European Union - Vancouver Model United Nations · Vancouver Model United Nations The 17th Annual Session | January 19 - 21, 2018 Dear Delegate, My name is Zehan Zhou, and I am honoured

B A C K G R O U N D G U I D E

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European Union

Vancouver Model United Nations The 17th Annual Session | January 19 - 21, 2018

Dear Delegate, My name is Zehan Zhou, and I am honoured to guide and help you discover the intricacies of the European Union (EU) at VMUN 2018. I am currently a senior at St. George’s School and throughout my high school experience, I have developed a particular interest in Europe and its dynamic political climate. From the first spurts of civilization in the Cyclades to the modern metropolitan scenes in Barcelona, Ljubljana, and Zagreb, Europe has seen eons of human history and astonishing heights of innovation and development. While the former Empires of Europe may have come and gone, they have left legacies placing Europe as a homeland of high culture, science, and arts; these developments made by Europeans have come to influence the whole world. However, along with high levels of human culture and development inevitably comes moments of setback and strife. With the rise of some cultures, others fade away, creating cultural voids. With the amazing social and economic opportunity that Europe provides, many in less fortunate areas seek to come to rebuild their lives, and the sheer number of those coming have stressed many European countries to the limit. As a representative of a country bearing a free-market economy, a stable democracy, and thousands of years of history and achievement, you are playing a part in strengthening Europe in the midst of our current crisis, through tackling our two topics, Minority Language Rights and the European Immigration Crisis. It is your responsibility in representing your country well in the EU and in reinforcing the values that Europe holds so dear: freedom, democracy, opportunity, and acceptance. This will not be an easy task. Many times, you will be pushed to your own limits in dealing with crises and in negotiating deals with other states that perhaps hold beliefs contrary to yours. However, always remember that I, along with my Chair, Kevin Zuo, and Assistant Director, Celina Chen, will be there for you. Don’t hesitate to ask us questions you may have either of position paper writing, debate, or any other theme of interest. Sincerely, Zehan Zhou EU Director

Ken Hong Secretary-General

Callum Shepard Chief of Staff

Jerry Jiao

Director-General

Andrew Wei Director of Logistics

Jadine Ngan USG General Assemblies

Eric Zhang

USG Specialized Agencies

Dillon Ramlochun USG Conference

Angelina Zhang

USG Delegate Affairs

Jerry Xu USG Delegate Affairs

Alan Chen

USG Finance

Meghna Lohia USG IT

Position Paper Policy

What is a Position Paper? A position paper is a brief overview of a country’s stance on the topics being discussed by a particular committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of your positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support. At Vancouver Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the committee’s topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page, and should all be combined into a single document per delegate.

Formatting Position papers should: — Include the name of the delegate, his/her country, and the committee — Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch document margins — Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders — Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit) Due Dates and Submission Procedure Position papers for this committee are highly recommended. To be eligible for an award, you must submit a position paper. The submission deadline is January 7th, 2018. Once your position paper is complete, please save the file as your last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email, to your committee’s email address, with the subject heading as your last name, your first name — Position Paper. Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body. Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted. The email address for this committee is [email protected].

Vancouver Model United Nations 2018 4

Minority Language Rights ............................................................................................................. 6

Overview .................................................................................................................................................. 6

Timeline ................................................................................................................................................... 7

Historical Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 8

Past EU Involvement and Important Treaties .................................................................................... 8

Current Situation .................................................................................................................................... 9

Possible Solutions ................................................................................................................................. 11

Solution 1 ......................................................................................................................................................... 11

Solution 2 ......................................................................................................................................................... 12

Solution 3 ......................................................................................................................................................... 12

Bloc Positions ........................................................................................................................................ 12

France ............................................................................................................................................................... 12

Germany and Italy .......................................................................................................................................... 13

Spain and Portugal .......................................................................................................................................... 13

Norway, Finland, and Sweden ....................................................................................................................... 13

The Baltic States .............................................................................................................................................. 13

Ireland ............................................................................................................................................................... 13

Discussion Questions ........................................................................................................................... 14

Additional Resources ........................................................................................................................... 14

Additional Tips ................................................................................................................................................ 15

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 16

European Immigrant Crisis ........................................................................................................ 19

Overview ................................................................................................................................................ 19

Timeline ................................................................................................................................................. 19

Historical Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 20

Past EU and UN Actions ..................................................................................................................... 21

Current Situation .................................................................................................................................. 24

Possible Solutions ................................................................................................................................. 27


Solution 1 ......................................................................................................................................................... 27

Solution 2 ......................................................................................................................................................... 27

Solution 3 ......................................................................................................................................................... 27

Bloc Positions ........................................................................................................................................ 28

Estonia .............................................................................................................................................................. 28

Germany ........................................................................................................................................................... 28

France and Belgium ........................................................................................................................................ 29

Sweden .............................................................................................................................................................. 30

Italy and Greece ............................................................................................................................................... 30

Hungary ............................................................................................................................................................ 31

Discussion Questions ........................................................................................................................... 31

Additional Resources ........................................................................................................................... 32

Additional Tips ................................................................................................................................................ 32

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 33


Minority Language Rights

Overview

We tend to think that Europe is a continent of nation states where each country bears a sole official language, spoken by all its inhabitants. However, this vision is ignorant of the diversity and histories of European minority languages: the EU is home to 60 officially recognized minority languages spoken by over 40 million people, ranging from Galician in the West of Spain to Saami in the North of Finland.1 The modern definition of minority languages divides them into four categories.

The first are autochthonous languages, which are indigenous but not state languages. An example of this is Catalan. The second are autochthonous and cross-border languages, which are indigenous, exist in more than one state, but are not state languages. An example of this is Basque. The third are cross-border languages, which are state languages in one state but minority languages in another, such as Russian in the Baltic countries. The fourth are non-territorial languages, without a specific geographic region of parlance, and an example of this is Roma. The number and variety of minority languages is not static. Immigration to Europe from elsewhere has created new minority language speakers in Europe. There have also been cases of new minority linguistic phenomena through linguistic syncretism, such as the development of Kiezdeutsch in Germany, a novel youth language using Turkish and Arabic loanwords and developing their own unique grammatical structures. The density of European nations has created transnational minority languages, minority languages with speakers in many different countries, such as Yiddish and Romani. However, this diversity is in danger of disappearing: the statistic of one language disappearing every two weeks notwithstanding, UNESCO lists over 90 European minority languages that are “definitely, severely, or critically endangered” in its Atlas of Endangered Languages.2

Patterns of European linguistic decline stem from many different social sources. Increasing globalization has caused the prioritization of majority languages, such as English, to be taught as a foreign language to 40% of primary-school and 90% of secondary-school non-Anglophones, according to the European Commission in 2002. English is spoken by 40% of all EU citizens as a non-native language and was rated as the most useful language to know by 75% of Europeans, followed by French (40%), and German (23%).3 According to Stephen May, “the normative ascendancy of national languages – and by extension, international languages such as English-specifically militates against the ongoing use, and even existence, of minority languages”; this, combined with traditional prejudices against minority language use, creates an increasing emphasis on integration of the minority language population. The lack of effective language-preservation programs, and, in rare cases, institutionalized linguistic discrimination has put European minority languages in extreme danger.4 Delegates debating this issue must consider all these cultural, social, and legal factors when finding ways to help language retention among linguistic minority groups.

1 EU. Multilingualism. https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/multilingualism_en 2 Ibid. 3 Melissa Kronenthal. University of Edinburgh. “The EU and Minority Languages: Real or Perceived Failure?” 2003.http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.510.1534&rep=rep1&type=pdf 4 May, S. (2006). Language Policy and Minority Rights. In T. Ricento (Editor) (Ed.), An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method (pp. 256-271). Carlton, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.


Timeline

September 2, 1945 — The end of WWII. The formerly populous Yiddish and Romani linguistic minority communities have been heavily destroyed by the Holocaust and the Fascist regimes of the time.

1958 — While Article 75-1 in the French Constitution states that “regional languages belong to the patrimoine of France [...]the language of the Republic is French,” as first stated in Article 2. This designation would later prevent the French government from ratifying future minority language legislation.5

February 7, 1992 — Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty, in its section on Education, Vocational Training, and Youth states that the European community fully respects “the responsibility of the Member states for [...] their cultural and linguistic diversity.”6

November 5, 1992 — The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is adopted at Strasbourg to protect and promote historical, regional, and minority languages in Europe. However, while France is a signatory to this charter, it has been constitutionally blocked from ratifying the Charter in respect to its national languages.

