15Reflections on Emotions,

Imagination, and Moral ReasoningTous ard, an Inte grated,,

Multldts cipli,narA App ro achto Moral Cogni,ti,on

WAYNE CHRISTENSENKonrad Lorenz Institute for Eoolution and Cognition Research

Beginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectiveson moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an inierest indeveloping a common conceptual framework for n-roral cognition research.we discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this ,roi.,*" that mightserve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis fbr the eventualdevelopment of such a framework. These include the role of theory in bindingtogether diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in the constructionof moral theory. we discuss the problem of disfinguishing descriptive andnormative issues and the importance of systematic normative analysis forempirical research. we argue that theories of cognitive architecture shouldplay an important role as a backdrop {br investigation into specific aspectsof moral cognition, and we consider some of the taronomic issues thai willarise {br moral cognition research, including types of moral agents, forms of

JOHN SUTTONMacquarie Unioersity

EMOTIONS, IMACINATION, AND MORAL REASONINO

moral cognition. and the nature of morality itsel[. Pirrally. wc rlisctrsskey issues in moral development, including the importance of uing the fine-grained structure of moral motivation and emergingschemas and the role of active interpretation and problem-solving as chiacquire moral skill.

INTRODUCTION

ecently, one of us (Christensen) was visiting a friend, and the diturned to the friend's oldest child, a 9-year-old boy with some bedifficulties. The boy is visiting a psychologist regularly, and the d

sis is that he might have mild Asperger's. The father was consideringpop psychology book that provides techniques for teaching empathy toin the hope that this would help. And after all, he said, you cannot have tooempathy. Christensen agreed that the book might help but wasn't so sure that"cannot have too much empathy." He has a relative with schizophrenia whoriences powerful empathic responses when in more acute phases of herThese empathic responses are often inappropriate-responses to perceivingers' distress and unhappiness when there is none-but, more importantly, forperson the strength of these empathic responses is disabling. Fortunately,of us do not experience such strong empathic responses to the emotionalof others, because it would be dlfficult to live our own lives coherently if we

Clearly, emotions and empathy play a fundamental role in mediatingrelations to others. Normal, fluid interaction with others depends on nuresponsiveness: Based on mutual expressiveness and sensitivity, we canconversation, gain trust, and over time develop intimacy with a friend orner. When social emotions go awry-as they do in individuals with schizoph?eiAspergers, and psychopathy-social interaction can be difficult or evenous. This book, and the workshop on which it is based, explores these issues,here we reflect on some of the contributions and themes.

INTEGRATING MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVESON MORAL COGNITION

A central concern of philosophy from its beginnings, moral cognition is nowimportant subject of investigation for a number of empirical disciplines, andvolume reflects the vibrancy of contemporary research. This is an excitingphase, but it also presents new problems. At a basic level, there is a problemmutual understanding: The various disciplines employ diverse methods,and research questions. Those from a philosophical background may struggleunderstand, for instance, how a psychometric instrument like the PsChecklist Revised (PCL-R) is devised and employed (see, e.g., Langdon &Chapter 5; Mcllwain et al., Chapter 6). Equally, those from a psychological orroscience background may have difficulty following the nuances of tdiscussion of the metaphysical noncommi,tment thesis and its relation to if pfiilosophy is to participate effectively m the aforementioned cooperative

REFLEcTIoNgoNEMoTIoNS,IMAGINATIoN,ANDMoRALREASoNING329

fl,sr)onsibility (Mc(ltxri, Oltrtptcr l4)' The greatest di{ficulty-may lie not with the

i;';1,;.i;; ;ri"ut,,t wl,ut is written-aut-hors have generally done well in writ-i,,g ii;;" t",erdisciplinary audience and are admirably clear-as with graspingif ,i.i""p".:r.gic,,oithe 1"r"rr"h, the background context and reasoning

that go

i,,i,, .-,"'""p*ilri.rg the issues in just-this paiticular kind of way. It can take a long

ltrrr.rrrsion in the activiti., of u 'JignUoti"g discipline' along with some luck find-

i,,l{ .lr" right colleagues and informints, to iegin io operate successfully within an

iil[,,, ,yrtZ. of con"cepts and assumption-s' Miny of the chapters nr,olde substan-

ii,,l i,ri.od,r"tory discussions that tietpf"Uy present some of the relevant context;

