ETHICS, MORALITY ANDANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

Roger Straughan

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:00 pm Page 1

1. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 - 4Why are genetically modified animals produced?Why are animals used instead of genetically modified microbes or plants?UK Regulations

2. MORAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS 5 - 6How can moral and ethical concerns be evaluated?Why do moral and ethical concerns matter?

3. ANIMAL ETHICS 7 - 10Animal welfare and the moral communitySentiencySpeciesismThe extent of the animal kingdom

4. INTRINSIC CONCERNSABOUT ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 11 - 16Religious concernsProblems with Nature and naturalnessProblems with animals

5. EXTRINSIC CONCERNS ABOUTANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 17 - 21Is animal biotechnology risky?Animal welfare

6. CONCLUSIONS 22

7. TECHNICAL ANNEX 23 - 25

References and Acknowledgements back cover

The Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) is the UK’s leading fundingbody for basic and strategic research in the biosciences in universities and research institutes. It isfunded from the Science Budget of the Government’s Office of Science and Technology.

BBSRC publishes this document as part of its commitment to promote public awareness anddiscussion of advances in the biosciences and the issues they raise. The views expressed are thoseof the author and are not necessarily those of the BBSRC.

This document complements “Ethics, Morality and Crop Biotechnology” written by Dr Roger Straughan and the Revd Dr Michael Reiss, and published by BBSRC in 1996.

BBSRC has published a leaflet “Why Animals are used in Biological Research” that outlines the Council’s position on some of the issues discussed in this booklet.

BBSRCPolaris House

North Star AvenueSwindon SN2 1UHTel: 01793 413200

www.bbsrc.ac.uk

Ethics, Morality and Animal Biotechnology

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:00 pm Page 2

In general, the phrase “animal biotechnology”covers many well established procedures ofconventional livestock breeding such as performancetesting and the use of artificial insemination, aswell as major developments in reproductivephysiology over recent decades such as in vitrofertilisation (test tube babies) and embryo transfer(surrogacy). Some people would argue that thedomestication of wild animals, which beganseveral thousands of years ago, and the selectivebreeding practices of recent centuries are alsoexamples of biotechnology.

However, in this booklet we focus mainly onethical, moral and social issues surroundingrelatively recent developments that involve geneticmodification, i.e. the direct manipulation of ananimal’s genetic make-up. Genetic modification ofanimals was first achieved with mice in 1980, andof cattle, sheep and pigs by about 1985.

We will also consider issues raised by the newtechnology called nuclear transfer. Here, wholenuclei, and the genes which they carry, aretransferred.This is the process that was used toproduce the sheep Dolly, and subsequent cloned

GENETIC MODIFICATIONSome people imagine that genetic modificationinvariably means moving genes from one species toanother, or “adding” genes to an organism’s normalcomplement. When it comes to considering ethicaland other issues, it can be helpful, however, toremember that genetic modification covers twotypes of activities:

• Altering the genes normally present in anindividual in such a way that the alteration ispassed on to (at least some of) its descendants.

• Transferring a gene or genes from one individualto another of the same species, or of a differentspecies.

A tale of two sheepThe ewe on the left is genetically modified: she carries a copy of a human gene for an enzyme inhibitor called alpha-1-antitrypsin which can be used to treat some lung disorders. Because the sheep carries a copy of a human gene she may be saidto be “transgenic”. The ewe on the right is Dolly – the world’s first mammal cloned from an adult cell. She is neither geneticallymodified nor transgenic. Dolly has the same genes as the ewe from which an udder cell was taken and fused with an “empty”egg to produce her.

animals. It does not involve altering the genes,rather copying them. In this respect it resembleswhat gardeners do when they “take cuttings” of a plant to propagate it.

An outline of how genetic modification and nucleartransfer can be achieved is given on pages 23-25.

1 Current developments inanimal biotechnology

Why are genetically modified animals produced?

When considering applicationsof genetic modification it maybe helpful to distinguishbetween:

• Theoretical ideas about what might bepossible with genetic modification

• The use of the technology as a tool inlaboratory experiments, for example, tofind out what a particular gene does

• The commercial production of geneticallymodified animals for use in medical,agricultural or other applications.

There are five reasons why genetically modifiedanimals are produced:

1. To help scientists to identify, isolate andcharacterise genes in order to understandmore about their function and regulation.

Genetic modification can be used to knock outthe activity of a particular gene. By correlatingloss of function with this “knock out” it ispossible to gain information about the role ofthe gene and the product for which it codes.

2. To provide research models of humandiseases, to help develop new drugs andnew strategies for repairing defectivegenes (“gene therapy”).

Animal models of diseases have been used formany years by exploiting naturally occurringmutations in genes, and in-breeding laboratorystrains of animals carrying the mutation.Anexample is a mouse model of DuchenneMuscular Dystrophy. Genetic modification hasbeen used to produce animal models of many

diseases including mice with predispositionto cancers, and mice with cystic fibrosis.These models may be made by “knockingout” the activity of genes, as describedabove, or by inserting defective genes.

By inserting additional copies of a geneinto laboratory mice and observing theeffects, scientists have recently confirmedthe role of this gene in a disorder ofhuman babies that is associated withincreased susceptibility to childhoodcancers.This will aid the design of newmedical treatments.

“Nude” mouse: A particular strain of mouse that is hairless andhas a very small number, if any, of a particular type of cell ofthe immune system. The mice are frequently used to maintainhuman tumours which can then be studied more easily. Dueto their genetic make up, the mice do not reject the tumours.

3. To provide organs and tissues for use inhuman transplant surgery.

There is a shortage of human donors of hearts,kidneys and other organs for transplantation.Animals can be genetically modified so thatthey carry copies of the human genes thatcode for proteins that inhibit the immuneresponse to foreign tissue.This means thatorgans from such animals might escaperejection and so could possibly be used fortransplantation into human patients.

4. To produce milk whichcontains therapeuticproteins; or to alter thecomposition of the milk toimprove its nutritional valuefor human infants.

Sheep, goats and cattle have beenproduced that make medicallyimportant proteins only in theirmilk.This has been achieved byinserting copies of human genesfor these proteins and attachingto them regulatory genes thatmake sure that the inserted geneworks only in the mammarygland.Two products fromtransgenic animals are already inphase two clinical trials.TheUK’s PPL Therapeutics is testingalpha-1-antitrypsin purifiedfrom the milk of transgenicsheep for the treatment ofchildren with cystic fibrosis, andthe US company GenzymeTransgenics is testing theeffectiveness of antithrombinIII from goats in preventing blood clotting after surgery.

Genetic modification of some cows couldenable replacement of one or two “cow”proteins by “human-identical” proteins, sothat milk from these cows could be used forpremature human infants who cannot tolerateordinary cows’ milk.

5. To enhance livestock improvementprogrammes.

In future genetic modification might enablebreeders both to accelerate the rate ofimprovement in livestock performance, and totake advantage of genes not accessiblethrough conventional selective breeding.Targets for improvement include enhanceddisease resistance, for example, to developchickens that resist infection by Salmonella.

Many people who are opposed to genetic modification of animals tend to oppose all research using animals.How do we tease out any key moral and ethical issues specifically associated with genetic modification?

This transgenic ewe makes large quantities of the human protein alpha-1-antitrypsin in hermilk. One of her lambs is also transgenic for this protein, which has potential for treating andrelieving symptoms in lung disorders including cystic fibrosis. Producing human proteins inthis way gets around the problem of costly procedures for separating the components ofblood and the risk of contamination with pathogens such as HIV.

• In providing founder animals leading to large numbers ofgenetically identical laboratory animals.

• In providing a more reliable way of producing transgenicanimals, and for reducing the number of animals needed toestablish each transgenic line.

• In enabling gene targeting in livestock and therefore theability to conduct more sophisticated genetic modificationthan in the past.

• In helping scientists to identify the genetic contribution todifferent diseases, and so to distinguish betweennature/nurture effects.

• In facilitating the study of age-related changes in cells, andtheir contribution to increased incidence of conditions such ascancer with age.

• In providing cells as a source of replacement grafting, forexample, to treat conditions such as leukaemia andParkinson’s disease.

• In animal breeding, producing multiple copies of the verybest performing animals will mean that the genetic progressachieved in elite herds will be more effectively transferred tothe wider farming community.

• In genetic conservation. Current methods of conservinggenetic diversity by storing frozen semen and embryos isexpensive and time consuming. Using nuclear transfer, skinbiopsies and even hair follicles might be used as sources ofcells which could then be frozen in liquid nitrogen for longterm storage.

Why are animals used instead of genetically modified microbes or plants?

UK regulations regarding transgenicanimalsIn the UK research using transgenic animals is covered bythe same controls as those for other animal research, i.e.the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986.

The production of transgenic animals is covered byrequirements of the Advisory Committee on GeneticModification (ACGM) and the Health and Safety Executive.They require notification of the work. These controls derive from the Genetic Manipulation Regulations (1989)made under the power of the Health and Safety at WorkAct 1974.

