 LORD HUTTON: That was the meeting on the afternoon of20 7th July?21 A. Yes.22 MR DINGEMANS: When were you drafting this material?23 A. On the evening of the 7th.24 Q. Which was after the interview anyway?25 A. We did not know the outcome of it or any detail of it at

1701 the time.2 Q. You were no party to the interview or any discussions3 after it?4 A. No, but I mean, Pam was in the lead on the issue. But,5 you know, we understood what the discussion had been6 about and the fact we would have to put out a statement7 and his name was almost certain to get out was part of8 that discussion.9 Q. Is there a distinction between a name coming out and10 your employer giving out your name to the correct11 question, so far as you are concerned?12 A. Sorry, can you say the question again?13 Q. You are a member of the Civil Service. Do you think14 there is a distinction between your employer confirming15 your name in answer to the correct question and your16 name, as it were, just coming out because press have17 identified it through other sources?18 A. There is a distinction; but I think, you know, as


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19 a press officer the thing that we were keen to do was20 (a) to prevent the wrong name being put all across the21 papers, but also to try and encourage media to come to22 us rather than go direct to Dr Kelly. If we were -- if23 our Q and A did actually provide some information,24 journalists were more likely to come to us.

25 Do not forget, there were a lot of journalists that

1711 did not -- well, there was certainly Nick Rufford who2 did not need the Q and A material or the statement in3 order to identify Dr Kelly, he had already done so.4 Q. He said, in evidence, that he thought it was and then5 was going up to try to confirm that.6 Can I then take you on to the 8th July? You are7 there and you are presented with the final version of8 the press statement and the final version of the Q and A9 material. Do you have any conversations with Dr Kelly10 at all on 8th July?

11 A. Not at that point. I knew that Richard Hatfield had12 just cleared the statement, which is why we were then in13 a position to put it out. I was going to speak to him14 once it had gone out and we had had some response to it,15 to let him know what the response was.16 Q. When did you in fact speak to him?17 A. I think it was 8.26 that evening.18 LORD HUTTON: I missed that.19 A. Sorry, my Lord, 8.26.20 LORD HUTTON: 8.26, yes.21 MR DINGEMANS: On the evening of the ...?22 A. Of the 8th.23 Q. What did you say to him?

24 A. Well, I had two calls with him; both of them were very25 brief. The first call he said he was out walking and

1721 could I call him back, so I called him back about2 20 minutes later and I said that we had put the3 statement out. I wanted to make sure he had my contact4 numbers. He said he did not have anything to write with5 so he could not take my number down, so I asked him if6 he had the number for the duty press officer which he7 said he did. I said: we have had a lot of follow up8 questions. He did not ask me what they were. I said:9 you do need to think about alternative accommodation.10 I asked him if there was anything he wanted from me and11 he said no. That was also a brief conversation.12 LORD HUTTON: Did he have any reaction when you said he13 should think about alternative accommodation?14 A. I mean, he acknowledged the comment but he did not15 actually say anything other than sort of "yes" or "hmm"16 or something like that.17 MR DINGEMANS: Did you tell him that a decision had been18 taken to confirm his name if the correct name was given?19 A. No, I do not think I did. The conversation was about20 how to handle what I thought was inevitable at some21 point, which would be that media would come direct to22 him, and if that were to happen then he should put them23 on to me or on to the press office. It was about24 directly handling the media himself.


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25 Q. Did you offer him accommodation or you just said he

1731 ought to go and stay with friends?2 A. I did not offer him accommodation. My view is always3 that it is better to go and stay with family or friends

4 than, you know, go to a hotel or something, and that is5 what I recommended to him.6 Q. How did he sound at that time?7 A. I mean, he was not surprised by anything I said. He8 seemed very calm.9 Q. Did you have any other conversations with Dr Kelly?10 A. I spoke to him on the next day, on the 9th, which was11 after his name had been confirmed. He actually called12 me, although I was about to call him to ask if he wanted13 a press officer to go to his house.14 Q. So what time was that conversation?15 A. The conversation on the 9th?16 Q. Yes.

