(1)

G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE OFFICER) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL LAZAGA

FACTS: SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC).

On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits (Rollo, p. 153).

Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex "C" of Petition for Certiorari).

Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent.

ISSUE: Does SEAFDEC-AQD have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal laws of the Philippines?

HELD: Yes. Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own."

(2)

G.R. No. L-18164 January 23, 1967

WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE vs. HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER

Facts: Paul Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, filed with the CFI of Rizal a complaint against herein plaintiff Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissu ed original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages.

As a response, Gemperle filed an action against Schenker on the allegation that the latter had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman.

The action was denied by the court as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, an instant appeal.

Issue: Whether or not, the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker?

Held: The SC ruled on the affirmative. It was not disputed that Schenker, a citizen of Switzerland has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the summons address to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines. Gemperle maintained that due to the voluntary appearance of Mr. Schenker, the same is considered a submission to the court’s jurisdiction. The SC hold that lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.

(3)

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. vs. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN

Facts: On April 24, 1950, the CFI Manila, Judge Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. Later in 1956, the executor filed a project of partition.

Meanwhile, Magdalena, the wife of Bohanan and his two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. The will has not given the wife any share in the estate left by the testator.

Magdalena further argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from her, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in the court’s jurisdiction. However, the court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.

On the part of the children, both received legacies in the amount of P6,000.00 only.

Issue: Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid?

Ruling: Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.Article 10 of the old Civil Code provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is

that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions.

(4)

G.R. No. L-3693 July 29, 1950

MARGARET QUERUBIN vs. SILVESTRE QUERUBIN

FACTS: (In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner Margaret Querubin, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. They had a daughter, Querubina. Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental cruelty." Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Marga¬ret's infidelity. In 1949, the Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child. Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both parties. Both parents were restrained from taking Querubina out of California without the permission of the Court.

On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an interlocutory decree (although the child was still kept in the neutral home) because at the time of the trial, Margaret was living with another man. Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she had then married the man she was living with and had a stable home, the Court granted custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the part of the father.

Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the same year, went to the Philippines and stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting the child from the effects of her mother's scandalous conduct. He wanted the child tc be raised in a better environment. In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina urlder the interlocutory decree of the California Court. She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the child's custody, must be complied within the Philippines.]

RULING

"The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the custody of the child to the father, prohibiting the mother from taking the child to her (Margaret's) home because of her adulterous relationship with another man. The decree was amended when Margaret was not in Los Angeles.

Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties.

In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of other states "at the time and under the circumstances of its rendition" but such a decree has no controlling effects in another state as to facts and conditions occurring subsequently to the date of the decree; and the Court of another state may, in proper proceedings, award custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree which justify the decree to the interest of the child.

In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed. Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, under her father's care. It is a long way from one place to the other. Neither can Margaret prove that she can pay the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of cigarettes one can send by mail.

Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and education. In comparison, the father has shown both interest in the child and capacity to provide for the needs of the child."

(5)

G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA

Facts: Gibbs and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in California. They acquired lands in the Philippines. The wife died in California. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the intestate proceedings instituted in Manila. Gibbs asked the court to adjudicate to him lands acquired in the Philippines not under our laws on succession but because in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. CFI granted such to Gibbs upon proof of California law. The register of deeds refused to transfer such properties on the ground of non-payment of inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that the conjugal right of a California wife in a community property is a personal right and even if this was a case of succession, California law would still apply.

Issue: is Gibbs exempt from inheritance tax?

Held: NO. The court held that it is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband and the descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances.

(6)

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA

Facts: Aznar filed a petition for certiorari to review COMELEC resolution proclaiming Osmena as the Cebu Governor. He alleged that Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the 1988 election. He presented evidence. Osmena claimed that he is a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or not Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the elections

Held: No . No substantial & convincing evidence was presented to prove Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen & disqualified from running. Filipino citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country or by express renunciation of citizenship or by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support another country’s constitution or laws (CA No. 63). No proof Osmena did any of those. Aznar assumed that the ACR & permit to re-enter were proof of such. However, only RP courts are allowed to determine whether one is a Filipino citizen or not, regardless of whether that person is considered an American under US laws. His father is Filipino thus, without proof to the contrary, the presumption that he is a Filipino remains.

(7)

G.R. No. L-29397 March 29, 1983

MODESTA DUGCOY JAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner, allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, filed a petition for repatriation claiming that she is a Philippine citizen due to the invalid marriage of her parents. Trial court issued an Order declaring the petitioner as judicially repatriated.

ISSUE: Whether or not repatriation through judicial proceeding is valid.

