Global Peace Operations Review | The Global Peace Operations …peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/... · 2015. 7. 17. · CAR, quickly capturing the city of Bria

A number of important political and secu-rity challenges confront countries in CentralAfrica, illustrated most vividly by the rapidemergence of a rebel coalition in the CentralAfrican Republic (CAR), which gained con-trol of approximately one-third of the countryby the end of 2012. Governance concerns, in-cluding the lack of inclusive governance,continue to present risks as both Burundi andthe CAR prepare for elections in the comingyears. In addition, despite important progressin addressing security issues, the region isthreatened by the continued operations of theLord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

Background

While the UN Organization Stabilization Mis-sion in the Democratic Republic of Congo(MONUSCO) is the region’s only large-scalepeacekeeping mission (see Mission Note 4.5),Central Africa hosts three UN political mis-sions supporting peace processes at variousstages. In addition to offices in the CAR andBurundi, the UN in 2011 established its Of-fice for Central Africa (UNOCA) to strengthenregional conflict prevention mechanisms.Based in Libreville, Gabon, UNOCA coversthe ten member states of the Economic Com-munity of Central African States (ECCAS).1

The office’s main function is to promote a re-gional approach to conflict prevention andpeacebuilding, in particular by carrying outgood offices on behalf of the Secretary- General and assisting subregional organiza-tions. After some recruitment delays, UNOCAis now fully staffed and has established part-nerships with other UN actors as well as re-gional organizations in order to fill its gaps in

thematic expertise. However, despite the Se-curity Council’s strong support, it still lacksfinancial resources and sufficient staff strengthto address the range of issues it is tasked todeal with, and is thus partly reliant on extra-budgetary funding.

The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Officein the Central African Republic (BINUCA)was established in January 2010, replacing aprior peacebuilding office,2 with the aim ofstrengthening the coordination of UN activi-ties in the country. The mission is mandatedto support implementation of the inclusivepolitical dialogue held after the signing of the2008 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)between the government and all but one ofthe major rebel groups. The mission focuseson assisting the government in security sectorreform (SSR), in particular the disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) pro -cess, which is guided by a national DDR strat-egy developed in mid-2011. The mission alsocoordinates with the UN Peacebuilding Com-mission, which is currently redefining its work-ing relationship with the CAR on the basis ofits second poverty reduction strategy paper,adopted in February 2012.

Also in the CAR is the ECCAS Missionfor the Consolidation of Peace in CentralAfrica (MICOPAX). Created in July 2008 toreplace the Multinational Force in CentralAfrica (FOMUC), MICOPAX is mandated toassist in restructuring the country’s securityforces, accompany the transition process to-ward national reconciliation, and coordinatehumanitarian aid. Despite this rather compre-hensive mandate, its staff is almost entirelymilitary. With a total staff of less than 700personnel, who receive financial and logistical

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support from the EU and France, the mis-sion’s capacities, and therefore its contribu-tions, were limited for much of 2012. It hasnonetheless worked to mitigate the risk oflarge-scale violence by acting as an interme-diary between the rebel groups, the CARarmy, and local authorities. Its escort mis-sions have also had deterrent effects, but areinsufficient to ensure the protection of civil-ians in the north.

The UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) wasauthorized in 2011 to replace the larger UN In-tegrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). BNUB isexpected to accompany the last phase ofpeace consolidation before the return to nor-malized UN engagement in Burundi. The mis-sion is mandated, among other tasks, to sup-port the government in strengthening nationalinstitutions, facilitate dialogue between na-tional actors, support the establishment oftransitional justice mechanisms, promote theprotection of human rights, and ensure that allstrategies and policies with respect to publicfinance and the economic sector have a focuson peacebuilding and equitable growth. Theswift replacement of former head of BNUBKarin Landgren, who in April 2012 was ap-pointed to lead the UN mission in Liberia,with Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, prevented aloss of mission momentum.

The Lord’s Resistance Army remains asignificant challenge for the region, and inter-national attention on the group intensified in2012 with the release of a controversial doc-umentary on its leader, Joseph Kony. In No-vember 2011 the African Union launched aregional initiative against the LRA. The UNalso produced a regional strategy, in June2012, aimed at enhancing cooperation be-tween UN and regional actors against LRAactivities (see the box “The African Union’sEfforts Against the Lord’s Resistance Army”).