17 A. That was 8 o'clock.18 Q. 8 o'clock. We have heard evidence that Mrs Kelly19 believed that the call was made to Dr Kelly.20 A. I mean, I do not think it can have been, assuming it21 came from the press office, because I was the only22 person with his number.23 Q. You phoned him or he phoned you?24 A. He phoned me at 8 o'clock.25 LORD HUTTON: Before you phoned Dr Kelly, did you phone

1741 Dr Wells?2 A. I spoke to the Permanent Secretary's office once I knew

3 that the name had been confirmed, so that someone in the4 Permanent Secretary's office could get Dr Wells to give5 him a ring.6 LORD HUTTON: Yes. And you did that before you rang7 Dr Kelly yourself?8 A. I did not ring Dr Kelly. He called me.9 LORD HUTTON: I should have said: before you were about to10 ring Dr Kelly.11 A. Yes.12 LORD HUTTON: I see.13 MR DINGEMANS: When did you ring Dr Wells? Do you remember14 what time that was?15 A. I did not ring Dr Wells myself because I did not have16 his mobile number. I asked the Permanent Secretary's17 office to ring.18 Q. When did you ring the Permanent Secretary's office19 asking them to call Dr Wells?20 A. It would have been about quarter past 6.21 Q. What time was Dr Kelly's name first confirmed?22 A. I heard that it was first confirmed at about 6 o'clock.23 Q. Did anyone think of ringing and telling Dr Kelly this?24 A. Yes, that is why I rang the Permanent Secretary's25 office, to make sure somebody was doing that.

1751 Q. And do you know what process was followed to notify2 Dr Kelly?3 A. I knew that Dominic was going to get hold of Bryan Wells


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4 to get him to make the call, because however inevitable5 being in the media spotlight is, you know, it is never6 pleasant. Dr Kelly had not wanted to discuss anything7 particular with me the night before, so I thought if he8 did have any concerns they would probably be better9 coming to Bryan than to me.

10 Q. What did Dr Kelly say to you at 8 o'clock?11 A. He was ringing specifically to tell me that12 Nick Rufford -- I thought it was a phone call at the13 time, I learned on Sunday that he had actually been to14 the house. He said that Nick Rufford had been in15 contact with him and asked him why he was not now in a16 hotel. He was now minded to go to family and friends17 and he would be heading to the West Country, but he18 would let me know where he was when he got there.19 Q. How did he sound at that time?20 A. Again, he still sounded calm.21 Q. Did he say that anyone had actually told him, before he22 had seen Mr Rufford, that his name had been confirmed?

23 A. He did not say and I did not specifically ask him24 because, you know, we were dealing with the fact that25 Nick Rufford had already been in contact with him.

1761 I did say that I confirmed that other journalists had2 got the name.3 Q. And how long did your conversation with Dr Kelly last?4 A. I do not know. I mean, it was again very short. All5 three conversations were all very short.6 Q. There is a document dated 9th July at MoD/31/19. Do you7 know what this document is?8 A. Yes, that is an extract from my notebook from the 9th.

9 Q. Right. If we scroll down that, does it have anything to10 do with Dr Kelly?11 A. No, no. I mean, the first issue was a member of the12 public that had rang -- sorry, that had called me. And13 the second was a journalist who had called saying that14 he understood that the 45 minutes claim had come from an15 MI6 agent and therefore could not have come from16 somebody that did not work in the SIS. That was the17 only call I made a note of because it was the only thing18 that was not covered in the Q and A. I did not know19 whether or how to answer it.20 Q. At the bottom, the journalist appears to have asked: how21 could he have known that if he did not get it from the22 source? And surely this: did he have access to the MI623 documents?24 A. Yes.25 Q. Over the page at MoD/31/20, is this also from your

1771 notebook?2 A. Yes, this is the next page of my notebook.3 Q. What is the last entry referring to?4 A. The last entry, which I think must have been the next5 day because at that stage the FAC had not asked for6 Dr Kelly, I do not think -- but that is from7 a journalist at Sky News.8 Q. That is on 9th July, in the evening. Had you attended9 any discussions earlier on in the day relating to


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10 Dr Kelly and press announcements?11 A. The only meeting that I had attended was the standard12 No. 10 8.30 meeting, which is a meeting of all press13 people from different Government departments.14 Q. What had been discussed there about the MoD press15 statement which had gone out on 8th July?

