Mood,Modality and Modal Verbs (Autosaved) (Autosaved)

7/27/2019 Mood,Modality and Modal Verbs (Autosaved) (Autosaved)

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The Functional categories of the Verb- Spring Term 2011- Ileana Baciu

Mood, Modality and Modal Verbs

1.Introduction1.1. A distinction should be made between moodand modality.Modality is a semantic/pragmatic concept while moodis a grammatical category. This distinction is similar to the onebetween tense and time , genderand sex oraspectand aspectuality.The primary function ofmood is to express modality and refers to specific linguistic forms orparadigms of forms, typically in verb inflection (Palmer 2001:4; Huddlestone&Pullum 2005:172), asin the contrast between indicative (realis mood) , subjunctive, imperative, infinitive (irrealis mood).Modality is defined as a linguistic category that refers to thefactual status of a state of

affairs/situation.Modality, hence, does not relate semantically to the verb alone but to the wholesentence.Moodand modality are not always co-extensive. In many languages, not moodbut certain modal

systems (e.g. modal verbs in English; cf. Palmer, 2001:4) are the typical means of expressingmodality.

On the other hand, not all functions ofmood markers necessarily express modality; we also have theother side of the coin, namely markers of grammatical categories other than moodmay help to expressmodal notions, e.g. the past tense form of the verb is used forirrealis marking in English.1.2. As far as English is concerned historical change has more or less eliminated mood markers fromthe inflectional system (the only remnant is 1st/3rd person singularwere), the mood system being

ratheranalytic than inflectional(Huddlestone&Pullum 2005:172).Modal concepts and attitudes can be expressed in English by:

(a) mood/inflectional markers : factual (indicative), non-factual (subjunctive, infinitive form,imperative form)(b) lexical modals:

(i) adjectives: able, bound, certain, compulsory, imperative, likely, necessary, possible, probable,supposed, etc.

(ii) nouns: allegation, assumption, certainty, likelihood, necessity, possibility, probability(iii) verbs: assume, believe, declare, fear, hope, imagine, insist, permit, presume, require, suspect,think, etc.(iv)adverbs: allegedly, certainly, possibly, probably, presumably, undoubtedly,(c) true modal auxiliaries: can, may must, shall, will, could, might, should, would, ought to, need,

dare.(d)semi-modal verbs: have (got) to

Roughly, modality is centrally concerned with thespeakers/subjects attitude towards thefactualityoractualization of the situation expressed by the non-finite part of the clause (the proposition p)

(H&P:2002:173).Consider the following sentences:

(i) He wrote it himself(ii) He must have written it

(iii) He must help him(iv) He may help him

(v) He may have written it

A declarative clause likeHe wrote it himselfis an unmodalised assertion : the speaker is committed tothefactuality of the proposition expressed (he write it) , i.e. the proposition is taken as a factin thereal world. Hence, the indicative moodis used.


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On the other hand, a sentence like He must have written itis modalised ; the truth of the sentence is

presented as something that isinferredand not as something that is directly known (epistemicmodality)A sentence like You must help him expresses a different kind of modality which is concerned with theactualization of a future situation, namely, you help him:I impose on you the obligation to bringthis situation about. (root/deontic modality)

The two modalised examples involve different kinds of modalities (epistemic ,deontic) but theyexpress the same concept, namely the concept ofnecessity.The concept ofnecessity and the related concept ofpossibility are core concepts in modality.Modalpossibility is illustrated in the examples under (iv )and ( v) corresponding to the ones in (ii, iii)by replacing mustwith may.

The sentenceHe may have written it himselfexpresses thepossibility of his having performed theeventuality described, i.e. it indicates an open attitude of the speaker towards the truth of theproposition (epistemic modality). Similarly, You may help him expresses thepossibility of yourhelping him, i.e. the speaker givespermission and thus a potential barrier to the actualization of thesituation is removed (root/deontic modality)

2.Distinctive syntactic and morphological properties of Modal Verbs

2.1. Modal verbs form a special class of auxiliary verbs, given their particular morpho-syntacticproperties which distinguish them not only from lexical verbs but also from other auxiliaries such asaspectual be and have. (Avram, 1999).(A) The NICE Constructions - Negation, Inversion, Code and Emphasis - distinguish between modalverbs and lexical verbs, placing modals within the class ofaspectualauxiliaries:

(i) Negation can attach to the modal without do-support:(1) It willnot work

(ii) Subject-auxiliary inversion is obligatory in questions and in tags, without do-support:(2) Willit rain?

(3) She can walk, cant she?(iii) Modals can appear in the code construction without do-support:

(4) Susan can help them andI can too /andso can I.(iv) Emphatic polarity is possible without do-support:

(5) I WILL be there.

Besides the NICE properties, modal auxiliaries share the following properties with the aspectualauxiliaries be and have:(v) Stranding:

(6) He cantcome, but I can.(vi) Precede adverb/quantifier:

(7) They willprobably/all come

(vii) Reduced forms:(8) Shellcome later/ She wontcome later

(viii) Combinatorial and order restrictions; have, be and modals exclude any combination with do(see (iii) above); there are also rigid restrictions on the sequence of auxiliaries; this indicates thatauxiliaries have fixed positions:

(9) She may have arrived/*She have may arrivedShe may be coming soon/*She is may coming soonShe has been reading/*She is having read

B) Properties that distinguish between modal verbs and the aspectual auxiliaries be and have:

(i) Modals show no person-number agreement:(10) *She cans do it

(ii) Modals cannot co-occur:


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(27) *She must can help you vs. She must be able to help you

(iii) Modals lack non-finite forms, consequently are excluded from constructions that require one.From a syntactic point of view modal verbs occur only in finite clauses:

(12) to havehadhad - havingto be -wasbeenbeing

(*to) cancould- *could*canning

*I regret not canning swim vs. I regret not being able to swim*I have could swim since childhood vs. I have been able to swim since childhood.*Id like to can swim vs. Id like to be able to swim

(iv) Modals can only select a bare infinitive as complement (except ought):

(13) They may come/be coming/have come

(v) The present /past distinction ; only some modal verbs exhibit a present/past alternation (whichis semantically neutralized in many contexts):can/could; shall/should; will/would; may/might:

(14) She couldalready swim when she was seven. vs. She could have told me thetruth.

3. Types of Modality

3.1. As already mentionedModality is realized in standard English mainly by the use of modalverbs.It has long been acknowledged that modal verbs are ambiguous along at least two dimensions: (i) theroot modal meanings and (ii) the epistemic modal meanings.According to Kratzer (1991), In using an epistemic modal we are interested in what else may (i.e. is

possible) ormust(i.e. is necessary) be the case in our world given all the evidence available.Epistemic modality is the modality of curious people like historians, detectives and futurologistsAhistorian asks what might have been the case, given all the available facts. Using a circumstantial

(=root) modal, we are interested in the necessities implied by or thepossibilities opened up by certainsorts of facts Circumstantial (=root) modality is the modality of rational agents like gardeners,architects and engineers. An engineer asks what can be done given certain relevant facts. Thiskind of information will generally be supplied contextually.The rootmodal meanings subsume deontic modality and dynamic modality.Deonticis derived from the Greek for that which isbinding, so that it refers to concepts likeobligation,permission. Deontic modality is concerned with thepossibility ornecessity of actsperformed by morally responsible agents. The authority (person, convention, etc) from whomobligation,permission emanates is known as the deontic source.. Prototypically, deontic modalityrefers to the speakers attitude to the actualization offuture situations (H&P 2005:178)Dynamic modalities are concerned withproperties and dispositions (such as ability and willingness)of persons referred to in the clause, especially by the subject NP. Prototypically, no person or

institution is identifiable as a deontic source. The boundary between dynamic and deontic modality isoften fuzzy, hence they are grouped together under the heading root modality oragent-orientedmodality. Compare:

(15) (i) She can stay as long as she likes. (deontic - permission)(ii) She can easily beat everyone else in the club. (dynamic- ability)(iii) She can speak French. (ambiguous) (H&P 2005:178)

Example (15i) givespermission,(15ii) is concerned with the subjects ability, while (15iii) can beinterpreted in either way, deontically, as permitting her to speak French ordynamically as reportingherability to do so.Epistemic is derived from the Greek for knowledge and roughly deals with the thepossibility ornecessity of an inference drawn from available evidence as to the truth (factuality) of past or presentsituations. Epistemic modalities arespeaker-oriented.


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It is not the case that what is known is taken in the strong sense, but it should be understood as what

evidence the speakerhas in making an inference or drawing a conclusion. This personalized kind ofknowledge reduces in fact to the belief-sets of the speaker. Epistemic modality involves thespeakersmental representation of reality and the evidence he has for that representation based on inferentialprocesses. The speakers mental representation of reality is a meta-representation of reality (cf.Papafragou, 2000).

