Global Peace Operations Review | The Global Peace

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4.11

West Africa

In early 2012, the governments of Mali andGuinea-Bissau were overthrown in succes-sive military coups. Both crises, as well ascontinued violence and illicit trafficking inCôte d’Ivoire and Liberia’s border region,pose serious risks to the region’s delicategains of the past several years. They alsodemonstrate the continuing structural weak-nesses in the region, including porous bor-ders, weak rule of law and justice systems,widespread corruption, and socioeconomicproblems such as high youth unemployment.These challenges further expose the region totransnational security threats including terror-ism and organized crime, all against the back-drop of a looming humanitarian crisis in theSahel caused by a major drought (see MissionNote 4.9 for coverage on the Sahel and Mali).

The United Nations has an extensive pres-ence in the region. In addition to a regional political office and the newly appointed Spe-cial Envoy for the Sahel, there are peacekeep-ing missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia,

and political missions in Guinea-Bissau andSierra Leone. With the exception of Côted’Ivoire, the countries hosting these missionsare also on the UN Peacebuilding Commis-sion’s agenda.

Regional organizations were also activein West Africa in 2012. The Economic Com-munity of West African States (ECOWAS)deployed a military mission to Guinea- Bissau.In response to the deteriorating security situ-ation in the north of Mali, the UN SecurityCouncil authorized an African-led militaryintervention force in December. The EuropeanUnion established a military support missionin Mali and a police mission in Niger.

Regional Approaches

In January 2002 the UN established its firstregional political office to promote an inte-grated subregional approach to peace and se-curity challenges in West Africa. Coveringthe fifteen member states of ECOWAS andMauritania, the UN Office for West Africa(UNOWA) has the broad mandate to enhancethe contributions of the UN toward achievingpeace and security in the region. UNOWAalso supports the efforts of the Manu RiverUnion (MRU) in this direction. Among its corefunctions, UNOWA carries out good offices,promotes good governance and the role ofwomen in peace and security, and enhancesregional capacities for conflict mediation, pre-vention, and cross-border threats. With a cur-rent mandate until December 2013, UNOWAis headed by Special Representative of theSecretary-General (SRSG) Said Djinnit.

With multiple crises emerging simultane-ously in West Africa during 2012, the year was

• Authorization Date 26 November 2001 (SG LetterS/2001/1128)

• Start Date 1 January 2002• SRSG Said Djinnit (Algeria)• Budget $8.9 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Military Experts on Mission: 331 October 2012 International Civilian Staff: 22

National Civilian Staff: 18For detailed mission information see p. 421

UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 134

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particularly challenging for the mission. SRSGDjinnit actively engaged in international effortsto address Mali’s armed rebellion and militarycoup as well as, in close cooperation with theUN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, thedeteriorating security and humanitarian crisisin the Sahel. In response to the coup in Guinea- Bissau, the SRSG, in coordination with thehead of the UN peacebuilding office in thecountry, supported efforts to ensure a return tocivilian rule and constitutional order. SRSGDjinnit also used his good offices function toaddress electoral tensions in Senegal and Togoand assisted in consolidating democratic pro -cesses and institutions ahead of the elections inGuinea.

To address the growing cross-border chal-lenges, such as illicit movement of wea ponsand armed groups, UNOWA is actively en-gaged with the heads of UN peace operationsin the region, as well as ECOWAS and the

MRU, to develop a subregional security strat-egy to counter these threats, building on ex-isting initiatives.

Together with the UN Office in CentralAfrica, the Economic Community of CentralAfrican States, ECOWAS, and other regionalentities, UNOWA is developing an anti-piracystrategy and action plan to tackle piracy in theGulf of Guinea and is supporting ECOWAS indesigning a counterterrorism strategy. UNOWAalso continues to implement the West AfricaCoast Initiative, aimed at combating drugtrafficking. In June 2012 a decision was takento expand the initiative to Guinea, the firstcountry without a UN presence on the groundto be added.1

Guinea-Bissau

In January 2010 the UN Integrated Peacebuild-ing Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)

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Abidjan

AU Liaison Office in Liberia04/2004


136 • MISSION NOTES

replaced a previous UN office initially estab-lished in 1999 to support the implementationof the peace agreement between the govern-ment and a military junta. UNIOGBIS’s man-dated tasks include supporting efforts by theUN Peacebuilding Commission, addressingnational reconciliation, and coordinating ef-forts of international partners on security sec-tor reform (SSR).