Ir,,wever, such discussion, "",, go o'ly

'o fui, u"d it's notable that the conceptual

lrtrrrlscape differs greatly across chapters' - r -, -^.Mutual understandinl ^.i.".

from and contributes to mutual engagement, and

tl,,,re is a substantial amZ,t't of cross-disciplinary engagement on show here' In

,ut,lit.r, to the fact that the volume u, u ,ihol" is inierdisciplinary, many chap-

i,,,1,. ,,ruaat" disciplinary boundaries' Many of the moral problems,used as stim-

,,fi t" "-porcal

sirdies'discussed here are sourced from-philosophy' Malle and

EMOTIONS, IMAGINA TION, AND /VIORAL I(EASONI N(i

disciplinary matrix envisaged then respect lilr its rrrotlxrds alrl cgrrtrilrrrtirimportant. nro.ad]r speaking, we see tfiree possibilities lbr trre relati,rr [l*tphilosophy and the sciencei, repracement, Lngogu^nrt, and sepctr.tisr*. rtt I,_"*:::::l.n*l * .xpansion of empirical"s"I"r"" wrests t.orn f nitrr,,pirytraditional suhject matter; pror"r. in (rigorou$ empirical science *ril;ill';(m,erely speculative) philoiophical theorj,.r In the 6ngagement *oJJ_*lriqhTll o"*n"1 . philosophy b""o*", ^a furi-fledge.l -"i.,b'". or u "ffi*tiu.,plrnary m_atrr1. taking in{brmation from the empirical disciplines and contrilto them. In the sepaiatism moder, phirosophy h", r.,odu*i"i.ily Jrnl*r* ,ods and subject,matter to.the scienJes arrd oplrates autonomously.

Separatism has been dominant in Englisir_speaking analyti" ihilorophy, uhas conceived of the division between piiroroihy "rri

the ,"i"i"", i, t"ro,,ilistinction between conceptuar and empiricai questions. phirosophy isrorcerned with conceptual que,stionr, ,iirg coiceptual onolyrir'u{ ft,,vhere conceptual analysis involves the forinulatt"i,

"i arr"".i,*"#"".r,ingmeaning of particular concepts, llke knouleclge, intenti,onal action, or resparts*,/r7. such theories are evaluated by their ,r"'""r, against counterexampies-ths, cases that fit the definition but are not instances Jf th"

"orr""pt. it

" *"thod

rotoriously dependent on intuitions: The judgment that a particriu. "ur"

i, o, isrn instance of the concept in question is

-based on the intiritions of the philosol

:al community, and the invention of counterexamples is "ir"

r"n a,il""ilrugi,rf the philosopher.2 Philosophers, it turns out, have very fertile imaginations,rxamples sometimes taking the form of esoteric science fiction-like scenarios.rroblem is that it is not clear whether we can trust our intuitions for such sases. Another problem is that it is not clear whether the intuitions ornignty t:|tl?.:,pl"T are representative of the broader community, with som"e reasonhrnk that they are not. This leads directly to the probrem that, since psychologlan and d, use empirical methods to investigate concepts, it seems h;rjir ;; j,ft{#;f :rl-, that philosophers do not need to] rn" fi"ld oi n*1rni*nr,rol phila*athy.wy developed in response to these kinds of probl"*r rrr'd uses-e*perimentEflrethods to investigate the interpretations that lalpeopte hr""