October 2, 1997 — The Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty of the EU, states that “the system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the...cultural needs of each society," inspiring the use of media to aid linguistic protection and revival efforts.7

December 7, 2000 —The European Charter of Fundamental Rights is adopted. Article 22 states that “the Union respects cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity."8

March 15 and 16, 2002 — The Barcelona objective, as outlined in the Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European council, emphasizes in Article 44 the importance of “teaching at least two foreign languages from a very early age” and the need for the “establishment of a linguistic competence indicator in 2002.”9

2003 — A European Parliament report on languages of minorities in the EU states notes that “the media play an important role in safeguarding and promoting the knowledge of lesser-used languages.”10

March 3, 2010 — Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU states that the EU “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural age is safeguarded and enhanced.”11

5 Conseil Constitutionnel. (2008, July 02)., from http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958/texte-integral-de-la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958-en-vigueur.5074.html 6 Treaty on the EU. (1992). 47. from https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf 7 The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the EU, the Treaties establishing the European communities and certain related acts. (1997). 109. from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf 8 Article 22: CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EU. (2000). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/Charter%20of%20fundemental%20rights%20of%20the%20European%20Union.pdf 9 EU, European Council. Presidency Conclusions: Barcelona European Council. From http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/71025.pdf 10 Official Journal of the European Union. (2003, September 4)., from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:313a238b-cdd4-49e0-900c-e32a9569af6c.0004.02/DOC_99&format=PDF 11 EU. (2010, March 30). Eur-Lex. from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:TOC


April 2013 — François Alfonsi presents a draft report on endangered languages and linguistic diversity in the EU to the Culture and Education Committee.

September 11, 2013 — The European Parliament resolution of 11 September 2013 on endangered European languages and linguistic diversity in the European Union is adopted in response to the report for measures to revitalize dying languages. The recommendations range from using media (Article 21) to digitalization (Article 23) to empowering endangered language communities (Article 24).12

Historical Analysis

Historically, European states had different linguistic dynamics: the past division of many European countries into city-states allowed local languages to flourish. However, the emergence of nationalist movements in the 19th century and the unification of previously independent states into nation states led to an increasing emphasis on linguistic standardization. For the newly emergent European states, such as Italy and Germany, to function efficiently, the government needed an effective mechanism with which to communicate with all its citizens and spread their propaganda and thus, new Standard languages were born. In Germany, this was Hochdeutsch and in Italy, this was Standard Italian: registers born from regional dialects that rose to the language of the “fatherland." The emphasis of the Standard language, through governmental publications schooling, led to local languages being used less, local languages being seen to mean “a lack of education, low economic status, and a rural upbringing."13 Historically, popular prejudice, encouraged by nationalist governments seeking standardization as shown by the disappearance of Scots in many Scottish urban areas, culminated in the endangerment of many regional languages. Due to increasing levels of linguistic standardization, the standard language gradually became the language in which economic exchange and scholarly education was conducted, and thus, the Standard language, in the popular imagination, became the language which one needs to be a functioning, successful part of society. Generations of youth were raised solely in the Standard language rather than the native minority languages. The impact of Nazism on minority languages is also extremely profound: the once powerful Yiddish community, bearing 11 to 13 million speakers of many minority languages such as French Alsace and Western Russia, experienced an extensive decline in these minority language speakers due to the Holocaust, with 85% of the Jews killed being Yiddish speakers.14

Much of the damage done to European minority languages has resulted in irreparable cultural losses upon their communities. Many European minority languages bear only a few aging speakers, such as Pite Sami in Sweden; unfortunately, linguistic revitalization and recording efforts may be too late to save them.15

Past EU Involvement and Important Treaties

One of the most important documents in preventing minority language loss in the EU is the 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. This document defines regional and minority languages as those that are “traditionally used within a given territory of a state by nationals of that state. who form a group

12 EU, European Parliament, European Parliament Research Service Blog. (n.d.). EU Minority Languages: In Danger. (2017, July 30) from https://epthinktank.eu/2013/05/25/eu-minority-languages-in-danger/ 13 Melissa Kronenthal. University of Edinburgh. “The EU and Minority Languages: Real or Perceived Failure?” 2003.http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.510.1534&rep=rep1&type=pdf 14 Wikipedia. Yiddish. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yiddish#Numbers_of_speakers 15 Wikipedia. Ume Sami Language. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pite_Sami_language


numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and different from the official language(s) of that state”. It also continues onto objectives regarding minority languages, ranging from the official recognition that minority languages are hallmarks of cultural wealth to means of actively preserving the minority languages.16 The Charter proposes using education to combat minority language extinction: the signatories to the treaty would make sure that minority language education would have as large of a presence as plausible in all levels of education, be it primary, secondary, tertiary, or vocational. Legal services, along with administrative documents, court proceedings, documents, and evidence, would be provided in minority languages. Crucially, the document provides for media representation of minority languages: signatories would create “at least one radio station and one television channel in the regional or minority languages; or encourage and/or facilitate the creation of at least one radio station and one television channel in the regional or minority languages; or make adequate provision so that broadcasters offer programmes in the regional or minority languages."17 Many of these programs have been successfully implemented in European nations— notably, the Tatort criminal television series of Germany and Austria spans over many cities and gives the viewers a unique glimpse on the city’s architecture, culture, and regional dialect.18 Through these television series, local culture and dialect gains new awareness and representation, encouraging its continued use.

In 2013, The EU gave almost unanimous support to a report concretely detailing more linguistic protection measures, drafted by François Alfonsi,19 a native Corsican speaker. While EU governments agree on the fundamental importance of protecting endangered languages, some minority languages face a lack of funding and support from their states. The report provides a broader scope for linguistic revitalization mechanisms, ranging from using “new technologies [as] a tool for fostering the knowledge, dissemination, teaching and preservation of endangered European languages” to “[taking] the view that the Union should support linguistic diversity in its relations with third countries, in particular those wishing to join the EU.”20 This document’s proposition of using digital resources in helping linguistic revitalization is extremely powerful, allowing for a combination of both traditional metacommunicative socialization, through schooling and everyday exposure, to modern metapragmatic methods, such as using digital media to encourage minority language use. The report was adopted with 645 votes for, 26 against, and 29 abstentions, showing the popular support for new linguistic revitalization efforts of the unofficial languages of the EU.21

Current Situation

Many of the propositions proposed by EU legislation have been highly effective. In Galicia, a region in Northwestern Spain, the Galician Autonomy Statute of 1981 made Galician a co-official language of the region, along with Castilian Spanish, the national standard. The statute mandated that Galician become a compulsory subject in all levels of education, with an equal number of hours given to Galician as Spanish. In France, despite

16 Treaty Office. Council of Europe Portal. Strasburg, 5. XI. 1992. http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680695175 17 Ibid. 18 Wikipedia. Tatort. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatort 19 European Parliament. Report on Endangered languages and linguistic diversity in the EU. (2013) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bREPORT%2bA7-2013 0239%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN 20 Ibid. 21 European Free Alliance. European Parliament votes overwhelmingly for Francois Alfonsi’s Endangered Languages Report. (2015) http://www.e-f-a.org/news/news/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=2&cHash=f872b6761df2dae5af4d5d6dc71155c4


the constitution not formally permitting minority language recognition, facilities to teach minority languages have become widespread. Notable examples include the Calandretas, bilingual associative schools in Southeastern France that teach both French and Occitan, as well as state-run primary schools, high schools, and universities, where Occitan is also available as a subject. Universities in different countries are also offering higher education programs in minority languages, such as Southern French universities offering degrees in Occitan.

However, many of these mechanisms prove ineffective. An outstanding example can be seen in a 2003 internet survey on local perceptions of Galician in Galicia, by Melissa Kronenthal from the University of Edinburgh.22 While more than 90 percent of the respondents to her survey were fluent speakers of Galician, and while literacy in Galician has reached near universal levels— an increase from the 45.1% that stated their ability to read Galician as “good"— 59% of the survey respondents believed that Galician is in decline.23 On a five-point scale, where respondents were asked to rate how prestigious Galician, Spanish, and English were, with a 0 representing no prestige and a 5 representing very high prestige, Galician received a rating of 2.9, substantially different from the 4.3 given to Spanish or the 4.1 given to English24. Carmen Hermida, a prominent linguistics scholar, states that “there is a deeply-entrenched perception that speaking Galician implies attributes such as a lack of education, low economic status, and a rural upbringing,” and that opinion is seconded by many in the Galician-speaking community.25

The stigmatisation of Galician is compounded by the fact that the majority language in EU nations is still the language of everyday communication, popular culture, and business. Although education has created new literature and increased the population of youth literate in their minority languages, this has not stopped the cycle of linguistic discrimination and the trend of speaker loss. Many of the minority languages may well descend into literary languages: the youth that are now capable of reading and writing in the minority languages are unlikely to use them in daily life.