16 A. I mean, the discussion was primarily about the fact that17 the BBC had issued a statement shortly afterwards, and18 the BBC statement had sort of confused us slightly,19 I suppose, because it said, to start off with, that20 their source did not work in the MoD, which seemed to be21 a fairly categoric piece of proof that it could not be22 the same person. But the statement ended by saying: we23 do not know whether it is the same person or not. So we24 talked about the implications of that statement.25 Q. Was there any discussion about whether or not to say, as

1781 a result of that: well, Dr Kelly actually does work for

2 the MoD but he is paid for by another Department?3 A. Yes, there was discussion about whether we could make4 that point or whether we should make that point, and5 also whether it was relevant to make the point that6 specialists in particular areas often advise more than7 one department or agency.8 Q. What was the point of making those points?9 A. Well, we were very confused by the BBC statement. As10 I say, on the one hand it seemed to be a categorical11 denial that it could be the same person, but at the end12 it seemed to be a non-denial denial, is what I would13 call it. It was whether or not there was more14 information that would be relevant to that specific

15 point; we were getting asked questions about it.16 Q. Is that why the Prime Minister's official spokesman in17 the afternoon of 9th July gave -- I will not take you to18 it, if that is all right -- far more details about19 Dr Kelly saying: in fact, he was employed by the20 Ministry of Defence but paid for by another Department.21 There were very few people. Is that the reason that22 that was given out to journalists?23 A. I mean, I can only speak from the MoD perspective but24 from our perspective we were getting asked the question:25 does this mean he cannot possibly be the same person?

1791 The actual answer to that was: not necessarily, no. We2 were being asked a specific question; we needed to be3 able to say something about it.4 Q. At this stage you have done what was perceived to be5 necessary, declared that a person had come forward. The6 BBC had clarified the matter. Why was there a need to7 give further detail and information which, as we know,8 journalists used to help identify Dr Kelly, because9 Mr Blitz went along to the Prime Minister's official10 spokesman's lobby briefing and said that he got the11 distinct impression that further details were being12 given out which inspired him to make further13 investigations. Why was that?14 A. It was not my decision to do it but, as I understand it,15 (a) we had to come up with an answer to the question we


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16 were being asked and the question was: does this mean it17 could not possibly be the same person? But (b) the18 additional information that was being given out did not19 particularly narrow down the field, I do not think.20 Q. Can I just take you, very briefly, to MoD/32/46, which21 I think is the beginning of the log. It goes up the

22 page, as it were, in time order. It is the beginning of23 the logs on 8th July, dealing with contact in relation24 to Dr Kelly; is that right?25 A. Yes.

1801 Q. If we go back to 45, and then to 44, we can see that at2 18.10, it is about five entries down: Paul Sykes, the3 press officer; caller, Kate Wilson:4 "The FT have the name of the person from MoD who was5 Gilligan contact."6 That is the first noting, is it?7 Then Mr Norton-Taylor for the Guardian:

8 "I have the name: Is it Dr David Kelly?"9 "Confirmed name is correct."10 Those are the details of the noting.11 Then it appears to be No. 10, Paul Sykes:12 "Has Dr Kelly been told that he is to become13 a public figure and what arrangements are in hand to14 protect him?15 "Advised that I was sure Kate would have considered16 this. Rang Kate to make sure."17 Do you recall that conversation?18 A. Yes.19 Q. What arrangements had been made for Dr Kelly by this20 time?

