Exelon Common Study Guide - alliedpwr-nuclear.com · STC, KENNETT SQUARE AND CANTERA Important Phone Numbers All Emergencies at STC, Kennett Square and Cantera 911 At Cantera, follow-up

Exelon Common Study Guide Rev 010 Effective 08/01/16

Exelon Common Study GuideRev. 010, Effective 08/01/16

This student guidebook is provided as a ready reference thatincludes topics which are common to all sites and also some that

are Exelon Station site-specific.


Table of Contents

STC, KENNETT SQUARE AND CANTERA........................................................................................................... 1

COMMON ITEMS FOR ALL EXELON NUCLEAR STATIONS...................................................................... 1

BRAIDWOOD ...............................................................................................................................................................26

BYRON ...........................................................................................................................................................................30

CALVERT CLIFFS ......................................................................................................................................................34

CLINTON .......................................................................................................................................................................37

DRESDEN.......................................................................................................................................................................40

R.E. GINNA ...................................................................................................................................................................42

LASALLE .......................................................................................................................................................................45

LIMERICK.....................................................................................................................................................................50

NINE MILE POINT.....................................................................................................................................................53

OYSTER CREEK .........................................................................................................................................................55

PEACH BOTTOM ........................................................................................................................................................58

QUAD CITIES ...............................................................................................................................................................63

THREE MILE ISLAND...............................................................................................................................................69

Page 1


STC, KENNETT SQUARE AND CANTERA

Important Phone Numbers

All Emergencies at STC, Kennett Square and Cantera 911

At Cantera, follow-up calls should also be made to (630) 393-7301 and (630) 657-2202

COMMON ITEMS FOR ALL EXELON NUCLEAR STATIONSApplies to Braidwood, Byron, Calvert Cliffs, Clinton, Dresden, Ginna, LaSalle, Limerick,Nine Mile Point, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom, Quad Cities Stations and Three Mile Island

EMERGENCY RESPONSE/PREPAREDNESSSite Assembly areas are within the station specific section of this document. REMEMBER: When notified toassemble, proceed to the designated assembly area, card into the assembly card reader and remain in theassembly area until you receive further instructions.

PROTECTED PATHWAYSSOER 09-01, Shutdown Safety (Commitment – Do Not Remove Protected Pathway information - See ActionItem - 997596-04).

Protected Pathways are established to protect vital equipment when maintenance is performed on othersimilar equipment. Protected Pathways may also be established for equipment when similar vital equipmentis non-functional (e.g., an important pump fails during testing). One example when a Protected Path may beused would be as follows: A plant has two emergency diesels. The diesels are used for emergency power tocombat accidents or safely shut the plant down when offsite power is lost. One diesel will be taken out ofservice for a 5 Year Overhaul. The other diesel would be established as Protected Path to keep it available forsafe shutdown or emergencies while the first diesel is out of service. Protected Paths are marked by cones,barriers, signs, tape or other similar devices. Do NOT work on equipment that is posted as a Protected Path.If you must go near protected equipment, contact your supervisor and Operations. Maintain a distance of atleast two feet away from protected equipment by adhering to the 2 Foot Zone Human PerformanceFundamental.

AIRLOCK DOORS

Across the fleet there have been a number of events associated with Reactor Building/Secondary ContainmentAirlock doors being opened at the same time. These events are significant in that they represent a potentialloss of secondary containment safety function as presented in Technical Specifications. These airlock doorsare used to control the release of radioactive material and having them open at the same time requires thestation to report the event to the NRC within 8 hours.

It is important to follow all written postings and procedures with respect to the operation of the airlock doors.When entering or exiting the secondary containment, personnel need to insure that only one door in the set isopen. Ensure the airlock doors are closed and latched properly after use. Contact the Control Room if thereare any issues with the doors not latching or if the two are inadvertently opened at the same time.

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NERC COMPLIANCEExelon Nuclear is registered with North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as aGenerator Owner/Generator Operator (GO/GOP) and therefore must comply with all applicableNERC Standards.

The Electricity Reliability Organization (ERO) (NERC) may impose a penalty on a user, owner or operator ofthe bulk power system for a violation of a reliability standard of up to $1 million dollars/day/violation.

LS-AA-129, “NERC Reliability Standard Compliance Program,” describes how Exelon Nuclear will meetcompliance with the NERC Standards.

Exelon Reportability Manual SAF 1.54, “Reporting of NERC Standards Requirements,” provides furtherguidance on required communications and notifications to meet compliance to the NERC Standards.

It is your responsibility to report potential issues of non-compliance to a NERC Standard to yoursupervisor. You can also contact BSC Transmission Strategy and Compliance Organization atOutlook mailbox "NERC Compliance Management Team" or the Ethics Help Line at 1-800-23-ETHIC(1-800-233-8442).

SECURITY AWARENESSSY-AA-101-132, “Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities,” implements expected actionscontained in the NERC Standards which require that events such as damage or destruction of a facility fromactual or suspected intentional human action or physical threats to a facility are recognized and reported to theappropriate governmental agencies and applicable interconnected entities to protect the following:

Bulk Power System (Bulk Electric System) Transmission Substations (including the switchyards) Generation Resources (including all nuclear generating stations)

All Exelon employees are expected to be able to recognize unusual or suspicious activity that could impactthe safety and security of Exelon Nuclear facilities, including station switchyards. This includes activities thatare suspected or could be determined to be caused by intentional human action.Examples of unusual or suspicious activity in the station, owner controlled areas (OCAs) or switchyards mayinclude but are not limited to:

Breach of perimeter security (e.g., fence, vault) Surveillance activities Unidentified individuals conducting surveillance (camera/video) Suspicious packages left around facilities or equipment Person(s) tampering with plant equipment or transmission equipment, including cyber related

tampering Items that are out of place, that may appear to be everyday items (e.g., handbags, briefcases,

backpacks) System failure with no apparent cause Suspicious device or activity Suspicious actions that might adversely affect operations Evidence of trespassing

It is your responsibility to report any suspicious activity that could impact security of the plant,security of nuclear switchyards or any other owner controlled area (OCA) immediately to StationSecurity.

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Exelon Corporation Industrial Safety Program (IS) PolicyVision & Value

Safety – for our employees, our customers and our communities.

Exelon’s Safety Policy (SA-AC-1) Exelon will operate in a manner that protects its employees, contractors, customers and the general

public. We will foster a culture where everyone believes that accidents are preventable. Each employee understands their responsibility for maintaining a safe workplace. Each employee recognizes and accepts his/her right and obligation to correct unsafe conditions and

behaviors.

Each business unit, including Exelon Nuclear, establishes appropriate people, processes, programs andtraining to support the program.

Exelon Industrial Safety Program (SA-AA-11)Designated “Functional Area” with Corporate & Site Governance, Oversight and Support.

Complete and comprehensive (i.e., people, policies, processes, and training). Structured to fit Exelon Nuclear Management Model. Outlines the activities needed to provide a safe working environment and improve safety performance

while complying with regulatory requirements. Assigns individual accountabilities and responsibilities across all functional areas and organizations. Focuses on engineering controls, administrative controls, and fundamental behaviors to prevent events

and injuries.

Maintaining Commitment

Strong safety focus established at the highest levels of the Site & Corporate Organization. Expectation that safety is everyone’s number one priority is continuously reinforced by all levels of

management. Injuries, significant “near miss” events, and fundamental behaviors that are essential to event-free

operation are reviewed and reinforced by Site and Corporate Senior Management during the dailyPlant Status calls.

Industrial Safety issues and activities are routinely reviewed and discussed during Station “Plan of theDay” meetings.

Engaging the Workforce

The Site Safety Committee is comprised of management and non-management employees establishedto solicit employee input.

All employees are encouraged to raise any and all safety issues or concerns to their Supervisor, andthe Corrective Action Program (CAP) is used to ensure thorough resolution.

Vehicle Use around High Voltage Equipment

OPERATE any vehicle or mechanical equipment capable of having parts of its structure elevated nearexposed energized overhead lines so that a clearance of 10 ft. is maintained for 50 kV or less. If thevoltage is higher than 50 kV, the clearance shall be increased 4 in. for every 10 kV over that voltage.Refer to SA-AA-129, Electrical Safety procedure, for additional detail.

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ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS

GoalsAll employees and badged personnel at Exelon Nuclear Facilities will be able to:

Explain the importance of conformity with the environmental policy, procedures and theEnvironmental Management System (EMS).

Explain the actual or potential environmental impacts associated with their job and the environmentalbenefits of improved personal performance.

Explain the potential consequences of departure from specified procedures. Understand that they are responsible to ensure visitors under their escort conduct their activities in a

manner that is consistent with the environmental policy, procedures and the EnvironmentalManagement System.

Exelon’s Commitment to the EnvironmentTo support our commitment, Exelon has:

Established a comprehensive Environmental Policy. Institutionalized an Environmental Management System. Established environmental performance improvement goals and objectives. Adopted a sustainable resource management program of reduce, reuse, recycle and recover where

practical.

Exelon’s Environmental Policy (EN-AC-1) Reinforces Exelon’s commitment to constantly improve its environmental performance. Establishes full compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and other commitments is the

minimum performance expectation. Strives for leadership in environmental management and partners with the communities we serve, to

preserve, restore and enhance the environment. Requires that we utilize natural resources more efficiently.

Exelon’s Environmental Policy ImplementationThis policy shall be implemented by establishing and maintaining:

Annual objectives and targets for measuring and improving environmental performance. An independent Compliance Audit Program and an independent EMS Conformance Audit Program. Support for the development of low impact energy resources and energy efficiency. Training programs for employees and contractors to educate them about their environmental

responsibilities. Support for environmental public policy based on sound science and economic analysis.

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Potential Regulatory ImpactsEnsure Regulatory Compliance

Environmental regulations govern many business activities andare becoming increasingly more challenging.

Environmental Regulators have significant influence over ourability to operate.

Complying with regulatory requirements can help limit potentialimpacts to the environment.

Failure to operate in full compliance with regulations can resultin civil and criminal action with fines exceeding $1,000,000 per incident.

Maintaining a positive working relationship with regulators, such as the Illinois EPA can be a valuableasset when their support is needed for making permit changes.

Benefits of Environmental ProgramsReduce Environmental Risk through:

Developing and maintaining Spill Response Plans. Training personnel who handle or use chemicals and petroleum products in the requirements of the Oil

Pollution Prevention Regulations (40 CFR 112). Maintaining spill response equipment and supplies. Reporting all observed chemical or petroleum spills to the Control Room.

Minimize potential stormwater impacts, as required by the stations surface water permits National PollutantDischarge Elimination System (NPDES), by:

Developing and maintaining a Preparedness Prevention and Contingency (PPC) Plan or equivalent. Ensure the PPC plan includes:

o Engineering control devices (e.g., secondary spill containment)o Spill Kitso Good Housekeeping Practiceso Soil and Erosion Control Measureso Cover materials stored outside

Ensuring only authorized releases occur into the Stormwater Systems (e.g., fire hydrant flushes,irrigation systems foundation dewatering, etc.).

Contacting the Control Room before releasing any material into the Stormwater System. Reporting all observed releases to the Control Room.

The former Constellation (CENG) sites have additional information on NPDES and SPDES Permits. SeeCalvert Cliffs, Nine Mile Point, and/or R.E. Ginna specific sections for more information.

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Environmental Performance and YouAll employees and badged personnel environmental responsibilities include:

Ensuring compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations. Awareness of the environmental impacts of your work and how to minimize them. Understanding the Significant Environmental Aspects (SEAs) associated with your work. Mitigating environmental risks associated with your work. Understanding and following the applicable procedures. Maintaining your own training and qualifications. Identifying and managing environmental risks. Building positive relationships with the community. Reporting potential and active environmental risks, including spills and other damage. Practicing proper housekeeping. Minimizing waste. Conserving energy. Ensuring any visitors you are escorting conduct their activities in accordance with the environmental

policy, procedures and the requirements of the Environmental Management System.

Key Points Exelon’s vision for the future depends on improving environmental performance. Compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and other commitments is the minimum

performance expectation. Each employee and badged contractor shares responsibility for the environment and can make a

difference. Each employee and badged contractor reports environmental risks and shares ideas for improving

environmental performance.

Page 7


EXELON NUCLEAR CYBER SECURITY

This section of the required reading provides supplemental and Exelon-specific information required in addition to generic training.

Nuclear Cyber Security is designed to protect Critical Digital Assets(CDAs) from compromise or cyber-attack. These are componentsof systems that support plant safety, security, or emergency

preparedness (SSEP) Functions.

CDAs are usually associated with plant or EP systems, and are generallyseparate from business computing systems that are used for word

processing, e-mail, and internet use. Exelon also has generalusage standards for IT assets per SY-AC-14. Many of the safe work

practices are similar.

You are responsible for understanding and complying with Exelon cyber security policies andprocedures. Failure to comply can result in adverse conditions ranging from a nuisance on a businesscomputer, to a large-scale network attack, to a condition that could threaten plant safety.

“If You See Something…Say Something”This is the main responsibility of all employees and contractors. Everyone has a rolein detecting and reporting abnormal or suspicious conditions. The methods thatadversaries use to gain access or attack systems can change, so awareness is morethan a static checklist.