Cross-border minority languages face a unique situation. As they are commonly spoken and utilized in other countries, a country with a cross-border minority language may not afford that language the linguistic protections it may grant other minority languages. A notable example is with Latvia. Article 114 of the Latvian constitution states that “persons belonging to ethnic minorities have the right to preserve and develop their language and their ethnic and cultural identity,”26 and while the Latvian government does grant protections to languages such as Latgalian and Livonian, no such protection is offered to languages such as Russian, the first language for more than a third of the Latvian population.27 The only official language of Latvia is Latvian, and there have been some plans to stop Russian education in schools caused by Latvian strands of xenophobia against Russian culture. Language is closely related to nationalism, and governments with cross-border minority languages may feel inclined to restrict the expansion of these foreign languages to preserve the national integrity of these minority groups.

Among all the minority languages, however, the most endangered still remain the non-territorial languages. These languages tend to be the most stigmatized and they have borne the brunt of past nationalistic repression.

22 Melissa Kronenthal. University of Edinburgh. “The EU and Minority Languages: Real or Perceived Failure?” 2003.http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.510.1534&rep=rep1&type=pdf 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Latvijas Republikas Saeima. 2014. http://www.saeima.lv/en/legislation/constitution 27 Wikipedia. Language Policy in Latvia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_policy_in_Latvia


A notable example is with the Romani languages, the languages of the Roma people.28 With millions spread across the EU, Romani people face severe discrimination on a day-to-day basis; many Roma people are denied social services, are often segregated in schools, and are racially targeted by the police because of their reputation for thievery and crime. To this day, many among the European populace hold negative views towards the Roma, with the notable example of the underreporting of their genocide during WWII. While estimates of Romani deaths in the Holocaust range from 25% to 70% of the Roma population in Europe, this statistic is often ignored in ceremonies to remember the Holocaust dead, which tend to only recognize Jewish Holocaust victims.29 The highly negative perception of many European communities against the Roma goes beyond normal levels of prejudice against minority cultures and languages, which puts Romani languages at extreme danger of extinction. More problematically, the Romani languages consist of various disparate dialects, some so different from others that they may be classified as separate languages. Furthermore, the nomadic lifestyle some Romani engage in, compounded with traditions tending towards early marriage, does not permit Romani children adequate schooling to be literate in either their language or other languages. This, in large part, hampers attempts for linguistic education of the Romani languages, as proposed by the Council of Europe Recommendation 1203, which calls for a European programme for the study of the Romanes.30 The lack of education among the Roma population prevent the development of established tradition of a single literary language and due to the wide dispersal of the Roma peoples, there is no single, accepted authority for the establishment of the Romani languages. Codification activities are, in essence, very diverse and highly region-dependent. In the absence of a Standard written variety of Roma, there can be no concept on which to base linguistic planning and media and educational attempts have been met with difficulty. Nonetheless, many national and regional governments, such as those of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania have recognized the Romani languages as minority languages and have attempted to craft Romani scripts for their own regions, along with Romani education at the university level. However, it will be some time before Romani linguistic preservation attempts are capable of reaching the Romani themselves.

Overall, while past legislation has promulgated several linguistic revitalization efforts in the form of education, media transmission, and digitalization, these programs have only driven the minority languages to become written and static rather than living, spoken, animated languages.

Possible Solutions

Solution 1: Actively supporting existing and emerging linguistic structures and encouraging home campaigns to transmit the languages in L1 (first languages) rather than L2 (second language) fashion One of the best bets for preserving linguistic communities is to conserve those already existing and to aid those that are forming. Many minority language communities seek to fight against societal prejudice in reconstructing their extinct languages and in forming new linguistic communities. For example, the reconstruction of the Hebrew language has shown this method to be most effective. While attempts to continue linguistic education and media transmission should most definitely be preserved, states should encourage elderly speakers to pass on their languages to younger speakers, forging a new generation of L1 minority language speakers. Encouragement may come in the form of rendering more regional services solely in the minority language as a means of proving 28 Better known by the exonym “Gypsies” in the Anglophone world. 29 Dan Simpson. CNN. “The Roma: A thousand years of discrimination continues in Europe, advocates say.” October 25, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/21/world/europe/roma-discrimination/index.html 30 European Roma Rights Centre. The Future of Romani: Towards a Policy of Linguistic Pluralism. March 11, 2005. http://www.errc.org/article/the-future-of-romani-toward-a-policy-of-linguistic-pluralism/2165


the growing usefulness of the regional language. However, critical questions delegates must consider regarding this solution is whether or not the ideals of “bringing the language into the home” are plausible or not.

Solution 2: Continue the current trend of EU policy in promoting linguistic recognition While the EU does recognize 60 minority languages, officially, the UNESCO shows that there are 90 truly endangered minority languages in Europe. With this solution, more minority languages would be recognized and thus granted the protection and revitalization efforts given to other minority languages.

However, a key part of this solution is the fact that the definition of a “language” should be rendered more specifically, as the current definition makes the differentiation between a language and a dialect ambiguous. A notable example is that while Spanish and Portugal are considered “distinct languages," they exhibit a higher degree of mutual intelligibility than various dialects, such as the “regional dialects” of German.

Another example of the difficulty of defining a “minority language” can be seen in the case of Ireland. While Irish is one of the national languages recognized by the Irish government, it is only a main home, work, or community language for 1% of Irish citizens. Throughout the entirety of Ireland, only 6% of the population is reputed to be able to speak in Irish and many official documents are solely written in English, even though the Irish constitution mandates that Bills must be translated in both official languages. In this case, would Irish be considered a “minority language” or would Irish still be considered a national language, unentitled to the benefits “minority languages” receive, as is the present case?

Solution 3: Saving the minority language as a scholarly language as a hedge against language loss. Patterns of globalization have spread some languages far and wide, but also have induced the linguistic death of many minority languages as their users increasingly find them less useful for the global marketplace. Thus, an ultra-pragmatic view regarding last-resort efforts to saving minority languages is to have them documented as much as possible, so that while they may not survive as living languages, they still function as scholarly ones. A famous example is Attic Greek, the dialect of Greek used in Classical Athens: while the language does not survive in daily spoken usage, extensive use of it in writing have been documented and the culture surrounding the language, such as its myths and epic poetry, have been well preserved in writing. Thus, while the language is nonexistent in daily use, people can still access its culture through scholarship. If a minority language has a speaker base too reduced for a proper revitalization effort to be mounted, it may be possible to document the language enough to allow the initiation of new speakers into its linguistic culture through literature and history.

Bloc Positions

France While Article 75-1 in the French Constitution states that the “regional languages belong to the patrimoine of France," “the language of the Republic is French," as first stated in Article 2. This designation prevents the French government from ratifying future minority language legislation; consequently, the French government cannot ratify many of the linguistic protection bills set by the EU.31 This is an unfortunate situation, as France is a country with numerous minority languages. Notable examples include Basque, spoken in the south-west; Breton, spoken in Brittany; Occitan, spoken in the south-east; and Alsatian German, spoken in Alsace and Lorraine in the north-east. To help protect minority languages, the French government offers minority language courses as 31 Conseil Constitutionnel. (2008, July 02)., from http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958/texte-integral-de-la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958-en-vigueur.5074.html


elective subjects; however, due to its constitutional obligation, the French government is only able to support minority languages in a limited way. Hence, official recognition of minority languages is currently impossible in France and the French government is unable to ratify any legislation that enforces minority language recognition mechanisms.

Germany and Italy Both these countries stem from the amalgamation of different, smaller states; consequently, both contain substantial linguistic diversity. Citizens from both countries also exhibit a great degree of regional pride, and thus, many regional dialects in the respective countries have vibrant linguistic communities. However, increasing numbers of Germans and Italians are becoming monolingual speakers of the standard dialect. This endangers minority languages, like Low German or Friulian, that are substantially different from the standard dialect. Both countries would ideally support mechanisms for continued support of regional dialects and mechanisms to add new speakers to existing minority languages, to help combat the trend of linguistic loss.

Spain and Portugal Spain and Portugal also boast high levels of linguistic diversity. However, the distinction between language and dialect is very unclear, similarly to Italy and Germany. A history of linguistic discrimination has led to many localized registers to be seen in a negative light, but in general, current policies of linguistic education have allowed many regional dialects to flourish. However, Spain has the unique distinction of bearing a linguistic nationalism movement, the Catalan separatist movement; consequently, Spain must instate linguistic protections measures to prevent secession.

