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archived as http://www.stealthskater.com/Documents/Fighter_03.doc

(also …Fighter_03.pdf) => doc pdf URL-doc URL-pdf

more on this topic is on the /Military.htm page at doc pdf URL

note: because important websites are frequently "here today but gone tomorrow", the following was

archived from http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26880/enough-with-the-indian-mig-21-

bison-versus-pakistani-f-16-viper-bullshit on March 12, 2019. This is NOT an attempt to divert

readers any website. Indeed, the reader should only read this back-up copy if it cannot be found

at the original author's site.

"Enough with the Indian Mig-21 Bison versus Pakistani F-16 Viper Bullshit"

The amount of garbage commentary and skewed analysis on the whole shoot down has been

unbelievable. Here's the reality, like it or not.

by Tyler Rogoway / The War Zone / March 11, 2019

I have never seen such a large and diverse mess of misinformation spouted and parroted with wild

abandon about a military skirmish than what has come out of the short spate of Pakistani-Indian air

battles that occurred in late February. But one aspect of those operations in particular has been so

ridiculously mischaracterized by the media, so-called analysts and the public in general that the majority

of narratives surrounding it have to be called out for what they are: Total Bullshit!

During a Pakistani Air Force counterstrike operation on February 27th (one that came in response to

India's air raid into their territory on February 26th), an Indian MiG-21 Bison was shot down and its pilot

Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman captured. He was returned to India in remarkably good

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shape not long after. Claims that India shot down a Pakistani F-16 during that same incident quickly

followed.

What has come as a result of all this has been a full-on information assault of laughably childish

narratives that lack any understanding of modern air combat and appear to be largely driven by blind

nationalism, political spin, or straight-up stupidity. Not reality or fact.

India now officially claims that they shot down a Pakistani F-16 and that Wing Commander

Varthaman was the one who did it just before he himself got shot down. I have to make clear that we

have zero evidence that a Pakistani F-16 was lost in combat. None.

That does not mean it didn't happen. It just means that at this time we have no reason to believe it

beyond taking India's word for it.

Mig-21 Bison

Pakistan Block 52 F-16D

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The videos and images being passed around online that supposedly support the downed F-16 claim

are pure misinformation made up of repackaged old media from past incidents or blatant mistruths

peddled by "open source intelligence" social media congregators and nationalist pundit accounts

supporting the Indian side of the long and sad standoff between the 2 nuclear-armed neighbors.

Maybe the most notorious piece of media being used to push the F-16 shoot down narrative is a set

of pictures of aircraft wreckage showing what some claim is the outer casing of a GE-F110 turbofan

engine. There are many issues with the photos to begin with. (Bellingcat even did a big and totally

unnecessary write up on it.) But one needs to look no further than the simple fact that Pakistan has

never operated a single F-16A/B/C/D with a General Electric engine. All of that country's F-16s have

run F100 series Pratt & Whitney engines since Pakistan first acquired the type decades ago.

So case closed when it comes to one of the most prolific examples of the garbage mound of

'evidence' swirling around the incident. Once again, throngs of people including major news outlets

from around the Globe arguing about a subject that they know nothing about.

But the question of if a seemingly archaic MiG-21 shot down a Pakistani F-16 really isn't the issue

here. The problem is that so many have said that such a loss would have been near impossible or a sign

of some sort of super embarrassing blunder by an incompetent Pakistani Air Force or even that the F-

16's value and capabilities as a modern combat aircraft should be discounted due to the purported loss.

This is all absolute and total swill. Here's why ...

Modern air combat is not a Hollywood blockbuster movie or an arcade game, folks! There are so

many factors that go into every single air-to-air engagement (even those that occur in a relatively sterile

vacuum for training) that acting as if the loss of a more modern and capable airframe to an older and less

capable one is some sort of unheard of and damning evidence as to the latter's relevance and

effectiveness on the modern battlefield is absolutely inaccurate.

First off, the MiG-21 Bison that India flies with well over 100 operational in its inventory is not the

'Fishbed' of the Cold War era. The aircraft was updated with 4th generation fighter avionics and sensors

in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Indian MiG-21 Bison loaded with R-73 and R-77 missiles

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This upgrade included a glass cockpit, radar warning receiver, and a helmet-mounted cueing system

for firing the high off-boresight R-73 short-range air-to-air missile. Although it isn't disclosed, it seems

to include a data-link terminal as well.

