GOLDSCHMIDT CONFERENCE 2013 Plenary session 28th August Florence, Italy

Natural Hazards and Scientific Advice: Natural Hazards and Scientific Advice: Interactions Among Scientists, Interactions Among Scientists,

Decision Makers and the Public Decision Makers and the Public

GOLDSCHMIDT CONFERENCE 2013 GOLDSCHMIDT CONFERENCE 2013

Plenary session 28th August Plenary session 28th August

Florence, ItalyFlorence, Italy

PAOLO GASPARINIPAOLO GASPARINIProfessor Emeritus at the University of Napoli Federico IIProfessor Emeritus at the University of Napoli Federico II

This presentation benefitted of contribution fromThis presentation benefitted of contribution from

Mauro Dolce, Dept. of Civil ProtectionMauro Dolce, Dept. of Civil ProtectionWarner Marzocchi, INGV RomeWarner Marzocchi, INGV RomeGiulio Selvaggi, INGV RomeGiulio Selvaggi, INGV Rome

and of ideas and discussions withand of ideas and discussions with::

Tom Jordan, SCECTom Jordan, SCECGaetano Manfredi, Università di Napoli Federico IIGaetano Manfredi, Università di Napoli Federico IIFranco Barberi, Università di Roma 3Franco Barberi, Università di Roma 3Gordon Woo, RMSGordon Woo, RMSFriedemann Wenzel, KITFriedemann Wenzel, KITJochen Zschau, GFZJochen Zschau, GFZ

Outline of the talkOutline of the talk

WHY LOSSES DUE TO NATURAL HAZARDS ARE INCREASINGWHY LOSSES DUE TO NATURAL HAZARDS ARE INCREASING

THE ROLE OF SCIENTISTS AND DECISION MAKERSTHE ROLE OF SCIENTISTS AND DECISION MAKERS

RECENT EXAMPLES OF FALSE OR MISSED ALARMSRECENT EXAMPLES OF FALSE OR MISSED ALARMS

AN EXTREME CASE: THE L’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIRAN EXTREME CASE: THE L’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIR

DEALING WITH VERY LOW PROBABILITIES DEALING WITH VERY LOW PROBABILITIES

A POSSIBLE SCENARIO OF INTERACTIONSA POSSIBLE SCENARIO OF INTERACTIONS

WHY LOSSES DUE TO NATURAL HAZARD ARE INCREASINGWHY LOSSES DUE TO NATURAL HAZARD ARE INCREASING


The Urban Explosion

In 2030 about 82% In 2030 about 82% of the population of of the population of industrial countries industrial countries and 57% of the and 57% of the population of less population of less developed countries developed countries will be living in will be living in urban areasurban areas

Urban population in developing countries

Rural population in developing countries

Urban population in industrialised countriesRural population in industrialised countries


Natural hazard risk index for megacities

Source: Munich Re, 2004

Worldwide, the loss potential from natural catastrophes is increasingly dominated by megacities.


Increasing disaster-related Increasing disaster-related fatalities and damage even if fatalities and damage even if the frequency and magnitude the frequency and magnitude of geophysical events remains of geophysical events remains unchanged.unchanged.

Emilia earthquake – May, 2012

Mw = 5.8Christchurch earthquake – February 22, 2011

Mw = 6.3

Virginia earthquake – August 23, 2011

Mw = 5.8 – Damages in Washington, D.C. 135 Km away


Black SwansBlack Swans(Extremely rare events with huge impact on human life, structures, and (Extremely rare events with huge impact on human life, structures, and

socio-economy)socio-economy)

Tohoku Tsunami triggered by the unexpected Mw=9.0 offshore earthquake of March 11, 2011



Communication is a major challenge for the management of risk nowadays and in the future;

We live in exponential growth time: world population is growing exponentially, cities and megacities are exponentially increasing in complexity;

Cities are natural risk attractors;

Communication of scientific information is a complex and still unresolved task, fundamental to prevent cities to become natural risk traps.