In September 2010, following the appoint-ment of two recurring coup-makers to toparmy positions, the EU withdrew its SSR mis-sion, in place since 2008, and suspended mostof its aid to the country. In March 2011 theAngolan Military Mission to Guinea- Bissau(MISSANG) was deployed to assist in effortsto reform the defense and security forces basedon bilateral military cooperation agreements, aswell as to implement an ECOWAS–Community

of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)road map for SSR.

On 21 December 2011 the UN SecurityCouncil extended UNIOGBIS’s mandate until28 February 2013, emphasizing the need forcontinued reform of the defense and securitysectors. On 26 December, while PresidentMalam Bacai Sanhá was hospitalized in Paris,MISSANG hindered an attempted coup bythe army, after which the relationship be-tween the two entities deteriorated rapidly.

Following President Sanhá’s death on 9January 2012, presidential elections to deter-mine his successor were held on 18 March,with inconclusive results. The election wasovershadowed by the assassination of the for-mer head of military intelligence and accusa-tions of vote rigging by opposition candi-dates, including the opposition forerunner,who announced his boycott of the runoff votescheduled for 29 April.

Following a 31 March joint fact-findingmission, including ECOWAS, the AU, andthe UN, ECOWAS, alarmed by the mission’sobservations, took measures to address theelectoral dispute and appointed Guinean pres-ident Alpha Condé as mediator for the crisis.

On 12 April the army imprisoned the in-terim president and prime minister along withother senior officials. In the weeks leading up to the coup, ECOWAS and the Guinea- Bissauan prime minister in respective lettersto the UN Secretary-General raised concernsabout mounting tensions between the armyand MISSANG2 and called for the deploymentof a peacekeeping force to help maintain thecountry’s political stability.

In response to these concerns and follow-ing discussions with the AU and national stake-holders, ECOWAS on 26 April decided to deploy standby forces to Guinea-Bissau to fa-cilitate the safe withdrawal of MISSANG, as-sist in securing the transitional process, and aidthe implementation of the ECOWAS-CPLPSSR roadmap. Comprising over 600 soldiersand police officers from Nigeria, Burkina Faso,Togo, and Senegal, the Economic CommunityMission in Bissau (ECOMIB) started jointdaily patrols with the national police in July.

• Authorization Date 26 February 1999 (SG Letter S/1999/232[as UNOGBIS]), 26 June 2009 (UNSCRes. 1876 [as UNIOGBIS succeedingUNOGBIS])

• Start Date 1 January 2010• SRSG Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)• Budget $19 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Military Experts on Mission: 231 October 2012 Police: 16

International Civilian Staff: 61National Civilian Staff: 53

For detailed mission information see p. 349

UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)

• Authorization Date 26 April and 3 May 2012• Start Date 18 May 2012• Head of Mission Colonel Gnibanga Barro and

Ambassador Ansumana Ceesay• Strength as of Troops: 63030 September 2012

ECOWAS Mission to Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB)


WEST AFRICA • 137

On 18 May, the UN adopted Resolution2048, establishing the Guinea-Bissau Sanc-tions Committee, which imposed a travel banon the coup’s leaders.3 Later the same month,under an agreement forged with ECOWAS, thejunta ceded power to a transitional civiliangovernment and agreed to elections withintwelve months. The transitional government,however, excludes any members of the gov-ernment overthrown in the April coup.

The ECOWAS agreement on the transi-tional arrangements has created deep divi-sions among national actors and the interna-tional community, hindering further progress.Stakeholders are divided between those sup-porting the transitional government and thosewho want to see a restoration of constitutionalorder through the return of the authorities inplace prior to the April coup.

