Giga 10 Wp130 Juan-Vuellers

8/3/2019 Giga 10 Wp130 Juan-Vuellers

1/29www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers

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GIGA Research Programme:

Violence and Security___________________________

Religious Peace ActivismThe Rational Element of

Religious Elites Decision-making Processes

Alexander De Juan/Johannes Vllers

No 130 April 2010


2/29

GIGAWP130/2010

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3/29

GIGAWP130/2010

ReligiousPeaceActivismTheRationalElementof

ReligiousElites

Decision

making

Processes

Abstract

Religiouselitesareactiveforpeaceinmanyviolentconflicts.Normativeexplanationsof

tendonotsufficetoexplaintheirengagement.Inthispaperwedrawonthefindingsof

socialmovementresearchtoidentifythefactorsthatinducerationallyactingreligiousel

itestobeactiveforpeace.Itistheirrelationshipstothegovernment,otherreligiouselites,

andbelievers

that

can

motivate

them

to

call

for

peace.

However,

they

will

do

so

only

if

theyanticipatebasedontheoverall influenceofotherreligiouspeace(co)activists,the

structureof the religiouscommunity,and the frameenvironmentthat theywillnotbe

penalizedfortheirengagement.Religiousnormsareanimportantmotivationbehindreli

giouspeaceactivism,butrationaldecisionmakingalsohastobetakenintoaccountifreli

giousengagementforpeaceistobeexplainedfully.

Keywords:Religion,

conflict,

peace,

elites,

rational

choice,

framing

Dr.AlexanderDeJuan

waspreviouslyaresearchfellowintheGlobalChallengespostgraduateresearchprogram

attheUniversityofTbingen.HeiscurrentlyworkingasaprojectmanageratKfWEnt

wicklungsbank.

Contact: [email protected]

JohannesVllers,M.A.

isapoliticalscientistandaresearchfellowattheGIGAInstituteofAfricanAffairs.

Contact: [email protected]

Website: http://staff.gigahamburg.de/vuellers

http://staff.en.gigahamburg.de/vuellers


4/29

Zusammenfassung

ReligisesFriedensengagementDasRationaleElementinder

EntscheidungsfindungreligiserEliten

ReligiseElitenengagierensichinvielenGewaltkonfliktenfrFrieden.NormativeRecht

fertigungenfrihrVerhaltenknnendiesoftmalsjedochnurunzureichenderklren.Zur

IdentifizierungvonFaktorenfreinFriedensengagementrationalerreligiserElitenstt

zenwirunsaufdieErkenntnissederSozialenBewegungsforschung.DieBeziehungreligi

serElitenzurRegierung,zuanderenreligisenElitenunddenGlubigenmotiviertsie

zuFriedensaufrufen,frdiesichjedochnurdannengagieren,wennsiedavonausgehen

knnen,dassvon anderen religisen Friedensaktivisten,derStruktur ihrerReligionsge

meinschaftunddemFrameUmfeldkeineGefahrenfrihrEngagementzuerwartensind.

ReligiseNormen sindzwar einebedeutsameGrundlage fr religisesFriedensengage

ment,zurErklrungdesZustandekommensvonFriedensengagementsolltejedochdiera

tionaleEntscheidungsfindungreligiserElitenbercksichtigtwerden.


5/29

ReligiousPeaceActivismTheRationalElementofReligiousElitesDecisionmakingProcesses

AlexanderDeJuanandJohannesVllers

ArticleOutline

1 Introduction2 ReligiousEngagementforPeaceasaCounterframingMethod3 TheMotivesbehindReligiousEngagementforPeace4 TheRisksandOpportunitiesofReligiousFramesforPeace5 Conclusion

1 Introduction

Inmanyviolentconflicts,religiousactorshaveeffectivelycontributedtopeace.Clericshave

mediatedbetween theparties to theconflict.Peacemovementshavegathered inchurches,

mosques,andtemples.Believershaveprotestedforhumanrights,democracyandpeaceunder

thebannerofreligion.ThecommitmenttopeaceonthepartoftheGrandAyatollahSayyidAli

alHusaynialSistaniinIraq;theDalaiLamainTibet;ortheinterreligiousnetworksinNige

ria,Uganda,andthePhilippinesarebutafewcurrentexamples.

Mostexistingstudiesonreligiousengagementforpeacearelimitedtotheanalysisof

thepeaceactivitiesthemselves.Theyfocusondescribingthespecialpotentialaswellthedif

ferenttypesofreligiousengagementforpeace.1Otherworksaremainlyempiricalinnature.

Theyfocusondescribingreligiousactivitiesinsinglecases.2However,anobviousquestionis

neglectedinallofthesestudies:underwhatcircumstancesisreligiousactivismforpeaceob

servable?

1 AbuNimer/KadayificiOrellana2008;Carter/Smith2004;Sampson1997;Appleby2001;Little/Appleby2004;

Harpviken/Roislien2008;Johnston/Cox2003;TerHaar2005.2 Cejka/Bamat2003;PalmDalupan2005;Steele2003;Wooster1994;Poethig2002;Sampson1994;Smock2006;

Nichols1994;Johnston1994;Haynes2009;Little2007.


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6 AlexanderDeJuan/JohannesVllers:ReligiousPeaceActivism

Inanswering thisquestion,one can focusonvariousdimensionsof religion suchas

identities,ideas,organizations,andelites(Harpviken/Rislien2008;Basedau2009).Wewill

concentrateonthelatter.Religiouselitesarepeoplewhosestatusenablesthemtoinfluence

religiousnorm

setting

processes

more

effectively

than

the

average

believer.

Members

of

the

officialclergy,theleadersofreligiousmovementsandsects,andinfluentialmissionariesbe

longtothereligiouselite.3Theyhaveincommonthatthebelieversacceptthemaslegitimate

interpretersof the common religious scripts and traditions (Appleby 2003).Consequently,

theyarecrucialindeterminingtherolereligionwillplayinagivenviolentconflict.

Wefocushereonaspecialtypeofreligiousengagementonthepartofelitesthatisof

tenneglected inacademicdebates: religious calls forpeace,which can countervailviolent

propaganda and thus counteractmassmobilization. Such calls canbe especially effective

when they address religious calls for violence. If rebel groups are trying to use religious

rhetoric tomobilizebelievers,clericsand theirreligiouscalls forpeacecaneffectivelycon

tributetopeace.4Thelatterfiguresaretheoneswhopossessthenecessaryreligiouscredibil

ityamongthebelieverstochallengeradicalreligiousinterpretationsofconflict.5Againstthis

background,wewillfocusonthefollowingquestion:underwhatcircumstancesdoreligious

elitescallforpeaceasachallengetotheradicalreligiouspropagandaofrebelgroups?6

Itisoftentakenforgrantedthatsuchcallsforpeacearebasedonreligiouspeacenorms

aswellas thebeliefsof individual religiouselites (Gopin2000;Butselaar2005).Nodoubt

such factorsplayacrucialrole.Theymighthelp toexplain theengagementof individuals

suchasMahathmaGhandiorDesmondTutu.However,theydonotconstituteacomprehen

siveexplanationofthecircumstancesunderwhichreligiouselitesbecomeactiveforpeace.In

manyconflicts, rapidchangesoccur in thebehaviorof largepartsof theclericalestablish

ment.Religiouseliteswhohavebeenactiveinthedisseminationofradicalreligiousinterpre

tations suddenlybegin advocatingpeacewhen the social orpolitical framework changes.