Scientific advise for natural hazard management is mainly asked for:

• URBAN AND LAND USE PLANNINGURBAN AND LAND USE PLANNING

(Long Term Hazard and Risk Assessment)

• EMERGENCY MANAGEMENTEMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

(Short Term Hazard and Risk Assessment)


Scientific advise for Urban and Land Use Planning is a demanding, complex but not complicated task:

No urgency requirements;

Fairly well defined responsibilities.

Main requirements of scientific advise:

Careful consideration of all possible hazard;

Harmonization and probabilistic quantitative evaluation of the parameters defining hazard occurrence.


THE ROLE OF SCIENTISTS AND ADMINISTRATORSTHE ROLE OF SCIENTISTS AND ADMINISTRATORS

Risk curves of the hazards due to windstorms, floods and earthquakes for the city of Cologne considering losses at buildings and in the sectors private housing, commerce and industry (2000).

(Matrix Project, Grunthal, et al, 2011)


SCIENTIFIC ADVISE FOR AN IMPENDING EMERGENCY

SITUATION IS DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT:

Need of rapid response;

No clear separation of responsibilities;

No established rules for information to the public;

No established protocols for real time risk mitigation actions.

The Challenge is for scientists to articulate uncertainty without losing credibility and to give public officials the information they need for decision-making

Scientists

Public officials

this requires to bridge the gap between scientific output (probability) and the boolean logic (YES-NO) of decision-makers


Scientists responsible for hazard

and risk assessment

Emergency managers

Decision making of emergency Education of the public

Human behaviour response of the population at risk

INDIVIDUAL

DECISION MAKING



This ideal division of tasks and responsabilities is not

usually respected in emergency management.

a) While providing assessment of risk, scientists often suggest more or less explicitely risk mitigation actions and are asked to contribute to inform the public;

b) Scientific advise is rarely given in quantitative probabilistic terms;

c) Emergency time is different for each kind of hazard. Successful results for volcanic crises (Mt. Soufriere of Montserrat, Mt. Pinatubo eruption) for floods and partially for hurricanes.

d) Earthquakes are an extreme case of decision making in short time and great uncertainty

19

Hurricane Irene: August 2011

Hurricane Sandy: October2012

370,000 New York Citizen were evacuated under the threat of two hurricanes in 2011 and 2012.

It was a false alarm: several industries and private companies threatened to undertake legal actions againts Mayor Michael Bloomberg. No blame on scientists


A debated case. Actions taken to protect aircrafts during the Explosive eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (Iceland) in 2010.


A situation of great uncertainties

Scientists provided a continuous simulation of ashes density in the plume and forecast of plume direction. The British Civil Aviation Authority established threshold levels for the ash density. Several flights over Europe were forbidden and some airport were closed for several days. The CAA manager was blamed to have been too cautious.No blame on scientists.


A case of missed alarm: The Madrid snow storm of January 9, 2009

45.000 people was trapped at Airports and 400 km of vehicles were trapped on Highways because authorities waited to give warning untill the false alarm probability was very low. Too Late to reach people timely!


On March 11, 2011, a M9 hits the Honshu coast

Probability map for the period Jan.1-Dec.31 2011. The legend reports the annual probability map for a M≥ 8.5 earthquake in each cell of 0.1x0.1 degrees. The box is the fault of the Tohoku earthquake and the star is the epicenter.


An outstanding case of missed alarm: the M9 March 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami

On March 9, 2011, a M7.2 occurred in the same area

Probability map for the period March 9 - March 16, 2011. The legend reports the probability map for a M≥ 8.5 earthquake in each cell of 0.1x0.1 degrees. The box is the fault of the Tohoku earthquake; the circle is around the epicenter of the M7.2 earthquake occurred on March 9; the star is the epicenter of the Tohoku earthquake.