21 A. It is the arrangement that we would always make, which22 is that we have a press officer on standby to go to his23 house if needed, and if indeed he was going to stay in24 the house. The normal arrangement is that -- or the25 normal way it works is that once a journalist has got

1811 the correct name they then work through the electoral2 register, come up with all the people of the same name,3 in this case David Kelly, and then it takes them another4 couple of hours to work out which one it is and where he5 lives. So that was the arrangement we were working on.6 Q. Was not a problem with the Q and A material this: that7 you were just never going to know exactly when8 Dr Kelly's name was going to be confirmed?9 A. Well, I mean, it comes back to the sort of point that10 first of all we were trying to encourage journalists to11 come to us with names rather than go anywhere else, so12 that we knew if they were going to run the name in the13 paper the next day, but that we could never prevent14 journalists from ringing Dr Kelly direct if they15 suspected that he was the source. So what we were16 trying to do was encourage people to come to us so that17 we had advance notice, so that we could get our press18 officer up to him if he chose to stay in the house.19 Q. But if his name was inevitably going to come out, why20 was it not done by the Ministry of Defence who would21 then have been able to answer all the follow up


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22 questions: he will not be contacted; he will not be23 interviewed; he has gone away to an undisclosed24 location, rather than have a situation where from25 Mrs Kelly's evidence he felt, so it is said, betrayed

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1 that the Ministry of Defence had confirmed his name?2 A. Well, I mean, the point in terms of, so that nobody3 could get in contact with him -- journalists already had4 his number, we knew that, so we were not in a position5 to stop journalists from calling him direct. All we6 could do was try to encourage them to come to us, which7 is what we did.8 Q. And encouraging them by giving a series of draft answers9 which provided quite a lot of information?10 A. There was certainly some information provided, but they11 were legitimate factual questions. What we did not do12 was give clues, which has been suggested. There were13 plenty of questions that we were asked that would have

14 been clues that we refused to answer, because we were15 sticking to legitimate factual questions.16 Q. Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of17 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?18 A. No, I do not think so.19 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. I think we will rise for20 a short time now, to give the stenographers 5 minutes.21 (3.30 pm)22 (Short Break)23 (3.35 pm)24 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I have in fact just been asked to25 elicit a few more pieces of information.

1831 LORD HUTTON: Yes.2 MR DINGEMANS: Did anyone ask for any clues? We have looked3 at the press log. Did any journalists ever ask for any4 clues over the course of that afternoon when you were5 being asked questions?6 A. The afternoon of the 9th?7 Q. Yes.8 A. Yes, various journalists asked for various bits of9 information. Examples are: what were his initials; what10 does he look like; does his name rhyme with anyone in11 the press office's name?12 Q. What was your response to those questions?13 A. We refused to answer them.14 Q. How many names were put to you by The Times, for15 example?16 A. Mike Evans says it was 20, which is possible, but it17 seemed certainly lower than that to me, and they were18 not all put to me in a great long list; it was three19 names at one point during the afternoon, then in the20 evening another two, then perhaps another three.21 Q. When you had been told that the correct name had been22 put and confirmed, were other journalists still calling?23 A. Particularly The Times, who called me probably another24 three or four times after I knew that the FT and the25 Guardian had got the name. At one point I said to

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1 Pam Teare: this is stupid, I am being pestered, can I2 not just give them the name, it is already out? Pam3 said: no, absolutely not. So I did not give the name4 out .5 Q. In the Q and A material describing Dr Kelly as "not a6 member of the Senior Civil Service", is there anything

7 else you wanted to say in relation to that?8 A. I mean, the only thing that I wanted to say is it has9 clearly been taken as a slur, and what I was trying to10 get across by saying -- you know, the steer about middle11 ranking was to make the point he was not a junior12 official. It was not intended as a slur, it was just13 intended to give people an indication of where in the14 hierarchy he was. The statement itself did make the15 point, you know, that he was an expert in his field.16 Q. On 9th July you have told us that Dr Kelly called you.17 Had you planned to call him at any stage yourself?18 A. Yes. Sorry, I meant to call him as soon as I had got19 Howard ready to go to his house, to make sure he wanted

20 somebody to go to his house.21 Q. Howard?22 A. Sorry, Howard Rhodes, who was the senior press officer.23 Q. After the meeting on 9th July in the morning with the24 Prime Minister's official spokesman, was there any25 follow up to that meeting with the Foreign Office?

1851 A. Yes. I mean, it was taken away as an action for the2 Foreign Office representative to go and check, because3 it was the Foreign Office who paid the salary, although4 we did not know whether or not they would say that or5 they should say that. We did not think they would, and

6 indeed they did not in the end. But it was for the7 Foreign Office to decide whether or not that information8 could be used in some format. So Ian went away to check9 it.10 Q. And they came back and said: no. Do you know what the11 result of the Foreign Office checking was?12 A. I mean, I assume that the result was the briefing that13 Tom gave in Lobby that afternoon. But, I mean, because14 time was running out, originally I thought they wanted15 something for the morning Lobby, which is at 11 o'clock,16 so Ian Gleeson went direct back to No. 10, rather than17 coming through me.18 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Gompertz.20 Cross-examination by MR GOMPERTZ21 Q. Ms Wilson, you had Dr Kelly's home telephone number on22 the evening of the 8th?23 A. I had his mobile number.24 Q. Mobile only?25 A. Yes.

1861 Q. You did not have his home number?2 A. No.3 Q. Did you try to get it?4 A. No, I did not need it.5 Q. Very well. At any rate, you had it available to you,6 did you, on the evening of the 9th?


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7 A. His mobile number?8 Q. Yes.9 A. Yes.10 Q. We know that the first identification of him was made at11 about 5.30; right?12 A. Between 5.30 and 6 o'clock, yes.

13 Q. We have heard about 5.30. It was not communicated to14 you that that had happened until 6 o'clock, are you15 saying?16 A. It was about 6 o'clock, yes.17 Q. Were you not in the MoD press office?18 A. Yes, I was.19 Q. How come it took nearly half an hour, or whatever the20 time lag was, before you were even told of an21 identification?22 A. Because the first -- the FT, who were the first23 journalists to get the name, spoke to Pam Teare direct.24 Her office is right at the other end of the corridor and25 her phone was ringing permanently. I went in to see her

1871 about 6 and she told me straight away that the FT had2 got the name, and straight away I told the duty press3 officer and the Permanent Secretary's office.4 Q. Did she have no means of telling you that there had been5 a positive identification?6 A. I mean, her phone was going constantly, so it was when7 I walked in that I learnt that.8 Q. Was there no other means of her telephoning you? Only9 one phone, is that what it is? No internal phone or10 anything?11 A. I mean, there is not an internal phone. At that time of

12 night her assistant would have gone home anyway.13 Q. Well, all right. Let us take it that there was that14 time delay. Why did you not immediately telephone to15 Dr Kelly?16 A. Well, because, as I have said, I had spoken to him the17 night before and he did not seem to want to have18 a particularly prolonged conversation with me. Being in19 the media spotlight is never pleasant, even if you are20 expecting it, so I thought it would be better to come21 from his line manager.22 Q. I dare say he would not have minded knowing that he had23 been identified as the source. Did that thought cross24 your mind?25 A. That is why I, you know, put in train for him to be

1881 informed by what I thought was the most appropriate2 person.3 Q. Why not phone him immediately yourself?4 A. The reason I did was, as I said, because I thought it5 was better he heard what to anybody would be fairly bad6 news from his line manager.7 Q. Had you taken the trouble to get his line manager's8 number in advance?9 A. No, I had not got his line manager's number, but I spoke10 to somebody that did have it.11 Q. Why not? You were supposed to be helping him out, were12 you not?


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13 A. Sorry, helping out Dr Kelly?14 Q. Yes.15 A. Yes.16 Q. Why had you not got the means of communicating with his17 line manager, if that was the appropriate method of18 communication?

19 A. Well, I spoke immediately to the Permanent Secretary's20 office, who did have his mobile number, who spoke to him21 straightaway.22 Q. When did you speak to Dr Wells?23 A. Sorry, I did not speak to Dr Wells because I wanted to24 carry on getting Howard ready to go. I asked for the25 Permanent Secretary's office to speak to Dr Kelly.

