Freeman Deliberative Dmcy (PPA 00)

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Princeton University Press

Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic CommentAuthor(s): Samuel FreemanSource: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 371-418Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672831 .

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SAMUELFREEMAN DeliberativeDemocracy:A SympatheticComment

Aswith many novel ideas in philosophy,accounts of deliberativedemoc-racy have so proliferated hatmanywonder whether thereis anythingtothe idea.But deliberativedemocracyhas become morethanjustanotherpopular label that philosophers attach to different ideas (althoughthishappens). Discussion alsohas gone beyond the point where whatunitesphilosophers who affirm he idea is more thanjust their rejectionofsomeentrenched view. At this stage there are severalfairlywell-defined areasof agreement (and disagreement)among the proponents of deliberativedemocracy.The aim of this essay is to discuss these, and to discuss themore distinctiveargumentsofferedin support of a deliberative democ-racy.This is not a comprehensivereview of the literaturenor even a criti-cal reviewof the contents of the volumes under discussion. Rather,mypurposewill be achievedifIcan clarifysome of the main ideas and argu-ments that distinguishdeliberativedemocracyfrom other conceptions.

The essay focuses on prominent themes discussed in two recent anthologies with thesame title:DeliberativeDemocracy d. JamesBohmanandWilliamRehg(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1997), eferred o here as 'DD1'; nd DeliberativeDemocracy ed. JonElster Cam-bridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998), eferred o here as 'DD2'.Also discussedare themes developedin JuergenHabermas,BetweenFacts and Norms(Cambridge:MITPress,1996); ohnRawls,"The dea of Public Reason Revisited,"n Rawls,CollectedPapers,ed. Samuel Freeman(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1999); nd Amy GutmannandDennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1996).I am grateful o Samuel Scheffler,ChrisKutz,and members of the Gala SeminaratBoalt LawSchool, UC Berkeley,and to SusanWolf,Henry Richardson,Doug McLeanandother members of thePhilamoregroup,and to David EstlundandAmyGutmann orhelp-ful discussions of this essay.Thanks also to the editors of this journalfor their editorialcomments.

( 2000 by PrincetonUniversityPress.Philosophy& PublicAffairs 9, no. 4


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372 Philosophy & Public Affairs

I.THE DEALFADELIBERATIVEEMOCRACYIt is popularly assumed that democratic government involves freepub-lic debate and legislative procedures subject to the public scrutiny andcriticism.J. S. Mill took an open legislative process subject to popularcriticismto be one of the main advantages of a representative democ-racy.Within much contemporary analytical political theory, however,these assumptions do not hold. Democracy is often characterized as aprocedure for making laws within which individuals who are countedequally register their preferences for competing alternatives,and out-comes are decided accordingto (bare) majority rule. Public discussionof measures under consideration is not essential to this conception ofdemocracy; ndeed public discussion does not even fit well with it. Forcharacteristicof much analyticalpolitical theory is the assumption thatindividuals vote their private preferences and groupinterests and seekto maximize their individual utilities; in effect they act like economicagentsremoved to a differentforum.Whatpoint could there be in publicdiscussion of theirself-seekingandcompeting group purposeswith oth-ers who haveopposing interests?It would only encourageothers to frus-trate one'sstrategiesand redouble theircompetitive effortsto gain lim-ited political resources.Whereas discussions of particularpolitical aimsmighthave a place behind the scenes, as a bargainingtool or in formingcoalitions, they would not be to one's advantagewithin public debatesopen to all citizens.

This indicates a second featureof the common sense conception ofdemocracy.It is a convention of democracy to appeal to the commongood. Fewpersons or political partieswould openly admit in legislativedebate that they advocate legislation that benefits some groups at theexpense of other legitimate groups.Whilelegislationwith which we arefamiliaroften has these partial effects, still those who advocate andsup-port partialmeasuresrarelyare able to admitit, even to themselves. Per-haps the conventional appeal to the common good is just a rhetoricalflourish needed to keep in check the underlying politicalconflict of self-and group-interests.Ifso, then howeverimportantthe appealmaybe tomaintaining civility,and howeverimportantit may be to participantstobelieve they are acting in the public interest, the idea of the commongood nonetheless would be irrelevant o explainingthe substantive out-comes generated by democraticprocedures.Ido not think the common


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good is wholly ineffectualin this way, even in our politically barren era,where the pursuitof self-interestis celebrated as a virtuein some quar-ters and is even identified with what best promotes the common inter-est. Concernfor the common good and other moral motivations of thekind not countenanced normally by the standard analytical model arestill real forcesin contemporary political life, even when political partieshave stuntedviews of the natureof the common good.Deliberativedemocracyis an idea thathas attracted ncreasingatten-tion from philosophers and political and legal theorists over the past de-cade. The idea of a deliberative democracy focuses on, and captures tobetter effect than the standardanalytical model, the intuitive givens ofthe commonsensical notion of democracyheretofore mentioned-freepolitical discussion, open legislative deliberations,andpursuitof a com-mon good. Still, knowing what we do about how democracy actuallyworks under current conditions, it would be a mistake to tryto explainlegislators'and voters' actions simplyin terms of what they publicly ad-vocate and some idea of common interests. The idea of a deliberativedemocracy serves more as political ideal than as an explanatorycon-cept. Forpoliticalscientists, this may be reason enough to disregard heidea.Forpolitical philosophers,the question remains of the feasibilityofthis ideal andwhether it can everplay a role in explaining political con-duct.There is no settled and commonly accepted account of the centralfeaturesof adeliberativedemocracy among politicalscientists and theo-rists. According o one account, it simplyinvolves discussion amongthemembers of a groupbeforevoting.'Foranother,it is voting preceded bypublic discussions and communications intended to change peoples'preferences.2Mostconceptions of democracywould be "deliberative"nthese respects.Toprovide a more precise account of the ideal of delib-erative democracy, I'll begin by contrasting an alternative that prettymuch capturesthe reigning analytical conception.Accordingto this interest-based view (the "aggregative onception"as JoshuaCohen termed it in DD1,p. 411),democratic decision proce-dures are mechanisms for aggregatingindividuals'interests or prefer-

i. See James Fearon, DD2, "Deliberation as Discussion," pp. 44-45.2. Susan Stokes, DD2, "Pathologies of Deliberation," p. 123;Adam Przeworski, DD2, "De-

liberation and Ideological Domination," p. 140.


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374 Philosophy& Public Affairs

ences over alternativeproposals (without takinginto account their in-tensity). Citizens presumablyreflecton their individual and group inter-estsand ascertainhowalternativeproposalsaffectthem;theythen choosethe proposal they believe most benefits them. Assumingthat each per-son is to count as one, once a bare majorityfavors a proposal, then fair-ness demands that it carry the day according to the aggregative view.Otherwise, o requiremore thanabaremajority s to assign greaterweightto the preferencesand interests of a minority.It violates the "neutrality"condition on democratic choice: alternatives up for consideration, in-cludingthose favoring he status quo, should have an equal likelihoodofsuccess.3To conceive of democracythis way is to see it as serving a role similarto economic markets.Democracy registersand responds to individualpreferences-although not like the market,accordingto willingness andabilityto pay,butratheraccordingto the greaternumberof persons hav-ing similar preferences. Theoretically here is nothing about the formalmodel of utility-maximizationoften used by aggregativeconceptions ofdemocracythat would prevent votersfrom choosing and voting for mea-sures that promote some conception of the common interest in prefer-ence to more particularinterests they have. But whatever prioritythecommon interest had would have to be decided by the intensity ofpeoples' preferences (orby theirgivingthe common interest priority ntheir ordinalrankingsover alternatives).Accordingto the utility-maxi-mization conception of rationality,allpreferencesareto be put on apar(the completeness condition) and areassigned position and priorityac-cordingto the intensityofunderlyingdesire. Politicalmeasures thatpro-mote a common good have moral force then onlyto the degreethattheyemerge as the preferredchoice of a bare majorityof voters. On this ac-count there is nothing undemocratic about collective choices that ben-efit only the majorityat the expense of aminority.Indeed, accordingto

3. Whereas he anonymity condition says (in effect) that each person'svote is to countthe same, the neutralitycondition says each proposal is to count the same.This followsfrom the alleged requirement hatin democraticvotingno proposalis to be favored; hereshouldbe no presumption n favorof the status quo. Any measure requiringmore than abaremajorityviolatesheneutrality ondition.On this distinction,see Knightand Johnson,DDi, pp. 287-92. The effect of neutrality s to eliminate constitutional constraints (whichrequire pecial majorities)on voting. Givensuch momentous implications,the claim thatneutrality s a requirementof democracy,relativelycommon among rationalchoice theo-rists, requires ar more argument han it is usually given.


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the aggregativeview, there is nothing undemocratic about the processwhen it consistently favors the private and group interests of an en-trenched majority,and never offers as alternatives for considerationmeasures that promote everyone'sgood.In contrast to this and other aggregativeconceptions, the ideal of de-liberativedemocracy says that in voting it is the role, perhaps the duty, ofdemocratic citizens to express their impartial judgments of whatconduces to the common good of allcitizens,andnot theirpersonal pref-erences based on judgments of how measures affect their individualorgroup interests. Citizens and legislators are to abstractfrom their per-sonal andgroup-oriented preferences(sofaras this is possible) and voteimpartially or measures that, upon reflection, they sincerely judge arein the interest of every citizen.The idea of the common good is, of course, controversial.Sometheo-rists deny that any political measure can be in everyone's nterest.4Theonly sense to be made of the common good is the expression of the willof the majority.Taken to the limit, this position implies that even themost minimal accounts of the common good cannot providea basis forsocial and political cooperation. (TakeHobbes'sview, for example, thatwhateverourdifferences,allhave an interestin securing the conditionsfor"peaceand commodious living.")Underlyingthe rejectionof a com-mon good is the identificationof aperson'sgood with his or herrevealedpreferences or occurrent desires. It is probably true that, were a poll tobe taken,no single end of any consequence would be desiredby every-one in society,not even the absence of war.Butwhereastakingconsum-ers'revealedpreferences as given may workin economic theory, it hasmanywell-knownproblemswhen transferred o ethics, political philoso-phy,and even normative economics.5Revealed preferencesare not sufficientto specify an individual'sor asociety'sgood. Tomake sense of apreference-basedaccountof aperson'sinterests,it must at least be assumed that his or her preferencesare ad-equatelyinformed and rational to some degree. I will not consider fur-ther the positionthat conflictis so entrenched thatnothingis in the com-mon interest of the members of a society. Most discussions of democ-

4. See, for example,J.A. Schumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism,and Democracy 3rd ed.(NewYork: Harper, 1950), chs. 21-23.5.See,forexample,AmartyaSen, "Rational ools:A Critiqueof the BehavioralFounda-tions of Economic Theory," Philosophy& PublicAffairs 6 (1977):317-44


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racy,even by proponents of the aggregativeview, assume otherwise. Themore important question for democratic theory then is, how arewe toconceive of the common good?Isthe common good simply such condi-tions as the rule of law and economic prosperity,which allowindividu-als the opportunity to pursue their private purposes? Or is it these con-ditions plus the availabilityof majoritarianproceduresformaking laws?Or s some more substantialconception of the common good appropri-ate to a democracy?Rousseau notably contends that the role of democratic legislators isto vote, not their "privatewill" or particular nterests, but the will of thepublic, the "generalwill."6The generalwill aims for the common good.For Rousseau the common good is not the same as the good of the ma-jority;noris itjust anyParetoefficient measure thatmightbenefit every-one. Instead, the common good is justice, which for Rousseau has itsbasis in the freedom and equality of each citizen; therein lies citizens'"greatest ood."7Rousseausees the equal freedom and independence ofeach as a kind of basic interest that all have; being a free and indepen-dent person and possessing an equal status with likepersons are essen-tial to livinga good life.ForRousseau, citizens are to vote their judgments regardingwhichmeasures are most conducive to the common good, understood aswhatis needed to maintain the freedom, equality, and independence of allcitizens. The idea of citizens voting their common interest in maintain-ing their freedom and equal status as citizens is a central featureof thepoliticalideal of deliberativedemocracy.These concepts requirefurtherelucidation certainlyif they are to be of any use to democratic legisla-tors. But already we see a clear contrast between this ideal and theaggregative iew.The common good, construedas the conditions neededto secure andmaintainfreedom, equality,andindependence of citizens,is supposed to be the focal point of citizens' deliberations,which theyare to reflectupon beforemakingtheir collective decision.Turnnow to the idea of deliberation.A contrast is sometimes drawnbetween views that advocate voting one'spreferencesversus deliberat-ing and making judgments (see Przeworski, DD2). But these are notmutually exclusive activities. Surelythe relevant distinction here is be-

6. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk.IV,ch. 2, par. 8.7. See Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. II, ch. ii, par. i.


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tween voting one's particular preferences when informed by delibera-tivejudgment about one's own good, versusvoting one'simpartial pref-erences when informed by deliberativejudgment about the commongood. No reasonableconception of democracywould advise us to votewithout thinking at all about how alternatives might affect relevantin-terests (whetherour personal interests or the common interest). Thiswould be irrational.In this regardwhat distinguishes deliberative fromaggregativeconceptions is not deliberation per se, nor the fact that oneinvolves voting but the other does not (contrastPrzeworski,DD2). Nor isit even that the deliberativeview involves discussion while the aggregativeview does not. Even on the aggregativeview, voters can benefit by shar-ing information, being rational they would do so. Instead, the relevantdistinctionbetween the twoconceptionsconcerns the objectabout whichcitizens deliberate and vote and the kinds of reasons that they take intoaccount in coming to their collective decision. Whereasan aggregativeview counsels voting one's informed preferences regardingone's owngood orpartial groupinterests (exceptwhere further deliberationis notworththe effort), deliberative democracycounsels voting one'sdeliber-atedjudgments (orinformedpreferences)for the common good, wherejudgmentis made on the basis of reasons and considerations that allcanaccept as democratic citizens. Integralto the idea of a deliberativede-mocracyis then some idea ofpublic reason. There are differentconcep-tions ofpublic reason,and decidingwhich of these is appropriate s nec-essaryto settling on an ideal of deliberativedemocracy. I address theseissues in section III.So one reason deliberative democrats emphasize deliberation is sothat citizens'judgments on laws and policies can be informed by con-siderationsthatall can reasonably accept in theircapacityas democraticcitizens. Here Rousseaumight seem to suggest that, in orderto preventvoters' decisions from being swayed by eloquence and demagoguery,voters should decide on the basis of theirindividual deliberationswith-out too much reliance on public debate.8 So far as Rousseau means tosuggest here that communication and discussion among voters shouldbe not be encouragedin a democracy,9deliberativedemocracy departs

8. "But ong debates, dissensions,and tumult betoken the ascendance of private nter-ests and the decline of the state."Rousseau, The Social Contract,BkIV, h. 2.9. Jon Elsterreads Rousseau n this way, n DD2, p.14.


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from Rousseau on this point. What makes a democracy deliberative iscommon public reasoning and argument by members of the body poli-tic about ends of legislation and means needed to achieve them. Theidea here is that of the demos deliberating,the sovereign People as a le-gallyconstitutedbody engagedin public reasoningand argumentaboutlaws requiredto realize justice and the common good.Why public deliberation?One branch of the republican tradition, of-ten called "civichumanism,"10says that essential to persons' good is thatthey actively participate in public political life, taking part in commondeliberations about the civic good. Only by activeparticipationin poli-tics can individualsdevelop the virtues needed to be good citizens andgood persons. This Aristotelian position often underlies the positionknown as "participatorydemocracy."It is a conception of democracybased in a philosophical account of intrinsic human goods, primaryamong which is participationin the public life of the polis.Advocatesof deliberativedemocracy generallyavoid this kind of ar-gument. They do not argue that participationin democratic delibera-tion is an intrinsic good or that it is necessary for human flourishingorself-realization.The major proponents of deliberativedemocracy trytoavoid any general, all-inclusive conception of value and of what giveslife meaning. Both Habermasian discourse theories and Rawlsian ac-counts of deliberativedemocracy accept liberalpluralism,or the inevi-tabilityof diverse and partially conflicting conceptions of the good un-der conditions offreedomandequality.Wherethese two versionsmainly

differ s in the kindof reasons they offer for deliberativedemocracy,andin their accounts of public reason.Inthe discoursetheoryof democracy,public deliberationis seen as essential to the discovery of truth aboutrational laws that best promote justice and the common good.11 nRawlsian accounts (Rawlsand perhaps Joshua Cohen), no such episte-mological claim is made about the need for public deliberation to dis-10. "Civichumanism" s Rawls's erm. He distinguishesit from "classicalrepublican-ism."See JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism, NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993,pa-

perback ed. 1996), pp. 205-206.11.Oras Habermas ays,"Moralustificationsare dependent on argumentationactuallybeing carriedout, not for pragmaticreasons of an equalization of power, butfor internalreasons,namely that realargumentmakesmoral nsightpossible." uergenHabermas,"Dis-

course Ethics,"in Moral Consciousness and CommunicativeAction (Cambridge:MITPress,1990)p. 57.See also p. 68, directed against Rawls.See also BetweenFacts and Norms, pps.147,151.


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cover the truth about the common good. Rather,deliberativedemocracyis a moral requirement of political legitimacy and perhaps of politicaljustice:To be just, political institutions should work for the good of all,whereas to be legitimate they should be justifiable to all on the basis ofreasons thatall can reasonably accept as democratic citizens.'2 Moreonthese mattersin sections IIand III.)Advocatesof deliberativedemocracynormally emphasize the signifi-cance of widespread agreement on laws and policies. For reasons to bediscussedlater,reasonedconsensus about the laws and policies requiredby justice and the common good is an ideal to which democratic delib-erationshould aspire.Here t is importantto indicatewhat kind of agree-ment deliberative heorists havein mind. Deliberativedemocracyis nor-mallyconceived as a model of deliberation that legislativeand otherde-cision-makingbodies are to emulate (see discussion of Cohen below).The model is a normative ideal that procedures should attempt to ap-

proximateas closely as possible. As a model for decision making,it is tobe distinguished from the theoretical construct of hypothetical agree-ment that typifiescontractarian heory. Hypothetical agreements (suchas the original position, or ideal speech situations) contain conditionsthat are not realizable n the world.Althoughtwo of the majoradvocatesof deliberative democracy (Habermasand Rawls) employ hypotheticalagreements, the construct is not necessary to deliberativedemocracy.Many proponents of deliberativedemocracy do not explicitlyadvocatecontractarianagreementtojustifyorapplytheirdemocraticmodels (e.g.,Sunstein, Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson). They leave open then thequestion of how to decide objective standards by which to assess thejustice of laws and policies concluded within a deliberativedemocracy.The constructofhypothetical agreementfor Rawlsand Habermaspro-vides a criterion for determining andjustifyingmoralprinciples of jus-tice and just laws and institutions. Accordingto Rawls, ultimately theappealwould be to hypothetical agreement (inthe originalposition andat the constitutional stage) to justifydeliberativedemocracyitself. (ForHabermas, t is less clear whether the ideal speech situationis needed tojustifydeliberativedemocracy;see later the discussion of Michelmanin

12. Rawlscalls thisrequirement he "liberal rincipleoflegitimacy." oliticalLiberalism,p.137.Cohen relieson a similarprinciplehe calls the "principle f deliberative nclusion."SeeDD2, p. 203.


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DD1 on the problem of infinite regress.) It may also be that democraticcitizens, in their deliberations, might need to appeal to the principlesand procedures that would be agreed to under hypothetical conditionsbyfree and equal, fully rationalbeings to come to a decision on laws andpolicies. (Habermas eems to envision citizensarguingabout what wouldbe agreed o underhypotheticaldiscourseconditions.)On the otherhand,it may be that democratic deliberation s not the proper forum for apply-ing philosophical reasoning of the highly abstractkind needed to decidewhat would be agreed to under hypothetical conditions. (Rawlsseemsless sanguine than Habermas about the prospects of legislators andjudges applying philosophical abstractions such as the original posi-tion.13)What matters most fordeliberativetheorists then is not hypothetical,but actual deliberation and agreement among free and equal citizensunder the realized ideal conditions of deliberative democracy.This is anecessary (if not also sufficient) condition forthe legitimacyof laws andthe proper exercise of political power. (Whether t is necessary or suffi-cient to the justice of laws and policies is a separate issue.) Proponentsofdeliberativedemocracynormallymaintainthat,whereas decisions thatsatisfythe conditions of a deliberative democracy are more likelyto bejust, they maynot be. Deliberativedemocracyis an imperfect procedurewith respectto justice and the common good.14 Habermas,we will latersee, claims that deliberationis the best method, perhaps even a neces-sary method, to discover what is called for by justice and the commongood;deliberativedemocracy'sdecisions, if not necessarily just, are stillbeyond criticismexcept on the groundsof other deliberativedecisions.)Another eaturecharacteristicof deliberativeviewsis the ideathat citi-zens can and should be morallymotivated by justice or the commongood and have a willingness to abide by (perhaps even participate in)democratic decisions regardingthese values. Proponents of the delib-erative ideal assume that citizens can be moved by such motives as aconcern for reciprocityand a desire to justify laws and institutions toothers on terms they can accept (GutmannandThompson, Democracyand Disagreement,p. 53);or by a sense of justice and willingness to co-operatewith otherson fairtermsfortheirown sake (Rawls); rbya com-

13. "Wemust not asktoo much of a philosophicalview."PoliticalLiberalism,p. 368.14.See,forexample,GutmannandThompson,Democracyand Disagreement,p. 368,n.34.


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mitment to deliberative nstitutions and norms arrivedatthroughdelib-eration (Cohen, DD1,p. 72); orbya commitment to reciprocityand pub-lic reason-giving (Michelman, DD1,p. 149),and so on. These are not ac-counts of the motivations of citizens in existing democracies but aremotivations citizens generally must have if the ideal of a deliberativedemocracy is to be feasible. Regardingcitizens who have no such politi-cal motivations,or who might even rejectdeliberative resolutions, theyare an impediment to a deliberativedemocracy.Finally,deliberative heorists take a moreexpansiveview of the politi-cal and social conditions of democracythan do other conceptions. De-mocracyis often depicted simply as a political procedureprovidingforuniversal franchise with equal rights to vote and hold political offices,and where decisions are made accordingto majorityrule. Otherpoliticalrights are normally recognized as necessary to establish and maintainthis procedure:freedom of (political) speech, freedom of the press, theright to formand join political parties, freedomof assemblyandthe rightto present grievances,and perhaps even certain anti-discriminationmea-sures that protect the social and political status of "entrenchedminori-ties."'5But other than these "procedural"measures, there are no furtherconstitutional restrictionson the substantive outcomes of duly consti-tuted democraticprocedures.Deliberativeconceptions bycontrasttypi-cally prescribecertainsubstantiverightsand institutional requirementsin additionto procedural rights:freedom of religion and of nonpoliticalas well as political expression;freedom of association and a right of pri-vacy in one's personal relations;freedom of occupation and adequateand fair workand educational opportunities of which citizens can takeadvantage;adequate health care for all, and economic rightssufficientto establishindividualindependence. Moreover,public financingof po-litical campaigns and public provision of arenas for free expression ofpoliticalviews areamong the institutions recommended to ensure thatthe political process is not controlledby concentratedgrouporwealthyinterests. Stringent social as well as political conditions are said to benecessary if citizens are to achieve a status as political equals who arefree; moreover,these social conditions must be in place if democraticcitizens are to be in a position to discern and vote the common good.

15.See John Ely'sproceduralaccount of democracy and judicial reviewin Democracyand Distrust (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1984), or a good example.


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(Cf. Cohen, DD1and DD2; Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy andDisagreement, chs. 6-9)To conclude this outline, I state the primary features of the politicalideal of deliberative democracy to which I have alluded so far:Conceived as an ideal of political relations, a deliberative democracyis one in which political agents or their representatives (a) aim to collec-tively deliberateand vote (b) their sincere and informed judgments re-garding (c)measures conducive to the common good of citizens. (d)Po-litical agents are seen and see one another as democratic citizens whoarepoliticallyfree and equal participantsin civic life. (e)A backgroundof constitutional rights and all-purpose social means enable citizens totake advantageoftheir opportunities to participate n public life. (f) Citi-zens are individuallyfree in that they have their own freelydeterminedconceptions of the good, and these conceptions arepubliclyseen as le-gitimate even though they are independent of political purposes. More-over, (g) free citizens have diverse and incongruous conceptions of thegood, which are constitutionally protected by basic rights. Because ofthis diversity (h) citizens recognize a dutyin their public political delib-erations to cite public reasons-considerations that all reasonable citi-zens can accept in their capacity as democratic citizens-and to avoidpublic argumenton the basis of reasonspeculiar o theirparticularmoral,religious, and philosophical views and incompatiblewith public reason.(i)What makes these reasons public is that they are related to and insome way advance the common interestsof citizens. (j) Primaryamongthe common interests of citizens are their freedom, independence, andequal civic status.The main advocates of deliberative democracy (Habermas, Rawls,JoshuaCohen, Michelman,Sunstein, Gutmann,Thompson,andEstlund,among others)would endorse,Ibelieve,most ifnot allof these features.'6They primarilydifferin the justifications they give for deliberativede-mocracy and in the conceptions of public reasons that are suitable fordemocratic debate andjustification,and in a few otherways. I turnnowto these issues.

16.Forexample,Michelman ets forthseveral eaturesof deliberativeness-"basicrightsof free and equal persons,""commitment o public reason-giving,""motivational .. fea-tures such as public-spiritednessand reciprocity," expectations f sincerity," nd so on-which fit with the accountabove. See DDi, p. 149.Cohen'smodel of deliberativedemocracyis discussed later.


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II.ARGUMENTSOR ELIBERATIVEEMOCRACYDifferent reasons and arguments are given for deliberative democracy,andproponentsusually relyon more than one of these. Many argumentsdevelop familiar ines of thought within democratic theory. Proponentsof deliberativedemocracyoften invokethe Millianargument that delib-eration on laws leads to more rational and informed decisions, becausefree discussion and open debate allow relevant information to be dis-tributed,mistakenreasoningto be exposed, and all the reasons for andagainstlaws to be debated and considered.'7A second line of argumentsaysthatbecause democracycombines equalparticipationwithfreeandopen debate and criticism,the points of view of all sides are expressed,and everyone's nterests are considered. It is less likelythen that the ba-sic rightsof minoritiesorindividualswill be infringed upon or their fun-damental interests ignored, particularlywhen citizens are called uponto reflect on the common good.'8Deliberationis also said to contributeto the legitimacy of decisions, because citizens who lose out in the reso-lution of competing claims aremorelikely to accept the decision when itis adopted after carefulconsideration of the relevantmerits of compet-ing moralclaims forresources.'9Anotherkind of argument,also fromJ.S. Mill,is that public deliberationin a democracy tempers self-interestand broadenspeople'sinterests and concerns, because it requiresthemto consider interests other than their own and make principled argu-ments for their positions. (Elster, Gambetta, DD2, pp. 104, 23.) Having todeliberatewith othersand givereasons acceptableto them inclines citi-zens to take into account others' points of view and thereby extendspeople's maginationsandempathy (Goodin)orengagestheir moralsen-timents (Rawls)20

17.See Diego Gambetta,DD2, "Claro! nEssayon DiscursiveMachismo,"atp. 22. Thiskindof argument eemsimplicit n PhilipPettit's ccountof "contestatory emocracy," hichis, he says, deliberativebecause, unlike interest-grouppluralism, t focuses on matters ofcommon concern." T]hepointis to createatestingenvironmentof selection for the laws."See Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)pp. 277-79,189,192.18.Both Pettit (ibid.) and Rawls n A Theoryof Justice (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1971; 999rev.ed.) rely on this argument.TomChristiano n DD1does also,althoughhe is mostlycriticalof deliberativeviews.

19. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 41-42.20. See RobertGoodin,"DemocraticDeliberationWithin,"Philosophy& PublicAffairs

29 (2000): 81-log; Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (rev. ed.), pp. 205-206; see also Gutmann andThompson, DemocracyandDisagreement,p. 42.


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Finally,an argument from autonomy says that democratic delibera-tion encourages people to reflect on theirpreferencesandprovidesthemwith information that can lead them to alter their values and positions.Because of political reflection, people arenot simply governedby givenpreferencesformed as a result of theirsubconscious adaptation to exist-ing circumstances. Theirjudgments arethen more rational and citizensas a result are made more free. Cass Sunstein argues that "the centralidea of deliberativedemocracy" s founded on autonomy, or the free andreflectiveprocess of preference formation. "Politicalautonomy can befound in collective self-determination,as citizens decide, not what they'want,' but instead who they are-what their values are and what thosevalues require."21Ratherthan discussing these more familiararguments,as importantas they are, in furtherdetail, the primaryfocus of this section will bethree more distinctiveargumentsfor deliberativedemocracy.Thefirst ofthese mightbe seen as aversion of the firstargument mentioned above,but given its association with Rousseau, as well as the attention it hasgained fromdeliberativetheorists, it deserves special attention.

1. EpistemicArgumentsDeliberativedemocracy assumes that there is apublic good aboutwhichcitizens can reason and about which they can be rightorwrong. One ofthe mainarguments or deliberativedemocracy emphasizesitsepistemicreliability.Commondeliberation s saidto be aregulative deal for demo-craticpoliticsbecause democratic deliberationandagreement s the best(if not the only) means we have for ascertainingtruth about the com-mon good and laws that best promote it. JuergenHabermas relies on astrong epistemic thesis to support a "discursivedemocracy.22 Because"Laws equirethe justifiedassent of all,"majorityrule is justifiedonly inso faras democracy involves equal participation by all in a "search or

21. See Cass Sunstein, ThePartialConstitution(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1993), p. 178. In general, see Sunstein, ch. 6, also pp. 133-55. See also Joshua Cohen in DD1,Pp.77-79.

22. Habermasalso relies on a "strongnormativeview," Michelman,DDi,p.162) involv-ing considerationsof autonomy and political self-rule.


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truth."23 odiscover the truth aboutjustice and the common good, par-ticipants in democratic deliberations areto make "reference o an idealaudience or an ideally inclusive community" and ascertain what theywould agree to under hypothetical conditions of ideal democratic dis-course.24 ome have noted a resemblancebetweenHabermas'sdeal com-munication situations and Rawls's hypothetical agreement. ButHabermashas long insisted, againstRawls, hat what would be agreedtounder hypothetical conditions is not accessible to the moral philosopherorindividualthinker"ina strictlymonological form."25 Realdiscourses"among existing communities of free and equal persons are needed todiscover what would be agreedto under hypothetical conditions.26Habermas claims that it is only by carryingout actual deliberationamong equals in situations that approximateideal discourse as closelyas is realisticallypossible thatwe can discover what would be agreedtounder hypothetical conditions of ideal discourse. Tosupport this claim,Habermasseems to hold that actual deliberationamong equals is nec-essarybecause otherwise it is not possible for individual thinkersto takeinto account and fully empathize with the situations, judgments, andinterests of allaffected by laws and other norms.27Thisargumentwouldbe more convincing if democratic deliberation were aimed at discover-

23. Habermas,"Popular overeignty s Procedure,"n DDi, p. 47;also in Habermas,Be-tween Fact and Norm, pp. 474-75.

24. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms,p. 286. See pp. 322-23, where Habermas sclearer han usual that deliberativepolitics involves a "thoughtexperiment,"undertakenby a "real ommunicationcommunity,"where it reflectson what would be agreed o withinan "idealcommunication community." n this hypothetical community citizens are pre-sumed to have equal powers of reasoning and attentiveness,full knowledgeof relevant n-formation,an absence of egocentrism, self-deceptionand weakness ofwill, and an equalwillingness formutualunderstanding. p.325).25. See Habermas,"DiscourseEthics," n MoralConsciousnessand CommunicativeAc-

tion, p. 68.26. See the essays n Habermas,Moral Consciousness and Comm unicativeAction, wherethis point is frequentlyemphasized,at pp. 57, 67, 68, 94,211.AgainstRawls'sprinciplesofjustice,Habermas ays: Allcontents,no matterhow fundamental he action norm nvolvedmay be, must be made to depend on real discourses." p. 94).Ina strongstatement of the

epistemicneed forjoint deliberation,Habermassays,"Moralustificationsaredependenton argumentationactuallybeingcarriedout, not forpragmaticreasonsof an equalizationof power,but for internalreasons, namely that real argumentmakes moral insight pos-sible."(p.57).27. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, p. 450. Michelmandiscusses this feature of

Habermas's view in DDi, pp. 160-61, 165.


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ing a common good that is responsive to people's occurrent nterests andcircumstances. But for Habermas, deliberation is to be about rationalinterestsand needs and the judgments of hypotheticalpersons and aimedat discoveringwhat would be agreed to among such fullyrational andinformed, morallymotivated, free and equal persons in ideal speech situ-ations (Between Fact and Norm, p. 286). Empathywith existingcitizens'currentsituationsand interests would not seem to be necessaryfor thesepurposes. It could even be distracting.Adifferent argumentfor the epistemic necessity of democratic delib-eration invokesCondorcet's o-called "juryheorem." Rousseau is oftensaid to have relied on this.28The jury theorem says that when a groupfaces a choice between two alternatives,and each member of the grouphas better than an equal likelihood of choosing the correct alternative(according o some independent standard), hen amajority s morelikelythan a minority to make the correctchoice, with a probabilityapproach-ing 1of their being correct in very large groups.29Certainfavorablecon-ditions must hold for the theorem to apply: for example, voters' judg-ments must be adequately informed; also, voters need to abstractthem-selves from their individual interests, conscientiously reflect on, andimpartiallyvote their judgment of the common good. Moreover, heymust form udgments about the merits of legislation independentlywith-out blindly deferringto the opinions of others. Otherwisethe biased ormistakenjudgmentsof a smallnumberof people can distortthe processof discerningmeasures for the common good.

The main objection to the jurytheorem is that it is unrealisticif notimpossible to realizein the realworld. Some say that many voters simplyare not likelyto judge justice and the common good correctlymuch ofthe time.30Othersarguethat voters do not form theirjudgments inde-pendently; indeed, it is not even clearwhat itwould mean for them to doso.31Also, it is especially peculiarto invoke the jurytheorem with its in-dependence requirementas ajustificationfor a deliberativedemocracy,

28. SeeB.GrofmanandS. Feld,"Rousseau'sGeneralWill:A CondorcetianPerspective,"American Political Science Review82, no. 2 (1988),pp.567-76.

29. See Estlund,DD1,pp.185-9o and p. 202, n. 21, for a discussion of thejury theorem.30. See RonaldDworkin,SovereignVirtue Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2000),p. 207. JeremyWaldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999) otes that Condorcethimself was skeptical about average ndividual compe-tence, especially n large assemblies (p.32).

31.See,forexample,ThomasChristiano,"Freedom,Consensus andEqualityn Collec-


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because the point of common deliberation is to mutually influence oneanother's udgments.Inreplyit can be said that independence does notrule out common deliberation and discussion. Rather, t requires com-ing to one's own reasoned judgment once all the arguments have beenmade, aftercritically reflecting on the reasons, and avoiding the influ-ence ofemotional appeals and uncriticalacceptance of others' positionsbecause of theirrhetoric or status.32David Estlundargues for a more moderate epistemic view than thatof Habermasor Rousseau.33The problem with strong epistemic views,especiallythose thatrelyon the jury theorem (the"CorrectnessTheory"he attributes to Rousseau), is their implication that democratic legiti-macy rests solely on the correctness of democratic decisions. So far asone votes in the minority,one must eitherbelieve a democraticdecisionis wrong and not legitimate, or concede one's error,thereby deferringnot just one's conduct but also one'sjudgment to the democratic pro-cess. Neither alternative s attractiveorfitting,Estlundcontends, fromademocratic or moralperspective. Moreover, trong epistemic views im-ply that if there were some procedure other than democratic delibera-tion among equals that more reliablydiscovered the common good (de-cision by a council made up of moral experts and economists, for ex-ample), then this would be the preferredpolitical procedureformakinglaws.It seems peculiar to attribute to Rousseau the position that democ-racyis justified only in so far as it accuratelydiscerns the truth. Reasonsofautonomy ("moral reedom")wereparamount n Rousseau'sargumentfordemocracy,and even if a feature of autonomy is accuratelydiscern-ing and actingfrom the GeneralWill,it puts the emphasis in the wrongplace to say that democracyforRousseauis justified only for epistemicreasons.34 till,Estlundrightlypoints out the perilsof a deliberativecon-ception that relies solely on epistemic arguments.He proposes a moretive Decision Making,"Ethics ol (Octoberggo):151-81,for a criticismof the theorem'sap-plication o democracy. ee also Christiano'sontribution o DD1,"TheSignificance f PublicDeliberation," pp. 271-73 and 277, n. 25.

32. Thanksto MatthewRisse for this suggestion. For a differentaccount of how inde-pendence is satisfied, ee DavidEstlund,"OpinionLeaders, ndependence,and Condorcet'sJuryTheorem,"Theory and Decision 36 no. 2 (1994):131-62.33.Estlund,DDi, "BeyondFairness ndDeliberation: heEpistemicDimensionofDemo-cratic Authority,"pp. 173-204.34.This sespecially o ifa further onditionofRousseauian utonomy s civicautonomy.


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moderate epistemic account, "EpistemicProceduralism,"which empha-sizes the moral reasons for equal participation in government (such asfairnessand equal respect for one another as citizens) while preservingthe epistemic role of deliberation and voting.35Democraticproceduresdo not have to be correctall the time or even more often than all otherprocedures. Instead, because of their moral properties, and assumingthat majority decisions are correct more often than not, then there arereasons to respect good faith democratic decisions as legitimate, evenwhen (one believes) they do not correctlyor optimally promote the com-mon good (withincertainlimits of injustice,one should add,cf.Estlund,DD1, p. 188).Estlund'sview seems right.Even if there were a moral savant whosejudgments approximatedsubstantivejustice more often than those ofsome majorityof sincereand conscientious citizens, we should not givethispersonultimatepolitical power (although certainlyhe orshe shouldbe givenanadvisoryrole).Proceduralviews emphasizefairness of demo-craticprocedures, whereas epistemic views emphasize substantive jus-tice of outcomes. A pure procedural conception of democracy has nostandard independent of the voting procedure itself to determine thejustice of outcomes.36A pure epistemic conception says that justice isentirely ndependent of proceduresfordecidingwhat is just, so that theprocedurethat best approximatessubstantivejustice is itself right (le-gitimate or just). Estlund rightly seeks to avoid either extreme.(Michelman, Cohen, and apparentlyHabermasdo, too, among others).There are moralpropertiesinherent in a process of democraticdecisionmaking among equals-fairness, equal recognition and respect, civicautonomy,and self-governance being among those frequentlycited-sothat any constitution which denies competent members equal partici-pationindemocratic awmakingprocedures s neither egitimatenorfullyThiswould meanautonomy s necessarilysocial: t requiresactingon the GeneralWill nlyas ascertained hroughdemocraticdeliberationnwhich one participatesasequalcitizen.It is only in one'scapacityas equal citizen that one gives the law to oneself.35. Estlund'saccount resembles in manyrespects CharlesBeitz'saccount of "ComplexProceduralism"nhis PoliticalEquality(Princeton:rincetonUniversityPress,1989), ch. 5.36.Iuse the terms"pureproceduralconception of democracy"n Rawls's ense of pureprocedural ustice. It is the view that, so long as all democraticproceduresarecompliedwith, then whatever the outcome, it is just. David Estlund distinguishes between pureproceduralismwithrespect to justice and with respect to legitimacy.He says his own viewis purelyproceduralwith respect to legitimacy,but not justice. See Estlund,DDi.


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just. These moral reasons are in addition to the traditional liberal rea-sons fordemocracy (emphasizedby Christiano,DD1),namelythat demo-craticprocedures are more likely to promote just outcomes and protectindividual rights.

2. DeliberativeDemocracyas a Fundamental MoralIdealA second distinctive approach is Joshua Cohen'sargument that delib-erativedemocracy is a basic moral ideal that engages our moraljudg-ments and sentiments.37Cohen cites three featuresof a "well-ordereddemocracy" mplicitin Rawls's deaof a well-orderedsociety.First,a well-ordereddemocracy involves public debate on the common good; sec-ond, it ensures the fairvalue of equal political liberties and "manifestsequality" n public institutions; third,it providesa basis forself-respectand the development and exercise of citizens' sense of justice. Cohenclaims, againstRawls, hat instead ofbeingderivative deas basedinmorefundamental notions of fairness or equal respect, these three featuresarepartof "an ndependent and expressly political ideal that is focusedin the first instance on the appropriateconduct of public affairs-on,that is, the appropriateway of arrivingat collective decisions" (DD1,p.71).Iunderstand this to mean that there is a politicalideal of democracyas a deliberativeundertaking among equals that is as fundamental toour moral awareness (among our "considered moral convictions" inRawls's ense), as arethe ideas of fairness andequal respectforpersons.38Weshare this intuitive ideal in the same waythat we (according o Rawls)share the political ideal of a well-orderedsociety. Indeed, Cohen'sargu-ment impliesthat the latter idealmayeven be derivative romthe demo-cratic deal.He aims to elucidate the ideal of deliberativedemocracywith-out relying upon a more abstractconception (such as Rawls'soriginalposition) or on substantiveprinciples of justice.

37. "Deliberation nd DemocraticLegitimacy,"n DDi, pp. 67-92.38. "Thenotion of a deliberativedemocracy s rooted in the intuitive idealof a demo-craticassociation nwhich the justificationof the terms and conditions of association pro-ceeds through public argumentand reasoning among equal citizens. Citizens n such anordersharea commitmentto the resolutionofproblemsof collectivechoice throughpub-lic reasoning, and regard heir basic institutions as legitimate insofaras they establish theframework or free public deliberation."Cohen, DDi, p. 72.


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390 Philosophy&Public Affairs

At this point Cohen's account shows the (admitted) influence ofHabermas (Cohen, DD1,p. 88, n. 12).Beginning with an ideal of delibera-tion as a public activity of justification among equals, Cohen asks, whatconditions "makedeliberation possible" (p. 79). His elucidation beginswith a "formalconception of a deliberativedemocracy."Formally,delib-erativedemocracy is (Di)an ongoing and independent association, (D2)whose basis of legitimacy is free deliberation among equals; (D3) it ispluralistic: ts members have different conceptions of their good; (D4)decisions both are and are publiclyknown to be the result of commondeliberation;and (D5)participants recognize one another as havingthedeliberativeand motivational capacities needed to realize the ideal. Atthe second stage, Cohen sets forth an "ideal deliberative procedure" ogive substantive content to this formal conception. (I1)Ideal delibera-tion is free in so far as (a) it is not constrained by prior norms, and (b)participantstake the conclusions of deliberation to provide sufficientreason to act (a motivational assumption). (12)Deliberation is reasoned,since only justification by the better argumentunderlies decisions. (13)Partiesare both formallyand substantively equal, to the degree that dis-tribution of resourcesdoes not playa causal role affectingdeliberation.(14)Deliberation aims for a rationallymotivated consensus, to find rea-sons acceptable to allwho arecommitted to acting on the results of freeand reasoned deliberationby equals.These features of ideal deliberation imply two generalizations aboutthe object of democratic decision. First,deliberationnaturallyfocuseson the common good, because the aimof deliberation s to secureagree-ment among all (DD1,p. 75). Second, ideal deliberation respects citi-zens' autonomy,because it encourages the exercise of their deliberativecapacities and the formationof preferencesas a resultof deliberation.The roleof Cohen's deal deliberativeprocedureis to provide"amodel[institutions]should mirror, o faraspossible" (DD1,p.79).Itdiffers romRawls'shypotheticalsocialcontract,which is not amodel forinstitutions,but a "thought experiment" (Rawls)that aims to provide principles ofjustice that areto applyto institutions. Cohen then does not aim to de-scribe a hypothetical procedure that justifies substantive principles ofjustice and the common good to regulatethe deliberations of a democ-racy. Rather,he describes an ideal procedure that democratic institu-tions are to emulate as a pattern for deliberatingabout justice and the


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391 Deliberative Democracy:A SympatheticComment

common good. He seeks to set forth the conditions for the possibilityofthis ideal (DD1,p. 79).In this regardCohen's deliberative ideal resembles Habermas'sview(so far as Habermas too aims to set forth a model for "idealdiscourse"and the conditions of its possibility). But does Cohen also followHabermasin holding (1) hat his procedureis not to be regulated by ex-ternal principlesofjustice,and (2) the proper wayto discover the laws inwhich the ideal procedure resultsis not by individual deliberation, butby actually engaging in the procedureunder real-worldconditions thatemulate the ideal?Points(1)and (2) are partofwhat Habermasmeans by"proceduralism."tappearsthat Cohen at least endorses point (1), orhiscondition I1says that ideal deliberation is freein so faras "considerationof proposals is not constrained by the authorityof prior norms or re-quirements"(DD1,p. 74).39Theapparent ack of antecedent substantiveprinciplesto regulatethedeliberations of democratic citizens does not mean that Cohen makesno provision for them. The conditions of the possibility of democraticdeliberation (as specified by the ideal, 11-14)have substantive implica-tions.Substantiverightsand libertiesalongwith opportunitiesandegali-tarian social institutions must be in place to make democratic delibera-tion possible. Cohen contends that a condition of deliberationamongequals is that democratic citizens be guaranteedcertain"non-political"liberties more commonly associated with liberalism.These liberties arein additionto the traditionalpoliticalrightsthat ensure equal consider-ation and rational and informed inputs to deliberation (such as equalrights of participationand freedom of political expression and assem-bly).40Moreover,a condition of deliberation(13) s that citizens have ac-cess to resourcesthat areadequate to render each citizen politicallyin-dependent of the influence of power-relations.This provides groundsfor a "politicalminimum,"or sufficient income to render citizens inde-

39. Whether Cohen also endorses (2), the epistemic branch of Habermas's"proceduralism,"s less clear.NeitherHabermasnorCohenseem to endorseafurthercon-dition, that just laws are simply whatever awswould result from what is agreedto in anyideal procedure assumingall its background onditions aremet) realized nthe realworld.See section IV or furtherdiscussion.40. Cohen says,"The[basic] iberties are not simply among the topics for deliberation;they help to comprisethe frameworkhatmakes it possible."DDi, p. 84.


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pendent so that rightsof political participation can be effectivelyexer-cised.41By arguing that such rights are a condition of democraticdelib-eration, Cohen provides a place for many of the rights, opportunities,and institutions covered by liberal conceptions of justice.The implication s that, whilethere are no (so to speak) "external"rin-ciples or constraints(suchas an independent conception of justice or ofvalue) to limit the deliberativefreedom of democratic citizens (see con-dition I(i)), there are still many conditions "internal" o deliberativede-mocracythatregulatetheirdeliberationson the common good;namely,the rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, and egalitarian social insti-tutions that must be in place if democratic deliberation among equalcitizens is to be possible. It helps to see this aspect of Cohen'sview inlight of later papers in which he discusses the role of public reason indeliberation (also in DD1 and DD2). These later discussions imply that,so long as democratic citizens relyon public reasons, then their delib-erationsarefreeand not subjectto the constraints orauthorityof normsthat arepriorto democratic deliberation itself (moreon this later).One question needing furtherclarification s how Cohen sees the re-lationship between decisions that result from ideal democratic delibera-tion and justice. The title of Cohen's article ("Deliberationand Demo-craticLegitimacy") uggests that deliberativedemocracy is a conditionof political legitimacy. But in denying that ideal deliberation is con-strainedby antecedent principles,how does Cohen avoid the inferencethat democratic procedures,when fully complied with, necessarily re-sult in just outcomes? Not only Rawls,but apparentlyeven Habermas,reject this position.42Even on Habermas'spurportedly "proceduralist"account, while "realdiscourses"arethe only reliablemeans of access towhat would be agreedto under theoreticalconditions of ideal discourse,stillanyactualagreement,no matterhow closely its conditions approxi-

41.See here Cohen'spaper,"TheEconomicBasisof DeliberativeDemocracy," ocialPhi-losophyandPolicy612 (1988):25-50.

42. For Rawlsno actualpolitical procedure satisfies pure procedural ustice, forthereare externalstandardsof justice, provided by his hypothetical "four-stage equence,"bywhich to assess the decisions of actual deliberations.Habermas eems to endorsea similarsort of viewwhen he says, for example,that theparticipantsn democraticdeliberationareto make "reference o an ideal audience oran ideally nclusivecommunity," resumably oascertainwhattheywouldagree o under theirhypotheticalconditions. Between FactsandNorms,p. 286, see also pp.322-23, 325, discussedin note 24 above. I assume this providesan epistemic standardofjusticefor actual democratic deliberation.


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mate the theoretical ideal, can depart from this hypothetical situation.Cohen'smodel of democratic deliberation does not appearto incorpo-rate any such hypothetical standardor other means that determines thevalidityof actual deliberated decisions. So it is not clear whether his viewresembles more Rawls'saccount, or Habermas'saccount, or whether headopts a third "purelyprocedural"way which says that real decisionsresulting from actual deliberation that closely matches the deliberativeideal are not only democratically egitimate but also necessarily just. Ifnot (and I suspect not), and Cohen recognizes an independent criterionofjustice that applies to the outcomes of any actual decision procedure,then what becomes of his condition (Ih) egarding he independence ofdeliberativedemocracy from priorstandards of authority?43n his laterpapers (DD1and DD2), Cohen is clearer about the distinction betweenproceduralversus substantive conceptions of democracyand clearlyre-jectsaproceduralview.The implicationis thatwhilejusticeitselfrequiresa deliberative democracy, still democratic decisions can be legitimate(so far as they accord with the deliberative ideal) without being alwaysjust.44

3. Public Reason and DemocraticLegitimacyThe third distinctive argument for deliberative democracy relies on theidea of public reason. Ithas long been arguedthat democracy encour-ages not only informed political decisions, but also conciliation, fairness,and taking up others'points of view, because grievances are aired andproposals are debated in the hopes of convincing others of their sound-ness or desirability.45Because of the publicity of democratic proceed-

43. Forexample, suppose citizens under ideal deliberativeconditions decide that oncethe political minimum and public goods are satisfied, ncome andwealth are to be distrib-uted by market exchanges and free gifts, or, alternatively, o as to satisfy average utilityrequirements.Are there democraticgrounds for criticizing hese decisions on grounds ofjustice or legitimacy?44.See ThomasChristiano,"TheSignificanceof PublicDeliberation,"DDi, pp. 243-78,for a thoughtful discussionof public deliberation and, at 262ff., a criticismof Cohen.Heargues Cohen is liable to incoherence because of his position that ideal deliberativeout-comes are "politicallyustified." fChristianomeans that for Cohen deliberativeoutcomesare not only legitimatebut also just,Ihesitate to attribute his position to Cohen, althoughadmittedlyhis earlierpaperin DDi is ambiguous.45. See WilliamNelson'sdiscussion andelaborationofJ. S.Mill nJustifyingDemocracy


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ings, there are alreadypragmaticreasons formakingproposals and ar-guments in terms that others of differentpersuasions and interestscanaccept. But Kantians,contractualists, and political liberals claim thatthere is an independent moralrequirementthatcitizens shouldbe givenreasons they can accept in their capacity as free and equal citizens, be-cause this expresses mutual respect and public recognition of them asequals and as free.46Thatinstitutionalprinciples be justifiable in termsacceptable to free and equal citizens is said to be a condition of theirpoliticalautonomy.47 t is also said to be a requirementof politicallegiti-macy that the exercise of politicalpower be justifiableaccording to con-siderations all can reasonably accept as democratic citizens.48Whatmakes a democracy deliberativeis that its discussions and judgmentson lawsproceedaccordingto these "publicreasons"(Cohen,DD1,p.413).JoshuaCohen, in two other essays, appeals to the idea of public rea-son to revise and furtherdevelophis account ofdeliberativedemocracy.49Cohen says that what primarily distinguishes the deliberative from(London:Routledge,1980). See also Christiano n DDi, and CharlesBeitz,PoliticalEqual-ity,pp. 113-16,on howthe openness of democraticprocedurespromotesresponsiblede-liberationmore likelyto reachsubstantively ustresults.46. "The equirementofprovidingacceptablereasons for the exerciseofpoliticalpowerto those who are governedbyit ... expresses the equalmembershipof all in the sovereignpoliticalbody responsibleforauthorizing he exercise of that power." oshuaCohen,DDi,"Procedure nd Substance in DeliberativeDemocracy," p. 407-37, at 416. In DemocracyandDisagreement,GutmannandThompson say,"reciprocity,"rseekingand giving"mu-tually ustifiablereasons expressesthe coreoftheprocessofdeliberation,"pp. 52-53),and

"prescribes ccommodationbased on mutual respect." p. 56).47.On the relationshipbetween "fullpublicity"andpoliticalautonomy,see Rawls,Po-liticalLiberalism, p.66-81,and the earlier1980Dewey Lectures,"KantianConstructivismin MoralTheory,"Rawls,CollectedPapers,ch. 16.48. ForRawls, he requirement hat laws and policies be justifiable n terms of publicreasons follows from a "liberalprinciple of legitimacy,"which requiresthat for politicalpower to be "proper"Rawls eems to mean bothjust andlegitimate), t must be exercisedin accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all reasonable citizens as freeand equal might reasonablybe expected to endorse, in the lightofprinciples and idealsacceptableto them as both reasonable and rational.(SeePoliticalLiberalism,pp. 137,217,393)Thisimplies a"duty f civility"o justifycoercivepolitical action in termsof the "politi-cal values of publicreason." PoliticalLiberalism, . 217)ForRawls his dutyunderwritesademocracythat is not simplyconstitutional,but also "deliberative."ee PoliticalLiberal-ism, p. lix (1996paperback d.):"The deal ofpublicreason contains a form ofpublic politi-cal deliberation ...Abelief in the importanceof public deliberation s essential for a rea-sonable constitutionalregime."49.Cohen,DDi,"Procedure ndSubstance nDeliberativeDemocracy,"ndCohen,DD2,"Democracy and Liberty,"pp. 185-231.


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aggregative conceptions of democracy is that, whereas the latter aimsfor procedural fairness, the former is built around the idea of politicaljustification (DD1,p. 412). n a democracymarkedby a "reasonableplu-ralism"of religious, philosophical, and ethical views, political justifica-tion among equals requiresnot simplythateveryone's nterests be givenequal consideration. It also requirespublic deliberationin terms of rea-sons that freepersonswithdifferentviews canreasonablyacceptas equalcitizens. Thisrequirement,which Cohen calls the "principleof delibera-tive inclusion" (DDi, p. 417,DD2, p. 203) in turn imposes certain demandson a democracy:In addition to procedural rightsof political participa-tion, there aresubstantive iberties, opportunities,and social institutionsthat must be providedfor if citizens areto takepartin democratic delib-eration as equals.The basic idea of Cohen'sdeliberative nclusion principle seems to bethat reasonable persons who have differentmetaphysical, religious,andethicalviews must be givenreasons that they can regardas sufficient,asmeasured by their reasonable comprehensiveviews. Otherwisethey arenot treatedas equalsin democraticdeliberation(cf.DD1,p.418).Forwhilelaws arejustifiableto those in the majorityfor reasons they can accept,they are not justifiableto the reasonableminority.Forexample,no con-siderations could convince reasonable religious persons that the com-pellingdemands of their faithought to be prohibited,for the frameworkof what constitutes good reasons is provided bytheirreligiousview.Thismeans that if democratic citizens are to be regardedas having equalstanding, they must be guaranteed religious freedom (DD2, p. 205-206).Cohen makes similarappeals to public reason tojustifyfreedomof non-political expression (DD1, p. 419f., DD2, p. 207ff.) and "moral liberty," orfreedom of sexual relations (DD2, p. 212ff.).These and other argumentsshowwhy adeliberativeconceptionisnot proceduralbutprovidesaplaceforsubstantiveliberties and guarantees.The efforts of Cohen and othersto show how substantive liberties, opportunities, and resources are acondition of deliberativedemocracyare one of the more fruitfulareas ofinquiryin current discussions of deliberative democracy.50

50. See also Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, and GutmannandThompson, De-mocracy and Disagreement,also relevant n DDi, James Bohman,"DeliberativeDemoc-racyand EffectiveSocialFreedom:Capabilities,Resources,and Opportunities," p.349-82;and James Knightand JamesJohnson, "WhatSort of EqualityDoes DeliberativeDemoc-racy Require?"p.279-320; and in DD2, Jon Elster,"Deliberationand Constitution Mak-ing,"pp.97-122.


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Onepotential objectionto Cohen'sargument forreligious and expres-sive freedom is, "Ofcourse the losing minority does not find religiousrestrictions reasonable or justifiable. But this shows that people havedifferent conceptions of what is reasonable andjustifiable. Given thesedifferencesit is unrealistic to seek 'discussion aimed at reachingreason-able agreement' (Cohen, DD1,p. 419) in a democracy."This kind of ob-jection is expressed by more than one critic of deliberativedemocracy.51Itconstitutes a serious challenge, because it raises a question about theviability of the idea of public reason. Rather han directly responding tothese criticismshere,itmay help advance the debate more to clarifywhatis meant by public reason.III. THE IDEAOF PUBLICREASONWhether a democracyis deliberativedepends not just on joint delibera-tion among citizens, but also on the topics aboutwhich citizens deliber-ate and the kinds of considerations they recognize as good reasons indemocratic argumentand decisions. A democracy is deliberativein sofar as its citizens engage in public reasoningabout a common good. Theidea of public reason is central to accounts of deliberativedemocracy.What is public reason?The idea has taken on a life of its own since it was reintegrated ntopolitical philosophyin the early1980s.52Presently here areseveral differ-ent accounts of public reason.Accordingto one account, public reasonsare the neutral reasons that people share in common in a democracy.53Accordingto another, they are the considerations that fullyrational andinformedpersons with diversevalues relyon in a procedureof ideal dis-course.54Athird account says public reason is embodied in the Thomist

51.In DD1, see GeraldGaus, "Reason,Justification,and Consensus:WhyDemocracyCan'tHave tAll," p. 205-42, and Thomas Christiano,"TheSignificanceof PublicDelibera-tion,"pp.243-78.See alsoJeremyWaldron, awandDisagreement(Oxford:OxfordUniver-sity Press, 1999), pp. 91-93, and ch. 7.52. ByRawls,so far as Iam aware.See Rawls's1985 paper,"Justice s Fairness:Politicalnot Metaphysical,"n CollectedPapers,at p. 395for Rawls's irstexplicitreference o publicreason:"Theaim is free agreement,reconciliation hroughpublicreason."53. See CharlesLarmore,Patterns of MoralComplexity, Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versity Press,1987),p. 53on "neutraldialogue."BruceAckermanhas an earlieraccount inSociallustice and the Liberal State (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1980), ch. ii.54.JuergenHabermas aysthe roleofmoralphilosophy is to analyzethe "communica-tivepresuppositionsand theprocedureofadiscursiveprocessofopinion-andwill-forma-


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tradition of natural aw,55whereas a fourtharguesthat only secular rea-sons can be public reasons.There is even a non-democratic account of"Hobbesianpublic reason,"accordingto which one person judges whatwe all have reason to do.56 Here I will focus mainly on Rawls's dea ofpublic reason andwill distinguish it from these conceptions. It is a com-plicated idea, but it is essential to understanding what may be called"thepoliticalliberal deal of deliberativedemocracy"endorsedby Rawls,Cohen, and others.A sense of Rawls's dea is conveyed in his claim, "in a constitutionalregime with judicial review,public reason is the reason of its supremecourt."(PoliticalLiberalism,p. 231).His point here is not to endorse thereasoning or decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,but to indicate that inconstitutional argument and justification within a democracy, certainkinds of considerations count as reasons and others do not. Most citi-zens (even those who are Christians) agree that a constitutional courtshould not relyon the Bible or on abstract heologicalarguments.Even fit be granted that these are reliable sources of moral truth, they still aresources that a large portion of democratic citizens, whether rightlyorwrongly, reject as untenable. The idea of public reason extends the ex-clusion of considerations from public political argument beyond reli-gion to all "comprehensivedoctrines."It assumes that citizens in a de-mocracy,because theyhaveultimatepoliticalauthority,are owedajustifi-cation in terms of reasons they can accept for the exercise of coercivepolitical power,which is exercisedalways n their name. Ofcourse,thereare always going to be reasonable citizens who disagree with supremecourt and otherpoliticaldecisions, no matterwhatreasonsareprovided.Unanimityon politicaldecisions is rarely o be had, even among reason-able citizens under optimal conditions. But this is not the issue.57 Thetion in which the public use of reason is manifested.""Reconciliationhrough the PublicUse of Reason," n TheInclusionof the Other Cambridge:MITPress,1998),p.72.55. See JohnFinnis,"Abortion, aturalLaw,and PublicReason," n RobertP GeorgeandChristopherWolfe, eds., NaturalLaw and Public Reason (WashingtonDC: GeorgetownUniversityPress,2000) pp. 75-106,at 77-78.56. David Gauthier,"PublicReason,"Social Philosophy and Policy12 (Winter 995): 19-42, p. 25, discussed in Gaus, DD1,pp. 225-26. Gauthier ays, "By ransferring he locus ofdeliberationfromeach individual o an agreed arbitrator,ationality upplants the resortto force in the resolution of conflicts." p.26). See also Michael Ridge,"HobbesianPublicReason,"Ethics o8, no. 3 (1998):538-68.57. In this regard, arlierclaims by deliberativedemocratsthatdeliberationseeks con-sensus (forwhich they have been widely criticized, see, e.g., Gaus, DD1,or Waldron,Law


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issue rather is that, whether or not citizens accept or reject particulardecisions or laws, it is important that they should be able to understandwhy the court or the legislaturearrived at its conclusion and be able toaccept the premises from which deliberation and argument proceed.Otherwise,no justification has been provided to citizens who disagree.58The idea of public reason presupposes a "dutyof civility"(PoliticalLib-eralism,p. 217) to be able to explain political decisions in termsofvaluesand considerations that allcitizens can accept in theircapacity as sover-eign citizens.Hereit is importantto emphasize that Rawls conceives of public rea-son as an idea only characteristicof a constitutional democracy.Publicreason shouldnot then be understood as the reasonscommonly affirmedby members of just any society of shared values and moral beliefs. Thefact thatall subjectsof Iranmight publiclyaffirmthe political priorityofthe Koranand Islamic morallaw would not makeIslamicreligiona basisfor public reason.59Public reason is defined against a background ofdemocraticinstitutions. Itpresumes that citizens takedemocratic insti-tutions seriously and are committed to maintaining them. Moreover,public reason is reason addressed to persons in their political capacityas democratic citizens, and not in their capacity as economic agents,members of a particular association (religiousor otherwise), or in anyother role.60The idea assumes that citizens think of themselves as freeand as equal participants in public life, and that they address one an-other as such. Theirself-conception as free and equal citizens is madepossible through institutions guaranteeing political freedom and self-rule.These institutionsprovidenot onlyforequal rightsto vote and holdoffice; they also secure freedom of thought, expression, and the press,and public forums for freepoliticalexpression,allof which areessentialand Disagreement)probablyneed to be revised,or at least clarified. Onthis Cohen is nowclear:"Evenan ideal deliberativeprocedurewill not, in general, ssue in consensus."DD2,p. 197).The agreement that is to be had among reasonable persons is on the kinds of rea-sons that arerelevant opoliticalargument,and(ifRawls s right)on aliberalconceptionofjustice, or at least a range of liberalconceptions, to construe these reasons and determinetheir weight. See Cohen, DD2, p.222, who appears o agree.

58. Cf.Rawls,A TheoryofJustice,p.580 (p.508 rev.ed.), "Beingdesigned to reconcile byreason,justificationproceeds from what all parties to the discussion hold in common."59. Of course Iraniansare not so uniform n their beliefs, but supposing they were.60. Rawlssays (PoliticalLiberalism, . 213):"Public easonis characteristicof a demo-craticpeople: it is the reason of its citizens,of those sharingthe status of equal citizenship.The subject of their reason is the good of the public."


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to criticaland informed deliberationamong equals.6'Finally,publicrea-son presupposes freedomofthe person, including institutionsthat guar-antee freedom of conscience and of association and citizens' libertytoact on their conscientious convictions (moral, philosophical, and reli-gious) and pursue their ideas of a good life.It is primarilybecause a constitutional democracy recognizesnonpo-litical as well as political freedoms that Rawls sees there to be a specialneed for public reason to regulate argument and deliberation in publicpoliticallife in a democracy.Ademocracythat tolerates differentmoral,philosophical, and religiousviews inevitablywill be markedby consci-entious conflicts of belief and doctrine among reasonablepersons. Reli-gious pluralism s normally accepted as inevitablein a constitutionalde-mocracy,but Rawlsclaimsthat equallyinevitablearedifferencesof con-scientious belief among reasonable persons regardingthe nature of re-ality,knowledge,andtruth,aswellas differences n comprehensivemoralvalues and the ends that give meaning to life. Evenamong reasonablepersons, agreement cannot be achieved on any metaphysical doctrineof realityorcomprehensiveset ofvalues or on ultimate moralprinciplesdealingwith many aspects of life. The implication is that such values asrationalormoral autonomy, social welfare or utility,economic efficiency,self-realizationorculturalexcellence-all ofwhich have been suggestedas a basis for unity in a democracy-cannot serve as shared values toground public reason or political cooperation, any more than can thewill of God and divinely inspirednatural law.Evenunder the ideal con-ditions of a well-ordered democratic society,where everyone endorsesfree democratic institutions and a democratic constitution, reasonablepersons inevitablywill affirm differentand conflicting "comprehensivedoctrines" that are themselves reasonable. Rawls calls this "the fact ofreasonablepluralism."His account of publicreasonrespondsto this fact.One of the several roles of a political conception ofjustice is to provideabasis forpublic reasoningthatcan be reasonablyaccepted bydemocraticcitizens.Here the complicatedidea ofwhat is "reasonable" eeds discussing. Itis a crucial idea in the accounts of deliberative democracy by Rawls,Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson, and others. A frequent objection to

61.The right to present grievances and criticize governmentand majorityviews, alongwith freedom to form and join political parties with alternativeplatforms or realizing hecommon good, are protected too.


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Rawls and others who use the concept is there are differentways to de-fine orspecify 'reasonableness,' ndthis is something about which peoplewill always disagree.I cannot adequately respond here to the questionwhether this poses a problem for Rawlsand other deliberative demo-crats who rely on the idea.62What is important for our purposes of un-derstanding the idea of public reason is Rawls'saccount of reasonable-ness, not someone else's. Rawlsconstrues 'reasonable'as a moral con-cept that is not definable in any straightforwardway. There is no list ofnecessary and sufficient conditionsthat specify its meaning. At best whatit means can be revealed by its uses, which might then be elucidated byother concepts, and explicated by moralprinciples.It is within the con-text of his theory that Rawls seeks to explicatethe concept of (political)reasonableness. To be reasonableultimately is to have a settled disposi-tion to reason and act from the requirementsof a liberalpolitical con-ception of justice.

Rawlsbegins to elucidate the concept of reasonableness by elaborat-ing primary features of the idea of a reasonable person with two moralpowerswho regardthemselves as free and as equals.63Reasonableper-sons (according o Rawls's pecification) recognizeand accept that otherreasonablepersons inevitablywillaffirmcomprehensive doctrines differ-ent fromtheir ownf.64 ForRawls,part of what it is to be reasonable is toaccept the inevitabilityof reasonablepluralism.This is partlya resultof62.Thepapers mentioned in note 51objectthatpeoplehave different tandardsof rea-sonableness,andthat what constitutes reasonable acceptance is a subject of controversy.(Gaus,DD1,p. 223; Christiano,DD1,pp. 268-69). The implication is that pluralism is sodeep in a democracy that there is no more likelihood of agreement on a basis for publicreasoning han on anythingelse. Suffice t to say that Rawlsrecognizesthat because of theirdifferentphilosophicalviews people will have differentdefinitions and criteriaof reason-ableness. He still believes, and argues,that a well-orderedsociety is realisticallypossible,where citizens agree on a liberalconception of justice andstandards or publicreasonandpolitical reasonableness.63.OfreasonablecomprehensivedoctrinesRawls hen says that, amongother charac-teristics, they "are he doctrines that reasonablecitizens affirm." PoliticalLiberalism,p.36) Hehopes that the "deliberatelyoose"account of reasonablecomprehensivedoctrinescan be compensated for by the account of reasonablepersons. See PoliticalLiberalism,p.

59.Seealsopp.xvi/xviii n the paperbackedition: "Politicaliberalismalsosupposes thatareasonablecomprehensivedoctrine does not reject he essentials of a democraticregime."64. Disagreementon comprehensive moral, philosophical,and religiousdoctrinesisinevitable among even rationaland fully reasonable persons because of certain "burdensof judgment," uch as vagueness of generalterms, evidentiarydisputes, and diverse expe-riences.


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a reasonableperson'sdesire to cooperate with others on terms that allcan reasonablyaccept.65This means not simply that reasonablepersonsare tolerant of other doctrines. Habermas charges that Rawls's dea ofreasonablenesssimply implies toleration.66But ftolerationwere alltherewere to being reasonable,it could be said of Christianfundamentalists,who arewillingto tolerate otherreligionswhile insistingon institutingastatereligion, hattheytoo arereasonable. Reasonablepersons forRawlsare not simply tolerant (indeed they will not tolerate injustice at all).Rather, hey want to be able to live with others according to principlesotherreasonablepersonscanacknowledgeandpolicies theycanendorse;also they want to be able to justify laws and political policies to peopleholding different reasonable doctrines with reasons that other reason-able persons recognize and can reasonably accept as well. Reasonable-ness involves a readiness to politically address others of different per-suasions in terms of public reasons.

Rawls's deal of publicreason then respondsto the "factof reasonablepluralism."Reasonablepluralism-not pluralismper se-defines the pa-rametersandthereachof public reason.This means three things (at east).first,Rawls's dea of public reason does not relyon autonomy or anyother"comprehensive" ccount of the human good; nor does it depend on anaccount of the origin of moral duty (in reason, emotion, or God'swis-dom orwill.)The idea that autonomy, God, utility,human perfection,orsome other comprehensive value, is a condition of justice and the hu-man good must be given up within public reasoning, for these valuescannot providebases for agreement on a common good among demo-cratic citizens.Second, publicreason does not tryto addressunreasonable doctrines.So (to mention views Rawis'scriticshave raised against public reason)there is no assumption that Social Darwinists, religious fundamental-ists, slave holders, or Nazis are amenable to public reason, nor shouldany effortbe made to accommodate theirviews. These doctrines couldnot be affirmedby reasonablepersons wanting to justifytheir relations

65. Two other features of reasonable persons Rawlsmentions are:(1)Theywant to beseen as fully cooperatingmembers of society by others; 2) they have a "reasonablemoralpsychology."Thelatterconditionimpliesreasonablepersonsarecapableof actingforthesakeof a conception ofjustice. PoliticalLiberalism,pp. 81-82.66. See Habermas, n "ReconciliationhroughPublicReason," n his The Inclusion ofthe Other(MIT, 998), originallyappearing n TheJournalof Philosophy,92 (March1995),109-131. Cf. Gaus, in DD1, p. 224.


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in terms that others can reasonably accept. Perhaps some, if not all, ofthese unreasonabledoctrineswill exist withina well-ordereddemocraticsociety. Any society no matter how ideal will have some unreasonablepeople holdingirrationalor unjust doctrines.Whereasexpression of suchunreasonable views is to be tolerated,theireffects are to be contained bysociety. There is no requirement that they be respected or accommo-dated by public reason.Finally, o sayreasonable pluralismdefines the reach of public reasonmeans that public reason must rely upon principles, values, and meth-ods of reasoning and assessing evidence that are shared by the reason-able doctrines affirmedby reasonable citizens in a democratic society.These values and principles do not always lie on the surface of reason-able doctrines. Some do; reasonable doctrines reject slaveryand affirmthevalues of the integrityof human life,forexample,which providerea-sons for a variety of measures, such as laws prohibiting violence andunjustifiedcoercion, maintaining public order,public health, and so on.But other sharedvalues andprinciples haveto be uncovered.Again,pub-lic reason is the reason of democratic citizens. Itis addressedto reason-able persons who see themselves as free and equal citizens, and it ad-dresses them in their political capacityas democratic citizens. The val-ues sharedby reasonable democratic citizens will be (forthe most part)politicalvalues.These"political alues ofpublicreason"respondin someway to how reasonable persons think of themselves politically:of theirstatus and role as citizens, theirpolitical rightsand duties,theirpoliticalrelations to other citizens, and to the proper exercise of political power.Aworkingassumption of Rawls's iberalideal of deliberativedemocracyis thatreasonablepersons in a well-ordered democraticsociety conceiveof themselves politicallyas free and equal citizens; as such they shouldrecognize they have fundamental political interests in maintainingthepowersof reason and volition that enable them to be cooperatingmem-bers of democraticsociety. Thisconception ofpersons as freeandequal,with interests in maintainingtheir moral and rationalpowers, providesthe fundamental basis for thinking about the political values of publicreason. The reasons that are public and shared in a democracy will insome way respond to political values, which themselves are in turn re-lated to conditions needed forrealizingthis ideal conception of demo-craticcitizens.


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403 Deliberative Democracy:A SympatheticComment

The point here is not to expound Rawls's"politicalconception of theperson,"nor to explore the complicated relationships between publicreasons, reasonableness, political values, and the democratic concep-tion of citizens.Thepoint rather s simplyto suggest that these ideas areinterconnected, and that they provide the background for the id

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Freeman Deliberative Dmcy (PPA 00)