Weekly prob M8.5+=0.12%Prob gain > 100


Performance EEW nel M9.0 Terremoto di Tohoku


The Government of Japan and The

Chief Manager of the Japan

Meteorological Agency admitted the

inadequacy of their actions and

apologized on dedicated TV

Broadcast.


On September 3, 2010 a M7.1 earthquake with 11 km focal depth hit an area 40 km away

from the town of Christchurch. No casualties.

On January 21, 2011 a M6.3 earthquake located 5 km away from Christchurch, at a depth of about 5 km, hit the region producing 180 casualties and about 7000 injuried people.

Christchurch Earthquake, New Zealand


Aftershocks gradually shifted with time from the location of the M7.1 quake Eastward in direction of the city of Christchurch


No alert was given during the aftershock sequence.

Although some blame was on scientists and administrators, no legal actions.

The only legal actions were against designers and builders of some collapsed structures.


Seismic Hazard map of Italy (2004) in terms of acceleration expected with a return period of 475 y (10% exceedence probability in 50 years). A zoom on Abruzzo Apennine is shown in the map on the left. Expected acceleration at L’Aquila on basement rocks are in the range 0.25-0.75 g.

L’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIRL’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIR

Sequences with M>3.9 earthquakes in an area with 50 km radius around L’Aquila in the last 50 years. 13 earthquakes had magnitude greater than 4.

1985 1994 2003-04


L’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIRL’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIRComparison between seismic swarms occurred in 1985 and in 2009 (before the Aprile 6 main shock). Number of events with M>2.5 and M> 1 (upper left) are reported.

(A) Epicenters of earthquakes between January 1 and April 6, 2009. (B) Location of the vertical section reported in (C) the violet curve encloses the foci of the pre-April 6 sequence. Black dots are the

aftershoks the brown line is the fault plane generating the April 6 main event.

PaganicaPaganica

A

B C

Seismic activity in the L’Aquila area increases in January, 2009 M<3.5 earthquakes were felt in L’Aquila region and continued in the following months.

During the sequence Mr. Gianpaolo Giuliani, a technician of INFN, issued predictions of impending large earthquakes in the region (The predictions were not backed by his scientific institution) These unofficial predictions were based on variations of Radon concentration measured with

gamma-ray detectors. The used correlation procedures were not made available, and when presented to ICEF after April 6, resulted to not have a scientific basis.

At least two of the specific predictions resulted to be false alarms, but generated widespread public concern.

INGV and the DPC respond with statements about “earthquake prediction” On March 31, The seismology section of the High Risk Commission (HRC), a consultant body to help

DPC in crisis management, was convened in L’Aquila to give an opinion on Giuliani’s prediction.

On Apr 1, L’Aquila mayor asks for state of emergency Damage from swarm estimated to be €15 M.

Municipality plan had been activated in “attention phase”,; several schools evacuated after felt events.

2009 L’Aquila Affair Sequence


After two quakes of M3.5 and 3.9 occurring a few hours before, a main shock of M 6.3 occurred at 3.32 a.m. of April 6, 2009.

The quake killed over 300 people, injuried more than 1700 persons and destroyed or severely damaged about 20,000 buildings.

On October 22, 2012 The Court of L’Aquila condemned at first level some of the participants at the March 31 meeting of the High Risk Commission.

2009 L’Aquila Affair Sequence


The verdictSeven scientists and public officials who attended the High Risk Commission meeting of March 31, 2009 were found guilty for involuntary multiple manslaughter and multiple serious injuries.The faults consisted in “negligenza, imprudenza and imperizia” (negligence, uncautiousness, unskillfulness). They were condemned to: 6 years in prison (*)(*) Perpetual interdiction from public offices and legal interdiction during the enforcement of the sentence (*)(*)

Financial compensation to the families of the victims (€

8ml) (**)(**)(*) execution suspended until final level of judgment(*) execution suspended until final level of judgment