If transgenic animals were to be released into the wild,prior approval would be required from the AdvisoryCommittee on Releases to the Environment and theACGM.

The experimental use of animals in the UK is covered byHome Office regulations. Under the 1986 Act, a projectlicence is required for each piece of research work, and apersonal licence is required by individuals who carry outregulated procedures on animals. To obtain a licence, anapplicant must attend and successfully complete anaccredited training course.

The Animal Procedures Committee advises the HomeOffice on animal experiments under the 1986 Act.

Scientists’ ability to move genes from, say, a plantinto a microbe, or from an animal into a microbe,arises from the fact that all living things share thesame genetic code.This means that a gene generallycodes for the same sequence of amino acids (thebuilding blocks of proteins) whether it is workingin an animal, a plant or a microbe. It might be argued,therefore, that for some applications, transgenic plantsor microbes might replace transgenic animals, so whyare animals preferred? There are two main reasons.

First, animals may be preferred because of their closerbiochemical similarity to humans.This is importantfor making therapeutic molecules. Many animalproteins need to be modified before they can carryout their function. Usually, the enzymes that areneeded to do this only exist in animal cells. Forexample, a gene that produces the protein alpha-1-antitrypsin can be inserted into a plant, but plants lackthe mechanism to attach carbohydrate groups to thisprotein.Without such groups the protein is removedfrom the human body 50 times faster than thenatural product. So to make a useful therapeutic formof the protein, production must be in animal cells.

Another reason why animals are sometimes preferredfor some genetic modification is because they canmake large amounts of product. For example,extracting large quantities of a therapeutic proteinfrom animal milk is technically more straightforwardthan purifying it from the fermentation broth oflarge scale fermentation chambers of cultured plantor microbial cells. For some therapeutic proteins

which are required in large quantities, becausepatients need to take large doses, transgenic animalsmay be the only economically feasible way of makingthe proteins. Production in plants is relativelyinexpensive and is an appropriate route for someproducts but not for others.

Applications of nuclear transferIn nuclear transfer, whole nuclei containing a full set of chromosomes are introduced into specially prepared recipient cells whose ownchromosomes have been removed previously. The result is a copy, or clone, of the donor cell that contains the same genetic material(barring a minute amount of DNA inherited maternally via some other cell organelles called mitochondria).

The main application of nuclear transfer will probably be in allowing more precise genetic modification of, for example, cattle, sheep andpigs for medical uses. But several applications are envisaged. These include:

We have now summarised the scientificpracticalities of animal biotechnology, but theissues raised by this technology are not onlyscientific ones. Modern biotechnology has thepotential to throw up a wide range of what areoften referred to as “moral and ethical concerns”about which it seems difficult if not impossible toreach any substantial degree of consensus.This iscertainly true of animal biotechnology, probablybecause of fundamental disagreements about whatour attitudes and behaviour towards animalsshould be. (For convenience, the term “animals”rather than the cumbersome “non-humananimals” will be used in this booklet, while

acknowledging the fact that human beings can beseen as part of the animal kingdom and that theimplied division between human and non-humananimals can be unduly exaggerated).

But what exactly is meant by saying that “moral andethical concerns” are evident here? The terms“moral” and “ethical” are often used interchangeablyin everyday language but it may be useful to try todistinguish between them.We need to clarify whatexactly constitute “moral” and “ethical” concernsbefore we can proceed any further, though this isnot to suggest that there is one and only one“correct” way of using the terms.

MORAL CONCERNSEverybody (except perhaps the psychopath) can be said to have moral views, beliefs and concerns, to theeffect that certain things are right or wrong and that certain actions ought or ought not to be performed.What issues arouse most moral concern will of course vary enormously between different individuals, culturesand periods of history. Moral views may refer to virtually any subject; a person may feel that it is wrong tohunt foxes, to make jokes about the Royal Family, or to smack children. Such moral concerns may result froma lot of deliberation and reflection, or from very little; they may be firmly grounded in a consistent set ofcarefully considered principles, or they may not. We all probably hold some moral views almost unthinkingly,perhaps as a result of our upbringing. We may just “feel” that certain things are right or wrong; we have a“gut reaction” about them; and that may be the sum total of some people's “morality”.

To call something a moral concern, then, doesnot necessarily mean that it is of much ethicalsignificance.A number of surveys have shown that,if asked, people will express moral concern aboutmodern biotechnology, but this does not tell uswhether they have done any ethical thinkingabout the issues.According to this suggesteddistinction, then, moral concerns are felt aboutwhat it is right or wrong to do, while ethicalconcerns are about the reasons and justificationsfor judging those things to be right or wrong.

“Only when ethics becomes a legitimate – and rational – part of the scientific attitude will concerns aboutparticular aspects of animal biotechnology be taken seriously, or taken at all.” (1)

ETHICAL CONCERNSEthics is a narrower concept than morality,and it can be used in several different,though related, senses. The most general ofthese:

“...suggests a set of standards by which aparticular group or community decides toregulate its behaviour – to distinguish what islegitimate or acceptable in pursuit of theiraims from what is not. Hence we talk of‘business ethics’ or ‘medical ethics.’” (2)

More technically, ethics can also refer to aparticular branch of philosophy which tries to analyse and clarify the arguments that areused when moral questions are discussedand to probe the justifications that areoffered for moral claims. So ethics in thissense puts our moral beliefs under thespotlight for scrutiny.

2 Moral and ethical concerns

Why do moral and ethicalconcerns matter?

One further question needs tackling in thissection: why is it necessary to investigate moraland ethical concerns about animal biotechnologyat all? Some may feel that the key questions andproblems here are scientific or agricultural ormedical or commercial ones, best left to expertpractitioners. Does ethical debate have any practicalimportance in the real world?

Two responses can be made to such queries:

i. No new scientific or technological developmentcan claim immunity from ethical scrutiny.Thefact that new technologies exist does not meanthat they necessarily ought to be employed.Science cannot be pursued in a complete moraland ethical vacuum in any society that claimsto be healthy and civilised, and in practice thelegal and regulatory systems of such societiescan be seen to rest upon an ethical basis.

ii. More specifically, surveys have shown thatmoral and ethical concerns are of considerablepractical importance in influencing publicattitudes towards modern biotechnology.Worries are being increasingly expressed that thepotential benefits of modern biotechnologymay be lost if the new processes and productsfail to gain “consumer acceptance” because ofmoral concerns, which surveys in manycountries show to be widespread.There must,then, be a strong practical argument in favourof examining the ethical basis of such concerns,not in order to try paternalistically to persuadepeople to accept the technology, but to raisethe level of debate and to encourage judgementsto be made on a rational and considered basis.

People’s moral concernsabout animals differ indifferent cultures, andmay change over time.

New technologies tend to provoke a hostile orsuspicious response, which may or may not turn out tobe justified by subsequent events. For example, therewas extensive media coverage of the first test-tubebaby Louise Brown. Since then, several hundredthousand test tube babies have been born, providingfulfilment to otherwise infertile couples.

The approach to be adopted in this booklet isbased upon the above distinction between“moral” and “ethical”.Those aspects of animalbiotechnology which appear to give rise to mostmoral concern will be described, and the variousways in which that moral concern is expressedwill be examined and subjected to ethical scrutiny,which will analyse some of the concepts used andthe principles implied.

No conclusive, prescriptive answers will beoffered about the rightness or wrongness ofanimal biotechnology, for ethics cannot providefinal “proof” of this kind derived from factual

data. One cannot prove that animals ought orought not to be used in cancer research in thesame way that one can prove that cancer killsanimals. Ethical judgements may be argued for oragainst, and shown to be more or less rational andinformed, but their rightness or wrongness cannever be comprehensively established.Thepurpose of this booklet, then, is more to posequestions than to answer them, in order that you,the reader, instead of being presented with ready-made conclusions, will be encouraged to ponderthe questions for yourself and form your ownassessment of the arguments.

How can moral and ethical concerns be evaluated?

© R

icar

do

San

chez

. The

Sto

ck M

arke

t

“The right not to be tortured is shared byall animals that suffer pain; it is not adistinctively human right at all.” (3)

“Most people are not averse to using animals as a major source of food...”

Before focusing on the moral and ethical issuesconcerning animal biotechnology, we need toconsider briefly how animals and their treatmentcan raise any such issues at all.Why, in other words,might animals be thought to matter ethically? Weuse plants, minerals and all kinds of other naturalmaterials for our own benefit and pleasure.Animals also can be extremely useful to us in manyways. So what, if anything, is wrong with using apig or a monkey or a rat for our own ends, as wemight use a tree or a rock?

Many people in the past have seen nothing at allwrong in doing this.The philosopher, Spinoza, forexample, claimed that there was nothing wrong inhuman beings consulting their own advantage andusing animals as they pleased, treating them in theway which best suits ourselves. Bernard, a famousFrench physiologist, asserted that the properattitude for scientists was to disregard totally thepain suffered by unanaesthetised animals inexperiments, and went so far as to practise whathe preached upon the family dog, whose fate wasshared by numerous animals used for experimentaland teaching purposes.