Norway, Finland, and Sweden All three of these countries boast Sami-speaking indigenous populations where linguistic revitalization efforts have been met with mixed success. On the one hand, cooperation across borders for linguistic revitalization and the setup of Sami linguistic protection organizations— such as The Committee of Experts, Sami language centres, spellcheck for Sami, Sami election announcements, and Sami language prizes— have encouraged the growth of Sami culture. On the other hand, previous negative attitudes towards Sami still persist and some Sami languages are too endangered to be effectively revitalized. These countries, in addition to encouraging linguistic expression and linguistic usage, should also consider the question of linguistic reconstruction as a part of reviving dying linguistic communities.

The Baltic States A part of the legacy of the Soviet Union within the Baltic states is the size of the Russian-speaking population. Huge numbers of Slavic-speaking populations in the Baltics face heavy linguistic discrimination, with little possibility for them to gain linguistic recognition as minority languages. Increasing pressures for them to integrate also play a part in the widespread frustration faced by Russian speakers in the Baltics and for the Baltic nations, the critical question should be about the definition of linguistic minority, about how beneficial linguistic protections would be for minority groups, and about what these protections mean to the integrity of the state.

Ireland Ireland has the unique dilemma of witnessing its national language, Irish, face the real risk of extinction. Today, Irish is only regularly used in the Gaeltacht regions and is facing severe declines even there, with a community


author predicting the end of Irish as a community language in 2025.32 However, the presence of linguistic immersion programs, combined with Irish educational measures, has helped create a new class of urban, middle-class Irish speakers, literate in the language but unlikely to use it in daily contexts. Ireland, in addition to protecting minority languages, has the pressing need to protect its own national language from the growing influence of its second official language, English, and would like a redefinition of minority language to suit its linguistic needs.

Discussion Questions

1. What defines a language? What defines a dialect? Is a language simply, in the words of Professor Asif Agha, a dialect with a military?

2. What would be the best way to change popular perceptions of regional registers? Are the current methods successful or not?

3. What is the root cause of the paradoxical situation of minority languages bearing a highly literate population that isn’t willing to speak it? Are modern educational methods beneficial for minority languages?

4. How can a government take a language out of the classroom and into the wider world? How should a government incentivize L1 linguistic transmission?

5. What should a government do about an extinct language? Are linguistic revival attempts necessary? Or do they simply construct a fake replica of a bygone culture?

6. Are L2 speakers beneficial to minority language survival? Or should minority languages remain solely spoken by those in the minority language community?

7. Are cross-border languages truly deserving of protection? Or is the speaker base they possess in other countries simply enough to ensure their survival?

8. What is the point of instituting linguistic protections? Should governments invest resources into protecting endangered registers?

Additional Resources

Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/Charter%20of%20fundemental%20rights%20of%20the%20European%20Union.pdf

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages:

http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680695175

The Maastricht Treaty:

https://europa.eu/europeanunion/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf

32 Wikipedia. Status of the Irish Language. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Status_of_the_Irish_language


Francois Alfonsi’s Report:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bREPORT%2bA7-2013-0239%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN

The Barcelona Objective:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/71025.pdf

Kronenthal’s article on Galician disappearance:

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.510.1534&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Roma Rights and Linguistic Pluralism:

http://www.errc.org/article/the-future-of-romani-toward-a-policy-of-linguistic-pluralism/2165

Additional Tips In addition to browsing governmental websites and governmental strategies about linguistic revival efforts, delegates should also delve into the realm of scholarship and read journal articles about linguistic revivals. Good websites for journal articles include JStor and Google Scholar and literary reviews are extremely helpful, along with studies done in certain European regions on certain regional languages. These studies allow delegates an unbiased view into the current state of linguistic revival programs in different states, and so may better help them draft their own effective policies for regional linguistic revivals. Delegates should also use books throughout their research and video usage is also highly appropriate, provided that the videos go into professional depth about linguistic situations. Often, orally conducted history and first-person testimonies about language endangerment and language usage can prove to be highly accurate and reliable. Using sources written in other languages is highly encouraged, so long as the delegates draft or produce an accurate English translation in their position paper. Remember, the position paper must be wholly in English!

Ideally, delegates should be using professional linguistic terms throughout their writing about these topics, whether working paper or position paper. This topic, in addition to an inquiry of the political and historical situation behind different countries, should also be an interactive introduction to the world of linguistics and communicative strategy for the delegates.


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European Immigrant Crisis

Overview

From its earliest beginnings, Europe has been a continent of demographic change and migration. Much of this change has resulted in a culturally richer and more diverse Europe. Despite the hardships many of these migrants faced, they contributed greatly in crafting new cultural dynamics in Europe. Europe’s geography has made it relatively easy for different groups to enter the continent. This phenomenon has also made it a target for current refugees fleeing war, poverty, and strife. Europe’s geographical proximity to many war-torn lands, combined with its high standards of living and robust economies, has made European nations a target for the mass migration of refugees and economic immigrants. In the last two years, Europe has experienced the greatest movement of people since the Second World War, with more than 1 million refugees and migrants arriving from war-torn areas of the globe.33 Delegates should note that the two principal groups that are arriving in Europe are refugees — those that are forced to flee their homelands due to war, natural disaster, or persecution — and economic migrants, those leaving their homeland to seek better economic opportunities. Currently, the majority of migrants arriving in Europe belong in the latter category; this dynamic results in a variety of consequences, such as the refugee difficulties in accessing asylum in European countries and the retaliatory attitudes by the European populace. This causes divisive debates on refugee policy, inflames nationalist movements, and encourages anti-EU sentiment.

Delegates must recognize the multitude of issues in dealing with the immigration crisis, ranging from the economic to the humanitarian. They must craft a solution to put an end to their own internal political divisions. They must recognize and propose solutions that their own respective countries can pursue to ease the process of the refugees’ arrivals, and they must ensure the health, safety, and general well-being of the newcomers. The EU knows, through its own experiences of seeing different states come together, that diversity is wealth, both material and cultural. The EU Commission has recently reported that the “Business case for diversity” shows that diversity management greatly aids business. To that end, various Diversity Charters in Europe are being implemented.34 However, delegates should not forget that their main obligation is to their own people; consequently, they must also take the needs of their own citizens into consideration when drafting solutions.

Timeline

December 10, 1948 — The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is drafted.

July 28, 1951 — The Convention Relating to the Status Refugees, signed by twenty-six states, including the EU countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and the United Kingdom, is adopted.

July 12, 1957 — The Nordic Passport Convention was signed by EU members Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, with non-EU member-state Norway.

33 The EU and the Refugee Crisis. European Commission. http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/refugee-crisis/en/ 34 European Commission. Diversity Management. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/diversity/index_en.htm


October 4, 1967 — The New York Protocol was drafted by the UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Council).

June 14, 1985 — The Schengen Agreement is drafted and signed.

June 15, 1990 — The Dublin Convention is signed.

June 19, 1990 — The Schengen Agreement comes into effect

March 26, 1995 — The Dublin Convention is implemented.

2014 — The UNHCR (United Nations High Commission on Refugees) reports that the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide has reached 59.5 million, the highest number since WWII.35

April 20, 2015 — A ten-point plan is proposed by foreign and internal ministers of the different EU states on regulating the influx of migrants and on how many refugees each state should accept.

March 18, 2016 — EU Heads of state and the Government of Turkey agreed on the EU-Turkey Statement to further distribute migrants.

Historical Analysis

Human movement defined ancient Europe. Around 4200 to 4000 BCE, Indo-European speakers migrated in huge numbers to Europe; this led to the rise of new Indo-European Language sub-groups. This shaped the modern ethnic groups we traditionally consider European.36

The rise of the Roman Empire saw the first signs of immigrants being integrated into European society as citizens: the vast conquests of the Republic and the Empire brought new peoples under Roman rule, and many people of different ethnicities were brought into the Urbs as temporary slaves. While enslaved, they would learn Latin, apprentice with a trade, acquire powerful social contacts through their masters, and observe the basics of Roman society. When freed they would enter Roman society as freedmen, with all the Roman rights except the right to vote and to run for office. However, their children would be considered free citizens, granted the full set of Roman privileges.37 From this revolutionary model of citizenship, Rome rose to become one of the most prominent powers in the Ancient World, showing Europe the benefits of including citizens of different races and creeds into the national fabric.