A Phazatron Kopyo ("Spear") lightweight multi-mode radar was installed in the jet's nosecone that

also allowed it to employ the R-77 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. That upgraded radar may also

have received certain tweaks that have improved its performance or it may have been replaced with an

even more capable foreign radar set altogether.

Other additions included a bubble canopy with far superior visibility compared to the MiG-21's

original smaller and more densely framed one. Expansive countermeasures dispensers were installed as

well.

With the ability to carry smarter weapons, the Bison also received a very important piece of

equipment from Israel. The bolt-on Elta-8222 self-protection electronic warfare pod. This was cutting

edge tech in the early 2000s. But even today, it is still amazingly formidable and is capable of wreaking

absolute havoc on enemy radar systems. Especially mechanically-scanned array fire control radars

found on most 4th generation fighters.

All this adds up to a potent little package for not a lot of money. The MiG-21 already sports certain

advantages like small radar and visual signatures from certain aspects as well as the ability to make hard

instantaneous turns and fast supersonic dashes. But when you pair the Bison package with creative

tactics and networking as well as a host of other aircraft and an experienced pilot, it becomes far more

lethal than the sum of its parts.

You don't have to take my (Tyler Rogoway's) word for this. The USAF found this out the hard way

during one of the most beneficial learning moments in modern air combat training history.

Cope India 2004 saw American F-15Cs paired off against the pointy-end of India's wildly diverse

Air Force. Although India's Su-30Ks were close to the best thing Russia had to export at the time and

their French-built Mirage 2000s were certainly not to be discounted, the most surprising star of the

exercise was the insidious little Bison.

Mirage 2000s, Su-30Ks, and F-15Cs during Cope India 2004.

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During the air combat training drills, Indian Air Force Su-30Ks would use their powerful radars to

build-up situational awareness and then data-link their 'picture' to other aircraft in the airborne force,

which seemed to include the upgraded MiG-21s. Either way, the Su-30 pilots could also use radio

communications to inform the Bisons of threats and tactical opportunities.

Running with their radars off and emitting few to no electronic emissions that could alert the F-15

crews as to their whereabouts, the Bison pilots would use this situational information to their advantage.

MiG-21 Bison pictured packing an Elta-8222 jamming pod.

With their already small radar and visual signature and with their Elta-8222 jamming pods fired up

and wreaking havoc on the F-15C's legendarily powerful AN/APG-63 radar, the Bisons would come

screaming in out of nowhere to within visual range of the Eagles. They would proceed to shoot the F-

15s in the face with their infrared-guided R-73 missiles before blasting by.

And even if the Eagles noticed the Bisons at the last moment, the Bison pilots could negate the raw

performance of the hulking F-15s by employing the 'fire and forget' R-73 nearly 90 degrees of the

centerline of their noses using their helmet-mounted targeting system.

To put it metaphorically, the Bison wasn't a cavalry soldier or a scout. It was a ninja!

Overall, during that historic 2004 Cope India exercise, F-15 pilots found themselves having to react

to rapidly changing tactics as the Indian airborne force constantly morphed their playbook in reaction to

the Eagles' moves and entering into visual fights just after picking up the Indian fighters that were

already right on top of them on radar. By then, the Indians were also locked on as well.

It was a notoriously brutal but highly beneficial learning experience for the Air Force. And yes,

rules-of-engagement for the exercise were set purposely to fulfill certain training goals and push the

Eagle force hard. This included limiting the F-15s from firing their simulated AIM-120 AMRAAMs in

active mode radar homing mode and only engaging at 20 miles-or-less with those missiles in their

degraded state.

The Eagles were also outnumbered (at times as much as 3-to-1). But that wasn't entirely uncommon

for the F-15C/D force. The U.S. flying contingent was also made up of fleet pilots from an active

squadron flying against a composite force of India's most advanced aviators.

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But most of all, the Americans lacked their E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning And Control System

(AWACS). A staple of USAF air combat doctrine that traditionally enhanced the F-15's situational

awareness and survivability dramatically by acting as their high-powered eyes and ears on high.

F-15Cs and MiG-27s during Cope India 2004. Note that the far MiG-27 is also packing an Elta-8222 pod.

