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EstimatedImpactsofTariffson

theU.S.EconomyandWorkers

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EstimatedImpactsofTariffsontheU.S.EconomyandWorkers

ExecutiveSummary

BeginninginMarch2018,theUnitedStatesbegantoimposeaseriesoftariffsandthenquotasonimportsofselectedsteelandaluminumproductsfromallcountriesexceptAustralia.Thosecountriesretaliatedinkind.TheUnitedStatesalsoimposedtariffsonalargeshareofU.S.importsfromChina,andChinaretaliatedinkind.TheUnitedStateshasthreatedtoimposeadditionaltariffsonU.S.importsofmotorvehiclesandpartsfromselectedcountries,aswellasontheremainderofU.S.importsfromChina.

ThisstudyexaminestheeconomiceffectsoftheseactualandthreatenedtariffsontheU.S.economyandU.S.workersonetothreeyearsaftertheyhavebeenineffect.Welookatfourscenariosandfind:

• BaseScenario:AsofNovember1,steelandaluminumtariffsofandquotasineffect,tariffsof25percentonU.S.importsofselectedgoodsfromChina(Lists1,2and3),plusretaliation:

AnnualimpactondollarvalueofU.S.GDP(percent) -0.37Annualimpactonfamilyoffour $767One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -934,700Everystateexperiencesnetjoblosses

• BaseScenarioplusU.S.tariffsof25percentonmotorvehiclesandpartsimportedfromcountriesotherthanCanada,Mexico,theEuropeanUnion,Korea,andJapan,plusretaliation:

AnnualimpactondollarvalueofU.S.GDP(percent) -0.43Annualimpactonfamilyoffour $902One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -1,040,200

• BaseScenarioplusU.S.tariffsof25percentonallremainingimportsfromChina,plusChineseretaliation:

AnnualimpactondollarvalueofU.S.GDP(percent) -1.01Annualimpactonfamilyoffour $2,294One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -2,159,500

• Allthreescenarioscombined:

AnnualimpactondollarvalueofU.S.GDP(percent) -1.04Annualimpactonfamilyoffour $2,389One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -2,235,400Everystateexperiencesnetjoblosses

EstimatedImpactsofTariffsontheU.S.EconomyandWorkers

I. Introduction

BeginninginMarch2018,PresidentTrumpbegantoimposeaseriesoftariffsand,later,quotasonselectedU.S.steelandaluminumimportsfromanumberofcountries,underSection232oftheTradeExpansionActof1962.Inaddition,onJuly6,2018PresidentTrumpappliedthefirstinaseriesoftariffsonimportsofselectedproductsimportedfromChina,inretaliationforChina’srefusaltochangeintellectualpropertyrights-relatedacts,policiesandpracticesthattheOfficeoftheU.S.TradeRepresentative(USTR)haddeterminedwereadverselyaffectingU.S.companies.Ineachinstance,U.S.tradingpartnersretaliatedwithtariffsoftheirown,appliedtoarangeofU.S.exports.AsofNovember1,2018,U.S.tariffsaffected$255billioninU.S.importsandforeignretaliatorytariffswerebeingappliedto$124billioninU.S.exports.1

ThePresidenthasalsothreatenedtoimposeadditionaltariffsonimportsofmotorvehiclesandparts,buthasagreedtoremovecertainsuppliersfromcoverage,atleastfornow.Thetotalvalueofpotentiallyaffectedmotorvehicleandpartstradeis$28billion,withcommensurateretaliationtoU.S.exports.

ThePresidenthasthreatenedtoimposetariffsonthebalanceofU.S.importsfromChinaifChinacontinuestofailtoimplementalonglistofchangestoitsintellectualpropertyrightspoliciesandpractices,andnarrowitstradesurpluswiththeUnitedStates.Chinahasagainthreatenedtoretaliateinkind.Thesethreatenedtariffswouldaffectanadditional$290billioninU.S.imports,withcommensurateretaliationtoU.S.exports.

Theescalationoftariffs,bothbytheUnitedStatesandbyU.S.tradingpartners,hasanimpactonU.S.producersandconsumersand,asaconsequence,U.S.workers.Someofthoseeffectsarepositive(increasedproductionandoutputinsectorsprotectedbythetariffs);othersarenegative(highercoststoconsumers–bothU.S.manufacturersandhouseholds–whomustpaythetariffs,forexample).ThisstudyestimatesthecomprehensiveimpactsofannouncedtariffsandquotasontheU.S.economyandU.S.workers.SectionIIdescribesinmoredetailourtariffscenarios.SectionIIIbrieflydescribesourmethodology;amoredetaileddescriptionisfoundinAppendixA.SectionIVpresentsourresults.SectionVconcludes.

11 ThevalueoftradeaffectedbyU.S.importandforeignretaliatorytariffsreportedheremaydiffersignificantlyfrompublishedaccountsoftheamountoftradeaffectedbytariffs.Onecauseisdifferenceinimportclassificationcodesforthesameproductthataredifferentfor2017and2018.AproductmaybeonaU.S.tarifflistfor2018,butnodatashowupforitfor2017becausethattariffcodedidnotexistin2017..Ourdatareflectsthe2018tariffcodesthataremissingfrom2017data.ForU.S.exports,thevalueoftradein2017maybehigherorlowerthanfigurescitedinofficialannouncements.Theneedtouseless-detailedcategories(6-digitHTScodes)thanthoseusedbyforeigngovernmentstoselectretaliatorytariffsmayoverstateaboutvalueoftradecoveredforcertainproducts,butlargervariations(higherorlower)resultfromforeigngovernments’useoftradedataforperiodsotherthan2017toselectretaliationlists.

2

1.5% 1.5%1.2% 1.3% 1.4%

1.6%

1.9% 2.0% 2.1%

2.6%

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18 Apr-18 May-18 Jun-18 Jul-18 Aug-18 Sep-18 Oct-18

II. ScopeofTariffstoDate,ThreatenedandActual

EffectiveMarch8,2018,PresidentTrumpinstructedhisAdministrationtoimposetariffsand,later,quotasonselectedU.S.steelandaluminumimportsfromanumberofcountries,underSection232oftheTradeExpansionActof1962.SevencountriesandtheEuropeanUnionannouncedandthenimposedretaliatorytariffsonlistsofvariousU.S.exportstotheirrespectivemarkets.

Inaddition,onJuly6PresidentTrumpappliedthefirstinaseriesoftariffsonimportsofselectedproducts(groupedbytheAdministrationas“List1,”“List2,”and“List3”)importedfromChina,inretaliationforChina’srefusaltochangeintellectualpropertyrights-relatedacts,policiesandpracticesthattheOfficeoftheU.S.TradeRepresentative(USTR)haddeterminedwereadverselyaffectingU.S.companies.Aftereachnewsetoftariffswasimposed,ChinaannounceditsownlistofU.S.productsthatwouldbesubjecttoretaliatoryChinesedutieswhenimportedintoChina.

AsofNovember1,2018,U.S.tariffsaffected$255billioninU.S.importsandforeignretaliatorytariffswerebeingappliedto$124billioninU.S.exports;tariffsaffecting$165billioninU.S.importsfromChinaaresettoincreasefrom10percentto25percentonMarch2,2019(seeTable1).

ThenewtariffshaveincreasedaverageU.S.tariffratessincetheystartedtotakeeffectinMarch(Chart1).Thetrade-weightedaverageU.S.tariffpaidbyU.S.companies–reflectingtariffspaidongoodssubjecttothenewtariffsaswellasregulartariffs–rosefrom1.5percentorlessinthefirstfivemonthsof2018to2.6percentbyOctober2018,thelatestmonthforwhichdataareavailable.GivenU.S.goodsimportsof$2.0trillionto$2.5trillionannually,a1-percentagepointincreaseinaveragetariffspaidequatesto$20billionto$25billioninadditionaltariffcostsforU.S.importers.

Chart1AverageTariffsPaidonAllU.S.GoodsImports,January–October2018

Sources:Ratesweightedbytradevalue.DerivedfromU.S.CensusBureaudata.

3

Table1SummaryofTariffsinEffectorAnnouncedasofNovember1,2018

Valueof2017 TradeAffected(Millions)

ImportsU.S.AluminumTariffs AllcountriesexceptAustralia,Argentina 10% $16,984U.S.AluminumQuotas Argentina Importscappedataverageof2015-2017volumes $167U.S.SteelTariffs Turkey 50% $1,192 Allothersexcept Australia,Argentina,Brazil,Korea 25% $22,888U.S.SteelQuotas Argentina Volumecappedat135percentof2015-2017average $56 Brazil Semi-finishedvolumefixedat2015-2017average; Finished,30%cutinimportvolumefrom2015-2017ave. $592 Korea 30%cutinimportvolumefrom2015-2017average $1,129U.S.TariffsonImportsfromChina List1(818products) 25% 31,936 List2(279products) 25% 13,712 List3(6,031products) 10%-25% 165,334TotalImportsAffected $254,990ShareofTotalU.S.ImportsfromAllCountries 10.9%

ExportsSteel/AluminumRetaliation Canada 10-25% $17,818 China 15-25% 2,441 Mexico 7-25% 6,744 EU 10-25% 4,230 Turkey 4-140% 1,563 India 5-100% (notineffectyet) Japan TBD (notineffectyet) Russia 25-40% 268ChineseTariffsonImportsfromtheUnitedStates RetaliationforList1(545products) 25% 29,172 RetaliationforList2(333products) 25% 21,878 RetaliationforList3(5,207products) 5-25% 51,956TotalExportsAffected* $124,035ShareofTotalU.S.ExportstoAllCountries 8.0%

*ThesumofexportvaluesreportedforindividualcountriesandactionsishigherthanvalueoftotalexportsaffectedduetodoublecountingofproductsthatareonmultipleChineseretaliationlists.Insomecases,asingleproductisonboththeChineseSection232steel/aluminumandSection301retaliationlists.Inothers,itisbecausemultipleproductsunderthesame6-digitHTScodeappearondifferentChinaSection301retaliationlists.ThetotalvalueaffectedfigureinthisTableeliminatessuchdouble-countingissues.

4

1.8% 1.8% 1.6% 1.6%2.4%

4.3%

5.9%6.6%

7.5%

14.2%

1.4% 1.4% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%


ImportsSubjecttoNewTariffs ImportsNotSubjecttoNewTariffs

Sources:Imports:Steel/aluminumandChinaimportvaluedatafromU.S.Censusforaffectedproducts;forquotas,estimatedonthebasisofvolumeimpactsofquotasrelativeto2017importvaluesfromU.S.Censusdata.Exports:CountryretaliationvaluesfromU.S.CensusforproductsincludedonU.S.DepartmentofCommerce’sCurrentForeignRetaliatoryActionspage,https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/retaliations/tg_ian_002094.asp#P4_161(accessedNovember2,2018).

BreakingoutaveragetariffratesforproductssubjecttonewtariffsfromthoseunaffectedbythenewtariffsshowsthatthebulkoftheincreaseinaveragetariffspaidshowninChart1wasinfactdrivenbythenewtariffs(Chart2).Averagetariffsonimportsnotsubjecttonewremedieshaveremainedsteady:between1.2percentand1.4percentallyear.Incontrast,averagetariffsonproductssubjecttonewtariffsincreasedfrom1.6percentinAprilto14.2percentinOctober.AveragetariffsonaffectedproductshaveincreasedeverymonthsinceMarch,andnearlydoubledfromSeptembertoOctober,thefirstfullmonththat“List3”tariffsonChinawereineffect.

Chart2AverageTariffsPaidonU.S.GoodsImportsbyType,January–October2018

Sources:Ratesweightedbytradevalue.DerivedfromU.S.CensusBureaudata.

ThenegativeimpactsofrisingtariffsareevidentonU.S.exportstrendsaswell.NewretaliatorytariffsonU.S.exportshavebeenannouncednearlyeverymonth:inresponsetoU.S.Section232steelandaluminumtariffs,ChinaimplementednewtariffsonU.S.exportsinApril.Mexico,TurkeyandtheEUsimilarlyimposednewtariffsinJune,followedbyCanadainJulyandRussiainAugust.Additionally,Chinaimposednew(orevenhigher)tariffsonU.S.exportsinJuly,August,andSeptemberinresponsetoSection301tariffs.Asaresultoftherollingimplementation,thevalueofretaliatorytariffsassessedonU.S.exportshascontinuedtoclimb(Chart3).

5

$0 $0 $0$43 $28

$348

$567

$725

$942$1,003

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200


Millions

5.3%

7.3%

10.4% 10.7%

13.5%

10.5% 10.1%8.8%

7.9% 7.4%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%


Chart3EstimatedRetaliatoryTariffsAssessedonU.S.GoodsExports,January–October2018

Sources:DerivedfromU.S.CensusBureaudata.

LimitedretaliationbyChinatoSection232steelaluminumremediesinApril/Mayballoonedtoanestimated$1billioninextratariffsonU.S.exportsinOctober2018.IncreasingretaliatorytariffshavecorrespondedwithasignificantslowdowninU.S.goodsexportsgrowth(seeChart4).

Chart4Year-Over-YearChangeinU.S.GoodsExports,January–October2018


6

6.3% 7.9%10.7% 10.7%

14.6%11.1% 11.8% 11.3% 11.1% 12.3%

-4.9%1.5% 6.6% 10.3% 1.6% 4.4%

-8.9%

-17.9%

-26.5%

-36.7%-45%

-30%

-15%

0%

15%

30%


NotSubjecttoRetaliatoryTariffs SubjecttoRetaliatoryTariffs

Afterrisingsteadilyinthebeginningof2018,growthinU.S.exportspeakedat13.5percentinMayandhasfalleneverymonthsincethen.BreakingoutU.S.exportgrowthforproductssubjecttoretaliation–asopposedtothoseunaffectedbyit–showsaparticularlystarkdifferenceinthenegativeimpactonexportgrowthofretaliatorytariffs(seeChart5).GrowthtrendsforU.S.goodsexportsnotsubjecttoretaliatorytariffshaveremainedremarkablyconsistent:generallyincreasingby11percentto12percentineachmonthfromMarchtoOctober.Conversely,exportssubjecttoretaliationhavedeclinedeachmonthsinceJuly.Declineshaveacceleratedastariffshaveremainedinplace,includinga37percentdeclineinOctober.

Chart5Year-Over-YearChangeinU.S.GoodsExportsbyType,January–October2018


Clearly,retaliatorytariffslikelyarebehindslowinggrowthofU.S.goodsexports.Iftheprimarycauseweregeneralfactors,suchasastrongdollarorweakeningglobalgrowth,onewouldexpecttoseeslowinggrowthfornon-affectedproductsaswell.Estimatingtheactualextentofthisimpactisoneoftheaimsofthisresearch.

ThestoriestoldinthesuccessionofChartsabovecouldgetworse.ThePresidenthasalsothreatenedtoimposeadditionaltariffsonimportsofmotorvehiclesandparts,2buthasalsoagreedtoremovecertainsuppliersfromcoverage,atleastfornow.MexicoandCanadanegotiated,inthependingU.S.-Mexico-CanadaAgreement(USMCA)largequotasforautos2 AtthePresident’sinstruction,theCommerceDepartmenthasbegunaSection232investigationfocusedonmotorvehiclesandparts.ThePresidenthassuggestedhecouldimposetariffsofupto25percentonU.S.importsoftheseproductsattheconclusionofthatinvestigation.U.S.tradingpartnershavesaidtheywillretaliateifthosetariffsareimposed.

7

andpartsthataredesignedtohavelittleornoimpactontheirexportsofthoseproductstotheUnitedStatesifSection232tariffsareultimatelyimposed;thePresidenthasalsoagreedtonotsubjecttheEuropeanUnionandJapantoSection232tariffsaslongasthosepartiescontinuetonegotiatetradeagreementswiththeUnitedStates.Finally,KoreabelievesithasanunderstandingthatSection232tariffsonautosorpartswillnotaffectU.S.importsofthoseproductsfromKorea(KoreanlegislatorshavepromisedtonotapprovethereviseU.S.-KoreafreetradeagreementifsuchtariffsultimatelydoimpactKorea’sautosandparts).ThismeansthatpossibleSection232tariffswouldaffectarelativelysmallshareofU.S.motorvehicleandpartsimports,andcommensurateretaliation.

ThePresidenthasalsothreatenedtoimposetariffsonthebalanceofU.S.importsfromChinaifChinacontinuestofailtoimplementalonglistofchangestoitsintellectualpropertyrightspoliciesandpractices,andnarrowitstradesurpluswiththeUnitedStates.Chinahasagainthreatenedtoretaliateinkind.Thesethreatenedtariffscouldaffectanadditional$291billioninU.S.importsand$145billioninU.S.goodsandservicesexports(seeTable2).

Table2SummaryofPotentialAdditionalTariffs

Tariff Valueof2017 Rate Trade(Million)

Imports

U.S.MotorVehicles&Parts AllsuppliersotherthanCanada, Mexico,EU,Japan,Korea 25% $28,020U.S.TariffsonImportsfromChina List4 25% $291,180

ExportsRetaliationbysuppliersaffectedbymotorvehiclesandpartstariffs 0.7% $297,704ChineseretaliationfortariffsonList4products Goods* 25% $87,103 Services 10-25% $57,628*IncludesproductsnotsubjecttoanycurrentSection301retaliationaswellasproductsonList3whosecurrentretaliatorytariffsarelessthan25percent.Sources:U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,CensusBureauandBureauofEconomicAnalysis.

8

ToexaminetheactualandpotentialeconomiceffectsofthesetariffsontheU.S.economy,wehavegroupedthemintofourscenarios.

(1) BaseScenario:AnnouncedTariffsandQuotas.Thisscenarioexaminestheimpactsofalltariffs(U.S.andretaliatory)andquotasineffectorannouncedasofNovember1,2018.ThisscenariogroupstogetherU.S.steelandaluminumtariffsof25percentandquotas,withretaliationonselectedU.S.exportsatthetariffsindicatedbytradingpartners;U.S.tariffsof25percentonimportsofChinaincludedonLists1,2and3,andChina’sannouncedretaliationonU.S.exportsatthetariffratesannounced.

(2) PossibleMotorVehicleandPartsSection232tariffs.ThisscenarioaddstotheBaseScenarioadditionalU.S.tariffsof25percentonU.S.importsofmotorvehiclesandparts,exceptCanada,Mexico,Korea,theEuropeanUnionandJapan,withreciprocalretaliationbasedonthedollarvalueoftariffsimposedonU.S.motorvehicleimports(fortopremainingsuppliercountriestotheU.S.),dividedbythedollarvalueofU.S.exportstothosesamemarkets.

(3) AllGoodsTradewithChina.ThisscenarioaddstotheBaseScenarioadditionalU.S.tariffsof25percentonU.S.importsofallremainingproductsimportedfromChina(dubbed“List4”),plusexpectedretaliationbyChina.AsChinahasalreadyraiseddutiesonvirtuallyallitsgoodsimportsfromtheUnitedStates,ItsnewoptionsincluderaisingdutiesonallU.S.importsto25percentwheretheyarecurrentlylowerthanthat,and/ortakingnon-tariffactionsthathavetheeffectofrestrictingtrade(e.g.,slowingimportprocessingormakingthepurchaseofU.S.servicesmoreexpensive).WeassumeherethatChinaimposestheequivalentofa25percenttariffonU.S.servicestransactionswithChina(intheformofincreasedcostsforoperatingintheChinesemarket),aswellasborderandcustomsnuisancecostsequaltoanadditional2percentofthevalueU.S.goodsexports.3

(4) TradeWar.Thisscenariocombinesallofthescenariosintoone:steel/aluminumtariffs/quotasplusretaliation;tariffsonallU.S.importsfromChinaplusretaliation,andtariffsplusretaliationonU.S.motorvehiclesandpartsfromforeignsuppliersotherthanCanada,Mexico,Korea,theEuropeanUnionandJapan.

3 CarolineFreund,MichaelFarrantino,MarylaMaliszewska,andMicheleRuta,“ImpactsonGlobalTradeandIncomeofCurrentTradeDisputes,”Macroecnomics,TradeandInvestmentMTIPracticeNotes,WorldBankGroup,No.2,July2018,http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/685941532023153019/pdf/128644-MTI-Practice-Note-2-Final-3.pdf.

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III. Methodology

TariffshavebothpositiveandnegativeeffectsontheU.S.economy.Theirfirstimpactistoraisethecostsofimports,forcingpurchaserstoeitherbearthehighercostsorshiftsourcingtounaffectedsuppliers.TheiroptionsareU.S.producers,whereavailable,orproducersinothercountries,whereavailable.SotariffshaveapositiveimpactonU.S.producersbyshiftingsomeforeignsourcingtotheUnitedStates,andapositiveimpactonthirdcountrysuppliersbyshiftingothersourcingfromthecountriessubjecttotariffstothosethatarenotsubjecttotariffs.

ButtariffshaveanegativeimpactonU.S.buyerswhomustpayhigherprices.Thecostofforeignproductsthataresubjecttotariffsrises,andiftheU.S.buyermustcontinuetosourcefromthosesuppliers,theU.S.buyermustpaythetariffs.IftheU.S.buyercanshiftsupplytoanotherforeign–orU.S.–producer,thecostofthatalternativesourceofsupplywillbehigher,aswell,andshiftingsupplyalsocoststimeandmoney.Thesehighercostsgetpassedontootherbuyersinthesupplychainand,eventuallytothefinalconsumer.

TheseimpactsripplethroughtheU.S.economy.U.S.producerswhowinnewsalesneedtopurchasemoreinputstoproduction,whichsendsnewbusinesstotheirsuppliers.CompaniesalongtheU.S.producersupplychainmayneedtohiremoreworkers.ThisadditionalU.S.spendingripplesfurtherthroughtheeconomyinpositiveways–allthewaytosuchsectorsaseducation(workersincreasetheiruseofdaycareservices,forexample)orentertainment(workersgoouttodinnermore).

ButthehighercostsofimportsalsohaveimpactsonU.S.companieswhoneedtocontinuetoimportbecauseU.S.producersarenotavailableorotherwisearenotaviableoptionforthem.Thefinalpurchaserofgoodsthatnowcostmorewillbuylessofthem.Salesdeclineseventuallyleadtoemploymentcuts.Employmentcutsresultinlowerconsumerspendingonarangeofgoodsandservices:insteadofanewcar,thefamilybuysausedcar;workersgoouttodinnerlessoften,andunemployedworkerscutoutevenmorediscretionarypurchases.Optionalhealthcareexpensesarepostponed.Eachofthesedecisionsinturnhasemploymentimpactsonworkersintheaffectedsectors.

Weuseamethodology,whichisdetailedinAppendixB,thatenablesustocapturealloftheseimpacts.Brieflystated,itexploresthedirectandindirecteffectsoftariffsonU.S.imports,thedirectandindirecteffectsofretaliatorytariffsonU.S.exports,andtheeffectsoftrade-inducedspendingincreasesanddecreasesonU.S.outputandconsumptionand,consequently,jobs.Itreflectsthedifferencesinprice,quantityandqualitybetweenimportedgoodsandU.S.-producedgoods.ItalsocapturesthejobsdirectlyandindirectlyrelatedtotheprocessofimportinggoodsandservicesintotheUnitedStates(e.g.,jobsassociatedwithtransportingimportsfromtheportstowarehouses,jobsatthewarehouses,orretailjobsthatselltheimportedgoodsiftheyarefinishedconsumerproducts).Finally,ourmethodologyalsoconsidersthepositiveandnegativeeffectsoftradeonjobs,andresultsreportedaretherefore“net”jobimpacts.

Ourresultsfocusontheshort-term(onetothreeyears)impactsofthetariffs.Weassumetheavailablepooloflaboristight.

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IV. Results

Ourabilitytocapturetheeconomy-wideimpactsofthevarioustariffscenariosshowsthattheyhavesomepositiveimpactsonsomesectors,andnegativeimpactsonothers.Ineveryinstanceexamined,thenegativeimpactsoutweighthepositiveimpacts.

A. BaseScenario:AnnouncedTariffsandQuotas

WefindthatU.S.tariffsandquotas(referredtoforeasehereassimply“tariffs”)coupledwithforeignretaliatorytariffsnowaffectingU.S.exportshavenetnegativeimpactsontheU.S.economyandU.S.workers.TariffsreducethedollarvalueofU.S.GDPby0.37percent,areductionthatwilloccureachyearthetariffsareineffect(Table3).TheaverageAmericafamilyoffourwillhavetofindanextra$767topayforhighercostsforgoodsandservicesresultingfromthetariffs,foreveryyeartheyareineffect.

U.S.exportsofgoodsandservicesoveralldeclineby5.6percent,or$131.7billionannuallybasedon2017levels,asaresultofthetariffs.ThisisdueprimarilytotheimpactoftheU.S.dutiesonimportsratherthanretaliationbyU.S.exporters.Thelargestdeclinestotheworld(notjusttheretaliatingcountries,intermsofpercentagereductions)arefeltbyU.S.exportersofironandsteel(-42.7percent,heavilyretaliation-related),oilseeds(-15.7percent,largelyretaliation-related),footwearandotherleatherproducts(-18.6percent,largelyduetoU.S.tariffeffectsmakingU.S.outputlesscompetitiveinternationally),woodproducts(-13.3percent,splitbetweenU.S.tariffandretaliationimpacts),andnonferrousmetals(aluminum,-12.8percent,largelyduetotheimpactsoftheU.S.tariffs).

NetU.S.jobsdeclineby934,700.Table4showsthatsomeworkersinsomesectorsfindnewjobsthankstothetariffs.Theseincludeworkersinthesteelindustry,asexpected.Workersinsteel-consumingsectorsarehurtbyhighercostsassociatedwithsteelandaluminumtariffs,butbenefitmorefromprotectionreceivedfromtariffsthatcutimportsfromChinaoftheproductstheymake.Overall,126,900workersgainjobsasaresultofthetariffs;however,1,061,400losejobs–morethaneightforeveryjobgained.Inshort,thetariffscosttheU.S.economy$490,900foreveryjobgained.

Table3AnnouncedTariffsandQuotas:NationalImpacts,1-3YearsAfterTariffsImposed

AnnualchangeindollarvalueofrealU.S.GDP(percent) -0.37AnnualchangeinrealU.S.nationalincome(billions) -$62.3AnnualchangeinU.S.exportstotheworld(percent) -5.6AnnualchangeinU.S.importsfromtheworld(percent) -6.5AnnualcostperU.S.familyoffour $767One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -934,700

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Table4AnnouncedTariffsandQuotas:NetNationalEmploymentImpactsbySector,1-3years

AfterTariffsImposed(Thousands)

Total -934.7Agriculture -59.3Forestry -1.8Fishing -1.0Oilandgas -2.9Othermining -3.6Manufacturing +83.8

Processedfoods -5.3Beveragesandtobacco -4.9Textiles +3.9Apparel -1.5Leatherproducts +1.9Woodproducts -2.6Paperproductsandpublishing +0.6Petroleum,coalproducts -0.1Chemicals,rubber,plasticproducts +0.5Othermineralproducts +5.8Ironandsteel +22.0Nonferrousmetals(includingaluminum) -0.7Fabricatedmetalproducts +22.0Motorvehiclesandparts -16.9Othertransportationequipment -11.1Electronicequipment +20.6Machinery +33.4Othermanufactures +16.2

Services -949.7Construction -209.5Wholesaleandretailtrade -216.4Transportation -27.4Finance -31.7Insurance -14.7Communications -23.8Businessandprofessionalservices -154.9Personalandrecreationalservices -38.6Otherservices(e.g.utilities,educ.,health,gov’t,etc.) -232.7

SeeAppendixTableA.1forsectordescriptions

12

Table5AnnouncedTariffsandQuotas:NetEmploymentImpactsbyState

Alabama -12,400 Montana -4,000Alaska -2,400 Nebraska -7,000Arizona -18,500 Nevada -9,100Arkansas -7,800 NewHampshire -3,600California -112,900 NewJersey -25,500Colorado -19,200 NewMexico -5,900Connecticut -10,600 NewYork -58,800Delaware -2,900 NorthCarolina -27,300DistrictofColumbia -4,200 NorthDakota -3,300Florida -61,000 Ohio -29,100Georgia -29,600 Oklahoma -11,200Hawaii -5,000 Oregon -11,900Idaho -5,500 Pennsylvania -32,900Illinois -33,500 RhodeIsland -2,800Indiana -15,100 SouthCarolina -12,700Iowa -9,900 SouthDakota -3,200Kansas -9,700 Tennessee -19,300Kentucky -12,900 Texas -85,100Louisiana -14,100 Utah -9,600Maine -4,400 Vermont -2,200Maryland -18,800 Virginia -26,300Massachusetts -21,700 Washington -24,000Michigan -25,100 WestVirginia -4,500Minnesota -16,100 Wisconsin -14,100Mississippi -7,700 Wyoming -2,300Missouri -18,700 TOTAL* -943,700*Thesumofthestatesdoesnotaddpreciselytothetotalbecauseofrounding.

13

B. AnnouncedTariffsandQuotasPlusPossibleMotorVehicleandPartsSection232Tariffs

Notsurprisingly,thenetimpactsontheU.S.economyandworkersworseniftheUnitedStatesimposestariffsunderSection232onimportsofmotorvehiclesandparts,andexportingcountriesretaliateinkindagainstU.S.exports–evenifthescopeofthosetariffsislimitedtocountriesthatarenotmajorsuppliersofmotorvehiclesandpartstotheUnitedStates.[Again,wehaveexcludedfromtariffsimportsfromandretaliationbyCanada,Mexico,theEuropeanUnion,JapanandKorea.]Tariffsonsteel,aluminum,andLists1-3ofgoodsimportedfromChina,plusretaliation,plustariffsonselectedmotorvehicleandpartsimportsandretaliationannuallyreducethedollarvalueofU.S.GDPby0.43percent(Table6).TheaverageAmericafamilyoffourwillpayover$900moreforhighercostsforgoodsandservicesresultingfromthetariffs,foreveryyeartheyareineffect.

U.S.exportsofgoodsandservicesoveralldeclineby5.8percent,or$136.4billionannuallybasedon2017levels,asaresultofthetariffs.Thesamesectorsasinthebasescenariocontinuetobetheleading“losers”ofexportstotheworld,andforthesamereasons:ironandsteel(-42.9percent),oilseeds(-15.7percent),footwearandotherleatherproducts(-18.8percent),woodproducts(-13.3percent),andnonferrousmetals(aluminum,-13.2percent).

NetU.S.jobsdeclineby1,040,200.Table7showsthatfewerworkersinsomesectors(3,000less)findnewjobsthankstotheadditionalmotorvehicleandpartstariffs(workersinthechemicals,rubberandplasticssectorsbecomenetlowersfromtheadditionaltariffs).Overall,123,600workersgainjobsasaresultofthetariffs.But1,163,600losejobs–morethannineforeveryjobgained.ThetariffsnowcosttheU.S.economy$592,136foreveryjobgained.

Table6

AnnouncedTariffsandQuotasPlusMotorVehicleandPartsSection232Tariffs:NationalImpacts,1-3YearsAfterTariffsImposed

AnnualchangeindollarvalueofrealU.S.GDP(percent) -0.43AnnualchangeinrealU.S.nationalincome(billions) -$73.2AnnualchangeinU.S.exportstotheworld(percent) -5.8AnnualchangeinU.S.importsfromtheworld(percent) -6.9AnnualcostperU.S.familyoffour $902One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -1,040.2

14

Table7AnnouncedTariffsandQuotasPlusMotorVehicleandPartsSection232Tariffs:NetNationalEmploymentImpactsbySector,1-3YearsAfterTariffsImposed

(Thousands)Total -1,040.2Agriculture -60.0Forestry -2.0Fishing -1.0Oilandgas -3.1Othermining -3.7Manufacturing +89.1

Processedfoods -6.1Beveragesandtobacco -5.1Textiles +4.0Apparel -1.4Leatherproducts +1.9Woodproducts -3.2Paperproductsandpublishing +0.1Petroleum,coalproducts -0.2Chemicals,rubber,plasticproducts -0.3Othermineralproducts +5.5Ironandsteel +22.3Nonferrousmetals(includingaluminum) -0.6Fabricatedmetalproducts +23.0Motorvehiclesandparts -5.7Othertransportationequipment -11.9Electronicequipment +19.6Machinery +31.9Othermanufactures +15.3

Services -1,059.5Construction -230.1Wholesaleandretailtrade -242.2Transportation -28.7Finance -35.1Insurance -16.0Communications -26.5Businessandprofessionalservices -165.2Personalandrecreationalservices -45.2Otherservices(e.g.utilities,educ.,health,gov’t,etc.) -270.3


15

C. AnnouncedTariffsandQuotasPlusAllOtherGoodsTradewithChinaImposingtariffsonthebalanceofU.S.importsfromChina(theso-called“List4”items),withretaliationbyChinareallyamplifiesthecoststotheU.S.economyandU.S.workersofcurrently-announcedtariffsandquotasonsteelandaluminum,importsfromChinaonLists1-3,andretaliation(ourbasescenario).TheannualreductioninthedollarvalueofU.S.GDPmorethandoublesfromthebasescenario,to-1percent(Table8).Toputthisinperspective:theimpactofthedutieserasestheestimatedgainstoU.S.GDPfromtaxreforminitsfirstyears.4TheaverageAmericafamilyoffourwillpaynearly$2,300moreforhighercostsforgoodsandservicesresultingfromthetariffs,foreveryyeartheyareineffect.Thismorethanconsumestheestimatedgainsfromtaxreformof$1,336pertaxpayer.5

U.S.exportsofgoodsandservicesoveralldeclineby8.4percent,or$197.5billionannuallybasedon2017levels,asaresultofthetariffs.TheimpactsofU.S.dutiesonexportstotheworldoutweighthenegativeimpactsofretaliatorytariffs.Inshort:U.S.policyhasagreaternegativeimpactonU.S.exportsthanreactionsbyforeigntradingpartners.Sectorsexperiencingthelargestdeclinesinexportstotheworldincludethoseprimarilyfeelingthebruntofretaliation(forestryproduct,-20.5percent;oilseeds,-17.1percent;non-bovineanimalproducts,-20.5percent;ironandsteel,-43.4percent,woodproducts,-19.5percent),butalsomanyothersectorsthatarenowlesscompetitiveinternationallyduetoU.S.tariffs(electronicequipment,-22.9percent;metals,-12.9percent;textiles,-12.6percent;clothing,-20.4percent;and,again,footwearandleatherproducts,-35.9percent).

NetU.S.jobsdeclinebymorethandoublethelossesinthebasescenario,by2,159,500.Table9showsthatmoremanufacturingworkersbenefitfromtheadditionaltariffsastheyforcemoreproductionbacktotheUnitedStates.Overall,334,900workersgainjobsasaresultofthetariffs.Buthighercosts,especiallyforconsumers,multipliesthejobslostinothersectors,primarilyservices.Atotalof2,494,500workerslosejobs,sevenforeveryjobgained.ThetariffscosttheU.S.economy$555,584foreveryjobgained.

4 TheTaxFoundationestimatedthatTaxCutandJobsActwouldincreaseU.S.GDPbyanaverageof0.8percentoveritsfirstthreeyears.SeeTable2ofHuaqunLiandKylePomerleau,“theDistributionalImpactoftheTaxCutsandJobsActOvertheNextDecade,”TheTaxFoundation,June28,2018,https://taxfoundation.org/the-distributional-impact-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-over-the-next-decade/.5 HuaqunandPomerleauestimate(Ibid.)thatby2022after-taxincomeforalltaxpayerswillincreaseby2.1percent(Table3).Applyingthatpercentageto2017after-taxincomepublishedintheConsumerExpenditureSurveybytheBureauofLaborStatisticsyieldsasavingsfromtaxreformof$1,336.

16

Table8AnnouncedTariffsandQuotasPlusTariffsonAllGoodsTradewithChina:National

Impacts,1-3YearsAfterTariffsImposed

AnnualchangeindollarvalueofrealU.S.GDP(percent) -1.01AnnualchangeinrealU.S.nationalincome(billions) -$186.1AnnualchangeinU.S.exportstotheworld(percent) -8.4AnnualchangeinU.S.importsfromtheworld(percent) -11.1AnnualcostperU.S.familyoffour $2,294One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -2,159.5

17

Table9AnnouncedTariffsandQuotasPlusTariffsonAllGoodsTradewithChina:

NetNationalEmploymentImpactsbySector,1-3YearsAfterTariffsImposed(Thousands)

Total -2,159.5Agriculture -70.3Forestry -6.9Fishing -1.2Oilandgas -3.7Othermining -5.0Manufacturing +235.5

Processedfoods -14.6Beveragesandtobacco -8.0Textiles +17.1Apparel +13.6Leatherproducts +6.0Woodproducts -9.8Paperproductsandpublishing -1.5Petroleum,coalproducts -0.5Chemicals,rubber,plasticproducts +4.4Othermineralproducts +3.9Ironandsteel +23.3Nonferrousmetals(includingaluminum) +0.4Fabricatedmetalproducts +24.1Motorvehiclesandparts -31.4Othertransportationequipment -33.6Electronicequipment +145.4Machinery +24.7Othermanufactures +72.0



18

D. TradeWarNowsupposeU.S.policymakersimposealltariffsandquotascontemplated,andU.S.tradingpartnersretaliateaspromisedoraslikelytoretaliate.Thisscenarioaddsmotorvehicleandpartstariffstothepreviousscenario,andtheresultsshowincreasesthenetnegativeimpacts,asexpected,butnotbyalot,alsoasexpected.TheannualreductioninthedollarvalueofU.S.GDPdeclinesbyjustover-1percent(Table10).TheaverageAmericafamilyoffourwillpaynearly$2,400moreforhighercostsforgoodsandservicesresultingfromthetariffs,foreveryyeartheyareineffect,wipingoutgainsfromtaxreform.

U.S.exportsofgoodsandservicesoveralldeclineby8.7percent,or$204.5billionannuallybasedon2017levels,asaresultofthetariffs.TheimpactsofU.S.dutiesonexportstotheworldoutweighthenegativeimpactsofretaliatorytariffs.Sectorsexperiencingthelargestdeclinesinexportstotheworldincludethoseprimarilyfeelingthebruntofretaliation(forestryproduct,-20.4percent;oilseeds,-17.0percent;non-bovineanimalproducts,-20.4percent;ironandsteel,-43.6percent;woodproducts,-19.6percent),butalsomanyothersectorsthatarenowlesscompetitiveinternationallyduetoU.S.tariffs(electronicequipment,-23.4percent;metals,-13.3percent;textiles,-12.7percent;clothing,-20.6percent;and,again,footwearandleatherproducts,-36.0percent).

NetU.S.jobsdeclinebymorethandoublethelossesinthebasescenario,by2,235,400.Table11showsthatmoremanufacturingworkersbenefitfromtheadditionaltariffsastheyforcemoreproductionbacktotheUnitedStates.Overall,332,000workersgainjobsasaresultofthetariffs.Buthighercosts,especiallyforconsumers,multipliesthejobslostinothersectors,primarilyservices.Atotalof2,567,500workerslosejobs,nearlyeightforeveryjobgained.ThetariffscosttheU.S.economy$583,693foreveryjobgained.Table12showsthateverystateexperiencesnetjoblosses.

Table10TradeWar:NationalImpacts1-3YearsAfterTariffsImposed

AnnualchangeindollarvalueofrealU.S.GDP(percent) -1.04AnnualchangeinrealU.S.nationalincome(billions) -$193.8AnnualchangeinU.S.exportstotheworld(percent) -8.7AnnualchangeinU.S.importsfromtheworld(percent) -11.5AnnualcostperU.S.familyoffour $2,389One-timenetimpactonU.S.jobs -2,235.4

19

Table11

TradeWar:NetNationalEmploymentImpactsbySector

(Thousands)Total -2,235.4Agriculture -70.8Forestry -6.9Fishing -1.2Oilandgas -4.0Othermining -5.2Manufacturing +236.4

Processedfoods -14.1Beveragesandtobacco -8.2Textiles +17.2Apparel +13.7Leatherproducts +6.0Woodproducts -10.3Paperproductsandpublishing -2.0Petroleum,coalproducts -0.6Chemicals,rubber,plasticproducts +3.5Othermineralproducts +3.7Ironandsteel +23.4Nonferrousmetals(includingaluminum) +0.4Fabricatedmetalproducts +24.5Motorvehiclesandparts -25.3Othertransportationequipment -34.1Electronicequipment +144.8Machinery +23.4Othermanufactures +71.4



20

Table12

TradeWar:NetEmploymentImpactsbyState

Alabama -30,348 Montana -9,050Alaska -5,972 Nebraska -16,201Arizona -42,673 Nevada -21,566Arkansas -19,493 NewHampshire -8,133California -248,399 NewJersey -61,694Colorado -44,590 NewMexico -13,623Connecticut -27,219 NewYork -143,888Delaware -6,919 NorthCarolina -63,479DistrictofColumbia -11,187 NorthDakota -7,501Florida -145,251 Ohio -76,491Georgia -71,170 Oklahoma -27,308Hawaii 12,030 Oregon -25,713Idaho -11,484 Pennsylvania -84,789Illinois -85,120 RhodeIsland -6,894Indiana -39,233 SouthCarolina -31,491Iowa -23,514 SouthDakota -7,200Kansas -23,566 Tennessee -46,960Kentucky -30,677 Texas -199,388Louisiana -34,943 Utah -21,853Maine -10,635 Vermont -4,993Maryland -45,237 Virginia -64,467Massachusetts -50,502 Washington -57,237Michigan -61,727 WestVirginia -11,162Minnesota -36,832 Wisconsin -37,344Mississippi -18,710 Wyoming -5,302Missouri -45,075 TOTAL* -2,235,400*Thesumofthestatesdoesnotaddpreciselytothetotalbecauseofrounding.

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V. Conclusion

Byanymeasure,theimpositionoftariffsbytheUnitedStatesandU.S.importsofsteel,aluminum,motorvehiclesandparts,somesubsetofproductsimportedfromChina–orallofthemisanetlossfortheU.S.economyandU.S.workers.Anexaminationofallthewaysinwhichsuchtariffs,accompaniedbyretaliationbyU.S.tradingpartners,affectspurchasingandhiringdecisionsdemonstratesthatonbalanceU.S.farmers,manufacturers,servicesprovidersandtheirworkersexperiencegreaterlossesthangains.Insomeinstances,thetariffactionserasealloftheanticipatedgainsfromtaxreform.

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AppendixA:MethodologyInDetail

A.TheModel

Toestimatetheeconomiceffectsofvarioustariffscenarios,westartwiththeGlobalTradeAnalysisProject(GTAP)database,whichisintegratedintoacomputablegeneralequilibrium(CGE)model.Themathematicalstructureofourmodel,startingwiththeGTAPdatabase,followsEggeretal,augmentingthebasicEaton-Kortum-ArmingtonstructureoftheGTAPmodelwithmonopolisticcompetition,dependingonthesector.6

TheGTAPdatabasecoversinternationaltradeandeconomy-wideinterindustryrelationshipsandnationalincomeaccounts,aswellastariffs,somenontariffbarriersandothertaxes.WhileourGTAPmodeldatabaseisbasedonversion10(for2014data),wehaveupdatedthedatatobetterreflecttheU.S.economyin2017.WehavealsoestimatedthetradeelasticitiesandusedinthemodelanextendedversionofthegravitymodeldatabaseemployedbyEggeretal(2015).

Themodelsimulatesthepercentagechangesinaggregateeconomicmeasures,includingU.S.realGDPandaggregateemployment,whenmovingfromthebaselineorreferencelevel(inthiscase,2017U.S.andglobaleconomies)tothevariouscounterfactuals(tariffsandquotasareimposed).Themodelresultsarethenconvertedintopercentagechangeswhenmovingfromcounterfactuallevelstotheactuallevelsthatprevailedinthebaseline.Theresultsreflectshort-termimpacts,i.e.,thatthetariffshavebeenineffectforatleastonetothreeyears.Forthisanalysis,werecognizethatU.S.employmenthascontinuedthegrowthtrendthatbeganinmid2010(seehttps://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS),withtheeconomynowappearingtoapproachfullemployment.Atthesametime,wagegrowthremainsrelativelyflatcomparedtoemploymentgrowth.Weincorporateddatareflectingrecentemploymentandearningstrendsandthetighteningofthelabormarket.7

Itisimportanttoemphasizethatouremploymentimpactestimatesarenet.TheytakeintoaccountpotentialincreasesaswellasdecreasesinemploymentasdemandincreasesinsomecasesforU.S.products,anddeclinesinothers.Thesechangesarisenotonlyfromthedirectimpactsofthere-impositionoftariffs,quotasandretaliation,butalsotheindirectimpactsofchangesinsupplyanddemandforgoodsandservicesgenerallyacrosstheeconomy.Forexample,youwillseethatsomesectorsthatyoumightnotthinkwouldbenefitfromtariffs–chemicals,forexample–showemploymentincreases.Thisisbecausedeclinesinproductioninothersectorsreleaseslaborandcapitalthatcannowbeused6 SeeFrancois,J.,Manchin,M.,&Martin,W.(2013).“Marketstructureinmultisectorgeneralequilibriummodelsofopeneconomies.”InD.JorgensonandP.Dixoneds.,Handbookofcomputablegeneralequilibriummodeling,vol.1,Elsevier,andEgger,Peter,JosephFrancois,MiriamManchin,andDouglasNelson."Non-tariffbarriers,integrationandthetransatlanticeconomy."EconomicPolicy30,no.83(2015):539-584.1. AccordingtotheU.S.DepartmentofLabor,unemploymentincreased1.4percentfromMay2017toMay2018.(Seehttps://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/real-average-hourly-earnings-up-0-point-2-percent-for-all-private-employees-april-2015-to-april-2018.htm).Weusethisrecentrelationshipbetweenrelativechangesinemploymentandrealwages(technicallyintheformofanaggregatelaborsupplyelasticity)tobetterreflectcurrentlabormarketconditions.

23

moreproductivelyinothersectors,likechemicals.Sooutputandrelatedemploymentrisethere.

B. Data

Todeterminetarifflevelchangesinthedifferentscenarios,wefirstmappedU.S.importandexportdatafor2017fromtheU.S.CensusBureautobothGTAPsectorsandremedy/retaliationlists.ForU.S.Section232steel/aluminumremedies,weapplieda25percenttarifftoU.S.importsofthesteelproductsdetailedintheCommerceDepartment’ssteelnationalsecurityreport,anda10percenttarifftoU.S.importsofthealuminumproductsdetailedintheCommerceDepartment’saluminumnationalsecurityreport,excludingimportsfromArgentina,Australia,BrazilandKorea.WereducedimportsofsteelfromKoreaby30percent,theestimateinmediareportsthattheAdministrationsoughttoachievefromKorea.WesimilarlyreducedimportsfromBrazilbythesharesshowninTable1,andfrozeimportsfromArgentinaattheaverageof2015-2017levels.

Finally,forstatelevelanalysis,wefirstmapstate-leveldataonemploymentandGDPforNAICSsectorsfromBEAtocorrespondingmodelsectors.Wethenmapnationalchangesinproductionandemploymentatindustryleveltothecorrespondingstatedataatthemodelsectorlevel.Theimpactonstatesthereforereflectsthevariationintheoutputandemploymentstructureacrossstateeconomies.

C. ModelingIssues

Technically,theincreaseintradecostsforservicestakestheformofincreasedoperatingcostsforU.S.firmsoperatingintheChinesemarket(alsoknownasicebergtradecosts).WehypothesizethatChinaimposestheequivalentofa25percenttariffonU.S.servicesimportsintoChina,andslow-downsinCustomsprocessingandotheradministrativeproceduresamountstoanadditional2percenttariff-equivalentongoodsimportedfromtheUnitedStates.

24

TableA.1

SectorConcordances

GTAPno.

GTAPSector

OurModelSectorNo.

OurModelSectors

NAICSNo.

NAICSCategory

1 PDR-Paddyrice 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

2 WHT–Wheat 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

3 GRO-Cerealgrainsn.e.c. 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

4 V_F-Vegetables,fruit,nuts 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

5 OSD-Oilseeds 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

6 C_B-Sugarcane,sugarbeets 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

7 PFB-Plant-basedfibers 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

8 OCR-Cropsn.e.c. 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

9 CTL-Bovinecattle,sheepandgoats,horses 1 Primaryagriculture 111,11

2 Agriculture

10 OAP-Animalproductsn.e.c. 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

11 RMK-Rawmilk 1 Primaryagriculture 111,112 Agriculture

12 WOL-Wool,silk-wormcocoons 1 Primaryagriculture 111,11

2 Agriculture

13 FRS-Forestry 2 Forestry 113 Forestry14 FSH-Fishing 3 Fishing 114 FishingandHunting15 COA–Coal 4 Othermining 2121 CoalMining16 OIL–Oil 5 Oil&gas 21112 CrudePetroleumExtraction17 GAS–Gas 5 Oil&gas 21113 NaturalGasExtraction

18 OMN-Othermining 4 Othermining2122,2123,213

MetalOreMining+NonmetallicMineralMining+SupportforMiningActivities

19 CMT-Bovinemeatprods 6 Processedfoods 311 FoodManufacturing

20 OMT-Meatandfishproductsn.e.c. 6 Processedfoods 311 FoodManufacturing

21 VOL-Vegetableoilsandfats 6 Processedfoods 311 FoodManufacturing22 MIL-Dairyproducts 6 Processedfoods 311 FoodManufacturing23 PCR-Processedrice 6 Processedfoods 311 FoodManufacturing24 SGR–Sugar 6 Processedfoods 311 FoodManufacturing25 OFD-Foodproductsn.e.c. 6 Processedfoods 311 FoodManufacturing

26 B_T-Beveragesandtobaccoproducts 7 Beverages&

tobacco 312 BeverageandTobaccoProductManufacturing

27 TEX–Textiles 8 Textiles 313,314 TextileMills+TextileProductMills

28 WAP-Wearingapparel 9 Wearingapparel 315 ApparelManufacturing29 LEA-Leatherproducts 10 Leatherproducts 316 LeatherandAlliedProductManufacturing

25

GTAPno.

GTAPSector

OurModelSectorNo.

OurModelSectors

NAICSNo.

NAICSCategory

30 LUM-Woodproducts 11 Woodproducts321,322,323

WoodProductManufacturing+PaperManufacturing+PrintingandRelatedSupportActivities

31 PPP-Paperproducts,publishing 12 Paperproducts,

publishing

321,322,323

WoodProductManufacturing+PaperManufacturing+PrintingandRelatedSupportActivities

32 P_C-Petroleum,coalproducts 13 Petroleum,coal

products 324 PetroleumandCoalProductsManufacturing

33 CRP-Chemical,rubber,plasticproducts 14 Chemical,rubber,

plasticproducts325,326

ChemicalManufacturing+PlasticsandRubberProductsManufacturing

34 NMM-Mineralproductsn.e.c. 15 Mineralproducts

nec 327 Non-metallicMineralProductManufacturing

35 I_S-Ferrousmetals 16 Iron&steel3311,3312,3315

PrimaryMetalManufacturing(Ferrous)

36 NFM-Metalsn.e.c. 17 Nonferrousmetals3313,3314,3315

PrimaryMetalManufacturing(Other)

37 FMP-Metalproducts 18 Metalproducts 332 FabricatedMetalProductManufacturing

38 MVH-Motorvehiclesandparts 19 Motorvehiclesand

parts

3361,3362,3363

MotorVehicleManufacturing+MotorVehicleBodyandTrailerManufacturing+MotorVehiclePartsManufacturing

39 OTN-Transportequipmentn.e.c. 20 Transport

equipmentnec

3364,3365,3366,3369

AerospaceProductandPartsManufacturing+RailroadRollingStockManufacturing+ShipandBoatBuilding+OtherTransportationEquipmentManufacturing

40 ELE-Electronicequipment 21 Electronicequipment 334 ComputerandElectronicProduct

Manufacturing

41 OME-Machineryandequipmentn.e.c. 22 Machineryand

equipmentnec333,335

MachineryManufacturing+ElectricalEquipment,Appliance,andComponentManufacturing

42 OMF-Manufacturesn.e.c. 23 Manufacturesnec 337,339

FurnitureandRelatedProductManufacturing+MiscellaneousManufacturing

43 ELY-Electricpower 34 Otherservices22,61,62,81,99

Utilities+EducationalServices+HealthCareandSocialAssistance+OtherServices(exceptPublicAdministration)+Federal,State,andLocalGovernment(excludingstateandlocalschoolsandhospitals)

44 GDT-Gasmanufacturedanddistributed 34 Otherservices

22,61,62,81,99


46 CNS–Construction 24 Construction 23 Construction

47 TRD-Tradeanddistribution 25 Tradeanddistribution

42,44-45,72

WholesaleandRetailTrade,AccommodationandFoodServices

26

GTAPno.

GTAPSector

OurModelSectorNo.

OurModelSectors

NAICSNo.

NAICSCategory

48 OTP-Othertransport 26 Othertransport

482,484,485,486,487,488,493

Rail,Truck,TransitandGround,Passenger,Pipeline,ScenicandSightseeingTransportation,+SupportActivitiesforTransportation+WarehousingandStorage

49 WTP-Watertransport 27 Watertransport 483 WaterTransportation50 ATP-Airtransport 28 Airtransport 481 AirTransportation

51 CMN-Communications 29 Communications 491,492,51

Information+PostalService+CouriersandMessengers

52 OFI-Financialservices 30 Financialservices

521,522,523,525

MonetaryAuthorities-CentralBank+CreditIntermediationandRelatedActivities+Securities,CommodityContracts,andOtherFinancialInvestmentsandRelatedActivities+Funds,Trusts,andOtherFinancialVehicles

53 ISR–Insurance 31 Insurance 524 InsuranceCarriersandRelatedActivities

54 OBS-Otherbusinessservices,ITservices 32

Businessandprofessionalservices

53,54,55,56

RealEstateandRentalandLeasing+Professional,Scientific,andTechnicalServices+ManagementofCompaniesandEnterprises+AdministrativeandSupportandWasteManagementServices

55 ROS-Recreationalandotherservices 33

Personalandrecreationalservices

71 Arts,Entertainment,andRecreation

45 WTR-Waterandsewerservices 34 Otherservices

22,61,62,81,99


56 OSG-Otherpublicservices 34 Otherservices22,61,62,81,99


57 -Residentialservices,Dwellings 34 Otherservices

27

TableA.2

Country/Regions

Australia Ecuador Lithuania Kuwait

NewZealand Paraguay Luxembourg Oman

China Peru Malta Qatar

HongKong Uruguay Netherlands SaudiArabia

Japan Venezuela Poland Turkey

Korea CostaRica Portugal UnitedArabEmirates

Taiwan Guatemala Slovakia Egypt

Cambodia Honduras Slovenia Morocco

Indonesia Nicaragua Spain Tunisia

Laos Panama Sweden Benin

Malaysia ElSalvador UnitedKingdom BurkinaFaso

Philippines DominicanRepublic Switzerland Cameroon

Singapore TrinidadandTobago Norway Coted'Ivoire

Thailand Austria Iceland&Lichtenstein Ghana

VietNam Belgium Albania Guinea

Bangladesh Cyprus Bulgaria Nigeria

India CzechRepublic Belarus Senegal

Pakistan Denmark Croatia Ethiopia

SriLanka Estonia Romania Kenya

Canada Finland Russia Madagascar

UnitedStates France Ukraine Malawi

Mexico Germany Tajikistan Mauritius

Argentina Greece Armenia Rwanda

Bolivia Hungary Georgia Tanzania

Brazil Ireland Iran Uganda

Chile Italy Israel Zambia

Colombia Latvia Jordan Zimbabwe

SouthAfrica

RestoftheWorld

Documents

Estimated Impacts of Tariffs on the U.S. Economy and Workers · About Trade Partnership Worldwide, LLC Trade Partnership Worldwide was formed in 2001 by Laura M. Baughman, President,