(**) immediate execution(**) immediate execution


A High Risk Commission (HRC) meeting was convened in L’Aquila on March 31, 2009, following a 6 month lasting low magnitude seismic sequence culminated with a ML 4.0 the day before;

All the seven indicted people are considered member of the Commission but only four actually were;

The Commission had peculiar duties of assessment of the risk situation in L'Aquila and correct information to the population;

The Commission has failed in those obligations of assessment and information, and all the HRC components are responsible for the violation of such obligations;

The fault consisted in approximated evaluation of the situation and in having contributed to spread reassuring messages to the population;

Because of this, 29 dead people out of 309 fatalities, that were used to run away from their homes alarmed by earthquakes, remained in their homes on the night of April 6, 2009 and died as a result of the collapse of the buildings in which they had remained.

In spite of its considerable length (940 pages), the verdict motivation can be summarised in few lines


After the meeting, De Bernardinis and Barberi hold a press conference, reporting the above mentioned conclusions. However no audio recording of the conference is available. No press release;

No minutes of the 31/3 meeting were published before April 6.

The meeting was held with the participation of many local authorities (including L’Aquila Mayor) and other officers all belonging to the National Civil Protection Service.

Experts were neither alarmistic nor reassuring, concluding that: large earthquakes are not predictable deterministically a large event in the short-term is “unlikely” L’Aquila is one of the areas in Italy with the highest seismic

hazard

The 31 March MeetingL’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIRL’AQUILA 2009 EARTHQUAKE AFFAIR

Government officials of the Civil Protection

Government-appointed Scientists

(High Risk Committee)

Scientist

Bernardo De Bernardinis (Vice head of DPC)

Franco Barberi (President) Giulio Selvaggi (Director of the National

Earthquake Centre, INGV)

Mauro Dolce (director Risk mitigation office)

Enzo Boschi (member)INGV President

Massimo Cialente (Mayor of L’Aquila) Gian Michele Calvi (member)

Daniela Stati

(Head of Regional Civil Protection)

Claudio Eva (member)

Preventive Action (including informing the public)

Evaluation ofScientific data

Provision ofScientific data

Participants at the 31 March Meeting• Government officials • Scientists with appointment as member of the High Risks Committee (HRC) • Scientist (Selvaggi), not formally invited to the meeting, accompanying a member of the HRC (Boschi). Each of them had a different duty decided by the law


The HRC main faults according to the sentence:

HRC and some of its members in several interviews stated that the seismic sequence in course at L’Aquila had to be considered normal and the probability of an impending higher M event was minor;

HRC did not behave as a unitarian body because in the meeting only statements were produced without explaination of scientific basis. Hence not all the members were aware of the reliability of the statements;

The virdict’s motivations indicate what a legitimate behaviour should have been:« it would be sufficient to not say sentences as:… It is not possible make predictions, ….(seismic) predictions have no scientific base…, the simple obsrevation of several small earthquake is not in itself a precursor, ..some strong earthquakes have been preceded by small shocks in many cases small earthquakes have not been followed by strong events …and so on» In other words, obvious scientific data should be dismissed and hidden.


698 seismic sequences or single shocks with 3.5<M>5.0 occurred in Italy in the period 1.1.1983-31.3.2009None of them was followed by a M>5.5 earthquake within 20 days and anda radius of 200 km According to Marzocchi and Zhuang, (2011) about 8/1000 M4 earthquakes are followed by strong events.

