Finnmarksvidda as an action area tromsø final

Finnmarksvidda as an Ac.on Area. Tradi&onal Rightholders vs.

Industrial Newcomers- ‐Encounter Implica&ons

Dr. Jan Åge Riseth, Norut Tromsø

Lecture and seminar at: Tromsø Academy of Landscape and Territorial Studies

January 17, 2014

Outline

–  Self- introduc6on ‐

•  I) Commons theory –  Which tragedy? –  Sustainable commons –  Ins6tu6onal analysis/IAD

Framework –  Social dilemmas –  Case studies –  Design principles –  Threats

•  II) Elements to an analysis –  History

•  The Sámi and the states •  Siidas •  Dalon and herders •  Finnmarksvidda in the 1960s

–  Challenges •  Roads and Transport Technology •  Moderniza6on and urbaniza6on •  Visitors or Invaders?

–  Berry pickers, hikers, anglers, hunters –  Industrial Ac6vi6es and Enchroachments

•  Climate change –  Conflicts

•  Internal –  In herding community –  In local community

•  External –  regional

–  Solu6ons?

17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 2


Personal background •  M. Sc. in nature management (1979) •  Central Agency for Reindeer

management (10 years) (Reindri^sadministrasjonen, Alta) –  Vice Director/Department Director

(statskonsulent) •  municipal land- use planner (2 years ) ‐•  College teacher/researcher (8 years )

–  Visi6ng scholar at Workshop in PTPA, Indiana Univ. Bloomington (1996)

•  Member of IASC •  Ph.D. in natural resource economics

(2000)

•  Researcher in Norut Tromsø since 2002 and s6ll

•  Adjunct researcher at Nordic Sámi ins6tute/ Sámi Un. Coll. 2003- 12 (9 of 10 years) ‐

•  Core research fields: –  Reindeer management & its

resource u6liza6on –  Nature conserva6on & local

people’s nature use –  Tradi6onal knowledge & climate

change –  Impact analyses

Why Ostrom and Commons Theory?

•  A system should be understood on its own premises •  Need of a holis6c theore6cal approach •  Other theories, e.g. “Tragedy of the Commons”

– Rigid analysis and outcome – Blueprint: State regula6on or priva6za6on/market

•  Flexible •  Posi6ve experiences •  Theore6cal level: Framework- not specific theory ‐•  SES Framework- more advanced ‐



Ins6tu6ons

•  «..prescrip6ons that humans use to organize all forms of repete6ve and structured interac6ons.»

•  ”… the conven6ons, norms and formally sanc6oned rules of a society. They provide expecta6ons, stability and meaning essen6al to human existence and coordina6on. Ins6tu6ons regularize life, support values and produce and protect interests” (Vatn 2005, 83).


An Ac6on Arena •  «…whenever individuals interact, exchange

goods or solve problems..»..

•  a game such as chess, a class, a market, a social semng, a local community


Ac6on situa6ons •  Par6cipants interact in ac.on situa.ons affected by a

broader context (physical possibili6es and rules)


IAD Framework


Applying the framework (I)


Rules on different levels •  Opera.onal rules directly affect day- to- day decisions made by the ‐ ‐

par6cipants in any semng. –  These can change rela6vely rapidly—from day to day.

•  Collec.ve- choice rules ‐ affect opera6onal ac6vi6es and results through their effects in determining –  who is eligible to be a par6cipant and the specific rules to be used in

changing opera6onal rules. –  These change at a much slower pace.

•  Cons.tu.onal- choice rules ‐ first affect collec6ve- choice ac6vi6es ‐by determining who is eligible to be a par6cipant and the rules to be used in craîng the set of collec6ve- choice ‐–  rules that, in turn, affect the set of opera6onal rules. –  Cons6tu6onal- choice rules change at the slowest pace. ‐


ANALYTICAL LEVEL Arena Examplexs

Operational rules-in-use

Rules for day to day adaptation

Rules faced by individuals, firms and organiza6ons

Collective choice arenas

Rules creation processes Planning process of a municipality

Constitutional arena

Usually at national areas Legislatures and government

Meta-constitutional areas

Usually international processes

Folk law


Linking levels of analysis


Rules of different origin


Resource management and property regimes Private property Individuals have a right to undertake socially acceptable uses, and

have a duty to refrain from socially unacceptable uses. Others (called "non- owners") have a duty to refrain from preven.ng socially ‐acceptable uses, and have a right to expect that only socially acceptable types of use will occur.

Common property The management group (the "owners") has a right to exclude non- members, and non- members have a duty to abide by ‐ ‐exclusion. Individual members of the management group (the "co- owners") have both rights and du6es with respect to use rates and ‐maintenance of the thing owned.

State property Individuals have a duty to observe use/access rules determined by a controlling/managing agency. Agencies have a right to determine use/access rules.

Non- property ‐(open- access) ‐

There is no defined group of users or "owners" and so the benefit stream is available to anyone. Individuals have both privilege and no right with respect to user rates and maintenance of the asset. (Bromley, 1989:205)


Törbel (Valais, Switzerland) •  Private land in the village;

–  Grain, hay, vegetables, fruit, vinyards •  Common land (Common pool resource)

–  Long 6me enduring ins6tu6ons •  Known regula6ons from year 1224 •  Formal associa6on from 1483 •  Borders known from 1507

–  Five types of land including alp, meadows/grazing land, 6mber forest, water rights

–  No ci6zen could send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the winter (wintering rule)

•  Substan6al fines for exeeding one’s quota •  Administered by an official •  Easy to monitor and enforce •  Cows counted- also basis for share of cheese produc6on ‐

–  Access dependent on community membership, outsiders can be accepted

–  All cow- owning village members of an alp associa6on ‐•  Annual mee6ngs decide fines, annual maintenance work

Nemng (1976) 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 16

When are communal forms of land tenure bewer?

•  (1) value of produc6on per uinit of land rel. low, •  (2) low frequency of dependability of use/yield •  (3) low possibility of improvement/ intensifica.on •  (4) large territory needed for effec6ve use •  (5) rela6ve large groups required for capital

intensive ac6vi6es

Nemng (1976)


Regimes and pay- off ‐

17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 18 Vatn based on Bromley 1991

Property rights in CPRs


(Schlager and Ostrom 1993:14-15)

Rights & Posi6ons


Games CPR users play

•  We define a general reward matrix by the parameters a, b, c og d. •  The parameter values are defined by the produc6on condi6ons for the actual resource

(reindeer pasture). •  The outcome is decided by the combina6on of the strategy choices by the two players. •  Player I can choose between 2 ac6ons given in 2 rows. •  Player II can choose between 2 ac6ons given in 2 columns. •  The 4 cells of the matrix represent the possible outcomes •  Possible outcome for Player I: Upper le^ corner of each cell •  Possible outcome for Player II: Lower right corner of each cell 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 21

The Dream

•  Defined by parameter values: a>c, b>d, e.g. a=4, b=2, c=3 and d=1. Dominant strategy (Cooperate, Cooperate), i.e. the players will find that coopera6on pays. Outcome: a=4 for both players.

•  The logic can mirror a situa6on of excess resources (pasture). •  Concretely coopera6on in this typen of situa6on can men

prac6cal coordina6on for mutual adavatage. This play illustrates an unproblema6c situa6on for u6liza6on of a CPR.

•  Ex.: Kautokeino winter range in the 1960s had excess pasture –  Each siida had its clearly defined area; unused areas between each of the

herds and close to the Finnish border. –  Siida interrela6ons were mutually posi6ve. General accept for the use of

others areas in cri6cal situa6ons. 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 22

The Dilemma

•  Defined by parameter values: c>a>d>b, e.g. a=3, b=1, c=4, d=2. •  Dominant strategy (Compete, Compete ), i.e. Outcome b=1 for

both players. As both players aim at c=4, but since they both make that choice, the resource is overused and both players loose.

•  Remark: a play where the players aim at individual ra.onality, but achieve collec.ve irra.onality. The situa6on at the fall and winter pastures in Kautokeino and Karasjok both during the 1980s and currently remind of this play.


Assurance

•  The 3rd play does not have a dominant strategy , on the contrary a condi&oned strategy ; i.e. the outcome is condi6oned that both players do the best given that both choose the same strategy

•  Defined by parameter values: a>c, a>d>b, e.g.: a=4, b=1, c=3, d=2.

•  Two possible equilibria (Cooperate, Cooperate)and (Compete, Compete ) wit the respec6ve outcomes (4,4) and (2,2).

•  In this play coopera6on always provide bewer outcome than compe66on. When both players cooperate, a joint surplus is created.

•  This play can remind of situa6ons both in South Sápmi (Trøndelag) and Easternmost Finnmark (Varanger). 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 24

Design principles •  1. Clearly defined boundaries. Boundaries of resource system & who has rights to harvest

resource units are clearly defined. •  2. Propor.onal equivalence between benefits and costs. Rules specifying the amount of

resource products that a user is allocated (benefits) are related to local condi6ons and to rules requiring labor, materials, and/or money inputs (costs)

•  3. Collec.ve- choice arrangements‐ . Many of the individuals affected by harves6ng and protec6on rules are included in the group that can modify rules.

•  4. Monitoring. Monitors, who ac6vely audit biophysical condi6ons and user behavior, are at least par6ally accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.

•  5. Graduated sanc.ons. Users who violate rules- in- use are likely to receive graduated ‐ ‐sanc6ons (related to seriousness of offense).

•  6. Conflict- resolu.on mechanisms. ‐ Rapid access to low- cost, local ac6on situa6ons to resolve ‐conflict among users or between users and officials.

•  7. Minimal recogni.on of rights to organize. The rights of users to devise their own ins6tu6ons are not challenged by external governmental authori6es, and users have long- term tenure ‐rights to the resource.

•  For resources parts of larger systems: •  8. Nested enterprises. Appropria6on, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolu6on,

and governance ac6vi6es are organized in mul6ple layers of nested enterprises.

(Ostrom 1990, 2005)


Threaths •  Rapid exogenous changes

–  Rapid changes in technology or popula6on numbers can become a challenge to effec6ve governance of the commons. A new technology that enables fishers to catch more fish with the same amount of effort, may render rules on where and when to fish useless unless restric6ons on gear are implemented.

•  Transla.on and/or transmission failures –  Informal arrangements can be translated into official rules. For example, when

wri6ng the bylaws of a homeowners associa6on the rules are oên based on informal prac6ces. Over 6me the reasons why some formal rules are wriwen in the books may be lost, which may lead to problems.

–  Rapid change in popula6on or culture may lead to a circumstance in which the general principles involved in the design of effec6ve community- governed ‐ins6tu6ons are not transmiwed from one genera6on to another

•  Blueprint thinking –  The fact that some rules work out well in one ac6on situa6on does not mean

that those same rules will work well for other situa6ons. •  Corrup.on and rent seeking •  Lack of large- scale suppor.ve ins.tu.ons ‐

–  Small- scale communi6es can be very effec6ve in self- organizing and sustaining ‐ ‐their shared resources but will eventually experience challenges in the long term if they do not have the support of larger scale ins6tu6ons.


External pressure •  "If the modern state holds common property in low

esteem...then external threats to common property will not receive the same governmental response as would a threat to private property.

•  ...If pastoralists are regarded as poli&cally marginal... then the property regimes central to pastoralism will be only indifferently protected against threat from others. If those threatening pastoralist property regimes - sedentary ‐agriculturalists for example - happen to enjoy more favor ‐from the state, then the protec&on of grasslands under common property against encroachments will be haphazard at best."

Bromley (1991:28) 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 27

Need and capacity in regimes


•  Riseth

Applying the framework (II)


Reflec.on in Break- up- Groups ‐ ‐•  Discuss (shortly):

– Does Commons Theory seem relevant for the understanding and analysis of Guovdageaidnu reality as you perceived it during your field work?

– What parts seem par6cularly interes6ng? – What kind of “facts”/informa6on are crucial for

the analyses you plan to perform?

•  Plan an oral answer in plenary class


The hun.ng and catching culture (Vorren 1978)

•  The tradi6onal sewlements of Sápmi were decided by the hun6ng/catching culture and its adapta6on to landscape and resources.

•  The core elements were the watercourses; due to the fish resources, transport possibili6es summer and winter and the forests in the valleys with both plants and animals.

•  Ridges and watersheds were natural borders between local communi6es (siidas)


Historical Siidas

17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 32 Solbakk 2007:95


History of fron6er- style coloniza6on ‐•  As a general picture Arc6c and Sub- Arc6c areas have a ‐

long history of fron6er- style inner coloniza6on where ‐the homelands of Sámi, Inuit and other northern indigenous peoples have been incorporated into –  the Nordic Kingdoms, –  the North American states, and –  the Russian Empire etc.

•  Their resources have been extracted under control of the ruling governments

•  However, there has been a rela.ve freedom due to the limita.ons in control abili.es


Tradi6onal livelihoods (I)

•  Guovdageaidnu has from 6me immemorial up to the latest half decade been almost exclusively been based on subsistence primary industries. –  i.e. within the memory of old and middle- aged ‐ (childhood memories) people –  and many elements s6ll intact/vital and important for people

•  From the 16th & 17th century the ancient semi- nomadic‐ hun6ng & fishing communi6es differen6ated into two subcultures: –  pastoral reindeer management and –  Sewled tundra peasantry with harves6ng and capturing of game, fish and berries

•  The pastoralists and the peasants cooperated through exchange of goods and services mediated through common ins6tu6ons (verdevuohta- ‐guest friendship) and by cross- marriage ‐–  i.e. a very fine web of rela6ons.

Hunters/catchers - - - - > nomads and sewled ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐

(Hågvar 2006:278) 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 35

The tundra peasants (Dálon) «Sealed»

•  Some of the tasks in meahcci (the tundra), par6cularly grouse catching and fishing, caused absence from the farm for several weeks at a 6me.

•  In winter draught reindeer was absolutely necessary, e.g. for retrieving of barrels of salted fish. A family could have as much as 50 draught reindeer. The sewled had their own pasture areas, and the herders avoided these areas

•  In total adult men could be away at least 6 months of the year, i.e. they were not very “sewled”

Tasks •  Winter: grouse catching •  Spring: Duck hun6ng •  Summer: Whitefish •  Late summer: cloudberry picking and

harvest of distant hayfields •  Late fall (ice forma6on): ice fishing

grouse hunt •  In between: consump6on fish,

winterwood, transport of fishing gear, fish barrels and grouse to markets

•  WOMEN: All household farm and farm near work –  wood and water, livestock, household,

children, food, clothing, sedge grass skins and sinews (Schanche 2002:167). 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 36

Dálon and nomads •  “In early May the nomads move to the coast and do not

return before the darkness &me. In the snow free period the landscape were under the control and management of the dálon Sámi. The land belonged to the ones who lived nearest. The use was collec&ve, but there was some mires and lakes which a family or two used regularly. Others could fish for daily use, but not for winter supplies. This was a well- func&oning system. It was great ‐agreement about alloca&on of the goods” (Buljo 2008:1)

•  Main points: –  Seasonal alloca.on: nomads and dálon –  Balance individual vs. collec.ve use

•  Family areas for purse seining and grouse catching (Hågvar 2006)


Alloca6on between local communi6es

•  “..each local community has for a long 6me used its own area alone. Persons from neighboring communi6es asked use permission, and normally got access. More distant areas were more used in common, and harvested more heavily a few 6mes(purse seining)”, (Hågvar 2006:101)


Herder ins6tu6ons

17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 39 Riseth 2013:403

Hun.ng and cathing siiida differen6ated to

Reindeer nomadism Nested

organiza.on and land

Zone (Migra.on system- 3#) ‐Siida (Orohagat- seasonal pasture ‐lands) Households

Rightholders (on several levels)

Siida- Siidavuođđu (siidarights) for ‐Vuođđuolbmot (siidamembers) Household (Báiki) Individual

Right types (posi6on rules)

First right ( for siida and households) to area and resources Youngest right (váhkar) to báikevuođđu Family rights to area and resources

Sealed peasantry


Reindeer nomadism Sealed peasantry Commu6ng possible

(Hågvar 2006:351)

Local community (Gillevuođđu) Households

ßVERDE- > ‐crossing coopera.on ins.tu.on

Local community Household (Báiki) Individual

First right ( for local com- ‐munity and households) to area and resources Youngest right (váhkar) to báikevuođđu. Family rights to area/ resources

Situa6on in the 1960s

•  A well- func6oning CPR system ‐– Nested system with ins6tu6ons on several levels

•  “Flat structure”- Lack of /weak top instutu6ons ‐– Two branches with

•  Growing from a common root (herding and catching society) •  Connec6on ins6tu6ons between them (verdde) •  Commu6ng possibili6es between them via family and

marriage



Tradi6onal livelihoods (II)- >1960s ‐•  Peasants

–  Subsistence mul6resource users

•  Cawle/sheep, fishing, hun6ng/ trapping, berries, share in reindeer management

•  Some resources used individually by households ( e.g. fishing lakes, cloudberry bogs/mires), others in common

•  As a group: summer6me masters of the inland while the pastoralists stayed with their reindeer at the coast

•  Pastoralists –  Follow their animals through the

annual cycle ( nature geography/ecology) •  Inland in winter, coast in summer

–  Reindeer basis of their economy •  Used for food, clothes, draught and

pack animal –  Reindeer privately owned and u6lized

(husbandry), but herded in common (siida- the band) ‐

–  Exchange with peasants: •  meet/fish, goats/reindeer, shelter/

sledges, boats etc.


Reindeer management: A technological revolu6on, mainly since the 1960s

Lavvo (traditional herder tent), ATV and cars

Pack animal

Skiing herder assisted by dog Snow mobile


Contemporary reindeer industry

•  Reindeer management is s6ll a major industry in Gouvdageaidnu & makes up a considerable part of the industry in Norway

•  Resource adapta.on: •  Reindeer popula6ons fluctuate on much higher levels than up to the 1960- 70s, ‐•  i.e. more intense resource u6liza6on due to control by vehicles, fences etc.

# 31.03.2008 Family units Persons Reindeer

Gouvdag. 216 1370 98010

Norway tot. 555 3036 252410


Lichen carpet changes- Finnmarksvidda ‐ (Johansen & Karlsen, 2002)

.


Sustainable? •  Reindeer management is

remarkably persistent in spite of predicted catastrophes

•  System problem: How to limit reindeer popula.on size to everybody’s advantage?

•  Powerful groups have taken advantage of the situa6on and expanded

•  Governmental regula6on efforts through 3 decades have failed due to insufficiencies in: –  insight in cultural dynamics and –  building of trust


Reindeer mgmt. in a household economical perspec&ve

PastureResources

REINDEER MANAGEMENT

Market

Wage Labour/ OtherIndustry

HOUSEHOLD

Meat- income (orange) ‐Cost (blue)

Other income (grey)

Subsidies (green)

Compensa6ons (black)

NOK per reindeer

Major Societal Changes since 1960s- > ‐•  All- year- open car road ‐ ‐

Open access inland fishing •  Motoriza.on •  From natural based to

money based life- forms ‐

•  Urbaniza6on –  From periphery to

municipality center •  Moderniza6on

–  Housing –  Schooling –  Public workplaces

•  Unilateral business pawern



Subsistence ou}ield use (Riseth & al. 2009)

05

101520253035404550

Inntil 7dager

Inntil 14dager

15-30dager

31-60dager

Mer enn60 dager

Vet ikke

Pros

ent

Dalon

Reindrift

# respondents (N)- DÁLON=172,REINDRIFT=128) ‐

How many days/year in the ou}ields?

Peasants

Pastoralists


. Which purpose for ouYield use?

Berries Fishing Hun6ng/ Pasture Wood Recrea6on Ren6ng Transpor6ng

trapping trips out tourists

cowages

Total Men Women


Mul6- resource use ‐

•  most people invest several weeks per year in a set of different harves.ng ac.vi.es at the tundra.

•  Kautokeino households s6ll are mul.- resource ‐users

•  Informal economy is essen.al for their standard of living.


Tradi6onal livelihoods (III)- changes ‐•  Technological moderniza6on and market openings have set these

livelihoods under external pressure. –  The reindeer industry s6ll occupies many people and has major cultural

significance, but shrinking lands and challenges of resource adapta6on and income level need to be resolved.

–  For the peasants the agricultural element is very much reduced •  (along with general structure ra6onaliza6on/ surplus decline having heavier

impacts the more marginal are the areas) –  and their tradi&onal subsistence hun&ng, fishing and catching is also under

pressure from compe6ng use from outsiders (full year open road from late 1960s), public regula6ons (from local commons to a more or less open access resource for everybody) and conserva6on efforts (ongoing).

% Employment

Guovdag. Norway avr.

Primary ind. 17,7 3,2

Secondary ind. 10,4 20,7

Tertiary ind. 70,1 75,7


Peasantry/Agriculture Municipality Area

(daa) Farms (#) Averag

e Guovdag.

2864 14 205

Finnmark 96832 372 260 # animals

Farms

average

Sheep Guovdag.

61 2 31

Finnmark 11565 137 84

Diary farms

Guovdag.

141 10 14

Finnmark 3021 149 20

Sow-breeding

Guovdag.

11 1 11

Finnmark 171 9 19


Current enterprises (cf. muncipal web- page) ‐

•  Ar6sts ( composer, singers, painters) •  local music organiza6on •  local radio •  Sámi part of na6onal radio/TV •  Sámi newspapers •  copy enterprise, na6onal digi6lizing central •  Media enterprises •  Sámi theater, •  Sámi publishing house, •  stores for tradi6onal Sámi clothing, •  Lavvu produc6on enterprise •  silversmiths/galleries •  Slaughterhouse •  Stores for shoes, clothing, grocery stores •  Tourist enterprises •  Hotel/motel/camping •  A major outcome of the homeland process is ins6tu6ons

connected to the building of a cultural autonomy; •  branches of public administra6on and educa6on,

–  not the least Sámi University College (SUC), •  which provide as well employment as cultural empowerment.


Public sector •  Expansion of public sector from the 1960s during the last half century has made wage- ‐

labour important •  To some extent this compensate for a decline in primary industries.

•  Primary schools •  Sámi secondary school •  Sámi Parliament (department) •  Resource Center for the rights of Indigenous Peoples •  Sámi University College with associates •  Na6onal Agency of Reindeer Management Administra6on •  Norwegian Food Safety Authority

% employment Guovdag.

Norway avr.

Public sector 46.1 28.7

Enterprises 53.9 71.3


Employment & educa6on

Unemp loyed

% Guovdageaidnu

Norway

Men 10 1.8

Women

Total

4.3

7.3

1.6

1.7

% Persons

with higher

education

20-39 years

Guovdageaidnu

North Norway

Men 10,9 22

Woman 41,6 36,3

Total 25,1 28,9

• Very high unemployment rates, for men in par.cular. • Very low educa.on level for men, par.cularly high for women .


Innova6on

•  Municipality efforts for innova6on and development: –  Social/ societal framework condi6ons, i.e. Infrastructure and municipal

services, –  Industry and enterprise development

•  Areas of priority: –  Mining and mineral development, –  Culture –  Tourism, –  Produc6on enterprises u6lizing material/goods from ou}ields or have

a basis in Sámi culture or competence, –  Public enterprises/ ins6tu6ons including research and educa6on

where established environment/competence or a poten6al


Homeland requirements & status

•  1)Resources –  (includes

economy) •  2)Competence

–  Tradi6onal & modern

•  3)Power –  Rela6ve

autonomy

•  Most resources intact, but external pressure is considerable

•  Much tradi6onal knowledge intact –  Ongoing process redefine a new Sámi modernity

combining tradi6onal and new elements. –  Educa6on level for men need to be increased

•  Cultural autonomy is necessary but insufficient

•  Local/regional resource control is fundamental

•  Is it disputed/obstructed by the Norwegian government


De- coloniza6on ‐•  Currently, ongoing major poli.cal changes following from:

–  Indigenous People’s claims of land- rights & poli6cal influence ‐•  E.g. Home rule for Greenland 1979 & 2008,set up of Nunavut in1993 &1999, •  The Sámi Parliament 1989, the Finnmark Estate in 2006

•  have altered the basement in the poli.cal landscapes of the North; i.e. they are cons6tu6onal changes. –  Important drivers for the changes includes the progress for indigenous peoples

in interna6onal policies; such as the ILO Conven6on 169 (1990) and the UN Declara6on on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)

•  As pointed to by Professor Audun Sandberg (Nordland University), the implementa6on into na6onal policies can be seen as –  a process of redefining Northern areas from fron&er areas to homelands, –  a building of a new social order; –  a movement from state dominance towards a situa6on where the inhabitants

have more control over their own future.


Contras6ng trends => ??? •  However, Decoloniza.on is an important trend, but •  Increasing resource needs of petroleum and minerals create

considerable pressure for prospec.ng and extrac.on on land used for reindeer management, catching, hun.ng and other subsistence ac.vi.es. –  These pressures inevitably tend to increase by 6me, and in addi6on

•  Climate change –  Creates diverse problems directly, but also provides easier access to

Northern areas & => increased resource compe66on

•  Is this a neo- colonioza6on trend? ‐•  Is this stronger than the decoloniza.on trend?

Breakdown?

Reindeer nomadism •  S6ll vital , but –  Motoriza6on/ moderniza6on =>

cost increase => –  Increased compe66on and cyclical

overgrazing => –  Increasing dependence of

addi6onal feeding in winter

•  Low income/dependence of household income

•  Over- accumula6on of people in ‐the industry?

Sealed peasantry •  Not much agriculture le^ •  Much centraliza6on of

sewlement to municipality center

•  Much of the life- form ‐persists


Coexistence: mining - herding? ‐•  Basic problem:

–  Space perspec6ve –  Time perspec6ve –  Power balance

•  Predictability informa&on/ communica&on and trust •  Precondi&ons

–  Safeguarding all necessary func&ons in the annual cycle of reindeer herding

–  Maintaining a reindeer industry of sufficient size and intensity –  Limi&ng environmental harm and pollu&on as much as possible

(or fulfilling environmental standard requirements) –  Full compensa&on of income reduc&ons and other nega&ve

external effects, damage or harm –  Full cleanup and reset of landscape as near to original state as

possible –  Extra s&mulus to coopera&on: Extended partnership


Professor James Anaya UNs Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples

«I believe that new and different models and business prac&ces for natural resource extrac&on need to be examined, models that are more conducive to indigenous peoples self- determina&on and ‐their right to pursue their own priori&es of development. Such models could include genuine partnership arrangements between indigenous peoples and corpora&ons, in which the indigenous part has a significant or even controlling share in the ownership and management of the partnership, or models in which indigenous peoples develop their own extrac&ve business enterprises…..” (Anaya 2012:16) “In my future on extrac&ve industries as Special Rapporteur, I plan to examine different models of natural resource extrac&on in which indigenous peoples have greater control and benefits than is typically the case under the standard corporate model, drawing on a review of the experiences of indigenous peoples in different places” (Anaya 2012:16- 17). ‐17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 63

Challenges to tradi.onal knowledge systems

17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 64 Riseth (2011:147)

For discussion

•  Commons and Ostroms Design Principles: – Which principles were «taken care of» up to recently? – Does ongoing changes threaten long 6me

sustainability? – How can threats be met/mi6gated, on different scales?

•  Locally •  Regionally •  Na6onally •  Interna6onal


Challenging «Design Principles»? •  1. Clearly defined boundaries •  2. Propor.onal equivalence

between benefits and costs. •  3. Collec.ve- choice ‐

arrangements. •  4. Monitoring. •  5. Graduated sanc.ons. •  6. Conflict- resolu.on ‐

mechanisms •  7. Minimal recogni.on of

rights to organize. •  8. Nested enterprises.

1 Are the boundaries clear? 2 Benefit for miners/ costs for locals? 3 Challenged by government? 4 Insufficient? 5 Which sanc6ons? 6 Which arenas 7 Challenged by government? 8 Are there par6cular weak «links in the chain?


Which Threaths seem relevant?

•  Rapid exogenous changes •  Transla.on and/or transmission failures •  Blueprint thinking •  Corrup.on and rent seeking •  Lack of large- scale suppor.ve ins.tu.ons ‐


References

•  Anaya, J. (2012): Interna&onal Framework and Standards Applicable to Resource Extrac&on on Indigenous Peoples’ Lands. In: Extrac6ve Industries and Indigenous Peoples. Seminar University of Tromsø, Centre for Sami Studies, September 10, 2012, 12- 17. , 2012Anderies, J.M. & M.Janssen ‐(2013) Sustaining the Commons. Arizona State Univ.

•  Bromley, D. W. (1991) Environment and Economy. Property Rights & Public Policy.Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Basil Blackwell.

•  Buljo, Johan Henrik (2008): Sámi bivdo- ja meahcástansearvi. ‐”Finnmárkkukommišuvdna – sin mandáhta ja min vuordámušat”. Deanu birasvisms, 29/10- 08). ‐

•  Hågvar, Geir (2006): Den samiske rewsdannelse i indre Finnmark. Dieđut 2/2006. Sámi Ins6tuhwa. Kautokeino.

•  Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons. The Evolu&on of Ins&tu&ons for Collec&ve Ac&ons. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press.

•  Ostrom, E. (2005) Understanding ins6tu6onal diversity. Princeton University Press.

•  Ostrom, E., R. Gardner and J. Walker (1994) Rules, Games & Common- Pool ‐Resources. The University of Michigan Press. Ann Arbor.

•  Riseth, J.Å. (2009) Moderniza6on and Pasture Degradia6on. VDM. Saarbrücken. 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 68

References (cont.) •  Riseth, Jan Åge (2011) ”Can Tradi6onal Knowledge Play a Significant Role in Nature

Management? Reflec6ons on Ins6tu6onal Challenges for the Sámi in Norway ” In: Porsanger, Jelena & Gunvor Guworm. (eds.) “Working with Tradi6onal Knowledge: Communi6es, Ins6tu6ons, Informa6on Systems, Law and Ethics. Wri6ngs from the Árbediehtu Project on Sami Tradi6onal Knowledge” Diedut 1/2011, 127- 161. ‐

•  Riseth, Jan Åge (2013): Reindriâ i Nord- Norge: Fra vikeplikt 6l bærekra^? I: Jento^, ‐Svein, Jens Ivar Nergård & Kjell Arne Røvik (red.). Hvor går Nord- Norge? Poli6ske ‐6dslinjer. Orkana Akademisk, 401- 416. ‐

•  Riseth, Jan Åge og Jan Idar Solbakken (2010) Naturbruk i Kautokeino i et kulturhistorisk lys. Utmark 1/2010.

•  Schanche, Audhild (2002): Meahcci, den samiske utmarka. I: Svanhild Andersen (red.) Samiske landskap og Agenda 21: kultur, næring, miljøvern og demokra6. . Rapport 2 i prosjektet ”Miljø, kultur og kunnskap. Bruk og forvaltning av naturressurser i samiske områder”. Dieđut 1/2002. Kautokeino, 156–170.

•  Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom (1993) Property- Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An ‐Empirical Analysis. In T. L. Anderson and R.T. Simmons (eds.) The Poli&cal Economy of Customs and Culture: Informal Solu&ons to the Commons Problem, 13- 41. Lanham, Md.: ‐Rowman & Liwlefield.

•  Solbakk, Aa. (2007) Sápmi. Sameland. Samenes historie fram 6l 1751. Davvi Girji. •  Tømmervik, H., Johansen, B., Riseth, J.Å., Karlsen S.R, Solberg, B. & Høgda, K.A. (2009)

Above ground biomass changes in the mountain birch forests and mountain heaths of Finnmarksvidda, Northern Norway, in the period 1957- 2006. ‐ Forest Ecology and Management 257: 244- 257. ‐

•  Vatn. A. (2005) Ins6tu6ons and the Environment. E. Elgar. 17.01.2014 Finnmarksvidda as an Ac6on Arena 69

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