Regional Developments

Following a request by the Security Councilin November 2011, UNOCA took the lead incoordinating the development of a UN regional

strategy for humanitarian, development, andpeacebuilding assistance to LRA-affectedareas, in close coordination with the Afri canUnion (in particular its Special Envoy for theLRA), UN missions and country teams in theaffected areas, and Central African states.The strategy, endorsed by the Security Coun-cil in June 2012, focuses on five key objec-tives: implementation of the AU RegionalCooperation Initiative for the Elimination ofthe LRA, protection of civilians, strengtheningof DDR activities, coordination of humanitar-ian assistance and child protection programs,and support to the affected countries in estab-lishing state authority in their territories.3

UNOCA is also developing a regionalanti piracy strategy in the Gulf of Guinea incooperation with Central African and WestAfrican regional actors, such as the UN Of-fice for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Eco-nomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). At the request of the SecurityCouncil, UNOCA is also involved in the de-sign of a systemwide strategy to address theimpact of the Libya crisis on the Sahel re-gion, following the recommendations of a UNinteragency assessment mission conducted inDecember 2011.

In keeping with its mandate to cooper-ate with subregional organizations, UNOCAadopted in May 2012 a framework coopera-tion agreement with ECCAS to strengthen the

CENTRAL AFRICA • 79

• Authorization Date 11 December 2009 (SG LetterS/2009/697), 30 August 2010 (SG Letter S/2010/457)

• SRSG Abou Moussa (Chad)• Budget $4.4 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Military Experts on Mission: 131 October 2012 International Civilian Staff: 19

National Civilian Staff: 6For detailed mission information see p. 408

UN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)


latter’s conflict prevention and mediationsupport capabilities. The two organizations,together with the International Conference onthe Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), are also de -veloping a counterterrorism initiative.

Also supporting peace consolidation ef-forts in the region are four AU liaison officesin Central Africa, based in Burundi, the CAR,Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.Their activities range from conflict prevention,management, and resolution to postconflictreconstruction. The liaison offices are partic-ularly active in supporting the implementa-tion of peace agreements, and in monitoringthe implementation of AU Peace and SecurityCouncil decisions at the national level.

Central African Republic

Despite positive signs of progress earlier inthe year, the emergence and rapid advance ofthe Seleka rebel alliance in December 2012dealt a significant blow to peace consolida-tion efforts in the Central African Republic.Governance and security in the CAR havebeen weakened by repeated coups and ensu-ing conflict since the end of the 1990s. TheJanuary 2011 elections were held in a peace-ful atmosphere, but the runoff elections twomonths later were boycotted by the opposi-tion and thus did not serve to reduce the po-litical tension between the ruling party andthe opposition. However, the political processmade significant progress in the second halfof 2012. Consultations between the govern-ment and various political parties, supported

by BINUCA, the African Union, and the Or-ganisation Internationale de la Francophonie,led to the adoption by consensus of a newelections management body in September2012, followed by the approval of a new draftelectoral code. Despite this major politicalbreakthrough, the continued restrictions onthe rights of the opposition continue to pose achallenge to political stability.

On 25 August, the Convention of Patriotsfor Justice and Peace (CPJP) rebel group ac-ceded to the CPA—the final rebel group tojoin the peace process. This development, to-gether with the European Union’s provisionin May 2012 of 4 million euros,4 allowed forthe extension of the DDR process in north-eastern CAR, which also includes formercombatants from other major rebel groups.With technical assistance from BINUCA andthe UN Development Programme (UNDP),and in cooperation with the World Bank, theDDR process resumed in the northwesternand northern-central regions in mid-2012.Though the DDR exercise benefited from therelative improvement of security conditionsin the country, its future implementation isuncertain due to security issues posed by thenew rebellion, as well as funding gaps thatreached a deficit of $20 million in May.5