Recurrence of Large Earthquakes Preceded by Swarms


Forecasting the mainshock (made retrospectively)


From Discharge of Energy to Discharge of Responsibility

2,000 earthquakes with magnitude larger than 2.1 each year in Italy2,000 earthquakes with magnitude larger than 2.1 each year in Italy

Schools evacuated after a 2.1 magnitude Schools evacuated after a 2.1 magnitude earthquake in two townsearthquake in two towns

The impact on society


Seismic sequence in Garfagnana (Tuscany)M4.8 on Jan 25 2013, then M3.2 on Jan 30

Final result: the twit from the Mayor

“Following the communication received from the Prime Minister office, we suggest to leave your

house and stay outside”

1. In the weekly seismic bulletin to DPC, INGV reports the largest aftershock of the sequence (M3.2), and its slightly offset location, stating that other aftershocks were likely

2. After several hours, the report is transmitted from DPC as it is to Regione Toscana and to the municipalities

aa

3. At least 25,000 stayed out of their houses overnight.


A defensive attitude from emergency managers meaning to give out decisional responsibility;

A general loss of credibility;

Indiscriminate application of the “precautionary principle” will be encouraged;

Precautionary principle can give catastrophic consequences if applied without a

clear statement of the risk that a given community is keen to accept;

The precautionary principle in an absolute sense cannot operate;The precautionary principle in an absolute sense cannot operate; Demand for a technology to be put into operation without risk is a metaphysics Demand for a technology to be put into operation without risk is a metaphysics

desire;desire; We have to take risks, but risks must be balanced with a calculation; We have to take risks, but risks must be balanced with a calculation; An absolutist use of the precautionary principle will stop forms of scientific An absolutist use of the precautionary principle will stop forms of scientific

investigations and application of innovative techniques even for the protection investigations and application of innovative techniques even for the protection of humanity.of humanity.

Consequences of L’Aquila Verdict


Charged on 11 May 2009 by Dipartimento della Protezione Civile (DPC) to:

1. Report on the current state of knowledge of short-term prediction and forecasting of tectonic earthquakes

2. Indicate guidelines for utilization of possible forerunners of large earthquakes to drive civil protection actions

ICEF report: “Operational Earthquake Forecasting: State of Knowledge and Guidelines for Utilization” Findings & recommendations released by

DPC (Oct 2009) and endorsed by IASPEI (July 2011)

Final report published in Annals of Geophysics (Aug 2011)

International Commission on Earthquake Forecasting (ICEF)Members (9 countries):

T. H. Jordan, Chair, USA

Y.-T. Chen, China

P. Gasparini, Secretary, Italy

R. Madariaga, France

I. Main, United Kingdom

W. Marzocchi, Italy

G. Papadopoulos, Greece

G. Sobolev, Russia

K. Yamaoka, Japan

J. Zschau, Germany

http://www.annalsofgeophysics.eu/index.php/annals/article/view/5350

DEALING WITH VERY LOW PROBABILITYDEALING WITH VERY LOW PROBABILITY

Issues with Operational Earthquake Forecasting While the probability gains of short-term, seismicity-based forecasts can

be high (> 100 relative to long-term forecasts), the daily/weekly probabilities of large earthquakes typically remain low (< 1% per day)

Preparedness actions appropriate in such high-gain, low-probability situations have not been systematically investigated

Standardization of OEF procedures is in a nascent stage of development

Incremental benefits of OEF for civil protection (e.g., relative to long-term seismic hazard analysis) have not been convincingly demonstrated

Under these circumstances, governmental agencies with statutory responsibilities for earthquake forecasting have been cautious in developing operational capabilities


Almost all short-term earthquake forecasting models are based on seismic clustering. ETAS (Epidemic-Type Aftershock Sequence) is probably the most diffuse

Poisson background

Omori (modified) law

Utsu law

Power-law spatial decay

Gutenberg-Richter law


ENSEMBLE forecasting model. Each model is weighted according to its forecasting performances

Selected models (constraints) They must be submitted to at least one CSEP experiment

No singles models are used!


