G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:The instant petition assails the Decision 1dated November 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution 2dated March 19, 2004 denying reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody, 3 docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:

Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.

Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this Court, who is directed to immediately make a return.

SO ORDERED. 4Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate court held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the minors detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitioner-mother to first show cause why her own three-year old child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called "restraint" despite no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of tender years. The assailed orders, resolutions and decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals are clearly void;

2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining her very own son of tender years. The petition is not even sufficient in substance to warrant the writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.

3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the "Sombong vs. CA" case supports rather than negates the position of the petitioners.

4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence to the tender-years-rule

5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to present prima facie proof of any compelling reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;

6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY. 6Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial courts orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003? Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 7 of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.

Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own child.

Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.

Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.

Under Rule 41, Section 1 8 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. 9 Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. 11 Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code 12 unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. 13

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 14 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC 15 that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decisiondated November 10, 2003 and the Resolutiondated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 170924 July 4, 2007In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESAROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner, vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, respondents.

D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 which dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Roberto Rafael Pulido (Pulido) in behalf of Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, and imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure, and its Resolution2 dated 6 January 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are not disputed.

At around one oclock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred twenty-one (321) junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood Premiere Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards of said establishment and planted explosives in its immediate surroundings.

The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). They declared their withdrawal of support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP President Arroyo and demanded her resignation and that of the members of her cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

At about one oclock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion." Consequently, she issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the "rebellion."

After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government negotiators, the former agreed to return to barracks, thus ending the occupation of Oakwood.

Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before the Court of Appeals.

On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a directive3 to all Major Service Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) regarding the Custody of Military Personnel Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength thereof, Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody by their Service Commander.

Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War. They were, however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup Detat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Said case entitled, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al." was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On 18 November 2003, a Commitment Order was issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City.4On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged5 from military service.

On 16 December 2003, per order of the RTC, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678 entitled, "People v. Ramon B. Cardenas" pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, on the ground that the cases are founded on the same facts and/or formed part of a series of offenses of similar character.6In a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 2004, Commodore Normando Naval, Commander of Naval Base Cavite, asked the Makati RTC, Branch 148, to relieve him of his duty as custodian of Gonzales and Mesa and that the latter be transferred to the Makati City Jail.7 In an Order dated 29 April 2004, the RTC relieved him of his duty but ordered the transfer of Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval Base Cavite in Sangley Point, Cavite City, to the Philippine Marine Brigade Headquarters, Philippine Marine, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the custody of the Commander of the Marine Brigade of the Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.8In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail pegging the amount thereof at P100,000.00 each.9On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail.10 On 20 July 2004, the RTC issued orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine Corps, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, to release Gonzales and Mesa from his custody.11 Despite said orders and their service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were not released.

On 21 July 2004, the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration12 of the order granting bail. Prior to the resolution of said motion, Jovencito R. Zuo, Chief State Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen. Manuel F. Llena, Judge Advocate General, to defer action on the provisional release of Gonzales and Mesa "until the Motion for Reconsideration shall have been resolved and attained finality."13 On 26 October 2004, the RTC denied the motion for partial reconsideration.

With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, asking for the nullification and setting aside of the orders dated 8 July 2004 and 26 October 2004 of Judge Oscar B. Pimentel for having been issued without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari was raffled to the Seventh Division and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Oscar B. Pimentel, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148." The Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) did not issue a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.

Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus14 was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and raffled to the Third Division. In support thereof, it was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer subject to Military Law as they had been discharged from the service on 8 December 2003, and since they are not charged before a court martial, the military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and there is no legal ground to detain them further because a court order for their release had already been issued.

On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and Gen. Ernesto de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, to produce the bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear and show the cause and validity of their detention.15On 18 August 2005, a return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made.16 Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440; and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7th Division.

On 9 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (7th Division) rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 dismissing the petition that questioned the propriety of the granting of bail to Gonzales, Mesa, and twenty-five of their co-accused.17On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus for violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It ratiocinated:

A reading of the parties submissions reveals a threshold issue the charge of forum shopping and the related falsity in the certification supporting the petition. We must initially resolve these issues because a finding that the petitioner violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can lead to the outright dismissal of the present petition. x x x

x x x x

The records show that the present petition contained the following certificate of non-forum shopping:

"I, ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, with office address at Unit 1601, 16th Floor 139 Corporate Center Valero Street, Makati City, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby state that:

1. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned case;

2. I have read the Petition and caused it to be prepared. All the contents thereof are true to my own personal knowledge and the record;

3. I have not heretofore commenced any action or proceeding involving the same issues, in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency and to the best of my knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; except for the related cases of "Eugene Gonzales et al. vs. Gen. Narciso Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 164007 and "Humabono Adaza et al., vs. Gen. Pedro Cabuay et al., G.R. No. 160792, both awaiting the resolution of the Supreme Court.

5. (sic, should be 4) If I should learn of any similar action or proceeding filed or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report such fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Court.

The present petition and its accompanying certification likewise show that the petitioner never mentioned the pendency before the Seventh Division of this Court of the certiorari case, SP 88440, for the annulment of the lower courts order granting the soldiers-accuseds petition for bail, when this same lower court order is cited as basis for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa in the present petition. All that the certification mentioned were the related cases pending before the Honorable Supreme Court. Neither did the petitioner comply with his undertaking under his certification to inform this Court within five (5) days of the pendency of any similar action or proceeding filed or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, as in fact the certiorari case was already pending with this Court when the present petition was filed. The certiorari case was only brought to our attention after the respondents filed their Return of the Writ.