You are the most familiar with your normal work conditions. If something does not seem right, it probablyisn’t.Any unusual conditions related to cyber security must be promptly reported.

How to Report Suspicious Conditions

Ensure your work is in a safe condition, and immediately report unusual or suspicious conditions relatedto cyber security using the following available resources depending on your location and role:

Your Supervisor Security Station Operations Management Exelon Security Operations Center (ESOC) at 1-800-550-6154 (24/7) Exelon Help Desk at 1-877-9EXELON (1-877-939-3566)

The follow-up will depend on the specifics of the situation.

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Cyber Security NRC Event Notifications and Event Response

Certain cyber security conditions require NRC notification within time limits that can be as short as 1 hour.Individuals must know to promptly report any suspicious conditions so that all activities leading up to NRCnotification can be made within required timelines.

Partial List of Examples of Conditions that Require Review for NRC Reportability:

Cyber-attack that disrupts Security or EP functions Unauthorized router or modem connected to plant equipment A targeted phishing e-mail followed up by a phone call to the

targeted person attempting to activate the malware Unauthorized person in a static position near the plant

protected area in possession of and operating equipmentcapable of scanning for wireless networks

Individuals with an uncommon level of interest or makingunusual inquiries about specific aspects of the Exelon cybersecurity plan outside of normal press or public questions

A CDA is connected to unauthorized media and is found to beinfected with malware

A full list of conditions is located in the following resources:

LS-AA-1130, (SEC 1.37) Exelon Reportability Reference Manual SY-AA-101-155, Security Events and NRC performance Indicators

Individuals required to use the above procedures receive additional training.

CAP 24 hour recordable Conditions

Certain deficiencies require an Issue Report to be written within 24 hours of discovery. A partial list includes: A cyber security assessment is not performed as required Cyber security program deficiencies and failures to follow processes with no consequence (such as

procedure violations

Ensure any shortfall or discrepancy regarding design or implementation of the cyber security program isreviewed with your supervisor for a potential need to document in CAP within 24 hours.

The site response to a cyber security event will include a review by aqualified Cyber Security Incident Handler. If warranted, the site Cyber Security Incident Response Team willbe activated. This team will assess, mitigate, and obtain needed site or fleet resources for theevent.

DO NOT ASSUME that only IT or Security will be the first to detect areportable condition. Some reportable conditions could be detected first by anyindividual on site. In all cases, your responsibility as a worker is to understandthe need to immediately report cyber related anomalies, degradations, or failureswithout delay.

Page 9


Exelon Cyber Security Program and Policies

At Exelon sites, the Engineering Department has cyber security program ownership, and heads the CyberSecurity Assessment Team (CSAT) and the Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT).

Cyber Security Policy and program structure is described in the following documents: CC-AA-6, Nuclear Cyber Security Policy CC-AA-60, Nuclear Cyber Security Program Description CC-AA-600, Nuclear Cyber Security Program

The above documents are higher-level program and policy documents that describe how the process fitstogether.

Examples of other user-level procedures include:

SY-AA-101-130, Security Responsibilities for Station Personnel – In addition to physical security, theprocedure directs that station staff comply with cyber security rules when working with digital assets. Thisprocedure also contains the requirement for all station personnel to report signs of cyber-relatedtampering.

OP-AA-102-102, General Area Checks and Operator Field Rounds – this procedure requires plant staff todetect and report Obvious Signs of Cyber Related Tampering which are physical or logical evidence that isobservable by security officers and plant personnel, of an attempt to disable or alter a digital component, itsintended behavior, or its data. Some examples of conditions that should be reported include:

Broken tamper seals and locks

Signs of unauthorized modifications to digital equipment such as cables added or cut

Unauthorized portable media attached Unusual status messages or behavior

MA-AA-716-235, Control of CDA Storage Media and Portable Devices

Many digital components are maintained and updated using portable memory devices, like USB flash drives.If not properly controlled, this pathway can represent a pathway that bypasses layers of cyber securitycontrols. You are responsible for helping to protect all Critical Digital Assets including plant control systemsby preventing the introduction of viruses and malicious software from portable media and portableequipment.

Procedure MA-AA-716-235 contains requirements for work with storage media and devices that are used onCDAs. One aspect of our process for preventing infection of CDAs is to establish a program of AuthorizedPortable Media.

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Whenever portable media or Digital Test Equipment (DTE) is used, there is required documentationthat must be completed and retained per MA-AA-716-235. Ensure that you understand and performall required steps if you handle CDA media or DTE.

CDA MEDIA AND DIGITAL TEST EQUIPMENT

Portable media—such as USB thumb drives—must be stringently controlled to prevent malware frombeing introduced to critical systems. Operating experience has shown that the most significant risk ofinfection is through portable media. Approved CDA media and Digital Test Equipment (DTE) are specialdevices that are properly secured, identified and tagged. If media and test equipment are not tagged, thenthey are NOT authorized for use on plant critical data assets. The tagging differs among Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeast sites.

Mid-Atlantic and Midwest Site Tagging – All sites EXCEPT Northeast sites - Orange Tag with BlackText

Authorized CDA Media

Authorized Digital Test Equipment

Unauthorized Media and Test Equipment

Note that CDA flash drives mustbe the type with digitally securefirmware. Ordinary USB drivesdo NOT have digitally securefirmware and will not beapproved media. They could bevulnerable to certain types ofmalware infecting the hardwareitself,

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In the plant you are responsible for challenging other employees against the use of unauthorized equipment,and reporting instances where unauthorized equipment use is observed.Northeast Site CDA Media and DTE tagging – (Calvert Cliffs, Nine-Mile Point, Ginna)

Northeast Site CDA Media and DTE Tagging (White with Green Text)

Northeast Site CDA Media Labeling (Green with Black Text)

Northeast Site Plant Labeling

While the purpose and importance of CDAs is consistent across the industry and Exelon, certain areas at theNortheast sites will contain the following signage related to Critical Digital Assets:

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.54, Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) are restricted to useby authorized users for Company business use only. The use of CDAs indicates consentto monitoring and recording. Users of CDAs waive any explicit or implicit expectationsand rights of privacy. Any use of CDAs may be intercepted, monitored, recorded,copied, audited, disclosed and inspected by the Company at any time. Unauthorized useof CDAs is prohibited and subject to civil and criminal penalties, as well as disciplinaryaction, including but not limited to termination of access to Company facilities and/oremployment.”

You might see a similar tag with “CENG” in thetitle during the time the CENG tags are beingreplaced.

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SCANNING KIOSKS FOR CDA MEDIA

Exelon has installed dedicated kiosks for ensuring CDA media is free of malware. They are restrictedfor use with approved CDA media only and are NOT for general use. Portable media use in business PCsis subject to approval based on business need per SY-AC-14, Acceptable Use Standards, and is scanned onthe PC using built-in anti-virus software. MA-AA-716-235 contains the requirements for frequency ofscanning CDA media.

Midwest and Mid-Atlantic Site Kiosk

Unacceptable Results of CDA Media Scan - STOP

KIOSK USE IS RESTRICTED TO EXELON CORPORATION OWNED CDA MEDIA ONLY

Potential Threats Found

STOPNOTIFY your SupervisorQUARANTINE the mediaNOTIFY site ITGenerate an Issue Report

Follow MA-AA-716-235

Acceptable Results for CDA Media Scan

Northeast Site Kiosk

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If a scanning kiosk detects a potential threat, then follow actions of MA-AA-716-235:

STOP

Notify your supervisor

Quarantine the media (ensure it is not used)

Notify Site IT and Transfer custody of the infected media to them

Generate an Issue Report (IR)

MA-AA-716-235 contains the requirements for use of digital test equipment and CDA media and must bereviewed and understood prior to work. A partial summary is below:

CDA Media and DTE Work Do’s and Don’ts Summary per MA-AA-716-235

DO DON’TUse ONLY the CONTROLLED andDESIGNATED CDA media and DTEidentified for the component being maintainedon one security level

Connect non-CDA media or DTE to CDAs oruse CDA media or DTE intended for adifferent component or level

Report unauthorized media connected to aCDA

Allow others to use improper media on CDAs

Sign CDA media in and out of PowerTrackRdatabase and complete all requireddocumentation

Complete work without a thorough review ofdocumentation per MA-AA-716-235

Provide continuous oversight of supplementalworkers who work on CDAs and documentcontrol of supplemental workers on MA-AA-716-235 Attachment 5

Allow supplemental worker access to CDAswithout direct oversight and a briefing perMA-AA-716-235, or share personalpasswords

Scan CDA media prior to and after use on aCDA media kiosk and follow all scanningkiosk instructions

Use CDA Media that has a malware alert ormedia that was not scanned on a designatedCDA media kiosk

Ensure you are qualified in the Critical Groupprior to CDA work or oversight orsupplemental workers

Allow unqualified work or oversight to takeplace

Review MA-A-716-235 prior to CDA work Rely on memory

Maintain physical custody of CDA media orDTE when signed out for work, and quarantineCDA media found not secured

Use CDA media or DTE that was not properlysecured

Immediately report lost CDA media andgenerate an Issue Report within 24 hours.

Remove CDA media from the OwnerControlled Area without proper approval andcontrol per MA-AA-716-235

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Critical GroupCertain individuals must be part of the security Critical Group per SY-AA-103-510, Insider MitigationProgram due to their roles or their knowledge. New employees and contractors must be reviewed as part ofon-boarding to determine if they must meet the additional qualification requirements for the Critical Group.Individuals qualified in the Critical Group will have the qualification on their Qual Check screen and itwill be current (White or Yellow).

The full list of individuals (by position) is included in SY-AA-103-510. A partial listing includes:

Site and Corporate Cyber Security Managers, Engineers, and Administrators IT staff who authorize access to CDAs Members of the Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT) and Cyber Security Incident Response

Team (CSIRT) Systems Administrators for CDAs Security supervisors, managers, and instructors Plant network administrators and those IT personnel responsible for securing networks Individuals who can independently change CDA configuration or security controls Individuals qualified and assigned certain duties in Security and Operations departments

SY-AA-103-510 contains the details of the requirements for assignment to the Critical Group. Supervisorsand managers will review job responsibilities and make the decision when new employees are assigned to arole per HR-AA-4000.

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FIRE PROTECTION

Fire Protection Program, CC-AA-211 describes the common Exelon Nuclear Station Fire Protection Program,including provisions for post fire safe shutdown, by identifying key program elements and organizationalpositions, and the responsibilities delegated to those positions.

Compensatory Fire Watch

OP-MA/MW-201-007, Fire Protection System Impairment Control is utilized for the tracking, reporting andrestoring of impairments to fire protection structures, systems, or components (SSC) (i.e. fire pumps,detection, suppression, fire barriers, fire wrap) to minimize duration and ensure appropriate compensatorymeasures are implemented. It also provides instruction for establishing and performing the compensatorymeasure fire watch inspections.

OP-MA/MW-201-007 defines Compensatory Measure Fire Watch as observation of a specified location forthe purpose of detecting and reporting any fires or fire hazards when a fire protection SSC is degraded and/orinoperable.

Work Group Supervisor SHALL:o ENSURE planned impairments are not started until the required Fire Watch is in place.o RETURN completed Fire System Impairments to the site Fire Marshal.

Fire Watch SHALL:o ENSURE Fire Watch is being performed in the correct area.o KNOW what to look for looking for while performing a Fire Watch?− Conditions likely to cause a fire or affect the severity of a fire, such as leaks, spills,

accumulations of combustibles, equipment storage, or faulty equipment.− Immediately REPORT the discovery of smoke or fire to the Control Room, and then

ATTEMPT to EXTINGUISH the fire only if it is obviously within the capacity of the fireprotection equipment available.

o KNOW your TARGET TIME?− Intervals between consecutive hourly fire watch inspections of the specified location shall not

exceed 75 minutes.− A timer device shall be used to ensure hourly fire watch is completed as scheduled.

o HAVE proper paperwork with you when performing the fire watch.− A copy of the appropriate attachments from OP-MA/MW-201-007 for the area(s) you are

inspecting. PIMS Fire Suppression Impairment (FSI) paperwork may be used in place of OP-MA-201-007 attachment.

− Complete the fire watch log following tour of area.− Times are recorded using military format.

When can I stop performing the Fire Watch?o Once you are properly relieved following face-to-face turnover.o Once Operations Shift Management terminates the Fire Watch.

What actions do you take if you cannot complete the Fire Watch?o IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY OPERATIONS SHIFT MANAGEMENT.

Additional information can be located in OP-MA/MW-201-007, Fire Protection System Impairment Control

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Fire Protection Equipment Accessibility

Everywhere you look on site there is equipment for Fire Protection. This equipment shall be accessible at alltimes. ENSURE equipment, scaffolding, tools, cords, etc., being staged or stored, do not block or impedeaccess or egress from any area, present a tripping hazard, or limit view or accessibility to:

Fire extinguishers Fire Hose Stations Fire Control Panels Emergency Light Battery Packs or light illumination Fire Equipment Cage Lockers Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

Access should be such that a fire brigade member in full protective clothing (e.g. turn out gear) can access theequipment.

