Guiyab - EU and US Competition Law Video Reviewer (Autosaved)

8/18/2019 Guiyab - EU and US Competition Law Video Reviewer (Autosaved)

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Guiyab Competition Law Reviewer

EU and US Competition Law Video Reviewer

European Union - 28 countries, based on two

major treaties:

-Maastricht treaty

-TFEU treaty

Q: What oes TFEU !tand "or#

$: Treaty "or the Functionin% o" the European

Union

Former&y treaty "or the estab&ishment o" the

European economic community TEE'

$rtic&es 8(-8) o&d treaty now (*(-(*) new

treaty

+u&e o" 2*

Q: " you were researchin% decisions under

$rtic&e (*) and wanted to "ind some precedent

"rom cases decided in the (8*.s under what

numbered artic&e in the pre/ious treaty wou&d

you &oo0#

$: $rtic&e 8)1 The new &aws a"terwards

renumbered this artic&e to (*)1

Article 101 3rohibitions on 'oncerted

$cti/ity

(*( 4(5 !tandards

(*( 425 6u&&i"ication

(*( 475 e"enses

Article 102 $buse o" ominant Mar0et

3osition

Types o" $buse:

Ec&usionary

Ep&oitati/e

Article 103-105

'a&&s "or ++s "or En"orcement

(*9 Transition $rtic&e

(* $uthori;es En"orcement o" 'ases

Q: " 1


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Q: True or Fa&se: The court that adjudicates

disputes under EU &aw on a "irst instance basis is

o"ten re"erred to as the E'>1

$: Fa&se1 This is an appe&&ate court, not a court

o" "irst instance1

EU $djudication o" 'ompetition 'ases

'ommission ssues "ine on recommendation o"

,

and the FT'5 does the 3'' seem to most

c&ose&y resemb&e# 3&ease brie"&y state the basis

"or your choice:

$: The FT'1 The Dimitation o" crimina&

prosecution to the A> is mirrored by the new

&aw a&&owin% crimina& prosecution to be hand&edec&usi/e&y by the epartment o" >ustices

A""ice "or 'ompetition1 ecisions o" the 3''

are a&so appea&ab&e to the 'ourt o" $ppea&s and

then, by certiorari, to the !upreme 'ourt o" the

3hi&ippines1


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RA 1066(

3hi&ippine 'ompetiiton $ct

Act $uni!a#le

3+AB?TE $'T!

!ec1 (91 Anti-Competitive Agreements.

$ER SE )&&E*SES

4a5 The "o&&owin% a%reements, between or

amon% competitors, are per se prohibited:

4(5 +estrictin% competition as to price, or

components thereo", or other terms o" trade

425 Fiin% price at an auction or in any "orm o"

biddin% inc&udin% co/er biddin%, bid

suppression, bid rotation and mar0et a&&ocation

and other ana&o%ous practices o" bid

manipu&ation

)#+ect or E,,ect 'et

4b5 The "o&&owin% a%reements, between or

amon% competitors which ha/e the object or

e""ect o" substantia&&y pre/entin%, restrictin% or

&essenin% competition sha&& be prohibited:

4(5 !ettin%, Dimitin%, or contro&&in% production,

mar0ets, technica& de/e&opment, or in/estment

425 i/idin% or sharin% the mar0et, whether by

/o&ume o" sa&es or purchases, territory, type o"

%oods or ser/ices, buyers or se&&ers or any other means

Catc! All Claue

4c5 $%reements other than those speci"ied in 4a5

and 4b5 o" this section which ha/e the object or

e""ect o" substantia&&y pre/entin%, restrictin% or

&essenin% competition sha&& a&so be prohibited:

Provided, Those which contribute to impro/in%

the production or distribution o" %oods and

ser/ices or to promotin% technica& or economic pro%ress, whi&e a&&owin% consumers a "air share

o" the resu&tin% bene"its, may not necessari&y be

deemed a /io&ation o" this $ct1

$n entity that contro&s, is contro&&ed by, or is

under common contro& with another entity or

entities, ha/e common economic interests, and

are not otherwise ab&e to decide or act

independent&y o" each other, sha&& not be

considered competitors "or purposes o" this

section1

!ec1 (1 Abuse of Dominant Market Position

AC' EE.$'/)*

!e&&in% be&owcost

The price estab&ished was in%ood "aith to meet or compete with the &ower price o" a competitor in thesame mar0et se&&in% thesame or comparab&e productor ser/ice o" &i0e @ua&ity1(

mposin% barriers toentry or competition%rowthhindrance

The barriers to entryde/e&oped in the mar0et as aresu&t o" or arisin% "rom asuperior product or process, business acumen, or &e%a&ri%hts or &aws12

!ubjectin%commercia&transactions toconditionsunre&ated to acommercia& purpose

Must substantia&&y pre/ent,restrict or &essencompetition17

11 Id. ( 4a51

21 Id. ( 4b51

31 3hi&ippine 'ompetition $ct, G(1


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3rice andHor mar0etdiscrimination

!ocia&i;ed pricin% "or the&ess "ortunate sector o" theeconomy price di""erentia&which reasonab&y or approimate&y re"&ect

di""erences in the cost o" manu"acture, sa&e, or de&i/ery resu&tin% "romdi""erin% methods, technica&conditions, or @uantities inwhich the %oods or ser/icesare so&d or de&i/ered to the buyers or se&&ers pricedi""erentia& or terms o" sa&eo""ered in response to thecompetiti/e price o" payments, ser/ices or

chan%es in the "aci&ities"urnished by a competitorand price chan%es inresponse to chan%in% mar0etconditions, mar0etabi&ity o" %oods or ser/ices, or /o&ume19

Ec&usi/ityarran%ements

3ermissib&e "ranchisin%,&icensin%, ec&usi/emerchandisin% or ec&usi/edistributorship a%reements

such as those which %i/eeach party the ri%ht touni&atera&&y terminate thea%reement or $%reements protectin%inte&&ectua& property ri%hts,con"identia& in"ormation, or trade secrets1

?und&in% " the %oods ha/e a directconnection with the main%oods or ser/ices to besupp&ied1)

41 Id 1 G( 4d51

51 Id 1 G( 4e51

61 Id 1 G( 4"51

3redatory purchase pricin%

3rices must be un"air&y &ow1I

3redatoryse&&in% pricin%

3rices that de/e&op in themar0et as a resu&t o" or dueto a superior product or

process, business acumen or &e%a& ri%hts or &aws sha&& not be considered un"air prices18

Autputrestriction

Dimitations that de/e&op inthe mar0et as a resu&t o" or due to a superior product or process, business acumen or &e%a& ri%hts or &aws sha&& not be a /io&ation1


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measure o" the si;e o" "irms in re&ation tothe industry and an indicator o" the amount o" competition amon% them1 6amed a"ter economists Arris '1 Ber"indah& and $&bert A1Birschman, it is an economic concept wide&yapp&ied in competition &aw, antitrust J(K and a&so

techno&o%y mana%ement1J2K t is de"ined as thesum o" the s@uares o" the mar0et shares o" the"irms within the industry 4sometimes &imited tothe * &ar%est "irms5,J7K where the mar0et sharesare epressed as "ractions1 The resu&t is proportiona& to the a/era%e mar0et share,wei%hted by mar0et share1 $s such, it can ran%e"rom * to (1*, mo/in% "rom a hu%e number o" /ery sma&& "irms to asin%&e monopo&istic producer1 ncreases in theBer"indah& inde %enera&&y indicate a decrease incompetition and an increase o" mar0et power ,

whereas decreases indicate the opposite

Cellop!ane &allac%

The Cellop!ane $arado 4a&so the Cellop!ane

'rap or Cellop!ane &allac%J(K or iner#read

$arado5 describes a type o" incorrect reasonin%

used in mar0et re%u&ation methods1

The parado arises when a "irm se&&s a product

with "ew substitutes, which in turn a&&ows the

"irm to increase the price o" that product1 The

ori%ina& reason was that as the price increases,

the product wi&& reach a point where it be%ins to

attract more and more substitutes1 n technica&

economic terms, such a product has /ery

&ow cross-price e&asticity o" demand1 The

situation is &in0ed to a United !tates !upreme

'ourt case and a subse@uent response in

economic &iterature1

'e&&ophane was a u3ont 'ompany p&astic

wrappin% materia& that had its U1!1 productionrestricted to du 3ont by numerous patents in the

ear&y (*s1 u 3ont was sued under

the !herman $ct "or monopo&i;ation o" the

ce&&ophane mar0et by the U1!1 >ustice

epartment, and the case 4.!. v. ". I. du Pont J2K5

was decided by the !upreme 'ourt in ()1 The

'ourt a%reed with du 3ont that when e/a&uated

at the monopo&istic price obser/ed in the ear&y

(*s, there were many substitutes "or

ce&&ophane and, there"ore, du 3ont had on&y a

sma&& share o" the mar0et "or wrappin% materia&s

4i1e1, it possessed &itt&e or no mar0et power 51
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industryhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industryhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orris_C._Herfindahlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_O._Hirschmanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_O._Hirschmanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_O._Hirschmanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_O._Hirschmanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economicshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition_lawhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition_lawhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antitrusthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-MergerGuidelines-1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-MergerGuidelines-1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_sharehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_powerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_powerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_powerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellophane_paradox#cite_note-1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substitute_goodhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_elasticity_of_demandhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Supreme_Courthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Supreme_Courthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellophanehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DuPonthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DuPonthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Acthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolizationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolizationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justicehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justicehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellophane_paradox#cite_note-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_powerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industryhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orris_C._Herfindahlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_O._Hirschmanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_O._Hirschmanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economicshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition_lawhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antitrusthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-MergerGuidelines-1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_sharehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herfindahl_index#cite_note-3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_powerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellophane_paradox#cite_note-1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substitute_goodhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_elasticity_of_demandhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Supreme_Courthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Supreme_Courthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellophanehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DuPonthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Acthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolizationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justicehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justicehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellophane_paradox#cite_note-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_power

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Guiyab - EU and US Competition Law Video Reviewer (Autosaved)