This “instrumental” view of animals is also evidenttoday, despite the gradual change which seems tohave taken place this century in our attitudestowards animals, particularly in western countries.Most people are not averse to using animals as amajor source of food; large numbers of animals arestill used in medical and other forms of scientificresearch and testing; and cases are regularly reportedof domestic animals being used as children’s toysor for their owners’ temporary amusement, andthen being abandoned when their period ofusefulness has expired.

However, it is difficult and dangerous togeneralise about “instrumental” attitudes towardsanimals. Probably much depends upon thecontext and the particular set of values whichindividuals hold. Some meat-eaters, for example,while accepting animal slaughter for foodpurposes, may be opposed to fox hunting or tozoos; some vegetarians may not object to thekilling of rats and mice for public health reasons

or for medical research.The vast majority of humanbeings seems happy to benefit from the use ofanimals, directly or indirectly, and has always doneso.The mere use of animals by human beings, then,has not in itself normally been seen as a matter formoral concern; indeed, some types or species ofanimal might well cease to exist if we did not usethem. It is particular kinds of use which havecome more and more under the ethical spotlight.

Animal welfare and the moral communityThe issue which has increasingly come to be seenas ethically significant is not the use of animalsbut their welfare.According to this view, thecrucial distinction between animals and othernatural materials which we may use is that animalscan be said to fare well or badly; they can be treatedin ways which either enhance or diminish theirwell-being; they can have experiences which arepleasant or unpleasant.

3 Animal ethics

This concern for animal welfare is sometimesportrayed and dismissed purely as a matter ofemotional response, particularly if the animals inquestion happen to have furry coats and soulfuleyes. Philosophers, however, have long debated thepossible ethical status of animals and explored therational basis of arguments and claims about howhuman beings ought to behave towards them.

The fundamental issue at stake here concerns theextent of what has been labelled the “moralcommunity”.Being a member of such a communitywould mean, among other things, that one isconsidered worthy of moral respect and entitledto have one’s interests taken into account. But doonly human beings belong to this community?Membership must presumably depend uponcertain qualifications, but philosophers have oftendisagreed over what those qualifications might be.Some, for example, have suggested characteristicssuch as rationality or the use of language in orderto exclude animals from membership.A numberof problems arise, however, over attempts to ruleout animals in this way as members of the moralcommunity.What is meant by rationality, andmight not many animals be said to exhibit formsof it (e.g. in devising ways of overcoming obstacles)?Do not animals appear to use various forms of(non-human) language and communication? Andmost importantly, do not many humans also lackthese qualities (e.g. infants and severely brain-damaged individuals), and do they thereby lose allmoral and ethical status?

SentiencyArguments like these have led many to agree withthe philosopher, Jeremy Bentham:

Sentiency, or the capacity to experience pain andpleasure, has increasingly come to be seen as anoverriding qualification for membership of themoral community, and thereby for the possessionof certain rights.The capacity of sentient beings toexperience pleasure and pain, satisfaction anddissatisfaction, comfort and discomfort, means thatthey may be said to have such things as wants, needs,interests and quality of life, though the sentiencyof many animals probably differs from that ofhuman beings in certain respects - for example, in

terms of self-conscious awareness and the abilityto imagine and anticipate painful or pleasurableexperiences.Although some philosophers andscientists have at times tried to argue that animalsare mere automata, incapable of any mental orphysical experience, commonsense suggests thatwe should reject what the American philosopher,Tom Regan, calls the “astonishing view (that) gorillasand cats are just as psychologically impoverishedas BMWs and holly bushes” (5) - a view which inpractice is probably held by very few people todaywho have any experience of animals.

SpeciesismIf we admit that animals can suffer and that thatcapacity is ethically significant, how might thisaffect our attitudes towards animals? Peter Singer,an Australian philosopher whose work on animalethics has been highly influential, claims that equalconsideration should be given to all beings capableof suffering:“if a being suffers, there can be no moraljustification for refusing to take that suffering intoaccount.” (6) Such a refusal, involving preferentialconsideration for human beings over animals, hasbeen labelled “speciesism.” Just as racism or sexisminvolve preferring the interests of a particular raceor sex simply because one is a member of thatrace or sex, so speciesism implies that the merefact of belonging to a particular species (e.g. Homosapiens) is ethically significant in determining one’smembership of the moral community and the non-membership of other species. Critics of speciesism,then, claim that membership of a particular speciesis as irrelevant as membership of a particular sexor a particular race in deciding who deservesmoral respect and considerate treatment.

The force of the objections to speciesism is perhapsbest appreciated by considering a science fictionexample. Suppose that a race of bug-eyed aliens, ofinfinitely greater intelligence and power than ourown, were to take over the earth and to set aboutusing human beings for food and experimentalresearch.Would we readily accept their claim thatthey were the more powerful species andtherefore entitled to do anything they liked toother species, including our own? We wouldprobably feel that their superior powers did notgive them, on ethical grounds, the right to useus in any way they pleased, just because we weremembers of a different species; our feelings, interestsand capacity for pain and pleasure should be takeninto account by this alien species. Being a memberof a more powerful species, then, does not in itselfconfer moral superiority, any more than being amember of a more powerful race, country orsocial group does.

“A full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison amore rational as well as a more conversable animalthan an infant of a day or a week, or even of a monthold. But suppose they were otherwise, what would itavail? The question is not, can they reason? Nor canthey talk? But can they suffer?” (4)

To change the example, if we have to choosebetween trying to save a child or a dog fromdrowning in a river, we would normally feel amoral obligation to favour the child, but thejustification for this could not (morally) be thathuman beings are more powerful than dogs as aspecies, and that therefore this dog’s interests donot matter.A dog’s sentiency and capacity forsuffering are ethically relevant factors, to be takeninto account whenever it is appropriate andpossible to do so, but this does not mean that itsinterests are necessarily to be treated as being on apar with those of a human being, whatever thecircumstances. By no means all philosopherswould accept that all species are of equal moralstanding.Are not chimpanzees, for example,worthy of greater moral respect than mosquitoes?Some would argue that, while it may be arbitraryand wrong to show moral respect (or disrespect)for members of a particular species purelybecause they are members of that species, it doesnot necessarily follow that all species are deservingof equal moral respect. However, it is generallyagreed that the sentiency of any species requiressome kind of moral respect.

But how exactly should one species take accountof the sentiency of another? There is not space hereto delve deeply into the philosophical complexitiesof this question, but two main approaches need tobe briefly mentioned at this point.

a) UtilitarianismThe utilitarian approach which represents animportant philosophical tradition, argues that here, asin other ethical decisions, a calculation has to be madeof what is likely to maximise pleasure and minimisepain.The best course of action, ethically speaking, isthat which produces the most overall satisfaction.

The main problems with this approach areconcerned with how exactly to do this calculation,particularly when we are talking about animalexperiences of pleasure and pain, which are likelyto be different from our own.Also, if we are aiming atthe maximum overall satisfaction, how are animalpains and pleasures to be weighed against humanones? Are human interests to be given a heavierweighting than animal ones and, if so, how is thisto be ethically justified in view of the objectionsto speciesism noted above?

Discussions about how justifiable it is to use animalsfor food production or for medical research willneed to weigh different levels of human benefitagainst different levels of animal suffering. PeterSinger, for example, argues that the pleasures andbenefits human beings derive from eating meat areunlikely to outweigh the discomfort and pain of farmanimals reared under modern intensive conditions.

The utilitarian calculation suggests that thejustification for some degree of animal suffering ismuch stronger if the objective is a cure for life-threatening diseases rather than a leaner pork chop,

Parents of childrensuffering from cystic

fibrosis may well havedifferent perceptions about

the use of geneticallymodified animals in the

search for a cure, than willthose with no personal

experience of thecondition. But how ethically

relevant is this?

Cystic fibrosis is the most common “single gene”genetic disease in Caucasians. One in 25 of us carriesthe recessive gene responsible and 1 in 2,500 babiessuffer from the disease. For sufferers, life expectancy isonly in the twenties or thirties, and constant treatmentis needed to maintain a reasonable quality of life.

Cystic fibrosis (CF) mice and wild type and heterozygote littermates.The cystic fibrosis mice were created by using embryonic stemcells (see page 24). The mutant mice cannot be distinguished fromtheir littermates visually but their cells display electrophysiologicalproperties characteristic of CF. These mice have been successfullyused to validate gene therapy approaches to disease treatment.

because the corresponding human benefit is muchgreater.This utilitarian conclusion may conflict withmany people’s assumption that it is laboratoryresearch which raises the most serious moralconcerns about animal suffering. Such an assumptionmay result from a failure to think the issues through,but it may also be based upon an alternative way of making ethical judgments about the sentiencyof animals.

b) Inherent valueA second possible approach to the treatment ofsentient creatures focuses not upon calculations oftheir pain and pleasure, but upon their inherent valueas individuals, which gives them the right to betreated with respect.To use a sentient individual,human or animal, purely as a means to achieve one’sown ends, without any respect for that individual’sends, is ethically unjustifiable according to thisaccount. (This approach is sometimes identified asan “animal rights” view, but as rights can becomean emotive term which is not necessarily helpfulin debates about how animals ought to be treated,it will not be emphasised in this booklet).