Immigration and the flow of refugees has featured greatly in later European societies as well. Numerous European conflicts generated European refugees. These refugees would then seek asylum in other European societies; for example, many French Huguenot refugees travelled to Great Britain and the Netherlands in response to the persecution of Louis XIV. Most notably, the Huguenots who fled typically possessed valuable skills such as silk weaving, clock-making, silversmithing, and optometry —valuable additions to the economies

35 Wikipedia. European Migrant Crisis. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_migrant_crisis#Schengen_Area_and_Dublin_Regulation 36 Wikipedia. Indo-European migrations. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-European_migrations#Europe_.E2.80.93_Danube_Valley_.284200_BCE.29 37 Mary Beard. British Broadcasting Corporation. “Meet the Romans with Mary Beard: All Roads Lead to Rome ." http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01ghsjx


of their adopted countries.38 During WWII, increasing Nazi aggression pushed German citizens and their neighbouring peoples, particularly Jews, to seek haven in other lands. The aftermath of the devastating war created even more refugees, with released prisoners as well as citizens of the occupied Axis powers wandering the continent.39 According to Liz Rothman and Liz Ronk, journalists from TIME magazine, “a total of about 60 million Europeans became refugees during the entire World War II period.”40 Furthermore, the United Nations reported that by 1951, a million Europeans had still yet to find a place to settle.41 In a somewhat ironic twist, many European refugees opted to seek refuge in Middle Eastern nations such as Syria, Egypt, and Palestine, with the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA) aiding in the transport of Europeans into European refugee camps in Aleppo, Nuseirat, Moses Wells, El Shatt, Khatatba, and Tolumbat.42 Much like the Syrian refugees in Europe today, the European refugees in Syria had to adjust to new lives in their refugee camps, beginning with an initial medical inspection, and then, following with the assignment of family living quarters, the possible self-registration for work, and even the chance for vocational training.43

According to Theodora Dragostinova, “during the age of European imperialism, networks grew from the colonial relationship between Africa and Europe. Especially since postwar decolonization, migrants have been drawn to the former metropoles because they know the language or rely on diasporic networks.”44 Following decolonization during the 1960s and 1970s, large waves of refugees arrived in Europe, fleeing post-colonial conflict and ethnic warfare— the most notable being the Harki and Pied-Noir exodus to France after the loss of Algeria. However, upon arrival, these refugees found themselves restricted in their opportunities to work and were often shunned by fellow European citizens. As a result, they began to form new immigrant ghettos. These ghettos remain incredibly important within the current immigration dynamic of the EU.

Past EU and UN Actions

With the Proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the UN General Assembly, the ideas introduced by both section 1 of Article 14 – stating that “everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum and protection”. Section 2 of Article 15, stating that “No one shall be arbitrarily...denied the right to change his nationality”45 , inspired the initial discussion regarding the treatment of refugees. This was followed by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, with its signatories unanimously adopting measures for facilitating refugee traveling, welfare services for the refugees, international cooperation in asylum and resettlement. The Convention also founded the principle of the unity of family, ensuring signatory governments to admit the entire family should the head of the family fulfill the necessary conditions for admission into a

38 Wikipedia. Dragonnades. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragonnades 39 Lily Rothman, Liz Ronk. Time. “This is What Europe’s Last Major Refugee Crisis Looked Like." September 11, 2015. http://time.com/4029800/world-war-ii-refugee-photos-migrant-crisis/ 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Evan Taparata, Kuang Keng Kuek Ser. PRI. “During WWII, European refugees fled to Syria. Here’s what the camps were like." April 26, 2016. https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-04-26/what-it-s-inside-refugee-camp-europeans-who-fled-syria-egypt-and-palestine-during 43 Ibid. 44 Theodora Dragostinova. Origins. “Refugees or Immigrants? The Migration Crisis in Europe in Historical Perspective” January 2016. http://origins.osu.edu/article/refugees-or-immigrants-migration-crisis-europe-historical-perspective 45 United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/


specific country.46 This principle continues to shape immigration policy in Europe today and contributes greatly to the magnitude of the refugee and economic immigrant influx in popular destination countries (i.e. France, Germany, and Sweden). However, this Convention restricted refugee status only to those who were displaced “as a result of the events occurring before January 1, 1951” as well as guiding states to interpret these events as solely occurring in Europe, i.e. the Second World War.47 Thus, to update the definition to suit the era of decolonization, with its massive influxes of refugees, world leaders signed the New York Protocol, a key international refugee law removing the former temporal and geographic restrictions of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, in 1967. This convention allowed the inflow of refugees from decolonization, and the children of the refugees that entered via the New York Protocol would later contribute many aspects of the present refugee crisis.48

In 1957, the Scandinavian states signed the Nordic Passport Convention, abolishing the need for citizens of these regions to pass through passport controls. This convention, effective on April 22, 2001, inspired the first discussions of a “Europe without borders."49 Inspired by this, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries signed the Schengen agreement in 1985, effectively forming the basis of the later Schengen area. This abolished border checks between these EU countries. Later, the same five countries signed the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990. The convention defines concepts such as “internal flight," “asylum seeker," “third State," “processing applications for asylum," and most importantly, “carrier," “any natural or legal person whose occupation it is to provide passenger transport by air, sea or land.”50 Soon after its signing, new European states joined the Schengen area, with a total of 22 EU states, 3 non-EU states, and 2 EU states — Bulgaria and Romania — expected to join in the near future. Thus, the Schengen area grew to represent a Europe in which internal borders only exist on maps, as almost every European country has opened its borders to other European nations for the free flow of people, capital, goods, and services.

However, the first paragraph of section 1 of Article 26 states that “if aliens are refused entry into the territory of one of the Contracting Parties, the carrier which brought them to the external border by air, sea or land shall be obliged immediately to assume responsibility for them again. At the request of the border surveillance authorities, the carrier shall be obliged to return to aliens to the third state from which they were transported or to the third state which issued the travel document on which they travelled or to any other third state to which they are certain to be admitted.”51 This clearly shows that while internal borders between the Schengen countries are open, control of the external borders of the Schengen area is to be magnified.

Proceeding the Schengen convention is the Dublin Convention. Signed by 12 nations, it is the EU law which determines the EU state responsible to examine an application for asylum seekers looking for international protection.52 This convention aids in stopping EU asylum applicants from “asylum shopping," with an applicant

46 The United Nations High Commission on Refugees. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 47 Wikipedia. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protocol_Relating_to_the_Status_of_Refugees 48 Ibid. 49 Nordic Co-operation. The Nordic Passport Convention. http://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/nordic-agreements/treaties-and-agreements/passport-issues-citizenship-and-national-registration/the-nordic-passport-convention 50 EUR-Lex 42000A0922(02) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(02):en:HTML 51 Ibid. 52 EUR-Lex 41997A0819(01) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01)&from=EN


sending his or her forms to multiple EU states.53 This aims to “determine rapidly the Member state responsible [for an asylum claim]” and assigns the asylum seeker to that member state.54 However, due to the magnitude of the recent migrant crisis, this was temporarily suspended, with Hungary no longer receiving its applicants who wandered to other EU states in June 23, 2015.55

With the growing immigration crisis, the European Council established Frontex, an organization to assist member states in “implementing the operational aspects of external border management through joint operations and rapid border interventions, risk analysis, information exchange, relations with third countries, and the return of returnees."56 Frontex has played an increasing role in dealing with the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, participating in efforts such as Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum, a year-long naval and air operation by the Italian government to tackle smuggling in the Mediterranean and migratory ship wreckages off Lampedusa.57 Programmes under Frontex include Eurosur, “the information-exchange framework designed to improve the management of Europe’s external borders [that] aims to support Member States by increasing their situational awareness and reaction capability in combating cross-border crime, tackling irregular migration and preventing loss of migrant lives at sea.”58 To further bolster these security measures, a joint meeting of Foreign and Interior ministers, held in Luxembourg, presented a 10 point plan to reinforce the joint operations in the Mediterranean, such as Triton and Poseidon. The ten points were:

1. To systematically capture and destroy smuggler vessels59

2. To increase EUROPOL, FRONTEX, EASO, and EUROJUST meetings60

3. To deploy EASO teams in Italy and Greece for joint processing of asylum applications61

4. To ensure that member states fingerprint all migrants62

5. To encourage consideration for emergency relocation options63

6. To initiate an EU-wide voluntary project for resettlement64

7. To establish a new return programme for the rapid return of irregular migrants65

53 Wikipedia. European Migrant Crisis. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_migrant_crisis#Schengen_Area_and_Dublin_Regulation 54 Wikipedia. Dublin Regulation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dublin_Regulation 55 Ibid. 56 Official Journal of the EU. Regulations. http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Legal_basis/European_Border_and_Coast_Guard.pdf 57 Wikipedia. Operation Mare Nostrum. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mare_Nostrum 58 European Border and Coastguard Agency. Eurosur. http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur/ 59 European Commission. Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten point action plan on migration. April 20, 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4813_en.htm 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid, 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid.


8. To engage with countries surrounding Libya through a joint effort between the European Commission and the EEAS66

9. To deploy Immigration Liaison Officers in key countries to gather intelligence on migration flows67

10. To strengthen the role of EU delegations.68

Most recently, the EU and Turkey agreed on the EU-Turkey Statement, to end the growth of irregular migration from Turkey to the EU and to replace it with organized, safe channels for migrants to enter Europe. While met with an initially pessimistic outlook, the agreement managed to reduce irregular arrivals by 97% and drastically reduce the number of lives lost at sea by the end of one year.69 However, the migration crisis is ongoing, and the events accompanying it further endanger the unity of the EU and continue to strain the financial limits of some European nations.

Current Situation

The recent mass migration is a great potential asset to the European economy. This is because processing the immigrants and providing them with basic needs leads to extra spending, which increases the aggregate demand of the country’s economy, revitalizing more disposable income from native workers.70 The vast majority of the refugees flowing into Europe are of working age, which helps balance out the increasingly ageing European population, which, according to the President of the Halle Institute for Economic Research, “is so negative that not even accepting one million immigrants per year can end this” demographic downturn.71 The arrival of immigrants gives pension systems an “introductory gift”. Here, the taxes of the large working population go on to support the enlarging population of retirees in Europe. This provides economic relief for European governments.72 Many of the migrants coming into Europe already possess marketable skills and high levels of education, and their arrival provides European nations the opportunity for further market development. Over the past decade, the share of highly educated migrants between 25 and 64 years of age to the EU climbed by 25%, while the share of migrants that were poorly educated fell by 14%.73 When given the opportunity, European migrants are perfectly capable of contributing to their respective countries of immigration. For example, Firas Alshater, a former acting student and a helper of Western journalists, became, as a Syrian refugee to Germany, the current founder of the YouTube series “ZUKAR-Stückchen” and one of Time magazine's ten Next Generation Leaders.74

However, too few of these immigrants are fortunate enough to be able to serve their adoptive homelands to their full potential. The vast majority of these immigrants, instead of being selected for their skills, came through

66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 European Commission. EU-Turkey Statement: One Year On. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf 70 The Economic impact of Europe’s refugee crisis. Euronews. http://www.euronews.com/2016/11/01/refugees-in-germany-from-desperation-to-economic-fortune 71 Flüchtlinge-Gewinn oder Risiko für Unternehmen?. Welt. Trans. Zehan Zhou https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article150312788/Fluechtlinge-Gewinn-oder-Risiko-fuer-Unternehmen.html 72 Heather Horn. The Atlantic. “Can the Welfare State Survive the Refugee Crisis?." February 18, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/02/welfare-state-refugees-europe/463272/ 73 Jonathan Chaloff, Ken Kincaid. OECD Publishing. “Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Europe 2016” 74 Wikipedia. Firas Alshater. Trans. Zehan Zhou. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firas_Alshater


humanitarian channels or as part of familial reunification, and thus despite some of them bearing substantial credentials or experience, end up working in menial jobs without much possibility for improvement. Newly arrived immigrants have higher chances of unemployment and are overrepresented in lower level jobs; for many, the linguistic and cultural barriers serve as a hindrance to their employment endeavours. As a result, many new immigrants contribute little revenue into the tax systems of their respective countries of immigration and instead, tend to take more from the European states in terms of welfare benefits, such as food stamps or paid housing. Many areas of Europe, in particular France, have experienced patterns of white flight not unlike that of the inner city US, in which entire neighbourhoods have become isolated settlements for the immigrant populations, with higher crime and unemployment rates than average European neighbourhoods. Often, these isolated settlements breed a vicious cycle of poverty among the immigrants, further depriving them and their adoptive countries from being able to benefit from their reserve of skills.

In Germany, Sweden, France, or any of the other large immigration countries, large migrant shelters are forming in which the newly arrived migrants stay in conditions of squalor and destitution. Many of these camps lack adequate security, food, and medical facilities. A letter passed to the Guardian newspaper from the heads of 141 families in a Greek refugee camp pointed out that “there are rats, insects and reptiles including snakes everywhere in the camp...unclean water has caused diarrhoea and nausea. The longer we stay here, the worse conditions have got, and now most people are suffering from mental illnesses, depression and other diseases.”75 The harsh conditions of these refugee camps has forced many refugees to the brink. Cases such as conflicts between refugee camp or arson are becoming more and more common.76

Despite continual measures to stop smuggling in the Mediterranean, smugglers continue to make booms from the migration crisis by offering to smuggle migrants illegally into European countries while charging exorbitant prices. Much of this smuggling takes place in the Mediterranean, where African workers, in search for opportunities, might work a three-month stint in Tripoli in order to give their smugglers an initial payment for transport across the Mediterranean to countries such as Italy. Most often, the utter lack of regard that the smugglers have for the refugees often results in people being transported in unseaworthy vessels. Consequences result in many deaths on sea, with vessels sinking and the crowded refugees with no means to reach dry land. According to Othman Belbeisi, the head of the IOM Libya mission, “selling human beings is becoming a trend among smugglers as the smuggling networks...are becoming stronger and stronger,”77 and the 2015 statistic of one million migrants and refugees crossing into Europe by sea via smuggler ships that risk sinking any moment demonstrates the magnitude of the illegal human trafficking operations.78

One of the compounded issues with the immigration crisis is that it coincides with the adulthood of the second and third-generation immigrants. Having observed their parents’ lack of opportunity in the ghettos, the prejudice mounted against them, and also their own inability to return to their societies of birth, many turn to drugs, sex, and violence as a way to vent their own built-up anger. A notable case is with Salman Ramedan Abedi, the instigator of the Manchester suicide bombing: according to Leena Al Olaimy, he “was a regular party-goer who drank vodka and smoked marijuana…[one] could argue that this helped him cope with a sense of cultural 75 Helen Smith. The Guardian. “Vulnerable refugees to be moved from 'squalid' camps on Greek islands," October 3rd, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/03/vulnerable-refugees-to-be-moved-from-squalid-camps-on-greek-islands 76 Ibid. 77 Al Jazeera. Irish Naval Ship ‘rescues 712 people’ off Libyan Coast. June 26, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/irish-naval-ship-rescues-712-people-libyan-coast-170626071349826.html 78 Vice News. Surviving One of the Deadliest Routes to Europe: Refugees at Sea. March 11, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nPelTu3iupc


displacement as a disconnected, second generation, European immigrant; a feeling that he was not Libyan enough, nor British enough. [One] could also deduce that coming as he did from a religious family, drink and drugs paradoxically pacified and amplified his feelings of shame.”79 Here, one can interpret that terrorism does not stem from religion or culture; rather, it stems from the desperation and anger that a second-generation immigrant may feel due to the society around him, and that religion is merely used as an excuse. Unfortunately, many ignore this more complicated reason behind terrorism and instead, place blanket claims over differing religions and cultures as a way of processing the issue. The unfortunate timing of the immigration crisis has resulted in immigrants being wrongfully denigrated with local xenophobic attitudes, and has only made the arrival process for immigrants more difficult. Delegates must take note that terrorism is generally not caused by a specific culture or ethnic group, but instead the internal feelings of torment some may experience.

Different EU states receive various numbers of immigrants. Thanks to their geographical location, Italy, Greece, and Hungary have received an inordinate amount of asylum applications, and due to the existence of large, pre-existing immigrant communities, Germany, France, and Sweden are also popular destinations for migrants. To curb the phenomenon of some countries being overwhelmed by immigrants and other countries not receiving an adequate amount, the European Commission's recent proposition “to relocate 40,000 people from Italy and Greece over 2 years (40% of recent applicants).”80 According to the European Commission, “the number other EU Member States should take is based on a distribution key calculated upon objective, quantifiable and verifiable criteria: size of the population (40%), total GDP (40%), average number of asylum applications over the previous four years (10%), and unemployment rate (10%)” and “each Member state appoints Liaison Officers to match the destination country with refugees’ qualifications, language skills, family, cultural and social ties, to help integration.”81 However, this program has been met only with limited success: when migrants are assigned to countries without the cultural intangibles to bring them into the community, they tend to leave for the countries that do, resulting in the occurrence of ‘remigration’ in certain locales.82 An outstanding example is Estonia. While it “offers one of the most comprehensive refugee-integration packages in Europe, providing each family with a furnished apartment immediately upon arrival, language courses, schools, translation services, and a dedicated support person who will help guide the newcomers through the settling-in process...in addition to the unemployment and welfare benefits to all Estonian citizens," and while it “has seen little backlash [against refugees]," Estonia experiences high rates of immigrant ‘remigration’ on account of the lack of community.83 For EU countries to successfully manage their own immigrant streams, they must not only take into account the physical factors, but also the cultural players in both encouraging immigrants to feel at home and better participate in their adoptive societies.

79 Leena Al Olaimy. World Economic Forum. “Terrorists don't kill for their religion. It's something else entirely.” July 27, 2017. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/terrorist-extremists-dont-kill-for-islam-or-christianity/ 80 European Commission. EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY: A REFUGEE RELOCATION SYSTEM. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf 81 Ibid. 82 Aryn Baker. Time Magazine. “Where Home Isn’t Where the Heart Is.” June 5, 2017. 83 Ibid.


Possible Solutions

Solution 1: Give migrants vocational, linguistic, and cultural training, while giving their children schooling in bilingual facilities Recently, the German government has been crafting bilingual German-Turkish schools to service the children of the Turkish immigrant population, with courses being taught in both German and Turkish. Thus, the second and third-generation immigrant child can gain a deep understanding of both their adopted German and native Turkish cultural identities, giving them the option to either stay in Germany or to return to their native Turkey. This education has been proven to be invaluable; by grounding the Turkish children in both the German and Turkish cultural fabrics, the children have a sense of belonging, which is often missing in the children of first-generation immigrants in other areas. With this, the children lack the intense shame felt by much of the second-generation immigrant population that so often causes them to find belonging in extremist communities, and, if they so wish, can go on to improve their own mother countries with their Western education, indirectly preventing the future conflicts that may cause other immigration crises. This solution would be both a pragmatic and realistic solution; however, member states require both the funds and a certain degree of popular tolerance to bolster such type of schooling.

Solution 2: Crackdown on migrant ghettos and institute measures to ensure full migrant integration while simultaneously combating against local xenophobic attitudes Traditionally, the greatest obstacle for the integration of migrants is the ghetto. According to Soeren Kern, “these ghettos are called ‘no-go zones,’ very deprived areas in many northern European cities," an example being the Brussels ghetto, with a 30% unemployment rate.84 For migrants to truly access economic opportunity and participate in European society more fully, measures would ideally curb ghetto formation through distribution of subsidized housing; this would also target extremist ideologies which often find support within ghettos as well. The immigrants would need to be further schooled in the values of their respective adoptive societies, including the value of fully respecting women and being accepting towards people outside of the gender norm. Most importantly, in societies that promote secularism, such as France and Belgium, it may be in the interest of the nation’s traditional values to further restrict religious garb.

For the immigrants to truly feel part of their adoptive societies, however, societies must first recognize the racism faced by these immigrants, and take measures against that racism. These measures cannot be overtly obvious; despite many European media sources ineffectively defending refugees, many popular attitudes still veer against further immigration.

While this solution is the preferred one for many European states, one should be forewarned that it is dependent on highly idealistic principles: attitudes can not be completely changed through governmental intervention and the majority of migrants desire to continue to express their traditional identities.

Solution 3: Create immigrant communities in countries without many immigrants through redistribution of migrants while continuing the current plan Given the situation in Estonia, in order to allow migrants to feel welcome in certain areas, a vivid, flourishing immigrant culture and community must exist. Thus, countries should take measures to construct these immigrant communities to give their migrants a more welcoming environment, which facilitates the process for 84 Jamie Schram, Bob Fredericks. New York Post. “Muslim Ghettos in Europe are breeding grounds for terror.” March 22, 2016 http://nypost.com/2016/03/22/muslim-ghettos-in-europe-are-hotbeds-for-terror/


these migrants to give back to their adopted countries. The current plan of using immigrant quotas is generally working for both these countries and the immigrants; thus, if the problem of immigrant retention were solved, then each individual country would well benefit from the demographic boost that immigration may give.

Bloc Positions

Estonia Among all European countries, Estonia has one of the smallest Muslim populations and is currently experiencing a contracting population pyramid. Thus, Estonia both has the resources to successfully integrate its immigrants, as evidenced by its generous, two-year package, and the desire to do so. However, Estonia’s biggest challenge is in retaining its refugee arrivals: as the Syrian proverb states, “even paradise is no fun without people.”85 Estonia is currently seeking the means to further refugee retention, and it needs to do that fast: many of the immigrants that have been distributed to Estonia leave overnight, taking many of the resources provided by Estonia along with them. Thus, many refugee families have been tarred with a suspicion that they may leave the country, even when they do not wish so. This leads to Estonian institutions being more reluctant in providing their services to immigrants. Unlike many other European countries, Estonia has seen little anti-immigrant backlash, but this may change if the phenomenon of immigrant departure does not change.

Germany Article 16a of the German Grundgesetz, states that “those that are politically persecuted enjoy the right to asylum."86 This attitude is reflected in the “open door policy” famously adopted by Germany in 2015, in which it took in 890,000 refugees and received 476, 649 applications for asylum.87 This is the highest annual number received in the history of the republic, and thus began Germany’s reputation as a refugee country. Among immigrants, Germany was known as a safe, prosperous country with liberal asylum laws and strong diaspora networks, providing a haven of economic and social opportunity in the initial sea of xenophobia.88 Thus, Germany has received up to 30 percent of asylum applications in Europe, a greater share than any other country. This refugee influx has resulted in the greatest population increase in the country for more than 20 years, and with more than 50 percent of the refugees being under the age 24, Germany’s population has enjoyed much of the demographic relief that mass immigration can provide.

However, the sheer numbers of migrants coming into Germany has strained the country’s economic and social resources to the limit. As a result, the government adopted a less welcoming stance in 2016 and has reactivated its border controls. This reactivation is further aided by Germany’s geographical advantage of being far away from most of the countries of emigration, allowing Germany to better monitor its refugee flow. Many of the migrants arriving in Germany have landed lower income jobs, and yet others still languish in growing refugee camps. The coming of age of second and third-generation immigrant Germans, with many of them feeling shameful of their alienation from both Germany and their own native countries, has started waves of terrorist activity, leading to the wrongful blame of such activities on immigrants and on their background cultures in

85 Aryn Baker. Time Magazine. “Where Home Isn’t Where the Heart Is.” June 5, 2017. 86 Die Grundrechte. (2010, September 2)., Trans. Zehan Zhou. from https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg_01/245122 87 Stefan Trines. WENR. “Lessons from Germany’s refugee crisis: Integration, costs, and benefits.” May 2, 2017. http://wenr.wes.org/2017/05/lessons-germanys-refugee-crisis-integration-costs-benefits 88 Ibid.


general. Such blame has sparked waves of xenophobic agitation, with a notable example being the 3,533 documented attacks on refugees in 2016.89

For Germany, the crucial concern is to both balance acceptance and pragmatism, and most of all, to make the German people aware of the fact that having both is possible. While only fringe groups are engaging in anti-immigration agitation in Germany, they are a loud fringe, as can be seen with the 12.6% representation gained by the far-right party Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD for short), a 7.6% gain from previous years.90

France and Belgium In the words of French President Emmanuel Macron, “the duty of Europe is to offer asylum to those who are persecuted and ask for its protection.”91 The European Commission established an immigrant quota for every country, mandating that that France accept 24,000 migrants per year, around 4 migrants per 10,000 French citizens.92 While France has accepted these migrants, 10,000 of them wound up in the refugee camp in Calais, known as le jongle de Calais, where migrants lived in squalid conditions, without clean water and adequate healthcare. Violence and smugglers ran rampant in the camp, and in October 2017, the French government decided to demolish the camp after a devastating series of terrorist attacks and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Currently, the immigrants of Calais are either sleeping in the ruins of the camp or being sent to special centers, scattered throughout France.

The reason for France’s slow reaction regarding the refugee crisis largely corresponds to its own internal security crisis. After decolonization, many immigrants from different parts of the former French Empire came to France, in the search for new economic opportunities and a refuge from the persecutions occurring in their own home countries. A notable example of this is with the Algerian harkis, French loyalists, who fled the country to France, in hopes of rebuilding their old lives in the new country. However, this massive immigration influx resulted in the formation of the infamous French banlieues, ghettos, in the larger cities of France, such as the St. Denis banlieue near Paris. In a system similar to the white flight in post WWII America, native French were fleeing certain areas of the city, to be settled with immigrants. There are large swaths of French cities where French is no longer heard on the streets and these banlieues are strongly associated with endemic problems of poverty and the inability for many of these immigrants to participate in French culture. With their economic destitution and their social isolation, the banlieues are the perfect breeding ground for terrorism among second and third-generation immigrant French, disheartened by their adoptive French society and also excluded by their societies of origin. To find a sense of belonging, they often resort to drugs, crime, and in extreme cases, terrorism, explaining the large rise in terrorist activity in French in the recent two years. There is perhaps no wonder why France’s state of emergency, starting on November 13, 2015, has been extended five times, up to November 2017, and why French border control has slowed down the influx of refugees arriving.