HELD: No, because there is no law requiring or authorizing such judicial repatriation. All that is required for a female citizen of the Philippines who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Philippine citizenship, is for her to take necessary oath in the proper civil registrar, upon the termination of her marital status. Decision revoked and set aside.

(8)

WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK vs. HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME, Presiding Judge, Br. XV, Makati, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; JOSEPH E. SCALLON, and JEWELL C. SCALLON

G.R. No. L-57338 July 23, 1987

FACTS: William Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property interests in Hawaii. In his business dealings with private respondent, Joseph Scallon, Borthwick issued the promissory notes but failed to pay the sums owing upon maturity and despite demands. The promissory notes provided that upon default, action may be brought for collection in Los Angeles, California, or at Scallon's option, in Manila or Honolulu.

Borthwick was served with summons when he was in California, pursuant to Hawaiian law allowing service of process on a person outside the territorial confines of the State. Because Borthwick ignored the summons, a judgment by default was entered against him.

However, Scallon's attempt to have the judgment exe¬cuted in Hawaii and California failed because Borthwick had no assets in those states. Scallon then came to the Philippines and brought suit against Borthwick seeking enforcement of the default judgment of the Hawaii court. Again, after due proceedings, judgment by default was rendered against him, ordering Borthwick to pay Scallon the amount prayed for.

The court issued an amendatory order and upon receipt by Borthwick, he moved for a new trial, alleging that the promissory notes did not arise from business dealings in Hawaii, nor did he own real estate therein. He contended that the judgment of the court of Hawaii is unenforceable in the Philippines because it was invalid for want of jurisdiction over the cause of action and over his person. The motion was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE

May the judgment of the court of Hawaii be enforced here in the Philippines?

RULING

"It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties," and rejection thereof may be justified, among others, by "evidence of a want of jurisdiction" of the issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either of two facts in accordance with its State laws, i.e., either Borth¬wick owned real property in Hawaii, or the promissory notes' sued upon resulted from his business transactions therein. Scallon's complaint clearly alleged both facts. Borthwick was accorded opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn those facts, but he failed to appear and was in consequence declared in default. There thus exists no evidence in the record of the Hawaii case upon which to lay a conclusion of lack of jurisdiction.

The opportunity to negate the foreign court's competence by proving the non-existence of said jurisdictional facts established in the original action, was again afforded to Borthwick in the Court of First Instance of Makati, where enforcement of the Hawaii judgment was sought. This time it was the summons of the domestic court which Borthwick chose to ignore, but with the same result: he was declared in default. And in the default judg¬ment subsequently promulgated, the Court a quo decreed en¬forcement of die judgment affirming among others the juris-dictional facts, that Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii and transacted business therein.

In the light of these antecedents, it is plain that what Borthwick seeks in essence is one more opportunity, a third, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court and the merits of the cause of action which that Court had adjudged to have been established against him. This he may obtain only if he succeeds in showing that the declaration of his default was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been able to do that; hence, the verdict must go against him."

(9)

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC.

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

FACTS

In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement was entered into by Northwest and Sharp, through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell the former's airlines tickets. Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of Northwest under the agreement which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the unremitted amount, with claim for damages.

The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of sum¬mons against Sharp at its office in Yokohama, Japan but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. Finally, the Tokyo District Court decided to have the writs of summons served at Sharp's head office in Manila. Sharp accepted the writs but despite such receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The District Court proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest the sum of 83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp failed to appeal and the judgment became final and executory.

Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp.

RULING

"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judg¬ment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is pre¬sumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presump¬tion that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of sum¬mons effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service'of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show taat under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accord¬ingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof re¬garding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similar¬ity or the so-called processual presumpcion may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business ir, the Philippines. Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: 1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or 3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to re¬ceive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.

(10)

EMILIE ELMIRA RENEE BOUDARD, RAYMOND ANTONIN BOUDARD, GINETTE ROSE ADELAIDE BOUDARD and MONIQUE VICTOIRE BOUDARD vs. STEWART EDDIE TAIT

G.R. No. L-45193 April 5, 1939

FACTS

Emilie Renee Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard and as guardian of their children, obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China, for the sum of 40,000 piastras, against Stewart Eddie Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial. Said judgment was based on the fact that Mr. Boudard, who was an employee of Tait, was killed in Hanoi by co-employees although outside the fulfill¬ment of a duty.

Emilie Boudard filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for the execution of the Hanoi judgment but the court dis¬missed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Hanoi Court, Tait not being a resident of that country.

ISSUE

How is jurisdiction over the person of the defendant who is not a resident acquired?

RULING

"The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam, over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment.

The evidence of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the complaint of the appellants, nor were his employees or representatives. The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.