1891 Q. We can hear in due course from Dr Wells whether that2 happened, but did it occur to you to, after that,3 enquire whether any contact had been made with Dr Kelly?4 A. I mean, I was focusing on getting Howard ready to go to

5 his house. I knew that he had my number if he needed6 it. I was going to ring him as soon as Howard was7 ready, to say, you know: Howard is on his way if you8 want him.9 Q. It might have been suggested the obvious thing to do was10 for you to telephone Dr Kelly immediately, as you had11 telephoned him the night before. Why could you not do12 that?13 A. I could have done that. As I have said, what I thought14 was better was to hear what would in any circumstances15 be bad news from somebody he knew.16 Q. Right, well, I do not wish to labour the point, but in17 fact you never telephoned him until he telephoned you.

18 A. I was about to telephone him when he called me.19 Q. Let me go on to something else.20 Is it right, as you have told us, I think, that you21 were involved in the first draft of the Q and A material22 which is CAB/21/3?23 A. Yes, I was involved in that.24 Q. Yes. I am not going to take you through it, but you can25 see at the top the first question, the answer:

1901 "We are not prepared to name the individual2 involved."3 And the second question:4 "There is nothing to gain by revealing the name of5 the individual who has come forward voluntarily."6 Right?7 A. Hmm, hmm.8 Q. You and Ms Teare put that in of your own initiative, did9 you?10 A. Yes.11 Q. Because you thought that was appropriate?12 A. Yes. I mean, as I have said, it is an early draft.13 These things evolve over time.14 Q. Yes. Can you look, please, at CAB/21/5? This is the15 draft that was reworked, I think you have told us, in16 the evening of Monday 7th July; right?17 A. Yes.18 Q. We can see what is endorsed at the top. It was


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19 evidently ready certainly by 8 o'clock on Tuesday20 morning. Would you like to look at just two questions21 there? The fourth one down asks:22 "Is it X (ie the wrong name)?"23 Answer:24 "No."

25 "Is it X (ie the correct name)?

1911 "If the correct name is put to us from a number of2 callers, we will need to tell the individual we are3 going to confirm his name before doing so."4 Did you put that question and answer in of your own5 volition?6 A. I cannot remember who of Pam or I put in which bits. We7 were working on it together.8 Q. What are you saying, that it was either you or Ms Teare9 who put that question and answer in this draft; is that10 what you are saying?

11 A. It was Pam and I who worked on that document, yes.12 Q. Why was there such a change in approach from that which13 you had thought proper to adopt on the first draft?14 A. Well, I mean, I was not involved in the -- sorry, from15 the first draft?16 Q. Yes. You have just told us that you were responsible17 for producing, with Pam Teare, the draft which we looked18 at -- if you want to see it again, by all means,19 CAB/21/3 -- the draft that was produced on the evening20 of Friday 4th July.21 A. Hmm.22 Q. Yes?23 A. Yes.

24 Q. There is a very considerable difference in the approach25 to the naming of the individual between that draft and

1921 the one which you worked on on the evening of Monday,2 7th. I would like to know, please, why it was that that3 change took place?4 A. I mean, you know, a Q and A evolves over time. It is5 not something that you start with and you have one6 finished document. You go away and you think about it,7 you try to predict the questions you are likely to get8 asked by journalists. By Monday night we were asking9 the question: what we will do when names get put to us?10 What we will do if the wrong name gets put to us? We11 were never in a position to prevent Dr Kelly's name12 coming out but we were in a position to prevent other13 people's names coming out.14 Q. So, are you saying this: that the responsibility in the15 MoD for the decision as to whether somebody should be16 named or not is left to the press office; is that the17 position?18 A. No, not at all. This is a second draft, this is not the19 final version.20 Q. Right. Perhaps you better look at the final version,21 even though, as I understand it, you did not have22 anything to do with it. MoD/1/62, please. You see23 there has been a change to the wording used in the24 question 2:


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25 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name."

1931 But after that:2 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm3 it...", and so on.

4 Is this what you are saying: that you and Ms Teare5 were responsible for changing the approach from not6 making any revelation as to the name to what we can see7 and have seen on 21/5, that you will name the individual8 if he is identified, and you have confirmed the name9 with the person involved; but you and Ms Teare were10 responsible for that policy, were you?11 A. I was involved in the first two versions but not the12 third version. It was only the third version that13 needed to be cleared, because that was the final14 version, and that is what happened.15 Q. Right. And that what you and Ms Teare had drafted was16 subsequently, without your knowledge, adopted by whoever

17 was responsible for the final draft?18 A. As I have said, a Q and A evolves. It just happens that19 in the final version I was not working on it. Pam was20 working on it with Martin Howard, and it was21 subsequently cleared with the Permanent Secretary. But22 as I have said, it evolved and this is the final23 version.24 Q. One other matter: I wonder if you could look, please, at25 MoD/31/16, which I understand is the log of calls made

1941 to the press office. We see, working up the page, that2 the last call recorded for the 8th is 22.37. The first

3 one that we have on this document for the 9th is at4 5 minutes to 6 in the evening of the 9th. Why is that?5 Were there no calls during the day?6 A. No. The purpose of the duty log is so that the duty7 press officer can log what has happened overnight so8 that everybody else coming in in the morning is9 instantly up to speed on what has happened overnight.10 It is not a day log, it is just for the night time.11 MR GOMPERTZ: I see. I have misunderstood the nature of the12 document. It would not be the first time.13 That is all that I want to ask. Thank you, my Lord.14 LORD HUTTON: Now Ms Rogers, thank you.15 Cross-examination by MS ROGERS16 Q. I want to ask you about the calls to the MoD on17 28th May.18 A. Okay.19 Q. You first met or came into contact with Andrew Gilligan20 when you were a junior press officer at the MoD?21 A. Yes.22 Q. He at that point was at a newspaper The Telegraph?23 A. The Sunday Telegraph.24 Q. Then you go away to the Home Office and come back as25 chief press officer at the MoD.

1951 A. I was in MoD for four years, then I went to the Home2 Office for two, and then I came back last July.3 Q. When you come back, he is defence and diplomatic


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4 correspondent on the Today Programme?5 A. He was actually on the Today Programme before I left6 MoD.7 Q. So you deal with him as a junior and as a chief press8 officer?9 A. Well, I mean, it is boring, but as an information

10 officer, then a senior information officer, then I went11 away and came back as a chief press officer.12 Q. If you forgive me I will omit the detail of the Civil13 Service grades.14 One gets an impression that life in the MoD press15 office is rather busy and rather demanding.16 A. It is fairly busy, yes.17 Q. Plenty of phone calls coming in every day?18 A. Yes.19 Q. You mentioned to Mr Dingemans the possibility of say 2020 to 30 calls a day. Presumably there could be days you21 are on the phone all day?22 A. There could well be, yes.

23 Q. In terms of calls coming in from Andrew Gilligan, I mean24 he was a regular caller to you as well as to the MoD25 press office more generally?

1961 A. That is right, yes.2 Q. I think his recollection is he probably would have3 spoken to you a couple of times a week.4 A. Yes, that sounds about right.5 Q. Unless there is a particularly big story in which he is6 having more regular contact, but that is the kind of --7 A. Yes.8 Q. At that point you are having lots of calls, lots of

9 phone calls from lots of people, lots of calls from10 Mr Gilligan?11 A. Sorry, on the 28th?12 Q. No, just as part of the general pattern before we get to13 the 28th. So in a sense, when he rings you on the 28th14 there is nothing at all out of the ordinary about that?15 A. No, not particularly.16 Q. In terms of the wider story, I suppose there was a time17 when people did not talk about weapons of mass18 destruction, the WMD, but the WMD story had been running19 for very many months?20 A. Different twists to it but there had been a story since21 the war had finished.22 Q. Sure. There had been a story before the war started.23 A. There may well have been.24 Q. About the dossier. Lots of stories that had been25 running for many months.

Documents

Hearing Transcript - 16 September 2003 Afternnon