The extent of the animal kingdomOne final, even more fundamental, question needs to be posed beforeproceeding to the specific sections on animal biotechnology: whatcounts as an animal, when we are considering animal ethics? If animalsare to be included as members of the moral community andconsideration given to their sentiency, welfare, interests and inherentvalue, a decision still has to be made about which, if any, cut-off pointsshould be established within the animal kingdom.

What are the boundaries of this kingdom? Do they extend, for instance,to insects and micro-organisms? Biologists normally include the formerand exclude the latter, but this kind of scientific classification does notanswer the ethical question about what forms of life demand moralrespect.As an illustration of this problem, we can take the work of thetheologian, doctor and missionary,Albert Schweitzer, who passionatelyadvocated respect for all life, on the grounds of its inherent value; yet hepresumably felt little respect for those forms of insect and microbial lifewhich brought death and disease to the Africans for whom he cared.Asthe philosopher, Mary Midgley, puts it,

“speciesism is hard to apply to locusts, hookworms and spirochetes, andwas invented without much attention to them.” (7)

Part of the difficulty here stems from uncertainty about what levels ofsentiency, if any, are experienced by “lower” forms of life. Scientificopinion here is divided, though it is perhaps doubtful whether scientificdata could ever conclusively resolve the issue. Many have assumed thatinvertebrates lack sentiency, but others claim that the behaviour of suchcreatures as the octopus suggests otherwise. Darwin believed thatearthworms showed intelligence in making their way through mazes.As far as insects are concerned, some biologists consider their sentiencyan open question, and have argued for a respectful attitude towards their nervous systems, which are far from fully understood.

This approach also raises further questions. Howexactly, for example, does one show respect for ananimal’s “ends”, and how does one decide whatthose “ends” are? This question will be examinedin more detail in a later section when the issue ofanimals’“telos” or nature is explored.Also, to whatextent is it possible to respect an animal’s “ends”while pursuing one’s own? If animals, for example,are produced to be killed for our food, can theway in which they are allowed to live their livesstill demonstrate respect for them as individualsentient beings?

This section has deliberately raised questions ratherthan tried to answer them, but it should havedemonstrated that “animal ethics” is not just aboutour emotional reactions to animals.These questionsare difficult and complex; they need careful con-sideration and rigorous analysis, and some of themwill come under closer scrutiny in the followingsections. Having briefly surveyed the generalquestions which are prompted by animal ethics,we can now start to examine how they relate to themore specific issues raised by animal biotechnology

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:01 pm Page 12

Animal biotechnology is a morally sensitive issuebecause many people have concerns not onlyabout the treatment of animals but also about thenature of modern biotechnology itself. Some feelthat all forms of genetic modification may be wrongin themselves, regardless of what they are beingapplied to and what consequences may result.

Animal biotechnology, then, may for a variety ofreasons be thought to be either intrinsically wrongin itself or extrinsically wrong because of itsconsequences. This important distinction can beapplied to a large number of moral issues and canoften help in identifying the precise grounds of anymoral concern. Confusion can quickly arise if thedistinction is not drawn.A debate about the rightsand wrongs of abortion, for example, will not getvery far if the participants fail to realise that one(intrinsic) set of arguments - that abortion is murderand thus always wrong in itself - is radicallydifferent from and so cannot be countered byanother (extrinsic) set of arguments - that theconsequences of allowing certain pregnancies tocontinue are sometimes morally unjustifiable.

Intrinsic arguments cut deeper than extrinsicones. If any practice is thought to be intrinsicallywrong, no further considerations are morallyrelevant, for nothing can reverse that intrinsicwrongness; consequences and intentions do nothave to be taken into account.

As intrinsic concerns are in many respects morefundamental than extrinsic ones they are bestexplored first. In this section, then, the strategy willbe firstly to consider some intrinsic objections tomodern biotechnology in general, and then see howthese may apply to animal biotechnology in particular.

Religious concernsIt is possible to hold religious views to the effectthat modern biotechnology is blasphemous.Theseviews may rest upon the belief that God hascreated a perfect, natural order; for people toattempt to “improve” that order by manipulating

DNA, the basic ingredient of all life, and in somecases crossing species boundaries instituted by God,is not merely presumptuous but sinful. Somereligions place great importance on the “integrity”of species, and object to any attempts to changethem by genetic modification.

The essence of this concern, then, is that modernbiotechnology is trying to “displace the firstCreator”, or to “play God”, but in assessing suchclaims, the following points need to be noted.

i. By no means all religious believers wouldmake these claims. Different religions havedifferent perspectives upon the nature of Godand his creation. Even among Christians, forexample, there is no unanimous condemnationof modern biotechnology per se.There is, forexample, scriptural support for the view thathumanity has been given by God an approved,privileged position of “dominion” over Nature.Some modern theologians even see biotechnologyas a challenging, positive opportunity for us towork with God as “co-creators”.

ii. Animal biotechnology may move genes fromone species to another, but religious believersdo not necessarily hold that the boundariesbetween species are sacred and immutable, norindeed that they are so regarded by God. Formany religious believers evolutionary theory maysuggest a view of species as provisional and fluidcollections of individuals, each species playingits part in a developing process, initiated by God,of which we ourselves are a fairly recent product.

4 Intrinsic concerns aboutanimal biotechnology

“There can be no manipulation more profoundthan that of another being’s geneticstructure.” (8)

Problems with Nature and naturalness

Species boundaries

The so-called “species boundary” may not be asmuch of a barrier as some people haveimagined. It might be more helpfully regardedas a point on a continuous scale.

It is estimated that about 10% of wild birdspecies cross with some regularity and in somecases higher rates of over 30% are observed, forexample, in the birds of paradise and amongDarwin’s finches. As scientists become able totrack the fate of more and more individualgenes, even higher rates of hybridisation maybecome apparent.

These two butterflies are different species of thepassion butterfly Heliconius but they hybridisein the wild. Top: Heliconius himera and bottomH. erato.

© James Mallet 1999

A belief that modern biotechnology is intrinsicallywrong need not rest upon a religious basis.Agnosticsand atheists would be unmoved by argumentsabout blasphemy, but might still share what seemsto be a widely felt concern that biotechnology isin some sense “unnatural” and therefore wrong.

Reduced to its simplest form, the argument seemsto be as follows:“Nature and all that is natural isvaluable and good in itself; modern biotechnologyis unnatural in that it goes against and interfereswith Nature, in some cases crossing natural speciesboundaries; modern biotechnology is thereforeintrinsically wrong”.

To examine this argument, we need to ask twofundamental questions: first, what are meant by“natural” and “unnatural”?; second, what is goodabout being “natural”?

i. What are meant by “natural” and“unnatural”?

Before the above argument can even get off theground, we have to be able to identify and agreeabout what is to count as “natural” and “unnatural.”This is no easy task in a world where we are offerednatural beef, natural toothpaste, natural margarineand a host of other allegedly “natural” products.

Depending on the context in which it is used, theword “natural” may mean “usual”,“normal”,“right”,“fitting”,“appropriate”,“uncultivated”,“innate”,“spontaneous” and no doubt many otherthings as well. Perhaps most commonly “natural”is contrasted with “artificial” or “man-made”, buton the basis of that distinction practically everyelement of our modern Western life-style is“unnatural”. Nor can more traditional products andprocesses avoid such a charge of “unnaturalness”,for the progress of civilisation has been largelydependent upon humanity’s “interference withNature”.Yet if every domestic or farm animal,every garden plant or agricultural crop, is thoughtof as the result of “unnatural interference”, thenthe concept of “unnaturalness” surely becomes sobroad as to be meaningless.

The more specific and serious charge of“unnaturalness” that has been levelled againstgenetic modification, however, is that it may breachnatural species boundaries and violate the naturalintegrity of species.One problem with this argumentis that biologists are unsure about the extent and eventhe definition of “natural species boundaries”.Indeed the meaning of the term “species” is itselffar from clearcut, depending very much on thecontext in which it occurs. Furthermore, somecrossing of species boundaries does occur

“naturally” without any help from modernbiotechnologists, though some examples of geneticmodification (such as transferring genetic materialfrom a fish to a fruit or vegetable) could certainlynever occur in the “natural” course of events.

The definition of “natural” and “natural speciesboundaries”, therefore, creates serious problemswhich suggest that we are not likely to find muchhelp here in sorting out the ethical issues. Buteven if these difficulties of definition could beovercome, the argument about “unnaturalness”faces further ethical objections.