(11)

In the matter of estate of Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller. ANA M. RAMIREZ vs. OTTO GMUR, as guardian of the minors Esther Renate Mory, Carmen Maria Mory, and Leontina Elizabeth

G.R. No. L-11796 August 5, 1918

FACTS

Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland, and for many years a resident of the Philippines, died in Iloilo on June 29, 1913, leaving a valuable estate which he disposed by will. The first clause of the will contains a statement to the effect that inasmuch as the testator had no children from his marriage, he had no forced heirs. In making this statement, the testator ignored the possible claims of two sets of children, born to his natural daughter Leona Castro.

It was shown that in 1895, Castro was married to Frederick Von Kauffman, a British subject. Three children were born of this marriage, namely, Elena, Federico and Ernesto. In 1904, Kauffman went to Paris, France for the purpose of obtaining a divorce from Castro under French law. On January 5, 1905, a decree of divorce was issued. On May 5, 1905, Castro married Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, in Westminster, England. Two children were born of that marriage, namely Carmen and Esther, and Leontina who was born before they were married.

On October 6, 1910, Castro died. Both sets of children claim that Leona Castro was the recognized natural daughter of Bischoff and as such would have been his forced heir had she been alive at the time of her father's death.

ISSUE: May all of Castro’s children inherit?

RULING

No. With reference to the rights of the von Kauffman children, it is enough to say that they are legitimate children, born to their parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore entitled to participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother, if she had survived the testator.

As regards the Mory claimants, it is evident that their rights principally depend upon the effect to be given by this court to the decree of divorce granted to Von Kauffman by the Court of First Instance of the City of Paris. The decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by the representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippine Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands by persons domiciled here, such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country.

As the divorce granted by the French court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations. The claims of the Mory children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bischoff must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legiti¬mated, and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descen¬dants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be inter¬preted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations."

(12)

CARL FRANZ ADOLPH OTTO INGENOHL vs. WALTER E. OLSEN AND COMPANY, INC

G.R. No. L-22288 (1925)

FACTS

Petitioner Ingenohl brought a suit against defendant Walter Olsen and Co. in Hongkong for infringement of trademark. The court ruled in the plaintiffs favor declaring him to be the owner of certain trademarks and trade names and entitled to their exclusive use in conn<~ction with his business as a cigar manufacturer. The court also restrained Olsen and Co. from using and selling cigars under these trademarks and ordered it to pay the costs.

Petitioner brought this present suit to recover the costs adjudged against Olsen and Co. by the Hongkong court, which the CFI of Manila granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision on ground that by the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment against a person may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, clear mistake of law or fact, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Hongkong showed such a clear mistake.

The supposed mistake consisted in denying effect in Hongkong to the sale to Olsen and Co. of business and trademarks seized by the Alien Property Custodian from Ingenohl in 1918. The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that it was plain error by the Supreme Court of Hongkong to hold that this sale did not carry the exclusive right to use the trademarks in Hongkong.

RULING

"A trademark started elsewhere would depend for its protection in Hongkong upon the law prevailing in Hongkong and would confer no rights except by the consent of that law. Hanouer Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403; United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90. When, then, the judge who, in the absence of an appeal to the Privy Council, is the final exponent of that law, authoritatively declares that the assignment by the Custodian of the assets of the Manila firm cannot and will not be allowed to affect the rights of the party concerned in Hongkong, we do not see how it is possible for a foreign Court to pronounce his decision wrong. It will be acted on and settles the rights of the parties in Hongkong; and in view of the fact it seems somewhat paradoxical to say that it is not the law. If the Alien Property Custodian purported to convey rights in English territory valid as against those whom the English law protects he exceeded the powers that were or could be given to him by the United States.

It is not necessary to consider whether the section of the Code of Civil Procedure relied upon was within the power of the Philippine Commission to pass. In any event as inter¬preted it involved delicate considerations of international relations and therefore we should not hold ourselves bound to that deference that we show to the judgment of the local Court upon matters of only local concern. We are of opinion that whatever scope may be given to the section it is far from warranting the refusal to enforce this English judgment for costs, obtained after a fair trial before a court having jurisdic¬tion of the parties, when the judgment is unquestionably valid and in other respects will be enforced. Of course a foreign state might accept the Custodian's transfer as good within its jurisdiction, if there were no opposing local interest or right, and that may be the fact for China outside of Hongkong as seems to have been held in another case not yet finally disposed of, but no principle requires the transfer to be given effect outside of the United States and when as here it has been decided to have been ineffectual it is unnecessary to inquire whether in the other event the Alien Property Custo¬dian was authorized by the statute to use or did use in fact words purporting to have that effect, or what the effect, if any, would be."