For France to effectively deal with its immigration crisis, it would have to deal with its own immigration ghettos and aid in the integration process of the immigrants. This would have to include the provision of economic opportunities to its huge reserve of second and third-generation immigrants, as well as opening up popular 89 Patrick Strickland. Al Jazeera. “Germany: 70-year-old anti-fascist defaces neo-Nazi art." July 28, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/germany-70-year-anti-fascist-defaces-neo-nazi-art-170622085119127.html 90 Wikipedia. Bundestagswahl 2017. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundestagswahl_2017 91 James McAuley. The Washington Post. “The Calais ‘Jungle’ is gone, but France’s migrant crisis is far from over." June 10, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-calais-jungle-is-gone-but-frances-migrant-crisis-is-far-from-over/2017/06/09/45780938-0193-4adf-b318-923c1745abf3_story.html?utm_term=.7d4df21d915d 92 Hugo Décrypte. Youtube. “CRISE DES RÉFUGIÉS EN FRANCE - 5 MINUTES POUR DÉCRYPTER” Trans. Zehan Zhou. November 30, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoKYxvJ7enE


attitudes to be more accepting of migrants. Noting the recent events of the French election, this may prove difficult, but throughout history, the French people have proven themselves to be accepting of those of other origins. Ding so again, in the 21st century, would prove an easier attempt than any of the moves to acceptance before, such as the Edict of Nantes and the Abolition of Slavery in the French colonies.

Much like France, Belgium has its own problems with ghettoization, the most notable example being Molenbeek near Brussels. Terrorism has also been a great impediment to the further acceptance of refugees among the Belgian population, and Belgium must also take measures to provide its second and third-generation immigrants with opportunities before accepting further influxes.

Sweden Traditionally, Sweden has viewed itself as a “humanitarian superpower," with 19.6% of those who arrived in 2015 being granted asylum.93 Sweden accepts more refugees in proportion to the size of the population and offers more shelter than all the other European nations.94 But, like many European nations, Sweden falls short in facilitating the participation of the migrants into mainstream Swedish society. Gang warfare has become a feature of many immigrant neighbourhoods and refugee care homes are being overwhelmed with “children." The usage of the scare quotes around “children” stem from Sweden’s lack of a test for the age of these immigrant children, accepting whatever age the refugee gives. Many young immigrants thus take advantage of the system, with one migrant, Daoud, explaining that “if I say I’m grown up, they’ll deport me.”95 The abundance of young migrants and their subsequent lack of societal admission allows many to be easily exploited by gang networks, drug dealers, pimps, and even jihadists. As a popular backlash against the growing immigrant problem, one in seven Swedes support the Sweden Democrats, a populist party formerly widely reviled.96

To ameliorate its situation, Sweden must take measures to allow immigrants into Swedish society while accepting more refugees in order for it to keep its position as Europe’s humanitarian superpower. However, Sweden, like Germany, must balance pragmatism with acceptance. For Swedes, this acceptance is not difficult: individuals and families have donated supplies and invested time with the newcomers, and businesses help through providing work opportunities for Swedish immigrants to work.97 Sweden’s goal is to ensure that this help comes to extend to the entirety of its immigrant population, so that it can benefit from the demographic boost and the workplace rejuvenation that the acceptance of immigrants can provide.

Italy and Greece As regions on the Mediterranean, close to the places of refugee flight, Italy and Greece have the unique situation of being the first places of reception for many of the arriving immigrants. As a result, both Italy and Greece have the unique privilege of dealing firsthand with smugglers arriving across the sea, as well as finding humanitarian solutions for the migrants, who are often found in horrible conditions at sea. Often, however, such solutions found prove to be detrimental: many of these refugees end up in squalid refugee camps, such as the camp on Lesbos in Greece and Lampedusa in Italy, waiting for the decision to come regarding whether or not they will be welcome in the EU. In both Italy and Greece, competitions between international organizations regarding

93 Tove Lifvendahl. The Spectator. “How Sweden became an example of how not to handle immigration” September 2, 2016. https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/09/how-sweden-became-an-example-of-how-not-to-handle-immigration/ 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid.


staffing and building refugee facilities has led to a certain commodification of the refugees, leading to a lessened focus on refugee welfare and a greater focus on erecting a presence in the respective countries.98

For both Greece and Italy, increased cooperation with the EU is key for both to effectively deal with their own refugee influxes. Former joint-security efforts have lessened the burden of dealing with the growing influxes, allowing a breath of economic respite in the chaotic conditions of their respective economies. Italy and Greece want to see more effective systems of refugee distribution and better policing of the Mediterranean to ensure the pragmatic dealing of the refugee crisis.

Hungary Throughout the events of the immigrant crisis, Hungary has opted to close its borders instead of opening them to newer refugee waves. A satirical advertisement capitulates this sentiment, in asking “Did you know that the average Hungarian sees more UFOs than refugees in a lifetime?"99 With the Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, claiming that the country is “under siege” and that Hungary can only count on itself for protection, the Hungarian government has ordered the reinforcement of fences along Hungary’s southern border. Applications for refugees who entered Hungary from Serbia or a “safe third country” will be declared inadmissible, while the appeal period will be cut to only three days, with the addition that refugees will have to cover the costs of their own imprisonment.100 In a recent referendum on whether or not Hungarians “want the EU to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of parliament," 73 percent of Hungarians stated no101, showing that Hungary’s firm and final solution to the refugee crisis is to not accept any and ensure the future of a Hungary with European and Christian values.

Discussion Questions

1. What is the difference between an economic immigrant and a refugee? Should the EU accept both groups, should the EU prioritize one group, or should the EU reject both arriving?

2. Is integration the best solution in bringing immigrants into EU society?

3. How important of a factor is popular attitudes towards immigrants? To what extent should they be taken into consideration when bringing immigrants to a country?

4. How should a country aid in building “community” among the immigrants? Is there an extent to how much “community” a country should encourage? Are ghettos extreme examples of cultural communities of immigrants?

98 Daniel Howden, Apostolis Fotiadis. The Guardian. “Where did the money go? How Greece fumbled the refugee crisis” March 9, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/how-greece-fumbled-refugee-crisis 99 Lili Bayer. POLITICO. “Hungary’s ‘zero refugee’ strategy” September, 20, 2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-zero-refugee-strategy-viktor-orban-europe-migration-crisis/ 100 Lizzie Dearden. Independent. “Hungarian parliament approves law allowing all asylum seekers to be detained” March 7, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/hungary-parliament-asylum-seekers-detain-law-approve-refugees-immigration-crisis-arrests-border-a7615486.html 101 Lili Bayer. POLITICO. “Hungary’s ‘zero refugee’ strategy” September, 20, 2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-zero-refugee-strategy-viktor-orban-europe-migration-crisis/


5. How should the EU best distribute its immigrants? What measures should be used to ensure some countries actually receive their allotted number of immigrants?

Additional Resources

Convention on the Status of Refugees:

http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10

The Dublin Convention:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01)&from=EN

A Schengen Agreement Brochure:

https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/elibrary/docs/schengen_brochure/schengen_brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf

Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

EU Proposed Refugee Relocation System:

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf

Additional Tips Unlike with Topic A, delegates are encouraged to use mainly news sources to supplement their papers, such as Al Jazeera and the Economist. As the Immigration crisis has been going on for several years and has had a huge depth of impact on the different European nations, there is a plethora of good journalism on the issue. However, delegates must be aware of partisan bias when reading the newspapers and must ultimately use the viewpoint that fits the position of their country the best. Going off position is highly frowned upon, however, delegates can make adjustments to their country’s position if necessary (eg. if the delegation of a country with a xenophobic leadership structure finds the governmental position too unproductive, they should opt for a slightly more accepting stance.) Governmental legislation and governmental websites are highly helpful in regarding the country’s own position regarding the refugees, as well as statistics from their respective countries. Once again, using sources written in other languages than English is highly encouraged, provided that the delegate produce their paper wholly in English.


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European Union - Vancouver Model United Nations · Vancouver Model United Nations The 17th Annual Session | January 19 - 21, 2018 Dear Delegate, My name is Zehan Zhou, and I am honoured