SuchshiftshavetakenplaceinRwanda,Thailand,andIraq.Theycannotbeexplainedonthe

basisofreligiousnormsandbeliefsalone.Instead,theyareindicationsofrationaldecision

making.

3 Usuallythetermeliteisusedtocharacterizeasuperlative(themostinfluential).However,wealsoinclude

clericsoflowerranksinthecategoryofelites.Theessentialelementofthedefinitionisthedifferentiation

fromthemasses.Duetotheirstatuswithinthereligiouscommunity,elitesinfluenceonreligiousnormset

tingishigherthanthatofthemajorityofthebelievers(Appleby2000).4 Besides,religiouselitescanbeactiveforpeaceindifferentways.Theycanactasneutralobserversorasme

diatorsbetween theparties to the conflict,and they canprovideorganizational resources forpeacemove

ments(seeSampson1997).5 Religiousengagementforpeacereferstoalltheactivitiesofreligiouselitesthatareintendedtopreventorend

violentconflicts,regardlessofwhethercontributetotheperpetuationofunjustsocialandpoliticalstructures.6 In thisarticleweonlyconsiderthepeaceactivitiesofnationalreligiouselites.Wepresumethattheengage

mentof international religiousorganizations isbasedon othermechanisms than the activitiesof religious

communities that are involved in the conflict themselvesare.Hence, theseother formsof engagement for

peacehavetobeanalyzedseparately.


7/29

AlexanderDeJuan/JohannesVllers:ReligiousPeaceActivism 7

Hence,wearguethatthesimplereferencetoreligiousaltruismandcharityisinmany

casesnotapersuasiveexplanationofreligiousengagementforpeace.Oftenstrategicconsid

erationsmake religious elitesbecome advocates forpeace.Their relationships to thegov

ernment,to

other

religious

elites,

and

to

believers

can

influence

their

behavior.

Furthermore,

therisksofpeaceactivitieshavetobetakenintoaccount.Inacuteviolentconflictsactivists

forpeacemaybedenouncedastraitorsandthreatenedphysically.Thehighertheprobability

that religiouseliteswillprevailover religiouscalls forviolence, the lower these risks.The

probabilityofsuccesswillbeespeciallyhigh ifreligiouscallsforpeacearesupportedbya

broadcoalitionof localandhighranking religiouselites, if the religiouscongregationsare

connected through formal interlinkages, and if the various religious communities are

stronglynetworked.

Inordertoestablishthesetheses,wefirstelaborateontherelevanceofreligiouscalls

for peace, drawing on social science research and the concept of collective action frames

(CAFs).Thesuccessofrebelgroupsdependsontheirabilitytodisseminatepersuasivemobi

lizingmessages.Accordingly,religiouscallsforpeacecanbeinterpretedascounterframesto

suchmobilizingreligiousmessages.Inthiscontextwebrieflyoutlinethedifferentformsof

religiousengagementforpeace.Subsequently,weidentifythefactorsthatcanmotivatereli

giouselitestoactivelycounterreligiouscallsforviolence.Wedifferentiatebetweenthosefac

torsthatcanmotivatereligiouselitesand those factors thatcanaffecttherisksofreligious

callsforpeace.Theconcludingsectionsummarizesthecentralthesesandtheresults.

2 ReligiousEngagementforPeaceasaCounterframingMethod

Thecurrentresearchonthecausesofcivilwarsfocusesonstructuralfactors;itconcentrates

oneconomic,political,andethnicdeterminants(Fearon/Laitin2003;Hegre/Sambanis2006).

However,ittendstoneglectthedynamicsofmobilization.Peoplesreadinesstosupportvio

lentmovementsdoesnotdependsimplyonstructuralgrievances.Themajorityofapopula

tionwillonlyengage inviolentconflict if itsmembershavecongruentperceptionsofhow

theirsituationistobeinterpretedandhowitcanbechanged(Barkeretal.2001;Snowetal.

1986:465466;Polletta/Ho2006;Fearon/Laitin2000).Suchcollective conflict interpretations

only evolve simultaneously on abroad scale if they are formulated and spread centrally

(Barkeretal.2001:45;Morris/Staggenborg2004:173).Insocialmovementresearchtheterm

framingisusedforsuchinterpretationanddissemination.Itresultsinsocalledcollective

actionframes(CAFs).CAFsareschemesofinterpretationthatexplainrealityinasimplified

way in order tomobilize support and todemobilize antagonisticparts of thepopulation

(Snow2004:384;Benford/Snow1988;2000).ViolentmovementsuseCAFstomobilizepeople

togo

to

war.

Only

if

they

are

able

to

persuade

the

population

of

their

interpretation

of

the

conflict,iftheyconvincethepeoplethattheyareabletochangetheirsituationandthatvio

lenceisthebestwaytodoso,willtheybeabletomobilizesupport.Againstthisbackground,


8/29


peacemaking can consist of a rhetorical act. Peace activists can challenge themobilizing

CAFs of violentmovements and defend their own interpretation of the conflict. If their

counterframesprevail, theywillbeable todemobilizepeopleand to contribute topeace.

Giventhe

structural

focus

of

the

current

research

on

the

causes

of

violent

conflicts,

such

rhe

toricalpeaceactivismisoftenneglected.

Religiouspeacemakingcanbeparticularly importantandeffective inconflictswitha

strongreligiousdimension.WhenincorporatedintoCAFs,religionscancontributetothees

calationofconflicts.Otherwisefragmentedgroupscanbeunitedonthebasisofcommonre

ligiousbeliefs,myths,and rituals.On theotherhand, religious identities canmark insur

mountabledifferencesbetweengroups.Hence,theycanbeeffective inthedefinitionof in

groupsandoutgroups(Appleby2000:61;Seul1999:565).Further,ifconflictsareperceived

asbeingreligiousinnature,theycanhardlyberesolvedinapeacefulway.Religiousbeliefsare

nonnegotiableandindivisible.Ifconflictsareintegratedintoatranscendentalcontext,peaceful

conflictresolution ispracticallyruledout (Hasenclever/Rittberger2003;Svensson2007).Fi

nally,thepromiseoftranscendentrewardsandpunishmentscan increase individualreadi

nesstobearthesacrificesofviolentconflictandtouseviolence.Combatantswilltendtobe

morereadytokillanddieforhigherreligiousgoalsthanforpoliticaloreconomicprograms

(Appleby2003;Hasenclever/Rittberger2003).

Religionwillhave suchamplifyingeffects ifbelieversarepersuadedof the religious

natureofaconflict.Analysesof thesociologyof religiondemonstrate thatreligiousnorm

settingprocessesarestronglyinfluencedbyreligiouselites.Abstractandcomplexmyths,re

ligiouswritings,andtraditionsneedtobecontinuouslyinterpretedinthelightofachanging

reality.Otherwisetheycannotbeappliedtoconcreteeventsandsituations.Ineveryreligious

communitytherearepeoplewhoareacceptedbythebelieversaslegitimateinterpretersof

religiousdogmas.Theyexplainconcretesituationsinthelightoftheirspecificsystemsofbe

lief.Theyapplyabstractreligiousideastorealityandprovidethebelieverswithconcretere

ligiousnormsandguidelines(Appleby2000).Hence,religionswillcontributetoviolenceif

thesereligiouselitesaresuccessfulindisseminatingradicalreligiousinterpretationsamong

thebelievers.

