Eric Spalding BSO Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

Case No.:

ERIC J. SPALDING, ))

Plaintiff, ))

v. ))

ANDREW TAYLOR, individually, )JUAN L. HERNANDEZ, individually, )MARC SOTO, individually, and )ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF )of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, )

)Defendants. )

)

COMPLAINT

1. This is a civil action seeking money damages in excess of $15,000 dollars,

exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney’s fees, against Defendant ANDREW TAYLOR,

individually, Defendant JUAN L. HERNANDEZ, individually, Defendant MARC SOTO,

individually, and Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY,

Florida.

2. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988, and the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The United States District

Court for the Southern District of Florida has jurisdiction of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28

U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Plaintiff further invokes the supplemental jurisdiction of the

United States District Court to hear pendant State tort claims arising under State law, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Case 0:12-cv-61651-RSR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/23/2012 Page 1 of 31

3. Plaintiff ERIC J. SPALDING has served notice upon Defendant ALFRED T.

LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and Jeff Atwater, as Chief Financial

Officer, Florida Department of Financial Services, pursuant to §768.28 of the Florida Statutes.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff ERIC J. SPALDING is a resident of Broward County, State of

Florida.

5. At all times referred to herein, Defendant ANDREW TAYLOR [hereinafter

Defendant RODRIGUEZ] was acting under color of law as a deputy sheriff for ALFRED T.

LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and in such capacity as an agent,

servant, and employee of ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY,

Florida.

6. At all times referred to herein, Defendant JUAN L. HERNANDEZ

[hereinafter Defendant HERNANDEZ] was acting under color of law as a deputy sheriff for

ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and in such capacity as

an agent, servant, and employee of ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD

COUNTY, Florida.

7. At all times referred to herein, Defendant MARC SOTO [hereinafter

Defendant SOTO] was acting under color of law as a deputy sheriff for ALFRED T. LAMBERTI,

as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and in such capacity as an agent, servant, and

employee of ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida.

8. Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY,

Florida, is the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida [hereinafter Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI,

as SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, or Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE],


as organized and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida. In this cause,

Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, acted through

its agents, employees, and servants, including Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ,

Defendant SOTO, and others.

9. Plaintiff sues Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ, and Defendant

SOTO in their individual capacities.

FACTS

10. On Saturday, February 20, 2010, Plaintiff, age 39, and his wife, Alejandra

Spalding, invited several guests to their residence located at 11302 Roundelay Road, Cooper City,

Broward County, Florida, to celebrate the engagement of Johnny Regis to Diana Regis. The guests

included Jon Onaindia and his girlfriend, Sandra Carolina Alarcon, an attorney (in her native

Colombia). Plaintiff, Onaindia, and Johnny Regis were all co-workers at BellSouth (now AT&T).

11. Several other couples were also invited, including Eduardo and Jenny Ibarra,

and Carlos and Lina Marquez. Plaintiff’s brother Todd, and Rodrigo Castro, a police officer for the

City of Sunrise and the recipient of their Officer of the Month Award for July 2009, also attended.

12. Guests began arriving around 9:00 p.m., and socialized both inside Plaintiff’s

residence and a screened enclosure in the back-yard.

13. Shortly after the arrival of guests at Plaintiff’s residence, the Broward

Sheriff’s Office received an anonymous noise complaint.

14. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff’s residence was located in a zero-lot line

townhouse community. There was a history of acrimony between Plaintiff’s family and one of their

neighbors. Based on information and belief, the anonymous noise complaint was made by Plaintiff’s

neighbor.


15. Defendant TAYLOR responded to the noise complaint after 10:00 p.m.

Defendant TAYLOR testified: “It was like a party-type environment. You hear some screams, a

short scream and maybe a laugh, you know. That’s pretty much it. You could just hear constant

chatter. The chatter was pretty reasonable, other than the scream or two here and there.” Defendant

TAYLOR left the area without making any arrests or issuing any citations.

16. Within two hours, Defendant TAYLOR responded to Plaintiff’s residence for

a second noise complaint. Again, Defendant TAYLOR left the area without making any arrests or

issuing any citations.

17. After no action was taken by Defendant TAYLOR, Plaintiff’s neighbor called

Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE on February 21, 2011, and alleged that an unknown

assailant threw an egg and/or orange at her residence.

18. Several deputies, including Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ,

Defendant SOTO, and deputy sheriff Andrew Rodriguez responded to Plaintiff’s residence and the

residence of Plaintiff’s neighbor.

19. The wooden fence between Plaintiff’s residence and his neighbor’s property

prevents line-of-sight between the two properties. However, Plaintiff was able to observe flashlights

in the back of his neighbor’s residence, and heard a voices yelling: “[T]he party’s over. Everybody

f - - - ing go home.”

20. At that time, Plaintiff’s remaining guests began exchanging end-of-evening

salutations, in preparation for their departure from Plaintiff’s residence.

21. While Plaintiff was in a guest bathroom, Alejandra Spalding and others heard

banging on the front door.

22. Alejandra Spalding opened the front door, whereupon she observed several


deputies from Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, including Defendant TAYLOR,

Defendant HERNANDEZ, Defendant SOTO, and deputy sheriff Andrew Rodriguez (hereinafter

“Rodriguez”).

23. Rodriguez reached into Plaintiff’s residence with his left hand and grabbed

Onaindia shirt, and pulled Onaindia outside the residence, in the absence of voluntary consent or

exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence.

24. As Onaindia stood with his hands in the air, Rodriguez pointed his index

finger very close to Onaindia’s face, and screamed: “Who fucking threw the orange?”, whereupon

Rodriguez ordered Onaindia to get on the ground.

25. Upon complying with Rodriguez’s request to get on the ground, Rodriguez

arrested Onaindia for the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest without violence/obstruction of

justice, in the absence of probable cause that Onaindia committed any criminal offense.

26. Rodriguez then handcuffed Onaindia behind his back.

27. Upon handcuffing Onaindia behind his back, Rodriguez rolled Onaindia onto

his back and proceeded to punch Onaindia in the area of his chest, whereupon Rodriguez stated:

“You’re not so tough now, mother f- - ker.”

28. In the interim, Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ, and

Defendant SOTO entered Plaintiff’s residence without warrant, notwithstanding Alejandra

Spalding’s immediate and unequivocal verbal protests directing the deputies to leave the residence.

29. Defendant TAYLOR confronted Plaintiff immediately upon Plaintiff exiting

the guest bathroom, at which time Defendant TAYLOR physically took hold of Plaintiff and placed

him over the back of a nearby couch, and handcuffed Plaintiff behind his back.

30. Defendant TAYLOR then physically threw Plaintiff, while handcuffed, out


the front door of his residence and into nearby ficus hedge.

31. Plaintiff came to rest partly on the front of his torso, with his feet caught up

on a raised light fixture located within ficus hedge.

32. As Plaintiff remained hung up in the hicus hedge, in handcuffs, Defendant

HERNANDEZ struck Plaintiff with his knee in the area of Plaintiff’s back.

33. Defendant TAYLOR subsequently charged Plaintiff with the misdemeanor

offense of resisting arrest without violence/obstruction of justice.

34. Following their arrests, Plaintiff and Onaindia were transported to Defendant

BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE substation in Cooper City, followed by a substation in Davie,

Florida. Plaintiff and Onaindia were subsequently transported to the main Broward County Jail in

Fort Lauderdale, for incarceration.

35. Following Plaintiff’s arrest, Defendant TAYLOR prepared a sworn probable

cause affidavit and supplemental report for submission to prosecuting authorities, containing false

statements and material omissions.

36. At all times material hereto, Defendant TAYLOR knew that his probable

cause affidavit and supplemental report would be relied upon by prosecuting authorities for the

commencement and continuation of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff.

37. The probable cause affidavit and supplemental report prepared by Defendant

TAYLOR for submission to prosecuting authorities contained false statements, insofar as the

probable cause affidavit falsely alleged that for officer safety, Plaintiff was ordered to place his hands

behind his back for handcuffing but refused to do so, when in fact, as Defendant TAYLOR knew,

there was no issue of officer safety justifying the handcuffing of Plaintiff in his own residence.

38. The probable cause affidavit and supplemental report prepared by Defendant


TAYLOR for submission to prosecuting authorities contained material omissions, insofar as the

probable cause affidavit and supplemental report omitted the material fact that Defendant TAYLOR

was not engaged in the lawful execution of any legal duty at the time of his arrest of Plaintiff, insofar

as Defendant TAYLOR was in the process of violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during the

warrantless search of Plaintiff’s residence, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. McClish v.

Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11 Cir. 2007) (“[A] warrantless entry into the home to effect an arrestth

is prohibited absent consent or exigent circumstances”).

39. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR caused the commencement or institution

of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, concluding in the trial court conducting a suppression

hearing on October 19, 2011, wherein the trial court determined that Defendant TAYLOR violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by the warrantless search of Plaintiff’s

residence.

40. The criminal proceedings commenced as a result of the conduct of Defendant

TAYLOR reached a bona fide resolution in Plaintiff’s favor, and Plaintiff has never been convicted

by any prosecuting authority of any criminal offense as a result of his arrest by Defendant TAYLOR

on February 21, 2010.

41. At all times material hereto, the conduct of Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant

HERNANDEZ, and Defendant SOTO occurred under color of state law.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT IUNLAWFUL SEARCH CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT TAYLOR,

INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983

For his cause of action against Defendant TAYLOR, individually, in Count I, Plaintiff states:

42. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count I, the allegations


of paragraphs 1 through 41.

43. In sworn deposition testimony on September 21, 2010 in State of Florida v.

Eric Spalding, Defendant TAYLOR testified:

A: The third time, well we knocked at the door. Somebody then

answered the door. We looked for Mr. Spalding. We were looking for Mr.

Spalding at the time.

The door was open and we pretty much figured, hey, they didn’t say anything

to us about not being able to come inside and we walked inside the house towards the

front of the house.

Q: Did you ever ask permission to walk inside of the house?

A: I think somebody said, where is Mr. Spalding or where is Eric or

something to that sort and they were looking for the homeowner. And the person

who answered the door, they were standing at the door. We walked inside. I didn’t

hear an objection at that time at that point.

44. In fact, Defendant TAYLOR entered Plaintiff’s residence without warrant or

other lawful authority, including the absence of exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. In

addition, Defendant TAYLOR remained in Plaintiff’s residence notwithstanding Alejandra

Spalding’s immediate and unequivocal verbal protests directing Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant

HERNANDEZ, and Defendant SOTO to leave the residence, and thus, the sworn testimony of

Defendant TAYLOR on September 21, 2010 is materially false.

45. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR towards Plaintiff was objectively

unreasonable and violated Plaintiff’s clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be secure in his house,


papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure.

46. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff has suffered grievously, has been brought into public scandal, and with

great humiliation, mental suffering, and damaged reputation.

47. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant

TAYLOR, Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff’s

losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation

of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his

services, herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays:

a. Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars;

b. Judgment for exemplary damages;

c. Cost of suit;

d. Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

e. Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and

f. Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and

appropriate.

COUNT IIUNLAWFUL SEARCH CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT HERNANDEZ,


For his cause of action against Defendant HERNANDEZ, individually, in Count II, Plaintiff states:

48. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count II, the allegations


49. In sworn testimony at the suppression hearing conducted on October 19, 2011


in State of Florida v. Eric Spalding, Defendant HERNANDEZ testified that he could not recall the

details of the incident and whether he received consent to enter Plaintiff’s residence.

50. In fact, Defendant HERNANDEZ entered Plaintiff’s residence without

warrant or other lawful authority, including the absence of exigent circumstances or voluntary

consent. In addition, Defendant HERNANDEZ remained in Plaintiff’s residence notwithstanding

Alejandra Spalding’s immediate and unequivocal verbal protests directing Defendant

HERNANDEZ, Defendant TAYLOR, and Defendant SOTO to leave the residence.

51. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ towards Plaintiff was objectively








HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life.

Plaintiff’s losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future,

in violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable

fee for his services, herein.




c. Cost of suit;





appropriate.

COUNT IIIUNLAWFUL SEARCH CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT SOTO,


For his cause of action against Defendant SOTO, individually, in Count III, Plaintiff states:

54. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count III, the allegations


55. In sworn deposition testimony on September 24, 2010 in State of Florida v.

Eric Spalding, Defendant SOTO testified:

Q: And you stated before you can’t recall whether or not you heard Mrs.

Spalding allowing Deputy Taylor into the residence, correct?

You didn’t hear her say anything?

A: I didn’t hear anything, but we were allowed in. She opened the store

[sic] and we were allowed in.

Q: When you say you were allowed in, why do you think you were

allowed in?

A: Well, we were conducting an investigation as to what happened

between the neighbor and them and that’s probably why she allowed us in so we

could continue our investigation.

Q: But I’m just trying to get to the point of how you know you’re allowed

in. If somebody opens the door, you ultimately assume you’re allowed in or are they


just opening the door because you’re knocking and?

A: No. I ask them if we’re allowed in when I’m a [sic] entering the

residence after the door being opened. So, I’m assuming that we were allowed in.

Q: The only way you know you were allowed in is because Deputy

Taylor had taken that initial action to go in?

A: Yes.

56. In fact, Defendant SOTO entered Plaintiff’s residence without warrant or other

lawful authority, including the absence of exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. In addition,

Defendant SOTO remained in Plaintiff’s residence notwithstanding Alejandra Spalding’s immediate

and unequivocal verbal protests directing Defendant SOTO, Defendant TAYLOR, and Defendant

HERNANDEZ to leave the residence, and thus, the sworn testimony of Defendant SOTO on

September 24, 2010 is materially false.

57. Regardless of Defendant TAYLOR’s decision to enter Plaintiff’s residence,

the unconstitutional behavior of Defendant TAYLOR did not relieve Defendant SOTO of his

responsibility to decide for himself whether to violate clearly established constitutional rights by

intruding into Plaintiff’s residence without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or voluntarily consent.

O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1210 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Hayes’s only remaining defense is thatth

he did not make the initial decision to enter the office, but instead merely followed the other officers

inside, ‘defer[ing]’ to their judgment. His defense ultimately boils down to ‘But everyone else was

doing it!’ Without inquiring as to what Hayes would do if everyone else were jumping off a bridge,

we recognize that precedent squarely precludes his claim”).

58. The conduct of Defendant SOTO towards Plaintiff was objectively








60. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant SOTO,

Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff’s losses are

either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of

Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his

services, herein.




c. Cost of suit;




appropriate.

COUNT IVFALSE ARREST/FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT

TAYLOR, INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983

For his cause of action against Defendant TAYLOR, individually, in Count IV, Plaintiff states:

61. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count IV, the allegations



62. Defendant TAYLOR proximately caused Plaintiff’s arrest in the absence of

lawful authority or probable cause that Plaintiff committed any criminal offense.

63. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR towards Plaintiff was objectively


Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be free from arrest and detention in the absence of probable

cause.





TAYLOR, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and

suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff’s losses are either

permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiff’s

civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his services, herein.




c. Cost of suit;




appropriate.

COUNT V


EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE BY DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ,INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983

For his cause of action against Defendant RODRIGUEZ, individually, in Count V, Plaintiff states:

66. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count V, the allegations


67. The use of force by Defendant RODRIGUEZ towards Plaintiff was objectively

unreasonable and unnecessary for Defendant RODRIGUEZ to defend himself or any other person

from bodily harm during the arrest of Plaintiff, and constitutes the excessive use of force in violation

of Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.





RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and

loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff’s losses are either permanent or continuing and

Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff has also

agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his services, herein.




c. Cost of suit;





appropriate.

COUNT VIINVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT

BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE

For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, in Count VI, Plaintiff

states:

70. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count VI, the allegations


71. The warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence by Defendant TAYLOR and

other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE was in the absence of lawful

authority, including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent.

72. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was objectively unreasonable and

occurred in the presence of Plaintiff’s family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental

suffering, shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or

mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

73. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was an invasion upon Plaintiff’s physical

solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy.

74. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR towards Plaintiff occurred during the

course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S

OFFICE.

75. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has

suffered grievously, has been brought into public scandal, and with great humiliation, mental


suffering, and damaged reputation.


BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and

resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life.


in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.



b. Cost of suit;

c. Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and

d. Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and

appropriate.

COUNT VIIINVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST

DEFENDANT TAYLOR, INDIVIDUALLY

For his cause of action against Defendant TAYLOR, individually, in Count VII, Plaintiff states:

77. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count VII, the allegations


78. The warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence by Defendant TAYLOR and

other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE was in the absence of lawful


79. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was objectively unreasonable and





80. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was an invasion upon Plaintiff’s physical


81. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count VI, if the invasion of

Plaintiff’s privacy by Defendant TAYLOR was committed outside the course and scope of

Defendant TAYLOR’s employment or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner

exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of

Defendant TAYLOR occurred in his individual capacity.





TAYLOR, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and



rights.




c. Cost of suit;

d. Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and

e. Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and

appropriate.


COUNT VIIIINVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT


For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, in Count VIII, Plaintiff

states:

84. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count VIII, the allegations


85. The warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence by Defendant HERNANDEZ

and other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE was in the absence of lawful


86. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was objectively unreasonable and




87. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was an invasion upon Plaintiff’s

physical solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy.

88. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ towards Plaintiff occurred during

the course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S

OFFICE.












b. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT IXINVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST

DEFENDANT HERNANDEZ, INDIVIDUALLY

For his cause of action against Defendant HERNANDEZ, individually, in Count IX, Plaintiff states:

91. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count IX, the allegations


92. The warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence by Defendant HERNANDEZ,

and other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, was in the absence of lawful


93. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was objectively unreasonable and




94. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was an invasion upon Plaintiff’s

physical solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy.


95. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count VIII, if the invasion of

Plaintiff’s privacy by Defendant HERNANDEZ was committed outside the course and scope of

Defendant HERNANDEZ’s employment or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner

exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of

Defendant HERNANDEZ occurred in his individual capacity.





HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and



rights.




c. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT XINVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT


For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, in Count X, Plaintiff


states:

98. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count X, the allegations


99. The warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence by Defendant SOTO and other

members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE was in the absence of lawful authority,

including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent.

100. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was objectively unreasonable and occurred

in the presence of Plaintiff’s family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering,

shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or mental

suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

101. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was an invasion upon Plaintiff’s physical


102. The conduct of Defendant SOTO towards Plaintiff occurred during the course

and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE.












b. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT XIINVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST

DEFENDANT SOTO, INDIVIDUALLY

For his cause of action against Defendant SOTO, individually, in Count XI, Plaintiff states:

105. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XI, the allegations


106. The warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence by Defendant SOTO and other

members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE was in the absence of lawful authority,

including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent.

107. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was objectively unreasonable and occurred

in the presence of Plaintiff’s family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering,

shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or mental

suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

108. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was an invasion upon Plaintiff’s physical


109. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count X, if the invasion of

Plaintiff’s privacy by Defendant SOTO was committed outside the course and scope of Defendant

SOTO’s employment or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and

willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of Defendant SOTO occurred in


his individual capacity.




111. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant SOTO,

Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental

anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff’s losses are either permanent or

continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.




c. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT XIIFALSE ARREST/FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM

AGAINST DEFENDANT BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE

For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE in Count XII, Plaintiff

states:

112. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XII the allegations


113. Defendant RODRIGUEZ proximately caused Plaintiff’s arrest and detention

in the absence of probable cause that Plaintiff committed any criminal offense.


114. The actions of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in causing the arrest of Plaintiff in

the absence of probable cause, were taken in the absence of lawful authority. The actions of

Defendant RODRIGUEZ constitute false arrest/false imprisonment of Plaintiff under Florida law.

115. The false arrest/false imprisonment of Plaintiff was committed by Defendant

RODRIGUEZ in the course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant

BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE.











b. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT XIIIFALSE ARREST/FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM

AGAINST DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY

For his cause of action against Defendant RODRIGUEZ, individually, in Count XIII Plaintiff states:


118. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XIII the allegations


119. Defendant RODRIGUEZ proximately caused Plaintiff’s arrest and detention

in the absence of probable cause that Plaintiff committed any criminal offense.

120. The actions of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in causing the arrest of Plaintiff in

the absence of probable cause, were taken in absence of lawful authority. The actions of Defendant

RODRIGUEZ constitute false arrest/false imprisonment of Plaintiff under Florida law.

121. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count XII, if Plaintiff’s arrest by

Defendant RODRIGUEZ was committed outside the course and scope of Defendant RODRIGUEZ’s

employment, or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful

disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ occurred in

his individual capacity.





RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and



rights.





c. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT XIVBATTERY/UNNECESSARY FORCE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT


For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE in Count XIV, Plaintiff

states:

124. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XIV, the allegations




from bodily harm during the arrest of Plaintiff, and resulted, as Defendant RODRIGUEZ reasonably

should have foreseen, in a harmful and offensive contact of Plaintiff, against his will.

126. The battery/unnecessary use of force by Defendant RODRIGUEZ towards

Plaintiff occurred during the course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant

BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE.





BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, Plaintiff suffered bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering,

mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff’s losses are either permanent


or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.



b. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT XVBATTERY/UNNECESSARY FORCE CLAIM AGAINST

DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY

For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE in Count XV, Plaintiff

states:

129. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XV, the allegations




from bodily harm during the arrest of Plaintiff, and resulted, as Defendant RODRIGUEZ reasonably

should have foreseen, in a harmful and offensive contact of Plaintiff, against his will.

131. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count XIV, if the conduct of

Defendant RODRIGUEZ occurred outside the course and scope of his employment for Defendant

BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE, or was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in

a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, then the

battery/unnecessary force was committed by Defendant RODRIGUEZ in his individual capacity.






RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and

loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff’s losses are either permanent or continuing and

Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights




c. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

COUNT XVIMALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY

For his cause of action against Defendant RODRIGUEZ, individually, in Count XVI, Plaintiff states:

134. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XVI, the allegations


135. No reasonably cautious police officer in the position of Defendant

RODRIGUEZ would have believed Plaintiff was guilty-in-fact of any criminal offense.

136. The conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ caused the commencement or

institution of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, resulting in the trial court granting Plaintiff’s

motion to suppress on October 19, 2011.


137. The conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in commending or instituting

criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, was with malice, and in the absence of probable cause that

Plaintiff committed any criminal offense.

138. At all times material hereto, Defendant RODRIGUEZ knew that his arrest

affidavit and supplemental report would be submitted to prosecuting authorities for the determination

of whether criminal charges should be filed against Plaintiff, and included materially false statements

and material omissions necessary to a finding of probable cause.

139. The conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ was reckless and without regard to

whether the institution of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were justified.

140. The criminal proceedings proximately caused by the conduct of Defendant

RODRIGUEZ reached a bona fide resolution in Plaintiff’s favor.


suffered grievously and has been brought into public scandal, with great humiliation, mental

suffering and damaged reputation.


RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered loss of his liberty and freedom, mental anguish, and loss of capacity

for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff also retained a criminal defense attorney to represent him in the

criminal prosecution instituted as a result of the conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, and agreed to

pay him a reasonable fee for her services. Plaintiff’s losses are either permanent or continuing and

Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.





c. Cost of suit;



appropriate.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

143. Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues so triable as of right.

DATED this 23 day of August, 2012.rd

By: s/. Hugh L. Koerner Hugh L. KoernerFlorida Bar No.: 716952Email: [email protected] L. Koerner, P.A.Sheridan Executive Centre3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 208Hollywood, FL 33021Telephone: (954) 522-1235Facsimile: (954) 522-1176Attorneys for Plaintiff Eric J. Spalding


mailto:[email protected]

Documents

Eric Spalding BSO Complaint