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:01 pm Page 14

Dogs evolved from a common wolf-like ancestor. The enormous differences between breeds have beenintroduced by selective breeding over long periodsof time for different physical and behavioural traits.Breeds have been developed for use in hunting,different types of work, and to be “companionanimals” for humans. Is this more “natural” or moreacceptable than genetic modification? Is the speed of change an important issue?

ii.What is good about being “natural”?

Why should we assume that whatever is “natural”is good and whatever is “unnatural” is bad? A“natural” event, product, process or tendency(however defined) is not automatically good ordesirable. Many “natural” substances are harmful;many “natural” events, such as earthquakes andhurricanes, create destruction and suffering, andare indeed usually labelled “natural” disasters;many “natural” organisms cause pain, disease anddeath.As the modern theologian Don Cupittpoints out, Nature can be seen as a “kindlymother, lovely in every aspect” but also as “wild,chaotic and pitiless”.(9)

We cannot then simply deduce what is morallyright and wrong from certain facts about the worldand about Nature. Simply because somethinghappens in Nature does not mean that we canhave no ethical justification for interfering withit. So even if natural species boundaries can beidentified (which may be difficult), their mereexistence does not tell us what ought to be doneabout them.The Alps, for example, are a “natural”boundary between Italy and Switzerland, but thatgeographical fact tells us nothing about whetherit is morally right or wrong to cross from Italy to Switzerland.

The moral concerns so far describedin this section could apply to allapplications of modern bio-technology, whether the geneticmaterial involved be that of animals,plants, human beings or even micro-organisms. If we now focus uponanimals, however,we find that further,more specific issues may be raised.

i. Transgenic animals can createparticular problems for somereligious groups. For Muslims,Sikhs and Hindus it would beforbidden to eat foodscontaining genetic material fromanimals whose flesh is forbidden.Such religious requirements raisefundamental questions about theidentity of animals and itsgenetic basis. If, for example, asmall amount of genetic materialfrom a fish is introduced into amelon (in order to allow it togrow in lower temperatures),does that melon become “fishy”in any meaningful sense? Somewould argue that as all livingbeings share a great deal ofcommon genetic material,transferring a gene from ananimal to another organism does not involveany incorporation of the animal’s identity intothat organism, though others would maintainthat the transferred genes are precisely thosewhich are distinctive of the animal.

ii. Many appear to be uneasy about the transferof genetic material from and into animals,though there seems little concern that insulinfor treating diabetics is now produced byinserting copies of human genes into micro-organisms.This suggests that it is theinvolvement of animals rather than the crossingof species (or even kingdom) boundarieswhich is felt to be morally problematic.

iii. The cloning of animals has recently becomethe focus of great public interest and mediaattention.As explained in Section 1, cloning isa biotechnological procedure which does notinvolve genetic modification, though thedistinction is probably not widely appreciatedby non-scientists. Cloning techniques have,however, raised some moral concerns of anintrinsic kind, because of the genetic identityof the resulting animals. Some critics have

Problems with animals

objected that the deliberate production ofgenetically identical animals is wrong, becauseit fails to respect the uniqueness andindividuality of all animals, particularly if theaim is a production-line uniformity.

iv. Does modern animal biotechnology pose anydistinctively new ethical problems which werenot already raised by traditional selectivebreeding? Some would claim that we have forcenturies practised a form of “geneticmodification” which has altered species and“interfered with Nature” on a massive scale,the results of which are evident in everydomesticated animal today. Belgian Blue cattle,for example, have been bred to have massivehindquarters, and the ethical issues raised bysuch creatures would seem to be the samewhether these animals are produced byselective breeding or by genetic modification.On the other hand, it can be argued that thespeed and precision of modern animalbiotechnology and the fact that we can nowdirectly modify animals’ DNA present uswith possibilities and responsibilities which dointroduce a new ethical dimension in terms of

INSULIN- a case history that touches on many aspects of thecurrent debate about the use of animals in research,and genetic modification technology.

In 1921, Frederick Banting and Charles Best in Canadashowed that an animal pancreatic extract could controlblood sugar levels in a diabetic dog. After purificationprocesses and further animal tests, it became possibleto test the extract on humans. The first use of insulin totreat a critically ill diabetic boy occurred in the followingyear. Subsequently, people with diabetes around theworld were treated with insulin which was derived fromthe pancreatic cells of cattle or pigs.

Within the last 20 years, advances in molecular biologyand gene technology have enabled scientists to make“human insulins” which are less likely to cause allergicreactions and which have other potential clinicaladvantages. Such insulins can be made either byconverting the pig insulin into the human form, or byusing genetic modification to insert a synthetic copy ofthe human gene for insulin into bacteria or yeast cells. Inthe latter case, the yeast and bacteria cells are clonedand used as “mini-factories” to produce large amountsof the human insulin.

There are an estimated 60 million people with diabetesworld-wide. As well as treating human diabetes, insulinis also used to treat the condition in cats and dogs.

the increased power and control we can nowexercise over the shape of animals’ lives.Thisissue leads directly to another,which philosophershave recently debated at some length.

v. Even if it is accepted that some examples ofanimal biotechnology are not intrinsically wrongand could be seen as extensions of traditionalbreeding practices, the question still arises as tohow far this technology can legitimately go.Are some alterations to animals’ geneticstructure intrinsically wrong, and if so, why?Of course, similar questions can again be askedabout selective breeding, which some wouldargue has gone too far in some cases - e.g. indesigning breeds of dogs and cats as fashionaccessories and for other frivolous purposes,with little regard for the origins of these species.

In considering this question, some philo-sophers have made use of the notion of ananimal’s telos, a term first introduced by theGreek philosopher Aristotle.Telos has provedto be a slippery concept which can be givendifferent interpretations by different writers,but it is generally understood to refer to thenature and interests of an animal, arising fromits membership of a particular species. BernardRollin, an American philosopher who haswritten extensively about animals’ telos, illustratesit by speaking of the “pigness” of the pig and the“dogness” of the dog - “fish gotta swim, birdsgotta fly”.Telos, according to Rollin, defines:

“the way of living exhibited by that animal,and whose fulfilment or thwarting matter tothe animal.The fulfilment of telos matters in a positive way and leads to well-being orhappiness; the thwarting matters in a negativeway and leads to suffering”. (10)

Happiness and suffering here have a widermeaning than mere pleasure and pain.To isolate anaturally social animal, for example,does not causeit physical pain,but can cause psychological sufferingbecause its telos is being ignored or violated.

It is easy to see how the notion of telos isrelevant to animal biotechnology, for somecurrent examples of genetic modification could certainly be said to involve alteringanimals’ telos, while many more can beenvisaged as lines of possible future research.Genetic modification can be used, for instance,to prevent broody behaviour in turkeys,thereby boosting productivity by up to 20%.Many other forms of genetic modificationhave been suggested which might alter farmanimals in ways which made them betteradapted to methods of intensive production.

Some of these possibilities raise difficult ethicalquestions.Would it be wrong to modify animalsin ways which altered their telos, but whichthereby also reduced their experience ofsuffering or frustration? Keeping chicken inbattery cages, for example, frustrates manynatural aspects of their behaviour, and couldbe said to ignore their telos. If chicken couldbe engineered so as not to suffer the frustrationof having their desires thwarted, they might besaid to have benefited from having their telosaltered in this way.A more extreme examplemight be the production of “decerebrated”animals, unable to experience pain or sufferingof any kind – though it is perhaps doubtfulwhether such creatures could strictly be called“animals” at all.

Philosophers disagree over the ethical issuesraised here. Rollin, for example, argues thatwhile we should always respect animals’ telos,this does not mean that we should neverchange a telos if happier animals result; if atelos is changed by genetic engineering, theanimals must be no worse off than they wouldhave been without the change. Others wouldclaim, however, that to create animals withreduced capacities is to restrict their freedomand to show a lack of respect.

It is debatable whether proposals toproduce “double muscled” cattle suchas the Belgian Blue by geneticmodification would obtain ethicalapproval by UK regulatory bodies. Yetsuch cattle have been developedcommercially by selective breedingprocesses that exploit a naturalmutation which gives rise to the doublemuscling effect.

What issues does this raise? Do anymoral concerns arise principally fromthe nature of the animal produced or themethod of production? What are theimplications for the regulatoryprocesses?

Belgian Blue

We cannot delve further here into the complexissues surrounding animals’ telos. However, itshould be noted that genetic engineering is notthe only means by which a telos may bechanged.All domesticated animals today showcharacteristics which have been produced byselective breeding and which represent changesto their telos – for example, reducedaggression.Those who would oppose onintrinsic grounds any changes to a telos whichanimal biotechnology might effect mustconsider whether they would also raise ethicalobjections to the methods which haveproduced all domestic pets and farm animals. Isit the type of animal produced or the processby which it is produced that is the real sourceof moral concern?

vi. A final, specific concern which needs a briefmention is that of patenting, which some feelhighlights the failure of animal biotechnology torespect the individuality and intrinsic value ofanimals. Some genetically engineered animalshave already been patented for their usefulness asmodels of human disease, and this will bediscussed further in the following section.