(13)

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts:

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the

Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

(14)

POLLY CAYETANO, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.

Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.

While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.

ISSUEs:

•Whether or not the will was valid

•Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply.

As to the issue of jurisdiction --

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.

Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

(15)

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO vs. ANDRE BRIMO

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

(16)

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983.

Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper.

RULING:

The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

(17)

G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan

FACTS:

Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother.

On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void and of no effect as between the parties for finding that the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia is considered to be a ground for annulling the marriage under Art. 95 of the Civil Code.

Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.

Five years later respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. She alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the estate. Petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.

Almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedent's estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother — the decedent.

On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998, petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.

THE ISSUE:

Whether Isabel is an illegitimate child because of the declared “null and void” marriage of her parents?

THE RULING:

No. Petitioner strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the

effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. (Emphasis supplied).

Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance."

Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and implications, Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already exists from the very beginning.

(18)

G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

FACTS:

Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were

purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats available on the flight.

Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ?

HELD:

The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact."

"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket

was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."

(19)

AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos, vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and COURT OF APPEAL

G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was Manila?

HELD

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

(20)

G.R. No. L-22795 January 31, 1977

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. (DANGWA BUS COMPANY), and JAMES G. GAYOT vs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and LAWRENCE HELLER,

Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being, merely to study therein.

Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.

Held: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true domicile.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favor.

(21)

LAURETO A. TALAROC vs. ALEJANDRO D. UY

G.R. No. L-5397; September 26, 1952

Facts: Alejandro D. Uy was elected as municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental on November 13, 1951. Laureto Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates filed a petition for quo warranto against Uy on the ground that Uy was a Chinese citizen and therefore ineligible. The lower court found the petition well- founded and declared the position in question vacant. Respondent Uy’s contentions were that his father was a subject of Spain and that his mother ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband. He thus followed his mother’s citizenship and is a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact of his birth.

Issue: Is the acquisition of citizenship under the jus soli doctrine nullified by the subsequent abandonment of aforesaid doctrine in favor of jus sanguinis doctrine.

Held: No. Par. 1, Article 17 of the Civil Code affirms and recognizes the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli. The decided weight of authority was to the effect that the marriage of an American woman with an alien conferred his nationality upon her during coverture; that upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of the husband, the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her conduct or acts showed that she elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and that the widowed mother herself thus reacquired her former nationality, her children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her nationality with the proviso that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.

On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro Uy undoubtedly was considered a full- fledged Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the constitution, when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine, i.e., a Filipino woman married to a Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband’s demise and that thereafter her minor children’s nationality automatically followed that of the mother’s. This rule was not changed by the adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine, and was in force until C.A. No. 63 went into effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time, provided a method for regaining Philippine citizenship by Filipino women in such cases. It is to be noted that when C.A. No. 63 was passed, Ursula Diabo, mother of respondent Uy, had been a widow for 19 years and Alejandro D. Uy had been of age three years, and that the new law carries no provision giving it retroactive effect.

(22)

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-104776, Dec. 5, 1994

FACTS:

Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.

ISSUE:

•Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law

HELD:

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:

“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

(23)

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.,

Facts:

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue:

Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

(24)

G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.

OH HEK HOW vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final and executory.

Issue:

Is the oath valid

Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China.

Held:

First issue:

The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not — and up to the present has not become final and executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government.

2nd Issue:

It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law.

However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed —pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No.473 provides, however, that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," interalia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired."

(25)

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. vs. JOSE K. RAPADAS and THE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 60673, May 19, 1992

Facts: Private respondent Jose Rapadas held passenger ticket and baggage claim check for petitioner’s flight No. 841 with the route from Guam to Manila. While standing inline to board the flight at the Guam Airport, Rapadas was ordered by petitioner’s hand carry control agent to check-in his samsonite attaché case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-pasengers were permitted to hand carry baggage. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try of he can get through without having to register his attaché case. However, the same man in charge of had carry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. Upon arriving in Manila on the same day, Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked in baggage except the attaché case.

Issue: Whether or not a passenger is bound by the terms of a passenger under the Warsaw convention, shall apply in case of loss, damage or destruction to a registered luggage of a passenger.

Held: After a review of the various arguments of the appointing parties, the court found sufficient basis under the particular facts of the case for the availment of the liability limitations under the Warsaw Convention. There is no dispute and the courts below admit that there was such a notice appearing on page 2 of the airline ticket stating that the Warsaw Convention governs in case of death or injury of passengers or of loss, damage or destructionto a passenger’s luggage. Art. 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees. That provision states that the limits of liability prescribed in the instrument shall not prevent the court from awarding in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part of the court costs and other expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff.