Upload
tanith
View
51
Download
0
Tags:
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Decomposing the corporate law reform and behavior of MOJ: an empirical analysis through public comments procedure in Japan. Hatsuru Morita University of Chicago and Tohoku University Talk at the Japanese Law Association Jan ??, 2006. Motivation. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Citation preview
Decomposing the corporate law reform and behavior of MOJ: an empirical analysis through public comments procedure in Japan
Hatsuru MoritaUniversity of Chicago and Tohoku UniversityTalk at the Japanese Law AssociationJan ??, 2006
Motivation
Repeated big reforms of the corporate law in this decade Only part of actors are subject to analysis
Managements and labor unions
The role of the bureaucrats of the ministry of justice has never been explored
Public comment procedure Originally introduced as a governmental guideline in 1999
and incorporated into the APA in 2005 However, almost no analyses have been made
Public comment procedure
The cabinet decision of Mar 23, 1999When a branch of the government makes a
regulation, it is required to publicize the draft of the regulation and to get comments on the draft
Although the branch is not bounded by the comments, it must publicize “the result of its consideration”
In 2005, this was incorporated in the APA
Process of corporate law reforms
Legal Council MOJ Diet
ManagementsEmployeesConsumersLawyersJudgesAcademics
Public CommentProcedure
Managements
Competing theories on the bureaucratic behavior
1. Public comment has no effect
2. Public comment has large effect
3. Observe only the influence of powerful interest groups
4. MOJ employs public comment procedure in order to countervail the pressure of interest groups
5. Only “convincing” comments have effect
Looking for data
Usually, only “the result of the consideration” is publishedYou can only know what sort of comments are
submitted and whether the original draft has been changed or not
As to two corporate law reforms, every single comment is publishedA nice data source to test theories!2002 reform and 2005 reform
Looking for data (cont’d)
How to construct the datasetsDivide the drafts into single issuesCheck the outcome
Whether the final bill is the same as the original draft or not
Count the numbers of “Yes”s and “No”s Also note what type of group submit the comment
Estimation strategy
Regression by OLS
Probability of “success” =
# of Yes’s + # of No’s + controls + ε
* # of Yes’s and No’s are decomposed by type of group
Predictions of the theories
No effectNo comment is significantSpecial explanatory variable: “expression”
Whether the issue has the form of “shall be ~” or “how about ~”
Strong effect# of Yes’s and No’s have significant effect on
the outcome
Predictions (cont’d)
Interest groups’ pressureOnly the # of Yes’s and No’s from
managements have significant effect Independence model
The # of Yes’s and No’s from managements are not significant
Non-interest groups (academic?) have significant effect (especially where the pressure of interest group is expected to be high)
Predictions (cont’d)
Persuasiveness mattersNo clear prediction?The # of Yes’s and No’s from managements
are not significantThose who are used to present legal(?)
discussions can have significant effect (= academics?)
The dataset
2002 corporate law reform and 2005 corporate law reformHand-collected dataset from the publication of M
OJClassification of the commenters
Business community (= managements) Financial institutions (Banks, etc) Academics Other (Bar ass’ns, NPOs, etc)
The dataset (cont’d)
Classification of issuesRegulatory / enabling
Under the recent trend of “deregulation” in Japan, the more regulatory a proposals is, the more “high-stake” it is
Expression by the drafter (MOJ) “shall be ~” “how about ~”
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxReform 0.809 0.394 0 1
Yes 16.3 6.54 1 31
No 5.28 4.87 1 25
Yes: Academic 4.76 2.82 0 17
Yes: Bus. Com. 3.8 2.29 0 11
Yes: Fin. Inst. 0.439 0.779 0 4
Yes: Other 7.39 3.08 0 19
No: Academic 2.89 3.05 0 17
No: Bus. Com. 0.554 1.06 0 4
No: Fin. Inst. 0.197 0.512 0 3
No: Other 1.64 2.32 0 11
Regulatory 0.14 0.348 0 1
Expression 0.675 0.47 0 1
Summary Statistics of 2005
Result of 2005
I II III IVYes .0229*** .0228*** .0149** .0147**
(.00414) (.00418) (.00462) (.00462)No -.0274*** -.0275*** -.0236*** -.0230***
(.00555) (.00559) (.00547) (.00554)Regulatory -.0187 .563
(.0756) (.0759)Expression .226*** .240***
(.650) (.678)Adjusted R^2 0.320 0.316 0.366 0.364
N 156 156 156 156
I II III IVYes: Bus. Com. .0538** .0580** .0482** .0540**
(.0176) (.0180) (.0170) (.0173)Yes: Fin. Inst. .0260 .0249 .0247 .0230
(.0351) (.0351) (.0339) (.0337)Yes: Academic .00587 .00263 .00348 -.00136
(.0132) (.0135) (.0127) (.0130)Yes: Other .0140 .0129 .00250 .000162
(.0151) (.0151) (.0149) (.0149)No: Bus. Com. -.0121 -.0278 .0171 -.00376
(.0298) (.0331) (.0299) (.0324)No: Fin. Inst. .00209 .00575 .00426 .00970
(.0555) (.0545) (.0525) (.0523)No: Academic -.0292* -.0286* -.0256* -.0246*
(.0124) (.0124) (.0120) (.0120)No: Other -.0542** -.0573*** -.0504** -.0547*** (.0173) (.0176) (.0168) (.0169)
Regulatory .106 .153 (.0972) (.0942)
Expression .236*** .251*** (.0679) (.0681)
Adjusted R^2 0.326 0.327 0.374 0.380N 157 157 157 157
Subset of the data
I II III IVRegulatory Yes Yes No No
Yes .0198 .0172 .0224*** .0130* (.0129) (.0136) (.00450) (.00503)No -.0545 -.0502 -.0262*** -.0214*** (.0296) (.0297) (.00568) (.00560)
Expression .115 .267*** (.178) (.0898)
Adjusted R^2 0.349 0.329 0.308 0.366N 22 22 135 135
I II III IVRegulatory Yes Yes No No
Yes: Bus. Com. .0885 .0995 .0615*** .0589*** (.0908) (.0945) (.0184) (.0173)
Yes: Fin. Inst. .271 .234 .0210 .0176 (.161) (.175) (.0359) (.0338)
Yes: Academic .0413 .0361 -.00761 -.0160 (.0281) (.0298) (.0158) (.0150)
Yes: Other -.0410 -.0388 .0243 .00919 (.0412) (.0426) (.0166) (.0161)
No: Bus. Com. -.0410 -.0459 .0209 .0515 (.0735) (.0756) (.0423) (.0406)
No: Fin. Inst. .0352 -.0125 -0.137 -.0209 (.239) (.256) (.0584) (.0550)
No: Academic .172 .193 -.0375** -.0326** (.0865) (.0944) (.0128) (.0122)
No: Other -.130* -.150* -.0432* -.0416* (.0588) (.0672) (.0187) (.0177)
Expression -.134 .301*** (.207) (.0732)
Adjusted R^2 0.532 0.510 0.324 0.400N 22 22 135 135
Summary Statistics of 2002Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxReform 0.642 0.484 0 1
Yes 22.2 9.6 3 38No 11.2 10.5 0 42
Yes: Academic 8.72 4.52 0 18Yes: Bus. Com. 5.72 4.04 0 14Yes: Fin. Inst. 0.925 1.11 0 4
Yes: Other 6.79 3.54 0 15No: Academic 4.94 4.82 0 20No: Bus. Com. 3.09 5.38 0 18No: Fin. Inst. 0.774 1.6 0 6
No: Other 2.34 2.41 0 8Regulatory 0.264 0.445 0 1Expression 0.83 0.379 0 1
Result of 2002 I II III IV
Yes .0274*** .0217*** .0183* .0159* (.00558) (.00534) (.00731) (.00679)No -.0117* -.00215 -.0138** -.00432 (.00508) (.00541) (.00508) (.00559)
Regulatory -.457*** -.420**
(.135) (.136)
Expression .328 .228
(.177) (.167)Adjusted R^2 0.417 0.518 0.444 0.526
N 53 53 53 53
I II III IVYes: Bus. Com. .0172 .00554 .0172 .00634
(.0188) (.0188) (.0187) (.0190)Yes: Fin. Inst. .00126 .00553 .0117 .0109
(.0549) (.0527) (.0556) (.0538)Yes: Academic .0315 .0212 .0170 .0140
(.0165) (.0165) (.0213) (.0207)Yes: Other .00653 .0140 .00511 .0128
(.0228) (.0222) (.0228) (.0224)No: Bus. Com. .00526 .0259 -.0000103 .0216
(.0217) (.0228) (.0222) (.0242)No: Fin. Inst. -.122 -.105 -.0861 -.0865
(.0691) (.0667) (.0765) (.0741)No: Academic .0285* .0211 .0217 .0180
(.0140) (.0138) (.0153) (.0149)No: Other -.0594 -.0575 -.0611 -.0586 (.0344) (.0330) (.0343) (.0332)
Regulatory -.433* -.403 (.197) (.205)
Expression .234 .127 (.217) (.217)
Adjusted R^2 0.483 0.525 0.485 0.518N 53 53 53 53
Subset of the data
I II III IVRegulatory Yes Yes No No
Yes .00217 -.00660 .0316*** .0259*** (.00995) (.0141) (.00562) (.00672)No .00735 .00395 -.0108 -.0122 (.00827) (.00919) (.00671) (.00667)
Expression .283 .262 (.319) (.176)
Adjusted R^2 -0.0966 -0.118 0.488 0.505F-statistic 0.43 0.54 19.08 13.89
N 14 14 39 39
I II III IVRegulatory Yes Yes No No
Yes: Bus. Com. .0375 .0345 .00127 .00126 (.0330) (.0366) (.0162) (.0164)
Yes: Fin. Inst. .117 .0647 -.0174 -.0152 (.160) (.211) (.0446) (.0460)
Yes: Academic -.00401 -.0000915 .0461* .0437* (.0229) (.0265) (.0175) (.0196)
Yes: Other -.0326 -.0233 .0348 .0338 (.0341) (.0428) (.0201) (.0208)
No: Bus. Com. .0817** .0852** -.0694 -.0754 (.0131) (.0165) (.0519) (.0570)
No: Fin. Inst. -.246** -.260* -.0884 -.0567 (.0580) (.0715) (.240) (.269)
No: Academic .0750 .0706 .00770 .00681 (.0469) (.0522) (.0119) (.0126)
No: Other -.0814 -.0568 -.00941 -.00765 (.0893) (.112) (.0327) (.0338)
Expression -.119 .0628 (.271) (.226)
Adjusted R^2 0.827 0.793 0.559 0.545F-statistic 8.77 6.56 7.03 6.06
N 14 14 39 39
Conclusion
General points Different groups have different influences The nature of issues matters
Evaluation of the theories MOJ has strong control on the outcome The managements has strong influence particularly w
here the stake is big Academics have significant influence when the stake i
s small Interest group explanation and convincing explanation
hold, while independence explanation does not seem to hold