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ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS OR ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTABILITY?
THE ANALYSIS OF CITIZENS’ PROTESTS AROUND LOCAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN MURCIA (SPAIN).
Alfonso Egea ([email protected], Instituto Juan March, Madrid) Mireia Grau ([email protected], Area of Political Sciences, Universidad de Murcia)
Paper to be presented at the Workshop "Environmental politics at the local level". ECPR Joint Sessions, Grenoble 6-11 April 2001
(work in progress; the paper has not been revised by any English native speaker)
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore citizens’ protests on local contexts
through the analysis of four case studies in the Región de Murcia, Spain. More in
concrete, the paper is focussed on the analysis of citizens’ platforms created as a
reaction to decisions made by local governments on environmental issues. At a
first sight, some of these reactions could be simply characterized as “not in back
yard” (nimby) behaviours since they involve the firm opposition of the citizenship to
the construction of certain collective infrastructures near their respective villages,
such as a solid urban waste treatment plant. However an although some of the
egoistic aspects of the nimby protests exist, the analysis of both the composition of
the citizens’ movements as well as their objectives, brings the key issue of those
protests towards another interesting aspect: the claim for citizens’ participation on
local politics. Thus, one question this paper points out is whether local
environmental conflicts, because of the features involved in local politics and, also,
the characteristics of environmental policy , can eventually work as engines for a
change on the way local government and local democracy are thought and
perceived.
Citizens’ protests are, therefore, taken here as an indicator that citizens’
perceptions and expectations about local democracy are changing or being re-
defined in, at least, two directions: one concerns the meaning of citizenship, and
the other concerns the nature of the relationship between citizenship and local
government. As for the former, both the objectives of the protests and the
composition of protest platforms show that the issue of the involvement of
citizenship in local public life is addressed as the involvement of citizens as one
single block (“citizenship”), rather than different interest groups. In which concerns
the latter, reactions organized by citizens point out that political responsiveness is
being perceived as a missing aspect on local public life.
The paper is divided into three main sections:
The first relates to the general theoretical and analytical perspectives. It
addresses the question of participation and democracy at the local level; it briefly
reviews the main theoretical questions about the relationship between citizenship
and local government through the concepts of accountability and responsiveness.
In order to put the analysis into context, this first section introduces as well the
principal features of local government and local power in Spain, as well as the key
aspects for understanding the Spanish trends and characteristics of environment
and environmental policies, and their links with the local government.
The second section explores the four case studies. Briefly, the first of the
cases is about citizens’ mobilizations against the construction of a water
purification station; the second is about the construction of a waste treatment
plant; the third about the actions to re-forest a burnt countryside area , and fourth
is about the plans to repair the serious ecological damages provoked in a natural
bay after decades of filling in with mining spoil heaps . The cases are analyzed
separately and, in the conclusions (section three) they are compared according to
the framework established in section one, that is, according to whether the
relationship between local democracy and citizens is changing.
1. Local government and representative democracy
1.1 The Analytical Perspective
Citizens’ mobilizations and protests are indicators of disagreement between
incumbents and society, whether such a disagreement is rooted in the content of
public decisions (and no-decisions) or in the form these decisions are made. From
an analytical perspective, these two different roots of disagreement can be linked
to two main questions about democracy:
One question refers to the extent to what incumbent politicians can be sensitive
about citizens’ preferences and, as a consequence, to what extent they can
decide to act accordingly;
The other question refers to the consequences of incumbents’ decisions when
these decisions do not correspond to the implicit and explicit terms of the
electoral agreement.
The first of these questions relates to the nature of the relationship between
citizens and incumbents; that is, to the concept of responsiveness. The second
question is linked to the evaluation, by citizenship, of incumbents’ actions, that is,
to the concept of accountability. These two questions and their corresponding
concepts are at the core of theories of democracy, and, more in concrete, of
representative democracy and its principles.
Our main interest in this paper is to explore whether the principles of
representative democracy and the questions it arises about the relationship
between citizenship and incumbents, can take particular features when applied to
understand local representative democracy.
The basis of such a question is the fact that local representative democracy
contents a singular and particular variable which can be expected to have
consequences on both local political responsiveness and accountability: the
proximity between citizenship and incumbents. Such a proximity is built upon
several factors although these are, mainly, the size of the political entity, the type
of public services provided by local institutions (focussed on the daily life of
citizens and on personal needs -health care, social assistance), and the way these
services are provided. Unlike other levels of government, the provision of local
services is structured through the direct relationship with citizens. Whether local
government implements policies defined by other levels of government or it
implements its own policies, the direct provision of services to citizens allows to
empirically contrast the appropriateness between formal definitions of political and
social problems and needs, and their realities. Local governments are, in this
sense, the closest political sensors of citizens’ problems and needs.