In

such

cases

religion

becomes

apart

of

CAFs

and

contributes

to

mobilization

(DeJuan/Hasenclever2009).ThiscouldbeobservedinBosnia,wheremembersoftheCatho

licChurchandtheSerbianOrthodoxChurchmobilizedbelieversonthebasisofradicalreli

giousmessages.ManyBuddhistmonksinSriLankaplayedasimilarroleintheconflictwith

theTamilminority. InNigeria,MuslimandChristianclericshaveon severaloccasions in

citedviolent clashesbetween the two religious communities. In thePhilippines andThai

land,Muslim clerics have supported rebel groupswithin theMuslimminorities through

radical religious calls for violence against their respective central governments (Bartholo

meusz2002;Ibrahim1991;Sells1996).


9/29


Accordingly,religiousengagementforpeacecanconsistofreligiouselitesattemptsto

preventsuchradicalreligiousnormsetting.7Theelitestrytocounter thereligiouscallsfor

violenceutteredby radical rebelgroups and their associated religious elites.Trough their

engagementthey

aim

to

provide

the

believers

with

alternative,

moderate

interpretations

of

a

conflict.Themorepersuasivetheseinterpretationsare,thesmallertheradicalframeschance

ofasuccessfulmobilization.Firstly,segregationamongreligiousgroupscanpotentiallybe

counteractedthroughanemphasisoncommonreligiousvalues.Thiskindofcounteraction

canbeobservedinIraq.ThecurrentcommunalviolenceisbasedontheradicalintraIslamic

differentiationbetween Shiites and Sunnis.Among the latter,AbuMusab alZarqawi de

claredtheShiitestobenonbelieversinordertosuccessfullymobilizetheSunnis.However,

in2004hisformermentorAbuMuhhamedAlMaqdisistartedtopubliclyquestionhisinter

pretation.Contrary toZarqawi,AlMaqdisiemphasized thatShiitesareMuslimsand that

anyattackonShiiteswouldbeillegitimate(Yehoshua2005).Secondly,religiousengagement

forpeacecanconsistofthenegationofthereligiousnatureofconflictsandattemptstocall

attentiontothepossibilitiesforpeacefulmeansofconflictresolution.InmanyMuslimcoun

triestoday,religiouscontestsinwhichmoderateclericspubliclychallengeotherreligiousel

itesdeclarationsofholywarcanbeobserved(Wiktorowicz2004;Snow/Byrd2007).Finally,

religiouspeaceactivism can call religious legitimizationsofviolence intoquestionbyem

phasizingthereligiousimperativeofnonviolenceandpeace.InSriLanka,forexample,the

embeddingoftheconflictwiththeTamilminorityintothenarrativeofanuncompromising

warfortheholylandhasbeenanessentialconditionforthesuspensionoftheBuddhistim

perativeofnonviolence.Inthiscontext,engagedBuddhistshavechallengedthereligiousle

gitimizationofviolenceandstressedthepriorityofthe imperativeofnonviolenceoverthe

imperativeofdefendingthereligion(Bartholomeusz2002).

Hence,religiouselitescanplayadecisiverole in fosteringpeacefulmeansofconflict

resolutionwhentheychallengeradicalreligiouscallsforviolence.However,theyarenotac

tive in thisway in every conflictwith a religious dimension.Underwhat circumstances,

then,issuchreligiousengagementforpeaceobservable?

3 TheMotivesbehindReligiousEngagementforPeace

Themotivesbehind religiousengagement forpeaceare rarelyquestioned in theacademic

debate.Manystudiesinsteadinvestigatethereasonsbehindreligiouscallsforviolenceand

trytodevelopcausalmodelsthatexplainthecircumstancesunderwhichreligiouselitesbe

comeactiveinfavorofviolentmovements(Appleby2000;DeJuan2009;Toft2007).Acade

7 Religiouselitescanalsobeactiveforpeaceinapreemptiveway,forexample,byfosteringrelationsandcontact

betweendifferentreligiouscommunitiestopreventthedevelopmentofstereotypes.However,inthisarticlewe

concentrateontheengagementinviolentconflicts.


10/29


mic interest in thecausesof religiousengagement forpeace is limited.The reason for this

seemstobeanoverlyoptimisticperspectiveonreligion.Whereasreligiouscallsforviolence

areoftentracedbacktospecificstructuralfactorsaswellasthe instrumentalizationofreli

gionby

self

interested

elites,

it

seems

to

be

agenerally

accepted

fact

that

religious

engage

mentforpeaceisalwaysgroundedinpersonalreligiousbeliefsandaltruism.Withoutdoubt

thesefactorsplayadecisiveroleinmanycases.However,inmanyviolentconflictsreligious

activitiesforpeacerestnotonpersonalconvictionsbutonstrategicconsiderations.Religious

elitesare integratedintodifferentrelationshipsthatmightinfluencetheirbehavior.Ofspe

cialimportancearetheirrelationshipstothegovernment,tootherreligiouselites,andtobe

lievers.Intheremainderofthissection,weillustratehowtheserelationshipscaninfluence

clericsactions.Wedonotstrivetoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofdecisionmaking,but

rathertodemonstratethatrationaldecisionmakingcaninfluencereligiouselitesbehavior.

ReligiousElitesRelationshiptotheGovernment

Religionselitesneedmaterialandorganizationalresourcestofulfilltheirreligiousandsocial

responsibilities.Proselytizing,offeringreligiouseducation,operatingchurches,mosquesor

temples, andproviding social services is costly. Furthermore, religious communities need

specific legal conditions that enablebelievers to freely practice their religion. This legal

frameworkisdeterminedbypoliticalelites(Philpott2007).Ifreligiouscommunitiesarede

pendenton

the

governments

goodwill

in

order

to

access

these

resources

and

if

they

do

not

expecttoprofitfromthevictoryoftheoppositionmovement(eitherbecauseitsmembersbe

long toanotherreligionorbecauseavictoryby therebelsdoesnotseem likely), there isa

significant probability that their religious eliteswill support the governmentwhen it is

threatenedbyoppositionalmovements.Iftheydonot,theyruntheriskthatpoliticalactors

willceasetheirsupporttothecommunity.Furthermore,theremightbeasubstantialriskthat

thegovernmentcouldbeoverthrownandthatsupporttoreligiouseliteswouldendasare

sult.Thus,ifreligiouselitesaredependentongovernmentsupport,theywilltrytocondemn

everycallforviolenceagainsttherulingregimeandwillcallonbelieverstorefrainfromvio

lenceandtoacceptthestatusquo(Hasenclever/DeJuan2007;Johnston/Figa1988).