Quality of the forecast Reliability and skill Retrospective and prospective testing

Consistency among forecasts Across temporal and spatial scales

Need for integrated model development

Value of the forecast to users Economic cost/benefit analysis; psychological value

Pre-set alert thresholds

Transparent messaging system; public education

Forecast ValidationICEF Criteria for “Operational Fitness”


Collaboratory for the Study of Earthquake Predictability CSEP goal is rigorous testing of predictability hypotheses and

forecasting models: Automates blind, prospective testing in a standardized, controlled environment

Current testing is only “quasi-prospective” owing to catalog latencies

Has established experiments in a variety of tectonic environments and on a global scale

CSEP components: Natural laboratories comprising active fault systems with adequate, authorized

data sources for conducting forecasting experiments

Testing centers with validated procedures for registering and evaluating prediction experiments

Model classes with common target events, forecasting regions, and forecast updating intervals


Economic valuation is one basis for prioritizing how to allocate the limited resources available for short-term preparedness In a low-probability environment, only low-cost actions are justified

However, many factors complicate this rational approach Monetary valuation of life, historical structures, etc. is difficult Valuation must account for information available in the absence of forecast Official actions can incur intangible costs (e.g., loss of credibility) and benefits

(e.g., gains in psychological preparedness and resilience)

Cost-Benefit Analysis for Binary Decision-Making (e.g., van Stiphout et al., 2010)

Suppose cost of protection against loss L is C < L. If the short-term earthquake probability is P, the policy that minimizes the expected expense E:

- Protect if P > C/L- Do not protect if P < C/L

Then, E = min {C, PL}.

The Valuation ProblemThe Valuation Problem


P> CL

⇒mitigation action is favorable

P< CL

⇒mitigation action is NOT favorable

Given the probability P that an earthquake has a certain impact, ...

... should mitigation actions be taken or not?

C is financial effort to mitigate an earthquake risk:#Evacueed People x socio-economic cost per day x day

L is financial loss due to an earthquake: #Fatalities x Willingness to pay for human life saved

PLC

CBA

Optimal policy for

decision making:

Short-Term Earthquake Risk Assessment (2)

Time-dependentProbabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment

Loss EstimationTime-dependent

Probabilistic SeismicRisk Assessment


Evolution of Probabilistic Risk in L'Aquila

Probabilistic risk of having 100 fatalities as a function of time in the last month prior the L'Aquila M

W6.3 earthquake

Seismicity within 50 km distance to L'Aquila in the last month prior the M

W6.3

earthquake


In September 2009, during construction workfor a new section of roadway, a crack was discovered in an eyebaron the eastern span of the San Francisco – Oakland Bay Bridge.

According to Caltrans, this problemwas significant enough to haveclosed the bridge on its own.

During a seismic sequence, additional infrastructureinspections might be scheduled to detect seismic defects.

A 50-foot section of the Bay Bridge was damaged in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake


During a seismic sequence, existing seismic retrofit programs might be accelerated at a rate commensurate with the increase in the threat level.

None of the recently retrofitted structures at the Anheuser-Busch brewery in Van Nuys, California were damaged in the 1994 Northridge earthquake


Earthquake hazard is a low-probability high-consequence international peril like pandemic and terrorism.

There are public pandemic and terrorism alerts, which are advisory not compulsory, and do not cause panic.

Increase in seismic risk advisories may also be provided to the public.


Something to remember:

In all sciences, there is always uncertainty, and under conditions of uncertainty, we have to take our decisions;

“We take our decisions in the twilight of probability, and not into the clear light of certainties”(John Locke);

“The calculus of probability is essential to decide upon our conduct” (Blaise Pascal);

Dealing with natual hazard we deal with very low probabilities and high uncertainty;

The concept of probability is not included in the legislation of many countires, including Italy. In Italy there is no legislation on insurance for NH;

The final aim should be for people being able to make decisions individually within a probabilistic framework. Data and protocols must be transparent and readily available to the public. AN UNCOMMENSURABLE BUT PRECIOUS TASK!AN UNCOMMENSURABLE BUT PRECIOUS TASK!

CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION

Documents

GOLDSCHMIDT CONFERENCE 2013 Plenary session 28th August Florence, Italy