Patenting in this context is a highly controversialand complex issue which leads some to feel itmorally wrong to see animals (or other livingorganisms) as objects which can be invented andowned. However, it can be argued that theemotive charge of “patenting and owning life”loses much of its force when it is realised thatthe “ownership” involved is of the inventionitself and not of living “matter”. In the case ofanimal biotechnology, a patent would implyownership not of an actual animal but of theinvention of the “genetic kit” which produces aparticular attribute. In any case, the logic behindmoral objections about “owning life-forms”seems far from clear in view of the fact that wehappily talk about owning cats and dogs withoutarousing moral indignation.

Although the above concerns are best described asintrinsic (i.e. they raise queries about whetheranimal biotechnology is wrong in itself), we haveseen that some of them also touch upon issues ofanimal welfare which relate to the possible extrinsicconsequences of the technology.The next section,therefore, will focus directly upon ethical problemsarising from these and other possible consequences.

Would you be prepared to eat

(i) free range turkey,

(ii) intensively reared turkey,

(iii) genetically modified

turkey?

What different ethical issuesare raised in each case?

The possible consequences of animal biotechnologyare many and varied.A number of the developmentsoutlined in Section 1 could produce substantialbenefits, notably in the area of medical research.Other less desirable consequences, however, canalso be envisaged, relating particularly to variouskinds of risk and to increased animal suffering,both of which can give rise to serious moralconcerns.Any technology can, of course, be usedfor good or ill, but the possibility of abuse andpotential for harm cannot rule out its legitimateuse and potential for benefit.

The moral concerns here are difficult to assessbecause they must involve predictions about futurestates of affairs. But predictions may be accurateor inaccurate, and no conclusive proof can ever beprovided that a particular set of events willinevitably occur in the future. Extrinsic concernsmust therefore always be in this sense provisional:they carry weight only in proportion to the likelihoodof the predicted consequences actually occurring.So to appraise the validity of these concernsbecomes in part a technical matter of trying toestablish what really is most likely to happen.

Ethical questions, however, can still be directed at these extrinsic concerns despite their technicalnature. Indeed, it is essential that they should, forthe following three reasons:

i. Even if agreement is reached about likelyconsequences (which is rare) this does notautomatically answer the moral and ethicalquestions.We still have to ask what is good orbad, right or wrong, about those consequencesand examine the moral claims and assumptionssurrounding them. (e.g. of what ethicalsignificance is animal welfare?)

ii. There is never just one consequence to anyactivity but a whole set of consequences, oftenoccurring at different times.The consequencesof any activity, therefore, cannot simply bemorally approved or condemned en bloc, forthey will often produce conflicting advantagesand disadvantages. (e.g. human beings maybenefit from animal suffering)

iii. Consequences, then, have to be weighed andcompared against each other, and this cannotbe a matter of purely factual assessment.Attempts to estimate the likely costs andbenefits of an activity can of course be madeon a straightforward financial basis, but thisdoes nothing to address the moral issues.(Presumably a financial assessment of this kindwas made in deciding the method of extinctionto be used in Nazi concentration camps).Ethical judgements have still to be made aboutthe value or priority to be placed upondifferent possible costs and benefits producedby different possible consequences.

This section will not, therefore, concentrate upontrying to establish “the facts” about the possibleeffects of animal biotechnology, although sometentative assumptions will have to be made aboutlikely and unlikely consequences.The aim willrather be to identify the range of moral concernsfelt about the possible consequences of animalbiotechnology, to analyse the logic of theseconcerns and to illustrate how the weighing ofcosts and benefits necessarily depends upon morefundamental value judgements.

Is animal biotechnology risky?Riskiness is not in itself a moral or ethical matter.Some activities are inevitably more risky thanothers, though none can be totally risk-free, and it does not follow that low-risk activities are morallysuperior to high-risk ones.

Risk and safety become matters of moral concernonly when they raise further questions aboutresponsibility and justifiability. Moral concernis appropriate when irresponsible and unjustifiablerisks are thought to be taken, which may result inharm to innocent parties. Determining preciselywhat constitutes “irresponsible” risk-taking andwhen a possible benefit justifies a possible risk ishighly problematic, however.

What kinds of risk are claimed to attach to animalbiotechnology, and are they sufficiently“irresponsible” and “unjustifiable” to merit moralconcern? Any new technology is unpredictable,and it is this unpredictability which producesconcerns about various risks.Although genetictechnology is often claimed to be precise intargeting specific genes, it remains unpredictable

“When one is genetically engineeringanimals, what we can do far exceeds what wecan know and predict, and it is thus goodpolicy to prepare for the worst case” (11)

5 Extrinsic concerns aboutanimal biotechnology

in terms of its possible wider effects and unfore-seeable consequences.One particular line of researchis especially open to this charge, where genes whosefunction is unknown are “knocked out” in order thatthe results may be observed - e.g. on the immunesystem of mice. If this random approach were to leadto harmful consequences, it might be difficult toavoid the accusation of irresponsible experimentation.

A number of other concerns has been expressedand debated, (12) and these include:

i. Concerns about the speed with which animalbiotechnology can effect changes in animals,compared with traditional selective breedingwhich allows changes to be observed andassessed over many generations.

ii. Concerns that this “fast-lane” method ofbreeding food animals might produceunexpected and harmful results for those whoeat foods derived from such animals (e.g. cattleand pigs engineered to grow at a faster rate).

iii. Concerns that animal biotechnology mightnarrow the gene pool and reduce geneticdiversity, so producing monocultures whichcould be vulnerable to new diseases or otherenvironmental threats.

iv. Concerns that animals engineered in biomedicalresearch to be models of human diseases mightescape and infect the human (and animal)population, or might generate new and moreresistant strains of the disease.

v. Concerns that organs from genetically modifiedanimals might transmit viral diesases if used inhuman transplant surgery.

vi. Concerns that genetically modified animalsmight be accidentally or deliberatelyreleased into the environment, causingvarious forms of ecological disaster as theintroduction of alien species is wont todo.Transgenic fish, particularly salmondesigned to grow at a faster rate, areoften used as an example here, though ofcourse it is not only genetically modifiedanimals which are capable of creatingecological problems.

Many scientists would not share theseconcerns, and it must be emphasised that themagnitude of such risks (of which the aboveare only a brief sample) is highly controversial,but this is not the place for a detailed technicalassessment of each case. Regulatory bodieshave in fact been established to undertakesuch assessments. However, some of the risksenvisaged here could be of such a catastrophicnature that no one would feel justified in

turning a blind eye to them. So does it follow thatany activity which could lead to catastrophic con-sequences ought not to be undertaken? Unfortunately,this simple and apparently responsible conclusionoverlooks the fact that it is impossible to provethat a particular event will or will not happen inthe future. No activity or process can ever beguaranteed to present no risk whatever and to be100% “safe”, and animal biotechnology is noexception to this logical rule. Any activity couldconceivably lead to catastrophic consequences.

But how much weight should we place on this logicaltruth? Critics argue that the risks involved here areof such a level as to make the further developmentand application of animal biotechnologyirresponsible; it is the particular and peculiar risksassociated with these techniques that make themethically unjustifiable. Clearly the issue here is partlyone of technical assessment, and this will of coursevary from case to case, making generalisationsabout the “safety” of animal biotechnology virtuallyimpossible. One obvious ethical requirement hereis a stringent system of risk assessment andregulation which ensures that no irresponsiblerisks are taken in the light of current knowledge,though it must be recognised that no such systemcan ever be foolproof. However, excessive cautiondoes not necessarily remove the risk of futurecatastrophes. It is possible that “playing safe” byabandoning research and development in all formsof animal biotechnology might deny us a techniqueor product which could prevent an environmentaldisaster in fifty years time, or could proveinvaluable in the treatment of serious diseases.

Trying to decide in any area what level of risk-taking is ethically justifiable, by weighing possible

REPORTSIn recent years there have been several reports thatcover many of the issues considered in this booklet.These include:

Report of the Committee on the Ethics of GeneticModification and Food Use (1993). A Report to MAFF.Committee chaired by Revd Dr J C Polkinghorne.

Report of the Committee to consider the EthicalImplications of Emerging Technologies in theBreeding of Farm Animals (1994). A Report to MAFF.Committee chaired by Revd Professor Michael Banner.

Animal Tissue into Humans (1996). Department ofHealth. A Report by the Advisory Group on the Ethicsof Xenotransplantation, chaired by Professor IanKennedy.

Animal-to-Human Transplants – the ethics ofxenotransplantation (1996). Nuffield Council onBioethics.

costs against possible benefits, is a difficult task,usually requiring detailed analysis on a case-by-case basis.With animal biotechnology, however,the issue becomes even more complex andcontroversial, because the costs and benefits willbe experienced by two different groups withdifferent interests - human beings and animals.While some of the possible human benefits couldbe dramatic, particularly in terms of medicalresearch, and consequently significant enough to outweigh a certain level of risk, the situation is much less clear in the case of animals.This has led some commentators to conclude that it islikely to be human beings who reap the benefitsand animals who incur the costs.

In order to examine these possible costs moreclosely, we now need to return to the subject of animal welfare and ask whether the possibleconsequences of animal biotechnology mightinvolve levels of pain and suffering which areethically unacceptable.

A section of mouse brain infected with theagent of the sheep disease scrapie. Thisshows the vacuolation that is a feature of thespongiform encephalopathy diseases thatinclude scrapie, BSE and CJD. Transgenicmice have been important in understandingthe nature of these diseases and in assessingthe transmissibility of BSE to humans.

GENETIC MODIFICATIONAND SPECIES CONSERVATIONIf a species that is threatened with extinctioncould be saved by introducing a gene thatgave disease resistance into the germ line ofbreeding animals, would this be acclaimed asa triumph for genetic modification technology?How might our views about this differ fromthose on the use of modern reproductivetechnologies used in many zoos to saveendangered species? How would we evaluatethe risk of using genetic modification in thisway? Would it ever be justifiable to use GMto “resurrect” extinct species?

Three 9 months old transgenic tilapia(right) and 3 non-transgenic fullsiblings. (Reproduced with permission,from Rahman et al 1998, TransgenicResearch, 7: 357-369).These transgenic fish were producedby introducing a gene that codes for a salmon growth hormone. The aim of producing such transgenic fishcontaining a novel growth hormonegene is to provide faster growth, thusreducing the farming period, andbetter food conversion rates, whichwould reduce the production cost.

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:01 pm Page 21

Animal welfareCritics of animal biotechnology claim that nobenefits have resulted yet for the animals themselvesfrom the new technologies and that there isevidence of actual harm being caused.An earlyexample of such harm which is often quoted wasprovided by the “Beltsville” pigs (named after theUS Department of Agriculture research stationwhere they were born). Growth genes wereinserted into these animals to produce faster growthand leaner meat, but the animals also suffered froma number of serious and disabling disabilities, as havesheep treated in a similar way.The unpredictablenature of such experiments clearly has considerablepotential to cause animal suffering, particularly inthe early stages of a new technology, though morerecent work in this particular area is claimed tohave overcome the problems.

Other grounds for claiming that animal biotech-nology may be detrimental to considerations ofanimal welfare include: (13,14)

i. Disease resistance is aimed mainly at diseaseswhich are endemic to intensive farmingmethods, where animals and birds are highlyvulnerable to infection. Increasing theproductivity of food animals by geneticmodification might also increase stress andperformance-related diseases.

ii. The production of pharmaceutical proteins inanimal milk might increase pressure to extend thelength of lactation or the frequency of milking.

iii. Providing organs for transplants to humanswill involve similar confinement and isolationin a clinical environment.The GovernmentAdvisory Report on the Ethics of Xeno-transplantation (1997) accepted that pigs usedfor this purpose may be exposed to harm andsuffering. (15)

iv. Changes to the growth rate of the embryomay cause reproductive stress for the mother.

On the other hand it can be argued that animalsmay benefit from biotechnology.A wide range ofdiseases and disorders could be tackled in this way,and while some of these may be exacerbated byethically questionable farming practices, animalwelfare might still be said to have improved if theoverall level of disease is reduced. Other undesirablepractices might be reduced, such as the destructionof day-old male chicks, castration and tail-docking. Many genetic disorders (for example, indogs) might also be prevented.Those who do notobject to changing animals’ telos if they are therebycaused less suffering or discomfort would also arguethat it could benefit animals to be geneticallymodified so as to fit them for living conditions forwhich they are not “naturally” suited. Finally,there is the possibility of using genetic technologyto save endangered species from extinction.

Disagreement exists then, over the possible impactof genetic technology on animal welfare, butconcerns about the potential for animal sufferingare by no means the sole province of philosophersand animal welfare groups. In 1995, for example,the Banner Committee in the UK produced areport for Government Ministers on the ethicalimplications of emerging technologies in thebreeding of farm animals, (16) which recognisedthat genetic modification might result in welfareproblems, some of which might not be immediatelyapparent.This Committee produced three generalprinciples for future practice:

i. Harms of a certain degree and kind ought underno circumstances to be inflicted on an animal.

ii. Any harm to an animal, even if not absolutelyimpermissible, nonetheless requires justificationand must be outweighed by the good which isrealistically sought in so treating it.

iii. Any harm which is not absolutely prohibitedby the first principle, and is consideredjustified in the light of the second, ought,however, to be minimized as far as isreasonably possible.

In applying these principles to the issue ofaltering animals’ telos, the Committee concludedthat it would be unacceptable to use geneticmodification to increase the efficiency of food

Disease resistance genes

Scientists have mapped novel genes involved indetermining chickens’ resistance to infection bySalmonella, and the virus that causes Marek’s disease.These are among the first economically important traitsfor which genes have been mapped in poultry. Thispicture shows a gene (highlighted in yellow) on one of thechromosomes, located using a specific marker sequence.

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:01 pm Page 22

conversion in pigs by reducing their sentience andresponsiveness, thereby decreasing their level ofactivity, on the grounds that this would be morallyobjectionable in treating the animals as rawmaterials upon which our ends and purposes can beimposed regardless of the ends and purposes whichare natural to them. Such recommendationsreflect legislation introduced in Sweden, requiringthat farm animals be allowed to live their lives inaccordance with their telos - e.g. that cattle havethe right to graze and that chicken and pigs havethe right to freedom of motion – though it must beremembered that the telos of farm animals couldbe said to have been already reshaped in manyways by selective breeding, as mentioned earlier.

Most animal biotechnology at present, however, ispractised not on the farm for food purposes, butin the laboratory for research purposes, andgenetically modified laboratory animals raiseparticular and difficult problems in terms of animalwelfare. Such animals may be used in various ways,and these are controlled by regulations intendedto minimise suffering, but it is as models of humandiseases that they create especially thorny ethicaldilemmas.Animals have in fact been used as diseasemodels for many years, but the production ofgenetically modified animals for this purpose hasrecently attracted particular attention and debate.

The best-known example of such an animal is theso-called oncomouse, the first creature ever to be(controversially) patented, which is geneticallydesigned to develop cancer.The creation of thisanimal poses the question of whether an ethicaldistinction can and should be drawn betweeninducing cancer in a laboratory animal andgenetically engineering an animal to develop cancer.While there seems little difference in terms of theanimal’s welfare (or lack of it), some have argued thatit is ethically objectionable to alter an animal’s geneticstructure with the clear purpose of causing it to bedefective and to develop a painful, lethal condition.

Even more problematic than the oncomouse,however, is the use of animals to model otherhuman diseases.At least in the case of cancerresearch, regulations require procedures to minimisethe suffering of laboratory animals by employingeuthanasia at a certain stage of the tumour’sdevelopment. However, it has been suggested thatresearch into a number of devastating humangenetic diseases (e.g. Lesch-Nyhan disease andHPRT deficiency), where animals are likely to beincreasingly used as models, will need to keep thoseanimals alive for as long as possible in order tostudy the full course of the disease.As BernardRollin points out, there is no way to study manyof these diseases in acute, terminal or short-term

experiments, and as anaesthesia cannot be maintainedfor long periods there appears to be the potential herefor a considerable amount of animal suffering. (17)

The issue of animal welfare and the distinctionbetween genetically modified food animals andlaboratory animals throws into sharp relief theethical problems which have been the focus of thisbooklet. If there are, as the Banner Committee’sfirst principle claims, harms of a certain degreeand kind which ought under no circumstances tobe inflicted on an animal, it seems that some suchharms might well be involved in the areas of medicalresearch mentioned above.Yet although criticsclaim that the differences between laboratoryanimals and human beings makes most of theresearch based upon animal studies of dubiousvalue, it is arguable that by not using animals in suchresearch, human beings may suffer. If such dilemmasexist even in the area of medical research, wherethe aim is to improve dramatically the quality ofhuman life for many, the ratio of animal costs tohuman benefits looks even more ethicallyquestionable in the case of the possible sufferingof food animals.

Extrinsic concerns about risk and welfare have beenshown to raise basic questions about the ethicalassessment of costs and benefits, such as when (ifever) do the possibly dramatic benefits of a newtechnology outweigh its possibly catastrophic risks,and how are possible human benefits to be setagainst probable animal suffering.The task of ethicshere is to examine the justifiability of the alternativecourses of action and the general principles onwhich they might be based. Ultimately, however,these principles are likely to reflect fundamentalbeliefs and value judgments,which cannot simply be“proved” right or wrong, about what is to count ashuman development and progress and what ourrelationships and obligations should be towardsother species.

The use of genetic modification in animal experimentation isincreasing. Of all the animals used in research procedures inGreat Britain, over 85% are specially-bred rodents.

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:01 pm Page 23

As this booklet has not attempted to offer simpleanswers to moral and ethical questions aboutanimal biotechnology, a convenient list of suchanswers cannot be provided in this concludingsection. Nevertheless, a number of underlyingthemes has emerged, explicitly or implicitly, whichare worth drawing together briefly at this point.

i. Animal biotechnology can generate a numberof different moral concerns. Distinctions ofvarious kinds need constantly to be drawn inorder to pinpoint precisely the grounds of themoral concern and the target at which it isdirected. Intrinsic and extrinsic concerns, forexample, have to be carefully distinguished asthey rely upon radically different forms ofargument. Generalisations about the rights andwrongs of animal biotechnology as a whole arenot likely to be very helpful.

ii. For moral concerns to carry weight, theyshould specify what is distinctivelyobjectionable about their target or demonstratethat the objectionable feature is equallyobjectionable in other contexts. It is illogical,for example, to object to animal biotechnologysimply on the grounds that it “interferes withNature,” without at the same time objecting tocountless other examples of such “interference”occurring in agriculture, horticulture, medicineand many other activities which most of usaccept without question.

iii. A major reason why animals raise ethical issuesis that they are sentient beings. Belonging to aparticular species does not in itself automaticallyconfer moral superiority or inferiority inrelation to members of other species.Takingaccount of the sentiency of other species maysuggest an approach which attempts to calculateanimal and human pleasures and pains, or onewhich respects animals as individuals possessinginherent value. In either case, difficult judgmentshave to be made about the precise boundariesof the animal kingdom and the qualificationsfor membership of the moral community.

iv. Moral concerns that animal biotechnology isintrinsically wrong depend largely upon beliefsabout its “unnaturalness”, but these raise problemsof definition and of ethical justification.Thequestion of whether it can ever be right to

alter an animal’s nature or telos, and if so towhat extent and for what purposes, hashowever provoked serious ethical debate.

v. Equally complex and controversial are utilitarianattempts to evaluate the consequences of animalbiotechnology in terms of risks and benefits.Huge benefits are predicted by some, particularlyin the area of medical research, but these haveto be weighed against potentially serious risks.The ethical assessment is further complicatedby the issue of animal welfare, and by thequestion of whether certain levels of harmought under no circumstances to be inflictedon an animal.

The examples of moral and ethical issues examinedin this booklet are not intended as an exhaustivelist, though they probably encompass the mainareas of current concern. One of the challengespresented by our ever-developing range ofknowledge and skills, however, is that it continuesto throw up novel and more complex questionsabout what it is right and wrong to do, and thesequestions cannot be answered by referring back tosome previously agreed moral rule-book, partlybecause no such rule-book exists and partlybecause, even if it did, it would be inadequate todeal with fresh and often unforeseen developments.Science and ethics, then, need to proceed hand inhand in exploring new territories such as animalbiotechnology, to ensure that the wide-rangingimplications for human and animal welfare arekept under constant review.

6 Conclusions

Three ways by which animals can be genetically modified

(a) Pro-nuclear injectionMicroinjection of DNA (genes) into a one-celled embryo (single recently-fertilised egg).

1. Single celled embryos are produced

or by mating a female animal that hasbeen injected with a hormone toproduce a larger than usual number ofeggs (superovulation).

either by in vitro maturation andfertilisation of egg cells.This approachhas been used with bovine egg cells.

2. The single cell embryos are isolated and injectedwith typically 200-500 copies of the new gene.This process is called microinjection.Theinjected gene incorporates randomly into thehost’s DNA.

4. Embryos develop in the surrogate mother. Offspring are tested to see if they possess the new gene.

3. After a few cell divisions,microinjected embryos aretransferred to the oviduct offemale animals which have beeninduced by hormones to act assurrogate mothers.

The overall efficiency of gene insertion is low, perhaps 2-5%, although this varies between species and may be up to 10% in mice.This low efficiency is compounded by the fact that the inserted genes may not work efficiently.However, in total, several genes have been successfully introduced into different livestock species using microinjection.

pipette holding theembryo

pipetteinjecting thenew DNA

embryo

Superovulate Flushing

7 Technical Annex

ETHICS MOR ANIMAL 29/9/00 3:01 pm Page 25

(b) Gene targeting in embryonic stem (ES) cells.

This method is usually used to target the insertion of the DNA by homologous recombination and so provides a method for specifically disrupting or replacing an endogenous gene, although it can be used for simply adding new genes.

1. Fertilised embryos are isolated and from these stem cells are dissected out and so-called embryonic stem (ES)cell lines are established.

2. DNA sequences are introduced into the ES cells and in a very small proportion of cases will be inserted at thetargeted site in the genome.

3. The targeted cells are selectedfrom the rest and injected intoembryos at the blastocyst stage.

4. These embryos are implanted into surrogate mothers.The animals produced are chimeras with a proportion of the cells in each tissue derived from the normal embryo cells and a proportion from the injected modified ES cells.

5. A proportion of the offspring of these animals will be genetically modified, i.e. they carry the targeted changeintroduced into the ES cells.

ES cells are only available in mice and, so far, this route is limited to this species.

ES cells have been widely used to knock out gene activity in mice but have not been isolated from livestock.Nuclear transfer has been developed as an alternative way of deriving genetically modified animals from geneticallymodified cells.

inner cell mass

ES cells

(c) Nuclear transferThis is the process that produced Dolly, the world’s first mammal derived from the cell of an adult animal.

A ewe is superovulated. Tissue is taken from the udder of anadult ewe.

A pipette is inserted into an egg cell to remove its DNA.

This creates an “empty“ egg cell.

These cells are cultured in a dish and“starved” so that they enter a restingstate.

One of the cultured cells is picked up in a micro pipette.

The cell is transferred into the spacebetween the cytoplasm of the “empty”egg and its outer “shell”.

The reconstructed “embryo” is culturedin vivo in a temporary recipient.

The embryo is transferred to asurrogate mother in which it developsto produce a new lamb after 21 weeks.

The egg containing the cell is placedbetween two wires.An electric currentthrough the wire “fuses” the egg andcell so that they grow together.

the eggs are collected.

R e f e r e n c e s

1. Burkhardt, J. (1998),The inevitability of animalbiotechnology? Ethics and the scientificattitude, in Animal Biotechnology andEthics, Holland,A. and Johnson,A. (eds).Chapman and Hall, London, p.130

2. Flew,A. (ed.) (1979), A Dictionary ofPhilosophy, Pan, London, pp.104-5

3. Rachels, J. (1989), Do animals have a right toliberty? in Animal Rights and HumanObligations, Reagan,T. and Singer, P. (eds.)Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.

4. Bentham, J. (1789), The Principles ofMorals and Legislation, Hafner, New York,p.311

5. Reagan,T. (1992),Treatment of animals, inEncyclopedia of Ethics, L.C. and C.B.Becker (eds), St. James, London, p.43

6. Singer, P. (1976), Animal Liberation,Jonathan Cape, London, p.6

7. Midgley, M. (1983), Animals and Why TheyMatter, University of Georgia Press, p.26

8. Stevenson, P. (1998),Animal patenting:European law and the ethical implications, inAnimal Biotechnology and Ethics, p.291

9. Cupitt, D. (1975), Natural evil, in Man andNature, Montefiore, H. (ed.) Collins,London, p.110

10. Rollin, B. (1998), On telos and geneticengineering, in Animal Biotechnology and Ethics, p.162

11. Rollin, B. (1995), The FrankensteinSyndrome: ethical and social issues in the genetic engineering of animals,Cambridge University Press, p.117

12. See e.g. Rollin, B. (1995), pp.108-136

13. See e.g. D’Silva, J. (1998), Campaigning against transgenic technology, in AnimalBiotechnology and Ethics, pp. 94-99

14. See e.g. Spedding, C. (1997),Animal welfareconsiderations, in Genetic Engineering in Food Production, Lord Soulsby ofSwaffham Prior (ed.), International Congressand Symposium Series 224, Royal Society of Medicine Press Ltd, London, pp. 57-60

15. Kennedy, I. (1997), A report by theAdvisory Group on the ethics ofxenotransplantation of animal tissuesinto humans, HMSO, London

16. Banner, M.C. (1995), Report of theCommittee to consider the ethicalimplications of emerging technologies in the breeding of farm animals,HMSO, London

17. See e.g. Rollin, B. (1995), pp. 200-206

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

The author thanks BBSRC for providing the text of Section 1, Section 7, and other technical content, and forhelpful discussions during the preparation of this booklet.Valuable comments on the original text were also provided by Revd Dr Michael Reiss.In publishing this booklet BBSRC acknowledges with gratitude the following who contributed illustrations:

Bruce Coleman Ltd

Compassion in World Farming

Cystic Fibrosis Trust

Imperial Cancer Research Fund

Institute for Animal Health

James Mallet

MRC Human Genetics Unit, Edinburgh

PPL Therapeutics

Roslin Institute

The Stock Market

University of Bristol

University of Southampton

ETHICS, MORALITY AND ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY