GENERATIONAL CHANGE AND THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

RETURNING TO THE FUTURE

Working Paper

Not to be cited with out the authors’ permission

Winter 2001

Mindy L. KotlerSeth D. Drewry

Daisuke Okuyama

Japan Information Access Project2000 P Street, NW

Suite 620Washington, DC 20036

(202) 822=6040access@jiaponline.org

http://www.jiaponline.org

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the heart of the question of whether there is a generational shift in attitudes toward Japanese foreign policy, is “has Japan changed?” In many respects, yes, but in a number of other critical aspects, no. Japanese values have remained surprisingly stable, though there are hints that traditionalism is returning. Yet the postwar system of nation building, which kept everybody secure and willing to sacrifice, is perceived to have failed. Now, more people are willing to look inward and take risks for individual goals. National goals are secondary and Japanese are reluctant to have their country pursue any collective risks. There is distaste for international commitment and over reliance on the U.S. This is the challenge to U.S. policymakers.

Opinion polls show that the Japanese do not see themselves as world leaders either economically or politically. Deep pessimism surrounds today’s Japan. The Japanese accept that they have limited world power and they expect their future to be no different from the present, if not worse. Withdrawal into the family is a popular reaction. For international policy, this suggests that Japan’s global interests will diminish and politicians will promote strategies closer to Japanese traditional values. Surveys find that the Japanese people want their role in the world to be contributing to international peace and improving the global environment. They see their armed forces mainly engaged in domestic projects such as disaster relief and border defense. Foreign involvements are to be limited and the use of force cosmetic.

Japan’s leadership views do not differ greatly from those of the average citizens. Nor do they differ among generations. Young leaders too feel a loss of world respect, only more deeply than their elders. They worry that Japan’s greatest national security challenge is whether Japan can maintain a healthy security relationship with the United States. They do not want to abrogate the Security Treaty, but they do want to see an “equal” alliance. Calls for an independent or autonomous defense are meant only to distance Japan from pressures of widening U.S. obligations. “Equal” remains undefined; and a strategic doctrine is nonexistent. Efforts to change the Constitution, which have limited public support, are exercises to separate Japan from the United States. The Constitution is viewed as an American-imposed, not Japanese set of rules. Independence, thus, is the desire is to retreat to a safer, more understandable, Japanese past.

Postwar history has defined Japan’s generations. It is not just a story of defeat, reconstruction, and rebirth. It is also one of great successes, continued humiliations, and thwarted expectations. The “Nixon Shocks” in 1971 greatly changed Japan’s picture of the U.S. as a reliable protector or trusted partner. Instead of understanding how Tokyo may have provoked Nixon, Japanese officials pursued an aggressive policy of information gathering and self-reliance. The result is that Japan has widened its defense commitments as circumstances demand and popular will permits, not because the U.S. demanded it.

Much of what is interpreted as generational change is frustration. As Tracy Dahlby, former Tokyo Bureau Chief for Newsweek who is working on a project on how Japan is changing noted, in a December 2001 interview:

There is more openly expressed anger in Japanese society now than at any time in the 30 years I’ve been watching the country. I was surprised by the frankness with which young people spoke out about their parents’ generation, particularly the fathers. They complain that their parents have failed to provide good role models for the kind of world they now face.1

1 Interview with Tracy Dahly, “Hovering Japan: Quiet Revolution or Noisy Evolution,” The Daily Japan Digest, December 5, 2001, 5.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 2

Cosmopolitan elites often express this frustration by “acting like an American”—meaning, combative, argumentative, and opinionated.

What Americans see as a more “assertive” Japan may be merely a misinterpretation of Western conversational style and dispute resolution. It is also a frustration with American views that do not seem to change. The surprising finding garnered from both American public opinion polls and personal interviews is how much Americans believe that Japan is an ally. Even young American elites believe that the U.S. is still the most significant actor in Asia and that its dominant status allows it to be a balancer and guarantor of security. This new generation believes, as their mentors do, that Japan will support the U.S. whether by design or by fait accompli. The Japanese, however, do not universally share this view.

The confident American attitude toward Japan relies on a belief that Japanese elite opinions matter while general public opinion does not. Personal interactions among policy elites and limited surveys appear to support the impression. This view, however, contradicts analysis on “changing Japan” and on Koizumi politics. For Prime Minister Koizumi, the greater public opinion matters most. He, his team, and his supporters are disenchanted with the traditional decision makers and institutions. His constituency is the public, and polls show that they clearly separate his administration from the rest of the LDP and government. As Koizumi policies emerge, it is clear they result from a sophisticated analysis of Japanese public opinion whether it is on politics or national values.

Current elites, including Koizumi, are becoming less reliable representatives of “Koizumi’s Japan.” The Japanese people are moving beyond the cautions and corruptions of their leaders. With new laws and institutions—such as independent nonprofits, freedom of information laws, and posting of administrative guidance—Japan’s democracy is maturing. The danger of too rapidly restructuring Japan’s security relationships is the strain it may put on Japan’s political structure and emerging civil society. Emergency legislation presents opportunities to ignore democracy. Japanese do wonder what the price might have been of the fall 2001 constitutional reinterpretation to expand, albeit temporarily the Japan Self Defense Force’s (JSDF) roles and missions.

It is dangerous for Americans to be seen as tampering with Japan’s incomplete democracy. It is more dangerous to make assumptions of what the Japanese do or do not believe. In November 2001, the annual Yomiuri-Gallup Kyodo poll on U.S.-Japan relations found that 71.6 percent of Americans felt that the relationship was good, in contrast to the 52.6 percent of Japanese who felt the same.2 Pressures to amend the Constitution, to commit Japan to new international obligations, or to expect international cooperation are resented.

In examining Japanese public opinion, it is clear that shared contemporary historical experience and interpretation of these experiences are what unite Japan’s generations. Their differences are more in tone than substance. There is also an increased willingness (maybe familiarity) by the younger generations to use the tools of modern democracy or civil society. There is no hint that the Japanese are becoming more “American” or even more willing to follow U.S. foreign policies. Indeed, the true fissure found in interviews and polls is that the differences between Japan’s generations are not so great as they are between Japanese and American colleagues, of all generations.

2 Yoron Chousa Ni Miru Nichi-Bei Kankei: Yomiuri-Gallup Kyodo Chousa 24 Nen. [Public Opinion Poll on US-Japan Relations: The 24th Yomiuri-Gallup-Kyodo Poll, November 2001]. Data collected by phone interviews during October and November 2001.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 3

PREFACE

Public, private, and personal resources were all used in this monograph’s research. Information was not used unless it could be verified and documented. As this policy research document is targeted to US audience, the Japanese names are in their Western form, with the family name last. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States is referred to as 9/11.

The majority of the public opinion survey data were obtained from Japanese government sources. The Management and Coordination Agency (MCA) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) commissioned many surveys. The MCA was a statistics and research group under the Office of the Prime Minister. After January 6, 2001 MCA was merged into the newly established Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) as the Statistics Bureau and the Statistics Center. The EPA after January 6th, became the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) as one of the institutions belonging to the Cabinet Office (CAO). Surveys used: The 6th (1998) and 7th

(2001) survey of The Japanese Youth In Comparison with the Youth in the World (MCA, CAO); White Paper on the National Lifestyle 2000 (EPA), National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences 1995 (EPA), Second Basic Survey on Youth’s Life and Opinion, November 2001 (CAO), Public Poll on Foreign Relations 2000 (CAO), Japan Defense Agency’s Public Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues, Japanese National Character Survey by the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Statistical Mathematics, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 2001 US Poll on Opinions toward Japan.

News organizations also provide important survey information. The publications used include the Yomiuri Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun in collaboration with the Gallup Organization, Asahi Shimbun, Nikkei, Sankei, NHK’s Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, JiJi Press, and Kyodo News. Surveys from advertising and public relations provided an additional perspective. They are The Comparative Analysis of Global Values by the Denstu Institute for Human Studies and various surveys on Japanese youth attitudes and Asian consumers by the advertising firm, Hakuhodo, Inc. Harris Interactive, a worldwide market research and consulting firm, and the Gallup organization presented data on American opinions about the world.

Surveys from research centers came from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1999) and Potomac Associates (Americans Look at Asia: A Potomac Associates Policy Perspective). Also used was the Report on Security Issues of a January 1997 Survey of Members by the Keizai Doyukai [Japan Association of Corporate Executives].

The interviews with “policy elites” were conducted by CSIS (A Washington think tank) research assistants, Mr. Glen Baek and Ms. Alice Brennan. In August and September 2001, Ms. Brennan conducted ten interviews with senior and younger U.S. foreign policy opinion leaders. In November 2000, Mr. Baek interviewed ten younger members of Japan’s foreign policy community. The definition of “elites” for these interviews, however, was the personal judgment of these researchers. Most of those interviewed were staff, researchers or donors at CSIS; many of the Japanese interviewed were resident in Washington, DC, and nearly all were personal friends of the researchers. More current, impartial observations on Japan were gathered from both American and Japanese newspapers and magazines as well as the Japan Forum, an E-mail newsgroup for Japan experts moderated by The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and funded by the Japan-US Friendship Commission. The Commission has been on the forefront of promoting rigorous policy research on Japan.

The Japan Poll (J-Poll) site at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research was also used. Unfortunately this extremely valuable and critical site for analyzing U.S.-Japan attitudes J-Poll is no longer funded and has not been updated since January 2000. Another U.S. resource for Japanese documents and surveys was the Japan Documentation Center at the Library of Congress. Sadly, this Center was also closed in 2000

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 4

and new documents are not available. For issue analysis and historic reference, the excellent reporting and monographs from the Japan Economic Institute (JEI, Washington) were used. JEI, long a starting point for every American scholar, was closed in 2000. All these organizations received support from the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

As this monograph shows, the unfettered access to critical information provided by these organizations was remarkable and invaluable. For newer information, this monograph’s researchers had to return to the traditional methods of Japanese information gathering that entailed requests to Japanese government and private sector officials. The return to private contacts and elites runs contrary to the new Japanese focus on democratic access to information and foreign policy openness.

Other institutions utilized were the Georgetown University Library, the University of Virginia Library, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation Library in Washington, DC. The latter is a good, public source of current information on Japan. Again, budget cuts have reduced the Library’s acquisition of Japanese government documents important to the Washington Japan research community. It is our hope that the Sasakawa Peace Foundation will reevaluate its decision to reduce the Library’s acquisitions and enhance its Japanese public policy resources to make up for the losses of J-Poll, JDC, and JEI. This move would do much to widen American understanding of Japan.

This monograph introduces the issue of whether or not Japan’s foreign policymakers have changed their perspectives on national security policy. It is not a scientific analysis and lacks much of the necessary empirical data for a more rigorous, scholarly analysis of the subject. Japanese surveys are difficult to use. The public documents of the surveys are summaries and often do not report critical detailed data on responses and age differences. Often the “neutral” response of “somewhat” is lumped together with the “yes or agree” response. Rare is a summary that also differentiates between “agree strongly and agree.” Respondents among groups (cells), especially among age groups tend to be uneven with the late to middle-aged group holding the greatest number of respondents. Thus, it is tricky to analyze rigorously shifts in opinion. Unfortunately, a number of scholarly articles accept and use the aggregate numbers.

A future project would include larger and more detailed data sets, more personal interviews and analysis by Japan scholars knowledgeable about politics, security, survey research, sociology, history, and linguistics. To better understand U.S.-Japan security relations a need exists to compare societal change with political evolution. Japanese security policy is no longer the purview of a few elites. Most important, additional research is necessary into the meaning and analysis of Japanese public opinion.

A special thanks needs to be given to Mr. Gaku Shibata and Mr. Akinori Uchida, both Washington political correspondents for the Yomiuri Shimbun with their help in obtaining the Yomiuri-Gallup polls. The efforts by Mrs. Akiko Sagano of the Embassy of Japan and Mr. Motoyuki Nakanishi of the Washington Office of Japan Defense Agency have been especially appreciated. Dr. James Marshall of the State Department, the single best analyst on Japanese public opinion, also provided his wisdom and advice with this project. Dr. Yoshiyuki Sakamoto, director of the Study of the Japanese Character of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, and Professor Yasumasa Kuroda of the University of Hawaii at Manoa were both kind and patient in providing critical surveys and analysis. Ms. Angela Stravolopos, a research assistant at The Brookings Institution, and Ms. Misa Imanaka-Miller, Chief Librarian of Sasakawa Peace Foundation Library, graciously helped the Japan Information Access Project obtain prompt access to journals and books. The Japan Information Access Project is extremely grateful for their help and insight.

The primary research and writing was by the director of the Japan Information Access Project, Mindy L. Kotler, in November and December 2001. The Japan Information Access Project (www.jiaponline.org) is a nonprofit research center that studies security, technology and public policy in Japan and Northeast

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 5

Asia. Assisting Ms. Kotler were Japan Project research associates, Mr. Seth Drewry, Mr. Daisuke Okuyama, and Ms. Reyko Huang. Mr. Okuyama did most of the translations and worked on the graphs with Mr. Drewry. Professor Mark Tilton, JIAP board member, assisted with the final editing of the report. Ms. Kotler would like to offer a special thanks to her family who tolerated her absences during the American Thanksgiving holiday weekend and the Christmas holiday season.

May 2002

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 6

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 7

GENERATIONAL CHANGE AND THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

RETURNING TO THE FUTURE

Japan’s policy officials and opinion leaders are more willing to voice openly their reservations about U.S. foreign economic and security policies. Japanese negotiators do not hesitate to say no, politicians plainly question American intentions, and commentators across the spectrum now call the United States “arrogant” and “overbearing.” Some attribute this new assertiveness to a maturation of Japanese politics and democracy; others believe it reflects an important generational change. No matter its source, Washington’s policy community discerns a change of attitude and anticipates less cooperation from Japan in implementing U.S. regional security plans.3

The new assertiveness is not usually attributed to the current leadership generation. These are men who currently work with their American colleagues to keep the Japan-U.S. security relationship intact. Now, in their 50s, 60s, and 70s, some lived through the war and all experienced its aftermath. It is reasoned that they are patient, compromising, and indebted to their American colleagues. These conclusions are an overstatement. It ignores the fact that this generation built Japan into an economic power and wants to see it respected. Pre-war, Japan ranked among the greatest economies and militaries in the world. This leadership generation is the one that has initiated the re-thinking of Japan-U.S. relations and that has long harbored a desire to equalize the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. They are the generation that changed.

The Next GenerationThe next leadership “generation” has simply inherited the goals and ideals of their elders. Circumstance and greater internationalization encourage them to reach these political aspirations as soon possible. They want to actualize what was long discussed. They want the respect of their American colleagues. This generation is loosely defined as those Japanese born after the end of World War II and soon to assume leadership positions. They are over 30, but no older than in their early 50s by 2001. This generation appears indifferent to World War II and its aftermath, comfortable with their lifestyle and social freedoms, and are said to feel little sense of debt to the United States for their prosperity.

The younger generation also sees its elders as acquiescing to American demands out of obligation, not national interest. They seem more interested now in kokueki (national interests) than in giri (obligation).4

Although opinion polls show that they are interested in constitutional revision, revising Article 9 (the no-war clause) is not among their first concerns. As a young Diet member noted, his generation thinks of itself as “standing on an equal footing with people of other advanced countries, including the United States” and is “ready to say what it thinks and stand for what it believes in.” 5 These observations cause many to conclude that the next generation of Japanese leaders will be more inward looking, wary of U.S. intentions, and less willing to accept pressure from Washington. In many respects, they are more like their grandparents than their parents.

3 See Zalmay Khalilzad, United States and Asia: Toward A New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, (Santa Monica, CA: 2001) and Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad, Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security, (Santa Monica, CA: 2001) and Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001).4 Awanohara, Susumu. “Japanese Attitudes and Approaches Toward US Policies and Presence in the Region,” in East Asia and the United States: Current Status and Five Year Outlook, Conference Report, December 2, 1999. (National Intelligence Council and Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: April 2000), 15.5 Motohisa Furukawa (Democratic Party Diet member from Aichi, 2nd District) talking points to the MIT Japan Program Symposium "Generational Changes and Leadership in Contemporary Japan" June 14 2001, International House, Tokyo, Japan. Furukawa’s private paper given to the Japan Information Access Project.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 8

This “new” Japan has U.S. defense planners wondering if Japan’s increased “willingness to contemplate the use of military force is occurring within the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance or as a step toward breaking free of the alliance.”6 Advisers to President-elect George W. Bush urged him to take this opportunity of a changing Japan to “consider encouraging it [Japan] gradually to revise its constitution to allow the right of collective self-defense, to expand its security horizon beyond territorial defense, and to acquire appropriate capabilities for supporting coalition operations.”7 The “Armitage Report,” recognized by the Japanese as a blueprint for Bush Administration U.S.-Japan security relations, found that “the key to sustaining and enhancing the [U.S.-Japan] alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan.” 8 Otherwise, Japan will become a less reliable ally.

What Accounts For Change?What accounts for these changing attitudes toward the United States? Are they really changes? And is this new generation of leaders really different from their elders? A more independent and assertive Japan, however, may be less a factor of generations than of political evolution and situation. Generational differences are likely to mirror simply a process that has long been in the works. The new generation, more cosmopolitan and familiar with the world, may be reflecting the trends as opposed to creating them. Anecdotal evidence reflects a greater willingness among Japanese leaders to take positions independent of the U.S. At the same time, surveys of Japanese values by the government show a growing conservatism within the younger generations. Maintaining the “status quo” is the common survey response to questions on national security.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is a shrewd interpreter of public opinion and the new role it plays in Japanese politics. His response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States demonstrates how well he understands the mood of the Japanese people. Koizumi knows that he can make changes to Japan’s foreign policy within the limits of popular opinion. He seizes opportunities from current events to affect change. Only cautiously can he stray from what the public wants and understands.

Generational change will be what Japan’s leadership translates it to be and how events shape it. The gaps between generations are not as large as they first appear. The greater divide remains between what Americans and Japanese believe is Japan’s role in the world. Koizumi knows to appeal to national identity, limited foreign relations, restrained use of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, and rescuing the global environment. He is the new generation because he is willing to speak out for what Japan wants. A danger exists when the American policy community does not recognize Japan’s quest for independence or understands the circumstances behind these desires.

DEFINING GENERATIONS

Much of the change in Japanese security policy is attributed to generational change. The younger leadership generation is no longer burdened by history. Yet, few understand exactly when Japan’s generations begin and end. Before a discussion of differences between generations, it is important to first define what these generations are. Identifying distinct contemporary Japanese generations is difficult. Definitions and age boundaries vary among scholars.

6 Khalilzad, 13.7 Carlucci, 30.8 National Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership [best know as “The Armitage Report”], October 2000. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html, 1.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 9

The Postwar GenerationGenerally, scholars define generations as changing every 25 years. Each generation understands its history in a different way. Judging continuity of attitudes and what is uniquely a product of the postwar [sengo] period is too a subject of controversy.9 Japan has used 1945 as a divide between their old and new country—imperial, nationalistic and militaristic vs. democratic, peaceful and prosperous. This sharp break with the past created a “myth” of a new beginning. It artificially divides Japan’s history and generations.

Historians have found that:

Most countries ceased to speak of themselves as “postwar” in the domestic sense by the late 1950s and became instead “contemporary.” Japan’s “long postwar” was as distinctive as it was anachronistic. One might argue that the name continued out of habit, awaiting a momentous event to end it….more likely, however, there was a reason the public memory clung to the postwar. The founding myth of the new Japan, the mythistorical beginning in 1945, was in part responsible….Clinging to the postwar expressed contentment with the status quo. 10

This view of maintaining the new status quo carries over generations on political and security issues, such as revising the “peace constitution.” The Japanese public has come to associate the 1947 Constitution with Japan’s 1945 beginning and prosperity. Popular views of the Constitution repeatedly note, “Things are fine the way they are [genji no mama de yoi].”11

Generational MarkersGenerational change in Japan coincides with great postwar political readjustments, both domestically and internationally. Thus, the simplest way to separate the postwar generations is into two categories. The first are those whose formative years were during and directly after World War II. As of 2000, the members are over 50 and currently in leadership positions. Sometimes this group is referred to as the Showa generation, named after the reign of Emperor Hirohito (1926-1989). The second group is those under 50 in 2000 whose worldview was shaped by Japan’s economic miracle and prosperity. This generation is expected to be in senior leadership positions over the next 10 years. Following the imperial eras, this is the Heisei generation named after the current Emperor Akihito’s reign that began in 1989.

This rough separation by imperial eras misses many social and historical nuances. Imperial eras, lasting over 60 years or less than 11 years, do not capture generational change. They are simply political divides, at best. Scholars rather separate the generations by focusing on each group’s formative years. A generation is considered to have formed its worldview from events that happened between the ages of 8 to 23. Thus, those individuals in 2000, aged between 50 and 70, now in leadership positions, have as their formative period the 1940s through the early 1960s. Those in 2000 aged between 30-50, the upcoming leadership, use the mid-1960s through 1990 as their reference point. Today’s teens and twenty-somethings have experienced the late 1980s and the 1990s with Japan’s growing international responsibilities, the bubble economy, political uncertainties, and the “lost decade.”

Three Postwar Groups9 See Carol Gluck, “The ‘End’ of Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium,” Public Culture 10:1 (Fall 1997), 1-23.10 Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” in Andrew Gordon, Editor, Postwar Japan As History, (Berkely: U of California Press, 1993), 93.11 Ibid.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 10

The above categories represent roughly the three postwar groups identified by University of Michigan professor John Campbell and by NHK [Japan’s state owned broadcaster]. Dr. Campbell finds four important political generations in Japan. They are: “those who were in their teens and earlier twenties in the pre-war, war/immediate post-war, later post-war, and post-1976 (post-Lockheed scandal) periods. The formative experiences of each of these groups were significantly different—war, occupation, the high-growth era, and the political scandals that began with the 1976 Lockheed affair. 12 NHK simply identifies the generations as the prewar and wartime (born before 1938), postwar (born 1938-1958), and no-war (born after 1959).13

Generally, however, Japanese survey organizations do not make sophisticated generational separations and often do not poll by age group. Although many surveys do record results by age categories, these results are rarely reported publicly. Thus it is easier to observe general trends than to track each generation’s attitudes toward social values and foreign policy.

The Media in Shaping OpinionReviewing the influences upon Japanese generational attitudes would be incomplete without reference to Japan’s media. The Japanese rely on their media to interpret international events. Surveys find that the media have become the primary and most trusted source of information for Japanese. The leading newspapers have the highest circulation in world--Yomiuri and Asahi both reaching over 8 million people.14 As the media increasingly expose corruption, mismanagement, and government deceptions, voters have come to rely on the press to support their already low opinion of politicians and desire for change.

Media as TrustworthyA more spirited media, especially on TV, complement the new electoral and administrative reforms that now empower individual politicians and the prime minister. A Yomiuri-Gallup Poll taken December 22-25, 2000 asking voters “which entity do you trust,” the highest was 42.4 percent for newspapers. TV was trusted 23.5 percent while the prime minister was trusted only 6.1 percent and the central government 8.4 percent.15 These figures decline slightly after 9/11with newspapers remaining the most trustworthy at 37.1 percent, but the prime minister rising to 31.5 percent.16

The dramatic rise of independent voters, from 10 percent in 1960 to nearly 50 percent in 2001 (over 50 percent under 40, over 30 percent between 40 and 60, and almost 25 percent over 60) further confirms greater reliance on the media.17 The July 2001 Upper House elections were particularly illustrative of the power of the media in public opinion. The advertising firm Hakuhodo asked in an August 2001 telephone 12 John Cambell and Karen Cox, “Generational Change or Periodic Fluctuation? Age and Political Attitudes in the US and Japan,” Paper presented to the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 31-September 3, 2001, Unpublished manuscript, 7.13 Tetsuo Makita, “Saki no senso to Sedai Gyuppu” [Recent Wars and the Generation Gap], (Buken Yoron Chosa Failu No. 1 [Broadcasting Culture Research Institute Public Opinion File #1], September 2000), http://nhk.or.jp/bunken/NL/n027-yo.html.14 Foreign Ministry of Japan. International Comparison of Major Newspaper Circulation, 1995. http://www.jinjapan.org/stat/stats/17MDA12.html 15 Yomiuri-Gallup Poll, Yomiuri, January 18, 2001, 30, [US Embassy Translation]. Poll taken 12/15-22/00 of voters over 18 in a random sampling of telephone interviews. 1,113 respondents.16 “Yomiuri-Gallup Poll: Japan, US Show Increase in Favorable Image of Bilateral relationship,” Yoimuri, November 30, 2001, 26. [US Embassy Translation] Survey October 27-November 12 of 1,010 voters by telephone interviews.17 See the work of Waseda University Professor Aiji Tanaka for analysis of the Japan’s independent voter. Aiji Tanaka, The Rise of the Independent Voter in Japan, Paper presented to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, “Leaders as Followers: Undercurrents in Japanese Politics” November 13, 2001. http://wwics.si.edu/asia/reports/2001/jpnpol.htm

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 11

poll of mainly younger Japanese (30 and under) how much more they paid attention to the politics sections of the mass media on TV, newspapers, and magazines. The results were (Figure 1):

Figure 1I now watch more politics-related TV programming 50.0%

I now read more politics-related newspaper articles 32.9%

I now read more politics-related magazine articles 27.2%

Hakuhodo concluded that television is now the predominant source of political information. They found that this trend was particularly noticeable among women, with the data showing a preference among females for TV and magazines, while males preferred newspapers.18

Media as InfluentialInterestingly, the public responded to the media in a negative way during the June 2000 lower elections. A NHK survey found that disillusioned voters, annoyed with media predictions that the LDP would win, purposely voted against LDP candidates.19 Also significant is that the media is increasingly the resource for history. For example, a NHK survey on Japanese historical memory of “recent wars” (those that took place between the Manchurian Incident and the end of World War II, 1931-1945) found that the postwar generations relied most on TV and textbooks for information while the pre-war generation on personal contacts/experience and newspapers.20

To those working on U.S.-Japan relations, the Japanese public seems overly influenced by the media. Japan’s new politics of populism with weakened political parties and scrutinized bureaucrats responds to public opinion. The use of the media, especially TV, for expressing popular instead of elite opinions is new to both Japanese and American foreign policy professionals. Public opinion does matter in determining Japanese foreign and security policies, and the prime minister’s office has learned to watch carefully opinion polls. Political observers find that “the media has played an ever larger role in amplifying the external shocks and pressures the Japanese system has felt since the end of the Cold War. This growing influence on foreign policymaking has everything to do with the unbundling of the 1955 system and the fluidity in Japanese politics.”21

HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF GENERATIONS

Changes in Japanese foreign policy are often attributed to reactions to specific events. Events do matter in analyzing public awareness of Japan’s international place in the world. The Japanese people tend to be reactive, situational, and holders of long grudges. The annual Yomiuri-Gallup Polls on US-Japan relations always map public opinion along a timeline (See Appendix I). The editors, like Japanese politicians, believe that historical events substantially affect Japanese views. Changes in attitudes, even temporary, can provide opportunities for politicians. Depending on how deeply these events affect Japanese core values, history can also affect Japan’s generational attitudes.

18 Hakuhodo, “Keitai” e-Democracy Survey (Preliminary Results), Press Release, 8/27/01.19 Bukun, Voters Decide on Candidates Just Before the Election, (Buken Yoron Chosa Failu No. 6 [Broadcasting Culture Research Institute Public Opinion File #6], September 2000), NHK http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/NL/n030-yo.html.20. Ibid.21 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, 69.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 12

Generational, Periodic or Life Cycle?In analyzing public opinion, therefore, it is important to consider whether reactions are generational, periodic, or life cyclical. The generational effect suggests that each group is shaped by the events of their generation’s formative years that take place between 8 and 23 years of age. The life-cycle effect finds that people change attitudes as they age; and the “period effect” refers to some change in the environment that affects people’s attitudes or behavior regardless of their age. Each Japanese generation’s perception of history and of what is historic is often more important than what actually happened. Significant shifts in Japanese public opinion can be graphed alongside important events such as the return of Okinawa, the Ron-Yasu relationship, the Gulf War, and the 1995 rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl. Often the shifts are temporary.

University of Michigan Professor John Campbell, whose research is the newest in the field, has found that the generational effect on public opinion is the most important in Japan. He observes that “people born around the same time grow up hearing and reading the same things and experience the same formative events. With respect to politics, there is evidence that they will take on relatively durable attitudes and behavioral patterns at around the time they become politically aware, perhaps in their late teens, and so the ideas and habits [and history] that are prevalent at that age often influence them for a lifetime.”22

Historical Generations DefinedEvery one of the three broadly defined generations identified above has significant historical markers. International events as well as domestic political and economic interactions have combined to capture Japan’s national imagination. Generational history must also allow for overlapping historical memories. Thus, when identifying Japanese generations one must take into account both age and history. Good designations for contemporary Japanese generations reflect cultural and political trends: Leadership Generation: “Embracing Defeat (1940-1970),” Nearing Leadership: “Japan: Asia’s New Giant (1960-1990);” and Anticipating Leadership: “A Japan That Can Say No (1990-2020).” The book titles that these “eras” have borrowed their names from have themselves become historical place markers. Below these generations will be simply referred to as the “Old,” the “New,” and the “Really New.”

What is History?What is history to these generations is not always obvious. A comparison among them of historical knowledge was done by NHK in May 2000.23 NHK surveyed 2000 Japanese citizens from the prewar and wartime (born before 1938), postwar (born 1938-1958), and no-war (born after 1959) generations about their knowledge of “recent wars,” which meant the Manchurian Incident to the end of WWII (1931-1945). Four historical and four viewpoint questions were asked. Although the survey found that the no-war generation had a limited knowledge of the “recent wars,” they were significantly more willing than their elders to take responsibility for the war onto themselves and to believe that the war was avoidable.

Questioned whether “those born after the war hold any responsibility for the consequences of Japan’s wartime actions,” overall 50 percent answered yes, 27 percent answered not necessarily, and 5 percent answered not at all. Sixty percent of the no-war generation, however, answered yes while only 37 percent of the wartime generation agreed. The oldest generation was also more willing to agree that “Was the war inevitable given the Japan’s scarcity of resources.” A third of each generation simply did not know, while those answering yes were 41 percent of the wartime group, 30 percent of the postwar group, and 20 percent of the no war group. For the latter group, although muddled on the facts, they did seem to take away the message of the “recent wars” better than their elders.

22 Campbell, 3.23 Ibid.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 13

The history questions NHK asked were: 1) Against which country did Japan fight the longest; 2) What country was Japan’s Wartime Ally; 3) What was the day of the Pearl Harbor Attack; and 4) What was the day marking the end of the war. Seventy-eight percent of the no-war, 65 percent of the postwar, and 46 percent of the wartime generation did not know the day when WWII began (December 8) (See Figure 2).

Figure 2

Leadership Generation: Embracing Defeat (1940-1970)24

For the generation currently in senior leadership positions (aged 50-70), their formative years were during and directly after World War II. They experienced firsthand the defeat and rebuilding of Japan. They helped recast Japan from an imperial power to establish a solid foundation for reestablishing Japan as a credible and significant world power. The movies of this generation were the anti-nuclear Godzilla (1954) and Kurasawa’s Rashomon (1950), a story of varied truths,25 and The Seven Samurai (1954) about revenge, sacrifice, and self-reliance. Most important, this generation grew up understanding great success, apocalyptic failure, hard work, and sacrifice. The “Old” Generation embraced empire as well as defeat.

Saving HumanityTheir memories did not begin and end in 1945. Yet they were crystallized by Emperor Hirohito’s radio address ending the war. They never heard from him that Japan had surrendered nor was defeated. Instead, Hirohito simply observed that the war “did not turn in Japan’s favor, and trends of the world were not advantageous to us.” The Emperor asked his subjects to “endure the unendurable and bear the unbearable.” As John Dower notes, “he then went on to present Japan’s decision to capitulate as nothing less than a magnanimous act that might save humanity itself from annihilation by an atrocious adversary.” “The enemy has for the first time used cruel bombs to kill and maim extremely large numbers of the innocent….to continue the war further would lead in the end not only to the extermination of our race, but also to the destruction of all human civilization.” By accepting Allied demands, the Emperor said it was

24 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, (New York: WW Norton, 1999).25 Some scholars have coined the term “Rashomonesque Yamazakura” as a sociological model that explains enduring Japanese cultural traits, such as situational ethics/viewpoints and lack of absolutes. See: Chapter 2, “Rashomonesque Yamazakura Ambiguous Language Model of Japanese Culture” in Chikio Hayashi and Yasumasa Kuroda, Japanese Culture in Comparative Perspective, (Westport: Praeger, 1997).

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 14

his purpose to “open the way for a great peace for thousands of generations to come.” 26 In other words, despite this setback, Japan will return as a great power.

Yoshida DoctrineJapan’s current leaders are the inheritors of the Yoshida Doctrine to secure economic prosperity by leaving security matters to the United States. Holding back on defense issues was also a politically sensible course. Both the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the 1960 Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security were met by bitter debates, even riots over the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The anti-American 1960 demonstrations caused the cancellation of President Eisenhower’s trip to Japan. Politicians’ efforts during the 1950s to suggest constitutional revision and a more independent foreign and defense policy [jishuboei] failed.27 Defense policy and the U.S. security arrangement was the central rift in domestic politics. Thus the politically safe emphasis for Japan’s leaders was to follow the consensus on economic recovery.

This generation is patient and wants to maintain the status quo while repairing Japan’s political and economic prestige. They are also wary of leaving political issues up to the public to decide. Intense right and left wing confrontations with the government propelled the establishment of the “1955” political system, which stabilized political succession essentially within one conservative party, the Liberal Democrats. While they harbor a sense of debt to the United States for reconstruction, it is a wary one. After all the Americans did use nuclear bombs on Japan and the U.S. maintains a considerable military presence on Japan. Most privately believe that the War was one between Japan and the Western powers. Yet, they are realistic and know that a time will come, without antagonizing the U.S., when Japan can slip smoothly out of America’s embrace.

Attitudes Toward the United StatesA good review of this generation’s elite attitudes toward the United States can be found in a 1983 dialogue among retired Japanese ambassadors Hiroshi Kitamura, Ryohei Murata, and Hisahiko Okazaki. 28

Ambassador Murata (ambassador to the U.S. from 1989-1992), noted that Americans are “self-centered” and suffer from a “superiority complex” that makes them always ready to “blame the other guy.” He also believed that “it is inevitable for Americans to view with a certain amount of alarm a non-white nation rapidly overtaking them” in economic or technological matters.29

Noting the increase in trade friction and American pressure on Japan to expand its share of its defense, Murata observed that: “…economic friction alone is [not] capable of undermining the Japan-U.S. relationship. It could, however, become a political problem if the United States were to decide that Japan is not bearing its share of defense costs.” He, as the other ambassadors, felt that “The maintenance of a sound defense relationship with the United States is thus a means of minimizing the friction that inevitably arise over economics issues. I would go so far as to say that defense is the only potential political problem between Japan and the United States.” The security issue with the U.S. was perceived as a way to deflect attention away from economic matters.

26 Ibid., 36.27 For a good discussion of the concept of jishuboei see: Kiyoshi Sugawa (DPJ) “Nakasone’s Jishoboei: Limits of Autonomy: (1970-1971, paper presented to the Economic Strategy Institute conference “Japan and the U.S. Reconsidered: Evolution of Security and Economic Choices Since 1960,” October 24, 2001. Unpublished.)28 Hiroshi Kitamura, Ryohei Murata, and Hisahiko Okazaki, Between Friends: Japanese Diplomats Look at Japan-U.S. Relations, trans. Daniel R. Zoll, (New York: Weatherhill, 1985). The US-Japan Foundation translated the book, first published in Japanese. See also, Fred Hiatt, “Japan’s Soon-to-be Ambassador to U.S. once called Americans ‘Self-Centered,” Washington Post, November 29, 1989, A29.29 John Hiatt, “Japan’s Soon-to-Be Ambassador to U.S. Once Called Americans ‘Self-Centered’,” Washington Post, November 29, 1989, A29.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 15

Nearing Leadership: Japan: Asia’s New Giant30 (1960-1990)

History has different disappointments for the “New” generation that is coming to power. They were stunned and humbled by a series of surprise political and economic moves in the early 1970s by the Nixon Administration. The 1970s began with a great feeling of confidence. The Japanese economy was easily the most dynamic in Asia and the U.S.-Japan security system was stabilizing. The prestigious Washington think tank, The Brookings Institution, began research on a seminal study, Asia's New Giant--How the Japanese Economy Works, highlighting Japan’s growing economic power. Discussions were underway for the reversion of Okinawa back to Japan, U.S. détente with Japan’s greatest enemy, the USSR was beginning, and the Vietnam War was coming to a head.

The Nixon ShocksThe economic and foreign policies of U.S. President Richard Nixon, viewed as the “Nixon Shocks” in Japan, firmly established the question of how reliable an ally the United States really was for Japan. The “Nixon Shocks”31 were a series of unexpected and unwelcome policies that began with Nixon’s “Guam Doctrine” in 1969 stating that America’s Asian allies need to assume primary responsibility for their own defense and was continued through to his forced resignation in 1974—a surprising event to the Japanese.32

Generally, the “Nixon Shocks” refer to events the summer of 1971. On July 15, 1971 the White House announced that the President would visit China to normalize relations. On August 15, 1971, Nixon announced end of the Bretton Woods System, abandoning the dollar’s linkage with gold and declared a state of economic emergency, imposing a 10 percent surcharge on all imports. Japan, neither formally nor through their American contacts, was consulted nor forewarned of any of these dramatic changes.

Most humbling to Japan, was that the state of emergency enabled Peter G. Peterson, then Nixon’s White House international economics adviser to forcibly resolve the increasingly bitter textile dispute between the U.S. and Japan.33 Peterson resurrected the 1917 “Trading with the Enemy Act” that allows the President during a state of emergency to “regulate…any…importation or exportation of…any property in which any foreign country or national has any interest.”34 This provided the President the legal cover to impose textile quotas and thus settle the long simmering textile dispute. The August 15 announcements were considered an international diplomatic humiliation. It “was a watershed event in U.S.-Japanese relations, throwing into question the basic structure of the postwar economic world just as Nixon’s opening toward China has shaken the world political structure.”35

Anti-AmericanismThese events combined with energy and food security crises in 1973. That year witnessed the first OPEC oil cutbacks and a U.S. embargo of oilseeds shipments (soybeans) to all foreign markets to stabilize

30 See, Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, editors, Asia's New Giant--How the Japanese Economy Works, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1976).31 Traditionally, the “Nixon Shocks” are simply the opening to China and the end of the Bretton Woods system. Practically, the “shocks” were greater than those two events covering a range of economic and diplomatic policies that questioned the nature of the US-Japan working relationship. 32 For an interesting history and account of misperceptions of this period through the eyes of the Japanese diplomat, see: Hisahiko Okazaki Oral History Interview Conducted by Akihiro Tanaka (University of Tokyo) Makoto Iokibe and Koji Murata, December 18, 1995. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/okazakiohinterview.htm 33 For the best account of the politics and history of the 1969-71 US-Japan textile dispute, see, I.M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato, The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).34 Ibid., 293.35 Ibid., 291.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 16

domestic prices. These embargoes had a strong psychological impact upon the Japanese who now understood, first hand, Japan’s potential vulnerability to world market conditions.36 In all, “[f]or many Japanese, such designedly unhelpful treatment of their country, in the midst of U.S. policy changes so deeply affecting Japanese interests, threw into doubt the very dependability of the U.S. Japan alliance. It shook their long-held assumption that the Americans would give due consideration and protection to Japanese interests in their world policy decisions.”37 Or as Ambassador Okazaki, who is now one of the important informal spokesmen for the Foreign Minister, told two young Japanese historians about his first tenure in Washington from February, 1971 to October, 1973:

Tanaka: So, Japan, including the Foreign Ministry, was very anti-U.S. as a whole?Okazaki: That's right.Iokibe: I think the Foreign Ministry was not very anti-U.S. compared with the mass media or the rest of society.38

Before going to the United States, Okazaki, also told the researchers, that he helped draft the Foreign Ministry’s annual report or Blue Book. The 1971 edition, Okazaki noted, was the first to state that the U.S.-Japan relationship was the most important relationship for Japan and that the U.S. was the country’s greatest friend. The irony was not lost on the young interviewers.