But still, the message was clear. Future enemies may be far more tactically resourceful than

previously realized, regardless of the quality of their equipment. The Pentagon had to react fast if it

wanted to retain its air combat edge.

Realizing and facing the shortcomings of equipment and tactics through high-quality training and

experimentation and attempting to remediate those shortcomings as much as possible is the hallmark of

a great flying force, not a poor one.

The Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) which was already slated for the F-15C/D

community would soon find its way on many other American fighters as well. The push to get Active

Electronic Scanned Array (AESA) radars that are far more capable than their mechanically scanned

array predecessors (and especially more adept at spotting small radar cross-section targets moving fast in

the ground clutter even in dense electronic warfare combat environments) was accelerated for the F-

15C/D community.

F-15C seen fitted with AN/APG-63V3 AESA radar.

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Other upgrades that are still in the works (including for the F-15 force) were spurred by the Cope

India's after-action findings. For instance, the F-15C/Ds infrared search and track system (which is just

in the process of being procured now) would have helped greatly when it came to detecting the Bisons at

beyond visual ranges regardless of the electronic warfare systems being employed against the Eagles.

You can read all about this and IRSTs in general in this past feature of mine.

And what do you know! American aggressor aircraft were soon spotted packing Elta-8222

electronic warfare pods. In fact, Cope India 2004, and Cope India 2005 that produced similarly dismal

results were key factors in enhancing the way American aggressors did business as well as some of the

kit that they had to help them replicate contemporary threats.

64th AGRS jet over the Nellis Test and Training Range packing a Elta-8222 jamming pods. The Israeli

EW system showed up USAF aggressors in the aftermath of Cope India 2004/2005.

In essence, thank goodness for the Bison and the tactics employed by the Indian Air Force during

Cope India 2004/2005. It gave those in the USAF that were frustrated with the snail's pace of key

upgrade programs the evidence they needed to get prioritized funding.

As I have described in great detail before, the fact that U.S. fighters received an air-to-air dogfight

missile with high-off boresight engagement capabilities (the AIM-9X) and a helmet mounted-

sight/display with which to target it (decades after the Russians had fielded a similar capability) is still a

bewildering and somewhat frightening fact to comprehend. In fact, America's supreme air-to-air fighter

the F-22 Raptor still doesn't have a helmet mounted sight/display system.

So yes, the Bison can be a wily and capable threat when paired with other aerial assets, advanced

electronic warfare, and a playbook of guileful and downright creative tactics.

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F-15C pilot wearing JHMCS.

This appears to be just how the aircraft was used during the shoot down in late February 2019.

According to reports, the Bison was in the air with Mirage 2000, Su-30MKIs, and (maybe most

important) the Embraer 145-based DRDO Airborne Early Warning and Control System. This aircraft is

not only able to get a 'God's eye' view of the battlespace including spotting low-flying bogeys and

detecting and geolocating the enemy's radar and communications emissions. But it can also share what

it sees via data-link or voice direction with Indian fighters.

In other words, those constantly morphing tactics and the unique employment of the Bison would

have been only more potent over a decade-and-a-half after Cope India 2004 via the help of the IAF's

new advanced airborne early warning and control aircraft.

IAF DRDO AEW&C aircraft.

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So now that we have painted the big picture regarding the Bison, its capabilities, and how India has

employed it in the past, it has to be made clear that we have very few hard facts about the engagement

that brought the Bison down and supposedly did the same to the F-16.

What was the quality of both pilots' situational awareness at the time? What was the electronic

warfare environment like? Were communications flowing freely or were they degraded? What was the

intelligence picture before the sorties even launched? What was the exact position of the Bison in

relation to the fighter that shot it down and what was the experience level of the pilot onboard that

aircraft?

● Was the Bison flying at low-level using the mountainous terrain to mask its radar signature?

● What was the opposing aircraft's mission?

● Was it offensive or defense counter-air?

● Were the Pakistanis baiting the Indians knowing full well how they employ their fighter aircraft?

● What was the real-time intelligence picture on both sides?

● Did Pakistan have intelligence aircraft airborne and sharing info with its fighters?

● Who knew what was where and when?

● What weapons were available on both aircraft?

● What was the exact visibility conditions at the altitude in which the engagement occurred?