To be sure, the petitioner, who is also the counsel for the accused Gonzales and Mesa in the criminal case before Branch 148 RTC Makati City and who represents Gonzales and Mesa as private respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440, cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the certiorari case. Why he deliberately kept the pendency of the certiorari case hidden from us, has not been sufficiently explained. We have no doubt, however, that his deliberate act of withholding information on a material fact directly required to be disclosed by the Rules of Court cannot but have legal consequences.

The primary basis of the present petition is the bail granted to and posted by Gonzales and Mesa. This is very clear from the petitioners argument that "The continued detention of the enlisted personnel constitutes violation of the lawful orders of the civilian court." He cited in support of this argument the grant and the posting of the bail, and the issuance of the release orders by the lower court. He did not disclose, however, what subsequently happened to the order granting bail. He deliberately omitted in his narration the fact that the People moved to reconsider this order. Thus, he gave the impression that the order granting bail immediately became enforceable and that Gonzales and Mesas continued detention is illegal because their constitutional rights to bail, which have received judicial imprimatur, were continuously being violated by the respondents.

The petitioner next omitted the fact that after the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail, the People filed the certiorari case before this Court, seeking to annul the lower courts order. While we are aware of the rule that the mere pendency of a petition for certiorari will not prevent the implementation of the assailed order unless the court where the petition was filed issues either a temporary restraining order or a writ or preliminary injunction the filing of a petition for habeas corpus while the order granting bail is being questioned on a petition for certiorari raises issues beyond the immediate execution of the lower courts bail and release orders. They raise questions on the propriety of filing the habeas corpus petition to seek the release of persons under detention, at the same time that a petition regarding their continued detention and release are pending. Apparently, the petitioner wanted to avoid these questions, prompting him to actively conceal the subsequent motion for reconsideration of the bail order and the petition for certiorari directly questioning this same order. In short, the petitioner conveniently omitted in his narration of facts the material factual antecedents detrimental to his cause; he chose to narrate only the factual antecedents favorable to his cause.

That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower courts grant of bail. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the order granting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement through a petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The question this immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and the release under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court?

We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason why the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be sure, we clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. For this very same reason, we should not entertain the present petition as the matter before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales and Mesas release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore footnoted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.

To be strictly accurate, the issues of detention and immediate release that are now before the two Divisions of this Court are likewise properly within the jurisdiction of the lower court who has original jurisdiction over the criminal case and who has issued the order granting bail in the exercise of this jurisdiction. If indeed there is a question relating to the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa pursuant to the lower courts order pending the determination of the certiorari issues, such question should be brought before the lower court as the tribunal that has ordered the release, or before the Seventh Division of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower court. The Decision recently promulgated by the Seventh Division of this Court ordering the release on bail of the soldiers-accused effectively demonstrates this point.

The inter-relationships among the criminal case below, the certiorari case and the present petition, as well as among the courts where these cases are pending, show beyond doubt that the petitioner committed forum shopping in the strict sense of that term i.e., the attempt by a party, after an adverse opinion in one forum, to seek a favorable opinion in another forum other that through an appeal or certiorari. The "adverse" aspect for the petitioner, while not an opinion, is no less adverse as he has failed to secure the release of Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court and before this Court in the certiorari case (as of the time of the filing of the present petition); thus, he came to us in the present petition. That the Seventh Division of this Court has ordered the release on bail of the soldiers-accused, thus rendering the present petition moot and academic after the finality of the 7th Division Decision, plainly demonstrates this legal reality.18

The Court further imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure for the aforesaid violation. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for violation of and pursuant to Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner, Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido, is hereby CENSURED for these violations. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Supreme Court, to be attached to the petitioners record as a member of the Bar, as a RECORD OF CENSURE that may be referred to and considered in any future similar act.19

On 5 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 which the Court of Appeals (Special Former Third Division) denied in its resolution21 dated 6 January 2006.

Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AND LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF FORUM SHOPPING.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONER THE PENALTY OF CENSURE.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI GONZALES.

Petitioner prays that the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and an order be issued ordering respondents to immediately release Gonzales and Mesa. He further prays that the censure against him be also reversed and set aside.

Before respondents could comment on the petition, petitioner filed, with leave of court, a Motion to Withdraw the Prayer for the Immediate Release of Julius Mesa and Cezari Gonzales.22 Petitioner informed the Court that the Commanding General of the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of Gonzales and Mesa and surrendered their persons to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus, Mesa and Gonzales are now enjoying temporary liberty by virtue of the release orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by the RTC. Petitioner asks that the prayer for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be dismissed but asks that the other prayers in the petition be granted.

In its comment, the Solicitor General stressed that the habeas corpus petition has been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of Mesa and Gonzales from detention and, in the absence of an actual case or controversy, it is impractical to consider and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of their detention, including the alleged refusal of the Court of Appeals to resolve said issues.

When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic.23 With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value.24 This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.25The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of forum shopping? (2) Should petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the 3rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court which asked for the annulment of the RTCs order granting Gonzales and Mesas petition for bail?

To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner asserts that the issues in the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of respondents filing of the motion for reconsideration and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims that the same has no legal relevance to the Petition for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed said petition, the order granting bail subsisted and has not been reversed or modified; and no TRO or injunction has been issued that would affect the efficacy or validity of the order granting the bail and the order directing the release of Mesa and Gonzales.

For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping (1) when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; OR (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files a motion before the Court of Appeals, since in such a case, he deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even in one case in which a particular allowable remedy sought for is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open; OR (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the same from the original court.26The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Stated differently, there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.

For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari case, petitioner clearly violated his obligation to disclose within five days the pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as mandated in Section 5(c), Rule 728 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 dated 12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUSRICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner, vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion2 read:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that matter to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.

In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5

The petition is granted.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.

We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)

In ruling that the Commissioners "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:

"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children"8 under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."9

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10

That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.

SO ORDERED.10Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.18The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:

Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.51It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons.62Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.65

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the