View of SecurityAttitudes toward security and foreign policy in light of these events began to shift. The “Nixon shocks” created a new level of distrust for American intentions. The Japanese began to move slowly beyond their focus of U.S.-dependence to cultivating greater internationalism. Western specialists tend to date growing Japanese awareness of their international role from the 1980s. It is wiser to watch these trends beginning in the 1970s. The Japanese public internalized the lessons of the “Nixon Shocks.” A divide appeared between Japan’s economic power and its international standing.

“Japan As Number One”39 and stood among their economic peers at the first G-7 summit in 1975. Japan’s robust economy, aggressive foreign acquisitions, impressive patent portfolio, and growing current account surpluses impressed the world. Their management and manufacturing systems were emulated and studied throughout the West. Japanese pride over these accomplishments, however, was tempered by increasingly bitter trade disputes over autos, TVs, steel, semiconductors, tobacco, patents and others products.

Japan’s economic power, however, did not lead to greater respect from the U.S. Instead, in the 1970s, Americans began to describe Japan was a defense “free-rider.” By the 1980s, Japan was also viewed in Washington as a possible security risk or as unfairly acquiring economic power, such as when it was revealed (1988) that Toshiba had sold sensitive military hardware to the Soviet Union and that Hitachi (1982) was caught stealing industrial secrets from IBM. Japanese interpreted these events as further defining why the U.S. would never take seriously an alliance Japan. The Americans seemed to suggest that their “allies” were “cheats and slackers.”

The Japanese themselves were also preparing for a new relationship with the U.S., just not the one laid out by Washington. By 1970, Japan was the second largest economy in the world and was beginning to feel like a confident world power. Before the “Nixon Shocks,” Prime Minister Sato noted:

36 Dan Pearson, “Soybeans Get Respect,” The Cargill Bulletin, June 1, 1998. http://www.cargill.com/today/bulletin/t061998.htm 37 I.M. Destler, 292.38 Hisahiko Okazaki Oral History Interview.39 Ezra Vogel, Japan As Number One: Lessons For America (Harvard University Press 1979).

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 17

I think it natural for any independent nation to defend itself by its own forces. But Japan did not have enough national resources and the government needed to focus on the life of the people and public welfare. Until now, the strength of the nation had grown. Japan has become the second biggest economy in the world. Although we have promised not to possess specific weapons, I think it a matter of course for Japan to return to what it should naturally be like.40

Nakasone: The Process of IndependenceOn defense issues, the Japanese government began a long process of educating the Japanese people about the need for a stronger security posture, independent of the U.S. In 1970, the Japan-U.S. Security treaty was renewed and Yasuhiro Nakasone became director of the Japan Defense Agency. In his short 18-month tenure, Nakasone laid the groundwork for rethinking Japan’s security system with the U.S. He advocated that Japan pursue a self-reliant posture in national security. The JDA issued its first Defense White Paper and tried to increase the defense budget. He interpreted the Guam Doctrine as an opportunity to revive from the 1950s the policy perspective of jishuboei or “autonomous defense or independent defense.” It is important to note, that Nakasone never interpreted jishuboei as jettisoning the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Although he did not have the political backing to change critical policy documents or budgets, and security policies remained the same, he did presage a new urgency in Japan’s defense debate.

“Autonomous defense” gave way to greater defense cooperation with the U.S. to strengthen Japan’s security policy. The Japanese public was to be won over slowly by limiting the defense budget, establishing a strategic doctrine, and commitments. In 1976, the second Defense White Paper (starting an annual publication) was issued, and the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO, the first in 1957 was simply called the Basic Defense Plan) was adopted, putting constraints on the defense budget by justifying defense expenditures and defining forces levels. The possibility in 1977 of a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea threatened to destabilize Japan’s gradualist approach by unexpectedly adding more security responsibilities to Japan. This never materialized, but in 1978 the first Guidelines of US-Japan Defense Cooperation were signed. This document outlined new sets of obligations and expectations for Japan while maintaining a credible U.S. defense commitment to Japan. The Guidelines helped Japan’s politicians maintain a limited defense budget.

The Japanese public became further aware of security issues with the 1981 inauguration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan who was determined to win the cold war, and the 1982 selection of Prime Minister Yashuhiro Nakasone who wanted to help. Nakasone, having failed to promote “autonomous defense” during the early 1970s, realized the importance of expanding Japan’s defense capabilities through the framework of the U.S.-Japan security system.”41 The purported close working relationship between the two allowed Japan to be more supportive of U.S. goals such as SDI, countering the Soviets, enhancing military technology cooperation, and ending the cap on Japanese defense spending. Japanese “military realism” developed, and clearer reasons for Japanese public support emerged.42 In the 1980s, the first joint command exercise began and study groups issued reports that U.S. military superiority is over. The

40 Remarks in Budgetary Committee of the House of Representatives on February 24, 1970, Yomiuri Shimbun, February 24, 1970 as quoted in Kiyoshi Sugawa, 10.41 Koji Murata, “U.S. Japan Security Relationship During the Late 1970s: The Road to the Ron-Yasu Era,” paper presented to the Economic Strategy Institute conference Japan and the U.S. Reconsidered: Evolution of Security and Economic Choices Since 1960, October 24, 2001. Unpublished.42 For a prescient article on the shifts in Japanese defense policy in the early 1980s and what is likely the intellectual starting place for the Armitage Report, see: Mike Mochizuki, “Japan’s Search for Strategy,” in International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3, Winter 1983/4, 152-179.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 18

danger was “if the Americans pressures Japan to move too quickly, the national consensus which is emerging in support of a defense build-up may unravel.”43

Transitional Defense PolicyThe 1970s functioned well as a transitional period for Japan’s defense policy. The security relationship, despite occasional U.S. accusations that Japan was a “free-rider” was viewed as a positive in the otherwise contentious atmosphere of trade and economic issues. In the former, Japan was an ally; in the latter Japan was an unprincipled predator. As one scholar concluded of the defense build-up of the 1970s and 1980s:

Even though there were thus numerous US demands in the cold war 1980s for Japan to build up its military, the priority that the Nakasone administration, successive Japanese administrations had been able to use domestic political factors, such as the Constitution or popular opposition to increased defence expenditures, as a means to resist pressure from the United States. This suggests that, despite external pressure, the Japanese government has the ability, if it has the political will, to exercise a degree of independence from the United States—at least more than was exhibited by Nakasone, who committed himself to the alliance as a way to facilitate the normalization of the Japanese military and the creation of a new national identity”44

Popular CulturePopular culture and imagination absorbed these conflicting trends. The first widely viewed “nationalistic” TV anime series was broadcast in 1974 and made into several movies. The series “Space Battleship Yamato” [Uchuu Senchen Yamato], told the story of a sunken WWII battleship’s resurrection from the sea floor and transformed into a space ship to save the world from invading space aliens who have attacked with myriad nuclear devices.45 In 1985, at 75, Kurosawa released his greatest film: Ran [Chaos] an adaptation of King Lear, the story of an aging monarch who fails in turning over his kingdom to the next generation by ignoring selfless advice and thus bringing ruin upon his family. 46 The “Old” Generation believed Kurosawa was too reluctant to turn over its past to the next generation.

The “New” Generation, unlike the previous one, became conversant and comfortable with the debates on security as a contributor to regional stability and a symbol of independence. They better understand the dynamics of civilian oversight of the military. A national consensus on Japan’s security policy was being developed to justify Japan’s Self Defense Forces. The “Old” generation only saw defense issues as political unrewarding and defense debates to be contained. In the 1960s, even the hint of a study (1963 Mitsuya Study) on what Japan should do in case of an emergency in Korea was a scandal. By the 1970s, discussions began on the nature of civilian control over the military and Japan allowed a set of guidelines to be established on cooperation between U.S. and Japanese defense personnel.47 Politically, the Japanese people were also beginning to see the cracks in their governmental system with the political scandals of the popular Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and occasional crimes of other government officials. Internationally, the Japanese felt safe with the Soviet Union at bay and the United States troubled and distracted by economic downturns and a fading manufacturing base.

Anticipating Leadership: A Japan That Can Say No (1990-2020)48

43 Ibid., 79.44 Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, (London: Routledge, 1996), 70.45 See: http://yamato.channel.or.jp/ (Japanese only).46 See: http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/rr10/ran.html 47 See: Eiichi Katahara, “Japan: From Containment to Normalization” in Muthiah Alagapa, Ed., Coercion & Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001)

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 19

The “Really New” generation is not expected to reach leadership until the middle of the century. Separating out the “Really New” era from the consciousness of the “New” generation identified above, however, would be an error. The 1990s confirmed many of the trends of the past decades. More important, the political and economic events of the 1990s strongly affected all generations. The “New” generation simply became the most restless in watching the continued misjudgments of those in leadership positions as Japan’s world standing slipped. The decade opened with the collapse of everything certain: the Japanese economy, the Soviet Union, U.S. cold war politics, the Emperor, and the Japanese political system. The “Really New” Generation is a reflection in image and in action of these unpleasant realities.

The end of the Cold War and the death of the Emperor Hirohito, both products of WW II, presented opportunities. In early 1990, however, the Japanese economy and political system began to unravel. After decades of high growth, the annual GNP rose barely 1 percent, banks and business failed, bad loans proliferated, foreign imports began to compete with Japanese products, and the American economy prospered. The 1997 Asian Economic Crisis undermined export growth. By 2001, deflation had set in, employment rose to a record of nearly 6 percent, and everyone warned of Japan’s financial disintegration.

DisillusionmentPolitically, the 1955 System collapsed in 1993 with the LDP losing power and forced into coalition politics. New political parties emerged and electoral reform with single seat districts helped make public opinion matter. The decade saw constant exposure of egregious official wrong doing, even from elites at the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister’s Office. The 1995 Kobe earthquake and the sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway by a known, dangerous cult exposed Japan’s bureaucratic weaknesses in emergency preparedness and inadequate police administration. These events also provided an uncomfortable look at Japan’s social values and community spirit. Corruption, accountability, and civil society gained political urgency.

Internationally, Japan seemed to be playing catch up. The Gulf War in 1991 highlighted the limitations of Japan’s security policy and their inability to assist in an international crisis. The West, despite Japan’s $13 billion contribution to the war effort, interpreted Japan’s inaction as callous unwillingness. The end of the Cold War also began to question the need for U.S. forces in Asia and the responsibilities of Japan toward its own defense. The firing of North Korean missiles over Japan, minor skirmishes with North Korean gunboats, and increasing piracy highlighted the restraints on Japan’s defense forces. The 1997 Asian Economic Crisis forced Japan to examine its relationship with the region while the rest of world wondered why Japan was not the engine of growth in Asia.

Wary of the U.S.Long harbored suspicions of U.S. intentions and abilities to defend Japan found new outlets. The U.S. developed increasingly sophisticated ways to open Japanese markets and press for structural reforms. U.S. trade strategy was to team with internal opposition groups and use internal domestic pressure (naiatsu). U.S. pressure was no longer something foreign. The 1992 North Korean nuclear and the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis found Japan being drawn into American conflicts without a clear view of Japan’s role. The Korean incursions caused to question whether the U.S. was forthcoming enough with intelligence and the government proceeded to develop its own intelligence satellites.

The 1995 gang rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl prompted reconsideration of the security treaty’s administration, as well as the larger issue of U.S. troop strength in Japan. Lt. General Earl Hailston’s (regional coordinator of U.S. forces in Okinawa) observation that Okinawan officials were just a “bunch

48 Shintaro Ishihara, No to ieru Nihon [The Japan That Can Say NO], trans. Frank Baldwin, forward by Ezra Vogel, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989). Japanese language edition was co-written with Sony President Akio Morita.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 20

of nuts and wimps” exacerbated local political frustrations. Tokyo was also chagrined when President Bill Clinton “passed over” Japan on his 1998 visit to China. In 2001, the first industrial espionage case under new U.S. laws was pressed against researchers at Riken, a prized Japanese government lab. The loss of U.S. military codes during the April 2001 EP-3 incident with China also caused consternation when it was revealed that the JDF used the same protocols.

On security matters, Japan was playing catch up. The U.S. Defense Department (DoD) began to publish a series of strategic reports on East Asia49, which at first recommended a gradual withdrawal from Asia. Less publicly, the Delphic DoD Office of Net Assessment was issuing its own studies on the China threat, Asian energy security, and the overall reliability of Japan as a defense partner. Net Assessment concluded that Asia would be the next security flash point and that Japan was a critical player in the region. By 1995, the DoD published the “Nye Report” that emphasized the importance of Japan as a security partner, affirming the U.S.-Japan treaty, and that Asia was a region of concern.50 In October 2000, a bi-partisan advisory group to next U.S. president issued the Armitage Report. Japan, this group counseled, should be strongly encouraged to move forward on collective defense and actively participate in a U.S.-Japan security alliance.51 They saw “the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance.”52

New Japanese Defense PolicyFor its part, Japan did respond to the Gulf Crisis by enacting in 1992 the first Peacekeeping Operations Law to allow Japanese troop participation on limited UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto laid the groundwork for revising the 1976 NPDO by commissioning the 1994, the Higuichi Report. The report recognized the importance of the bilateral relationship albeit suggesting that Japan pursue autonomous defense and multilateral arrangements. As noted in the report: “Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past, that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order.”53

In 1995, the socialist Murayama Cabinet began to issue Japan’s own series of public reports on East Asian security, The East Asian Strategic Review and released the new National Defense Program Outline that included a response to large-scale disasters and military contingencies.54 Prime Minister Murayama

49. “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim” (East Asia Security Initiative I, EASR), Department of Defense, April 1990 and “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim II” (East Asia Security Initiative II, EASR II), Department of Defense, April 1992.50 “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” East Asian Strategy Report: 1995. Department of Defense, February 1995. [Nye Initiative or Nye Report, prepared by Dr. Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs] and “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” East Asian Strategy Report: 1998. Department of Defense, November 1998. (Prepared by Dr. Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs: Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau) http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf .51 National Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership [best know as “The Armitage Report”], http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html (See INSS Special Reports #10).52 Ibid., 3-4.53 “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan,” [Nihon no Anzen Housho to Boeiryoku no Arikata] Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on Defense Issues, August 12, 1994. (Higuchi Report) as translated in Appendix A, p. 22 in, Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, eds., Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program. National Defense University, McNair Paper # 31, November 1994. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair31/mcnair31.pdf54 East Asia Strategic Review, Japan Defense Agency, 1996-1997. http://www.nids.go.jp/english/east-asian/esr76-97.PDF and National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). [Bouei Keikaku no Taikou] Adopted by the Security Council and by the Cabinet on November 28, 1995. http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.htm

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 21

also apologized to China and removed his Party’s objection to the existence of Japan’s self-defense forces. Shortly after his tenure, the Socialist party essentially went out of existence taking with it many of the political roadblocks toward enhancing the roles and missions of the JSDF.

New GuidelinesMost important, Japan reached an accord with the United States in 1996 to strengthen and clarify its bi-lateral security arrangements. A new Guidelines agreement was reached in 1997, debated and approved by the Diet in 1999 after the Taepo-Dong missile launch over Japan. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) outlined in 1996 many of the consultative procedures between the Okinawan government and the U.S. military. The Foreign Ministry did a follow up of the Higuichi Report in 1999 called the Challenge 2001-Japan’s Foreign Policy toward the 21st Century that expanded on Japan’s desire for greater participation in the international community.55 Also in 1999, study groups formed in the Diet and in private think tanks to discuss revising the Constitution. The 2001 Defense White Paper and the 2000 MITI White Paper identified China as greatest threat to Japan’s economic and political security.56 By September 2001, a Conference to Study the Stature of Defense Capabilities was formed by the Defense Agency to prepare a new NPDO.

The SDF’s contribution to international peacekeeping in the 1990s in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and relief operations in Zaire “improved the public image of SDF officers and helped them toss their outdated image as social outcasts.”57 During this time, politicians were able to tap into this positive view of the military to institutionalize in 1999 Japan’s national symbols, the Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem. International pressures, politicians will, and better communications all combined to prepare the Japanese people for greater desire to discuss and implement new security policies. The people were also growing more comfortable with their symbols of national identity. And in 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi with an eye on approving opinion polls made a controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (Shinto shrine and cemetery for patriotic war dead and war criminals) in an official capacity.

A growing pessimism, however, dominated the 1990s. Not only was the economy failing and international respect fading, but the very institutions that the Japanese had come to reply upon to ensure their safety were failing. In 1999 alone, there were several bullet train accidents, a Japanese satellite again failed its test, and the world’s third worst nuclear accident took place in Tokaimura where plant employees died followed a manual that instructed them how to circumvent safety standards. As Tokyo engineering Professor Hirokai Yanagida noted: “In Japan there is a lack of responsibility and an arrogance on the part of engineers and industry. They’ve been telling us for 30 years that these technologies were completely safe, and we’ve just blindly accepted what they told us.”58

Political CultureAttitude and history aside, there were concrete institutional changes made during this decade that promise to affect greatly Japanese political life and strengthen democratic structures.59 The formal establishment

55 Challenge 2001 - Japan's Foreign Policy Toward the 21st Century. January 4, 1999. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/challenge21.html56 “Defense of Japan 2001,” [Nihon no Bouei] JDA Defense White Paper 2001. http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2001/index.html and Diplomatic Bluebook 2000: Toward the 21st Century--Foreign Policy for a Better Future. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/index.html.57 Eiichi Katahara, 86.58 As quoted in Calvin Sims, “Angst at Japan, Inc., A Nation Frets Over a String of Technological Accidents,” The New York Times, December 6, 1999, C1.59 For the best current reviews of the institutional and administrative changes see: Japan Information Access Project Symposium, “Energizing Japanese Politics: New Tools for Citizen Participation,” April 24, 2001, Washington, DC. [Proceedings available January 2002, http://www.jiaponline.org ] and The Woodrow Wilson International Center for

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 22

of the tools of political and social protest highlighted the 1990s. Foreign pressures to create transparent legal and regulatory structures dovetailed with domestic interests in greater information disclosure. Mid-decade administrative reform and legal changes allowed public referenda, nonprofit organizations independent of government supervision, access to government information, and some transparency of government regulations. These are changes with significant future effects:

New policy-oriented civil society groups will likely change the tenor and nature of the traditional government-to-government relationship. Public opinion and new political voices will matter more, making rigid, U.S.-conceived plans of structuring the U.S.-Japan relationship moot before they can be implemented. Long-cultivated old friends among the Japanese elites may prove ineffective in assisting U.S. policy. Although the U.S. will find it easier to team with potential Japanese domestic allies, there will be an equally well-organized opposition. Civil society groups span a wide spectrum creating a more complex mosaic of Japanese domestic and international politics than experts previously have acknowledged.60

The interesting impetus behind many of these changes is not a greater focus on the Japanese state, but an effort to maintain traditional ways and private lives. It is the intrusion of the state, such as in building unneeded dams, in insisting on dangerous nuclear plants, on planning onerous rules on small business, on interfering with local affairs, and on failing to provide needed social services to which the new political tools are targeted.

Popular CultureThe popular culture of the 1990s has been dark, nationalistic, and negative. Since 1989, one of the favorite manga [comic book] has been “Silent Service” [Chinmoku No Kantai] by Kaiji Kawaguchi. Politicians and even economists discuss the comic. It is a story of a renegade Japanese nuclear sub (a conspiracy between the U.S. and Japan) that forms it own nation, the Yamato. The sub (nation) races around the world preaching total nuclear disarmament and a transnational military to enforce world peace. Highly nationalistic, the magna criticizes superpowers and militarism, hinting (like Emperor Hirohito in 1945) that only Japan can be a world leader.61 This genre of manga dovetailed with Yoshinori Kobayashi’s “Gomanism” [arrogance, obnoxious] movement among Japan’s teenagers. Promoted through a popular manga glorifying Japan's role in World War II, this anti-establishment, boisterous, and ultra-nationalist view is considered a political movement by Japan’s younger generation. The non-cooperativeness and conflicted nature of this rhetoric undercuts some of right-wing sentiments.62

The decade ended with Kurosawa’s last film, “Pride” [Puraido: Unmei NoToki, 1998]. Underwritten by a right-wing group, the film focused on the human side of General Tojo Hideki and the Tokyo war crimes trials. As the Japan Times’ movie critic noted to a newsgroup, “though the film's core audience is the same crowd that worships at Yasukuni Shrine--i.e., over-50s who lived through the war and its aftermath--it is also going to draw more than a few younger Japanese who buy Kobayashi's ‘Gomanism’ paperbacks, with their revisionist arguments….‘Pride’ expresses sentiments that are gaining ground here among not only ranters on sound trucks, but otherwise ordinary Japanese.”63

Scholars, Asia Program, “Undercurrents in Japanese Politics” November 13, 2001. [Proceedings available January 2002, http://wwics.si.edu/asia/index.htm ]60 Robert Pekkanen, “Civil Society and its Regulators: Non-Profit Organizations in Japan,” presented to the Japan Information Access Project Symposium, “Energizing Japanese Politics: New Tools for Citizen Participation,” April 24, 2001, Washington, DC. [Proceeding available January 2002, http://www.jiaponline.org]61 See: http://www.zms.or.jp/~ssbn/; http://www.j-pop.com/manga/archive/reviews/02_shonen/picks2.html62 See, Reese Erlich, “Nationalist Revival Plays in Japan,” St. Petersburg Times, June 2, 2001, http://www.sptimes.com/News/060201/Worldandnation/Nationalist_revival_p.shtml.63 Mark Schilling, May 19, 1998, http://pears.lib.ohio-state.edu/Markus/kjthreads/pride.html

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 23

That Young GenerationJapan’s disaffected youth have been the subject of innumerable magazine cover stories, newspaper articles, and TV specials.64 These shinjinrui or “the new human beings” are considered the embodiment both of their generation and the era. The 20-somethings of the 1990s grew up during Japan’s “lost decade” of economic retrenchment, declining safety, and diplomatic uncertainty. Japanese youth are uniformly reported in the media as selfish, inward looking, disrespectful, pessimistic, and indifferent to family, or group ties. They are referred to as the “me-generation,” the “digital generation,” the “parasite generation,” and even the “lost generation.” Predicting how these select 20-somethings will behave as it nears leadership age in 30 years is tricky, and likely to be wildly inaccurate.

Recent surveys of this new generation confirm that they are less interested in their community than others. In a March 2001 survey65 of “active Asian consumers,” the advertising firm Hakuhodo identified six types of individuals: New Leaders, For Peace and Harmony, New and Now, Look at Me, Self-Polishing, and Contented. “Active leaders” are described as the type most interested in making a contribution to society and those who are “For Peace and Harmony” place a high value on stability, family happiness and human relationships and are most likely to aid the weak and vulnerable. The “self-polishing” are self-centered and place emphasis on self-fulfillment and show little concern for others and the “Contented” is self-descriptive. Young Japanese are found to be the most inward-looking young consumers in Asia with 37 percent describing themselves as Self-Polishing. Only 5.7 percent were For Peace and Harmony and 8.9 percent were Contented. All these responses with considerably lower than any of their Asian peers.

Japan’s young are not all bad. The Hakuhodo poll also found that 46 percent of younger Japanese (15-24) were willing to work hard to achieve success while only 32.3 percent of middle aged Japanese (35-44) were willing (both were the lowest in Asia).66 Among 20-somethings, 60 percent of males and 53.4 percent of females voted in the 2001 Upper House elections. Their participation was only slightly lower than the older generations. 67 In the recent Cabinet Office survey of young people’s life and opinion (aged 13-24), 50 percent or more were willing to help people in need, while in the same survey taken five years before, barely 30 percent would offer assistance.68

CORE VALUES

The history of Japanese perceptions of its postwar security situation must be viewed within the context of Japanese core values. To interpret the postwar history above without reference to the issues that constitute “japaneseness” ignores this history’s significance. It is not what happened that is important, it is why the Japanese believe the events are significant is what matters. The common view is that if there is

64 One of the popular English-language books on Japan’s disaffected youth is, Karl Taro Greenfeld, Speed Tribes: Days and Nights with Japan’s Next Generation, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994); also see “Young Japan,” Cover Story, Time, May 3-10, 1999, and Hiroyuki Takahashi and Jeanette Voss, “Parasite Singles”: A Uniquely Japanese Phenomenon?” Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 31, August 11, 2000. http://www.jei.org 65 Hakuhodo, Inc., HABIT Asia 2001: For Asia’s most active young consumers “Made in Japan” now means more style and more fun as well as higher quality, Press Release, November 16, 2001, http://www.hakuhodo.co.jp/news/e/index.html [Hakuhodo is a public relations firm that is the primary funder of the foreign policy research group, The Okazaki Institute.]66 Hakuhodo, Inc., HABIT67 Hakuhodo, Inc. “KEITAI”. 68 Cabinet Office, Second Basic Survey of Young People’s Life and Opinion, November 2001.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 24

generational change, then the perception of the history cited will also change. This is not the case. There is surprising continuity of values and beliefs among Japanese generations.

Little Change Among GenerationsThe ease with which the Japanese appear to have accepted the American-initiated war on terrorism is attributed to great changes in Japanese core values. Today’s leadership generation is viewed as more willing to accept international involvement and to project Japanese power. Thus, one expects the new generation’s attitudes and ideals to be significantly different from their elders. This does not appear to be true in Japan.

An unexpected finding of surveys taken to determine changes in Japanese basic values, in light of the seismic changes to Japan’s political economy in the postwar era, is that not much has changed. If anything, the post-1970 generations are more conservative and family oriented than others in the postwar period.69 Analysis done by the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Statistical Mathematics (ISM), which conducts a survey of Japan’s national character (National Survey) every five years, shows that significant change in Japanese attitudes did accompany the first 20 years of democratization and modernization. These changes, however, ended in the early 1970s and the following years found a return to conservative, more inward looking traditional values, closer to the prewar generation.

The 1990s continued this retreat to conventional norms away from greater societal interests. Social values focused increasingly on personal interests, individual rights, the family, tradition, and a growing pessimism about the future.70 In an analysis of a half-century of National Survey’s, the IMS research coordinator Professor Yoshiyuki Sakamoto found a number of significant indicators of the Japanese people’s turn inward. Increasingly, the emphasis has been on family as opposed to society and local versus national concerns.

FamilyJapan seems to be increasingly more family oriented. Proof can be found in the response to the National Survey question “What is the single most important thing in your life,” which has changed dramatically after 1973. The answer “family” showed a 28 percent increase, rising from 12 percent in 1958 to 40 percent in 1998, the most popular answer. In 1953, the most popular answers were “health” at 22 percent and “love” at 16 percent; both figures have remained the same over time.71 Throughout the period 1953-98, respect for family remained the most important social value, 60 percent in 1953, rising steadily to 70 percent in 1998.72 The Dentsu Institute for Human Studies annual study of global values found that those in Japan who wanted to spend more time with their family rose from 56.4 percent in 1996 to 64.8 percent in 2000. Those who said “family makes life worth living” rose from 72.6 percent in 1996 to 79.7 percent in 2000.73

Personal LifeJapanese seem to be appreciating their private life more and more. The National Survey shows a steady increase in the number of people who believe their private life is the most important. In a question on describing one’s attitude toward life, the popular answer, 29 percent, of those surveyed in 1953 answered

69 Hakuhodo, Inc., HABIT.70 Yoshiyuki Sakamoto, “How Has the Japanese Way of Thinking Changed” A Half Century of the Statistical Survey of the Japanese National Character,” Proceedings of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2000), 3-32.71 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #2.7.72 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #5.1d.73 Dentsu Institute for Human Studies, Value Changes with Globalization: Japan Remains Groping, Asia Takes An Opportunity: The Fifth Comparative Analysis of Global Values, March 2001, 19. [Survey taken September to October 2000 using the drop and collect method with 733 respondents. http://www.dihs.dentsu.co.jp/english/research/new.html

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 25

to “live a pure and just life.” This answer dropped to 8 percent in 1998 while “to my own taste” became the predominant response at 41 percent (21 percent in 1953).74 The Denstu survey found a tendency toward the status quo in Japan by noting that the Japanese remain the most reluctant in Asia to dispute others. Only 8 percent in 2000 would “maintain their own opinion if it means falling out the someone.” Those who “didn’t mind breaking the rules” hovers near 16 percent. As can be seen in Figure 3, those younger than 30 were slightly more inclined to follow their own judgment.75

Figure 3

NatureTraditionally, Japanese have felt that individuals should be in harmony with nature. The National Survey bears this out. Whereas postwar modernization tended to devalue nature, the return to tradition during the 1970s reversed this trend. The Japanese people have increasingly become concerned with the environment and nature. Even in questions on international politics and constitutional change the Japanese today place a high value on protecting and cleaning the environment. In the National Survey, the opinion that “in order to be happy, man must follow nature” rose from 26 percent in 1953 to 49 percent in 1998 while “conquer nature” declined from 23 percent to 6 percent during the same period. When asked “how important it is to preserve the environment, 82 percent said “very important and important” in 1998 and 87 percent in 1983.76 This will be strongly reflected in revising the constitution in the role of foreign policy, detailed in a following section.

The YoungOne important observation in all the surveys is that differences between the overall attitudes of younger Japanese (15-24) when contrasted to their middle-aged peers (35-44) is very small on every dimension. A Hakuhodo survey of Asian consumers found that both generations in Japan placed “seeking pleasure and enjoying life” as their top priority (74 percent) and “seeking self-fulfillment” as their second (54 percent). Giving “their all to society” was hovered only between 18-20 percent. Hakuhodo concludes from its data the “surprising” finding that Japan’s youth are closer in values (with significant exceptions) to their grandparents’ than their parents’ values. 77

74 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #2.475 Dentsu, 14.76 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #7.35.77 Hakuhodo, Inc., HABIT.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 26

PUBLIC OPINION ON FOREIGN & DEFENSE POLICY

Across generations in Japan there is a consistency of views toward foreign policy. History and values are viewed from the same lens. The contemporary generations perceive their postwar history in much the same way as their elders. Where the differences appear, the factors are economics, status, and gender.

The general consensus of the surveys viewed suggests a turn toward Japanese solutions and a distancing from international entanglements. A more independent military is seen as a withdrawal from rather than greater involvement in greater world responsibilities. Significant differences in opinion do appear between Japan’s opinion leaders and the average citizen. Thus, how much these views will be or can be tempered by political realities and political leadership remains to be seen.

Cautions in Examining DataBefore examining Japanese opinion survey data, a number of cautions should be observed. They concern polling format, attitude, and language:

FormatSurvey results in Japan are difficult tools for analyzing public opinion. Questions often suggest only one reasonable response or are too vague to provide a meaningful opinion. Japanese scholars see public polls as “delicate dialogues among people.”78 Public opinion in Japan does not always appear in public polls. There are other expressions of public opinion as valid as and more issue specific than surveys such as editorials, popular movements, and interest groups.79 Researchers also notice that many government polls show a surprising consistency over time even in face of seminal political events. Until recently, all surveys in Japan were personal interviews.

AttitudeHow the Japanese people approach survey questions is an important factor to consider. The Japanese, in general, are reticent about expressing strong opinions in public. In addition, as an American business executive who has worked many years for a Japanese company in Tokyo notes: “the Japanese are very resilient in differentiating multiple roles without internalizing role conflict. Japanese are keenly adept at this separation that allows them, for example, to answer in the context of an “individual” role to a questionnaire, while behaving, in what Westerners may believe is a “contradictory” manner in a different role.”80 A Japanese scholar on public opinion simply notes, “People like to answer tatemae [diplomatically], instead of with honne [honestly].”81

Language: The Translucent ‘Alliance’Language contains a large set of unconscious assumptions about the physical and social world.82 Thus, it is important not to ignore the language of Japan-U.S. security relations. Americans focus their discussions of Japan-U.S. security relations on the nature of the “alliance.” Although most Americans liberally use the term “alliance,” the U.S. has a “security treaty,” not a formal, legal “alliance” with Japan.

The Japanese are much more careful with their “alliance” terminology. Among the many opinion polls examined for this monograph, including those jointly conducted by Japan’s Yomiuri and America’s the Gallup Organization, none used domei, the Japanese word for “alliance,” in their questions. Most used is 78 Hiramitsu 1998 p. 52.79 Ibid. p. 7680 NBR Forum Mesher email 11/15/0181 Op. cit. p. 116.82 For a discussion on how language is important in defining Japan, see: Chikio Hayashi and Yasumasa Kuroda, Japanese Culture in Comparative Perspective, (Westport: Praeger, 1997).

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 27

kankei or relationship and it is common to find taisei for arrangement/system and kyoryoku meaning cooperation. If used, domei was hesitant and in quotes, implying a broader, more abstract meaning. It is only in the Western literature that there is a consistent, more liberal use of the word alliance.

Beginning in the 1980s, Japanese officials began tentatively to use domei to imply a commonality of interests and to de-emphasize conflict. Alliance [domei] was used for the first time in a joint communiqué issued after a 1981 meeting between Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. 83

The intent was to emphasize “the economic, political, and cultural ties between the two nations, playing down any military implications behind the term ‘alliance.’”84 Nevertheless, the controversy generated by the use of domei forced the resignation of the Japanese foreign minister, Ito Masayoshi. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone and some of his aides are said to have used domei when discussing Japan-U.S. security relations.

In the late 1990s, some Japanese policy elites have found it fashionable to use publicly “domei” [alliance] in both their speech and writings. This has been particularly apparent after the inauguration of President George W. Bush in January 2001. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials, in private conversations, admit to “domei’s” new currency. Younger Ministry bureaucrats see it as a symbolic, positive response to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s new emphasis on strengthening Japan-U.S. security ties. They are, however, quick to point out that it does not mean that a formal alliance exists, but that the word expresses well the new spirit of shared interests and values.85

THE ISSUES

Japan-U.S. security discussions revolve around a number of critical issues and perceptions of international security. How the Japanese see their role in the world, their country’s power, and its relationship with the United States weigh heavily on their political leaders. Many of those concerns are reflected in views toward constitutional reform, U.S. troops in Okinawa, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and the role of the SDF. The following are representative surveys showing the complex attitudes both ordinary Japanese voters and their elites hold on security policy.

Overall, Japanese at the end of the 20 th Century are pessimistic about their future and their abilities to be a world power. They are cautious about constitutional change, unhappy about the Japan-U.S. security relationship, want the U.S. troop presence reduced, and desire limited international involvement. Elites trend more toward an active foreign and security policy. This can be interpreted as an issue of respect and a return to self-reliance. These trends can be seen over time and across generations.

Japan’s Role in the World

InternationalizationAccording to the 2000 Cabinet Office Survey on Foreign Relations, Japanese view internationalization favorably, especially the younger generations.86 People in their twenties view “internationalization” as “good” 87.1 percent of the time, those in their thirties 90.1 percent, forties 87 percent, fifties 82 percent

83 Although this was the first time “alliance” appeared in a formal document it was used by the previous Prime Minister Ohira and Foreign Minister Official Okazaki also claims to have first used the word in the Diet to explain the Soviet threat in 1979, see: Hisahiko Okazaki Oral History Interview.84 Hook, 139.85 Series of private conversations with Japanese Foreign Ministry officials from August to December 2001 by the Japan Information Access Project.86 Japan, Cabinet Office, “Gaiko ni Kan Suru Yoron Chosa [Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy],” October 2000. Nationwide survey of 2,107 people over 20 years old conducted on October 19-29, 2000 by face-to-face interviews. http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/gaikou_01/index.html

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 28

sixties 74.1 percent and seventies 66 percent (See Figure 4). The more experience each age group has with foreign things and the global media affects their views.

Figure 4

What do you think of Internationalization?

6674.1

828790.187.1

21

2.96.1 4.26.2

13.5

10.15.86.8 11.8 12.4 13

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- Age Groups

Bad

Don't KnowGood

Japanese View Of Others And Their World RoleSurveys show that the Japanese do not view themselves as international leaders. The March 2001 Dentsu Comparative Analysis of Global Values finds that less than 2.5 percent perceive Japan as an international political power. 87 This survey finds that only 0.8 percent of Japanese see their country’s “International Political Power” as an area where Japan excels, a decrease from 2.4 percent in 1997. Only 0.3 percent see “International Leadership” as an area in which Japan excels, a decrease from 1.8 percent in 1998 (See Figure 5).

Figure 5

87 Dentsu Institute for Human Studies, Value Changes with Globalization: Japan Remains Groping, Asia Takes An Opportunity: The Fifth Comparative Analysis of Global Values, March 2001, 19. [Survey taken September to October 2000 using the drop and collect method with 733 respondents.] http://www.dihs.dentsu.co.jp/english/research/new.html

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 29

00.5

11.5

22.5

1997 1998 1999 2000

Years

Aspects In Which Japan Excels

InternationalPolitical Power

InternationalLeadership

Despite reluctant international leadership, Japanese do see a need to maintain friendships with other countries. The surveys reveal that the U.S., China, and South Korea are the most important countries for Japan to maintain good relations. The 2001 Dentsu poll shows that 69.0 percent of respondents want to “create close relations” with U.S., 58.8 percent with China; and 42.7 percent with South Korea (See Figure 6).

Figure 6

0

20

40

60

80

United States China South Korea

Countries Japan Should Create Close Relations With

199619982000

Being An Economic World PowerA range of surveys find that the Japanese do not perceive themselves as an economic world power. More interesting, they also do not appear to want to be one. Since the late 1980s, opinion polls show expectations of economic decline in Japan. In 1988, 42 percent thought Japan’s economic achievement was very high and 40 percent thought it was fairly high. By 1998, only 4 percent felt that economic achievement was very high and only 28 percent found it was fairly high. 88 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun conducted a poll in late 1999 on Japanese views of the future of the international economy. As for Japan’s economic strength, 53.7 percent replied that its GDP rank would fall back to the world’s 3rd or 5th place by

88 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, A Study of the Japanese National Character: The Tenth Nationwide Survey (1998), November 2000, Research Report General Series No. 85 (English Edition), 123.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 30

2025.89 After 9/11, 61.8 percent of the Japanese believed that their economy would deteriorate. Only 31 percent of Americans thought the same for their economy.90

When asked in Japan’s National Survey of what is the single most important thing in life, only 3 percent in 1998 answered wealth and money, while in 1953, 15 percent gave this answer.91 For the question whether the people will “become more affluent, or worse off,” the response in 1998 was 50 percent worse off and 15 percent more affluent. In contrast, in 1978 the response to the same question was only 25 worse off and 44 percent more affluent.92 Relevant to the question if Japan wants to be a world economic power is whether the Japanese value the impersonality and efficiencies of modern globalism. When asked whether they consider a desirable person to be either someone “who is friendly and can be counted on to help others but is not an efficient worker” or “who is an efficient worker but is indifferent to the worries and affairs of others,” the Japanese favored from 1978 through 1998 the former by 7 to one (77 percent vs. 11 percent).93

Constitutional RevisionConventional wisdom within the U.S. Japan policy community is that a majority of Japanese are now interested in revising Japan’s Constitution. This is interpreted as focused on amending the Preamble for collective self-defense and revising Article 9 to allow and to use a military. With the exception of some foreign policy elites, most Japanese are not concerned with revising these sections of the Constitution. At best, changing Article 9 ranks a recent second among the Japanese people’s constitutional interests. Individual rights and the environment are their first concerns. Since September 11, 2001 polls indicate that the Japanese have become less willing to revise the constitution to allow for collective defense. More men than women are willing to support collective defense and constitutional revision.