The surge in human rights violations re-ported by BINUCA throughout 2012 high-lights the urgent need for progress on theSSR front, which still lacks a national strat-egy. A roadmap for the revival of the SSRprocess, developed with strong technical sup-port from BINUCA, was adopted in Febru-ary.6 The Security Council identified as acause for “deep concern” the numerous casesof summary executions, torture, and arbitraryarrests perpetrated by security and defenseforces, as well as the instances of harassmentand extortion of the population in areas con-trolled by armed groups.7

These developments underscored the ex-isting weaknesses of the security environ-ment when on 10 December, the Seleka rebelalliance launched attacks in northeasternCAR, quickly capturing the city of Bria and


• Authorization Date 25 April 2005• Start Date February 2006• Head of Office Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin

(Burkina Faso)• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 330 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 5

AU Liaison Office in Chad



extending to cover nearly one-third of thecountry. The alliance is made up of factionsof three rebel groups united in their opposi-tion to President Bozizé and his perceivedfailure to implement the 2008 peace agree-ment. In response, and at Bozizé’s request,the government of Chad agreed to send 2,000troops to halt the rebels’ advance. The presi-dent also requested assistance from the UnitedStates and France, but neither country was will-ing to intervene. As a result of the violence,the UN temporarily evacuated non essen tialstaff and the United States closed its embassyin Bangui.

The ECCAS held a summit on 21 De-cember where it put forth a roadmap to bringan end to the crisis, including a cease-fire andimmediate negotiations, and agreed to furtherreinforce MICOPAX to turn it into an inter-position force. The UN Secretary-General andSecurity Council both strongly condemnedthe rebels’ activities and called for the imple-mentation of the ECCAS roadmap. BINUCAengaged with both the government and rebelsto establish a dialogue and cease-fire.

In late December, the Seleka alliancehalted their advance and agreed to enter intopeace talks with the government beginning inearly January, following President Bozizé’spledge to form a coalition government in-cluding members of the rebel group. As nego-tiations began in January the security envi-ronment remained precarious.

In addition, the LRA continues its opera-tions in the CAR, where its leader, JosephKony, is believed to be hiding, and the coun-try saw a spike in attacks in the first half of2012. In light of the growing threat of theUgandan rebel group, in December 2011 theSecurity Council designated BINUCA as afocal point for LRA-related activities. In ad-dition to its participation in the UN regionalstrategy against the LRA, BINUCA also con-tributes to the drafting of a national strategyon the issue, which has yet to be adopted bythe government. It also supports activities toencourage the defection and reintegration ofLRA combatants. In the framework of the AU

initiative against the LRA, BINUCA provideslogistical support to the AU delegations trav-eling to the affected areas, and has recruited

• Authorization Date March 2010 (date of effect)• Head of Office Ambassador Hawa Ahmed Youssouf

(Djibouti)• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 730 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 8

AU Liaison Office in the Central African Republic

• Authorization Date 2 October 2002 (Libreville Summit)• Start Date December 2002• Special Representative Ambassador Albert Akendengue

(Gabon)• Force Commander General Akaga (Gabon)• Budget $46.1 million (1 October 2011–

30 September 2012)• Strength as of Troops: 33430 September 2012 Civilian Police: 57

National Staff: 1

Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX)

• Authorization Date 3 March 2009 (UNSC Letter S/2009/128 [as BONUCA]), 7 April 2009 (UNSCPres. Statement S/PRST/2009/5 [asBONUCA]), 21 December 2009 (UNSCPres. Statement S/PRST/2009/35 [asBINUCA succeeding BONUCA])

• Start Date 1 January 2010• SRSG Margaret Vogt (Nigeria)• Budget $20.9 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Military Experts on Mission: 231 October 2012 Police: 2

International Civilian Staff: 67National Civilian Staff: 84UN Volunteers: 4

For detailed mission information see p. 238

UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)



two consultants based in Obo as part of theAU Joint Intelligence and Operations Center.

Burundi

Though BNUB is intended to be the finalmission before a return to normalized UNCountry Team engagement, it inherited a po-larized political situation following a boycottof the 2010 elections by major oppositionparties, some of whose leaders left the coun-try. These elections marked the second pollssince the signing of the Arusha Accords in2000, which provided for a new constitutionand a power-sharing agreement to mitigateinterethnic conflict.

To facilitate dialogue between political ac-tors ahead of the 2015 elections, BNUB pro-vides technical support on topics such as civil

society development, electoral preparedness,and press freedom. The mission also conductsquiet political engagement with senior gov-ernment and opposition leaders in Burundiand abroad. Meetings between ruling-partyofficials and extraparliamentary oppositionmembers over the past year, together with thereturn from Belgium of opposition spokesmanPancrace Cimpaye in July, were positive steps.However, despite a modest decrease in 2012,the persistence of extrajudicial killings andcases of torture serve as reminders that polit-ical violence remains too frequent an alterna-tive to dialogue. The strong language on ex-trajudicial killings and accountability for pasthuman rights violations in Security CouncilResolution 2027 applied helpful pressure.

Implementation of a transitional justicemechanism has slowed again since 2011, whenthe government, with significant support fromBNUB, set up a technical committee to elab-orate a draft law to establish a truth and rec-onciliation commission. Given the new delay,questions arise as to whether such a commis-sion could complete its work before the be-ginning of the 2015 electoral campaign.

This issue also highlights the deficienciesin the justice sector, the strengthening ofwhich is one of BNUB’s main focuses. Themission, together with UNDP and the UNCountry Team, is also providing technicaland financial support and training to promotethe accountability of magistrates and the in-dependence of judicial institutions, includingthe national human rights commission and of-fice of the ombudsman. However, progress instrengthening the rule of law is hampered bythe mixed results of police reform, wherehuman rights abuses and relative lack of pop-ular confidence stand in contrast to the suc-cess of army integration and reform.

Progress has been more visible in the so-cioeconomic sphere, where the governmentadopted its second poverty reduction strategypaper in February 2012, with strong supportfrom international partners. These develop-ments have reopened the question of whether

• Authorization Date 25 October 2006 (UNSC Res. 1719 [as BINUB]), 16 December 2010 (UNSC Res. 1959 [as BNUB succeeding BINUB])

• Start Date 1 January 2011• SRSG Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon)• Budget $17.5 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Military Experts on Mission: 131 October 2012 Police: 1

International Civilian Staff: 52National Civilian Staff: 67UN Volunteers: 6

For detailed mission information see p. 243

UN Office in Burundi (BNUB)

• Authorization Date 25 March 2004 (PSC/PR/Comm.[III])• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 330 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 11

AU Liaison Office in Burundi



In November 2011 the African Union,with support from the United Nations,United States, and European Union,launched a comprehensive approach tocombat the notorious rebel group Lord’sResistance Army (LRA). The AU Re-gional Cooperation Initiative for theElimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) wasauthorized by the Peace and SecurityCouncil on 22 November and officiallylaunched the following March in Juba. Itis mandated to build the operational ca-pacities of the countries affected by theLRA, to establish an environment con-ducive to the stabilization of the affectedareas, and to facilitate the delivery of hu-manitarian assistance. The AU SpecialEnvoy for the LRA issue, Francisco Cae-tano José Madeira, was appointed on 23November 2011. He is tasked with coor-dinating and monitoring the implementa-tion of the AU strategy against the LRA.

The RCI-LRA has three components.First, the Joint Coordination Mech anismis an ad hoc structure comprising theministers of defense of the affected coun-tries, chaired by the AU Commissionerfor Peace and Security. Headquartered inBangui, the mechanism is responsiblefor political and strategic coordination.Second, the Regional Intervention Force,also known as the Regional Task Force,is the military component, tasked withcapturing LRA combatants. At full de-ployment, it will comprise 5,000 sol-diers drawn from the Central AfricanRepublic (CAR), the Democratic Repub-lic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, andUganda. It is headquartered in Yambio,

South Sudan, with three sector bases, inDungu (DRC), Obo (CAR), and Nzara(South Sudan). Nearly 3,000 troops havebeen committed to date, though not allof these troops are operational due to logistical issues. Finally, the Joint Intel-ligence and Operations Center will un-dertake integrated planning and monitor-ing of the operations under the authorityof the Regional Task Force. The centercomprises a total of thirty officers sec-onded by the affected countries.1

The AU initiative is supported byinternational partners, in particular theUnited States, which sent 100 militaryadvisers to Uganda in October 2011, andthe European Union, which pledged 9million euros in humanitarian assistance

to LRA victims in March 2012.2 TheAU’s efforts are also a key focus of theUN regional strategy against the LRA, which is centered on the UN system butdesigned in close cooperation with theAU. The AU Special Envoy accompa-nied the Special Representative of theSecretary-General of the UN Office inCentral Africa in his travels to affectedcountries, and participated in coordinat-ing the drafting of the UN strategy, com-pleted in June 2012.