TRANSIENT COMBUSTIBLES

Why Control Transient Combustibles?OP-AA-201-009, "CONTROL OF TRANSIENT COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL," defines a transientcombustible as any flammable or combustible material that is not identified or accounted for as a combustibleload/fire load in the Station Fire Hazards Analysis/Fire Protection Report and/or Combustible LoadingCalculation.

In other words, the installed fire protection equipment is designed to fight fires with a certain amount of fuelavailable. When we bring additional fuel (transient combustibles) into the plant, we may create a situationwhere the installed fire protection system is unable to put the fire out or keep it from spreading.

How Are Transient Combustibles Controlled?We control transient combustibles by having someone continuously in control of the material and removingthe material at end of the shift, storing the material in closed metal containers (e.g., cabinets, tool boxes, metaldrums, drums with flame tamer lids, that are in good repair), or by obtaining a Transient Combustible Permit(TCP) to assure the amount of transient combustibles are within the capability of the installed fire protectionsystems.

When bringing transient combustible materials into the plant, certain requirements must be met. Differentareas have different requirements. Refer to OP-AA-201-009 for specific information.

Combustible Control Zones (i.e., Combustible Free Zone (CFZ); Transient Combustible Exclusion Zone(TCEZ); Transient Combustible Free Zone (TCFZ) or Transient Free Zone (TFZ)) in the plant should beconspicuously identified (i.e., signs, floor painted). Transient combustibles cannot be staged/stored incombustible control zones without a TCP. Transient combustibles cannot be staged/stored in combustiblecontrol zones that are established to meet the 20-foot separation without a barrier Plant Barrier Impairment(PBI) and TCP or PBI and approved Engineering evaluation (i.e., 86-10 evaluation).

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Critical buildings are identified as Safety Related and Non-Safety Related:

General Guidelines for Critical Buildings - Both Safety Related & Non-Safety Related1. LIMIT transient combustibles to those materials and quantities necessary to support the work activity.

2. REMOVE all waste, debris, scraps, used rags, loose packing material, oil spills resulting from the workactivity from the area immediately following completion of the work activity, or at the end of each workshift, whichever comes first, or PLACE in appropriate containers (i.e., storage cabinet, trash receptacles,etc.).

3. MAINTAIN general housekeeping in the area in accordance with applicable housekeeping procedures.

4. Do not STAGE or STORE transient combustible material that:a. Restricts access/egress paths, orb. Restricts access to fire protection or other plant equipment, orc. Interferes with emergency lighting illumination, ord. Is within fifteen (15) feet of a PCB transformer, ore. Is inside or beneath stairways, unless the area underneath the stairway is protected by an operable

automatic sprinkler system, orf. Is under solid scaffolds which impair automatic sprinkler protection, org. Is directly adjacent to the surface of a door.h. Is within 3-feet of heat sources (as defined by OP-AA-201-006, Control of Temporary Heat

Generating Equipment) or live electrical components (e.g., transformers, switchgear, motor controlcenters) unless unavoidable, or

i. In concealed spaces such as plenum areas or underneath raised floors, orj. Is directly beneath (i.e., within approximately 10 vertical feet of horizontal trays) and immediately

adjacent (i.e., within 3-feet) to vertical cable tray risers, unless unavoidable.

5. Guidelines for Class A Material (i.e., Ordinary Combustibles)a. Wood/Lumber must be DESIGNATED as fire-retardant, pressure treated lumber suitable for exterior

use. It must bear the mark of an accredited testing agency and be distinctively color coded to indicatethat it is fire-retardant. NOTE: Smaller pieces of lumber may not bear the mark of the accreditedtesting agency but are still usually distinctively color coded (e.g., blue or green).

b. Plastic films and fabrics that are USED as sheeting material for protective floor coatings,contamination control, temporary enclosures, etc., shall be of material that is UL listed as weatherresistant and flame-retardant or meet the flame retardant requirements of NFPA 701 or equivalentrequirements.

c. Combustible radwaste material and other trash, which has been COLLECTED for removal, shall beREMOVED from the area, PLACED in closed metal containers, or REMOVED to the wastepackaging area.

d. Rags used to CLEAN up flammable or combustible liquid spills should be PLACED in an approvedcontainer with self-closing lid or REMOVED from the area and DISPOSED.

e. Minimize the use of plastic and rubber (in particular halogenated plastics including PVC andneoprene). Non-combustible material should be used when available.

f. Flame tamer type trash cans shall not be overfilled such that material sticks out the top of thereceptacle.

6. Guidelines for Class B Material (i.e., Combustible and Flammable Liquids and Gases)a. Liquids should be KEPT in an approved (e.g., UL Listed, FM Approved, DOT specification, etc.)

container and the container shall be CLOSED when left unattended.Exceptions Liquids with special handling requirements (i.e., alcohol, paint, chemicals, etc.) may be kept in

their original containers.

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A small amount of combustible liquids (< 3/4 gallon) may be kept in metal tool boxes providedthat it is needed for the work activity, the liquid container is identified by a chemical controlsticker, all lids are secure so that no leaking can occur, and the tool box is in good repair and lidis closed when unattended.

b. Containers, including aerosol cans, when not attended, should be STORED in UL Listed/FMApproved flammable liquid storage cabinets.

c. Containers and drums should have covers, caps, or bungs REPLACED immediately after emptying.d. Catch containers, buckets, drums, etc., may be used to CATCH oil leaks. However, the leakage

should not be allowed to ACCUMULATE, and the container should be EMPTIED periodically orPLACED in an approved Class B storage area to ensure the container does not overflow.

7. Guidelines for Compressed Gas Cylindersa. Oxygen/fuel gas (e.g. acetylene, propylene, etc.) torch sets/hoses shall be BROUGHT into

CRITICAL BUILDINGS only for the duration of the work activity (e.g., hot work operation) thenremoved.

b. Comply with SA-AA-122, Handling and Storage of Compressed Gas Cylinders/Portable Tanks andCryogenic Containers/Dewars requirements for handling, staging, use and removal of compressed gascylinders.

8. Flammable Liquid Storage Cabinetsa. Flammable liquid storage cabinets have specific placement requirements. Do not relocate cabinets

without contacting the cabinet owner.b. GROUNDING of the flammable liquid storage cabinets is not required as long as dispensing

activities are not being conducted.

9. Designated Staging Locationsa. Specific areas in the plant have been evaluated by the site Fire Protection Engineer/Designee for a

specific amount of transient combustible materials that can be used for the staging of materials in theplant to support work activities.

b. Material can be STAGED for no more than 72 hours and is required to be posted in accordance withMA-AA-716-026, Station Housekeeping/Material Condition Program.

c. Do not place material in permanent storage locations unless agreed to by the area owner and it hasbeen verified the combustible load calculation for the area is sufficient for the increased material.

General Guidelines for Critical Buildings - Safety Related

1. All transient combustible material that is required for work in Safety Related Buildings shall be either:a. Constantly attended OR

Exception: Material not in a Combustible Control Zone (CFZ, TCEZ, TCFZ, or TFZ) can be leftunattended for short periods (less than 1 hour), during breaks or during lunch periods.

b. Removed from the work area at the end of the shift (NOTE: Material can be stored in designatedstaging locations) OR

c. Contained in closed metal containers (cabinets, tool boxes, gang boxes, metal drums, metal drumswith flame tamer lids, etc.) that are in good repair OR

d. Have a Transient Combustible Permit (TCP) for all of the combustible material that will be neededfor the work activity.

2. UNPACK equipment or supplies shipped in untreated combustible packing containers outside ofSAFETY RELATED areas whenever possible. If the equipment must be staged and/or unpacked in theSAFETY RELATED area for valid operating reasons, then approval from the Fire Marshal/Designee inthe form of a TCP is required. The combustible materials should be removed from the SAFETYRELATED area immediately after unpacking.

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3. OBTAIN a TCP prior to staging exposed combustible/flammable metals (Class D material) in SafetyRelated Buildings.

4. OBTAIN a TCP from the Fire Marshal/Designee prior to staging a combustible/flammable gas cylinderinside a Safety Related Building.

When is a Transient Combustible Permit (TCP) required?

1. The material will be left unattended in a SAFETY RELATED building.2. The materials are exposed combustible/flammable metals (Class D material) to be staged in Safety

Related Buildings.3. Material is a flammable gas cylinder to be staged in a Safety Related Building.4. Material is not kept in metal containers with self-closing lids or lids maintained in the closed position.5. The material will be staged / stored in a transient combustible control zone (CFZ, TCEZ, TCFZ, or TFZ).

What are the Work Group Supervisor/Designee responsibilities?1. Identifies the need for a transient combustible permit (TCP) in the planning stages of a job and submits a

TCP in accordance with OP-AA-201-009.a. When implemented Combustible Loading Manager (CLM) is to be used for permits and Attachment 1

of OP-AA-201-009 is a backup method to be used with Fire Marshal/Designee permission.2. Posts a copy of the approved TCP form at the job site and ensure compliance with OP-AA-201-009

requirements and with any special requirements or compensatory measures described on the approvedpermit.a. Periodically inspects the work area to ensure compliance with the requirements of OP-AA-201-009

and the TCP.b. Initiates compensatory measures required by the approved TCP as applicable.c. Assures necessary metal storage containers are available at the work location.

3. If an extension or revision is required, then the Work Group Supervisor/Designee shall ensure thechanges are made in accordance with OP-AA-201-009.

4. When work involving the transient combustible is complete the Work Group Supervisor/Designee shallensure the timely removal of material from the plant area, and close the TCP in accordance with OP-AA-201-009.a. The Work Group Supervisor will close the TCP after verifying the removal of the transient

combustibles from the plant area using the CLM website for permits generated in CLM or bycompleting Section IV of Attachment 1 of OP-AA-201-009 and returning the completed attachment tothe Fire Marshal.

What are the Worker responsibilities?1. Minimize the amount of combustibles brought into the plant to the extent practical. Limit transient

combustibles to those materials and quantities needed to support the work activity.2. Place transient materials in proper containers at the end of shift or work activity.3. Remove all transient combustible material from the work area following the completion of the work.4. Contact the Work Group Supervisor or site Fire Marshal with any questions regarding transient

combustible control

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What are the Fire Marshal responsibilities?1. Periodically monitor the transient combustible material, including designated staging locations.2. Determine the need for compensatory actions to mitigate excessive quantities of transient combustible

material or if an administrative fire loading limit is exceeded, or if material will be located in a High RiskFire Area.

3. Advise workers regarding requirements of OP-AA-201-009.4. Approve TCPs and TCP extensions.5. Maintain a log of TCPs and review returned TCPs for completeness and accuracy.

Minor Transient Combustibles1. Minor Transient Combustibles are ordinary (i.e., Class A) combustible materials inherent to every day

work activities. MINOR transient combustibles are exempt from the general guidelines when they areused in the plant to support work activities (except for Combustible Control Zones where TCPauthorization is required). Only the amount needed to support the work activity at the time should beused. The material still needs to be labeled in accordance with MA-AA-716-026 and removed at thecompletion of the work activity. Examples of Minor Transient Combustibles include (additionalexamples available in OP-AA-201-009 Attachment 15):a. Cable for Cameras, Temporary Powerb. Brooms & Mopsc. Composite Equipment Cartsd. Extension Cordse. Hosesf. Ladders (Fiberglass, Wood, etc.)g. Personnel Protective Equipment (Face Shields, Gloves, etc.)h. Test Equipmenti. Absorbent pads

HOT WORK ACTIVITIES

OP-AA-201-004, Fire Prevention for Hot Work is used to positively control hot work (via a permit system) toprotect against losses, protect personnel, and minimize fire hazards to structures, systems and componentsimportant to safety and insured buildings. The provisions of this procedure are applicable to all hot workoperations performed within the protected area, inside any building located outside the protected area, orwithin 35 feet of any site buildings.

Hot work performed in other locations within the owner-controlled area should be performed in accordancewith CC-AA-501-1027, Hot Work Precautions and Safety Practices.

Hot Work is defined as activities that involve welding, cutting, grinding and open flame operations that arecapable of initiating fires or explosions. Typical examples of hot work include: Welding and allied processes– such as arc welding, oxy–fuel gas welding, open-flame soldering, brazing, thermal spraying, oxygen cutting,and arc cutting; Heat Treating; Grinding; Thawing pipe; Powder-driven fasteners; Hot riveting; Torch-appliedroofing.

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Work Group Supervisor SHALL: OBTAIN a Hot Work Permit in accordance with OP-AA-201-004, Fire Prevention for Hot Work. NOTIFY the Operations Supervisor of the intent to perform the hot work activities, and OBTAIN

verbal permission to proceed. INSPECT the area each shift that hot work is being performed prior to the start of the hot work to

ensure that it is a fire safe area (i.e., no combustibles or they are protected within 35-feet unless itmeets the exception in the procedure and spark containment is in place.

VERIFY a fire watch is in place and a fire extinguisher is available. ASSURE individuals assigned to specific job duties (i.e., welders, fire watch, etc.) are qualified to

perform those activities and understand their duties. NOTIFY the Control Room and the Fire Marshal anytime there is a fire or an extinguisher is used and

capture the incident in CAP. RETURN completed hot work permits to the Fire Marshal when the hot work is complete.