With thesocalledPatronageofIslamAct, thegovernmentofThailandhasmade the

countrysMuslimreligiousestablishmentmoredependentonthestate:acentralized,state

controlledreligiousstructurehasbeenestablished,andthereligiouseliteswithinthisstruc

ture are paidby the state.Accordingly, in the conflict over the autonomy of theMalay

Muslimstatesinthesouthofthecountry,manyoftheseclericshavesupportedthegovern

mentagainsttherebels.Religiousinterpretationsoftheconflicthaveplayedamajorrolein

themobilizingideologyoftheMuslimrebelgroups.MuslimclericswithintheofficialMus

lim establishment have publicly challenged these religious interpretations and called for

peace(CheMan1990;Yusuf1998;Gilquin2002).


11/29


DuringthecolonialperiodinMozambiquetheCatholicChurchwashighlydependent

on thegovernments financialandpoliticalsupport.Whenagrowing independencemove

mentbegantochallengetheregime,Catholicclericsstartedtocondemnviolentprotestsand

topreach

submission

to

the

colonial

power.

Supporting

the

independence

movement

was

declared an act againstGodswill.With these religious interpretations these clerics chal

lengedthereligioussupportgiventothemovementbymanylocalclerics,whodrewonlib

erationtheologytolegitimizeprotestsagainstthegovernment.Similarsituationscanbeob

servedinmanyotherAfricanandLatinAmericancountries,forinstance,AngolaandNica

ragua(Azevedo1992;McKenna1997;Schubert1997;Sawchuk1997).

InIndonesianWestPapua,conflictsbetweenChristianandMuslimcommunitieshave

onseveraloccasionsescalatedintoviolentclashes.WithinChristianmilitias,religiousinter

pretationsoftheconflicthavegrowninimportance.Rebelgroupshavetriedtomobilizethe

populationonthebasisofradicalreligiousinterpretations.However,outoffearofgovern

mentpunishment,thereligiouselitesoftheCatholicChurchhavepubliclycondemnedany

religiouslegitimizationofviolenceagainstthestate(May1991;Rutherford2005).

ReligiousElitesRelationshiptoOtherReligiousElites

Within religious communities,different theologicalpositions,worldviews and conceptsof

socialorderamongthevariousreligiouselitescanclash(Johnston/Figa1988:42;Haynes1996).

Hence,clerics

will

try

to

prevail

over

competing

religious

elites

and

to

maximize

their

own

communitysaccesstomaterialandorganizationalresources.Suchintrareligiouscompetition

canformthebackgroundtoreligiousengagementforpeace.Thiscompetitionmanifestsitself

inmutualchallengesoftheotherstheologicalinterpretations.Competingreligiouselitestry

to strengthen their ownpositionbypublicly challenging the religious interpretations and

credibilityoftheirreligiousrivals.Ifoneofthesecompetingfactionsisengagedinreligious

callsforviolence,engaginginreligiouscallsforpeacecanbeapromisingstrategyforitsop

ponents(DeJuan2009).8

InChechnya, intrareligious competitionplayedadecisive role in the engagementof

various religiouselites forpeace.MostChechensbelong tooneof themajorSufiTariqahs:

QadiriyyaorNaqshbandiyya.BeforethefirstChechenwar,manyQadiriyyaclericssuppor

ted Dschochar Dudajews nationalist government because they expected that Dudajew

wouldstrengthentheirpositionagainsttheNaqshbandiyya.Intherunuptothewar,these

clericsdisseminatedradicalreligiousinterpretationsoftheconflictandsupportedDudajews

uncompromising stance towards theRussiangovernment.ManyNaqshbandiyya religious

8 Engagementforpeaceisbutonestrategyinsuchintrareligiouscompetition.Analternativeoptionwouldbe

callsforviolenceagainsttherebelgroupsandassociatedclerics.Therelativevalueofthesetwostrategiesde

pendsontheindividualcontext(forexample,theinterestsofthepoliticalelitesinthegovernment).Hence,in

trareligiousrivalriescanfosterpeaceengagementbutdonotdosoeverycase.


12/29


elitesopenlychallenged the religious interpretationsandmessagesof their religious rivals

andcalledforpeaceandcompromisewiththecentralgovernment(Gammer2000;Rotar2001;

Yemelianova2001).ItwasonlywhentheactualRussianinvasionbeganthattheytoobegan

callingfor

violence.

InmanyMuslim communities clericshave lost their traditionalmonopolyover reli

giousinterpretation.Newcommunicationstechnologyhasprovidedbelieverswithdirectac

cesstoreligiousknowledge.Inthisway,acrucialbasisforthetraditionalreligiousauthority

of theclericshasbeen lost: themonopolyover thepreservationanddisseminationof reli

giousknowledge (Robinson1993). Inmanyplacesanew stratumof religious intellectuals

hasemerged thathasacquired itsknowledge independently.These individualsdonotrec

ognizethetraditionalauthorities.SomearetryingtoforcefullyIslamizepoliticsandsociety;

sometrytoachievethesegoalsbyviolentmeansandbymobilizingsupportamongbelievers.

Membersofthereligiousestablishmenthavevehementlychallengedthereligiousinterpreta

tionsandworldviewsofsuch radicalgroups.Theycondemn radicalcalls forviolenceand

insteadcallforpeaceinordertoprotecttheirpersonalpositionwithinthereligiouscommu

nity.Thiscanbeobserved,forexample,inAlgeriaandEgypt.

Inmanyconflictsreligiouselitesengageforpeaceafterhavingsupportedforalong

timethe radical religious interpretationsofviolentmovements.Suchshiftscanbe traced

backtothefactthatrivalreligiouseliteshavestartedtosupportthesameviolentmovement.

Inthissituationclericsmightreactbyabandoningtheirpreviouscallsforviolenceandpub

liclychallengingthenewviolent interpretationoftheirreligiousrivals.InThailand,forex

ample,thefounderoftheMalayMuslimrebelmovementtheNationalRevolutionaryFront

(BRN)distancedhimselffromthegroupin1984,onceotherreligiouseliteshadgainedinflu

encewithin themovement.He founded the socalledBRNUlama and started to call for

peace,summoning the rebels to laydown theirarms.Similarly, in Iraq themilitia leader

MuqtadaalSadrwas supportedby the influential clericalHariri.However,whenalSadr

increasinglyclaimedthereligiousleadershipofthemovementhimself,alHariristartedtodis

tancehimselffromalSadrandtocondemnhisviolentpolitics(Gilquin2002:119;ICG2006).

ReligiousElitesRelationshiptoBelievers

The social influence of religious communities also depends on howmanymembers they

have.Themorepeoplebelongtoareligiouscommunity,thegreaterthecommunitysinflu

enceontheconstitutionofsociety.Usuallybelieversandtheirreligiousdonationsformthe

financialbackboneoftherespectivereligiouscommunityandreligiousestablishment(Miller

2002:438).Hence,acentralaimofreligiouselitesistosecurethesizeoftheirreligiouscom

munity,especially if its religious influence isnot artificiallyprotectedby thegovernment.

Theeliteswilltrytopreventanyconflictbetweentheirownreligiousinterpretationsandthe

realityofbelievers.Religionsaremeanttoprovideexplanations.Ifreligiousmessagescon


13/29


tradicttheperceptionsandlifesituationsofbelievers,religiouselitesruntheriskthatpeople

willturntoalternativeclericsandtheirreligiousinterpretations(Silbermanetal.2005,Ben

ford1993).Insuchasituationclericswilloftenactstrategically.

Inmany

conflictsafter

years

of

violencea

strong

sense

of

war

weariness

develops

amongthepopulation.Thepublicbeginstoincreasinglycondemnactsofviolenceandtheir

perpetrators.Peopledistancethemselvesfromviolentmovements.Personalexperiencesand

sufferingasaresultofthewarleadpeopletoquestionthenecessityandbenefitsofviolence

andtocallforareturntopeace.9Religiouscondemnationsofviolenceandcallsforpeacecan

bevery influential in suchan environment.This canbeobserved inSudan,where, in the

middleofthewar,Christianchurcheshavebeenimpressivelysuccessfulintheirproselytiz

ing efforts.Within a few years they havemassively gained in influence among the local

populationthroughtheirreligiouspeacesermons(Wheeler1997;Hutchinson2001).Accord

ingtotheextenttowhichreligiouscallsforpeacegainininfluence,thosereligiouseliteswho

haveincitedviolenceoractedpassivelyinthepastthencomeunderpressure.Iftheydonot

adapttheirbehaviorandtheirreligiousmessages,theyriskloosingtheirreligiousinfluence.

AftertheRwandangenocidein1994,manybelieverslefttheCatholicChurch.Catholicclerics

hadactivelysupportedtheHabyarimanaregimeanditspolitics.Manyofthemhadplayed

an active role in the genocide.Others hadwatched themilitias passively. Even after the

genocide,highrankingclericswerehesitant tocondemnwhathadhappened.Asa conse

quence,manypeopledistanced themselves from theCatholicChurch.Simultaneously, the

MuslimcommunityandmanyPentecostalchurchesgrewrapidly(Klsener2006;Doughty/

Ntambara2005).

TheconflictsinSudanandRwandademonstratethatreligiouselitesmighthavemuch

towiniftheybecomeactiveforpeaceandmuchtoloseiftheydonot.Adaptingtheirreli

giousmessagestochangingconflictinterpretationswithinthepopulationinordertoprevent

alossofreligiousinfluenceduringoraftermanifestviolentconflictscanthusbeastrategic

decisiononthepartofreligiouselites.Suchstrategicbehaviorcanbeobservedinmanycon

flicts,especiallyinthepostconflictphasewhenmanifestviolencehasendedandmanypeo

plelong

to

return

to

apeaceful

life

(Fox

2004:

23).

On

many

occasions,

religious

actors

who

havelongcontributedtotheescalationofaconflicthavethenreversedtheirreligiousinter

pretationsofit.Theycallforpeaceandforgivenessandtrytoadapttheirreligiousmessages

totheexpectationsofbelievers.InBosnia,forexample,manyclericshavebeenactiveinfos

teringforgivenessandreconciliation,althoughtheypreviouslyincitedintoleranceandsup

portedthesegregationofMuslims,CatholicsandSerbianOrthodox(Steele2003).Asimilar

9 ThiscanbeobservedinUgandaorinChechnya.Theprevioussupportforviolentmovementsonthepartofthe

populationdecreasedinthecourseoftheconflict.Therebelgroupsevolvedfrommassmovementstoisolated

guerrillagroups.However,violentconflictsdonotalwaysdevelopinthisway.Inmanyconflictscontraryde

velopments takeplaceandpeoplesacceptanceofpeacefulmeansofconflict resolutiondiminishes. In these

casestheeffectonthereligiouseliteswouldbeexpectedtobecontrarytothatnamedabove(seeCole2007).


14/29


situationcanbeobservedinIreland.ReligiouselitesintheCatholicandtheProtestantcom

munities longcontributed to theescalationof theconflictbetween the twodenominations.

However,astheviolenceended,thepositionofthechurchesbecamemuchmoremoderate

andconstructive.

Instead

of

emphasizing

the

insurmountable

differences

between

the

com

munities,theybegantounderscorethepossibilityofpeacefulcoexistence.

4 TheRisksandOpportunitiesofReligiousFramesforPeace

Ifreligiouselitesactrationally,theiractionsarealsoinfluencedbythepotentialcostsoftheir

engagement forpeace.Clericswho are committed topeace inviolent conflicts take some

risks.Thereisapossibilitythat,iftheycallforforgivenessandtoleranceinasettingwhere

peopleare

oppressed

or

violated,

they

will

be

stigmatized

as

traitors

by

those

affected

(Little/

Appleby2004).Inadditiontophysicalthreats,thereisdangerthatbelieverswillabandonthe

clericsbecause theydonotbelieve in theirpeace appeals, or that other influential clerics

fromwithintheircommunitywillcondemnthem.Finally,theriskexiststhatradicalpolitical

groupswillthreatenthem.Clericsareawareoftheserisksandtakethemintoaccountinde

cidingfororagainstactivepeaceengagement.

Accordingly, thequestionofwhat influences the levelof risk arises.10 Itmustbeas

sumedthattheriskswillbelowerifthesereligiouscallsforpeaceprevailoverreligiouscalls

forviolence.Aslongasclericsradicalreligiousmessagesofviolencesucceedindominating

theinternaldiscourseinareligiouscommunity,thegreateristhelikelihoodthatclericscall

ingforpeacewillfacetheabovementionedrisks.Inviewofthis,clericswillespousepeace

whentheyexpectthattheyareinapositiontosurmounttheopposingreligiouscallsforvio

lence.Theirchancesof successare relatedespecially to the strengthof the religiouspeace

coalition,thecharacteristicsofthereligiouscommunity,andtheempiricalcredibilityofreli

giouscallsforpeace.

TheStrengthofPeaceCoalitions

Therisksforindividualclericsareloweriftheydistributepeacemessageswithintheframe

workofabroaderandinfluentialcoalitionofreligiouselites.Thisimpliesthatthemorecler

icsofdifferenthierarchical ranksareengaged inacoalition, thehigher thepossibility that

theycaneffectivelychallengecallsforviolencefromotherreligiouselitesdirectedattheirbe

lievers.Suchalliancesprovidecredibilityinvariouswaysandhavetheabilitytoeffectively

10 Forreligiouscalls forpeace tobesuccessful, theyhave toconsiderseveralnonreligioussurroundingcondi

tions,suchasthefurtherdevelopmentoftheconflictorthebehaviorofpoliticalandcivilelites.Inourview,

thesefactorsarenotcrucialinthedecisionmakingprocessesofreligiouselites.Thefactorsmentionedinthe

followingdiscussionarethemostimportantones,butitmustbenotedthatotherfactorscouldhaveaninflu

enceuponthedecisionsofreligiouselitesinspecificcases.


15/29


transmittheirmessagestobelieversthroughdiversechannels.Nevertheless,thisholdstrue

forboththedominantframeandthecounterframewithinonereligiouscommunity.

Theclericsarethevisiblefaceoftheirframes;theircredibilitydeterminesthecredibility

ofthe

particular

frame

(Wiktorowicz

2004:

161;

Benford/Snow

2000:

621

622).

The

holders

of

highholyofficesareseenas theofficialspokespeopleof their religiouscommunitydue to

theirformalposition.Theysymbolizetheologicalknowledgeandsacralauthority(Wiktoro

wicz2004:161;DeJuan/Hasenclever2009;Carroll1981;Nepstad2004).Nevertheless,thehier

archicallevelisonlyoneelementofthepotentialaccessibilityandcredibilityofaframe.Fur

thermore,localreligiouselitessuchaspriests,imamsandgurusareoftenactiveoveralong

timeperiodintheircommunityandthereforewellestablished.Theirdailycontactwithpeople

andtheirlongtermcharitableengagementmakethemcredible(Appleby2001:826827).

Religiouspeacemessagesprevailoverreligiouscallsforviolenceiftheyreachbeliev

ers.Whatmattersisthatthemessagescanbetransportedtothelatter.Highrankingclerics

normally have access to the communications infrastructure of their religious community.

This infrastructure includessupraregionalnetworks, important religiousschools,churches,

andmosques.Ontheotherhand,localclericshaveadifferentkindofaccesstobelievers.Often

theyrepresenttheonlydirectcontactthatbelievershavetoaninstitutionalizedreligion.Lo

cal religious elites thushave aunique capacity todeliver their religious interpretationdi

rectly to the people through religious worship, discussion groups or common prayers

(Polletta/Ho2006:201;Johnston/Figa1988;Longman1998).

Withincoalitionsofhighrankingandlocalreligiouselites,theriskforeachindividual

clericthatbelieverswillrejecthis/hermessageofpeaceandabandonhim/herdecreases.In

suchacoalition the individualmessagesofpeaceandcondemnationsofviolenceare sup

portedandwitnessedbymanyotherpotentiallycredibleclerics.Additionally,as the influ

enceofthepeacecoalitiongrows,itsinfluencebecomesamotivationalfactorinitself:clerics

willingness tosupport themessagesofbroadand influentialpeacecoalitionsgrowsas the

former try tobepartof thedominant religiousdiscoursewithin theircommunity.But the

weakerthecoalition,thehighertheriskwillbeforthe individualcleric.Inmanyconflicts,

forinstance,

in

Thailand

or

the

Philippines,

similar

processes

can

be

observed:

if

religious

peacecoalitionsachieveacertainstrengthandinfluence,moreandmorepassiveorviolence

supportingclericsjoin.

However,the idea thatpeaceengagementwillexist ifpeaceengagementhasalready

existedappears tobeacircularargument.Nonetheless, two important conclusions canbe

drawn. Firstly, the abovementioned motivational mechanisms must surpass a certain

thresholdtooperateatall.Thatistosay,thegreaterthenumberofclericsfromdiversehier

archical rankswhoareaffectedby thesemotivational factors, thegreater thenumberwho

willbepreparedtoengageforpeaceandthemorelikelyitisthatpeaceengagementwillbe

observableatall.Secondly,astheimpactofapeacecoalitiongrows,thepeacecoalitionitself

actsasamotivational factor.Believersacceptthecallsforpeace,andthus itbecomesmore


16/29


difficult todefendopposing interpretations tobelievers.Correspondingly, it ismore likely

thatclericswillincreasinglyengageinpeaceeffortseventhoughtheythemselvesarenotaf

fectedbytheoriginalmotivationalfactors.

TheStructureoftheReligiousCommunity

The structure of the religious community has an ambivalent influence on possible peace

frames.Religiouscallsforpeacecanbeextraordinarilyeffectiveininstitutionalizedreligious

communities. The institutionalized character of the community can increase the above

mentioned selfenergizing effect. Conversely, the institutionalized structure can also sup

pressreligiouspeaceinitiativesbyincreasingtheriskofsuchengagementforreligiouselites.

Believershave access to thediverse interpretations of thedifferent religious elites if

communities have formal structures to connect the various parishes among themselves.

Structuressuchasnationalreligiousorganizations,regionalandlocalcouncils,andmiscella

neoussupraregional,supraethnic,andsupradogmaticaffiliationscreateareligiouspublic

sphere inwhichdiverse interpretationsmustbejustifiedand inwhich religious calls for

peacecanchallengeradicalinterpretations(Hasenclever/DeJuan2007).Furthermore,iffor

malmechanismsregulatetheaccesstofinancesandmaterialresourcesortheconfiguration

ofreligiouseducation ina religiouscommunity,religiouspeacecoalitionscanutilize these

structurestoeffectivelychallengeradicalelites.Inthisregard,JohnstonandFigahavedem

onstratedthat

the

absence

of

formal

networks

simplifies

the

propagation

of

radical

interpre

tationsbylocalreligiouselitesbecausetheseelitesdonothavetofearsanctions(Johnston/

Figa1988:44).Likewise,Foxnoticedinhisstudythatreligiouscommunitieswithmarginal

formalcontactsamongthemselvesareinvolvedmostofteninviolentconflicts(Fox2004:99).

Thefactthattheseformalstructurescanincreasetheeffectivenessofreligiouscallsfor

peaceisobvious,forinstance,inIraqorintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC).Ayatollah

alSistanipropagatedhisreligiouscallsforpeaceoverawidenetworkinallregionsofIraq.

Simultaneously,heusedhis influence tomarginalize the radicalelementswithin the tradi

tionalstructures(Gleave2007:6570;Cole2003).IntheDRCtheCatholichierarchyusedthe

churchscommunicationsmedianetwork todisseminate itscalls forpeace.Forexample, it

distributed itspeacecalls throughpastoral letterswhichweredistributed toallparishes in

thecountry.Theimportanceoftheinternalstructureisobviousinthisspecialcase,asonlyin

theeastoftheDRCwerereligiouscallsforviolencesuccessful.Inthisregiontheindividual

parishesweremoreorlessisolatedfromthecentralstructureoftheCatholicChurchduring

theongoingwar.Thus,thepeacepromotingcommunicationfromthecentralchurchdidnot

reachthemeffectively(Longman2001).

Furthermore,structureswhichprovidethebelieverswithaccesstodiversereligiousin

terpretationsmaynotonly increase theefficiencyof religiouscalls forpeacebutmayalso

enhance thewillingness forpeaceengagementwithin the religious community.Theymay


17/29


advance the strength of the abovementioned selfenergizing effects of the peace engage

ment.Otherclericsmotivationtojointhepeacecoalitionmayincreasewiththegrowingim

pactofthereligiouspeacecoalitioninthecommunityandthegrowingassertivenessofthe

peacepromoting

messages.

The

impact

of

these

mechanisms

is

especially

great

if

the

various

parishesofonereligiouscommunityareconnectedamong themselves,and if thereligious

authorityofsingularclericsisallocatedthroughformalmechanisms.Thepeacecoalitioncan

effectivelyuseitsgrowinginfluenceinthereligiouscommunitytomarginalizeradicalclerics

and todistribute itscalls forpeaceasacrediblealternative ineveryparishof thereligious

community.Furthermore,during these longprocesses thewillingnessof the clerics tobe

comepartofthepeacemessagesofthereligiousmajoritygrowsbecausetheydonotwantto

losetheirownpositionwithintheircommunityortheloyaltyoftheirbelievers.

Factorswhichincreasetheeffectivenessofreligiouscallsforpeacecouldalsodecrease

theriskthataccompaniesthesecalls.Theinstitutionalintegrationofreligiouselitesactsina

preventivemannerbecauseitallowsforthedissenting(radical)interpretationsofindividual

clericstoberecognizedforwhattheyare.Otherreligiouselitescantheneffectivelycondemn

theseradicalclericsand/orquestionthem infrontoftheirbelievers.Inthismannertheim

pactofindividualclericsdependsonthesupportorlackofsupportfortheirmessagesonthe

partofotherreligiouselites.Butwhathappensifthereligiousmessagesofviolencearenota

dissentingopinion in the religious community? If theviolentdiscourse isdominant, then

thesemechanismscouldhaveanequallysuppressiveeffectonindividualsengagementfor

peace.Theythenmakeiteasierforthemainstreamtodiscredittherepresentativesofmoder

atepeacepromotingmessages.Simultaneously,thepeacepromotingclericscouldeffectively

be penalized: they couldbe either isolated from access to the religious communitys re

sourcesordeposedfromtheirrank.

Theimpactofthesemechanismshasbeenobviousinstronglyformalizedcommunities

liketheSerbOrthodoxChurchinBosniaortheBuddhistcommunityinSriLanka.Sincethe

1950stheBuddhistcommunityinSriLankahasbeendominatedbymonkswhohaveadvo

catedanuncompromisingapproachtowardstheTamilminority.Anumberofthemhavedis

seminatedthese

fundamental

principles

in

their

sermons

and

their

teachings

since

inde

pendence(DeSilva/Bartholomeusz2001).Thosemonkswhohavesuggestedconcessionsto

theTamilsaselementsofreligiouspeaceinitiativeshavebeenbrandedastraitors.Duetothe

hierarchicalandstronglyformalizedstructureofthecommunity,themoreradicalmajority

ofmonkshasbeenabletooppressthepeacefulmessagesoftheminority.Furthermore,the

overwhelmingmajorityof themonkswhohave takenamoderate,conciliatorypositionto

wardstheTamilminority,haveaccordingasurveyofBuddhistmonksfromthe1980shad

aweakandunderprivilegedstatuswithintheBuddhistcommunity(Katz1988).

AnanaloguesituationexistedwithintheSerbianOrthodoxChurch.Whenthechurch

finallyescapedalongperiodofmanipulationandoppressionattheendofYugoslaviasTito

era,ittriedtogainmoreinfluence.Inthecourseofthisprocess,aneoconservativeopposition


18/29


securedinfluencewithinthechurch.Atthebeginningofthe1990sitthengrewtobecomethe

dominant faction in the religious community and thus limited the role of themoderates

within thechurch.During thewar, thisneoconservativewingplayedan importantpart in

thereligious

legitimization

of

violence.

Here,

too,

individual

clerical

opponents

existed,

such

asBishopHrizostominthenortheastofBosniaorthepriestmonkIgnatijeMidic.Bothcon

demnedthealliancebetweenthechurchandthenationalistsandthedisplacementofMus

limsinBosnia(Steele2003:136137;Radic1998:197).Nevertheless,thereligiousmajorityef

fectivelyoppressedthesevoices.

Theseexamplesraisethequestionofhowtheseradicalviewpointswereabletogainin

fluenceintherespectivereligiouscommunitieswhenthestructuresshouldinfacthavesup

portedthepreviouslydominantmoderateclerics.Bothcasesshowthatthisoccurredmainly

viaexternalpoliticalsupport.Nationalistpoliticianssupportedtheradicalclerics inBosnia

andSriLanka.Thispoliticalinterferencediminishedtheeffectofthepeacefavoringreligious

communitys structure.Similarmechanismshavebeenobserved inother countries, for in

stance,inRwandapriortothegenocideorinChechnyaatthebeginningofthe1990s(Radic

1998;DeSilva/Bartholomeusz2001;VanHoyweghen1996;Rotar2002).

TheCharacteristicsoftheFrameEnvironment

Interpretationsofconflictareneverpropagated inavacuumbutarerather integrated ina

specificstructural

and

cultural

context

(Benford/Snow

2000;

Williams/Kubal

1999;

Swidler

1986;Polletta/Ho2006:194;Williams2004).Peoplewillbelieve in religiousmessagesmore

easilywhenthesemessagescorrespondtotheirstructuralandculturalcontextandthustheir

dailyreality.Accordingly,theempiricalcredibilityofreligiouscallsforviolenceorpeaceis

predominantlyaffectedbytheattitudeofbelieverstowardsbelieversofanotherreligion.Re

ligiouscallsforviolenceareusuallybaseduponareligiousdefinitionofinandoutgroup,of

friendandfoe(Seul1999).Therefore,religiousframesforpeacewillbemoresuccessfulun

derconditionsinwhichthelivedrealityofbelieversdoesnotcorrespondtosuchadistinc

tion.Incontrast,aframeenvironmentwithaningroup/outgroupdistinctionbetweenreli

giouscommunities favorsreligious frames forviolence. Insuchasituation there isagreat

riskthatbelieverswilldistancethemselvesfromclericsandtheircallsforpeacesimplybe

cause thepeacemessagestands incontrast todailyexperienceswithorperceptionsof the

otherreligiouscommunity.Asclericstrytopreventsituationsinwhichthereisasubstantial

riskthatbelieverswilldistancethemselvesfromtheirinterpretations,theywillthereforebe

reluctant toengage forpeace themselves incommunitieswithweak relations tootherreli

gious communities.Accordingly, the likelihood of religious calls for peace decreases the

moretherespectivereligiouscommunitiesareisolatedfromeachother.

Conversely,religiouscallsforviolencewillbeatoddswiththedailylifeofbelieversif,

forexample,institutionalizedinterreligiousdialogueforumsexistatthelevelofthebelievers


19/29


andattheleveloftheclerics;ifthecommunitiessharecommonreligioustraditionsorritu

als;orifahighlevelofsocialcrosslinkagesbetweenreligiouscommunitiesexists,forexam

ple,familiarrelationsandmixedmarriages.Thelatterincreasethe likelihoodthatreligious

callsfor

peace

will

be

enforced.

InThailand the interreligious relationshipbetweenMuslimsandBuddhistswas rela

tivelyharmoniousovera longperiodof time.Thereligiouscommunitiesshared localcus

tomsandrituals;reciprocaldistinctionsandisolationsweretheexception(Haemindra1977;

Horstmann2004).These traditionallypositive relationsbetween the religiouscommunities

hamperedthesuccessofradicalmessagesatthebeginningoftherebellion inthe1960s.In

Chechnyatheoppositesituationexisted.Here,theinterreligiousrelationshipbetweenMus

limsandChristianswasnotdeeply rooted.ThedominantSufibrotherhoodsweremainly

privateorganizations.Manyof theirsupporterscut themselvesoff fromSovietsocietyand

avoidedcontactwithnonbelievers (LemercierQuelquejay1983;Khalilov2002).Thus the

numberofethnicallymixed families inpredominantlyChechen regionswasexceptionally

small(Bryan1992:197).Likewise,theinterreligiousdialoguebetweentheMuslimandChris

tianOrthodoxcommunitieswas littledevelopedandhardly institutionalized.Cooperation

wasofapragmaticnatureandaboveallspontaneous.Underthesecircumstances,theradical

messagesof religiousdistinction from rebelsandclerics in thesecondChechenwarhada

highlevelofempiricalcredibilityamongthebelievers.

Thelargersocialenvironmentalsoplaysasignificantroleinthedecisionmakingproc

essesofreligiouselites.Oneimportantdimension iscivilsociety.Theconfigurationofcivil

society inrelation to the religiousdemography is important forreligious frames forpeace.

Institutionalizedcivilsocietieswithoverlappingreligiousboundariesareabletoincreasethe

effectivenessofsuchframes.Theycontributeto interreligiousunderstanding,enhancecon

tact, and create forums for exchangebetweenbelievers (Varshney 2001: 375).Under such

conditionsreligiouselitescancrediblypointtocommonalitiesandcanrebutstereotypesby

referringtoexistingcontactsbetweenthedifferentreligiouscommunities.Theimportanceof

civilsocietyhasbeenimpressivelydemonstratedinastudybyVarshney.Atthebeginningof

the1990s,

many

cities

in

India

experienced

violent

riots

between

Hindus

and

Muslims.

Yet

in

otherIndiancitieswithcomparabledemographicconditionsnoviolenceoccurred.Varshney

plausiblylinksthesefindingstothedifferentstructuresofthevariouscivilsocieties.Novio

lenceoccurredincivilsocietieswithcloseformalizedcontactsbetweenbelieversfromdiffer

entreligiouscommunities(Varshney2001).Undertheseconditionsthepeaceframehadthe

highestlevelofempiricalcredibilityandalsocorrespondedtotheinterestsofthemajorityof

thepopulation.

Inlightofthe importanceoftherelationshipbetweenreligiouscommunities,thecru

cialroleplayedbythespecificmomentoftheengagementforpeaceisclear.Sustainedperi

odsofpeacecanresultinthedevelopmentofpositivegrouprelations,bothatthecivilsoci

etylevelandattheinterreligiousrelationslevel,andcansubsequentlyreducetheempirical


20/29


credibilityofreligiouscallsforviolence.However,onceexistingconflictshaveescalatedinto

violence,thedangerexiststhatcivilsocietystructuresandtherelationshipbetweenvarious

believerswill change rapidly.Mixedmarriagesbecomemore rare; interreligiousdialogue

breaksoff;

and

civil

society

structures

are

reduced

to

individual

communities.

Furthermore,

the daily life of people then corresponds with the religiously delimiting and violence

supportingmessages.Insuchaphase,religiouscallsforpeacewillbelesslikelytosucceed.

Fromtheperspectiveofclerics,theinevitablerisksofengagingforpeacewillincrease;reli

gious calls for peacewill thusbecome rare. Only after long periods of violence do the

chances of success once again increase.Ahurting stalemate (Zartman 1985)may increase

peoplescallsforapeacefulsettlementoftheconflict,asexplainedabove.Insuchasituation

notonlytheclericsmotivationtoadvocateforpeacebutalsothechancesofsuccessofthe

correspondingcallsforpeacewillincrease(Jessopetal.2008;Kelleher/Johnson2008).

5 Conclusion

Incontrast to theextensive studieson religiousescalation, religiousengagement forpeace

haspreviouslyreceived littleacademicattention.This isespecially truewithrespect to the

causalexplanationsforsuchengagement;thatis,thequestionofwhyreligiouselitesengage

inpeacefulconflictresolution.Intherecentdebatetheimplicitassumptionthatthebehavior

ofreligiouselitesisbasedupontheirnormativeconvictionshasdominated.Thus,clericses

pousepeacebecause thiscomplieswith thepeaceful imperativeof theirreligion.From the

perspectiveofsocialscience,however,asolelinktoindividualreligiousbeliefsisnotasatis

factoryexplanation.Furthermore,thejustificationforthecompleteomissionofrationalele

mentsintheanalysisofreligiouselitesdecisionmakingprocessesisnotclear.Oftenclerics

areexcludedfromrationalanalysisbecauseit isassumedthattheyactupontheirreligious

beliefsandmoralconsiderations.Nevertheless,elitesmayalsoact rationallyandpurpose

fully inpursuitof their religiousgoals. It is conceivable that religiouselites, regardlessof

theirunderlyingreligiousbeliefs,decidetoengage forpeacebecause itmayseemstrategi

callyusefulinagivensituation.Moreover,itisnotplausiblethattherelationshipsinwhich

believersareintegratedarenottakenintoconsiderationbyreligiouselites.

Given theseshortcomings,ourargument in thisarticlehasbeen thatrationalconsid

erationscouldplayaroleinreligiousengagementforpeace.Inourview,religiouselitesof

tenappealforpeacewhentheyareunilaterallydependentonpoliticaleliteswhoarebeing

attackedby rebels.Additionally, religious competitionwithin a religious communitymay

causepeaceframingtoberegardedasapromisingtoolforwinningbelievers.Finally,believ

erscouldalsopersuadereligiouselitestoundertakepeaceframingbyexertingahighlevelof

pressure.When

we

assume

that

religious

leaders

act

in

arational

way,

it

seems

plausible

that

theyassess thechancesofsuccessand the risksofapossiblepeaceengagementaspartof

theirdecisionmakingprocess.Theirdecision to supportpeaceorviolencewill largelyde


21/29


pendontheframeenvironment.Insituationsinwhichclericsanticipatethattheirmessages

willbeeffectively challengedbyother clericsand that theirengagementwill reduce their

ownreligiousinfluence,thelikelihoodthatreligiouscallsforpeacewillbemadedecreases.

Crucialin

this

regard

is

the

relative

strength

of

the

religious

peace

coalition,

the

structure

of

thereligiouscommunity,andtheparticularframeenvironment.

None of the abovementioned factors (the elites relationships to thegovernment, to

other religiouselites,and to thebelievers; thestrengthof the religiouspeacecoalition; the

structureofthereligiouscommunity;theframeenvironment)worksinisolation.Theyinflu

enceeachotherandtogetheraffectthebehaviorofreligiouselites.Theycanreinforceorop

poseeachotherforexample,whenthemotivationforactionemanatesfromthethreelevels

oftheelitesrelationshipsmentionedabovebuttherisksofpeaceengagementareextremely

high.Thisleadsustotheconclusionthat,ineverysinglecase,theimportanceofallfactors

andtheirinteractionwithoneanotherneedstobetaken intoaccount.Onlyinthismanner

canweunderstandhow rationaldecisionmakingprocesses influence thebehaviorof reli

giouselites.

Thisdoesnotmean thatnormativeaspectsare irrelevant.Undoubtedly,manyclerics

areengagedforpeacebecausethisisinkeepingwiththeirinherentreligiousbeliefs.None

theless,ourargumentisthatthisexplanationonlyappliesinsomecases.Oftenthebehavior

ofreligiouselitescanonlybeunderstoodifitisacknowledgedthatstrategicconsiderations

alsoinfluencetheirdecisions.Whenoneacknowledgesthisrationalityonthepartofclerics,

theirreligiousengagementforpeaceinmanyconflictscanbeaccuratelyexplained.


22/29


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