From the speakers point of view, the employment ofepistemic modality rests crucially on his abilityto reflect on the content of his own beliefs. The speaker takes into account the reliability of thesebeliefs and performs deductive operations on them. On this picture, in the epistemic interpretation ofmodal verbs, the speaker uses the embedded proposition (the non-finite partof the sentence) as arepresentation of an abstract hypothesis he makes (i.e. meta-representation) and sees whether this

abstract hypothesis is compatible with, or entailed by his set of beliefs.Note that an epistemically modalised assertion is weaker in strength than its non-modalisedcounterpart (i.e. in the modalised sentence the speaker is less committed to the truth of the sentence)although mustconveys epistemic necessity. Compare:

(16) San Marino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world.(17) San Marino must be the country with the highest life expectancy in the world.

Sentence (16) offers a piece offactualinformation and the speaker trusts it to be true. In (17),the speaker possesses compellingevidence about the country with the highest life expectancy in theworld but thepossibility that there are pieces of evidence beyondthe speakers beliefs is left open.These extra pieces of evidence may disconfirm the fact that San Marino is the country with thehighest life expectancy in the world. That is why sentence (17) is felt as weaker than (16) in spite ofthe fact that mustconveys epistemic necessity.One obvious consequence of the fact that epistemic modality involves the speakers mentalrepresentation of reality and the evidence he has for that representation is based on inferentialprocesses is that epistemic modals, unlike rootmodals, cannot appear sentence-initially inyes-no

interrogatives:

(18) May the race start?Is there permission for the race to start?*Is it possible that the race starts?

(19) Should John leave?Is it required that John leave?*Is it predictable that John will leave?

In general, it is assumed that the rootuses of modal verbs are more basic, with the epistemic usesrising by extension to the domain of reasoning of concepts primarily applicable in the domain ofhuman interaction, such as compelling and permitting (H&P 2005:178).

The sentences below are examples of root and epistemic uses of the modals mustand may:

(20) (i) You must do as you are told. (root necessity)=you are required/obliged to do as you are told

(ii) She must have already left. (epistemic necessity)=it is a necessary assumption that she has already left

(iii) John must be in class today. (ambiguous)

(21) (i) You may go if you wish. (root possibility)=you are allowed to go if you wishHe may have left. (epistemic possibility)=it is a possible assumption that he has leftHe may sleep downstairs. (ambiguous) (H&P:178)


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As the examples show, both epistemic and root interpreted modals show a two-fold distinction

between some kind ofnecessity (e.g. must, should, ought to, have to, need) and some kind ofpossibility. (e.g. may, can).According to The Cambridge Grammar of the Englsh Language (H&P 2002:175) the core modalconcepts ofnecessity andpossibilityconcern the strength of commitment (prototypically the speakerscommitment) to thefactuality (epistemic)oractualization (root) of the situation: necessity involves a

strong commitment,possibility a weak one.Deontic necessity, i.e. obligation (which may range from strong to weak) is expressed by must,should, ought to, have to, need, while deontic possibility, i.e.permission, is expressed by may orcan.Epistemic necessity is expressed by must,need, have to,should, ought to, while epistemicpossibilityis expressed by may and can. In its epistemic use, can, just like need, is restricted to non-assertive

contexts.

3.2.Root-Epistemic Contrasts.

In the literature on modal verbs, it has long been assumed that we can identify grammatical features

that distinguish between rootand epistemic readings of modal verbs. In what follows we shall presenta summary of the arguments for astructural epistemic-rootsplit, following Papafragou (2000)

3.2.1.Properties of the Subject. It has long been noticed (Hoffman 1976, Jackendoff, 1974, etc) thatroot readings of modal verbs, unlike epistemic readings of modal verbs, imposeselectionalrestrictions on the subject. Utterances with expletive orinanimate subjects are anomalous with rootmodals, (irrespective of whether they denote necessity orpossibility), while epistemic modals do notimpose any restriction whatsoever:

(22) (i) It may be raining (It is possible/* is allowed)(ii) The political uncertainty may lead to early elections (It is possible/* is

allowed)

(23) (i) There must be a demonstration today (it is certain/*..is required)(ii) The political uncertainty must lead to early elections (it is certain/*..is required)

The distinct behaviour of root vs epistemic modals was accounted for by assuming that rootmodalsinvolve requiredorpermissible actions performed by agents (hence, in theirrootinterpretationmodals take two arguments: subject NP and complement clause), while epistemic modals involve theevaluation of a proposition aspossible ornecessary (hence, they take one single argument, namely theproposition as such)The assumption that rootmodals have the ability to assign a subject/agent role seems to besupported by the fact that rootreadings undergo a meaning shift in passivisation, while epistemicreadings are unaffected:

(24) (i) Relatives may visit the students on Monday. (permission)(ii) Students may be visited by relatives on Monday.

(25) (i) The home team may win the game. (possibility)(ii) The game may be won by the home team.

The root readings ofmay in (24) differ in meaning: (24i) refers to the rights of relatives while (24ii)involves the rights of the students. The epistemic use ofmay in (25) does not show any meaningdifference: both utterances communicate that there is a possibility that the home team will win thegame.

The generalizations concerning the properties of subjects are not absolute: expletives andinanimate subjects may occurin root (deontic) statements:


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(26) (i)There must be law and order in the country (it is required that; *it is

certain that)(ii)The table should be ready for dinner at 7 (it is required that; *it is certain

that)

Rootreadingspermission and obligation- require a responsible agentfor carrying out the activity

described by the sentences in (26) and in these cases the agent is identifiedpragmatically.As far as the alleged meaning shift which root readings undergo in passivization is concerned, it is tobe noted that notall root statements undergo such a shift (the examples below are borrowed fromNewmeyer,1970); the explanation is the same as the one for the examples above: the predicaterequires the presence of an agent which, in the passive counterparts, is identified pragmatically (27) or

syntactically (the by-phrase in (28)):

(27) (i) Sam must shovel the dirt into the hole.(ii) The dirt must be shoveled into the hole.

(28) (i) Visitors may pick flowers.(ii) Flowers may be picked by visitors.

3.2.2. Properties of the Verbal Complement. It has also been noted that rootand epistemic readings ofmodal verbs impose different restrictions on the verbal complement from an aspectualpoint of view.

Viewpoint aspect:Epistemic interpretations allow the presence ofperfectandprogressive aspectinthe complement.Rootinterpretations exclude these forms. The following examples only allow theepistemic reading:

(29) (i) He must have been very tired./She may have left.(ii) John must be joking./She may be sleeping.

A consequence of the aspectual restriction is that epistemic readings havepresentandpastorientation, i.e. the speaker evaluates propositions about past (29i) or present (29ii) situations.

Lexical aspect:Individuallevel states (i.e. inherent properties of individuals: have green eyes, be anative speaker, believe, know, etc) in the complement of the modal force an epistemic reading, not arootreading of the modal verbs; rootreadings broadly involvestage-level predicates (activities,events or stage-level states).These predicates refer to situations that can be brought about by anindividual:

(30) He must have green eyes like his mother(it is certain that.*it is requiredthat)

They may be native speakers of Dutch (it is possible that*it is allowed that)People in this part of the world may believe in strange gods.He must know the answer.

(31) You must behave yourself (it is required that..*it is certain that)You may go now (it is allowed that*it is possible)

Note, nevertheless, that once the abovestate predicates are coerced into an achievementoractivity reading (contextually) the rootreading becomes available (examples from Papafragou (2000)and Barbiers (1995)); the second condition to obtain a deontic reading with individual level states isthat no co-reference be established between the subject and the bearer of obligation (see example(32iv,v):


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(32) (i) I must be the best chess player there is (i.e. become)

(ii) You must be honest . Do you understand? (i.e. act)(iii) You must believe in God or theyll burn you on the stake.(iv) The new professor must be a native speaker of Finnish.(v) My blind date must be tall.

Zagona (1990) remarks that when the complement of an epistemic modal isstative, the eventuality-time of the verbal complement may be understood to besimultaneous with the modal time (i.e. thetime at which the modal evaluation obtains) ; afuture-shiftedreading is also possible . When thecomplement of the modal is eventive, its eventuality-time is understood to befuture-shiftedwith

respect to the modal evaluation time (actually the interpretation is ambiguous between a root andepistemic reading). Habituals and progressive eventive predicates behave like stative predicates.Compare:

Epistemic reading:

(33) (i) Jeremy must/should be in class today. (simultaneous or future-shifted)(ii) Jeremy must/should leave today. (only future-shifted)(iii) Jeremy must/should be lying on the beach by now. (simultaneous)

Most rootmodals favour afuture-shiftedreading of the eventuality-time of the complement relative tothe modal evaluation time regardless of the aspectual class of the complement of the modal, exceptinthe case ofability readings ofcan and could:

(33) (i) You may go now. (the event of going isfuture)(ii) She can swim. (generic ability)(iii) She could swim when she was five. (past ability)

3.2.3. Ordering Constraints . When an epistemic and a root modal co-occur, the epistemic readingalways scopes higher than the root, i.e epistemic > root.

In English, the co-occurrence of two modal verbs is syntactically constrained but we may usesemi-modals and othermodal constructions (examples from Papafragou 2000):

(34) epistemic > rootThey may have to go soonHe ought to be able to do itHe might be allowed to go there

According to Cinque the epistemic > root constraint belongs to Universal Grammar (i.e. it isvalid cross-linguistically). There are no co-occurrence restrictions if the modal expressions are both

root or both epistemic.

(35) root> root

You must be able to prove your innocence

Epistemic > epistemic

Necessarily, the solution to this problem may be false

3.2.4.Interrogatives. Epistemic modals, unlike root modals, cannot appear sentence-initially inyes-nointerrogatives:

(36) May the race start?


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Is there permission for the race to start?

*Is it possible that the race starts?(37) Should John leave?

Is it required that John leave?*Is it predictable that John will leave?

Papafragou (2000) argues that it is hard to construct a context in which it would be felicitous for thespeaker to ask whether a conclusion ispossible ornecessary with respect to his own set of beliefs.However, once such a context becomes available, interrogative-initial epistemics become acceptable.Consider:

(38) Might John be a liar?Must John be a liar?

Such sentences involve deliberative questions in which the speaker addresses a question to himself inan attempt to elaborate the evidence he has for a certain conclusion.

Since epistemic readings of modals involve the evaluation of a proposition (state of affairs) withrespect to the current belief-set of the speaker in the here and now of the talk-exchange, they cannotoccur in indirect speech and conditionals. Compare(Papafragou 2000:119):

(38) (i) ?If John must have a high IQ, then his teachers should treat him carefully(ii) ?If that blonde may be Jacks wife, we should keep quiet about the secretary(iii) If John must leave, then I will go(iv) If money may rule, then there is no justice

3.2.5.Negation.According to Coates (1983) negation affects the modal predication if the modal hasrootmeaning (in this case we speak ofexternal negation), while it affects the mainpredication (theVP) if the modal has epistemic meaning (in this case we speak ofinternal negation)

(39) You may [not be given this opportunity again] (epistemic) may [not VP]It is possible [that you will notbe given] - internal negationYou [may not ] enter (root) [not may] VPYou are [notallowed] to enter -external negation

An exception is root mustwhere negation affects the verbal complement and the suppletive formneedis used instead (40):

(40) You mustnt eat it all. (root) must [notVP]It is necessary [that you noteat it all]internal negation

You neednt eat it all (root) [not need] VP

It isnotnecessary [for you to eat it all]external negation

The above stated claim turns out to be wrong when other modals are taken into consideration.Consider the examples below, where should, ought to (Cormack &Smith 2002) are interpretedoutside negation (assume wide scope over negation, i.e. the negative morpheme negates the predicate(VP)) irrespective of their interpretation:

(41) Alfred shouldnt eat nuts. (root) should [not VP]It is advisable [for Alfred notto eat nuts]internal negationBob shouldnt be late (epistemic) should [not VP]It is predictable [that Bob will notbe late]- internal negation

Mary ought not to leave (root) ought [notVP]It is required [that Mary does notleave]- internal negation


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There oughtnt to be a problem finding the way. (epistemic) ought[notVP]

it is predictable [that there will notbe a problem] - internal negation

A second group of modals consistently fall undernegation,i.e. it is the modal that is negated; in thesecases we have externalnegation: can, could, need, dare:

(42) (i) George cannot swim (root) [ not can]VPexternal negationGeorge [is not able ] to swim

(ii) George cant be coming late (epistemic) [not can]VP -external negationIt is [notpossible] that George is coming late

(iii) Hugh neednt leave . (root) [not need]VP- external negationIt is [not required] that Hugh leave

(iv) Unicorns neednt exist (epistemic) [not need]VP- external negationIt is [not certain] that unicorns exist

(v) You dare not resign (root) [not dare] - external negation

In what follows we shall have a closer look at the way modal readings pattern with respect tonegation adopting the claim put forth by Cormack and Smith (2002) according to whom thescopedivide relative to negation seems to be broadly along the distinction necessity vspossibility.

4. Modals and negation and the logical relation between necessity and possibility

4.1. It has long been noticed that necessity andpossibility are logically related.In order to describe the logical relation between necessity andpossibility we need to consider theirinteraction with negation (H&P 175). As has been mentioned above, we need to distinguish betweeninternalnegation and externalnegation.Whenever the negative applies semantically to the VP complementof the modal we speak of internal

negation. We say in such cases that the modal has scope overthe negation or that the negation fallswithin the scope of the modal.(as in (43i) below; the paraphrase with the lexical modal isilluminating).Whenever the negative applies to the modal itself we speak of external negation since the modalfalls within the scope of negation.(as in (43ii) below). There are cases when the two types of negationcan combine(as in (43iii)). Consider the examples below:

(43) (i) He may [not have read it] (internal negation)It is possible [that he didntread it]

(ii) He [cant ] have read it (external negation)It is [notpossible] that he has read it

(iii) He cant not have read it.

It is not possible that he didnt read it

A second set of examples is (44) below:

(44) (i) You mustnt eat it all (internal negation)It is necessary [that you noteat it all]

(ii) You neednt eat it all (external negation)It is [notnecessary ] for you to eat it all

The equivalence between pairs of clauses expressing modal necessity (irrespective of how they areexpressed: must, need, necessarily, necessary etc) andpossibility (irrespective of how they areexpressed: can, may, possible, possibly, perhaps, etc) is illustrated in the examples below (H&P 176)where we use Nec fornecessity, Pos forpossibility and P for thepropositional contentHe be


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guilty; not-Nec and not-Pos indicate external negation while not-P indicates internal

negation:

Necessity PossibilityHe must be guilty He cant not be guilty [NecP]=[not-Pos not P]

He must be not guilty. He cant be guilty. [Nec not-P]=[not-Pos P]

As can be noticed from all the examples above necessity modals scope over negationi.e. notnegates the VP complementof the modal; possibility modals scope under not. The paraphrases with

lexical modals are relevant and illuminating as we can see in (43) and (44).According to Cormack and Smith (2002) the two exceptions would be:(i) May, apossibility modal, where the relevant distinction is that between epistemic and root

reading.e.g.You may not leave = You are notallowed to leave; [not may] P

He may not be coming tomorrow=It is possible that he is notcoming; may [not P](ii) the necessity modal needwhich should be considered a negative polarity item so it willalways appearunder negation.

The pre-negative modals are labeled as Modal1 while post-negative modals as Modal2 inCormack& Smiths analysis (2002). The positions for modals relative to NEG is given below

PRE-NEG necessity: shall, should, must, will, would, ought to, be to, have toModal [Not] possibility: epistemic reading only: may, might

POST-NEG possibility: can, could, dare (only root)Not [Modal] root reading only: may, might

necessity: need

5. The semantics of modal verbs5.1 The most natural question that arises on the root-epistemic shift is: are modals lexicallyambiguous (e.g Palmer 1990, Coates, 1983), polysemous (e.g. Sweetser 1990) or unitary in meaning(monosemous) (e.g. Wertheimer (1972) Perkins, (1983), Haegeman (1983), Kratzer 1977,1981, 1991,Papafragou, 2000) ?

The root/epistemic alternation has been given various explanations:(i) the distinction is determined at thesyntactic level (e.g. Picallo, 1990): epistemics are inserted

at sentence (IP) level while root modals are inserted within the VP level;

(ii) the difference is determined in the lexicon (e.g. Ross, 1969,Jackendoff 1971, Huddleston1974): epistemics are lexically one place (intransitive) predicates,corresponding to raisingverbs, while roots are two-place (transitive) predicates corresponding to control verbs. Thiswould mean that root modals and epistemic modals are distinct lexical items.

(iii) the distinction is determined contextually in thesemantic/pragmatic component (e.gWertheimer (1972) Perkins, 1983, Haegeman (1983), Kratzer 1991, Papafragou, 2000), i.e.the interpretive differences are determined by the conversational background. This is knownas the monosemous approach.

The solution we adopt is the third one, namely a unitary semantic approach, i.e. a commoncore for the meaning of each modal. The different interpretations modal expressions acquire arecontext-dependent. The theoretical framework is the one suggested by Kratzer (1991) and Papafragou(2000).Lets take the following set of examples:


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(45) (i) I must go on a diet.(ii) You ought to be ashamed.(iii) You may go home only if you have finished your work.(iv) You should acknowledge the authorities effort to fight crime.

(46) (i) You must be Johns wife.(ii) That problem ought to be easy for a genius like you.(iii) You may find that your love for opera is not widely shared here.(iv) Since you are interested in industrial design, this course should be

useful. (Papafragou 2000:520)

Broadly speaking, the utterances in (45) involve a root modal base and convey that a given state ofaffairs is consideredpossible (permissible) ornecessary (obligatory) in view of somephysical, moral,legal, socialcircumstances in the real world; on the other hand, the utterances in (46) involve anepistemic modal base and convey that a given proposition presents itself as apossible ornecessary

conclusion in view of the evidence availableto the speaker . The evidence can be explicitly stated orinferred: e.g. in (46ii) in view of the fact that you are a genius it is a necessary assumption that theproblem is easy for you.In the logic of modality, modal expressions in general are treated aspropositional operators (i.e.quantifiers) which quantify over a set of possible worlds (identified by the non-finite part of theclause/the VP complement, i.e. the proposition) and relate to the proposition under question.Modal operators express different types ofcommitment to thetruth of the proposition, i.e. a modaloperator expresses an attitude towards the proposition it operates on. This attitude is determined bythe contextual and pragmatic information required to understand the utterance.5.2. All conversation presupposes a common conversational background(ormodal base). Thepropositions in the conversational backgroundare taken as premises in the judgements people make

about the truth of the utterance.1

To quote Papafragou a first approximation to the meaning of modal

verbs is that they express possibility or necessity with respect to different types of modal base.Consider the following set of examples that contains the various modal meanings of

the verb MUST (Kratzer (1977). In all the examples below the modal expresses some kind ofnecessity and the paraphrases with the phrase in view of(in 47)give the preferred modal

base for the interpretation of the utterances :

(47) a. All Maori children must learn the names of their ancestors.b. The ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.c. If you must sneeze, at least use your handkerchief.

d. When Kahukura-mir died, the people of Kahunguru said: Rakaipaka must be our chief.

1 The propositions in the conversational background play an important role in human reasoning, since they are taken as implicit premises in the judgements

speakers make. These implicit premises are sometimes explicitly signalled by using phrases of the type: by virtue of what is known, by virtue of what is

reasonable/lawful, etc. For instance, all speakers/hearers in our real world interpret a sentence such as (1) as true in our solar system:

(1) Nothing can travel faster than light

When we talk to other people we generally suppose that they share with us a common ground, which is the same for all community. members. As a rule, we do

not suppose that a person we address comes from another solar system regulated by other physical laws and where sentence (1) can be false.


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The verb MUST in (47a) has a deontic reading: it refers to a duty. The verb MUST in (47b) is used

epistemically: it refers to a piece of knowledge. The verb MUST in (47c) has been calleddispositional must: it refers to dispositions people have. The verb MUST in (47d) is sometimescalled preferential must: it refers to preferences and wishes.

(47) a.In view of what their tribal duties are, all Maori children must learn the names of

their ancestorsb.In view of what is known, the ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahitic. If in view of what your dispositions are - you must sneeze, at least use yourhandkerchiefd. In view of what is good for us, Rakaipaka must be our chief

In order to account for the utterances in (47) Kratzer adopts a number of ingredients. Thethree factors that are important and which underlie modal operators are:

the modal relation,

the modal base andthe ordering source

The modal relation is basically the relation ofcompatibility orlogical consequence (or entailment);this relation underlies the notion ofpossibility ornecessity.The modal base and the ordering source are the two parameters along which the conversationalbackgroundis defined.The modal base is the set of possible worlds/domains where the propositions considered as premisesin the modal inference are true, i.e. worlds compatible with what is known, worlds compatible withwhatis believed, worlds compatible with what is the norm, etc. Such a background may be signalledby phrases such as in view of what is reasonable, in view of what is desirable, orin view of what isknown. The modal bases form the restrictions for the particular modal expressions they are relevant

to. According to Kratzer, the epistemic-root distinction arises from the kinds of facts that areconsidered salient in forming a particularmodal base.

Modal bases are generally inferredfrom the conversational context. As we can notice, modalbases are organized in various domains: the factual domain (i.e. propositions that describe the factualworld), the regulatory domain (i.e., propositions that include legal rulings, social regulations,religious rules, chess rules, etc.), the domain of moral beliefs (i.e., propositions that are descriptions ofstates of affaires in ideal worlds), the domain of desirability (i.e., propositions that are descriptions ofstates of affairs in worlds desirable from someones point of view), thesocial domain, the biologicaldomain, etc.

A particularly salient ingredient in interpreting modality is that it may have a strongnormative component. Modal judgements of the type exemplified so far imply not only a modal basebut also an ordering source, i.e., a set of principles that impose an ordering among the considered

alternatives.The ordering sourceis some ideal world with respect to which the worlds (i.e. alternatives) in themodal base are to be considered, The ordering source further delimits the domain over which themodal relation is taken to quantify.In the examples below both shouldand must are necessity modals. The difference between them isgiven by the ordering source:must is astrong necessity modal (NecP entails P) ( the modal base iscompatible with different domains, as in (47)), while should is a weaker necessity modal ( in viewof what is the norm ), i.e. the modal base is compatible only with the normative domain:

(48) (i) Jeremy must be at Heathrow by now.(ii) Jeremy should be in class.

As we have seen above (ex.47), one and the same modal verb can be evaluated with respect to variousmodal bases (in view of phrases). In the following examples (taken from Anna Papafragou, 2000)


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the verb CAN is evaluated in the pre-posed modal bases, which are thus made explicit; in these

contexts, CAN conveys different types of possibility (potential) :physical,social, legal, biological:

(49) a.As a former champion, John can lift heavy weightsb.As a simple guest, John can dress casuallyc.As a University employee, John can get health benefits

d.As a human being, John can have conscious mental states

To conclude, modal operators express different types of commitment to the truth of the modalisedproposition. The modality of the sentence signals the context in which it is evaluated; this context is

determined by the modal operator. What changes is the kind of world or situation where theproposition is evaluated (i.e., what changes is the modal base, that is, situations compatible with whatis known, situations compatible with what someone believes, etc.). More often than not modal basesare inferred from the pragmatic /conversational context.Modal expressions have incomplete orunder-specifiedcontent; we say that they aresystem-neutral.

Their contents needpragmatic/contextual supporton the basis of which speakers process inferencesthat ensure the recoverability ofmodal verbs meanings. This contextual support is assumed to begiven by the modal base, the in view ofphrases, which are contextually given or inferred.

Thus, a sentence that contains a modal verb is tripartite; it contains a modal operator (i.e., themodal verb), a modal base/domain (i.e., a contextually specified set of propositions) and theproposition p (i.e. the verbal complement). The introductory phrases in the sentences in (49) aboveactually spell out the modal bases. This tripartite structure can be formalized as follows:

(50) Operator (Restrictor, Matrix)

In the case of modals the operator is the logical relation ofentailmentorcompatibility, thematrix is the proposition p (the complement of the modal) and the restrictor is the modal base/domain

(the restrictor may be either linguistically indicated or pragmatically inferred) .To exemplify, the core meaning of CAN generally covers the notion offactual possibility(potentiality) in the sense thatfactual circumstances in the modal base/domain do not preclude anevent x from happening (Klinge 1993, Papafragou 2000). A state of affairs ispotentialwhen it iscompatible with the state of affairs in the real worldand, hence, may itself be actualizedat somepoint in the future. The introductory sentences in (49) spell out the factual circumstances in the modalbases that underlie the interpretation of the modalised sentences.

Operator Restrictor (Modal Base/domain) Matrix (Proposition p)CAN in view of his physical ability John lifts heavy weights

In view of the social requirements John dresses casuallyIn view of university regulations John gets health benefits

The semantic/grammatical information of modal CAN spelled out above may be formallystated as below (where p stands for the proposition while D for the modal domain/restrictor):

CAN p is compatible with Dfactual

There are instances when the speaker - hearer misunderstand each other because they may bemistaken in the recovery of the modal base/domain. Jokes are a good example to illustratemisunderstanding in the identification of the right modal base/domain. (cf. Papafragou, 2000:50).Suppose that a zookeeper says sentence (51) to his new assistant:

(51) The monkey can climb to the top of the tree


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Later on in the day, the monkey is missing and the zookeeper is angry with the assistant because he

warned the assistant that the monkey was able to climb to the top of the tree and so could escape. Theassistant replies that he interpreted the sentence to be about what the monkey was allowed to do, andwas therefore not worried when the monkey behaved in just this way. The misunderstanding is due toa modal domain/ base mismatch: the zookeeper had in mindpotentialityin terms of the monkeysphysicalabilities (ability), while the assistant had in mindpotentiality in terms of thezoos

regulations (permission).A further piece of evidence, which shows that interlocutors are sensitive to subtle aspects of the modalbases, is that speakers and hearers frequently shift and modify modal domains/bases during the sameconversational exchange. Imagine that Alice and her lawyer have been discussing the prospect ofAlices having a divorce. Alice utters sentence (52a) and her lawyer replies as in (52b):

(52) a) I cant leave my husband penniless.b) Of course you canthe law allows you to.

The modal domain/base in (52a) includes assumptions about Alices feelings and moralprofile

whereas in (52b) it includes assumptions about legal regulations. This example is a cleardemonstration of how the modal base/domain affects the truth-conditional content of a modalisedsentence.In what follows we shall adopt the view that modal verbs have a core meaning on the basis of whichone can derive the vast range of possible interpretations that modals may contextually receive (cf.Perkins, 1983, Kratzer, 1977, 1991, Papafragou, 2000).

To quote Kyle von Fintel (2006) ...in other words modal expressions have in of themselves aratherskeletalmeaning and it is only in combination with the background context that they take on aparticular shade of meaning (such as epistemic or deontic, dynamic).6. Root and epistemic necessity . (must, need, need to, have(got) to, should, ought to ).6. ROOT MUST6.1. Of all the modals conveying deontic necessity, deontic MUST conveysstrong obligation. It is

a typical member of the class of modal auxiliaries with all properties applying unproblematically.According to Papafragou (2000) the grammatical information that musthas is the one in (53)

below:

(53) must: P is entailed by Dunspecified

What this formula actually says is that mustconveys necessity and (just like possibility may) issemantically more generalthan other necessity modals (shouldoroughtfor instance) in the sense thatit admits a variety of domains as restrictors and the unspecified domain D has to be narrowed downpragmatically to sub-domains. Recall thatshould, another necessity modal is restricted to a normativedomain.Coates (1983) interprets Root mustas being related to a cline extending from strong to weak

obligation (from it is obligatory/imperative to it is important/appropriate ).The interpretation of must has also been related to to the presence or absence of the feature: thespeakers involvement in the utterance. Consider the following examples:

(54) (i) You must be back by ten.(ii) The president must formally approve the new Government before it can undertake its duties.(iii) The accused must remain silent throughout the trial.(iv) In opening a game of chess, the players must move a pawn.

The most commonly conveyed type of necessity with mustis purely deontic, the obligation-imposinguse. This use arises in case :

the modal restrictor involves a set of regulatory propositions which thespeakeris entitled to enforce;the speakerhas authority over the hearer


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the heareris in a position to bring about the situation described.

The example in (54i) is prototypical deontic modality with the speaker as the deontic source: thespeaker is the one who imposes the obligation. Palmer (1986) calls this discourse orientation whileLyons (1977), Huddlestone and Pullum (2000) as subjective, while Coates (1983) calls itperformative.

The interpretation of (54ii,iii,iv) requires regulatory domains of different types, hence thesources of obligation are different: (54ii) expresses necessity with respect to the Constitution, (54iii) anecessity with respect tojudicial rules, (54iv) a necessity with respect to the rules of chess. In allthese case, therefore, the deontic source is not assumed to be the speaker but ratherrules, regulations,law or even custom.Some grammarians call this objective necessity.

In order to understand the distribution and interpretation ofmustvs have (got) to we will assume withPalmer (1986), among others, that in the case of deontic mustthere are degrees to which the speakermay be involved:

he may be totally involved;

he may be involved as a member of the society or body that instigates the action; orhe may not be involved at all.

Palmer (1979:93) correlates the degrees of speaker involvement as:

discourse-oriented deontic sourceneutral oriented deontic sourceexternal oriented deontic source

In example (54i) mustis discourse-oriented ; in (54ii,iii,iv) the deontic source is neutral(rules, regulations; the speaker is part of the system or he states what the rules, regulation or lawdeontically requires).

6.1.2 Generally speaking, in the case of deontic mustwe speak ofobligation which can be defined associally-oriented deontic necessity. We have argued that with deontic mustwe can identify differentdeontic sources:

the deontic source is thespeaker/hearer who imposes an obligation on the subject to bring about thesituation described (the paraphrase could be I order/oblige you); with first person subjects thespeaker expresses self-imposed obligation (self-compulsion); Coates (1983) argues that in this casewe speak ofweakobligation which simply comes from the speakers sense of the importance of someaction, theparaphrase being it is important/appropriate :

(55) You must concentrate on one thing at a time.Tell him he must stop this dishonest behavior at once.

You must clean up the mess right awayMust I answer all the questions?If I must go there, why dont you say so?I must remember to feed the cat later.I must work hard if I want to be a student.What I have promised I must do.I must do something about that leak.I must lose weight.

Anyway, we must consider seriously the Prom programme.

Generally, the imposition of an obligation by the speaker involves animate subjects, typicallyhuman, who are capable of performing the action.


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Contextually, the force of obligation may be weakened to express emphatic advice, invitation,

suggestion, in contexts where the hearer/addressee is the beneficiary of the action described; the stateof affairs described by the proposition is desirable to the hearer and beneficialto him..

(56) I absolutely must walk home with you.You must see this movie.

You must come round and see us.You mustnt miss this show.You must keep everything to yourself, be discreet.We must get together for lunch sometime.

And you mustnt miss theShakespeare play thats on at the Everyman Theatre in Liverpool when you

are there.

Withfirst person subjects mustcan be used in a hedged performative sentence (thespeaker is performing what he is in the act of urging himself to do) with a limited number of verbs, allrelated to the act of conversation: admit, say, confess, promise, warn, etc:

(57) I must admit that I was wrongI must order you to leave the building at onceI must beg you to help me out of this mess

the necessity arises from some internal need, the subjects dispositions orproperties, or byforce ofcircumstances; H&P call this use ofmustdynamic mustwhile Kratzer calls it dispositional must.In such cases we do not identify a deontic source. This use ofmustis sometimes found in theharmonic idiom must needs(H&P:185)

(58) Eds a guy who mustalways be poking his nose into other peoples business. (H&P 2000:185) internal need/disposition

Now that she has lost her job she mustlive extremely frugally. force of circumstancesI mustsneeze.

We mustremember that the peasantry in those days didnt live on wages alone. (Coates 1983)They will eventually split, because either of them must needs have his own way.

This use can be pragmatically exploited in sarcastic questions conveying different speech (i.e. non-literal) acts such as indirect directives. The subject isyouand must is invariably stressed; mustcould easily be replaced by will in the sense of insistence Leech 1971):

(59) `Must you make that dreadful noise? (for heavens sake stop it)If you 'must smoke (='will smoke), use an ashtray.

If you 'must behave like a savage, at least make sure the neighbours arent watching.

the deontic source is objective(rules, regulations, custom, fate; the speaker is part of the system orhe states what the rules, regulation, law, etc deontically require); in this case the obligation use ofmust may be found with inanimate orimpersonalsubjects (Coates 1983, Papafragou (2000), amongothers) in warnings,rulings and rules of the type exemplified below:

(60) We must make an appointment if we want to see the Dean.Passengers must cross the line by the footbridge.Door must be closed when machine is in operation.If you commit murder, Charlotte, you must be punished

Women must cover their heads in church.Clay pots must have some protection from severe weather .(Coates)Students must pay course fees before attending classes.In England traffic must keep to the left.


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In a pessimistic assessment of the cold war, Eden declared There must be much closer unity

within the West before there can be effective negotiation with the EastBut with all due respects and allowances, it must truthfully be said that what they heard was

more syrup than sweet, more mannered than musical.There must be a solution to this problem on my table this morning.

In such cases, mustcan be replaced by have to under certain circumstances whichwill be stated when we discuss the semi-auxiliary have to.

6.2. Scope of negation with deontic must 6.2.1 As already mentioned root must normally takes internal negation (i.e. mustnt

= must [not P] or Nec [not-P] ), the negative affects the main predication) and is

interpreted as obligation not to do something.

To negate the modality for necessity there is no appropriate form formust but needntmay

be used. In English, the negative form mustntis generally used only deontically. Hence,

obligation can be externally negated by using needwhich takes external negation

(neednt=not Nec P) and which is interpreted as lack/absence of obligation. Consider the

examples below borrowed from J. Coates (1983:39), Stefanescu (1988:455):

(61) You mustntput words into my mouth Mr. Williams

You are obliged,/ required notto put words

The present overdraft must notbe increased.

We musttake no risk.

Caravans must notbe parked here.

Vs

(62) You needntanswer that question.

you are notobliged/required to answer

The politics of the party does not and need notconcern them.I dont think we needworry about it.

6.2.2 Temporal reference

As already mentioned, as far as temporal reference is concerned a distinction should be made

between the modaltime, i.e. the time at which the obligation is issued, and the

situation/eventuality time, i.e. the time of the VP complement of the modal.

Generally, in the case of deontic modality (obligation, permission), the modal time is

presentwhile the time of the situation/eventuality is future: one can impose an obligation/or

grant permission on the animate subject to do something in the future but one cant impose

an obligation/grant permission in the past. Moreover, musthas no past tense (historically it is

itself a past tense form (Coates 1983:40).Whenever the sentence combines with a future time adverb, the adverb as such qualifies as

reference time for the event described by the VP complement of the modal e.g. This must be

discussed next week.

In the discourseoriented deontic interpretation mustneeds no past tense. In the neutral

(objective)necessity interpretation, have(got) to is used to renderpast necessity or if

necessity isfuture orconditional. Consider the following examples, borrowed from different

sources:

(63) (i) I must have all your news: how long have you been there, and hows that

fabulous husband of yours.

(ii) You must tell me at once.(iii) This must be discussed next week.


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(iv) and we must do something about it.

He gave the children their presents in early December but they didnthave/hadnt got to open

them until Christmas Day

Well,Ill have to think about it.

The next time you can take the exam is April. Otherwise,youll have to wait till September.Yes well have togo out, if youre really going to do it, darling.

How long do they reckon were going to have to wait to find out if the mortgage advance is

forthcoming?

However, must can be used in reported speech where the context is past or with internal

monologue. Consider the following examples borrowed from different sources

(e.g.Jespersen, 1931, part iv:7; Coates 1983:40):

(64) (i) I told him he must either apologize or go away immediately.

(ii) One thing was certain: the Government must make a distinct move of some kind

(iii) Sapt began to know exactly how far he could lead or drive, and when he mustfollow

(iv) Bill had reluctantly decided that Kay must be left in the dark.

Quite exceptionally, deontic modality may combine with present or past situations only with

general requirements, conditions, options, etc as in (65i) (present) or (65ii) (past) (H&P

2000:184); in such cases musttakes the perfect infinitive:

(65) (i) We must make an appointment if we want to see the Dean.

(ii) Candidates must have completed at least two years of undergraduate studies.

It is required that candidates have completed 2 years of study

6.Epistemic Must : logical necessity, probability

6.1. In the case of epistemic mustthe modal base is assumed to consist of the speakers

belief-set, i.e. the speaker reasons (domain of the laws of reason) on the basis ofevidence

reconstructed from encyclopedic and situation specific information.

According to Coates (1983), in its most normal usage, Epistemic MUST conveys the

speakers confidence in the truth of what he is saying, based on a logicalprocess of deduction

from facts known to him (which may or may not be specified). So, in the case ofmust, a

necessity modal, knowledge-oriented necessity is interpreted as conclusion. According to

Leech (1976:72) Must is used of knowledge arrived at by inference or reasoning rather

than by direct experience.In each casea chain of logical deduction can be postulated.

Along the same lines, Palmer(1986:64) states that it is the notion of deduction or inferencefrom known facts that is the essential feature of MUST. Consider the examples below:

(66) (i) Look at that house! Those people must have a lot of money.

(ii) It must be hot in there without air-conditioning.

(iii) The computer is on so someone must be using it.

(iv) What a sensible Mum she must be.

(v) It must surely be just a relic from the past.

(vi) She is a bridesmaid and she must be all excitement at the moment.

(vii) In such a warhe must have been the captain of the protestant armies.

He must be working late at the office; the lights are on.

His teeth were still chattering but his forehead, when I felt it, was hot and clammy. He said Imust have a temperature (Coates 1983:41)


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Mustrepresents the strongest epistemic judgement one can make, nevertheless a

factualassertion makes a stronger claim than the strongest of all epistemic judgements.

Compare the following examples borrowed from Papafragou (2000:73):

(67) (i) San Marino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

(ii)San Marino must be the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

(67i) states a fact, while (67ii) conveys that the speaker makes his assertion based on

evidence which may be incomplete.

Leech (1976:72) remarks that the knowledge arrived at indirectly by inference/deduction is

felt to be different from knowledge acquired by direct experience; hence the sense of

logically inferred can be weakened to logically assumed or even a guess:

(68) (i) You must be Johns brother.(ii) You must be tired/thirsty.

(iii) You must be a foot taller than I.

(iv) He must be well over eighty.

Epistemic mustcan also be used to expresspure logical necessity with no element of

speaker-involvement as in the examples in (69 i,ii).

(69) i) If it is a bird, it must have wings.

(ii) He is a bachelor, so he must be unmarried.

6.2.Temporal reference

6.2.1 With epistemic must, as already mentioned, the modal time is alwayspresent, while the

main predication usually refers to states or processes/events in the present, as the examples

below indicate; please notice the progressive form of the predicate:

(70) (i) Judging from the noise , the children must be playing upstairs.

(ii) There must be some mistake.

(iii) He must be working late at the office.

Epistemic mustvery rarely occurs with future time reference, since a future time reference

would be open to a deontic interpretation e.g.He must come tomorrow/The government mustact soon.

According to Huddlestone&Pullum (2001:182) the future+epistemic combination is more

likely in conjunction with harmonicsurely (which is not used deontically):It must surely rain

soon.

Palmer (1979:45) shows that be bound to could be used to express epistemic necessity when

the main predication refers tostates orevents in the future; according to Coates (1983),

Palmer (1979) the interpretation in such cases is it is inevitable that:

(71) (i) Its bound to come out though, I think.Its received such rave notices that

somebodys bound to put it on.


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6.2.2.Must, as already mentioned has no past form, but sentences with epistemic mustmay

refer to situations that occurred in the past, since we can make judgements, at now, about past

situations. In such cases, theperfect infinitive (have-en) is used. Perfect have, just like

negation, belongs semantically in the complement; in such cases we speak ofinternal

perfect, i.e. the time reference of the modal is unaffected (i.e. present), while the timereference of the verbal complement is past:

(72) (i) She must havearrivedlate last night.

I confidently believe/I am sure that she came last night

(ii) She must havebeen such a pain in the neck to her Mum and vice versa

(Coates (1983)

(iii) He must have been dishingup the same lectures for 30 years at a gradually slower

and slower speed (Coates (1983)

I mean there must have beenan awful lot of hit and misses, mustnt there?2

6.3. Negation6.3.1 As already mentioned, in terms of negation, mustis anomalous :

(a) with root meaning, must takes internal negation, i.e. negation affects the main predication

[Nec not-P], lack ofnecessity (not-Nec P) being rendered by the suppletive form neednt

(external negation);(b) epistemic musthas no morphologically related negative. For epistemic must, the more naturalexpression of impossibility in English is cant. Infrequently, needntcan also be used (with a

different meaning though). In colloquial English needntis replaced by not necessarily.

(e.g.He neednt be guilty = He isnt necessarily guilty) Compare:

(73) (i) He must have done it deliberately.

it is certain that he did it(ii) He cant have done it deliberately.

it is not possible that he did it=it is necessarily the case that he didnt do it

(iii) He neednt have done it deliberately

it is not certain/necessary that he did it deliberately

6.3.2.Must, like all epistemic modals, does not occur in interrogative sentences. If it does it is

under very restricted circumstances. Papafragou (2000) argues that it is hard to construct a

context in which it would be felicitous for the speaker to ask whether a conclusion ispossible

ornecessary with respect to his own set of beliefs. More often than not, needmay be

considered the interrogative counterpart of epistemic must.

6.4. Harmonic combinations.

The term modally harmonic was introduced by Lyons (1977) and describes the

combinations that a modal verb may have with expressions (words or phrases) which

convey the same degree of modality; the modal expressions are said to be mutually

reinforcing:Im sure, surely, certain, necessarily, of necessity, inevitably (Coates 1983:46):

(74) (i) It mustsurely be valid.

(ii) It must necessarily have involved deception.

2

Note: mustntnever occurs with epistemic meaning except in tag-questions i.e. in what Halliday (1970:333)calls verbal crossing-out) (apud Coates 1983:44)


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Anyone who says that must inevitably and of necessity be wrong.

7. NEED and NEED TO

It is important to make a distinction between the auxiliary verb needand the relatedfull or lexical verb need to. The modal needexhibits the modal properties described in 2.0

above and expresses both rootand epistemic necessity (Leech 1976, Coates 1983, etc).

Need to, on the other hand, forms interrogative and negative forms employing the

auxiliary DO and takes tense morphemes. The main verb to needfollowed by the to-infinitive

has practically the same meaning as when it is followed by a noun or gerund: e.g.He needs to

practice more=He needs more practice./My pen needs filling(Leech 1976:96).

7.1. ROOT NEED

7.1.1 As a modal auxiliary, needis a necessity modal and is characterized by all the

properties which define a modal.Needoccurs infrequently in affirmative contexts (mainly if

the context is non-assertive), i.e. this verb is chiefly restricted to non-assertive contexts, tosentences containing a negative form or an adverb like only orhardly, or interrogative

sentences. In such contexts needsmain function is to provide the negative counterpart of

deontic must.

Deontic needntexpresses lack of obligation, and generally expresses the authority

of the speaker, being in complementary distribution with need to and have to (where the

deontic source is an external authority or circumstances). The paraphrase in such cases is it

isnt necessary/obligatory. Consider the examples below, borrowed from different sources

(e.g. Coates 1983):

(75) (i) Im very grateful to you.

You neednt be. I toldyou. Im glad to do it.

(ii) I need hardly tell you that it was a most gratifying experience

He need have no fear.

I do not think I need read subsection 2.

You neednt take that medicine any more

All you need do is go there and pay the money.

I wonder if I need be present.

Needalso provides an additional interrogative form for the mustparadigm. Root needI/he

etc. is especially used when a negative answeris expected.Must I/he etc. does not have this

implication, i.e. we have an open question. Compare:

(76) (i) Must I wait for her now? (open question)

(ii) Need I wait for her now? (hoping for a negative answer)

7.1.2.Time reference

Neednt+short infinitive has only present (or extended present) reference , although

it can occur in indirect speech:

(77) (i) He needntcome tomorrow.

(ii) Need I say more?

(iii) I toldhim he needntcome if he didnt want to.


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Just like must, needlacks a past tense (preterite) counterpart, so if we wish to refer to real

past time we use need to orhave to instead. The same verbs are used for all the situations

where needntlacks the necessary verb forms; if the absence of obligation or necessity will

exist only eventually or is dependent on some other event, need to orhave to is used:

(78) (i) I didnt need/have to see him immediately

(ii) When you get an assistant, perhaps you wont have to work quite so hard yourself.

(iii) I havent had to see a doctor for years now

(iv) We may not need to bring the subject up.

Deontic needntmay occur in the context of aperfect infinitive (have-en) to indicate absence

of obligation/necessity in the past, which was neverthelessfulfilled; in the case of deontic

neednt have the proposition of opposite polarity is actually true3. In this case we say that the

perfect (have) has scope over the modal, we speak ofexternal perfectrendering what is

known as unreal pastor contrary to past fact. Hence, neednt+perfect infinitive always

expresses unreal past and contrasts with didnt need to/didnt have towhich expresses realpast(i.e. the event described did not take place, as it was not necessary).

(79) (i) I neednt have gone there (but I went)

it wasnt necessary for me to go (but I did)

(ii) I didnt need/have to go there (so I didnt go)

7.2.EPISTEMIC need

Epistemic needis the interrogative and negative counterpart of logical necessity

must. It is quite infrequent. In colloquial English epistemic needntis replaced by not

necessarily. (e.g.He neednt be guilty = He isnt necessarily guilty). According to Coates

(1981) epistemic need x? meansis x inevitable?and can often be paraphrased with bound

to. Here are some examples borrowed from different sources Coates 1981, H&P 2001):

(80) (i) A: oh gosh, getting married is an awfully complicated business

B: actually, it neednt be; it can be very straight forward

(ii) The basic questions for the new American administration are two: needthe

quarrel with Cuba everhave happened, and can it be put into reverse?

(iii) I needlook changed for I have been through much suffering, both in mind and body

He neednt have told her

It isnt necessarily the case that he told her (epistemic-internal perfect)

hewasnt obliged to tell her (but he did) (deontic-external perfect)

Past reference is rendered by need+perfect infinitive, as the example (80ii) shows.In the

epistemic reading ofneed the perfect auxiliary have is internal, i.e.it isnt necessarily the

case that/it isnt inevitable that x happened. This use is very rare and somewhat formal or

literary in style. In negative contexts need+have-en is usually interpreted deontically.

Actually the example in (80iv) is ambiguous between the epistemic and deontic reading, as

the paraphrases indicate.

3Shouldnt have/ oughtnt to have/could have/might have are similar in sense to neednt have: with all

these modals there is an implication of the unreality of the event, with the further implication that the event didtake place.


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7.3.NEED TO

As already mentioned need to is a regular verb having none of the properties of modal verbs:

it forms the interrogative and negative with the auxiliary do, it takes the whole range of verb

forms and assigns theta roles.Semantically, need to, alongside need, expresses obligation/necessity, but while neednt

generally expresses the authority of the speaker, (dont) need to parallels (dont) have

to/havent got to in expressing that it is an external authority orcircumstances that

impose/remove the obligation or necessity for action.

The distinctions in meaning between needand need to occur only in the present tense in view

of the fact that the deficiencies ofneedare supplied by need to/have to, as already

mentioned.

With need to the deontic source is an external authority or circumstance. Compare:

(81) (i) You neednt cut the grass.= I allow you not to cut the grass

(ii) You dont need to cut the grass. =it is not necessary..

Sentence (81i) involves the authority of the speaker who exempts the subject from cutting the

grass; a possible paraphrase would be I allow you not to cut the grass; in (81ii) it is the

circumstance of the grass not having grown to need cutting that exempts the subject from

cutting the grass; a possible paraphrase would be it is not necessary..

With past time necessity, as already mentioned, there is a sharp contrast between needand

need to illustrated below:

(82) (i) He neednt have gone there.(*so he didnt)

(ii) He didnt need to go there.(so he didnt)

In (82i) the deontic interpretation of need+have-en implicates that he didgo there, i.e. it

wasnt obligatory for him to go,but he did; (82ii) only conveys that it wasnt necessary for

him to go there; so the addition of so he didnt is possible for (82ii) but not for (82i).

Need to just like have to is more suited to expressgeneral, habitualactions; mustorneed(as

well as have got to) are more suited to occur in statements referring toparticular occasions:

(83) (i) Do I need to/have to show him my ID card every time?

(ii) Need/Must I show him my pass now?

8. HAVE (GOT) TO

8.0.Have to and have got to are not true modals but no discussion ofmustor of the modals of

necessity would be complete without reference to them.

Semantically, have (got) to is very similar to must. It can express both root and

epistemic meaning. It is acknowledged that have (got) to is most commonly used for deontic

necessity, and, unlike must, it is never discourse-orientedwith respect to the deontic source.

According to Leech (1976) the two meanings ofhave (got) to (deontic, epistemic) are

scarcely distinguishable in scientific and mathematical writing where the author is

expounding an abstract system of thought. To take an example, borrowed from Leech

(1976:73) Every clause has to contain a finite verb can be interpreted either as: every


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clause is obliged (by the rules of language) to have a verbor It is necessary for every clause

to have a verb.

As already mentioned, the meaning ofhave (got) to is different from that ofmustin the

presentdue to the fact that , unlike must, it is not discourse-oriented, but ratherexternal-

orientedwith respect to the deontic source, i.e.the subject is bound to do something because itis the only course of action, the obligation being imposed by circumstances/authority which

are independent of thespeaker or the addressee. Nevertheless, mustand have(got)to may

share the same contexts, whenever the deontic source is neutral(H&P 2001:205; Coates

1981:55):

(84) Now that she has lost her job, she has (got) to live extremely frugally.

There is already a great imbalance between what a student has topay if hes in lodgings and

what he has to pay if he is in a hall of residence.

Weve got tobear in mind that there is not one healthy fox.

In the examples above mustcan be substituted forhave (got) to. Must, however, is not veryfrequent in such cases.

8.1. HAVE GOT TO

8.1.1.Have got to is generally substitutable forhave to in colloquial English, except that

there are no non-finite forms (*to have got to; *having got to; *will have got to). Thus have

got to cannot occur in the following: We may/will have to leave early;I regret having to

refuse your offer.

Semantically, have got to is similar to mustin expressing both root and epistemic

meaning; the latter, though, occurs only rarely in Br.E. In American English, though, have

got to is common in epistemic interpretation. Consider the following examples, borrowed

from different sources:

Root

(85) (i) There is a whole lot of literature youve got to read.

(ii) Oh, well, hes got to go into hospital, you know.

(iii) This, I think, is something on which universities have got to begin now to

take a stand.

(iv) A really healthy effective Opposition which youve got to have if youre going to

shake the government.

(v) I began to beat my hands against the slime-covered wallsDont Charlotte. Youve

got to stick it out for another few minutes.

Epistemic

(86) (i) If youve seen all the old Frankensteins youve got to know all the

jokes.

(ii) Something has got to give in this second half, I think.

(iii) Youve got to be joking.(AE) vs. You must be joking (Br.E).

(iv) Someone has got to be telling lies.

(v) This has got to be the worst restaurant in town.

(vi) There has to be some reason for his absurd behavior

(vii) Somebody had to lose the game.

8.1.2. Root meaning.


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It is generally agreed upon that have got to, just like have to, indicate external

compulsion/obligation, i.e. have got to/have to is eitherneutralorexternal-oriented with

respect to the deontic source, but neverdiscourse-oriented.

Palmer (1979:93), Coates (1981:53) remark that, in certain contexts there issemantic

overlap between mustand have got to; actually, in all the examples in(85) above mustcan besubstituted freely (Coates 1981:53). The examples above do not indicate a discourse-oriented

statement, rather all the examples suggested are neutralwith respect to the deontic source

(see also Coates 1981). Consider, also, the following examples (offered by Palmer (1979:93))

that share similar contexts forhave got to and mustand which justify the belief that in such

cases the deontic source is neutral:

(87) (i) I musthave an immigrants visa. Otherwise theyre likely to kick me out, you

see.

(ii) Ive reallygot to know when completion date is likely. Otherwise I might find

myself on the streets.

Consider the example below which is a clear case ofexternal compulsion/obligation and

hence rules out mustwhich is neverexternalwith respect to the deontic source:

(88) Theyre obliged by the curriculum in force to pass in various ways; theyve got

to/*must pass our section of it.

It should be noted that Root have got to, like must, is preferred in statements referring

toparticular occasions, i.e. have got to and mustare notused in habitual, general statements :

(89) (i) I must/have gotto feed the baby now; shes been crying for half and hour.

(ii) I have to/*have got to/ *must feed the baby six times a day.

In the present, have got to (and have to), unlike must, implies actuality, i.e. the event

denoted by the verbal complement is under way at now. With must, on the other hand, the

event denoted by the verbal complement could only occur in thefuture.(Palmer 1979 apud I

Stefanescu 1988:455). This accounts for the use ofhave got to in the example below, where

mustcannot be used:

(90) Its slow walkdown. Hes got to fight his way through the crowds.

Palmer (1979) shows that the sentence describes a boxer actually in the process of fightinghis way through.

8.1.3. Temporal reference

Have got to, like must, has no non-finite forms, hence only have to can be used in contexts

requiring this form.Have to is also employed to supply for the whole range of verb forms

that have got to lacks.

Have got to may occur in the context of future time adverbs (alongside have to ) to

indicate that the situation described is already planned and arranged for the future:

(91) We have got to be there at ten tomorrow


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The past tense form had got to is rarer and is suggested to be acceptable only in (free) indirect

speech contexts in BrE; moreover, had got to lacks the implication ofactuality, i.e. the

implication that the event actually took place. Compare the following examples (Palmer

1979:97):

(92) (i) We had to make a special trip down to Epsom to collect the bloody thing.

(ii) Wed got to make a special trip down to Epsom anyway, so it did not matter very

much.

(iii) She had got to think of some way out.

I told him hed got to hurry up.

8.1.4.Negation

Dont have to/have not got to , like neednt, take external negation, i.e. the modal predication

is negated; do not have to/have not got to mean it isnt obligatory/necessary for.

(93) (i) They havent got to juggle about. Theyve got the total page copy.

8.1.5.Epistemic meaning

Have got to may occur in epistemic context but only rarely, as in (94) below:

(94) (i) If youve seen all the old Frankensteins youve got to know all the

jokes.

(ii) Something has got to give in this second half, I think.

In American English, however, have got to is common in epistemic interpretation, where

British English is likely to use must:

(95) (i) Youve got to be joking.(AE) vs. You must be joking (Br.E).

(ii) Someone has got to be telling lies.

(iii) This has got to be the worst restaurant in town.

In British English there is a difference of meaning between have (got) to and must.

Epistemic mustis used of knowledge arrived at indirectly by inference orreasoning, i.e. a

chain oflogical deduction.

According to Coates (1983), in its most normal usage, Epistemic MUST conveys the

speakers confidence in the truth of what he is saying, based on a logical process of deductionfrom facts known to him (which may or may not be specified). Hence, logical necessity

can easily become weakened to logical assumption or even guess. In the case of epistemic

mustwe speak of factual necessity (Leech 1976:73).

Epistemic have (got) to, on the other hand, never appears to be far away from its deontic use;

in this case the necessity is imposed by an idea, circumstances and hence we can speak of

theoretical necessity; as theoretical necessity means that the possibility of the opposite

state of affairs cannot even be conceived of, have (got) to has a stronger force than mustand

cannot be weakened, like must, to the interpretation of logical assumption.or guess.

(Leech 1976:73).

Compare the following examples:

(96) (i) Someone must be telling lies.


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(ii) Someone has (got) to be telling lies.

(iii) You must be mad to do that.

(iv) You have (got) to be mad to do that.

While (96i) voices a mere suspicion, (96ii) sounds more like an accusation. What (96iii)conveys is that the speakers conclusion from the evaluation of the subjects action is that the

subject is mad; (96iv) states that being mad is a necessary condition for acting in a certain

way. We notice that the difference in the epistemic interpretation ofmustand have(got)to is

given by the fact that in the case ofhave(got)to the deontic use is never far away.

According to Leech (1976), Huddlestone and Pullum (2001, Coates (1981), etc.

epistemic have(got) to is much less frequent, in British English at least, than must, because it

is frequently unidiomatic. A roundabout way of expressing theoretical necessity would be

the following negative alternatives:

(97) These lines cant be by anyone but Shakespeare

Nobody but Shakespeare could have written these lines.

8.2. HAVE TO

Have to has none of the properties of modal auxiliaries; it forms negation and inversion with

the auxiliary do and it is fully inflected (similar to need to with which it shares a lot in

common semantically and formally). Given its regular behaviorhave to acts as a suppletive

form of modal must/have got to, when the latter lack the necessary verb forms.

(98) (i) Im having to read this very carefully

(ii) I have had to give up the idea

I told him I had had to give up the idea

We may have to change our plans

Its a pity to have to give up the idea

No one likes having to pay taxes

Semantically, have to is similar to must/have got to; is has a deontic (obligation) and an

epistemic interpretation (logical necessity), the latter being infrequent, according to different

scholars. It is acknowledged that have to is most commonly used for deontic necessity, and,

unlike must, it is neverdiscourse-orientedwith respect to the deontic source, but rather

external-oriented orneutral-oriented with respect to the deontic source i.e. with have to the

authority comes from no particular source.

(99) (i) You have to file a flight plan before you start,give an estimated time of

arrival,stick to certain heights,routines and landing drills

(ii) Will you say to him that I cant come to the meeting next Wednesday because I have

to go to a Cambridge examiners meeting.

As already mentioned, Palmer (1979:93), Coates (1981:53) remark that, in certain contexts

there issemantic overlap between mustand have to; actually, in all the examples in (100)

below mustcan be replaced freely by have to. As already mentioned, there are cases when the

speaker reports what someone else deontically requires or is himself/herself committed; in

such cases we said that the deontic source is neutral:


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(100) (i) The verdict of a jury must/has to be unanimous:if its members are unable to

reach agreement , the case must/has to be retried before a new jury.

(ii) The University is sayingthese people must/have to be expelled if they disrupt

lectures

(iii) A new insistence from President Nixon that Hanoi government must/has tonegotiate if there is to be any settlement.

Epistemically, have to just like have got toexpresses theoretical necessity (see 8.1.5)

8.3.Summary ofhave to/have got toin relation to must

The distinctions in meaning and usage between mustand have to/have got to occur only in

the present tense in view of the fact that the deficiencies of mustare supplied by have

to/need to as already mentioned:

Mustand have got to lack verb forms; have to supplies for the missing forms (101); thevariant withgotis more colloquial (101iv):

(101) (i) We may have to change our plans

Its a pity to have to give up the idea

No one likes having to pay taxes

Pensioners have (got) to be careful with their money.

Have to (similar to have got to) is neverdiscourse-orientedwith respect to the deontic

source; mustis neverexternal-orientedwith respect to the deontic source; it is only in the

neutral necessityreading that mustcan be replaced by have to/have got to (examples in

(100);

(102) Theyre obliged by the curriculum in force to pass in various ways; theyve got

to/*must pass our section of it.

Have to/need to may be used to indicate what is habitual, general(103), or may refer to a

particular occasion (104); must/have got to only refer toparticularoccasions (104):

(103) (i) I have to get up at seven every morning(ii) Do I have to/need to show him my ID card every time I come here?

(iii) I dont have to/need to workon Sundays

(104) (i) We have to be there at 7 tomorrow/

We must/weve got to be there at seven tomorrow.

(ii) Do I have to show him my ID now?/

Must I/have I got to show him my card now?

Have to has an implication ofactuality (i.e. the event took place) in the present and past;

mustdoes not ; have got to implies actuality only in the present:


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(105) (i) We had to make a special trip to Epsom to collect the bloody thing.

(ii) Colin the shotgun, the one who had to get married.

(iii) She had to sleep in the kitchen last night.

(iv) Its slow walk down. Hes got to fight his way through the crowds.

Dont have to takes external negation similar toneedntand haventgot to; the negative

particle has scope overhave [not-Nec P], i.e. the modality is negated and the meaning is not

necessary/not obligatory; musttakes internal negation, i.e. the verbal complement is negated

[Nec not-P] i.e.is necessary/obligatory ..not to

(106) (i) You mustnt do that

you are obliged notto do that

vs

You dont have/havent got to to do that.

you are notobliged to do that

Epistemic mustconveys factual necessity; have to/have gotto convey theoretical

necessity: epistemic have (got) to never appears to be far away from its deontic use.

Must, need, and have to can be used in sarcastic questions conveying directives:

(107 (i) Mustyou make that dreadful noise?

(ii) Needyou drop ash all over my carpet?

(iii) Do we have to have jam roll and custard every day?

8.4. Should and ought to

8.4.1. Ought to (OE ahte) derives histor

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