Fire Watch SHALL: Have NO other duties that would cause distractions from primary responsibility of watching for fires

(e.g., the Hot Work Operator cannot also be the designated Fire Watch). OBTAIN required hot work fire watch training annually. WATCH for fires in all exposed areas and try to extinguish them only when obviously within the

capacity of the equipment available and your level of training. All fires shall be promptlyREPORTED to the Control Room, regardless of size and whether they are immediately extinguished.

COMPLETE Fire Watch section of the Hot Work Permit. REMAIN at the work area 30 minutes after completion of the hot work activity (if required by hot

work permit). ASSURE oncoming fire watch is briefed regarding expected duties during turnover. STOP WORK in the event of a safety problem.

Additional information can be located in OP-AA-201-004, Fire Prevention for Hot Work.

CONTROL OF TEMPORARY HEAT SOURCESIf equipment is capable of generating temperatures sufficient to ignite combustibles or flammable materialslocated in the area or the equipment is capable of generating smoke, fumes, or other products of combustionthen the requirements of OP-AA-201-006, Control of Temporary Heat Sources shall be followed.

FIRE RISK

Fires can be the most significant challenge to Nuclear Safety. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)measures the amount of nuclear risk and potential for core damage. Fire is shown as one of the mostdominant contributors to site risk in PRA. Proper control of hot work and combustibles is critical to protectthe plant from fires as they could challenge the capability of mitigating systems as well as challenge theability of the operators to monitor the plant status. While all fires are of great concern to the site, there areparticular areas in the plant where it is extremely important that you are aware of the controls for preventionof fire. High Risk Fire Areas (Defined in the site’s fire PRA) are conspicuously identified (e.g., doors orfloors labelled) to highlight the concerns for those areas. Before commencing hot work or movingcombustibles into these areas make sure that you and your supervisor were aware and the work planningaddressed this additional sensitivity.

Additional information can be located in ER-AA-600-1069, High Risk Fire Area Identification.

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FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM CONFIGURATION CHANGE REVIEW

If a configuration change package review determines that the approved Fire Protection Program has beenimpacted then CC-AA-209, Fire Protection Program Configuration Change Review shall be followed.

FATIGUE MANAGEMENT AND WORK HOUR LIMITS

LS-AA-119, Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits:

Establishes requirements for managing worker fatigue and controlling work hours in compliance with10CFR26 Subpart I (The Fatigue Rule).

All badged workers fall under the requirements of fatigue management. Workers, who perform covered work (work on systems, structures, and components considered high

safety significance (HSS SSCs)) under the Fatigue Rule, must comply with the work hour limitsrequired under the rule.

Self-Declarations of Fatigue

All workers under the Fatigue Rule have the right to self-declare fatigue if they feel they are too fatigued toperform their assigned duties effectively or safely.

Workers should make this declaration to their supervision. The individual will be removed from duty as soon as practicable and be required to complete

documentation of the self-declaration. A fatigue assessment may be performed following the self-declaration at the discretion of the

supervisor. The fatigue assessment may determine that:o The individual is fatigued and must be sent home for a 10 hour (minimum) break.o The individual is NOT fatigued and may perform covered work.o The individual is NOT fatigued and may perform non-covered work only.o The individual is NOT fatigued, but may require additional oversight to perform work.

If an individual undergoes a fatigue assessment and is found to be fit, but disagrees, the individualmay:o Request a second fatigue assessment.o Pursue other management paths to resolution.

If an individual refuses a fatigue assessment, the individual:o Will be considered fatigued and will be removed from duty.o Shall be subject to disciplinary action and possible removal from unescorted access.

Work Hour LimitsIndividuals who perform covered work must comply with the work hour limits of the Fatigue Rule. Exelongenerally applies these limits to the following workers unless specifically exempted:

Operations (Equipment Operators, Reactor Operators, Control Room Supervisors, and Shift Managers) Maintenance (Technicians and FLSs) Chemistry and Rad Protection (Technicians) Outage support and supplemental workforce members and FLSs (who perform maintenance activities) Fire Brigade Leaders and Advisors Security

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Limits that always apply to covered workers are as follows:

Maximum Work Hours: 16 hours of any 24-hour period 26 hours of any 48-hour period 72 hours of any 7-day period (168 hours)

Minimum Breaks (time between scheduled work periods): 10 hours between work periods (except 8 hours may be used to accommodate scheduled shift rotations) 34-hour break at least every 9 days

For on-line conditions:

Maximum Average Work Hours (54-Hour Rule) are followed. Individuals may not work more than a weeklyaverage of 54 hours, calculated using an averaging period of 6 weeks, which advances (rolls) by 7consecutive calendar days at the finish of every averaging period. The point in time each week the scheduleis advanced is Monday 0000 hours (Sunday midnight).

For outage conditions:

Minimum Days-off (MDO) are followed. The requirements are specified based on work group and shift–length. The MDO requirements are as follows:

Outage Required Minimum Days OffThe following minimum days off apply to the first 60 days of an outage.

Group 8, 10, or 12 hr. shiftMaintenance 1 day off in any 7-day period (rolling 7 days)Ops, RP, Chem, FBL 3 days off in each successive (non-rolling) 15-day periodSecurity 4 days off in each successive (non-rolling) 15-day period

Expectations for Individuals for managing fatigue (from Exelon Fitness for Duty Policy)

Individuals shall be responsible for evaluating and managing their own personal fitness-for-duty based onimpairment from fatigue by:

Managing their work hours consistent with the objective of preventing impairment from fatigue. Verifying their work hours are correctly documented regardless of whether they are paid for the hours

worked. When an individual’s work shift starts at the end of a calendar day and concludes during the next

calendar day, the hours worked will be attributed to the calendar days on which the hours were actuallyworked.

Self-declaration when fatigued or reduced mental alertness could negatively affect their jobperformance and discussing these concerns with supervision.

Monitoring and reporting concerns related to individuals’ Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) based on impairmentfrom fatigue (i.e., Behavior Observation Program).

Being aware of the total hours worked in the previous 14 days, the weekly average hours worked in theprevious 6 weeks and notifying management if work hour limits will be exceeded if asked to workadditional hours.

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WATER INTRUSION

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Event Notification (SEN) 283 discusses theinitiating event of a dual unit scram that was the result of a roof leak not recognized as a threat to plantequipment. Another contributing factor was that identified leaks were not always addressed at the site in atimely manner. The leak from the roof seeped along the outside of the conduit where it found its way into acurrent transformer enclosure that contained the 13-kV supply for a Reactor Coolant Pump causing a faultthat tripped the pump leading to a very complicated trip scenario affecting both units.

Exelon operating experience suggests that some water leaks have not been consistently identified and trackedto resolution for similar reasons as described in the INPO SEN. At one Exelon station a safety related valveactuator failed due to corrosion of the actuator torque switch from water intrusion into the limit switchcompartment of the actuator. Sometime after the failure, water was identified dripping from the roof in thearea near the valve and had begun to collect at the actuator.

Water leaks and evidence of previous leaks need to be identified as soon as possible and documented in thecorrective action program in order to assure the impact of the leak can be investigated and the leak prioritizedfor resolution. A Water Leak/Intrusion Issue Report template captures key attributes of the water leak thatwill support evaluation of the impact to plant equipment and help prioritize resolution of the leak. Thestandard template is available at each station in the “IR Templates for Backgrounding” link. Braidwood andByron have a different template for tracking leaks. Other stations should be using the new WaterLeak/Intrusion template to document water leaks or evidence of water leaks in the plant. (1344420 05)

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

Listed below are some every day behaviors that need to be followed to stay SAFE each and every day.Personnel are expected to take action to stop unsafe jobs and unsafe behaviors they observe at the station.

Walk on sidewalks or designated pathways Do NOT cross over or under ropes or barriers Always choose the safest route even if it is longer Keep your eyes on path – Stop to read material or text messages Be aware of your surroundings, wet, ice or uneven surfaces Walk at a safe pace

Walk down the parking lot aisle in which you parked your vehicle Check for vehicle traffic prior to entering designated cross walk areas

Allow ALL doors to self-close and keep your hands out of the Line of Fire Do not force doors closed - Always allow them to close on their own Keep your hands clear and your eyes focused prior to challenging doors

Gloves Wear gloves when engaged in maintenance and operational work activities or other physical work

activities (e.g., lifting, pushing, fabricating) in nuclear generation station industrial areas. Climbingscaffold, ladders, and on plant equipment, as permitted by station procedures, is considered a workactivity. Refer to SA-AA-116, Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) for further guidance.

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BORIC ACID CORROSION CONTROL PROGRAM AT PRESSURIZED WATERREACTOR (PWR) SITES (BRAIDWOOD, BYRON, CALVERT CLIFFS, GINNAAND THREE MILE ISLAND)Why do we have a Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program?

Industry events have revealed instances of corrosion of plant components, valves, vessels, manways,etc. due to exposure to borated water. The most notable event was the Davis Besse Reactor HeadDegradation Event. Approximately 6” of the reactor head was corroded away due to exposure toborated water/boric acid leakage over a long period of time. Valve and pump bolting had also beencorroded away due to exposure to borated water and boric acid.

What is boric acid and what does it do?

Boric acid is a chemical that is used to control reactivity in Pressurized Water Reactors. It is presentin Reactor Coolant Systems. Boric acid is added to the water contained in the Reactor Coolant Systemand other supporting systems.

When external leakage of boric acid exists, there is the potential that the boric acid deposits andborated water can cause corrosion of plant equipment when exposed to borated water and boric aciddeposits.

Boric acid is mildly corrosive and is generally not a personnel safety issue. However, when leakageonto plant equipment occurs over an extended period of time, degradation can occur. Componentsfabricated from carbon and low alloy steels are much more susceptible to corrosion than stainless steelmaterials.

What does boric acid leakage look like?

Boric acid leakage can be in the form of wet or dry deposits. Although drips, and/or streams may bepresent, in most cases the boric acid deposits may be wet (no drips) or dry (no moisture).

Boric acid deposits are usually white in color and may look like snow or popcorn. However, in somecases the deposits may be discolored (brown, tan, or pink). This is an indication of the potential forcorrosion of plant equipment.

Where are the typical locations boric acid leakage can be found?

The typical locations for borated water and boric acid leakage are valve packing, instrumentationfittings, valve body to bonnet connections, and pump seals.

It is also important that components and surfaces that are affected by the leakage (target componentssuch as piping, floors, walls, supports, etc. that are below the leaking component) are identified ifpossible.

What actions do you take if you observe boric acid leakage?

Notify your Supervisor. Do not touch the boric acid or leaking water. The boric acid is likely to be radioactively contaminated. If leakage is active and is dripping on other components or surfaces, notify the Shift Manager and

request that catch containment be installed until corrective actions can be implemented. NotifyRadiation Protection so the spread of contamination can be minimized.

Generate an Issue Report if possible. If not, contact the Site Boric Acid Corrosion Control ProgramOwner so the issue can be investigated. Reference procedure ER-AP-331-1004 and Issue Report229446.

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BRAIDWOOD

NUCLEAR POWER STATION OVERVIEW

Braidwood Important Phone NumbersEmergency 2211Security 2330Radiation Protection 2241Site Nurse 4204

MiscellaneousAt Braidwood Station, a colored stripe is provided around the wall of the room to differentiate between units.

Unit 1 has a Yellow stripe

Unit 2 has a Green stripe

Unit 0 (Common equipment) has a Blue stripe

FIRE PROTECTION

Gaseous Suppression System SafetySeveral areas at Braidwood are protected by gaseous suppression systems. These areas require personnel tobe aware of the special precautions required for any entry into an area protected by a gaseous suppressionsystem (i.e., CO2 and Halon) in order that work/entry in these areas may be performed in a safe, efficientmanner.

The areas listed below are protected by gaseous suppression systems. Any entry/work in these areas is subjectto the requirements as set forth in BwAP 1100-21.

Upper Cable Spreading Rooms - Halon 1301 and CO2. Lower Cable Spreading Rooms - CO2. Diesel Generator and Day Tank Rooms - CO2. Electrical Cable Tunnels - CO2. Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Day Tank Rooms - CO2. Braidwood Station QA Vault - Halon 1301. CECo/ENC QA Vault-Halon 1301. Comstock QA Vault - Halon 1301. Getschow QA Vault - Halon 1301.

If you will be performing work in any of these areas, you must be aware of the following precautions:

Do not use radios within 4 feet of smoke detectors. Entry beyond 5 feet into Upper Cable Spreading Rooms 1EE2 and 2EE2 requires use of an emergency

escape breathing apparatus, available from Radiation Protection. Do not enter any room in which the alarm horn is sounding. System CO2 has been scented with wintergreen. If a wintergreen odor is detected, leave the area

immediately.

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BRAIDWOOD (Continued)

In the event of a pre-discharge alarm, or system actuation:

Leave the area immediately, in a calm but quick manner. (CO2 pre-discharge times were developedbased upon actual exit times.)

Be aware that a discharge will create a great deal of noise and will greatly limit visibility. Avoid passing through nozzle spray paths.

Section C.2.d. of BwAP 1100-21 provides examples of work that may require the gaseous suppression systemto be taken out of service. The Station Fire Marshal or designee may be contacted for further guidance.

Visual Warning Lights for Plant Alarms (IR 534661)

Functional Description:

The red beacons (strobe lights) located in the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings are interlocked with the PublicAddress (PA) system and are designed to alert plant personnel working in high noise areas of several types ofconsequential plant conditions. The beacons are actuated by use of the Site Fire Alarm, Site Assembly Alarm,or use of the Emergency Page function from the PA system. These differ from the red strobe lights in Unit 1and Unit 2 containment, which are manually actuated from the main Control Room when a containmentevacuation is necessary.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE/PREPAREDNESS

Braidwood Assembly Areas Maintenance Shop Elev. 401 Unit 1 Turbine Building Trackway Elev. 401 Unit 2 Turbine Building Trackway Elev. 401 OSC Elev. 451 (Access) TSC Elev. 451 (Access) Control Room Elev. 451 If you are in training, the Training Building is also an assembly area.

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BRAIDWOOD (Continued)

EXPECTATIONS BRIEFING

At Braidwood Station, our work is never so urgent or our schedule so important that work cannot beperformed safely. The majority of personnel injuries are due to at-risk behaviors, not the work environment.Taking unnecessary risks while performing a task, as well as unawareness to surroundings can lead to seriousand potentially fatal consequences.

Any condition, which could be adverse to quality, is to be immediately reported to station supervision. Use of cell phones inside the power block is prohibited. (See policy BR-032) When processing through all security and fire doors, ensure they are secured prior to leaving the area. Handrails shall be used when traversing stairways. Walk on sidewalks or designated pathways. Approved footwear must be worn. Limit casual conversation while traversing the power block to prevent distraction from immediate

surroundings (e.g., low hanging pipe supports). Piping and equipment can be extremely hot; keep a safe distance away. Smoking is ONLY allowed in designated areas. (See policy BR-051) When attending station meetings or training sessions, pagers, cell phones and Blackberries will be

placed in vibrate modes. It is expected that all personnel stop when faced with uncertainty. Do not proceed until resolved with

supervision. Personnel are expected to take action to stop unsafe jobs and unsafe behaviors they observe at the

station. In case of an injury, illness or near-miss, stop work immediately and place equipment in a safe, stable

condition. If a serious injury has occurred, notify the Control Room at extension 2211. Bollard Safety - do not walk in or around security bollards. Adhere to signs posted.

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BRAIDWOOD STATION

Notes:Normally accessible RCAs at Braidwood are contained within the Auxiliary Building and the ContainmentBuildings.

1. Maintenance Shop, EL 401 A. Turbine Building2. Unit 2 Turbine Bldg.Trackway EL 401 B. Auxiliary Building3. OSC EL 451 (Access) C. Main Access Facility4. TSC EL 451 (Access) D. Drug Screening Reporting Site5. Unit 1 Turbine Bldg Trackway EL 401 E. Pre Access Facility6. Main Control Room EL 451

Page 30


BYRON

NUCLEAR POWER STATION OVERVIEWByron Important Phone Numbers

Emergency 2211Security 2943Radiation Protection 2241Site Nurse 4204

MiscellaneousAt Byron a colored stripe is used on the floor to differentiate between units.

Unit 0 Blue

Unit 1 Yellow

Unit 2 Green

FIRE PROTECTIONGaseous Suppression System SafetySeveral areas at Byron are protected by gaseous suppression systems. These areas require personnel to beaware of the special precautions required for any entry into an area protected by a gaseous suppression system(i.e., CO2, Halon, and FM200) in order that work/entry in these areas may be performed in a safe, efficientmanner.

The areas listed below are protected by gaseous suppression systems: Upper Cable Spreading Rooms - Halon 1301 and CO2 as a Back-up Lower Cable Spreading Rooms - CO2

Diesel Generator and Day Tank Rooms - CO2

Electrical Cable Tunnels - CO2

Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (B) and Day Tank Rooms - CO2

SX M/U pumps and day tank rooms – CO2

Byron Station QA Vault (Service Building) - Halon 1301 New QA Vault Room (Outside Protected Area) - FM 200 raining Building Simulator - Halon 1301 raining Building Computer Room - Halon 1301

Work Area Precautions: Do not use two-way radios in the vicinity of the Halon Control Panels and some detectors.Entry into Upper Cable Spreading Rooms 1EE2 and 2EE2 requires an emergency air pack however it

is not required to be donned unless for emergency purposes.Do not enter any room in which the alarm horn is sounding.he CO2 system contains wintergreen vials, which burst upon a CO2 actuation. If a wintergreen odor is

detected, leave the area immediately.

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BYRON (Continued)

Tritium Awareness (AR 01402338)

Tritium-What is it? A radioactive isotope of Hydrogen (H3) It behaves like water It has a half-life of 12.3 years It undergoes Beta decay It can be inhaled, ingested and/or absorbed through the skin The USEPA drinking water limit is 20,000 pCi/L− pCi/L=picoCuries per Liter− A picoCurie is 10-12 Curies (0.000000000001 Curie)

Tritium-Where does it come from? Neutron activation of Boron Neutron activation of Lithium Reactor Coolant contains Boron and Lithium

Tritium-How does it get to secondary side water? The Tritium molecule is very small and it migrates through the metal tubes of the steam generators

from the primary side water to the secondary side water.

What systems contain tritiated water? Steam Generator blowdown water (SD) Feedwater (FW) Condensate (CD) Reactor Coolant (RCS) Water processed through Treated Wastewater (TR) Condensate Polisher (CP) sump

What systems do not contain tritiated water? Circ Water (CW) Essential Service (SX) Water Non-Essential Service (WS) Water Fire Protection Water (FP) Potable Water (WW) Demineralized Water (DM)

What should I do when I work on systems that contain tritiated water? Take extra precautions to ensure tritiated water does not enter the environment.

Prior to draining a system consult BAP 1256-8, NPDES Screening of Wastewater Generation andDraining Activities.

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BYRON (Continued)

What are the consequences if tritiated water enters the environment? Spills of tritiated water to the environment can be reportable to several different groups/agencies:

- Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA)- NRC- Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)- Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)

Spills of tritiated water to the environment can also generate media attention

What should I do if I spill tritiated water to the environment? Immediately contact the Shift Manager or WEC If possible, stop the source of the spill If possible, try to contain the spill

Refer to EN-AA-407, Response to Inadvertent Releases of Licensed Materials to Groundwater,Surface Water or Soil, for proper response actions

- “Licensed Material”=Tritium or other radionuclides

Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) / Radio Frequency Interference (RFI)EMI/RFI is caused by the signals transmitted from electronic devices such as two-way radios, two-waypagers, digital cameras, laptops, tablet e-reader/media player (i.e. IPADs/Nooks), cell or cordless telephones.The signals can be transmitted by these devices anytime it is turned on. EMI/RFI signals can affect sensitiveplant equipment and cause it to respond in a way that is undesirable.

All electronic devices, especially cellular phones are restricted from being used and/or powered on in allpower block areas, including the Circ. Water Pump House, River Screen House and other areas wheresensitive equipment may be present. Note: Electronic device use is acceptable only in office areas within thepower block.

At all times, individuals are to refrain from using radio transmitting devices within designated ‘NO RADIOZONES’. These are identified with unique markings and signs.

Any electronic devices requiring use for work activities (i.e. new WI-FI based devices) in these areas musthave an Engineering Evaluation completed before use. Contact your site specific EMI/RFI subject matterexpert (SME) for questions. (AR 1458642 07)

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BYRON (Continued)


Byron Assembly Locations within the Protected AreaMechanical Maintenance ShopUnit 1 Turbine Building TrackwayOperations Support Center (OSC) / Outage Control Center (OCC)Technical Support Center (TSC)Control Room

Notes:Normally accessible RCA at Byron are contained within the Auxiliary Building and the ContainmentBuildings. Drug Screening Reporting Site is located in the Training Building.

Page 34


CALVERT CLIFFS

NUCLEAR POWER STATION OVERVIEWCalvert Cliffs Important Phone Numbers

Emergency 911From a cellular phone to the U1 Control Room Supervisor, dial 410-495-5203

Security 5222Employee Concerns 5228

Miscellaneous

At Calvert Cliffs each unit is painted to differentiate between units:

Unit 1 is painted Orange

Unit 2 is painted Blue

ENVIRONMENTAL

Effluent Discharge Permit (NPDES/SPDES Permit)A National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit is used to control plant effluent dischargesfrom Calvert Cliffs to the Chesapeake Bay.

These permits allow release of plant effluents and wastewaters from previously approved and monitoredpathways to the environment.

An unplanned release of chemicals into storm drains, plant floor drains, sanitary systems, or plant systemscould potentially damage effluent systems and/or violate the plant’s NPDES/SPDES permit. Priorapproval is required for all effluent discharges.

In accordance with the requirements of its NPDES Permit, Calvert Cliffs has developed a Storm Water PollutionPrevention Plan (SWPPP) to document efforts to reduce the introduction of pollutants to storm water that flowsinto the Chesapeake Bay. The SWPPP describes routine actions that affect storm water discharges.

Page 35


CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Page 36


CALVERT CLIFFS (Continued)

Main Entrance Facility (reference map on previous page)Access to the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) may be obtained with advanced notification andproper identification at the Security Access Main Entrance Facility, located on Calvert Cliffs Parkway.Contact Security Access on X2230 for more information.

Nuclear Security FacilityThe Nuclear Security Facility (NSF) is the first building in the office complex and the Security Access Unit islocated on the 2nd floor.

Medical/Drug ScreeningMedical and Drug Screening are located on the 1st floor, Office Training Facility (OTF red side).

DosimetryDosimetry is located on the 1st floor, Office Training Facility (OTF blue side).

Protected AreaEntry to, and exit from, the Protected Area is through the Nuclear Security Facility.

Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)The main entrance to the RCA is located on the 69’ elevation in the Auxiliary building.

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)This complex is a set of completely passive, concrete bunkers that cool fuel assemblies and keeps themisolated from the public. It stores used radioactive fuel assemblies on-site. The ISFSI is located west of theplant, on road C1.

Emergency Response Assembly Areas:

IF you are not in the Emergency Response Organization AND your regular work location is OUTSIDE theProtected Area, THEN your assembly area is your regular work location.

IF you are not in the Emergency Response Organization AND your regular work location is INSIDE theProtected Area, THEN your assembly area is the OTF/NEF/NOF hallway. Assembly is in your designatedarea.

Supplemental Workers

IF supplemental worker IS an integral part of a CCNPP group, THEN assemble with the CCNPP groupwith which you work.

IF a supplemental worker is NOT an integral part of a CCNPP group, THEN assemble in the NuclearOffice Facility cafeteria.

Page 37


CLINTON


Clinton Important Phone NumbersSite Emergency 3329, 2211Medical Emergency 3333Security 2941Radiation Protection 3227Site Nurse 4204

Public Address SystemClinton Power Station (CPS) also uses a Public Announcement system known as a Gaitronics that allowsplant personnel to contact the Main Control Room, Security, etc. in emergency situations. Depress the ‘Page’button to summon the department that you need (also inform them what line [1-4] to use). Use of theGaitronics is NOT approved for routine business.

SECURITY

Protected Area AccessNormal access is through the Main Access Facility (MAF). The Operations Gate House (OGH) is currentlyonly used for personnel delivering vehicles or material into the Protected Area and CPS uses a door instead ofa turnstile to access the Protected Area at the OGH. Only one person may access the Protected Area throughthis door at a time. The door must be closed and secured by each person.

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

Severe Weather Actions

If you see any severe weather, call 3333. Announcements are made over the site communication systems, and a whistle is sounded for personnel

outdoors. When the siren sounds, enter the nearest building and follow any instructions provided. Personnel in buildings other than the power block should go to the designated “Tornado Warning

Shelter Area” in the center of that building. The Admin Building personnel should go to the first floorRP area. Do not leave the building you are in unless your building does not have a designated internalshelter area. Only then would you go to another building.

Stay in the shelter until an "all clear" announcement is made. Personnel who are outdoors and unable to reach indoor shelter should seek refuge in low-lying areas

such as ditches, culverts, etc.

FIRE PROTECTION

CPS has Carbon Dioxide total flooding suppression systems in the Diesel Generator room. The MainGenerator Exciter in the Turbine Building is a local application system. Both are equipped with a wintergreenodorizer. If you smell the wintergreen proceed to the Radwaste Building.

Page 38


CLINTON (Continued)

FIRE PROTECTION

Control of fire loading (wood, solvents, oil) and the disposal of flammable materials

The following fire protection zones are established: Transient Combustible Free Zones (TCFZ) - an area of the plant in which no transient combustible

material is permitted to be stored, staged, or left unattended unless compensatory actions are in place.At Clinton, signs identify transient combustible free zones and most areas have red striped/solid floors.


Clinton Assembly Areas (Also see site map)

Service Building - Contractor Outage Control Center 762’ Radwaste Building - Contractor Break Area

Plant Emergency Announcements are made over the site communication systems with a siren with thecommunications following. When you hear the siren sound, listen for the plant announcement and follow anyinstructions provided. In the event that you cannot hear the announcements proceed to a location where youcan hear the announcement or contact your supervisor for instructions.

RADIATION WORKER TRAININGIt is expected that Radworkers check electronic dosimetry at a minimum of every 15 minutes in a HighRadiation area. When in a non-High Radiation area, check ED once to twice an hour. Tools painted purpleare to be used only in the RCA and are not to be removed from the RCA.

TRANSIENT EQUIPMENT/MATERIAL CONTROL (IR1309366)

TRANSIENT EQUIPMENT/MATERIAL are items that are not configured, or not configured in theircurrent location. Examples are ladders, gang boxes, barrels, tools, carts, etc.

Control of transient equipment/material is required to ensure there is no unforeseen impact to personnel safetyand safe operation of plant equipment. Failure to comply with the requirements of procedure CPS 1019.05may affect operability of plant equipment and result in reportable conditions.

This is particularly true inside the containment and drywell. The Suppression Pool exists at the outer radiusof the Drywell and lower elevation of the Containment. During certain accident conditions, the suppressionpool level will swell significantly such that the increase in water level will flow up through the lower twolevels of grating and dislodge items not properly secured. There are several concerns:

1. Solid loose items can become missile hazards in the pool swell and damage safety-related equipmentsuch that it could not perform its design basis function.

2. Flexible material can be drawn into the suppression pool where it will conform to the shape of asuction strainer which would reduce the flow of water into the emergency core cooling system.Examples of flexible material are ropes, tape, plastic sheeting, paper, protective clothing, absorbentmats, decals, etc.

Page 39


CLINTON (Continued)

During Modes 1, 2, or 3, no items may be stored in Containment/Drywell without a technical evaluation.During Modes 1, 2, or 3, the quantity of flexible material in Containment/Drywell shall be controlled. DuringModes 1, 2, and 3, any transient flexible material left unattended inside the containment or drywell requirespermission of the Operation Work Control Supervisor and the Fire Marshall.Contact Maintenance Services Manager if you have any questions on the use or storage of transient materialin the Containment and Drywell.

Notes:

Normally accessible RCAs at CPS are contained within the Turbine Building.

Page 40


DRESDEN


Dresden Important Phone NumbersEmergency 2211Security 2940Radiation Protection 2241, 2253Site Nurse 4204

MiscellaneousAt Dresden, the following colors are used to differentiate between units.


Unit 3 has a Light Blue stripe

SECURITY

Visitor Escort

The far left-hand turnstile should be used for escorts and visitors exiting the station.

Both the escort and the visitor are to use the same turnstile – visitor MUST exit first.

If the escort is not exiting the station, please note that the escort responsibilities do not end until theescort ensures that the visitor has successfully processed through the turnstile.

Access Checkpoint

Dresden has an Access Check Point (ACP) for entry into the Owner Controlled Area of the property. Theincoming lanes of traffic are marked as “Badged Employees”, “Visitors and Badged Employees” and“Deliveries”. Please ensure you proceed through the appropriate lane when entering the property.

For the safety of our Security Officers and any other individuals in the area, please keep the following pointsin mind while processing through the ACP:

Reduce your speed when approaching the ACP, and be prepared to stop. Roll down your window in order for the Security Officer to address you. If you drive a vehicle with searchable areas (i.e., truck boxes), you will need to exit your vehicle and

open the area to allow for the search. The Security Officer will advise when you are clear to proceed through the checkpoint. Do not

proceed prior to this verbal clearance. This will ensure that the Officer is in a safe area, away frommoving vehicles.

Page 41


DRESDEN (Continued)

Security Pre-Access Facility

Prior to entering the Security Gatehouse, all individuals will process through the “Pre-Access Facility”(PAF). During normal business hours, the Visitor/Vehicle Registration Officer (VVRO) is located at the PAF.All visitors and vehicles will be processed at this desk. When the VVRO is not posted, individuals who arenot badged will need to call into the gatehouse (using wall phone) to gain entry through the PAF turnstiles,and will be processed in the gatehouse.


Dresden Assembly AreasAdmin Building (Lunchroom)D2 Turbine Building (Ground Level Main Corridor)Mechanical Maintenance Shop (Ground Level)

Page 42


R.E. GINNA

NUCLEAR POWER STATION OVERVIEWGINNA Important Phone Numbers

Emergency from a Ginna Station Phone 911From a cellular phone to the U1 Control Room Supervisor dial 315-791-5203Security from a Ginna Station Phone 791-5222Employee Concerns from a Ginna Station Phone 791-5228

ENVIRONMENTALEffluent Discharge Permit (NPDES/SPDES Permit)

State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permits are used to control plant effluent dischargesfrom R.E. Ginna and Nine Mile Point to Lake Ontario.


An unplanned release of chemicals into storm drains, plant floor drains, sanitary systems, or plant systemscould potentially damage effluent systems and/or violate the plant’s NPDES/SPDES permit. Prior approval isrequired for all effluent discharges.

In accordance with the requirements of its SPDES Permit, Ginna has developed a Storm Water PollutionPrevention Plan (SWPPP) to document efforts to reduce the introduction of pollutants to storm water thatflows into Lake Ontario. The SWPPP describes routine actions that affect storm water discharges.

Gaseous Suppression System SafetySeveral areas at Ginna are protected by gaseous suppression systems. These areas require personnel to beaware of the special precautions required for any entry into an area protected by a gaseous suppression system(Halon) in order that work/entry in these areas may be performed in a safe, efficient manner. This agent cancause suffocation.The areas listed below are protected by total flooding automatic Halon 1301 extinguishing systems in thefollowing locations:

Relay Room and MUX Room Telephone Service Room in the Turbine Building TSC SAS/PPCS Computer Room

Simulator Room in the Simulator BuildingHalon System Discharge Response:

1. Leave the area immediately upon hearing the siren, and/or seeing the red flashing light, or the smell ofwintergreen in detected.

2. Close the door behind you and report it to the Control Room.3. When leaving the area, go far enough away to ensure you are not exposed to gas.4. Remember Halon is heavier than air and will sink to the lower levels of the plant and surrounding

areas; although means are in place to minimize leaks, they still occur.5. Never use elevators to evacuate.6. Warn others as you exit the area.7. Listen to all subsequent plant announcements.

REMEMBER the life you save may be YOUR OWN.

Page 43


R.E. GINNA (Continued)

Location of Plant Fire Prevention procedures:Plant fire prevention procedures are normally located on the site’s computer network. If computer access isnot available, procedures can be obtained from document control or contact your site supervisor.

R.E. Ginna Power Plant: (See map on next page)

Owner Controlled Area Buildings:Ginna’s Brookwood Training Center (GTC), Simulator buildings, Material Handling, and the OffsiteWarehouse are located in the Owner Controlled Area of Ginna Station. The Security Access Unit andFitness for Duty screening are housed in GTC East.

Emergency Assembly Areas:Areas are located throughout the site in case of an emergency. Every individual on site is responsible forlocating the nearest assembly areas to their normal work location.

Security Access Points:These are points where you may enter the fenced-in area of the site. To do this, you must pass through theGuard House.

Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) and Access Control Points:The RCA has Access Control Points located between the Service Building and the Intermediate Buildingnear the Men’s Locker Room. This is the only acceptable entry and exit point to the RCA.

Page 44


R.E. GINNA STATION POWER PLANT LAYOUT:

Page 45


LASALLE


LaSalle Important Phone Numbers

Emergency 2211, 2911Security 2220, 2218Radiation Protection 2241Site Nurse 4204

Miscellaneous

At LaSalle, a colored stripe is used to differentiate between Unit 1 and Unit 2.



SECURITY

Vital Area DoorsIdentified with a BLUE semi-circle for single doors or a BLUE circle for double doors

EscortsThe number of visitors per escort is 1 at all times in the drywell during refueling outage.Escorts will NOT transfer the control of their visitor while in the drywell.

Environmental Awareness (TR 07-887)

Environmental Management System

Significant Environmental Aspects (SEA): An element related to an activity, product or service that may cause asignificant environmental impact. These are situations that can cause an adverse or beneficial change to theenvironment. Activities involving air emissions, discharges to water, waste disposal, and natural resources wereconsidered. The identified items were then assigned probability and consequence scores. The scores wereranked and the items, which scored above a certain threshold value, were listed as Significant EnvironmentalAspects (SEAs).

LaSalle station currently has three SEAs, which can cause a significant impact to the environment. LaSalle hasseveral operational controls which mitigate these impacts. The LaSalle SEAs are as follows:

1. ISFSI (Dry-Cask Storage)2. Underground piping (Diesel Fuel Lines)3. Tritium Contamination

Page 46


LASALLE (Continued)

DOORS

Secondary Containment Access Doors:

Secondary Containment Access Doors are held closed magnetically. If upon approaching one of the interlockdoors you see a white flashing light and hear an alarm/buzzer going off someone is using the opposite door andyou need to wait for the alarm and light to clear prior to using the door. To use the door simply push the buttonlocated near the door, as directed by the sign on the door. This will release the magnet holding that door closedand allow you to access that door. Once in between the interlock doors allow the door you entered to close.Then push the button for the other door to release the magnet for the opposite door and allow you to passthrough. You must ensure the door is closed prior to leaving the area.

Page 47


LASALLE (Continued)

FIRE PROTECTION

ENSURE DOORS ARE CLOSED AND LATCHED PROPERLY AFTER USE

Doors at LaSalle that have high differential pressure have special monitoring to ensure that they closeproperly. There is an audible and visual alarm that actuates when the door is opened and will keep alarminguntil the door is properly closed. If the alarm does NOT actuate once opened or does NOT stop alarming onceclosed, please contact the appropriate unit supervisor for that door. Unit 1 supervisor is at extension 2300,Unit 2 supervisor is at 2400.

Page 48


LASALLE (Continued)

PROHIBITED FLOATABLE ITEMS (AT# 01172503-32-04)

Prohibited floatable items refer to the storage of items which may inhibit drainage flow in areas designatedas “Flood Control Areas” in the UFSAR and supplements all existing housekeeping and storage procedures.Loose floatable items shall not be stored in flood-controlled areas. Floatable items include the following:

• Items composed primarily of fabric, foam, paper, plastic, rubber, or wood.• Light-weight metal objects with the potential to block floor drains (e.g. buckets, sheet metal, or

scrap metal).

The following are flood-controlled areas:

• ECCS Corner Rooms(673’ and 694’)a. LPCS/RCIC Roomsb. ‘A’ RHR Pump Roomsc. ‘B’/’C’ RHR Pump Roomsd. HPCS Pump Rooms

• CSCS Pump Rooms (673’) and Mezzanines (694’)• Diesel Fuel Storage Tank Rooms (694’)

This applies to all on-site personnel and to both units. For more information, please refer to Policy LSCSP.G. No. 134, Floatable Items prohibited in the Flood Protected Areas.

LaSalle Collective Radiation Exposure (CRE) – A/R 01056377-36

LaSalle Station rigorously takes actions to reduce radiation exposure. Strong ownership in reducingcollective radiation exposure is exhibited by workers, supervisors, and managers who have internalized,advocate, and demonstrate job-site behaviors that promote excellence in radiological practices.

Dose Initiative and Reduction Team (DIRT)LaSalle Station is striving to improve its performance with respect to collective radiation exposure, which isprimarily driven by high source term, demonstrating the need for aggressive action to eliminate this sourceterm and drive the station to better performance. LaSalle Station has developed an excellence plan, asimplemented through the dose initiative and reduction team (DIRT), to provide an integrated approach tostrengthen all facets of the station’s radiation exposure performance.

Whose Responsibility is it?Ultimately it is every workers responsibility to maintain their dose ‘As Low as Reasonably Achievable’(ALARA), and provide any possible dose saving ideas to the Radiation Protection Department.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE/PREPAREDNESSLaSalle Assembly Area:South Service Trackway

Page 49


LASALLE STATION

Page 50


LIMERICK


Limerick Important Phone Numbers

Control Room:

Emergencies - Use the “Emergency Control RM / Fire” pushbutton on the page system or telephoneExt. 2911

Normal calls - 2277

Security Shift Supervisor – 2048Radiation Protection – 2222Site Nurse – 2056

Miscellaneous

At Limerick Generating Station (LGS), a colored stripe (with the unit number inside) around the wall of theroom is used to differentiate between units.



FIRE PROTECTION

Actions to take upon discovery of a fire

Use the “Emergency Control RM / Fire” pushbutton on the page system or telephone Ext. 2911 tonotify the Control Room of the fire location regardless of whether the fire is out or was small.

If in buildings other than the power block (Limerick Learning Center, Graham Leitch Building,Limerick Training Center, Personnel Processing Center, etc.), then actuate a fire alarm pull box ifable, exit the building immediately, and proceed to a safe location. Use Ext. 2911 to notify the ControlRoom of the fire location.

Control of fire loading (wood, solvents, oil) and the disposal of flammable materialsThe following fire protection zones are established:

Combustible Free Zones (CFZ) - an area of the plant in which no combustible material (fixed ortransient) is permitted to be stored or staged unless compensatory actions are in place. At Limerick,orange diagonal lines painted on the floors and/or walls identify these zones.

Transient Combustible Free Zones (TFZ) - an area of the plant in which no transient combustiblematerial is permitted to be stored or staged unless compensatory actions are in place. At Limerick,orange diagonal lines identify these zones.

Page 51


LIMERICK (Continued)

Response to a station fire alarm

Cardox/Halon/HFC-125 systems are designated by postings on the door to the room. An alarm will soundbefore the system is activated. Exit area immediately if alarm sounds or if a wintergreen odor (CardoxSystem) is detected. Initiating these systems may create an immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH)atmosphere.

Additional actions may be required. Ensure you read and understand all signs and postings when working inareas equipped with Cardox/Halon/HFC-125 systems.

Upon hearing a fire alarm in-plant, remain clear of the fire area and follow instructions provided on the plantpublic address system. If a fire alarm sounds in a building other than the power block (Limerick LearningCenter, Graham Leitch Building, Limerick Training Center, Personnel Processing Center, etc.), thenimmediately exit the building and proceed to a safe location.


On-site and off-site assembly areas

If plant accountability is ordered, personnel will report to the following onsite assembly areas:

Location designated in the message broadcast over the PA system.

If a site evacuation is ordered, personnel should follow the instructions given on the plant page announcementfor offsite assembly (directions are available at the plant exit doors from the TSC) and report to theannounced location:

Limerick Airport, or

Phoenixville Service Building

RADIATION WORKER TRAINING

RCA entry points

Limerick - Normal entry points to the RCA are the 41 line and 5th floor Turbine Building.

Page 52


Page 53


NINE MILE POINT

Nine Mile Point Important Phone Numbers

Emergency 911 (From a cellular phone, dial the direct number to theUnit 1 Control Room Supervisor 315-349-5203)

Security 5222Radiation Protection 1092Site Nurse 7963

ENVIRONMENTAL

Effluent Discharge Permit (NPDES/SPDES Permit)

State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permits are used to control plant effluent dischargesfrom Ginna and Nine Mile Point to Lake Ontario.


An unplanned release of chemicals into storm drains, plant floor drains, sanitary systems, or plantsystems could potentially damage effluent systems and/or violate the plant’s NPDES/SPDES permit.Prior approval is required for all effluent discharges.

In accordance with the requirements of its SPDES Permit, only clean water is allowed down drains. Cleanwater is defined as treated water that is acceptable for use in a nuclear reactor. Liquids in the plant thatcontain chemicals (e.g., surface prep solutions, cleaning chemicals, etc.) do not meet the criteria for “cleanwater.”

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION: (See map on next page)

Security Access Points:These are points where you may enter the fenced-in area of the site. To do this, you must pass throughthe Unit 2 Security Building.

Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) and Access Control Points:The RCA has Access Control Points at both Unit 1 and Unit 2. These are the only acceptable entry andexit points to the RCA.

In-Processing Building (P-Building):Handles the in-processing of personnel and houses the following groups: Medical Services, Fitness forDuty, Security Access Unit and General Employee Training.

Owner Controlled Area Buildings:Engineering Services Building, Nuclear Learning Center, Energy Information Center, O-Building,Warehouse and Welding Shop are located in the Owner Controlled Area of NMPNS. All other areasreside within the Protected Area of the site.

Emergency Assembly Areas:Areas located throughout the site in case of an emergency. Every individual on site is responsible forlocating the nearest assembly areas to their normal work location.

Page 54


NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION LAYOUT:

Page 55


OYSTER CREEK

OYSTER CREEK SITE SPECIFIC BADGING

Effective October 2013, Oyster Creek began using a Site Specific requirement associated with theirunescorted access Security badge for individuals who DO NOT have RWT (Radiation Worker Training)NGET.

This Security badge has a solid RED BAR located on the right-hand side of the individual’s picture.Individuals issued these badges are PROHIBITED from entering the RCA (Radiologically Controlled Area)at Oyster Creek. Should you find any individual with this “Red Bar Badge” inside Oyster Creek’s RCA,escort the individual to the closest RCA Exit Point and contact Security immediately at Ext. 4957.

NOTE: You may see this badge at other sites because the individual has unescorted access at multiple plants,but the red bar has no meaning for the rest of the Exelon Fleet stations.


Oyster Creek Important Phone Numbers

Contacting the Control Room:

Use the plant page system or telephone at phone numbers 4911 for emergencies or 4666 for routinecalls.

FIRE PROTECTION


At Oyster Creek, if a fire is discovered off the main site, sound the local alarm (if installed), call the local FireDepartment (1-911) and notify Security at Extension 4954. When you dial 1-911 you will be contacting theControl Room who will notify the local Fire Department.

123456JOSEPH

DOE

SECURITY

012345JANE

DOE

LICENSEE

Page 56


OYSTER CREEK (Continued)

Control of fire loading (wood, solvents, oil) and the disposal of flammable material

The following fire protection zones are established:

Combustible Free Zones (CFZ) - an area of the plant in which no combustible material (fixed ortransient) is permitted to be stored or staged unless compensatory actions are in place. At OysterCreek, signs identify combustible free zones. (OP-AA-201-009)

Transient Combustible Free Zones (TFZ) - an area of the plant in which no transient combustiblematerial is permitted to be stored or staged unless compensatory actions are in place. At OysterCreek, signs identify transient combustible free zones. (OP-AA-201-009)




Miscellaneous

Notify the Control Room of the fire location via the phone or page.


On-site and off-site areas

If plant accountability is ordered, personnel will report to the following on-site assembly areas:

Oyster Creek - Location designated in the message broadcast over the PA system.

If a site evacuation is ordered, personnel will report to the following off-site assembly areas as indicated onthe plant page announcement:

Oyster Creek - Manchester Township High School or the Pinelands Regional High School


RCA entry points

Oyster Creek - Entry points into the RCA are located at the NE corner of the Reactor Bldg.,Bldg. 3/Turbine Bldg. SW entrance and the third floor MOB.

Page 57


OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION

Page 58


PEACH BOTTOM


Peach Bottom Important Phone NumbersContacting the Control Room:

Use the “Emergency Control RM / Fire” pushbutton on the page system or telephone at numbers3911/4911 for emergencies. For routine calls, call 4221.

MiscellaneousAt Peach Bottom, a colored stripe (with the unit number inside) around the wall of the room is used todifferentiate between units.



FIRE PROTECTION


If a fire alarm sounds when in buildings other than the power block (Site Management Building,Administration Building, Training Center, Personnel Processing Center, etc.), exit the building immediatelyand proceed to a safe location.



Combustible Free Zones (CFZ) - an area of the plant in which no combustible material (fixed ortransient) is permitted to be stored or staged unless compensatory actions are in place. At PeachBottom, orange diagonal lines painted on the floors and/or walls identify these zones.

Transient Combustible Free Zones (TCFZ) – An area in the plant where transient combustiblematerial is strictly controlled. All transient combustible material must be either: Constantly attended,contained in closed metal containers with closed metal lids/openings, or have a Transient CombustiblePermit (TCP). Transient Combustible Free Zones are identified in the plant with red painted floorsand are marked “Transient Combustible Free Zone”.

Page 59


PEACH BOTTOM (Continued)

ENVIRONMENTAL

We are committed to containing our radioactive material and preventing pollution of groundwater. PeachBottom has 27 active groundwater monitoring wells installed as an early tritium detection device. Tritium isan isotope of hydrogen that produces very low levels of beta radiation with low health risk, but high publicconcern. The EPA limit for tritium concentration in drinking water is 20,000 picoCuries per Liter (pCi/L).While it occurs naturally, nuclear power generates a significant quantity in the reactor, which is thencirculated throughout the plant systems in steam and water pipes.

OPEX: In April 2015, routine sample results showed that groundwater monitoring wells along the Unit 3Turbine Building contained elevated levels of tritium. The investigation found contaminated water pooling inthe U-3 Turbine Building had seeped into the groundwater through Moisture Separator seams and floorimperfections. The detection of elevated tritium prompted voluntary notifications to regulatory agencies andstakeholders. The source of the leakage was mitigated and corrective actions have been implemented at thestation. Tritium from system leaks has never been detected near the station boundary or in station/publicdrinking water.

Contaminated water pooling on the floor or leaks in the following areas are potential pathways to theenvironment:

Unit 2 and Unit 3 Turbine Building Moisture Separator areas, 116’ Recombiner Building 135’ Unit 2 Condensate, Refuel Water Tank Moat Unit 3 Condensate Tank Moat Torus Dewatering Tank Moat

2015 Peach Bottom Significant Environmental Aspects (SEAs)

Each year, site-wide risks are assessed for Environmental and Business Impacts. The current Peach BottomSEAs are:

Chemical Control Spill Prevention River Stewardship

Page 60



Response to station fire alarm





If plant accountability is ordered, personnel will report to the following on-site assembly areas: Peach Bottom - Location designated in the message broadcast over the PA system.


Peach Bottom - North Sub-Station or the Unit 1 / Training Center


RCA entry points: Peach Bottom - 1st floor of Pearl Building and 4th Floor Administration Building

CONTROL OF HAZARD BARRIER DOORS

All Peach Bottom Hazard Barrier Doors are identified with the following sign.

Hazard Barrier Doors can be Fire, Security, Steam, Flood or Secondary Containment. All Hazard BarrierDoors SHALL be physically verified closed and latched after passing through the door. This is accomplishedby either pushing or pulling on the door to verify it is latched.

In order to adequately verify the security function of a water tight door, the door must be closed, time must beallowed for the security solenoid to engage, the door must be challenged, and then the wheel must be doggedclosed.

Page 61



Blue Light Secondary Containment Doors

Technical Specifications require at least one inner or outer door in each access to the Secondary Containment(Reactor Building) to remain closed; the intent of which is to not breach the Secondary Containment.Simultaneous opening of both an inner and outer Secondary Containment access door causes a local "bluelight" alarm. If this occurs, immediately close either the inner or outer door to restore the SecondaryContainment integrity.

Principles for an Engaged, Thinking Workforce (SOER 10-2)OPEX: CHK-48A SWING ARM / SCAFFOLD INTERFERENCE IR Number: 1680741PEACH BOTTOM

On 7/11/2014, during the U2 A RHR Loop testing, when the 2A RHR pump was secured the torus level began torise. Subsequent investigation found that the 2A RHR check valve swing arm was contacting a horizontalscaffold pole which prevented the check valve from completely closing. Operations closed the valve by pushingthe check valve arm slightly and it slid past the scaffold pole. The position of the scaffold pole did not preventinterference with the check valve arm for the full range of motion.

This scaffold was originally built in February to support the core bore for the U2 RHR cross tie modification.Scaffold has been added to the original build twice to support an area room heater relocation and work associatedwith the RHR cross-tie flow transmitters. Reviews of these moves would not have specifically changed theconfiguration of this particular horizontal pole. Operations waived the post build inspection for the original build.

Engineering performed a walkdown for the original scaffold on 5/6/14 and for the additional attached builds onJune 26th to support 50.59 evaluations for scaffolds erected longer than 90 days. None of these inspectionsidentified that the cross member had the potential to impact the check valve motion.

Two probable causes:

a. The original scaffold or subsequent modifications did not provide appropriate clearance from the checkvalve arm through the full range of motion and it went undetected by the post build inspections. Reviewof the scaffold request form for the later modifications indicates that the post installation walkdowns byoperations were not performed as required. The RHR PVF was run successfully on 4/29/14 after theinitial installation and one modification.

b. The scaffold was modified during the actual work by workers in the field during either the core bore orthe room area heater work and was not precisely placed back in the correct location. Interviews with theindividuals involved with this work will be conducted to determine if any scaffold was disturbed.

Another cause that was considered was that the scaffold moved due to the actual work due to vibration oragitation. This was ruled out due to multiple seismic clamps being utilized by the scaffold.

Page 62



Page 63


QUAD CITIES


Quad Cities Important Phone NumbersEmergency 2211Security 2940Radiation Protection 2753, 2754Site Nurse 4204

Communications

Throughout the plant, there are various locations designated as “Do Not Transmit” or “No Radio Use in ThisArea” zones. These zones are typically signified by orange and white striped areas on the floor, or throughthe use of signage. At Quad Cities Station, cell phones and Blackberries must not be taken into the powerblock or any radio-free zone. Laptop computers must have their wireless capability disabled before enteringthese areas. Additionally, flash devices and digital cameras are not allowed to be used in radio-free zones.

Motorola MTS 2000 radios must be placed in ‘Transmit Inhibit’ mode or turned off priorto entering restricted zones. These radios will transmit automatically when they detectan incoming call if they are not placed in ‘Transmit Inhibit’ mode (see insert). QCOP9000-04, Plant Radio System Operation, details these requirements along with theoperating instructions for the station portable radios.

Utilize Pre-Job Briefs to address issues with radio transmission at the job site and duringtransit. Use Human Performance tools such as STAR, questioning attitude, and the 2-minute drill at the job site.

Miscellaneous

At Quad Cities, a colored stripe (with the unit number inside) around the wall of the room is used todifferentiate between units.

Unit 1 has a Blue stripe


Hazardous Induced Voltages

Due to the location of the transmission lines at Quad Cities station, a heightened awareness is required:

Qualified electrical workers must review work to be performed by unqualified electrical workers, where: Any work that will take place within 70 feet of energized overhead conductors (such as: East of the

Reactor Building where 345KV lines pass overhead). Cranes, booms, lifts or ferrous metal will be operated if used within 50 feet of energized lines. In-plant work will be performed within 30 feet of the main generator, line buildings, isophase bus

ducts or high current bus ducts. Refer to SA-AA-129, Electrical Safety and SA-QC-129-1000; Work in the Vicinity of Exposed

Energized Overhead Lines procedures for further guidance.

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QUAD CITIES (Continued)

SECURITY

Security Access Checkpoint

Quad Cities has a Security Checkpoint for entry into the Owner Controlled Area of the property.

For the safety of our Security Officers and any other individuals in the area, please keep the following pointsin mind while processing through the Checkpoint:

Reduce your speed when approaching the Checkpoint, and be prepared to stop. Roll down your window in order for the Security Officer to address you, and present your

identification badge to the Security Officer. If you drive a vehicle with searchable areas (i.e., truck boxes), you will need to exit your vehicle and

open the area to allow for the search. The Security Officer will advise when you are clear to proceed through the checkpoint. Do not

proceed prior to this verbal clearance. This will ensure that the Officer is in a safe area, away frommoving vehicles.

Security Pre-Access Facility

Prior to entering the Security Gatehouse, all individuals will process through the “Pre-Access Facility” (PAF).During normal business hours, the Visitor/Vehicle Registration Officer (VVRO) is located at the PAF. Allvisitors and vehicles will be processed at this desk. When the VVRO is not posted, individuals who are notbadged will need to call into the gatehouse (using wall phone) Ext. 2943 or 2940.

Security Main Access Facility (MAF)

When entering the MAF entryway (foyer), you will need to remove outer garments and headgear (other thanreligious headgear) that can be removed without going under the feet or over the head prior to entering theExplosive Detector. Place garments into a possessions tub which is stacked on the tables to be put through theX-Ray machine for evaluation. Refer to the sign posted in the foyer for specific items to be removed.Remove any metal you have in your pockets and place in the tub along with any hand carried items. Laptopsmust come out of any carrying case and be run through the x-ray separate from the case. Place yourpossessions tub on the x-ray belt and process through the detectors. Once you have cleared the metal detector,take the possessions tub containing your items from the x-ray belt over to a table to empty the tub. Place theempty tub on a cart where they are stacked.

Safeguards Information

Electronic transfer (fax, e-mail) or development/revision of safeguards information on any network computeris PROHIBITED.

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

The tornado siren is located at the top of the Service Building and is controlled by Security. The siren is awailing tone that rises and falls.

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QUAD CITIES STATIONBELT MANLIFT SAFETY

MANLIFT is restricted to EXELON EMPLOYEE USE ONLY

Humphrey invented the belt manlift in 1887 and over the years new technologies and procedures have beendeveloped to dramatically increase user safety. The OSHA regulations on manlifts can be found in 29 CFR1910.68.

Rules for use:The following are some rules for manliftuse:

Only one rider per step. No tools or other objects of any

kind can be carried (except thosethat can be completely enclosed in apocket or carried in a close fittingtool belt).

Grasp the handhold firmly withboth hands before placing your footon the step.

Step on or off only at floor levels. Do not leap to catch a step that has

passed the floor landing. (Anindividual did fall 23 feet (595’ to572’ elevation), down the manlifthere at Quad Cities Station whenhe stepped down to catch a stepthat had already passed the floorlevel)

Face the belt directly. Keep both feet square on the step. Keep landing spaces open and clear

of any objects that might interferewith employees getting on or off themanlift.

If the manlift stops, be sure everyone using it is in the clear before starting it up again. Report promptly to management any defect or irregularity in the operation of the manlift. Do not use the manlift as a freight-lift.

There are specific inscriptions that must be stenciled on the belt. The following is the approximate wording:Face the Belt, Use the Handholds, To Stop, Pull Rope in Direction of Travel. In addition, a directional arrowpointing in the direction of belt travel must be marked on the belt (above each handhold). Immediately belowthe top floor a sign must be displayed with the following words: "TOP FLOOR - GET OFF". A warning signmust be displayed at the bottom or bottom landing and have the following words: BOTTOM FLOOR - GETOFF. (AT 01165155 05) Remember: The rules are for your safety, so follow them when using the manlift

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FIRE PROTECTION

Cardox and Halon protected areas are designated by postings on the doors to the rooms. An alarm will soundbefore the system is activated. Exit the area immediately if alarm sounds or a wintergreen odor (CardoxSystem) is detected. Initiation of these systems may create an immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH)atmosphere due to oxygen displacement. At Quad Cities Station the Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit ‰ EmergencyDiesel Generator Rooms, the Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit ‰ Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tank Rooms andthe Unit 1 and Unit 2 Generator Exciter Housings (Generator Doghouse) are protected by Cardox Systems.Halon Systems protect the site Telephone Room, the Simulator Main Control Room, the Simulator ComputerRoom, the New Computer Room and the New Records Storage Building. If a Cardox or Halon system isinitiated, contact the site emergency number at 2211.

Upon hearing an in-plant fire alarm, remain clear of the fire area and follow instructions provided by thepublic address system. If a fire alarm sounds in a building other than the power block (Service Building,Professional Learning Center, Outage Support Building, etc.), then immediately exit the building and proceedto a safe location. Do not re-enter the building until notified a safe condition exists. Notification will beprovided by the public address system.

ACTIONS FOR ENTRY INTO ENERGIZED ELECTRICAL PANELS (PM-10-005)

Individuals requiring access to panels will adhere to the following:

All persons shall have permission from an on-shift Operations Supervisor prior to opening any panel.

Operations shall provide a robust challenge to ensure proper precautions against a configurationcontrol event are taken.

Personnel will follow applicable industrial safety requirements when opening panels. Permission shall beobtained from the applicable Unit Supervisor immediately prior to opening the panel.

Individuals shall not break the plane of the open panel without express permission from Operations. TheUnit Supervisor shall be notified when the applicable task is complete and the panel is closed.


RCA Entry Points:Quad Cities – The normal RCA entry / exit point is on the 1st floor Service Building. An additional RCAentry / exit point is at the Unit 2 Turbine Building 595’ and is used during outages.

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Quad Assembly AreasThe Emergency Siren is a 2-minute constant tone over the PA system. Listen and respond to the

announcements. Stay out of affected areas and proceed to the designated assembly areas, if required.CafeteriaSVP/Senior Managers, Human Resources,Business Operations, Operations, Regulatory Assurance,Information Technology (IT), Nuclear Oversight, WorkManagement, Station Laborers, Project Management, SecurityAll others not mentioned

Technical Support Center (TSC):ERO Directors and other TSC personnel currently staffing thefacility

Outage Support Building (OSB) – First FloorConstruction and Contractors

Room 225 (Front-Half):Fuel Handling, Supply (Stores/Procurement), Work PlanningMaintenance Programs, Instrument Maint., Chemistry & CMO

Room 225 (Back-Half):Engineering, OAD/Substation, Records Management

MMD Break Area/Machine Shop:Mechanical Maint., Electrical Maint,Radiation Protection (except Station Laborers)Personnel located in Break Area and currently staffing the OSC

Outage Control Center (OCC):OSC Director, Group Leads and staff located in the OCC andcurrently staffing the OSC

Off-Site Assembly AreasIf a site evacuation is ordered, personnel could report to one of the following off-site relocation areas asindicated on the plant page announcement:

ERO Off-Site Staging Area/Relocation Center14439 Crosby Road (Rt. 78), Morrison, Illinois 61270-9618

or

Byron Station4450 North German Church Road, Byron, Illinois 61010-9794

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Notes:Normally accessible RCAs at Quad Cities are contained within the Turbine Building, Reactor Building, andRadWaste Buildings. Satellite RCAs located inside the protected area are posted as such. Contact RadiationProtection for information if there is a need to enter those areas.

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THREE MILE ISLAND

NUCLEAR POWER STATION OVERVIEWThree Mile Island (TMI) Important Phone Numbers

Contacting the Control Room:

Use the plant page system or telephone phone numbers 8069 or 8071 for routine calls. Foremergencies, use telephone number 5911 to contact the Control Room.

Areas of the station that are controlled by Security including the Owner Controlled Area (OCA),Protected Area (PA), and Vital Areas (VA)

At TMI, an “Exclusion Zone” which is identified with orange colored chains and postings, surrounds the PAfence and is intended to create an isolation or buffer zone between the OCA and PA. No entry into this areais allowed without permission from Security.

FIRE PROTECTION


At TMI, if a fire is discovered off the main site, sound the local alarm (if installed), and notify theControl Room at extension 5911.



Combustible Free Zones (CFZ) - an area of the plant in which no combustible material (fixed ortransient) is permitted to be stored or staged unless compensatory actions are in place. At TMI,signs identify combustible free zones.

Transient Combustible Free Zones (TFZ) - an area of the plant in which no transient combustiblematerial is permitted to be stored or staged unless compensatory actions are in place. At TMI,signs identify transient combustible free zones.




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THREE MILE ISLAND (Continued)

Miscellaneous

At TMI, fire wardens will assist with employee exit in the event of a fire or other emergency in officebuildings outside the plant.

Notify the Control Room of the fire location via the phone or page.



If plant accountability is ordered, personnel will report to the following on-site assembly areas:

TMI - Location designated in the message broadcast over the PA system.


TMI - Training Center or other location designated in the message broadcast over the PA system.


RCA entry points

TMI - Normal entry points to the RCA is the Rad Pro Control point, 305’ elevation of the ControlBuilding.

EVENTS THAT CHANGED THE INDUSTRY (IR #1131916-13)

Core Damaging Loss of Coolant EventMarch 28, 1979 - Three Mile Island 2 (PWR)

This was the worst accident at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant, resulting in the meltdown of half ofthe reactor core and permanent closure of the plant. Although no injuries occurred, public confidence in thenuclear industry was severely shaken. Sweeping changes in emergency planning, operator training,emergency procedures, human factors engineering, regulatory oversight, and a number of other areas were theresult. Nuclear utilities formed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations to promote excellence in utilityoperations of nuclear power plants.

How It All StartedThe accident occurred when an open power-operated relief valve failed to reset during a plant transient, andoperators did not realize it was open. This caused the core to overheat because reactor coolant escapedthrough the open valve. Operators were confused by the many alarms in the control room and took a series ofactions that made plant conditions worse by reducing coolant flow through the core. As the core overheated,the zirconium fuel cladding ruptured and the fuel pellets began to melt.

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THREE MILE ISLAND (Continued)

What Happened

At 4 a.m. on March 28, 1979, the plant experienced a loss of main feedwater during a simple maintenanceactivity while at 100 percent power. Safety systems automatically shut down the main turbine and started theemergency feedwater pumps. However, the emergency feedwater pumps failed to pump water to the steamgenerators because system valves were inadvertently left closed after an earlier test. With no feedwater, thesteam generators eventually stopped removing heat from the reactor, causing the temperature and pressure ofthe reactor coolant to increase, which resulted in the power-operated relief valve opening to relieve pressure.Instead of closing as it should have, the valve remained open. There was no indication of the actual positionof the power-operated relief valve in the control room, so operators did not recognize that it was open. As aresult of the open relief valve, system pressure decreased to the point where the safety injection systemautomatically initiated. Operators erroneously thought the core was covered with coolant because ofpressurizer level, so they drastically reduced injection flow. They did not realize that a steam void had formedin the reactor vessel head, which grew to the point of uncovering fuel. Over half the core melted as a result.The reactor was permanently shut down and defueled, after only three months of operation. Ironically, asimilar event had happened two years earlier at Davis-Besse, except that the open power-operated relief valvewas recognized and closed by operators, stopping the event with no consequences. Weaknesses in industryprograms for sharing information prevented the Three Mile Island operating crews from benefitting from thelessons learned from Davis-Besse.

How This Event Shaped the Nuclear Power Industry

Many plant design and equipment requirements were implemented, including piping systems,auxiliary feedwater systems, containment isolation, and automatic shutdown and accident mitigationcapabilities. The process of implementing the modifications took years.

Public confidence in nuclear power was badly shaken, and support for nuclear projects evaporated.Utilities suspended plans for new nuclear projects, and some plants under construction were notcompleted.

Many improvements in human factors design within the control rooms were made to assist operatorsin diagnostics and discernment.

Operator training was substantially strengthened. Physics, math, and other fundamentals becamerequirements of operator training, and site specific simulators were adopted to further enhance theknowledge and skills of licensed operators.

Symptom-based emergency operating procedures were developed to ensure operators couldeffectively diagnose and respond to emergency and abnormal situations.

Many changes in emergency preparedness standards were made, including prompt regulatornotification of problems.

Substantial changes to regulatory oversight were made, including inspection standards, howperformance is determined, periodic reports, and analysis of vulnerabilities.

The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) was established to promote excellence inoperations and to provide for sharing of lessons.

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Documents

Exelon Common Study Guide - alliedpwr-nuclear.com · STC, KENNETT SQUARE AND CANTERA Important Phone Numbers All Emergencies at STC, Kennett Square and Cantera 911 At Cantera, follow-up