In April 2001 and April 2000, the annual Yomiuri Shimbun polls on constitutional revision found that a majority felt it “best to amend the present-day constitution.” The 2001 figure was 54.1 percent responding yes with 28.4 percent responding no.94 In the 2000 poll, 60 percent responded positively, an all time high since Yomiuri started these constitutional surveys in 1981 when those in favor were 28 percent. 95 One anomaly in both polls is the question “what is your interest in the Constitution” with respondents told to pick as many as they like. In both polls, “constitutional revision” was only slightly above 13 percent, ranking approximately 11th.

The April 2001 survey found that the percentage of those in favor of constitutional revision was higher than that of opposing it in all brackets. Younger generations of Japanese were more in favor of revision, with 62 percent of those in their 30s, the highest of any age group, and the second highest were those in their 20s at 57 percent. A May 2000 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) poll supports the Yomiuri findings. The Nikkei poll reports that 60.5 percent are for and 31.5 percent are against amending the Constitution.96

89 “Poll Views Japanese, World Economy, Politics in 2025,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 4, 2000, 1, [FBIS Translations, FTS20000104001721]. Survey taken October-November 1999 of senior white-collar workers.90 “Yomiuri-Gallup Poll: Japan, U.S. Show Increase in Favorable Image of Bilateral Relationship,” Yomiuri, November 30, 2001, 26. [U.S. Embassy Translation] Survey October 27-November 12 of 1,010 voters by telephone interviews.91 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #2.7.92 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #7.18d.93 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #5.6h.94“Poll on Japan’s Constitution,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 4/5/01, p12-13. Nationwide survey of 1,946 eligible voters conducted by face to face interviews March 24-25, 2001. [U.S. Embassy translation.]95 “Yomiuri Poll: 60% Favor Amending the Constitution,” Yomiuri, 4/15/00, p1. Nationwide survey of 1,935 voters conducted by face to face interviews, March 18-19, 2000. [U.S. Embassy Translation]96 “Poll: 60% Insist on Need to Amend Constitution,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5/3/01, p2. Nationwide survey of 1,743 adults aged 20 and up conducted in April 2001 by telephone. [US Embassy Translation].

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 31

Asked why the Constitution should be amended, those who responded “yes” to the 2001 Yomiuri poll most frequently cited “new problems” that the Constitution does not deal with. The other top issues mentioned were “international contributions,” “neglected obligations” of the state, and “situational changes” (participants could choose more than one). A slight majority, 50.7 percent, of those polled said that “because there are now new problems the present-day constitution can no longer meet, such as Japan’s international contributions,” the Constitution should be amended; 30.6 percent said “because there are too many cases claiming rights while neglecting obligations;” and 27.1 percent said “because the conventional way of reading or applying the constitution’s provisions would lead to confusion if and when there is a need to meet situational changes.” A quarter or 24.3 percent responded, “Because America forced the constitution on Japan;” and less than a fifth, 18.9 percent, responded, “In order to expressly stipulate the nation’s right of self-defense and the existence of the Self-Defense Forces” (See Figure 7).

Figure 7

In the Yomiuri polls concerning the Constitution, the highest levels of interest in the Constitution are “Environmental Disruption” noted by 45.2 percent in 2001 and 30.6 percent or second in 2000. Third, was the “right to live in peace” in 2001 at 27.7 per cent and in 2000 it was “privacy protection” 24.3. “Japan’s war renunciation and Self-Defense Forces;” was second in 2001at 33.9 percent (See Figure 8) and in 2000 it was first at 37.1 percent. Among Japanese Diet members in 2000, 87.5 percent answered “Japan’s war renunciation and Self-Defense forces” compared to 37.1 percent of the public. “Environmental disruption” was the second interest of Diet members at 67.5 percent.

Figure 8

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 32

The strong interest in the environment is apparent in other surveys. In the Nikkei poll, respondents were asked what is “problematic about the present-day constitution. Of the five possible answers, the first choice (48.1 percent) was that the Constitution “It stipulates nothing about environmental rights, privacy rights, or any other kinds of rights to meet the changing times.” The last choice at 22.1 percent was “Article 9, which stipulates Japan’s renunciation of war, does no longer meet the realities.” (See Figure 9)

Figure 9

A May 2, 2001 Asahi poll further demonstrates the priority given to economic and environmental problems over Constitutional revision.97 When asked to pick two issues that they wished politicians to

97 “Poll on Political Parties, Constitutional Issues,” Asahi Shimbun, 5/2/01, p6. Nationwide survey of 2,069 eligible voters conducted April 8-9, 2001 through face-to-face interviews. [US Embassy Translation].

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 33

pursue, Japanese voters overwhelmingly chose “economic recovery” at 63 percent and “environmental problems” as second at 26 percent. “Constitutional revision” was only noted by 3 percent (See Figure 10).

Figure 10

Asahi also found that Constitutional revision was thought “necessary” by 47 percent of the population and “not necessary” by 36 percent. Twenty-six percent thought that revision was urgent. When asked directly about their interest level in the Constitution, only 15 percent were “very interested,” while 61 percent were “somewhat interested,” 22 percent “were not interested,” and 2 percent did not know or did not answer. In a follow up question to ask specifically what was of interest in the Constitution; “fundamental human rights” was the most popular choice with 21 percent. “Article 9 (war renunciation)” was second, receiving 20 percent.

When asked about Article 9 and whether it should be amended, an overwhelming number of those polled by Asahi in May responded negatively: 17 percent wanted to amend Article 9 specifically in May 2001 with 20 percent in April 1997, and 74 percent did not want to revise that section in May 2001 compared with 69 percent in April 1997. A March 1999 U.S. Information Agency poll found similar results. 98

When asked whether Japan should “revise the constitution and develop our own military capability to become a normal country,” 65 percent of the general public rejected this idea with 39 percent “strongly opposed,” 26 percent “somewhat opposed,” 19 percent “somewhat in favor,” and 4 percent “strongly in favor.”

These diverse polls seem to suggest that Constitutional revision is not a priority for the Japanese people. When ordinary Japanese do think about Constitutional revision, economic and environmental issues are most important. The emphasis is on personal concerns and traditional Japanese values, i.e., nature. Revision of Article 9 and becoming a ‘normal nation’ is a secondary agenda.

98 “Japan’s New Right: Implications for U.S. Security Ties,” (USIA, Office of Research and Media Reaction, June 25, 1999). Nationwide sample of 1,006 Japanese aged 18 and over on March 18-22, 1999 by face-to-face interviews.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 34

Collective SecurityEven after 9/11, the Japanese are reluctant to amend the Constitution to allow for “collective security.” A November 20, 2001 Mainichi Shimbun poll finds that a majority, 52 percent, believe that Japan’s Constitutional clauses prohibiting the right of collective defense should be “left intact;” while 32 percent believed that the constitution “should be modified” to allow Japan to use the right of collective self defense.99 A Jiji Press poll also taken in mid-November supports these results.100 The government’s interpretation of the constitution as barring collective defense was supported by 46 percent with 34 percent saying that Japan “should be able to use the right” and 20 percent “did not know.” There was also a noticeable gender gap. The Mainichi poll found 59 percent of women and only 27 percent of men supported the government view. In the JiJi poll, only 39.9 percent of men supported the government position while women supported the current interpretation by 51.4 percent.

Elite Views of Constitutional ReformElites within Japan are more interested in constitutional revision especially issues regarding Article 9 and collective self-defense. In the 2000 Yomiuri Constitutional poll, questions were administered to lawmakers serving on the Diet’s lower and upper house constitutional affairs panels.101 Within this sample, 68.8 percent thought that the Constitution should be revised with 15.0 percent opposed. The same poll found that voters were “very interested” 14.9 percent and “somewhat interested” 30 percent in the Diet’s discussions on constitutional issues. A 1997 Keizai Doyukai survey on security of it members (senior business executives) found that 72.4 percent thought that a constitutional debate was needed, 21.9 percent thought that a constitutional debate was needed, but that it was “too early,” and only 2.9 percent of respondents thought that there should not be a constitutional debate.102

A poll of all Lower House representatives by Mainichi Shimbun on May 3, 1999 (the 52nd anniversary of the constitution) shows that 60 percent of the respondents (around 40 percent of the lower house) favored revision of the Constitution.103 Of those wanting revision, 41 percent focused on Article 9 of the constitution; 38 percent on “environmental conservation;” and 37 percent did so for “education and subsidy for private education.” In the 2000 Yomiuri poll, 72.7 percent of those Diet members and 21.7 percent of the general public who believed that the Constitution should be revised also wanted it “to expressly stipulate the nation’s right of self-defense and the existence of the Self Defense Forces.”

The 1997 Keizai Doyukai survey corroborates the above view with 64.8 percent of those surveyed agreeing “that the rights of collective Self Defense is inherent to a nation and that it is time to reconsider the constitution.” Some, 26.7 percent, felt that this was too early.104 Only 5 percent directly opposed this view. At the same time, the survey found that these businessmen also wanted to maintain the security treaty with the U.S. with 83.2 percent believing that the Japan-U.S.security system should be maintained and 10.8 percent disagreeing. A majority, 56.1 percent, also thought that the Japan-U.S. security relationship would continue. A third, 32 percent, thought that the Treaty should be broken.

99 “Poll on Japan’s Responses to Terror,” Mainichi Shimbun, 11/20/01, 2. [US Embassy Translation].100 “Survey Says More Japanese Favor Nonuse of Collective Defense,” JIJI Press, 11/17/01. Nationwide poll of 1,276 people aged 20 or over conducted November 9-12, 2001. [FBIS Translation].101 Yomiuri Shimbun, 4/15/01, 1.102 “Anzen Hosho Mondai ni Kan Suru Ishiki Chosa [An Opinion Survey Concerning Problems with the Security Arrangment],” Keizai Doyukai, 4/21/97, 4. Survey of 421 Keizai Doyukai members, conducted January 1997. Several questions included responses from the public from a poll by Keizai Dokukai of nonmembers in April 1996. http://www.doyukai.or.jp/database/teigen/970421.htm 103 “Lower House Members Polled on Constitutional Amendment,” Mainichi Shimbun, 5/3/01, 3. Poll of 500 House of Representatives members, with about 40% respondent rate conducted late April, 1999. [FBIS Translation].104 Keizai Doyukai, 8.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 35

For Japan’s leaders, constitutional debate is linked to the future of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. Although interested in Constitutional revision and a vigorous military, few are willing to abandon the treaty altogether. They have a realistic view of Japan’s current capabilities, limitations, and public opinion. They want to enable Japan to be able to defend itself while gradually taking on greater international responsibilities. For now, they are ready neither to jettison Japan-U.S. Security Treaty nor to turn it into an alliance.

In 1999, Nobuo Matsunaga (1923), former ambassador to the U.S., observed that: “At least for the foreseeable future, the Japan-U.S. alliance will be necessary….Japan has a big population and a massive economy. If the Security Alliance is revoked, there will be a political and military vacuum. There are only two ways to fill this vacuum – Japan fills it, or a third country other than the United States will have to take up the role. Both these options are unrealistic.”105 Yet, the leadership generation is restless. In a May 2000 interview in Asahi Shimbun, LDP Secretary General Taku Yamasaki (1936) said that the Constitution “is a supreme law, but it is not a code of laws that will be in effect forever. Germany’s Bonn Basic Law has been amended more than 40 times, but Japan has made no amendment to the Constitution. As a result, the Constitution does not go well with the present age.”106

Role of Japanese Foreign PolicyOne consistent result of the many Japanese opinion polls on foreign policy is that the Japanese believe that their role in the world is to handle environmental and peace issues. Few want to see dramatic changes in their foreign or defense policies. Maintaining the status quo, across the board, is the primary interest of most Japanese. In the Cabinet Office survey on foreign policy, “contribution to the solution of global scale issues (environment),” and “contribution to the maintenance of international peace,” have consistently been the most popular responses to what type of role Japan should play in international society with support at 41.8 and 40.2 percent respectively in 2000 (See Figure 11).107

Figure 11

What Role Should Japan Play In International Society?

05

101520253035404550

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

%

Contribution to the maintenance ofinternational peace

Contribution to the solution ofglobal-scale issues (environment)

Humanitarian support for refugees

Contribution to the development ofthe world economy

International cooperation to protectuniversal values (human rights)

Contribution toward thedevelopment of developing countries

Contribution to international culturalexchange

105 Hideyuki Ozawa, “The Bureaucrat’s Perception of the Japan-U.S. Security,” Aasahi Shimbun, 4/14/99, 21. [FBIS translation].106 “LDP, DPJ, SDP Leaders Comment on Constitution,” Asahi Shimbun Online, 5/3/2000. [FBIS translation].107 Cabinet Office.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 36

In a similar question by Dentsu, the responses were nearly the same as in the government survey.108 The focus is more regional than international concerns and again on environmental and economic priorities. “Development and Stabilization of Asian Economy,” was seen by 69.3 percent as the most important “role Japan should play in the world;” “Improvement of the Global Environment” was seen by 68.2 percent as the most important role; 43.7 percent saw “Development and stabilization of World Economy;” 40.5 percent saw “Solving Natural Resource Problems;” 36.7 percent saw “Solving Food Problems;” 33.6 percent saw “Arbitrating the Interests and Opinions in the Asian Region;” 25.6 saw “Arbitrating the Interests and Opinions of the International Society;” and 25.1 percent saw “Solving International Conflicts” (See Figure 12).

Figure 12

Japan-U.S. Security TreatyThe Japan-U.S. Security relationship and the role of the SDF seem to be increasingly incompatible in the minds of the Japanese people. Levels of support for the Japan-U.S. security relationship have been stable, according to the Japan Defense Agency’s Public Survey on Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues.109

Older generations view the relationship more favorably than the younger generations: 35.5 percent of respondents in their 60’s thought the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was “useful,” the highest percentage, while only 21.7 percent of those in their 20’s thought the same. Overall, Japanese thought the treaty was “useful” to some extent: 29.6 percent of respondents think it is “useful;” 41.7 percent “somewhat useful;” 10.3 percent “somewhat not useful;” and 4.5 percent “not useful at all.” Japanese women are less likely to support the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty: 39.6 percent of men think that it is “useful” compared with 20.9 percent of women who think the same (See Figure 13).

Figure 13

108 Dentsu Institute, 26.109 Japan Defense Agency, “Jieitai, Boei Mondai ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa [Public Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues],” January 2000. Nationwide poll of 3,461 people aged 20 and up conducted on January 13-23, 2000 by face-to-face interview. http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/yoron

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 37

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Overall 2000

Men

Women

20 - 29

30 - 39

40 - 49

50 - 59

60 - 69

70 - 79 yrs.

What is Your Opinion on the US-Japan Security Treaty

UsefulSomewhat UsefulDon't Know

Somewhat Not UsefulNot Useful

For now, the Japanese do not want to change the current Japan-U.S. security system. The 1997 Keizai Doyukai poll of businessmen notes that 94.9 percent of those polled wanted to maintain the “status quo.” The general public agreed by 56.1 percent.110 Only 2 percent of the businessmen and 32 percent of the general public wanted to “break up” the security system. Both groups rejected expanding the security relationship. The Keizai Doyukai poll found that 62.3 percent of business leaders and 70.3 percent of the general public wanted to maintain the same level of cooperation with the U.S.111 Expanded cooperation was preferred by 32.2 percent and by 27.1 percent respectively.

American Forces In JapanJapanese opinion on American forces within Japan and Okinawa is not favorable. It is believed that most Japanese want the American military footprint in Japan reduced, with younger Japanese thinking this even more. Surveys generally do support this view. A March 1999 U.S. Information Agency poll on the “New Right” finds that 21 percent of the general public believed “a great deal” that U.S. bases in Japan should be reduced; 48 percent responded “somewhat reduce;” 12 percent thought that bases should be left at current levels; and 8 percent thought that bases should be completely withdrawn.112 Thus, almost three-fourths of the general public thinks that U.S. bases should be reduced to some degree.

Reducing the number of bases, however, is not seen as coming at the expense of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. USIA found that among those who favor revising the Constitution so that Japan can develop its own military capabilities, 82 percent still “favor” maintaining the U.S. security “alliance” while 70 percent consider U.S. bases important for regional security.”113

Other polls are mixed. The 2000 JDA poll on Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues found that Japanese support for bases on Okinawa divided: 46.6 percent the bases acceptable with 41.9 percent viewing them

110 Keizai Doyukai, 19. 111 Ibid., p19.112 “Japan’s New Right: Implications for U.S. Security Ties,” USIA.113 Ibid.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 38

as unacceptable.114 Men are much more supportive than women of the bases in Okinawa, with 57.9 percent in favor and 35.5 percent opposed; women were 36.4 percent in favor and 47.6 percent opposed. The poll does find young people to be much less in favor of the bases than older people: 37.2 percent of people in their 20’s support U.S. bases while 50.1 percent are opposed. Of people in their 60’s, 51.4 percent are in favor and 37.5 percent are opposed (See Figure 14).

Figure 14

The 1997 Keizai Doyukai poll also examines burden-sharing and U.S. troops on Okinawa.115 The responses support the ones above. A majority wanted to reduce the requirements on Japan: 44 percent wanted to reduce U.S. bases in Okinawa and on the mainland; 11.7 percent wanted no change in the burden-sharing but a reduction in U.S. bases in Okinawa; 10 percent thought that the situation of U.S. bases on Okinawa “can not be helped” and that the burden sharing status should be maintained; and 28.5 percent said that that burden-sharing and bases should be maintained as is.

Although there are not many polls on the subject, there seems to be a gap between American and Japanese opinions toward keeping military bases in Japan. According to an April 1999 Harris Interactive poll, 63 percent of Americans favor maintaining status quo of bases in Japan and 31 percent wanted to reduce American forces from the bases.116 In Japan, however, 28 percent wanted to maintain the bases as they are with 63 percent wishing to reduce American forces from the bases (See Figure 15).

Figure 15

114 Japan Defense Agency, 2000. 115 Keizai Doyukai, 4. 116 Humphrey Taylor, “Americans and Japanese Attitudes Very Different On…” Harris Interactive Poll #27, April 27, 1999. In US, nationwide survey of 1,008 adults on March 19-23, 1999 by telephone. In Japan, nationwide poll of 2,184 adults on March 14-15, 1999 by face-to-face interviews, conducted by Asahi Shimbun. http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=28

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 39

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Maintain bases as they arenow

Reduce American forces fromthe bases

In the future, which one of the following would you favor for the U.S. bases in Japan?

United States

Japan

Role of the SDFAlthough Japanese might be interested in contributing to the maintenance of international peace as shown in the 2000 Cabinet Office Poll (See Figure 10), they are less likely to see a role for the SDF in that capacity. The surveys suggest that the Japanese do not want to do much beyond its own borders in terms of security. Instead, according to the 2000 JDA poll, Japanese see a greater role in the future for the SDF in domestic priorities. There is not that much difference between age groups or gender on what type of role they believe SDF should play in the future. Overall, domestic priorities dominate, such as “disaster relief,” which received 67.5 percent support, national security, which received 44.7 percent support, and public security, which received 20.4 percent support. “International Contribution” only received 36.1 percent support (See Figure 16).117

Figure 16

117 Japan Defense Agency, 2000.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 40

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Overall 2000Men

Women20-2930-3940-4950-5960-6970-79

Where Should the SDF Play a Role in the Future?

Disaster Reliefnational SecurityInternational ContributionPublic SecurityPublic WelfareOther - D/K

A 2001 Asahi poll corroborates the view that national security for Japan is national. The Asahi asked, “What do you think should be the SDF’s role in the future?”118 The most popular answer, 37 percent, was “Engage in disaster relief operations at home,” similar to the Cabinet Office poll (See Figure 10). Other priorities were equally inward looking: 20 percent were for “Engage in National Defense” and 19 percent for “Maintain public order.” Only one percent chose “Act as a partner of U.S. forces;” and eight percent chose “Engage in nonmilitary operations under the United Nation’s command.” When asked if Japan should limit its cooperation to non-military activities 66 percent agreed, 24 percent disagreed, and 10 percent did not know/did not answer.

Peacekeeping OperationsSurveys are showing a slight contradiction in Japanese opinion toward international relations that may be exploited later by politicians domestic and foreign. The general public, though wary of foreign involvement, is supportive of increasing Japan’s peacekeeping operations. The 2000 Cabinet Office poll on foreign relations shows that support for PKOs increased since 1995, the first year of the survey. Support for participation rose from 15.5 percent in 1995to 28.4 percent in 2000. Those opposed to increased participation has declined. Support for the “status quo” remains the top response and has been stable ranging from 43.4 percent in 1994 to 47.8 percent in 2000. Support for only minimum participation has declined from 25 percent in 1994 to 11.8 percent in 2000 while those who do not want any participation declined from 8.6 percent in 1995 to 2.1 percent in 2000 (See Figure 17).

118 Asahi Shimbun, 5/2/01, 6.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 41

Figure 17

Participation in Peace Keeping Operations

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Years

%

Increase ParticipationMaintain Status Quo

Minimum Participation

No Participation

Japan and Anti-TerrorismOverall, Japanese give tepid support for their county’s involvement in global anti-terrorism efforts. In a mid-October 2001 poll, Yomiuri reported 83 percent of Japanese “support or accept” on-going U.S.-led military action against terrorists in Afghanistan.119 One Kyodo News poll conducted in late October 2001, reported in its headline that “57% support antiterrorism bill.”120 These figures reported are aggregate and only 16.4 percent “firmly” approved of the bill with 40.6 percent supporting it “to some degree;” 24.7 percent said they were “generally against it,” and 14.2 percent were “definitely opposed.” In another Kyodo News poll conducted October 1-2, 2001, reportedly “2 out of 3 Japanese Back U.S. Retaliation for Attacks,” where 66 percent of respondents “support” air strikes against Afghanistan and 32 percent did not. 121 A closer look at this poll finds that only 17 percent “fully support” retaliatory strikes, 49 percent supported strikes “to a certain extent,” 23 percent said they were “not willing to support” strikes, and 9 percent said they would “not support at all.” Close analysis of these polls finds the Japanese more equivocal than their newspaper headlines suggest.

As noted above when discussing the role of the SDF before 9/11, the Japanese place a priority on enhancing domestic security and avoiding conflict. To compare with the polls conducted after September 11, it is interesting to look at results from a May 2001 Asahi poll, mentioned earlier.”122 When asked if

119 “Poll: 83% Accept U.S. Military Action; 65% Appreciate Government Response; 63% in Favor of Japan’s Cooperation to Help Refugees,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 10/23/01, p1. Nationwide survey of 1,911 eligible voters, conducted October 20-21, 2001. [US Embassy translation].120 “57% Support Antiterrorism Bill, 63% Back U.S. Strikes,” Kyodo News, 10/29/2001. Nationwide survey of 1,060 eligible voters, conducted October 27-28 by phone.121 “2 Out of 3 Japanese Back U.S. Retaliation for Attacks,” Kyodo News, 10/3/01. Nationwide survey of 1,884 people over 20-years old, conducted October 1-2, 2001. [FBIS Transcribed Text, JPP20011029000111]122 “Poll on Political Parties, Constitutional Issues,” Asahi Shimbun, 5/2/01, p6. [US Embassy translation].

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 42

Japan should limit its PKO “cooperation to non-military activities,” 66 percent agreed, 24 percent disagreed, and 10 percent did not know/did not answer. The results show an inward-looking populace preferring to use their resources to deal with domestic rather than international problems before September 11, 2001.

Of the Japanese surveyed in the post-September 11 Kyodo News poll, only 8 percent cited “full support including use of force by Self Defense Forces”; 52 percent listed “medical services and refugee rescue operations;” 19 percent listed “transport of provisions and supply of fuel;” 9 percent said “supplying and transporting weapons and ammunition;” “financial help” was cited by 5 percent and 4 percent said there was “no need to offer any support” (See Figure 18).

Figure 18

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

MedicalServices and

Refugee RescueOperations

Transport ofProvisions andSupply of Fuel

Supply andTransportingWeapons andAmmunition

Full SupportIncluding Useof Force by

SDF

Financial Help No Need toOffer Support

What support should Japan provide US in retaliation for terrorist attacks?

The Kyodo poll also points out a significant gender gap, where 76 percent of men said they “support” retaliatory action by the U.S. while only 56 percent of women would. These figures are aggregate and combine the answers “fully support” and “support to some extent.” Women clearly support military action much less than men.

Other polls show the actual level of support that Japanese give to the U.S. led war on terrorism, which is not very much. The November 30, 2001 Yomiuri-Gallup poll on U.S.-Japan relations shows a Japanese split in support of Koizumi’s efforts to counter terrorism; although noted above the results are worth repeating.123 Support was split, 48.5 percent appreciated their country’s antiterrorism response either “very much” or “somewhat,” and 43.3 percent did not appreciate it “very much” or “at all” with 8.2 percent not responding. On November 20, 2001 Mainichi Shimbun found that 50 percent “support the U.S. military action” against Afghanistan and 42 percent did not.124 Further, 64 percent of men “supported” the actions while only 38 percent of women did. This poll also noted the amount of support to expect if an SDF member is killed in the line of duty assisting the U.S. In this case, only 39 percent felt that Japan should “continue the SDF dispatch” and 52 percent end the deployment.

123 “Japan, U.S. Pollees Say Bilateral Relationship is Good,” Yomiuri Shimbun Online, 11/30/01. 124 “Poll on Japan’s Response to Terror,” Mainichi Shimbun, 11/20/01. Nationwide survey of 1,066 people over 20-years old, conducted November 17, 2001 by phone. [US Embassy translation].

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 43

Japanese, despite the “war on terrorism,” continue to place a higher priority on issues other than national security. A May 2001 Yomiuri Shimbun poll asked what Prime Minister Koizumi’s policy priorities should be: 73.6 percent believed it should be “economic recovery.”125 Other economic priorities topped the list with 44.7 percent seeing “economic, fiscal reforms” and 26.6 percent seeing “disposal of bad loans” as high priorities. Only 7.6 percent thought that “security issues, such as emergencies legislation,” should be a top priority for the Prime Minister.

As to how they view the sending of SDF ships to assist the U.S.-led efforts, Japanese public opinion wavers. In an Asahi Shimbun poll conducted in late September 2001, 46 percent did not believe SDF ships should be dispatched while 42 percent thought that they should.126 Japanese also do not want the SDF to use their weapons to actively participate in the “war on terrorism”: 51 percent oppose the idea of easing restrictions on weapons use by the SDF while only 39 percent are in favor. A Kyodo News poll, mentioned above, conducted October 27-28, 2001, shows that almost half, 49.5 percent of the Japanese public, want prior Diet approval for the dispatch of the SDF.127

An Attack On Japan?Although these polls do not suggest what further support Japan should/could offer in the current war against terrorism or what Japan would do if there were a terrorism attack on Japanese soil, the 2000 JDA poll might offer some insight.128 The JDA asked what Japanese citizens would do if Japan was attacked and invaded. The survey found that few would support an active resistance and even fewer would personally put up a fight. The responses were: 43.3 percent would support the SDF, but not fight personally; 19 percent would participate in non-military resistance; and 8.9 percent would put forth no resistance. A minority would participate personally in fighting off an invading force: 6.9 percent would join the SDF to fight and 1.7 percent would participate in guerilla warfare (See Figure 19).

Figure 19125 “Poll on Koizumi Cabinet, Political Parties,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 5/29/01, p2. Nationwide survey of 1,987 eligible voters, conducted May 26-27, 2001 by face-to-face interviews. [US Embassy translation].126 “46% Oppose Plan To Use SDF Ships in U.S. Retaliatory Operations,” Asahi Shimbun, 10/1/01. Nationwide survey of 2,119 people, conducted September 28-29, 2001 by phone. [US Embassy translation].127 Kyodo News, 10/29/2001. 128 Japan Defense Agency 2000.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 44

Thus, Koizumi’s hesitant anti-terrorism response is not inconsistent with Japanese values or views before or after September 11, 2001. He delivered what he could within Japanese self-perceptions. There is nothing truly ideologically new in Japan’s antiterrorism efforts. The dispatch of MSDF ships has been limited to non-military objectives far away from the front lines of Afghanistan. Japan has only transported aid, fuel, and non-military supplies. Under the current anti-terrorism law passed in October 2001, there is a time limit of six months for assistance in the Afghan effort only, the level of possible assistance is listed in detail, and Diet approval is necessary. Further debates and legislation are necessary if Japan’s leaders wishes to expand its involvement in global anti-terrorism efforts. Koizumi has done nothing that opinion polls show that the Japanese people would oppose.

WHAT IS NEW?

If Japanese public opinion has been consistent over the past decades and among generations, what is new? The surveys show a greater pessimism coupled with a desire for political change. There is greater concern for personal and local issues while national and international concerns seem increasingly distant. The opinion gaps appear between elites and average citizens and between men and women.

WomenWhere the opinion gaps do exist in Japan they are clearly between women and men. The late 19 th century, post-Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) notion of “good wife, wise mother” [ryosai kenbo] as woman’s proper role in imperial Japan continued until late into the 1970s.129 If there is one tradition that has been let go it is this one. Women are no longer content just to stay home. By 1998, the National Survey found that 50 percent (only 29 percent in 1958) believed that there was no inherent difference in abilities between men and women.130 With demographics encouraging more women to enter the professional workforce they

129 See Kathleen S. Uno, “The Death of ‘Good Wife, Wise Mother’?” in Andrew Gordon, Editor, Postwar Japan As History, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 293-322. 130 National Survey, #6.5.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 45

will be increasingly found in positions of authority in Japan. In the surveys reviewed above, women are uniformly more cautious about the use of force and the expansion of international obligations. In today’s politics, women are the most discontented and the most likely to support reform. They are using their voting power and are increasingly willing to participate in politics.

New Assertiveness?Yes, Japanese officials appear more assertive and outspoken than in the past. They are willing to interpret, publicly correct, and repeatedly question their Western counterparts. American policy officials and analysts have been quite struck by this “new” stance. It is an attitude noticed and discussed in the West. It is new to senior members of the U.S. policy community used to traditional Japanese social interactions.

Internationalization and Western education has prompted the younger members of Japan’s foreign policy community to provide their own interpretation of “being like an American.” They are willing to express what their elders could only whisper among themselves. Badgering, interrupting, and soliloquizing are common misinterpretations of Western discourse and debate. At present, this assertiveness stands out because it is simply boorish and untoward. They are also symptoms of insecurity, rather than confidence.

These mannerisms may fade. According to the National Survey, while Japanese feelings of superiority toward Western people peaked in 1983 at 53 percent, it dropped to 33 percent in 1998. Feelings of inferiority rose during this period from 8 percent to 11 percent and feelings that the Japanese are the same rose from 12 percent to 32 percent.131

New PessimismAlthough contemporary surveys show that the Japanese have never held much faith in the future, the current pessimism is a postwar historic low. The Japanese people are worried about their future and dismiss politicians who claim things will improve. All generations take an exceptionally grim view of their lives and anticipate little change or things getting worse. The National Survey found that the Japanese saw the future of their “peace of mind” as diminishing. Those who answered “diminishing” were 51 percent in 1978 and 70 percent in 1998 while whose who answered “increasing” dropped from 24 percent in 1978 to 9 percent in 1998.132

In a Cabinet Office Survey released December 14, 2001, about 65 percent felt troubled or uncertainty about life, the highest rate on record. Asked what the troubles and uncertainties are about, 47.1 percent of respondents selected post-retirement finances, 43.6 percent health, 38.5 percent family members’ health, and 37.8 percent future income or assets. The percentage of respondents who indicated the sense of unease--65.1 percent--was up 2.7 percentage points from the previous survey conducted in December 1999. It was the highest figure since the government began conducting similar surveys in 1958. The rate of those who think life will get better was 6.2 percent, the lowest figure ever recorded. Those who said life would be worse comprised 28.4 percent, the second highest figure since the 29.9 percent figure posted in 1974 following the oil crisis of 1973, which triggered an economic recession in Japan.133

131 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #9.6.132 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Japan, #7.18b.133 As reported by Kyodo News 12/15/01. http://home.kyodo.co.jp/all/display.jsp?an=20011215067.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 46

New Politics: Koizumi EffectPolitics has gotten fun in Japan. Koizumi sporting a bosuzoku-style hair cut [permed like young Japanese bikers] and free of any family obligations has the appeal of something out of the ordinary, daring, and youthful. He is a physical symbol of a new Japan. He appeals to growing trend toward individual voters who will vote for anything new just to shake up the system.

Japanese citizens are voting less nationally, but more locally. Personal needs and managing community problems, not international concerns, propel the independent voters. Koizumi has used every means to capture this vote. His advisers like American “spin doctors” carefully track the opinion polls and manage his media relations by paying attention to the 70 percent who do not read the political reporting in newspapers. Koizumi responds to interviews by manga, sports journals, and women’s magazines.134

Through the first year of his Administration his policies have never fallen far from the results of Japanese opinion polls.

PRIVATE OBSERVATIONS OF EMERGING POLICY ELITES

Data aside, younger American and Japanese foreign policy elites have their own observations on the changes in Japan and how it affects Japan-U.S. relations. In informal interviews conducted by a conservative Washington think tank (CSIS) with a limited number from these two potential leadership groups, a similarity can be found in their acceptance of a closer Japan-U.S. security relationship. The differences appear, as they do in the polling data above, in the definitions of “closer” and in the expectations for international involvement. Personal perceptions of each country’s economic and political power factor heavily into what each believes can be achieved. This too is reflected in the public surveys above.

Japan’s next generation of leaders, like the general public, looks back to traditional values, is cautious in expanding Japan’s obligations, and is unwilling to completely rearrange the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. On the other hand, America’s next generation is optimistic, sees Japan as a critical ally, and expects Japan to do more for international security. There is more of a disconnect between U.S. and Japanese opinions than there are among generations in Japan.

Japan’s Next GenerationInterviews with a number of emerging Japanese elites, many resident in Washington, show that they are very aware of the lack of respect Japan garners in international society. As one of their American counterparts observed, “the emerging generation of political elites in Tokyo resents the lack of initiative in Japanese foreign policy and chafes at American policies that treat them as passive partners.” 135 These young leaders, unlike the general public, are not comfortable with Japan’s diminishing power. They are even less sanguine with being Washington’s “junior partner.”

Ms. Hiromi Murakami of the Washington, DC, Economic Strategy Institute noted “Japan is not being respected internationally, in terms of diplomacy, economic policies, and political leadership.”136 It is not uncommon to find this generation believing that this lack of respect is due to the unequal security relationship with the United States. Ikuko Toyonaga, an Associate Professor at Kyushu University, states it most starkly,

Most people belonging to this [younger generations of Japanese, 46-55 years old] must feel they surrendered to the U.S. This generation makes the strongest stand against the

134 “Prime Minister Koizumi’s Close Aide Reveals Strategy of How High Popularity of Koizumi is Kept,” Asahi, November 21, 2001, 3. [US Embassy Translation]135 Michael Green, “The Forgotten Partner” in The National Interest, Summer 2000, 42.136 Written response to survey questions by Hiromi Murakami, Research Associate, Economic Strategy Institute.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 47

reform among other generations….They can be compared to the generation which belonged to the Tokugawa shogunate at the time of arrival of Commodore Perry. This generation is likely to compare the present time to the Occupation period.137

Toyonaga’s “Tokugawaization” of Japan acknowledges that Japan is looking inward and withdrawing from external relationships. Like the Tokugawa Bakufu (the military government from 1603-1868), Japan is retreating internationally, lessening the authority of a strong central government, promoting traditional values, and inhibiting economic expansion through archaic laws. This trend, he finds, needs to be countered.

Others also expressed disappointment with Japan’s position in the world, though their reasons varied from the Constitution to poor public relations to ineffective leadership. National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) research associate, Narushige Michishita, said, “Japan is not respected and appreciated enough by the international community. But I think this is Japan’s own doing in that it has had bad public relations and is constrained by its constitution.”138 Motoyuki Nakanishi, of JDA’s Washington, DC liaison office felt that:

…looking at our current situation, Japan does not have enough vitality that is worth respecting; Japan could not overcome the recession after the bubble economy, and did not play a minimum role in the security field…some nations might disrespect Japan because Japan relies on the United States too much; maybe this is Japan’s, not the U.S.’s, fault in not taking initiative in the Japan-U.S. relationship.139

These dynamic, younger Japanese are clearly self-conscious about their country’s seemingly inferior position in international affairs. They agree with Nakanishi’s view that “if Japan was respected internationally, I think that this respect might come from our past, not our current status.”

To compensate, this generation sees the solution as taking on a larger, more visible security role for Japan. This means establishment of a more “independent self-defense.” It is interesting to note how similar this jushuboei view is to one held by their elders both in the 1950s and 1980s. An independent self-defense would be achieved through the reduction of American bases in Japan and the strengthening of defense capabilities. No one, however, was willing to sever the Japan-U.S. security relationship. DPJ (opposition party) Diet member Motohisa Furukawa observed “the U.S.-Japan relationship should actually be equal so that Japan should be in charge of its national security.”140

Hiroshi Mitsuishi, of MOFA’s Cabinet Information Research Office Foreign commented, “I would support the drastic reduction and a de facto withdrawal of the Marine Corps from Okinawa but I wouldn’t support the entire withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan. I believe the visible presence of the U.S. forces is still effective.”141 Seiji Maehara, a DPJ (opposition party) Diet member, was more direct:

I believe the U.S.-Japan relationship will remain very important in the 21 st century, but the current condition of burden sharing needs to be changed. We need to make efforts to

137 Written response to survey questions by Ikuko Toyonaga, an Associate Professor at Kyushu University.138 Written response to survey questions by Narushige Michishita, Research Associate, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), November 6, 2000.139 Written response to survey questions by Motoyuki Nakanishi, of the Washington, DC liaison office of the JDA, January 29, 2001. 140 Written response to survey questions by Motohisa Furukawa, Member House of Representatives, Democratic Party of Japan, November 13, 2000.141 Written response to survey questions by Hiroshi Mitsuishi, Foreign Affairs Department, Cabinet Information Research Office, November 2000.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 48

reduce U.S. bases in Okinawa….To make up for the decline of U.S. forces capability caused by the future base reduction, Japanese should take a bigger role in the alliance. The new roles will include exercise of right of collective self-defense, legislature of emergency law, and more active participation in PKO.142

The new generation sees U.S. troops in Japan as simply enhancing Japan’s own security. Tomoyuki Ishizu, a NIDS assistant professor, took a traditional, albeit condescending view in saying that

U.S. forces in Japan are necessary for Japan as well as the region’s peace and stability. Even if Japan is the only Asian country to host an U.S. military presence, I think that it’s a bargain for Japan. It’s more cost effective to hire a ‘mercenary army’ such as the U.S. military than build a homegrown military. For centuries, many countries utilized mercenary armies to protect their interests. In this context, I see no problem of keeping U.S. troops in Japan.143

Although this generation is interested in continuing the Japan- U.S. security relationship, they do not want to become overly involved or dragged unwillingly into a situation beyond their control. They want to make their own choices that will be compatible with Japanese values. As Murakami said “If a [regional war] is solely for U.S. interest, then I feel it is wrong [for Japan to participate]. If Japan legitimately supports U.S. actions, then I feel differently. Therefore, revision or redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security treaty is necessary to make it explicit what Japan stands for.”144

Tomoyuki Ishizu said that “I think it’s quite unlikely that the U.S. will go to war over Taiwan. In such an event, Japan should remain neutral while keeping the alliance.”145 Asahi political analyst Kazuo Sato simply observes that the U.S. would use its Japanese bases in a Taiwan confrontation, and thus it is a situation that Japan “should make the greatest effort to avoid.” 146 The JDA’s Nakanishi worries that if Japan had “to deal with a contingency in the Taiwan Straits” it would be “very nervously and carefully.”

More sympathetic to U.S. regional security interests were the two respondents with close ruling-LDP ties. Tsuneo Watanabe (son of Kozo Watanabe, vice speaker of Japan's House of Representatives and former MITI minister, and longtime U.S. resident researcher at CSIS) believes that “US-Japan security cooperation is against any regional threat in the region. Taiwan Straits cannot be excluded even though huge political difficulty exists.” Not to “provide appropriate cooperation” to the U.S. in the Taiwan Straits “would endanger the vital interests for the survival of Japan.”147 LDP coalition partner New Komeito Diet member Isamu Ueda added that he thinks, “most Japanese would support U.S. forces in Japan’s combat role in the Taiwan Strait.148

Interestingly, despite the new generation’s desire for change, none interviewed saw the real possibility of major changes or a “third revolution” coming. More considered the possibility of a global revolution in power and values. Furukawa best expressed this sentiment by noting that:

142 Written response to survey questions by Seiji Maehara, Member, House of Representatives, Democratic Party of Japan, November 14, 2000.143 Interview with Tomoyuki Ishizu, assistant professor, Military History Department, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), November 7, 2000.144 Interview with Hiromi Murakami.145 Interview with Tomoyuki Ishizu.146 Written response to survey questions by Kasuo Sato, Political Reporter, Asahi Shimbun.147 Written response to survey questions by Tsuneo Watanabe, CSIS Fellow.148 Written response to survey questions by Isamu Ueda, Member House of Representatives, New Komeito, November 6, 2000.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 49

The value that prevailed after the Industrial Revolution was the European value of dualism influenced by Christianity, arguing zero or one, good or evil, black and white. However, an Oriental value based on pluralism influenced by Buddhism will be more influential in the 21st century. This new value system will be adopted by the Americans and the Europeans too.

Interestingly, several interviewed saw the revolution as a “return to the future,” to the Meiji Restoration. Michishita believes the current changes resemble more the “Meiji Restoration than the post-war changes because this is something that the Japanese have chosen, not forced upon us like the post-war period.” Echoing this sentiment is Professor Toyonaga who sees the “beginning of liberalization and individualism.” He finds that “it is desirable that people have an enterprising spirit and the society is open to the foreign countries like the era of civilization and enlightenment after Meiji Restoration.”

Although some of public opinion data discussed in previous sections show a gap between the new generation leadership’s willingness to strengthen Japanese foreign and security policy, up close this generation does not differ much from the general public. They, in fact, profoundly reflect the worries, aspirations, and values of their generation, in general. Japan’s greatest national security challenge, as reported by Sato, “is whether Japan can maintain a healthy U.S.-Japan security relationship.” China is a close second as a worry.

Japanese Intergenerational ContrastsNevertheless, the new generation appears different. Elders are surprised by the self-assured, bellicose nature of their younger counterparts. An interesting intergenerational discussion on “Where is This Country Going” between liberal social critic Soichira Tahara (born 1934) and nationalistic literary critic Kazuya Fukuda (born 1960), highlights not necessarily generational contrasts but current strains in reevaluating the Japan-U.S. relationship. Fukuda emphasizes recapturing Japan’s past and its national character. He sees that the relationship with the United States has devalued both.

Fukuda: I think that Japan needs to get rid of the coaxing and indulgent attitude it has brought to US-Japan relations to date. The connection will be lost if we continue to believe in the fantasy since the time of the so-called Yoshida doctrine of an alliance. Tahara: But if we do away with that fantasy, won't the connection between the United States and Japan vanish? Fukuda: It is only a matter of rearranging the U.S.-Japan alliance on actual foundations, rather than fantasies. Tahara: What are the foundations? Fukuda: Because the economy isn't doing well, it's probably politics and the military. ….Tahara: Why does Japan have a poor sense of strategy? Fukuda: The Yoshida doctrine was strategic. However, because it succeeded all too well -- because everyone was happy and said that's enough and they made Yoshida into an excuse to stop thinking. ….Kakuei Tanaka, I don't believe the feeling had yet emerged that we were an advanced nation. Fukuda: During that time, Japan quietly left the Yoshida doctrine behind. It seems to me that, even more so than at present, we were doing things out of concern for national strategy. For example, Kakuei Tanaka, even if only a little, thought about energy self-sufficiency and he began projects such as nuclear fuel cycles. I wonder if it isn't possible that Japan, had we pushed a little more in the direction of economics or national

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 50

security, would have become, to a certain extent, to use your words, a whale with a high I.Q. ….Fukuda: However, that as well is not a matter of rules. It's just a matter of how we make car parts. If we take it one step further, I wonder if we have no desire to create rules. Tahara: Haven't we given up on it out of concern that another war will result if we try to make rules? (Kiichi) Miyazawa said something interesting. The Japanese are bad at making clothes that fit their own bodies but they are really good at making their bodies fit into clothes that are forced upon them. Fukuda: I think that such Miyazawa-like thoughts have destroyed Japan. Miyazawa probably really dislikes the United States. But such people are becoming the biggest slaves to the United States. ….Fukuda: If they understand that Japan is reliable, then they will deal with us. That's because, as a practical matter, it's much better for the United States to ally itself with Japan rather than with China. Tahara: I think that Japan, as well, at least through the early nineties, thought that way as well. But "Japan bashing" has turned to "Japan gnashing." And Clinton, even though he takes a nine-day trip to China, won't stop in Japan. Haven't the Japanese lost their self-confidence? Fukuda: The United States holds Japan in contempt because we take Miyazawa-like responses. The United States cannot stand servile and slave-like people who listen to whatever they say. That's because such people have no character. It's not only Miyazawa. I believe it's true of everyone in the entire conservative mainstream of the Liberal Democratic Party. Tahara: What does it mean to have no character? Fukuda: It means not having any guts. We have no determination to show our values even if means our life. It's not that if we did show that, it would mean war. We have enough sense, not to engage in war although we display our values. Although our world outlook is different from the United States, there are many points on which, politically and culturally, we could forge a connection. Thus why can't we ask the United States to join us in making a world, supplementing each other's needs. ….Tahara: To date, Japanese have thought it bad to consider such matters as the Japanese spirit. I think that the postwar was certainly such an age. However, I think that an age is coming in which we must once again reclaim our identity as Japanese. Fukuda: I agree. Specifically, I think it is important that we first clearly and consciously think of ourselves as Japanese. So long as Japanese are living in Japan, they will be able to go from day to day without ever considering the fact that they are Japanese. We need to escape from this low-tension. Tahara: But since a low-tension situation is a happy situation, isn't that best? When tension is high, it means a time or crisis in which there is fighting and competition. Fukuda: That happiness it the happiness of a patient suffering with opium poisoning. It's precisely the feeling that characterized the end of the Manchu dynasty. That low tension leads to spiritual decadence and a lack of responsibility. Thinking that I am a Japanese leads to thoughts of thinking how one behaves toward the public or how to recapture that thought. That route is very important.149

149 “Interview by Soichiro Tahara, critic and journalist, with Kazuya Fukuda, literary critic, “‘Where is This Country Going,’ Why does the U.S. want to join with China and not with Japan? It's because the United States relies upon the country by which it is threatened rather than the lowly slave,” Chuo Koron, September 1998, pp 70-79, [FBIS Translation, Document ID: FTS19981103001809].

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 51

America’s Next GenerationInterviews with younger scholars and donors at CSIS that may become America’s next generation of foreign policy elites show a contrast in style and assumptions with their Japanese counterparts. The Americans are straightforward and confident. As the polls of American attitudes (see below) toward Japan show, this generation believes Japan is an important country and that the security alliance will strengthen. China is considered the regional threat and America’s greatest security challenge. This differs from their Japanese colleagues who saw their greatest challenge as finding how to work within American security expectations. With one exception, no American doubted that Japan would continue to be an American ally—whether by design or by fait accompli.

American confidence of its role in the world comes through with strategic consultant Alexia Suma’s statement that “The U.S. is a global power and must have a role in Asia.” 150 Investment banker Randall Fort wrote, “The U.S. is still the most significant actor in Asia. Its dominant status allows it to be a balancer and guarantor of security. Our relations in Asia are overall constructive.”151 Dean Mitchell Reese of the School of International Relations, College of William & Mary said, “The U.S. is essential for stabilizing the region on the security/military side. We are an important force and need to maintain our allied commitment.”

This generation assumes that Japan and Asia welcome our military assistance. Investment banker Ken Moskow, when asked whether Japan would welcome the use of their bases in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, exclaimed: “Of course, the U.S. should use their bases. The region would be happy to have U.S. assistance. The governments will thank us for our help.”152 Dean Reese noted that this situation “will create strains with Japan, since they will not agree to U.S. use beforehand….If Japan strongly protests, fairly unlikely, then the U.S. would be in a bit of trouble.” Although conscious of Japanese unease with using their bases in a conflict, most agree with Washington Quarterly editor, Alex Lennon who believes “the Japanese are unlikely to object to the force use if it is during a crisis; thus the negotiations [over base usage] are unnecessary.” This view that America must and will have access to its Japanese bases is best summarized by Fort who bluntly said: “The U.S. should use their troops for whatever they would be needed for.”

These younger Americans continue to view Japan as America’s security policy subordinate. Meghan O’Sullivan now with the Bush Administration’s Policy Planning staff at the State Department, said the “U.S. should support Japanese efforts for a limited, but larger role in supporting forces, while being careful of regional opinions.”153 Suma was blunter: “The relationship is valuable, but the emphasis should be on maintenance, not strengthening.” Others noted, like Randall Fort, Japan’s economy as hindering the alliance for “Japan will be less willing to engage internationally.”

Though few see the Japan-U.S. relationship compared to the one the U.S. has with Great Britain, they do like the metaphor. “There is political benefit to making the relationships symbolically similar,” wrote Lennon.154 Only one interviewee differed from his colleagues, Army Major and West Point history professor Robert Bateman dismissed the China threat as a “red herring.”155 He said that “China is not a direct, and barely an indirect threat to U.S. interests.” To him, the biggest challenge to America’s national security “will be the loss of U.S. bases in Japan and Korea, especially after Korean reunification.” He was

150 Written response to survey questions by Alexia Suma, Senior Analyst, Stratfor.151 Written response to survey questions by Randall Fort, Vice President, Goldman Sachs.152 Written response to survey questions by Dean Mitchell Reese of the School of International Relations, College of William & Mary.153 Written response to survey questions by Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution.154 Written response to survey questions by Alex Lennon, Editor-in-Chief, The Washington Quarterly.155 Written response to survey questions by Major Robert Bateman, CSIS Military Fellow, U.S. Military Academy.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 52

the only one that did not have great expectations of Japan. He saw alliance alternatives such as Australia and the Philippines.

In general, this next American generation believes that the relationship will not weaken. They merely want to be assured that Japan held the same views on regional security as Americans. Some like CSIS’s Asian Studies deputy coordinator, Karen Wong, agreed that Japan should be a close ally, “but so long as it is not at the expense of relations with other countries.”156 Many of the old fears that Japan’s leader held about the U.S.unilateralism, lack of appreciation, and possible abandonment—are unknowingly echoed by this new generation of American Asia policy professionals.

U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

American public opinion also reflects the optimistic attitudes expressed above. As their Japanese counterparts become increasingly independent and pessimistic, Americans remain hopeful, even after the September 11, 2001 terrorism incident and announcements of a recession in the U.S. Herein lies an important dissonance when discussing U.S.-Japan security ties. While the Japanese are unsure of their future and want to have the means to be independent from the U.S., the Americans retain their can-do spirit and see deeper cooperation with Japan as natural. Japan was part of U.S. security policy. Americans consider the relationship sound and have long believed the security alliance implied common interests and common enemies. Disappointment came when the Japanese appeared to not understand this linkage. Surprise comes from when the Japanese goals differ from those in the U.S.

Americans see the Japan-U.S. “alliance” (in the U.S. the reference to the security arrangement is always “the alliance”) as strong as ever. This can be seen in President Bush’s December 7, 2001 speech on the 60th Anniversary Pearl Harbor Day aboard the USS Enterprise. There are many mentions of the enemy in his speech but only one reference to Japan. The President said: “Today we take special pride that one of our former enemies is now among America’s finest friends: we’re grateful to our ally, Japan, and to its good people. Today, our two Navies are working side by side in the fight against terror.”157

Before 9/11In the few polls taken both before and after 9/11, U.S. opinion toward Japan has been quite positive. In a four-country, January 2001 Harris Interactive poll asking “impressions” of other countries, 47 percent of Americans rated Japan as “favorable” (40 percent had no opinion) and 11 percent saw Japan unfavorably.158 American elite opinion of Japan, however, is often much higher than that of the general public. In a March 2001 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) poll on U.S. opinion toward Japan, 75 percent of those defined as opinion leaders have a “favorable” view of Japan compared with only 40 percent of the general public.159 The 1999 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) Survey of 156 Written response to survey questions by Karen Wong, CSIS Asian Studies Program Coordinator.157 George H.W. Bush, “We're Fighting to Win - And Win We Will,” Remarks By The President On The USS Enterprise On Pearl Harbor Day, USS Enterprise, December 7, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011207.html.158 Humphrey Taylor, “Of Those Who Have an Opinion (and Many Do Not) Majorities in Japan, South Korea, and Beijing Have Favorable Impressions of USA,” Harris Interactive Poll #8, 1/31/2001. In US, nationwide survey of 1,023 people over 18-years old, conducted November 13-18, 2000 by phone. In Japan, nationwide survey of 2,094 people over 20-years old, conducted November 19-20, 2000 face-to-face. http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=218 159 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, “The 2001 US Poll on Opinions toward Japan.” For ‘General Public’: nationwide survey of 1,509 people over 18-years old, conducted March 2001 by phone. For ‘Opinion Leaders’: survey of 375 people in “leading positions in the field of politics, administration, business, academia, labor, media and religion,” conducted March 2001 by phone. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/survey/summary2001.html MOFA only provides statistics for this question starting in 1995. This it is impossible to use these MOFA’s numbers to see how US opinion has changed

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 53

American public opinion on U.S. foreign policy also shows that Americans have “warm” feelings toward Japan, rating 55º on their “Country Thermometer.” 160 A rating above 50º is positive. The CCFR survey shows that this “warm” perception by Americans has been relatively stable since 1978, the first year they give numbers, with a rating of 56º, 53º in 1982, 61º in 1986, 52º in 1990; 53º in 1994, and 55º in 1998.161

What does seem to be changing is the increasing importance Americans, especially among elites, place upon Japan. The 1999 CCFR Survey, rated Japan as the most “vital” country in the world by 87 percent of the general public and the second most by 94 percent of opinion leaders. China was first with 95 percent.162 The importance placed on Japan is increasing. In 1978, 78 percent of the CCFR general public respondents saw Japan as a vital interest to the U.S.

Japan is viewed increasingly as a valuable partner to the United States. According to the 2001 MOFA poll, 61 percent of the general public and 85 percent of American opinion leaders agreed that Japan is a “dependable ally or friend.”163 This has increased substantially. Only 30 percent of Americans in 1960 held this view. For elites, 80 percent agreed in 1993 (the first year in which this data is given). A survey conducted for the Henry Luce Foundation on U.S. opinions toward Asia in 1999 showed that 51 percent felt that Japan was America’s “most important partner” in Asia.164 The 2001 MOFA poll also showed that 49 percent of the general public and 72 percent of opinion leaders believed that Japan is the “most important partner” to the U.S. in the Asian region.165 In the same poll, 85 percent of respondents, both the general public (highest historical level) and opinion leaders, felt that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty should be “maintained.” Further, 89 percent of the general public (another historical high level) and 82 percent of opinion leaders felt that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is either “very important” or “somewhat important.”

The rise of China has played a role in shaping American opinion toward Japan. The 1999 Henry Luce Foundation Survey concluded that “As China has emerged as a larger cause of concern for Americans, Japan’s former image as threat to the United States…has given way to a more relaxed and generally positive image.”166 Other polls show that Americans and Japanese alike share fears about China and would prefer to maintain closer relationships with one another. In an April 21, 1999 Harris Interactive Poll, only 29 percent of Americans and 30 percent of Japanese thought that they could work with China “to adopt the same common values about democracy and a market economy,” with 65 percent of Americans and 55 percent of Japanese agreeing.167 Furthermore, 47 percent of Americans and 55 percent of Japanese thought that relations with one another were more important than those with China, with only 36 percent of Americans and 15 percent of Japanese feeling that relations with China were more important. Gallup poll analyses show that since 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, U.S. public opinion has been more unfavorable of China than favorable. There has been an upward (more favorable) swing in

over time. 160 John E. Rielly; ed. American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1999, (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations [CCFR], 1999). For public: nationwide survey of 1,507 people over 18-years old, conducted October 15 – November 10, 1998 in person. For leadership: survey of 379 people in senior positions with knowledge of international affairs, conducted between November 2, and December 21, 1998. in person. http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/AmPuOp99.pdf161 Ibid, 30. 162 Ibid, 28. 163 MOFA Poll 2001.164 William Watts, “Americans Look at Asia: A Potomac Associates Policy Perspective,” (Henry Luce Foundation), 20. http://www.hluce.org/images/usasia_report_1099.pdf165 MOFA Poll 2001.166 Watts, 39.167 Humphrey Taylor, “Both Americans and Japanese See US/Japan Relations as More Important Than Their Relations With China,” (Harris Interactive Poll #26, 11/21/1999) http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=27

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 54

the polling numbers the last three times the poll was taken, with the last analysis jumping from 36 percent favorable and 57 percent unfavorable to 45 percent favorable and 47 percent unfavorable. 168 The April 2001 EP-3 spy plane incident has reversed this trend. In another Gallup poll conducted April 20-22, immediately after the incident on, 69 percent of Americans viewed China as either unfriendly or an enemy.169

The economic stagnation of Japan coupled with the continuing economic growth of the United States reduced worries that Japan could harm the U.S. economy. The CCFR poll shows substantial lessening of fears of economic competition from Japan as a critical threat.170 The general public registered a drop off in economic fears of Japan from 60 percent in 1990 to 64 percent in 1994 to 45 percent in 1998. Opinion leaders show a much more substantial decrease with 63 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 1994 to only 4 percent in 1998 showing concern.

After 9/11After September 11, Koizumi understood that the world would watch to see how well Japan would respond to the new international crisis. The reticence of Japan to become involved in the Gulf War both financially and militarily created an atmosphere of low expectations in the U.S. Koizumi’s rapid efforts to reinterpret constitutional restrictions on the use of force, to pass an “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,” to create a Basic Plan for the new laws, and to send destroyers to the Indian Ocean have impressed and amazed U.S. policy officials.

To be sure, there has been little negative to report to the general public: White House officials have described Koizumi’s post-attack call to Bush (“appreciated”), Koizumi’s visit (“fantastic meeting”), the package of legislation pushed through by the Prime Minister (“impressive”), and the JMSDF getting underway (“dramatic”). The December 10 meeting between the head of the JDA Director Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ended with the later declaring that there was “fine cooperation” in the anti-terrorism effort.

Americans have thus appreciated Japan’s efforts in aiding the U.S. According to a Yomiuri-Gallup poll taken in October 2001, 66.3 percent of Americans “appreciated to some extent” the Japanese response. 171

Japanese support for their government’s efforts however was not as strong, with public support at only 48.5 percent (See Figure 20).

Figure 20

168 David Moore, “Americans Divided in Feelings About China,” (Gallup Organization, 4/3/2001) http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010403.asp 169 Gallup Organization “Gallup Poll Topics: A-Z – China,” last accessed 11/28/01. http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indchina.asp 170 Rielly, ed., 32. 171 “Yomiuri-Gallup Poll on Terrorist Incidents in US,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 11/22/2001, 2. In US, nationwide survey of 1,010 eligible voters, conducted October 27 – November 12, 2001 by telephone. In Japan, nationwide survey of 1,287 eligible voters , conducted November 2-5 by phone.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 55

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

United States Japan

In response to the September 11 outbreak of terrorist attacks in the US, the Japanese government has taken a

series of measures. What do you think about them?