The UN has reaffirmed its support for theECOWAS-led mediation process but hascalled for a consensual and inclusive solution.UNIOGBIS and the AU Liaison Office inGuinea-Bissau have taken steps to enhance theexchange of information between stakeholdersand to ensure more effective coordination ofinternational efforts toward a return to consti-tutional order. However, efforts to harmonizepositions of the various partners in 2012 havenot succeeded, and the political and securitysituation remained volatile, illustrated by analleged coup attempt in October.

In an effort to forge unison, in late De-cember the UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS, and theCPLP deployed a joint assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau to assess the political andsecurity situation. The mission plans to rec-ommend ways on how best these organiza-tions can work together to assist the countryin areas key to long-term stabilization, in-cluding SSR, strengthening the rule of law,combating drug trafficking, and promotingsocial-economic development.

In November, the transitional government,in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, report-edly requested the replacement of UNIOGBISSRSG Mutaboba, saying that he did not servethe interest of the transition under way. Inearly January, the Secretary- General appointed

former Timorese president and Nobel PeacePrize laureate José Ramos-Horta as the newhead of UNIOGBIS.

Côte d’Ivoire

The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)was established by the Security Council in2004 to assist with implementation of thepeace accords that ended the 2002 civil war.France’s Operation Licorne, deployed shortlyafter the outbreak of war, supports UNOCImilitarily and assists in implementation of thepeace accords and the holding of elections.

In April 2011, UNOCI and Licorne forceshelped end five months of electoral violencethat ensued after former president LaurentGbagbo refused to accept the November 2010election results in favor of Alassane Ouattara.In December 2011, legislative elections wereheld, fully restoring the country’s constitu-tional order. However, attacks against civil-ians and security forces, including peacekeep-ers, and reports of coup attempts in 2012,destabilized the security situation.

Police stationed with the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) coordinate with the gendarmerie in the La Maison de’Arrete et

Correction prison in Abidjan, following attacks on the Youpougon and Akouedo camps.

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UNOCI is currently mandated until July2013, with the priority of protecting civiliansand supporting the government in disarma-ment, demobilization, and reintegration as

well as SSR efforts. Following recommen -dations by the Secretary-General, SecurityCouncil Resolution 2062 (2012) endorsed areduction of UNOCI’s military componentequivalent to one battalion as soon as practi-cal. The resolution also requests the Secretary-General to undertake an assessment of the sit-uation in Côte d’Ivoire in a special report tobe submitted no later than 31 March 2013.

The beginning of 2012 saw an increase ofviolent attacks on civilians, primarily in thewest of the country. On 8 June, UNOCI peace -keepers were attacked and seven blue helmetsfrom Niger were killed while responding to anattack on civilians near the Liberian border. Asoldier of the national army was killed in a re-lated attack the same day. The event under-scores growing concern about the significantnumber of attacks on security forces, in par-ticular in the border areas and near Abidjan,and an increasing mistrust among security elements.

Beginning in August, armed groupslaunched a string of attacks against militaryand police posts in Abidjan and the westernparts of the country, causing casualties amonggovernment soldiers. These attacks took placeagainst the backdrop of reported coup-plottingby elements loyal to Gbagbo in Liberia andGhana. In October, the Group of Experts ofthe UN’s Côte d’Ivoire sanctions committeereported that exiled supporters of Gbagbo hadestablished a strategic command in Ghanafrom which they seek to destabilize PresidentOuattara’s government. The report further al-leges that the group sought to establish contactwith extremist groups operating in northernMali to set up operations against the Ivoriangovernment.

The deteriorating security situation nega-tively affected reconciliation efforts in 2012.After the formation of a new government inMarch, political parties, with support fromUNOCI, established a framework for ongoingdialogue to continue discussions in quarterlymeetings. The first meeting took place on 21June. Gbagbo’s party refused to participateand continued to condition its participation ingovernment and upcoming local elections.4

• Authorization Date 27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1528)• Start Date 4 April 2004• SRSG Albert Gerard Koenders

(Netherlands)• Force Commander Major-General Muhammad Iqbal Asi

(Pakistan)• Police Commissioner Major-General Jean Marie Bourry

(France)• Budget $575.0 million (1 July 2012–

30 June 2013)• Strength as of Troops: 9,39831 October 2012 Military Observers: 189

Police: 1,430International Civilian Staff: 418National Civilian Staff: 767UN Volunteers: 193


UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

• Authorization Date 4 February 2003 (UNSC Res. 1464)• Start Date February 2003• Force Commander Colonel Loïc Mizon (France)• Budget $91.0 million (1 January 2011–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Troops: 45030 September 2012

Operation Licorne

• Authorization Date 29 March 2010 (PSC/PR/Comm.[CCXXII])

• Head of Office Ambassador Ovidio Manuel BarbosaPequeno (Angola)

• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 730 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 5

AU Liaison Office in Guinea-Bissau


WEST AFRICA • 139

In February the International CriminalCourt (ICC) announced that it would widenits investigation into possible war crimes tothe start of the country’s civil war in 2002.

The trial of former president Gbagbo at theICC is scheduled to proceed, after the Courtrejected arguments that it lacked jurisdictionand ruled Gbagbo fit to stand trial in August.

In 2002 the UN established theCameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission(CNMC) at the request of the govern-ments of Cameroon and Nigeria to assistin the implementation of the Interna-tional Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling onthe boundary dispute between the twonations.

The CNMC’s mandate covers tech-nical issues around border demarcationand delineation, but the commission alsoconducts monitoring and early warningto uphold the rights of those living in thearea. The commission also supports con-fidence-building measures between thetwo countries, including joint economicventures and cross-border cooperation.The CNMC is co-located with the UNOffice for West Africa (UNOWA) andshares the latter’s Special Representativeof the Secretary-General (SRSG), SaidDjinnit, who is also the chairman of theFollow-up Committee for the GreentreeAgreement,1 in place until 2013.

Border demarcation is the major re-maining technical aspect of the CNMC’smandate. As of November 2012, over1,825 kilometers of the estimated 2,000-kilometer land boundary had been de-marcated between the two countries. It isexpected that the assessment of the re-maining boundary can be completed bythe end of 2013 and that the outstandingareas of disagreement be settled by theend of 2014, allowing for final maps andagreement by 2015.

Though significant progress has beenmade with the support of the CNMC, ithas been hampered by technical and

political challenges, including lack ofadequate funding, faulty estimations oftimelines, and omissions of importantdetails in the ICJ ruling that pertain tothe exact location of villages and roadsalong the delineated border. Politicalstalemates have centered on access to re-sources, particularly in the Bakassi pen -insula, which has rich offshore oil de-posits and plentiful fish stocks, but alsoinclude issues of nationality of the af-fected population.

In June 2012 the Nigerian House ofRepresentatives passed a resolution de-manding a review of the ICJ judgmentahead of the ten-year expiration of theperiod of revision of the ICJ’s ruling on9 October,2 and called for a UN super-vised plebiscite in which the people ofBakassi would exercise their right ofself-determination. This was echoed bythe Nigerian Senate in September. How-ever, following intense consultation withlegal experts, the government of Nigeriadecided not to pursue the revision of thejudgment.

Despite these risks, the commitmentof the parties involved remains steadfast.The two countries signed a bilateral se-curity pact in February to establish atransborder security committee to ad-dress additional insecurity challenges.The two countries have also agreed tojoint oil exploration in the Bakassi penin-sula. Further, new confidence-buildingmeasures directly aimed at supportingthe affected border communities havebeen enacted by the government of Cam -eroon, and similar commitments to as-sess possible measures have been sched-uled by Nigeria.

To facilitate the exit of the CNMC,its activities will be transferred to a bi-lateral commission and to other subre-gional structures. However, this willonly be possible once the remaining out-standing issues have been addressed,such as placement of the final boundarypillars, the formal adoption of legallyagreed maps, and the expiration of theFollow-up Committee of the GreentreeAgreement in 2013.

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

• Authorization Date 17 March 2004 (SG Letter S/2004/298)• Chairman Said Djinnit (Algeria)• Budget $8.9 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012) • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 931 October 2012 National Civilian Staff: 2


Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)

Notes: 1. In 2006 the two parties agreed to the transfer of authority from Nigeria to Cameroon in the Bakassi peninsula under the GreentreeAgreement. The process was successfully concluded in August 2008.

2. Although the judgment is final and not subject to appeal, the statute provides for circumstances under which a revision can be consideredwithin a ten-year period from the ruling.



In November, the ICC also indicted Gbagbo’swife Simone, the first woman to face chargesby the court, on charges including murder, rape,and persecution. In Côte d’Ivoire, the violentattacks against national security forces haveled to the arrest and trial of three high-levelGbagbo supporters. On 11 October the Abi djanmilitary court sentenced a top military ally ofGbagbo to fifteen years’ imprisonment—thefirst conviction since the 2011 postelectionviolence. Four other former military officerswere also sentenced in relation to the samecase. Critics charge that no Ouattara ally hasbeen arrested or credibly investigated over2011’s election violence.

To address the increasingly volatile secu-rity situation along the border area, Côted’Ivoire and Liberia reinforced the presenceof their military contingents in these areas. Ina joint meeting with UNOCI and the UN Mis-sion in Liberia (UNMIL), the governments fur-ther agreed to enhance cooperation, includingon judicial aspects and to promote reconcilia-tion and development. The attacks in the eastof the country led to an increase of securityforces and a temporary closing of the borderwith Ghana, which was later reopened fol-lowing an intervention by UNOCI.

UNOCI and UNMIL also increased jointactivities, including coordinated border patrolsand enhanced exchange of information andanalysis. In September, the Security Councilordered the transfer of three armed helicoptersdeployed in UNMIL to UNOCI to be used foroperations in the border area between Côte

d’Ivoire and Liberia. The recent increase in vi-olence and the number of attacks in the countryhas prompted the mission to reexamine currentthreats, risks, and operational requirements forits deployment. In a letter to the Security Coun-cil in October, the Secretary-General asked theCouncil to defer the reduction of UNOCI’stroops until the mandated assessment of the sit-uation in Côte d’Ivoire in early 2013.

Liberia

UNMIL was deployed in October 2003 to as-sist in implementation of the comprehensivepeace agreement that ended an internecinefourteen-year civil conflict. The mission isled by Karin Landgren, who replaced EllenMargrethe Løj in July 2012.

In September 2012 the Security Council,through Resolution 2066, extended UNMIL’smandate for another year, with the primarytasks of supporting the government’s effortsin strengthening peace and stability and pro-tecting civilians. UNMIL is also mandated tosupport the government in moving forwardthe political process essential for peace con-solidation—including national reconciliation,constitutional reform, and decentralization—and transitioning complete security responsi-bility to the Liberian National Police.

Following recommendations of the Secretary-General, the UN Security Councilagreed to reduce UNMIL’s forces in threephases, from 7,952 in September 2012 to ap-proximately 3,750 by July 2015, based on thesecurity situation in Liberia. The first reduc-tion phase, of 1,990 military personnel, isscheduled to take place between October2012 and September 2013. Resolution 2066also provides for an increase in UNMIL’s po-lice component by three formed police unitsor a total of 420 personnel, bringing the au-thorized police strength to 1,795 officers.

On 16 January 2012, President EllenJohn son Sirleaf was inaugurated for a secondsix-year term amid heightened political ten-sions, following violent clashes in the lead-upto the presidential runoff in November 2011

• Authorization Date 10 January 2010 (PSC/AHG/Comm.[XXII])

• Start Date March 2003• Head of Office Ambassador Ambroise Niyonsaba

(Burundi)• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 730 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 7

AU Liaison Office in Côte d’Ivoire


WEST AFRICA • 141

and a boycott of the runoff by the main oppo-sition candidate. The election highlighted thevulnerability of Liberia’s institutions and per-sistent societal and political divisions.

UNMIL’s drawdown is in large part drivenby pressures from the international communityafter the largely successful completion of the2011 election as well as budgetary constraints,with budget cuts of some $29 million for fis-cal year 2012–2013.

Out of a total of six benchmarks guidingUNMIL’s transition, only one—the peaceful,credible conduct of accepted national elec-tions—had been achieved by November 2012.Progress in the other five areas that relate tohanding over security responsibilities to na-tional authorities is slow.5 The April 2012Secretary-General’s special report on UNMILpoints out that “none of the country’s securityinstitutions is operationally independent” andthat they are not “able to maintain stabilitywithout the support of UNMIL.”6

Key reform processes and national recon-ciliation have stalled partly due to lack of inclusive governance. As of August 2012,only 11 out of 447 persons appointed as partof the new government were not affiliatedwith the ruling party.7 Following PresidentJohnson Sir leaf’s appointment of supportersand family members, including three of hersons, to government and cabinet positions,she was accused of nepotism, leading the op-position and factions of her own party to callfor her resignation. In October the head of thegovernment’s peace and reconciliation initia-tive and co–Nobel laureate Laymah Gboweequit her position over concerns that the pres-ident had failed to adequately address corrup-tion and nepotism.

In light of outstanding progress, the gov-ernment and the UN agreed on a gradual approach to handing over security responsi-bilities to national authorities that includesgeographic and functional prioritizations.8

With its stronger police component and inline with its mandate, UNMIL will increasementoring and technical support to nationalpolice. The additional formed police units

will be deployed as operational support to na-tional institutions. This increased presencealso aims to alleviate concerns among thepopulation that the mission’s military draw-down could leave a security vacuum.

To address the volatile security situationalong the border with Côte d’Ivoire, the Li -berian police, military, and immigration agen -cies are engaged in the first joint security op-eration aimed at mitigating the threat fromarmed elements. While the operation led tothe arrest of more than a dozen suspects,UNMIL in September expressed concern aboutreports of mercenary activities at refugeecamps in southeastern Liberia. In addition to increasing its cooperation with UNOCI,UNMIL has also adopted a more robust

• Authorization Date 6 April 2004 (PSC/PR/3[IV])• Head of Office Ambassador H. Oluwatoyin Solaja

(Nigeria)• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 430 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 8

AU Liaison Office in Liberia

• Authorization and 19 September 2003 (UNSC Res. 1509)Start Date

• SRSG Karin Landgren (Sweden)• Force Commander Major-General Leonard Muriuki Ngondi

(Kenya)• Police Commissioner John Nielsen (United States)• Budget $496.5 million (1 July 2012–

30 June 2013)• Strength as of Troops: 7,53831 October 2012 Military Observers: 122

Police: 1,302International Civilian Staff: 470National Civilian Staff: 989UN Volunteers: 226


UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)



posture, by increasing the frequency of airpatrols and deploying two armed helicopterscloser to the Ivorian border.

Sierra Leone

The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office inSierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was established in2008 as a follow-on to a UN office in placesince 2005. As one of the first fully integratedoffices, UNIPSIL is headed by an Execu-tive Representative of the Secretary-General(ERSG) who is also double-hatted as the Res-ident UN Coordinator.

UN member states viewed a successfuloutcome of the November 2012 presidential,parliamentary, and local council elections(the first elections conducted entirely by thegovernment) as a key benchmark for peaceconsolidation in the country, on which alsohinges the future transition of UNIPSIL into aUN Country Team presence. In advance ofthe elections, the Security Council asked theSecretary-General to deploy an interagencytechnical assessment mission to review prog -ress made on UNIPSIL’s mandate and to pro-vide details on a transition, drawdown, and exitstrategy for UNIPSIL by 15 February 2013.

In September 2012, through Resolu-tion 2065, the Security Council extended

UNIPSIL’s mandate for six months until 31March 2013, with a focus on providing assis-tance in the preparation and conduct of theelections. Resolution 2065 also mandatedUNIPSIL to provide assistance for conflictprevention and mitigation efforts and supportgenuine and inclusive dialogue among politi-cal parties.

In February 2012 the UN Secretary- General withdrew his long-standing ERSG,Michael von der Schulenburg, amid heightenedpolitical tensions. The withdrawal took placeat the request of the Sierra Leone govern-ment, which reportedly questioned Schulen-burg’s impartiality. In March, Jens AndersToyberg-Frandzen was appointed as the newERSG for UNIPSIL.

Since March, incidents of political vio-lence have decreased. In May, as an outcomeof a meeting co-organized by UNIPSIL, keypolitical players and relevant institutionsadopted a declaration reaffirming their com-mitment to political tolerance and nonvio-lence. The meeting also decided on a follow-up mechanism to ensure implementation ofthe declaration.

In preparation for the November 2012elections, UNIPSIL helped train judges, pros-ecutors, police investigators, and other para-legal staff for the newly established ElectoralOffenses Courts, and assisted in training10,500 general-duty police and 2,224 person-nel of the police’s Operations Support Divisionon election-specific issues and public ordermanagement.9

According to international observers, the17 November elections were held in a peace-ful and orderly manner amid a high voterturnout. Despite efforts to increase the role ofwomen in politics, including by UNIPSIL,only 38 women ran for seats in parliament,compared to 538 men.10 The incumbent pres-ident Ernest Bai Koroma won with more than57 percent of the votes and was sworn intooffice on 23 November. His party, the AllPeople’s Congress (APC), won the majority inparliament with 67 seats, while the opposition

• Authorization Date 4 August 2008 (UNSC Res. 1829)• Start Date 1 October 2008• ERSG Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen

(Denmark)• Budget $17.7 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Police: 731 October 2012 International Civilian Staff: 36

National Civilian Staff: 33UN Volunteers: 8


UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)


WEST AFRICA • 143

Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) came insecond with 42 seats.

Following the announcement of the elec-tion result, SLPP presidential candidate JuliusMaada Bio stated that he believed the electionprocess was fraudulent, prompting EU elec-tion observers to voice concern about post-election unrest. Shortly after, the SLPP calledon its deputies in parliament to boycott pro-ceedings, citing the unwillingness of the National Electoral Commission to addresstheir concerns about electoral irregularities.However, following talks between Bio andPresident Koroma, the SLPP called off its

boycott in early December, enabling the po-litical activities to commence.

Conclusion

West Africa’s diverse challenges and precari-ous security situation call for increased coor-dination and cooperation between all relevantactors, including the UN system, regional or-ganizations, and bilateral actors. As develop-ments in the region throughout 2012 haveshown, hard-won gains in peace and develop-ment are delicate and easily undone.

Notes

1. The other member states of the West Africa Coast Initiative are Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

2. MISSANG was reportedly ordered to withdraw by the head of the armed forces, General An-tonio Indjai.

3. Six further individuals were added to the Sanctions Committee on 18 July 2012.4. These demands include the release of Gbagbo and associates from detention, the lifting of ar-

rest warrants against those in exile, and the unblocking of frozen assets.5. For more on the transition benchmarks, see United Nations, Special Report of the Secretary-

General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2012/230, 16 April 2012, para. 29.6. Ibid., paras. 46 and 35.7. United Nations, Twenty-fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations

Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2012/641, 15 August 2012, para. 4.8. A first security handover took place in Robertsport, western Liberia, in October 2012.9. United Nations, Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Peace-

building Office in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2012/679, 31 August 2012, para. 4.10. “Landmark Sierra Leone Election Sees High Turnout,” CBC News, 17 November 2012, http://

www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/11/17/sierra-leone-election.html.


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