Thus, although some variables can, of course, modify the nature and intensity of
this direct relationship between citizenship and their political representatives (i.e.
the demographic and socio-economic bases of local government units -urban or
rural; metropolitan areas or medium-sized towns- the structure of the local power -
partisan or personal-, the political relationship between local governments and
other levels of governments -collaborative or conflictive, authoritarian or
permissive-, and the type of policy issue) the main question here is whether
proximity works, at the local level, as a mechanism which balances out the two
separate worlds of representative democracy: that of citizens and that of elected
politicians, two worlds which are only and briefly connected at the electoral time.
In this sense, the analysis of the four cases of local protest is an attempt to explore
this question in a concrete policy area: that of environment. There are some
reasons which make local environmental issues appropriate examples for the
analysis of our main question: issues related to environment at local level affect
and involve, directly or indirectly, explicitly and implicitly, the whole local
community; in other words, local policies related to environment are not target
policies as local social policies can be. Local environmental issues tend to mobilize
the whole citizenship, independently on whether mobilization is actually articulated
through large and heterogeneous citizens platforms, or through different and
opposite groups of citizens (i.e. ecologist groups, neighbours): the analysis of
these large mobilizations can provide some hints about how the relationship
between citizens and their local political institutions is understood and expressed,
how, in other words, the two worlds of democracy are shaped at the local level.
Furthermore, the subsidiary principle entails political powers to the local level.
Hence, local government is supposed to provide public services and to make
decisions that broadly affect citizenship’s life.
Bearing in mind that local government is the framework where the concepts of
accountability, responsiveness and proximity are analyzed, it is worth to provide a
description of the local system in Spain. The level of local autonomy and the role
of local government in providing public services will be addressed. Once the main
characteristics of the Spanish local government are caught up, we will turn to
analyze the cases. The exploration of the cases will allow us to suggest several
points about both the relation between citizens and incumbents and concept of
citizenship at local level.
1.2 The Spanish local system: some features
In Spain there are 8077 units of local government. The powers of local government
institutions and their relations with central and regional levels are inspired on the
French model (as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon one): local government is
constitutionally recognised as well as it is its principle of autonomy which it enjoys
for the managing of its own interests (article 137 of the Spanish Constitution). In
this sense, local government takes part of the constitutional framework of the state
and, as such, its own existence and its autonomy cannot be altered by law
(Sánchez Morón, 1998: 29-34; Brugué and Gomà, 1998: 15-16). However, one
thing is the recognition of its internal margin of manoeuvre (autonomy) which
involves that local governments are not subordinated entities, and quite another is
the powers and the financing its is entitled to have. In other words, the Spanish
local government enjoys of full autonomy to do very little. (Brugué and Gomà,
1998:15-16).
The general powers of local government are established according to law (Ley de
Bases del Regimen Local, law enacted in 1985) and according to the constitutional
distribution of the legislative powers between central government and the
Autonomous Communities. In this sense, local government will find its powers
regulated by both national and regional legislation (Sánchez Morón, 1998: 42-47).
As for the latter, it brings about a variety of legislative situations since neither all
the Autonomous Communities have the same level of powers, nor their ruling
institutions share (or have shared) the same political approaches and relationship
regarding local government. Other factors such as the regional balance of powers
and the partisan competition will interact in this dimension and shape a Spanish
map of local government that can be characterized as of political variety.
Another aspect that has to be taken into account is the role that Spanish local
governments have had, at the return of democracy, in the establishment of the
Welfare State and in the particular way they have contributed to establish it. After
the first local democratic elections (1979), local governments had to face the
construction, from scratch, of most of the basic welfare infrastructures. During the
1980s and with the visa and support of citizenship, local governments built up the
net of basic social and health services. Local governments had, thus, both from a
political and managerial perspective, a very clear, legitimate and agreed margin of
action. The needs, problems and expectations of citizens were, therefore, as
transparent as they could be and local governments took a clear administrative
and technocratic profile (Brugué and Gomà, 1998: 19-23; Brugué, Gomà,
Quintana and Subirats, 1999).
Given this situation and coming back to our analytical perspective, it can be said
that during the 1980s, in Spain, there was a high coincidence between citizens’
expectations and local authorities on the content of local policies. This could have
had, as a consequence, the relax on the capacity of local governments to detect
new problems, and, a trend to act unilaterally. Therefore, during the 1980s,
proximity was neither an important variable to understand the relationship between
citizens and elected local representatives, nor the absence of “proximity” became a
conflictual issue. Electoral accountability was, in this context, enough as a
constitutive element of the relationship between citizens and incumbents.
The crisis of the Welfare State and its consequences on the local sphere (the loss
by local authorities of mechanical and clear directions and actions on “what to do” -
Brugué and Gomà, 1998-), have also modified the terms of the relationship
between citizens and local authorities: the coincidence between citizens and
politicians’ expectations that characterized the contents of local politics and
policies in the 1980s does not exist any more. Another question is whether local
governments continue to act and behave as if it did.
In fact, during the 1990s, some local governments have gone through new
experiences that have tried to reform and keep them closer to citizens: these
experiences show that the relation between citizens and the local institutions
matters at the eyes of the latter (Brugué, Amorós, Gomà, 1994). However, whether
this is a common trend or whether this is applied to all local policy areas is
something to be tested empirically.
Although the relation between citizens and local institutions has become an issue
in many local governments all across Spain, such a relation of proximity (to keep
close to citizenship) does not always take similar patterns: basically, citizens can
be understood as individuals or as members of a collective (Brugué, Amorós,
Gomà, 1994) and whether they are understood as individuals (voters, customers,
clients) or as members of a collective changes the nature of the relationship that
citizens may expect to have within local institutions and with incumbents. A
collective meaning of citizenship can emerge from local institutions or from citizens
themselves, but, in any case, it implies a public dominion reference, that is, the
emergence of collective perceptions of citizenship is always addressed as the
other face of public accountability and responsibility.
In the next section, we will explore the four cases of citizens’ protest according to
the terms we have set in this section, that is, according to whether proximity has
worked as a mechanism approaching citizens and elected politicians within the
general trends taken by Spanish local government.
2. Environment, a chance for responsiveness? The analysis of the
case studies.
The aim of this section is to describe the processes of four local contests
related to environmental issues. Bearing in mind the features described in the last
section, this one is focussed in providing a rather detailed picture of the
institutional settings where political and social actors interacted.
In order to proceed, we will, first all, depict the general context of the Región
de Murcia in which concerns general economic features, the type of local
government units, the main trends characterizing the inter-governmental, as well
as some indicators about “environment” (ecologist movement, environmental
awareness, main issues etc.). We will, then, describe and analyze the four cases.
2.1 The economic, the local and the environmental contexts
The Región de Murcia is placed in one of the more active geo-economic
areas of the European Union: the Mediterranean Arch (Consejo Económico y
Social, 1996: 159-182; Consejería de Economía y Hacienda, 2000). It is, thus, a
region with high levels of economic growth. An outlook at the relative proportion of
its economic sectors within the Gross Added Value (GAV) shows, as Table 1
illustrates, the following trends:
Table 1. Relative Proportion of the Economic Sectors within the GAV
MURCIA MEDITERRANEAN
ARCH
SPAIN
1980 1992 1980 1992 1980 1992
Agriculture 8.03 10.62 4.47 3.35 6.83 5.14
Energy 17.37 10.56 5.46 5.69 6.07 6.06
Industry 18.5 17.17 31.26 27.96 25.67 22.5
Construction 6.28 8.99 7.3 7.51 7.31 8.25
Services
(direct)
39.59 37.22 43.33 44.43 42.64 43.59
Services 10.23 15.43 8.17 11.07 11.47 14.48
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CES, 1996: 174.
AGRICULTURE
Comparing the three economic areas (Spain, the whole Mediterranean Arch and
the Region itself), it is important to highlight how the agriculture sector takes
different trends in Murcia: whilst the shared trend between the Mediterranean Arch
and Spain is a loss of its weight, in Murcia the relative proportion of such a sector
is not only higher but it is also increasing. This shows a very well-known fact: the
economic specialization of the region on export agriculture, or, in other words, on
industrial agriculture. The environmental impact of such a sector is very high:
pesticides, fertiliser products, wastes such as plastics sheets used as protectors
for crops, and an abusive use of water for the growing of vegetables that require
high levels of irrigation. At the same time, the economic benefits generated by the
industrial agriculture have also worked as strong incentives to abandon traditional
forms of agriculture, and they have promoted the conversion of traditional
cultivated lands into irrigated cultivation. The extension of highly-irrigated
agricultural activities to quasi-arid zones of the Region has been done with the
silent agreement of the Regional government ( the regional government denies this
is happening since it contravenes the European law derived from the Common
Agriculture Policy) and with the criticisms of the ecologist groups.
ENERGY
The proportion of the energy sector is also quite higher when compared with the
Spanish and Mediterranean averages. Within the Region, this sector is
geographically placed in the north coast (Cartagena) and it is mainly based upon
the oil industry. Its direct environmental impact is related to air pollution, but it has
secondary effects such as being, for decades, a pole of attraction for other heavy
polluting industries such as gas industry, as power related industries (the
multinational General Electrics, for example, has one of its biggest European
plants in there), as fertilisers industries, as well as mineral related industries. It is
also important to highlight that previous to the establishment of this sort of
industries, the same geographical area had been suffering from another highly
polluter activity: mining. The environmental impacts of mining are huge:
abandoned spoils heaps containing high concentrations of dangerous minerals
and the complete destruction of near-by ecosystems.
INDUSTRY
A comparative outlook at the industry proportions of each area shows how, in the
Region, the weight of industry is relatively low but it is, as well, a high polluter: one
of the main polluters of the region is the leather industry. Although its percentage
on the industrial GAV is relatively low (2.2% - Consejo Economico y Social, 1996),
such an industry has become one of the main water polluters of the region.
From the point of view of the local government and its structures, the region shows
a very interesting characteristic:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S STRUCTURE
Compared to the Spanish averages and to the averages of other Autonomous
Communities, the Region de Murcia has a structure of medium-sized local
government units (45 in total), both in terms of inhabitants and geographical
extension. It shows a particular pattern on territorial distribution of population:
instead of the polarised pattern followed by most of the Autonomous Communities
(more than 75% of local units have less than 5000 inhabitants and less than 10%
of local units have more than 50000 inhabitants), the Region de Murcia shows a
quite homogeneous distribution of population across the territory.
The medium-sized pattern of local government units can also have effects upon
the nature and structure of local power: the units are big enough to articulate the
political conflict through the party system, but, at the same time, personal sources
of power are much more intense than they can be in larger towns. Local power is,
in this sense, quite related to personal networks.
LOCAL AND REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT
From an objective point of view, the economic activity of the Region together with
the quasi-arid geo-climatic conditions, have made the whole Autonomous
Community to suffer from environmental degradation. We have already pointed
out some of the most acute environmental problems derived from the economic
activity of the Region. Others derive from the process of desertification (worsened
by the abandonment of rural areas and by forest fires), the permissive position of
local and regional governments, as well as from the lack of environmental
practices shown by the citizens of the Region, although the latter trend is not at all
different of that shown by Spaniards as a whole: according the surveys, the
Spanish green awareness is not very different from that of its European partners,
differences are revealed when awareness has to be put into practice.
The ecologist movement is composed by five associations: a regional branch of a
state-level association (Ecologistas en Accion); a regional association, the
Southeast Naturalist Association (Asociacion Naturalistas del Sur-Este, ANSE),
and three local groups: Carayuma (from Caravaca, a north-west town), ANIDA
(from Yecla, a north-east town), and Juncellus (from Jumilla).
The two big groups are ANSE and Ecologistas en Accion. Whilst ANSE is
more addressed to environmental education and to act in punctual actions,
Ecologistas en Accion is rather addressed to react against any institutional any
private action that could entail environmental damages. Its priority issues are
centred on, first of all, the protection of natural spaces, secondly, on problems
derived from waste and water, and, thirdly, the effects of electromagnetic pollution
(linked to mobile phones and their aerials), leaving besides other aspects such as
urban ecology (recycling, noise, green spaces etc). Ecologistas en Accion works
very closely to the three local groups (Carayuma, ANIDA and Juncellus). Their way
to detect problems is double-based: one is through their own members and the
other is through citizens. Citizens usually address their problems and claims to the
ecologist movement after they have not found any answer within the
administration. The trust citizens seem to have given to the ecologist associations
is confirmed by a survey carried out in 1999 in Murcia: at the question “who do you
trust more in questions related with the environment?”, 46% of citizens answered
“the ecologist organizations” (see Table 2); it is interesting to see the ridiculous
level of environmental trust that citizens give to political institutions (2%); even
political parties reached higher levels of trust (6%).
Table 2. Environmental Trust
Political Parties 6% Trade Unions 1% Employees 0% Regional and local institutions 2% Ecologist Associations 46% Scientists and University professors
11%
Technicians 24% Journalists 3% None 8% DNK/NA 13% Total 100%
Source: Consejo Economico y Social, 2000: 425.
The perception citizens have about the environmental actions taken by the
regional and the 45 local institutions is, thus, very negative and it reveals, as well,
the little role institutions play in “giving example” to citizens in environmental
practices. As an example, the regional law on wastewater treatment is one of the
most severe and restrictive laws in Spain on the subject: the levels of permitted
pollution are very high and fines to industries for not respecting these levels are
very expensive. Such a model law has promoted a process of industry de-
localisation or, at least, has promoted the use of such a de-localisation as a threat
to the regional and local governments. It has to be taken into account that the
industrial area of the region follows the Segura river which also flows across
another Autonomous Community, the Comunidad Valenciana. Wastewater laws in
the Comunidad Valenciana are much less restrictive, and given the proximity to
this Autonomous Community, Murcian industries have moved to the nearest
possible Valencian area. When de-localisation has been used as a threat, eco-
fines have been converted by local councils and industries into an agreed irregular
punishment and into a way to obtain local taxes.
2.2 The case studies
Environmental policy-making is a long-term process which involves several
level of government -local, regional, central and European. All through this
process, any environmental policy will have to be handled by different ruling
parties and given the duration of environmental actions, political changes will also
imply the replacement of those politicians in charge of the issue by new ones. It is
in this context were the four cases took place during the 1990s in the Region de
Murcia.
The selection of these four cases of study is connected to two factors:
firstly, environmental policies concern different government levels due to the
constitutional distribution of powers and to the subsidiary principle; secondly
environmental issues have provoked, independently on the degree of green
awareness shown by citizens, wide reactions in local communities.
In order to provide a better understanding of the cases, this sub-section
refers to the description of each case, leaving the comparisons among them to the
conclusions.
The selected cases are four examples of environmental conflicts between citizens
and their local incumbents and institutions. The conflicts took place in the 1990s in
four different municipalities. Some of them are still in development. In the span of
time the conflicts took place, local and regional elections were held and derived in
in governmental changes. Whether changes resulted from the electoral
punishment expressed by citizens, the fact is that governmental changes has not
modified either the nature or the intensity of these conflicts. Electoral accountability
has not worked as a form to give and define solutions to the problems detected by
citizens. On the contrary, in spite of the governmental changes they have
provocked, citizens have insisted in their claims and struggles for having a say in
the policy-making process; citizens are, thus, claiming for rather more participative
processes of policy-making.
a) The plant for the treatment of urban water in Abarán.
In January 1998, the Abarán council decided to build a water purification
plant in a countryside area known as “Cañada del Hidalgo”, at 1 Km away from the
city centre, following the measures established by the 98/15CE European
Directive. The news about the construction of the plant and about the chosen area
provoked a wide reaction within the local community: citizens immediately reacted
against such a decision and co-ordinated their protests through the creation of a
wide citizens' platform, the Plataforma ciudadana en defensa de Cañada del
Hidalgo, composed by neighbours' associations, ecologist groups, youth
associations and the youth branches of two state-wide parties (the Spanish
Socialist Workers Party -PSOE- and the Spanish Communist Party -PCE). The
objectives of the common platform were that of making the local government to
change its decision on the geographical placement of the plant. The reasons for
such an opposition were linked to the environmental value of the area so they
presented alternative locations; but apart from the environmental profile of the
citizens' claims, another issue was also included within their protest: the use of the
institutional resources held by the Abarán's mayor for his private interests; the
lands the council decided as the most appropriated for installing the plant,
belonged to one of his close relatives.
The actions taken by the platform in order to make the council to reconsider
its initial decision consisted in several public demonstrations and other
mobilizations addressed to attract the media attention, as well as rather
confrontative events such as more or less violent interruptions of local council
meetings. In spite of the different actions and the social mobilization against the
local council's decision, the latter did not either rectified its initial position, nor
consider any possible negotiation with the platform. The compulsory evaluation on
the environmental impact did not reject the location chosen by the council but it
pointed out at other alternative locations which were not taken into account by the
municipality. Thus, so far the location was not a technical question, the platform
demanded to have a say. However, the local council, legitimated by the non-
conclusive environmental evaluation. It carried on with the project. In February
2000, the works to build the plant started and the platform, given the situation,
addressed its complaints towards the European Union.
From an analytical perspective, through the development of the conflict,
three aspects should be highlighted: we have already mentionned two of them,
that is, the environmental content of the protest as well as the claim for a more
participative local policy-making process. However, another aspect revealed its
importance: the impact of party politics and local-regional intergovernmental
relations upon the whole process of decision and policy-making.
The 1998 local council's decision on the construction of the water
purification plant had been preceeded by some years of discussion on the subject
among the two institutions involved in the policy implementation: the Regional and
the local council's government. However, when the project for the water purification
plant started to be considered (1994), the party membership of each level of
government was quite different from that of 1998. In 1994, the regional
government was ruled by the Socialist Party (PSOE) whilst the Abarán's local
institutions were already ruled by members of the Popular Party.
The socialist regional government launched, thus, an initial project spurred
by European funds which were addressed to such an objective. It planned to build
a water purification plant embracing two municipalities: Abarán and Blanca. Both
local governments (PP ruled) refused the initial plans. Confrontation between the
two local governments and the regional government worked as an obstacle to
reach an agreement on where to place the plant. After 1995 regional and local
elections, the PP went into power at both the regional government and the
Abarán’s mayoralty., transforming, thus, the previous balance of powers. The
partisan change promoted a more collaborative scenario where to negotiate the
project.
b) Where to place a regional urban waste treatment plant? The case of the
macro-plant of the Región de Murcia
Some of the features of the nimby's protest characterize this local contest,
that is, citizens considered that such a plant for the treatment of solid urban waste
is necessary for the collective well-being but, at the same time, they did not want to
be those who have to suffer the negative effects derived by the plant. Apart from
that, the analysis of the local contest also highlights that another keystone: the
lack of local government's responsiveness.
The project implied the building up of a plant that has to face the treatment
of the growing amount of solid urban waste of the region. This plant was supposed
to provide a satisfactory answer to 35 out of the 45 municipalities of the Region.
The negotiation on the location started in 1996 but it did not progress notably until
1999. These municipalities joined their efforts through the articulation of one single
association (consortium) which was in charge of the management of the plant. At
the initial steps of the project, there was a wide agreement that included the two
main political parties (PP and PSOE) as well as the ecologist groups fully
supported the project.
Initially, the location of the plant was easly found and agreed among most of
the crucial actors; one of the 35 municipalities, Torres de Cotillas (ruled by the PP),
offered lands for the construction of the plant. The PP regional government and
the local institutions reached an agreement which had, in addition, the visa of the
ecologist groups. However, before the implementation of the project started, the
1999 local elections brought about some governmental changes: the PP
governmental team at Torres de Cotillas was substituted by a new one ruled by the
former opposition party, the PSOE. Some months after the governmental change,
the local council withdrawn the support to the construction of the plant. The local
government argued that the previous governmental team had undermined the
environmental effects carried by the plant, so, they eventually considered the
construction absolutely inappropriated. After that, a next step was taken: to decide
on another location where to place the plant.
Following attempts to find a location were increasingly harder because of
the rejection-effect, that is, once one facility had been refused by a local
government for its potential negative effects, other local collectives did not need
many excuses to organize their opposition. In fact, successive attempts to find a
location immediately aroused wide local contest and the mobilization of citizenship
through large platforms. Politicians became unable to reach a consesual
agreement with all involved actors (farmers, neighbours associations, ecologist
groups) and had to unilaterally made an impopular decision just because of one
fact: timing. Time started to be a key resource for those who opposed the
construction of the plant since the European Union funds provided for this had a
clear deadline: december 1999.
c) Reforestation actions in Cieza: local grievances as electoral resources
The starting point of this local protest was a reforestation project launched
by the regional government with the support of the Cieza's local council. The
objectives of the reforestation were to recover a large burnt area; the regional
government had asked the technical and scientific assesment of a research centre
on biology which evaluated positevely the effects of the potential reforestation.
Immediately after the project was proposed by the council, the head of the Cieza’
hunters association started a campaign against such an initiative; the conflict,
then, developed its own dynamics.
As in the rest of the cases, the content of the project was not the conflictive
issue, but it was the decision-making process through which the project was
defined. The relationship between political elites is one of the key features in this
case: the head of the one of the local political parties, the Spanish Democratic
Party (PADE) was as well the president of the hunters association, that which
initiated the social mobilization. The importance of this point has to be understood
in the context of the conflict: it raised some months before the 1999 local and
regional elections. In this sense, those political actors who were involved in the
conflict, used the latter as an electoral weapon: all of them, by means of their
active role within the contest, claimed to really represent the interests of the
citizens. Thus, such a partisan implication explains, to a certain extent, the
evolution of the local protest. The potential local grievances were make to be
perceived as a political resource, therefore, it can be said, in this case, that the
electoral timing made the issue of the reforestation to arise both within the
systemic and institutional agenda.
It was in the 1999 local and autonómicas elections when one of the local
opposition parties, the PADE, denounced the government project because of its
environmental impact. The PADE´s position was based on a technical evaluation
carried out, independently, by the Ecology Department of the University of Murcia..
However, the political implications of the controversy were early noticed by
the citizens. They realized that the campaign lead by the PADE was biased by
electoral aims but that, on the other hand, also noticed that the reforestation plan
of the local government was exclusively monitored by the regional government. In
this sense, local institutions left besides any possible political responsiveness: it
was a matter of the regional government; local institutions had a very clear role:
that of being the implementation arm of the regional government.
d) Regeneration of the Bay at Portmán
For more than thirthy years a mining entreprise thrown tones of spoils to a
large natural bay north to Cartagena, the bay called Portmán. The decline of the
mining industry came together with the first environmental regulation in Spain. The
entreprise closed in 1991, at the same time that most of the mining industries of
the area, but the bay has disappeared under tones of spoil heaps; the question is,
now, what to do. Different posible alternatives have raised deep conflicts at several
dimensions: conflicts between citizens and ecologist groups; and conflicts among
the different administrations involved in the conflict: local, regional, national and,
as well, European.
Two characteristics feature this case: firstly, the case offers one common
trend in environmental policy-making: the difficult combination between
environmental protection and economic development; and, secondly, it shows the
difficult co-operation between ecologist groups and citizenship.
The case of the bay in Portmán presents a setting where economic
development interacted with the environmental protection. The long-standing
process taken by the conflict together with the Spanish fragmentation of the policy-
making process determined a complex network of actors as well as the dynamics
of the project. In this sense, the two political parties which have been ruling at the
regional levele (the PP and the PSOE) have proposed and defended very different
projects. The PSOE, in office between 1987 and 1995, launched a proposal at the
end of tis tenure -in 1994- which received a high social support and it was
successfully submitted to the compulsory environmental impact assessment.
However, the change of government in 1995 also changed the regional
governemntal preferences on the problem. In fact, the new regional abandonned
the previous project and designed another one which aims at combining the
regeneration of the bay with the enlargement of the near port of Cartagena within
a global economic development project.
The failure of the successive projects and the turnout of political parties in
office (at the central, autonomic and local level) made citizens not to rely on
politicians as promoters of solutions. On the contrary, citizens consider that the
lack of political determination in solving the problem was due to the political
implications of the project: the results of the regeneration programme would be
long-drawn-out and political parties do not have incentives to carry out such a long,
time-consuming and expensive project. Furthermore, citizens did not either trust
that ecologist groups (Greenpeace, Asociación de Naturalistas del Sureste ANSE-)
could provide a higher expectation of solution. The conflict between citizens and
ecologist group lays in the different points of view about the relationship between
environmental protection and economic development. While ecologist group
fostered environmental implications of the project, citizens focussed on the need to
find a way out to the socio-economic recession of the former mining area. This
situation of confrontation is underlined by politicians and the media in electoral
term. Consequently, the citizensship argues that politicians are blurred by the
complexity of a policy-making process that demands the co-operation of different
level governments that are not necessarily ruled by the same political party.
3. Comparative approach
The analysis of the four cases has pointed out that the aim of local protest
seems to deal with the policy-making process styles rather than with its specific
outcomes. In other words, local protests have not disapproved so much the
content of the public policy as the lack of citizens’ participation in the local
decision-processes. Citizens demand further responsiveness as far as electoral
accountability is hardly effective and feasible due to two main reasons: the first
refers to the institutional context: the highly decentralized political government
demands high levels of co-ordination between different level of powers which are
not often achieved; the second reason is related to the fact that environmental
policies generate a long policy-making process that is not adjusted to elections in
temporal terms: electoral accountability cannot work, in this sense, as a control
mechanism.
As for the former, the decentralization process does not make local
governments completely autonomous, and the responsibility for the political
outcome would be addressed, almost unevenly, to different levels of government.
Furthermore , this co-ordination is not supplied by any institution but it only seems
to be achievable by means of political parties. As for the latter and taking into
account that the implementation of any measure related to any environmental
policy would probably take more than the period in tenure, elections would not be
an effective mechanism to evaluate local institutions. An evaluation of the election
effects in term of accountability and responsiveness can be obtained by
considering separately the collective and the individual effects of elections. The
collective effects are linked to the selection of incumbents; the individual effects
should be linked to the potential transmission of preferences from citizens to
politicians. In this sense, electoral accountability at the local level does not derive
in a better transmission of policy preferences and citizens' moods. Therefore, from
the point of view of citizenship, local elections do not generate political
responsiveness among local politicians.
Taking into account the analyzed citizens' protests, their message seems to
point out at one aspect: the lack of responsiveness and the failure of electoral
accountability as mechanisms to transmit citizens' preferences to their incumbents.
Local protests, sometimes in co-ordination with ecologist groups (Cieza, Abarán,
Solid Urban Waste Treatment Plant) and sometimes in clear confrontation with
them (Portmán) were not focussed on the achievement of one specific goal but on
the promotion of citizens' participation within the local decision-making process.
Protests pointed out that the current political system is not politically responsible, in
other words, it lacks mechanisms of responsiveness.
The existence of a possible closer relationship between citizens and
incumbents is vanished because of the features of the policy making. In other
words, the Spanish almost-federal system and the subsidiary principle do not give
a higher level of autonomy to local entities; rather, the fact that policy making
requires co-ordination amon the different levels of government, cuts it up. In this
sense, two different scenarios of policy-making can be distinguished:
a) Homogeneous/one colour multilevel policy-making: local and regional governments
are ruled by the same political party. In this scenario, the common party
membership variable reduces the chances of confrontation between institutions.
This scenario corresponds to the cases of Cieza, Abarán -since 1995- and
Portmán. However the economic dependency of this entity requires that local and
autonomic governments look for economic resources at the central and European
levels.
b) Heterogeneous/ two colours multilevel policy-making: different political parties rule
at each level of government. This scenario tends to generate partisan conflicts
(Abarán, Solid Urban Waste Treatment Plant) which monitor the development of
other protests. However neither the local or the regional government have used
citizens' protest as a means to struggle for popular support against the different
colour level of government.
Summing up, none of the processes has dealt with citizens' participation
within the local policy- and decision-making. On the contrary, these processes
have fostered a partisan dynamics by which co-operation or confrontation
strategies depend on which party is in office. Protest platforms have addressed
their claims in two directions: to re-consider the role of local government as their
main interlocutor within the multi-level policy-making and to increase the levels of
political responsiveness as a means to built up channels of communication
between citizens and incumbents' ideas and preferences on their local context.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Consejería de Economía y Hacienda, 2000 Anuario estadístico de la Región de Murcia,. http://www.carm.es/econet/eco_menu.htm. Brugué, Quim; Moisès Amorós and Ricard Gomà 1994 La administración pública y sus clientes: ¿moda organizativa u opción ideológica? in Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas, nº1, September-December 1994. Brugué, Quim and Ricard Gomà (coord) 1998 Gobiernos locales y políticas públicas, Ariel: Barcelona. Brugué, Quim; Ricard Gomà, Imma Quintana and Joan Subirats 1999 El gobierno local in Informe España, Fundación Encuentro: Madrid. Consejo Económico y Social de la Región de Murcia (CES) 1996 Estrategias para el desarrollo de la Region De Murcia, CES: Murcia. Consejo Económico y Social de la Región de Murcia 2000 (CES) Competitividad y Medio Ambiente en La Región de Murcia, CES: Murcia (available at http://www.cesmurcia.es/estudios/estudios_10/Indice_del_Estudio_10.html).
CASE STUDIES: Miñano, Roberto and José Israel Carrión 2000. “La estación depuradora de aguas residuales de Abarán”, mimeo. Universidad de Murcia.
Barrionuevo, Mª. Dolores; Alfonso Egea and Patricia Pérez 2000. “La Regeneración de la Bahía de Portmán, el Medio Ambiente en cautividad: ¿técnica o política?”, mimeo. Universidad de Murcia.
Martínez, Sonia; Mª Teresa Moreno and Mª José Cantero 2000. “La ubicación de la planta de residuos sólidos urbanos”, Mimeo. Universidad de Murcia.
Martín, Fernando; Manuel Llamas, Antonio José Blázquez and Fernando Jiménez 2000. “Las acciones de reforestación en la Solana del Pinacho y los Parajes de la Chiripa y La Torca y sus Efectos Medioambientales”, mimeo. Universidad de Murcia.