The RCI-LRA entered its opera-tional phase in the summer of 2012, butit is unclear whether it will overcome itslack of funding and coordinated leader-ship amid a climate of tensions betweenthe national armies it brings together.

The African Union’s Efforts Against the Lord’s Resistance Army

• Authorization and 22 November 2011 (PSC/PR/Comm.Start Date [CCXCIX])

• Special Envoy Francisco Madeira (Mozambique)

AU Special Envoy on the LRA

• Authorization Date 22 November 2011 (PSC/PR/Comm.[CCXCIX])

• Start Date 24 March 2012• Force Commander Colonel Dick Prit Olum (Uganda)• Strength as of 30 personnel at headquarters30 September 2012

AU Task Force on the LRA

Notes: 1. AU Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Status of the Implementation of CommuniquéPSC/PR/COMM: (CCXXCIX) of the 299th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the Lord’s Resistance Army (Addis Ababa: African Union,2012).

2. Institute for Security Studies, “Peace and Security Council Report no. 34,” 4 May 2012, http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=31476.



Burundi, one of the first countries on the UNPeacebuilding Commission’s agenda, shouldfinally “graduate” from commission support,as suggested by its government.

The future transition back to regular UNCountry Team engagement is also up for debate, to be informed by the benchmarks presented by the Secretary-General to the Security Council in May 2012, which meas-ure progress toward accomplishing BNUB’smandate and broader peace consolidation inBurundi, including democratic process, tran-sitional justice, institution building, and humanrights. The Security Council, the governmentof Burundi, and the Secretary-General willneed to reach a consensus on whether thistransition should take place before the 2015elections, as called for by the government, orafter, as some Council members have alreadymooted.

Conclusion

The security environment has stabilized in im-portant ways in Burundi and the wider region.However, critical security and political chal-lenges remain, illustrated most dramatically byevents in the CAR as the year came to a close.How governments choose to approach theseissues will largely determine future stabilityin the region. Funding gaps affecting nationalefforts in security sector reform and interre-lated efforts to mitigate threats posed byarmed rebel groups operating across the re-gion have also hampered progress in theseareas. It remains to be seen whether the recentparallel initiatives launched by the AU andUN to combat the LRA will be effective inharnessing thinly spread resources, or willlead to a resource strain through duplicationof efforts.

Notes

1. ECCAS members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

2. For further information, see Center on International Cooperation, Review of Political Missions2010 (New York, 2010).

3. Tasked to coordinate implementation of the strategy, UNOCA organized a first workshop ofdonors and the LRA focal points in Entebbe in July 2012, which adopted a set of priorities designed toform the basis of a programmatic document.

4. According to interviews with mission staff.5. These funding gaps were partially ameliorated by the provision of $2.4 million by the UN Peace-

building Fund and the $10 million pledged by ECCAS.6. The roadmap envisages the elaboration of six subsectoral strategies to be consolidated into a

three-year national SSR strategy. Among them, the substrategies on the armed forces and the gen-darmerie, and on democratic oversight, have been finalized, and the design of the substrategy on the po-lice is receiving additional support from the Security Sector Reform Unit of the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations. The substrategies on the justice sector, decentralization, and environmentalprotection, and on public finance and customs, have yet to be drafted. See United Nations, Report of theSecretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and on the Activities of the UnitedNations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that Country, UN Doc. S/2012/374, 2012.

7. United Nations, Department of Public Information, Security Council Press Statement on Cen-tral African Republic, UN Doc. SC/10665-AFR/2400, 2012.


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Global Peace Operations Review | The Global Peace Operations …peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/... · 2015. 7. 17. · CAR, quickly capturing the city of Bria