● Was everything working on both jets?

● What type of plane actually shot down the Bison?

● If it was an F-16, was it one of Pakistan's plentiful upgraded F-16A/Bs or was it one of the handful

of advanced Block 52 F-16C/Ds in their possession?

● Maybe most importantly, what were the rules of engagement and the general intent of both parties

at the time of the engagement?

And the list goes on and on. So if you are looking for some definitive account of the engagement

itself, you won't find it here as it doesn't exist at this time. Not even remotely close.

With all this in mind, is it possible that a MiG-21 Bison shot down a Pakistani F-16? Of course it

is.

In fact, India's claim that the Bison got off an R-73 shot just before being shot down fits exactly with

what we know about the Bison's sneaky tactics dating back to Cope India 2004.

Does this mean the Bison is superior or equal to the F-16? Or does this put into question the F-16's

capabilities?

Absolutely not. Networking alone could have been the decisive factor along with tactics,

experience, and electronic warfare, and especially supporting airborne early warning and control aircraft

capabilities.

This is not just true for the Bison. The Navy and Marines have 45 aggressor F-5N/Fs that are far

less capable than the Bison. Yet they fly against fleet pilots daily. We are talking about these old jets

standing off against Super Hornets that are packed with AESA radars, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing

Systems, advanced data-links, and sometimes even benefitting from E-2D airborne early warning and

control support.

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These F-5N/Fs now have internal electronic warfare suites and other aircraft in their formations

during large training drills (like contracted aggressors or Topgun/NAWDC F-16s and F/A-18s) pack

advanced electronic warfare pods. But they lack a decent radar, helmet-mounted sight and a missile to

use it with, and don't have a data-link for coordinated operations without the use of voice

communications, among other deficiencies.

Yet just like the Bison, these even less capable F-5s still rack up kills on the mighty Super Hornets.

It happens far more often than most would believe.

A pair of F-5N aggressors depart in formation.

In fact, the Navy just selected a private contractor with F-5s upgraded to a similar but even more

advanced standard than the Bison as their '4th generation' threat replication provider for NAS Fallon

Nevada (the home of "TopGun"). Their competition was offering F-16s. Cost played a major part in the

decision which you can read all about here. But it underscores how sensors, avionics, tactics, and

electronic warfare can be more important than the raw performance or age of the platform itself when it

comes to modern air combat.

Obviously, this rule diminishes greatly when low-observability (stealth) is factored in for 5th

generation fighter aircraft. But even with such advanced fighters, old and relatively low-performance

aircraft with updated avionics can still pose a threat. Especially when employing similarly surprising

tactics as the Indians used and when operating as part of a large integrated air combat team that has

strength in numbers.

In the end, the avalanche of recent direct comparisons of the MiG-21 Bison versus F-16 Viper and

who would win in some fictional and largely irrelevant one-versus-one dogfight carry next to no

relevance in regards to recent events and, in general, to a large degree.

Anyone who pushes that type of childish analysis (usually paired with a sensationalized headline) as

some sort of pathway toward a definitive conclusion on these matters should be viewed as an

untrustworthy source. In other words, read for entertainment value only.

The fact is, the side with the more capable sensor and networking architecture and most potent

electronic warfare capabilities, as well as a creative tactics playbook and experience to leverage it, can

have a far greater advantage regardless of 'airframe versus airframe' performance differentials.

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Above all else, the loss of one aircraft on either or both sides in a highly complex battlespace in a

region boiling over with aggression and likely buried deep in 'the fog of War' is not indicative of the

quality of an entire nation's air arm or its overall capabilities and the relevancy of its equipment in any

tangible way. Both sides have very capable aviators and a mix of varyingly potent weapon systems at

their disposal, each with their unique advantages and disadvantages.

So to those who have been pushing totally unsubstantiated 'takes', peddling fake evidence, spinning

what little info is available for political or monetary gain, and/or making grand claims and conclusions

backed by a weak knowledge base and childish assumptions about what happened in the skies near the

Line of Control late last February, take your often nationalistic and deeply skewed narratives and stuff

them up your tailpipes.

Contact the author: Tyler@thedrive.com

Reader Comments follow the end of the article at http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-

zone/26880/enough-with-the-indian-mig-21-bison-versus-pakistani-f-16-viper-bullshit .

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