Sin vs. SinGR No. 137590, March 26, 2001FACTS:Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.HELD:Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.De Ocampo vs. Florenciano107 Phil 35FACTS:Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.HELD:Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio43 SCRA 177FACTS:Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.HELD:An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.Posted by hyper_jetsetter at 6:50:00 PMGandionco vs PenarandaGR No. 72984, November 27, 1987FACTS:Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.HELD:Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.Bugayong vs. GinezGR No. 10033, December 28, 1956FACTS:Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.HELD:Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation. Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.Pacete vs CarriagaPacete vs Carriaga231 SCRA 321FACTS:Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.HELD:The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.Macadangdang vs CAMacadangdang vs CAGR No. 38287, October 23, 1981FACTS:Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation.HELD:The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.Potenciano vs CAPotenciano vs. CAGR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001FACTS:In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned for habeas corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is Erlindas motion to reconsider the decision made. A conference was set on September 2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted. Erlindas motion to have Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in March 2001. ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.HELD:Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium but clearly she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition. What the law provides is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.Goitia vs Campos-RuedaGoitia vs. Campos-Rueda35 Phil 252FACTS:Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.HELD:The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home. Ty vs CATy vs CAGR No. 127406, November 27, 2000FACTS:Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.HELD:SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.Ilusorio vs BildnerIlusorio vs. BildnerGR No. 139789, May 12, 2000FACTS:Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.HELD:A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process. Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELECTITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELECCITATION: 248 SCRA 300FACTS:Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.HELD:Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.