No Answer

Don't Appreciate AtAll

Don't AppreciateVery MuchAppreciate Somewhat

Appreciate VeryMuch

In another Harris poll of the American attitudes since September 11, 2001, Japan is rated as more of a “friend” than a close “ally.”172 This semantic nuance can be viewed as the English-language equivalent of Japan’s use of “arrangement” in place of “alliance.” Although 26 percent of Americans feel that Japan is a “close ally,” 39 percent see Japan as a “friend, not a close ally.” This view appears to have declined since 1982 when 35 percent found Japan a “close ally,” but increased from 1993 when only 13 percent of Americans found Japan a “close ally.” 23 percent of Americans thought of Japan as a “close ally” in the year 2000. The 2001 poll also found that many other nations, such as Spain (27 percent), Mexico (40 percent), and Italy (37 percent) rank higher as close allies in the American mind (See Figure 21).

Figure 21

How Americans View Japan - Trends On "Close Ally"1982 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200135% 27 13 14 14 19 21 19 23 23 26

As of December 2001, American opinion of Japan remains high after 9/11 even if the country is not seen as a close military ally. In a November 2001Yomiuri-Gallup poll on US-Japan relations, 72 percent of Americans and 53 percent of Japanese considered the U.S.-Japan relationship to be good, up 7 percent and 6 percent, respectively, since the last survey in 2000.173 This gap between Japanese and American views is also evident in levels of trust between nations. In Japan, 15.2 percent trusted America “very much,” 35.7 percent trusted “somewhat,” 26.1 percent did not trust America “very much,” 8.9 percent did not trust America “at all,” and 14.1 percent did not answer. Americans trust Japan much more than Japanese trust Americans: 25.9 percent trust Japan “very much,” 54.6 percent trusted Japan “somewhat,” 12.0 percent did not trust Japan “very much,” 5.3 percent did not trust Japan “at all,” and 2.2 percent did not answer.

172 Humphrey Taylor, “Events Since September 11th Have Changed the Way Many Americans View Other Countries,” Harris Interactive Poll #54, October 31, 2001. Nationwide poll of 1,011 adults, conducted October 17-22, 2001 by telephone. http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=265 173 “Japan, US Pollees Say Bilateral Relationship is Good,” Yomiuri Shimbun Online, 11/30/01. In Japan, nationwide poll of 1,287 eligible voters conducted November 2-5, 2001 by telephone. In US, nationwide survey of 1,010 eligible voters conducted October 27-November 12, 2001 by telephone.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 56

CONCLUSION

At the heart of the question of generational change in Japan-U.S. foreign policy, is “has Japan changed?” In many respects yes, in a number of other critical aspects, no. Japanese values have remained surprisingly stable with hints that conservative traditionalism is returning. Yet the old postwar system, which kept everybody comfortable and willing to sacrifice, is perceived to have failed, and more people are willing to consider the idea of taking risks for individual goals. These risks, however, are not for the Japanese nation itself.

Opinion polls show that the Japanese do not see themselves as world leaders either economically or politically. Deep pessimism surrounds today’s Japan. The Japanese accept that they have limited world power and their future is expected to be no different from the recessionary present. Withdrawal to family is a popular reaction. For international policy this suggests that Japan’s global interests will diminish and politicians will promote strategies closer to Japanese values. Surveys find that the role the Japanese people want to play in the world is contributing to international peace and improving the global environment. They see their armed forces engaging in projects at home in disaster relief and national security. Foreign involvements will be limited and the use of force cosmetic.

Japan’s leaders views did not differ greatly from those of the average citizens. Nor do they differ among generations. Young leaders too feel a loss of world respect, only more deeply. They worry that Japan’s greatest national security challenge is whether Japan can maintain a healthy Japan-U.S. security relationship. They do not want to abrogate the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, but they do want to see an “equal” alliance. What is “equal” is open to considerable debate.

Calls for an independent or autonomous defense are meant only to distance Japan from the pressures of widening obligations to the U.S. Efforts to change the Constitution, which has limited public support, are exercises to further separate Japan from America and its imposed rules. Independence can be interpreted as the desire to retreat to a safer, more understandable, less hurried past.

Postwar history has defined Japan’s generations. It is not just of the story of defeat, reconstruction and rebirth. It is also one of great successes, continued humiliations, and thwarted expectations. The “Nixon Shocks” greatly changed Japan’s picture of the U.S. as a reliable protector. Japan has expanded its security commitments as circumstances demand, not necessarily because the U.S. demanded it.

Much of what is interpreted as generational change among Japanese is simply frustration. As Tracy Dahlby, former Tokyo Bureau Chief for Newsweek who is working on a project on how Japan is changing noted in a December 2001 interview:

There is more openly expressed anger in Japanese society now than at any time in the 30 years I’ve been watching the country. I was surprised by the frankness with which young people spoke out about their parents’ generation, particular the fathers. They complain that their parents have failed to provide good role models for the kind of world they now face.174

For cosmopolitan elites, this frustration is expressed in “acting like an American”—combative, argumentative, and opinionated. What Americans see as a more “assertive” Japan may be merely a misinterpretation of Western debate etiquette. It is also a frustration with American views that do not

174 Interview with Tracy Dahly, “Hovering Japan: Quiet Revolution or Noisy Evolution,” The Daily Japan Digest, December 5, 2001, 5.

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 57

seem to change. The surprising finding from both American public opinion polls and personal interviews is how much Americans believe, in contrast to their Japanese counterparts, that Japan is an ally. Even young American elites accept as true that the U.S. is still the most significant actor in Asia and its dominant status allows it to be a balancer and guarantor of security. This new generation, believes as their mentors that Japan will support the U.S. whether by design or by fait accompli.

Last, the dangers of too rapidly restructuring Japan’s security relationships are the strain it may put on Japan’s political structure. Japan’s civil society is only beginning to emerge and public opinion only starting to matter. Emergency legislation presents opportunities to ignore democracy. Japanese do wonder what might have been the price of recent constitutional reinterpretation to expand the JSDF’s roles and missions. Noble Prizewinning, liberal writer Kenzaburo Oe, in a November 2001 interview with Le Monde stated these concerns most eloquently:

The “questionable fight” around the Constitution ended in victory for those who swept away with the back of the hand the ambiguity from the [Constitution’s] preamble in order to make it possible for Japan to participate in the war in Afghanistan. For myself, I judge that the Constitution and the post-war Japanese democracy were dead from that day on, or at least entered a comatose state, swept up by the bellicose fever of the United States. And, perhaps more serious, no one, or any significant movement has tried to bring it back.175

It is dangerous for Americans to be seen as tampering with Japan’s democracy. Pressures to amend the Constitution or to commit Japan to new international obligations are resented. Indeed, the differences between Japan’s generations are not so great as they are between Japanese and American colleagues.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1) “U.S. policymakers can no longer assume Japan’s automatic compliance with U.S. diplomacy—and certainly cannot assume Japanese passivity.”176 The Japanese have long held beliefs of the Constitution and the Security Treaty as American imposed and subject to eventual revision. As former Japanese Ambassador to India, Eijiro Noda observed:

However, the present system of defense cooperation based on the treaty has become increasingly irrelevant and is untenable. This so-called alliance does not exist beyond diplomatic rhetoric, both in terms of the geopolitical situation in the Far East and the unfortunate reality of base problems….For Japan and the United States to mutually enjoy a more salubrious and durable relationship, it would be in the genuine interest of both governments to terminate the security treaty. All U.S. military bases would be withdrawn and a new treaty of friendship and cooperation worked out.177

175 Kenzaburo Oé, Romancier Japonais:"Les Grandes Nations Sont Entrées Dans Un "Combat Douteux," Le Monde (Paris), November 26, 2001, http://www.lemonde.fr/rech_art/0,5987,248531,00.html [Le "combat douteux" autour de la Constitution s'est terminé par la victoire de ceux qui ont balayé d'un revers de main l'ambiguïté du préambule afin de faire participer le Japon à la guerre en Afghanistan. Pour ma part, j'estime que la Constitution et la démocratie japonaises d'après-guerre sont mortes ce jour-là, ou à tout le moins qu'elles sont entrées dans un état comateux, emportées par la fièvre belliqueuse des Etats-Unis. Et, plus gravement peut-être, personne, aucun mouvement conséquent, n'a essayé de les ranimer. JIAP translation].176 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, 9.177 Eijiro Noda, “Japan-US Security Treaty Should be Scrapped,” International Herald Tribune, June 23, 2001. http://www.iht.com/articles/23757.html

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 58

2) Be wary of the United States being seen as preventing, pushing or enabling changes in Japanese foreign policy. As part of imagining an independent foreign policy, Japan’s leaders nurture the impression that they are being pushed around or misled by the United States.

3) Do not expect Constitutional revision soon. While there is interest in revision of the Constitution there is little agreement on how and why it should be revised. A gap exists between elite opinions and the voters. The call for a constitutional debate reflects a mild, albeit safe, criticism of the United States. There are other issues such as the environment and personal liberties that interest Japanese voters more.

4) Take care not to attribute the “new” feistiness of Japanese officials to generational change alone. It can be simply a misinterpretation of Western interactions and debate. Having new diplomats with increased experience in international issues and situations does not always translate into a full understanding of social mores and etiquette. Whereas the older generations hid their uncertainties behind Japanese formality, the newer officials hide theirs behind badgering, blunt statements, and fault-finding. They are unaware of how startling and inappropriate this is in the West and how they are viewed as rude and boorish. This language and culture gap is widening.

5) Do not assume that elites have as much power or influence as once believed. The Koizumi “revolution” recognized that the average Japanese voter matters and capitalized a range of laws and trends empowering Japan’s citizens. Although there is distrust of politicians and erratic voting, the focus of voter interest remains domestic. Foreign involvements do not see relevant. The popularity of Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka demonstrates an interest in reigning in foreign policy. Political leadership does follow Japanese public opinion.

6) Reach out to new opinion makers groups in both the U.S. and Japan. If the generations are changing and individual interests are expanding it is important to establish ties with those not traditionally considered part of the security community. Young scholars and heads of new NGOs are finding avenues to make their opinions heard. While it is unusual to find women and minorities at policy meetings on security, it is now important to insist on including representatives from organizations that have ties to the broadening spectrum of security interests. This is not affirmative action but a serious effort to hear alternative and emerging voices on security policy.178 Japanese women are smart, ambitious, and mad. With Japan adjusting itself to accept an empress and a dwindling labor pool, expect to see more Japanese women are publicly wielding authority. Japanese political reformers will all have to appeal to the concerns of women. U.S. officials should expect to see many more Japanese women involved in foreign policy especially in public diplomacy.

7) Pay careful attention to language nuances. If policy elites and the public is chary about using the word alliance or use it with alternative meaning this presages a deeper, ideological disconnect. Pay more attention to language. Listen carefully to what words the Japanese use in their formal discussions. Also be careful of American political slang and imagery. It is unlikely that the Japanese, no matter how good their spoken English sounds understand the language of popular political culture.

8) Track how attitudes in Japan are changing. Encourage funding and projects to enhance access to Japanese and Asian survey data in English to international scholars. This would enhance better analysis of political trends. In addition, a better job needs to be done to explain Japanese public opinion to the American foreign policy community. The gaps in perception are evident in the interviews of the Japanese and Americans.

178 See: Diversity in American Foreign Policy: Does it Matter? Remarks by Walter E. Massey, President, Morehouse College to the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, December 5, 2001, http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS/speeches/massey.htm

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 59

9) Hold no romantic notions of Japan or U.S. presence in Asia. In November 2001, a question went out to the NBR Forum, a newsgroup for Japan experts, on observations about Japanese generational change. The responses are best summarized by a non-Japanese scholar, who noted:

It is probably a good idea, when looking at debates the Japanese have on defense/foreign policy, and the actions actually taken by the Japanese leadership, to make a distinction between the views of what could be considered the Japanese foreign policy elite (bureaucrats, think tankers, politicians, etc.), and the people on the street (especially younger Japanese people). While elements of Japan's foreign policy elite, in my experience at least, seem to want a more activist foreign policy (activist in this case does not mean militaristic either, just not the passive/reactive approach taken in the past five decades), they are in many ways the lonely voices making impassioned speeches to a bored and indifferent crowd. While a situation like this provides a certain amount of autonomy to Japanese policy makers, it also means that anytime they need to carry out a foreign policy endeavor requiring substantial sacrifices in terms of manpower, finances, and political capital, the public support will not be there.179

Thus far, polling data and people’s observations support the above observation. Elite views reflect public opinion and public opinion matters more than ever. With domestic politics so urgent, it is likely that across generations any changes in security policy will be tempered by practicality.

179 Stanley Chan, NBR Fourm Post, 12/9/01, http://lists.nbr.org/japanforum .

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 60

Appendix I

Timeline of Opinion on US-Japan Relations

"What do you think about US-Japan Relations?"

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Years

%

Japan GoodJapan NeitherJapan BadUS GoodUS NeitherUS Bad

1978-1999 data from: Makoto Iokibe, ed. Yoron Chousa Ni Miru Nichi-Bei Kankei: Yomiuri-Gallup Kyodo Chousa 22 Nen:

Anzen Hosho Mondai Ga Konkan Wo Yusaburu. [Public Opinion Poll on US-Japan Relations: The 22nd Yomiuri-Gallup-Kyodo Poll: 2000]. (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 2000), 4-5. Data collected by face to face interviews.2000-2001 data from:

Yoron Chousa Ni Miru Nichi-Bei Kankei: Yomiuri-Gallup Kyodo Chousa 24 Nen. [Public Opinion Poll on US-Japan Relations: The 24th Yomiuri-Gallup-Kyodo Poll]. Data collected by phone interviews during October and November 2001.

N.B.: Bolded timeline entries are the ones highlighted by in the original of the timeline above by Yomiuri from their 1999 Yomiuri/Gallup survey; all others entries were added by the authors of this monograph.)

1951 September – First US-Japan Security Treaty signed.1954 July – Japan Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces are formed.1957 May – Japan adopts Basic Policy for National Defense.1960 January – New US-Japan Security Treaty signed.1961 July – Japan releases second defense buildup plan.1963 Misuya Study recommending consideration of legislation for emergency situations

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 61

1967 March – Japan releases third defense buildup plan.December – Prime Minister Sato announces Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

1968 July – President Nixon announces the “Guam Doctrine” – US allies have first responsibility for self-defense.

1970 June – US-Japan Security Treaty automatically renewed.October – Japan publishes first Defense White Paper.

1970 Nakasone becomes JDA Chief.1971 July – President Nixon announces plan to visit China (1st “Nixon Shock”)

August – Nixon announces his plan to abandon gold standard, end of Bretton Woods. (2nd “Nixon Shock”); Nixon threatens to impose import quotas on Japanese textiles under Trading with the Enemy Act.

1972 February – Nixon goes to China; Japan releases fourth defense buildup plan.May – United States returns Okinawa to Japan.June – Japan and US agree there is no need to revise bilateral Security Treaty.

1973 February – Japan announces “Peacetime Defense Capability” concept.1975 March – The Defense Study Group is established.

September – The Defense Study Group issues a report “Thinking about National Security,” initiating first NDPO.October – President Ford signs US-Japan Amity Law.

1976 June – 2nd Defense White Paper published, beginning annual publishing.July - Lockheed Scandal. November – Japan adopts cabinet resolution to set GNP 1% ceiling on defense budget.1977 August – Japan’s Study on Legal Problems with Regard to Emergency Situations begins.

1978 August - Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China signed.

1979 April – Comprehensive Security Study Group is established by Prime Minister Ohira.December - Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China

1980 July – Comprehensive Security Study Group issues a report that concludes US economic and military superiority is over and peace must be maintained through burden sharing and articulates Japan’s security agenda including US-Japan relations, strengthening self-defense, relations with China and USSR, and energy and food security.

1980 Japan becomes world’s largest automobile maker September - Iran-Iraq war begins.

1981 April - U.S.-Japan Agreement on the Voluntary Export Restriction for Automobiles from Japan.

1982 June - IBM Industrial Spy Incident in the U.S.1983 January - Nakasone visits US

November - Reagan visits Japan, addresses Diet.1984 IMF Declaration of Recovery from worldwide economic recession.1984 June – First US Navy-Japan MSDF joint command post exercises.

October – Results of the “Studies on Legal Problems with Regard to Emergency Situations,” are presented to Diet.

1985 September - Plaza Accord1986 February – First US-Japan joint command post exercises.

May – Tokyo G-7 Summit; Adoption of Tokyo Economic Declaration at Tokyo Summit;Bill calling for the establishment of the Security Council of Japan becomes law.October – First US-Japan joint field exercises.

1987 October – US and Japan hold first meeting on Toshiba’s violation on the agreement of the Coordinating Committee for Export Control to Communist Area (COCOM).

1988 June - US–Japan Agreement on Japanese Beef and Orange Market Liberalization

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 62

1989 January – Emperor Hirohito dies, end of Showa era.June – Tiananmen Square, People’s Democracy DemonstrationSeptember – First Structural Impediments Initiative talks to reduce trade imbalance.November – Berlin Wall falls.

1989 Ishihara Shintaro and Morita Akio publish The Japan that Can Say No.May - U.S. specified Japan as the country of unfair trade practice based on Super 301.December –End of the Cold War after the U.S. – U.S.S.R. summit (between Bush and Gorbachev at Malta)

1990 April – DoD “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim (EASI I)” announces 3-stage reduction of US forces in Asia.June – Last meeting of Structural Impediments Initiative Talks; ends with final report.August – Iraq invades Kuwait. Economic sanctions on Iraq in response to crisis.December – Japan releases midterm defense plan for FY1991-1995.

1990 October – Re-unification of Germany1991 January – “The Agreement Between Japan and the United States Concerning New Special

Measures on Cost of Stationing of US Forces in Japan” is signed.1991 January – Operation Desert Storm begins.

March – Cease fire in Gulf.April – Japan sends minesweepers to Persian Gulf.November – Miyazawa becomes PM.

1992 Toyko declaration on the Japan-US Global Partnership with a focus on the environmentApril – DoD issues EASI II.June - PKO cooperation law passed the Diet.

1993 Ozawa Ichiro publishes Blueprint for a New Japan. August – Hosokawa becomes PM December - Japan decides to partially open rice market to imports

1994 June – Murayama becomes PM.August – Higuchi Commission (Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on Defense Issues) releases “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan.”

1994 February - Hosokawa–Clinton summit meeting breaks down.1995 January – Great Hanshin Earthquake.

February – US DoD issues “US Strategic Security for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” (East Asia Strategy Report – EASR).March – Aum Shinrikyo Cult commits sarin gas attack.September – Okinawan schoolgirl kidnapped and raped by US servicemen.August – Murayama offers apology for WWII.November – Japan’s revised NDPO is approved.December – Japan releases midterm defense plan for FY1996-2000.

1996 January – Hashimoto becomes PM.March – Taiwan Straits Crisis.April – Clinton visits Japan. Clinton and Hashimoto issue Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st CenturyDecember - US–Japan agreement on the return of Futenma Military Airport

1997 June – Interim report on the revisions of the 1978 Guidelines issued.September – New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation issued.

1997 July - Asian Financial Crisis1998 April – Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for situations in areas surrounding

Japan is signed.August – North Korea launches Taepo-Dong 3-stage ballistic missile over Japan.June - Clinton visits China, bypasses Japan

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 63

1999 April - Law regarding to the Guideline for US–Japan security cooperation passed the Diet.November – Parliamentary vice minister of defense Shingo Nishmura resigns over an interview with Playboy as to the necessity of nuclear weapons.

2000 January – Diet forms the Constitutional Research CommitteeApril – Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi dies and is replaced, after much controversy over government transparency, with Yoshiro Mori.May – JDA moves into new headquarters building at IchigayaApril – Lower House elections, opposition parties gain seats

2001 February – Sinking of Ehime Maru by USS Greenville.April – United States EP-3 spy plane collides with Chinese jet fighter, sparking international incident.September – Terrorist attack on United States; hijacked planes flown into World Trade Center and Pentagon with an additional hijacked plane crashing en route to Washington, DC area.October – Diet passes “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.”November – Japanese ships sail to the Indian Ocean

Japan Information Access Project - Generational Change in Japan 64