"r:ir-r" i"rGilt

roblems that philosophers have been grappri"g #ith. Knobe (see, e.g., 2008) trn exponent of experimental philosophy, ""i ultt" and Gugrieimo s (6hapter is)ritical response to Knobe here is a f'ascinating example in wfirch u t.uirtiorrrt phtl.sophical problem (the nature of intentionalitiludgmentr) t

", nr.t r""rrtackled by

UOTIONS, IMAQINATION, AND MORAL REASONINQ

So, in our view, the separatism model cannot w.rk fbr phikrs.priy becaurt;eds engagement with the sciences if it is to place its theori& on a jefLnsiblo forg against empirical challenges; however, the basic problem for philosophyrplies to some extent to a1l disciplines. That is, each discipline, and indeed:1d, makes assumptions_that might in principle be disproved by results in otJlds and disciplines. Philosophy's struc[ural r.i,eakness lias bee, ihat it has hadstematic mechanisms for checking its empirical assumptions, but equallye few systematic mechanisms for ensuring that researih within any partnprrjcal field is compatible with results tn oiher fields and disciplirr"r. Ti.,rr,sciplilyy engagement is an appropriate model to strive foa not simply becwould be nice but also because it is mandated by basic scholarly p.irr"iples,rportant to have systematic mechanisms for checking assumptionJ.

-Some may wonder, however, whether replacementls not tll more or ress i

rle fate ofphilosophy. The previously descirbecl case ofpsychological research:entionality judgments, where we see psychology intrud-ing into itraditional fl,philosophy is gristfor such a view. And the issue of testa'bility provides furrtivation for the replacement view. The idea that important claids should bele is a core value for scientists, one that philosophe.s do not always appear tory seriously. A comment we have overheard (we name ,ro rr"rn"riir, :idon,t rrrking with_philosophers as long as they're talking about things that areperimental_philosophy applies empirical methods to philo"sophical rt if one is thinking of doing experimental philosophy ih" qr"rtio,

".ir"r, ,

t go allthe way and become a full-fedged piychorogisi? Aftei all, just what ismary distinction between experimental phiiosophy and psychology?one reason replacement might not be the inevitabre faie'of phiiosophy is

r remorseless drive to testability and experimentation *^y .^iry witfr it critations that are balanced by distinctive philosophical stiengths. Testabipal can take different forms: we can dlstinguish n n ro* undbroad. testabililrrow testability is the idea that every imporLnt claim should be testable and,s to be taken seriously, actually tested. Bioad testability is the idea that theruld be assessed against available evidence, with theoiies that provide therrall account of the evidence being preferred. Experimental scientists focus'row testability: Their mode of operation is the experiment, in which the manted phenomena are carefully shielded from urrcontrolled contextual iI their primary academic currency is the experimental journal article.losophers of science long ago gave up o, th. idea thi narrow testability isrropriate goal for science as a whole, and with good reason. Scientific th; can be complex and abstract; consequently, to airive at a specific predictiony be necessary to take into account multiple aspects of a theory (ii some casItiple theories) and use a complex chain 6f infe-rences that bridge between tory and the shielded experimental situation. If an experimental result is notdicted, the fault may lie with bridging inferences and methodological limts rather than the theory (see, e.g., Levy & McGuire, Chapter B)."And, iflt lies with the theory, it may be drfficult to isolate where in t^he structure ofory the mistake lies. Narrow experimental testing of all the individual ideasnto a theory can be not merely impractical but alio logically impossible. He

REPLESTIONS ON EMOTIONS, IMAGIT'iATION, AND MORAL REASOI{ING

lrroad theory asscssnront rnust also focus on internal coherence and predictive andr,xplanatory success in relation to the overall body of evidence. Darwin's theory ofnirtural selection is a good example: It is strongly supported by the evidence, butI lrcre are no decisive individual tests.

Theories get their value because they can unite a variety of seemingly disparater,irses into a coherent picture, draw subtle distinctions between superficially similar

plrenomena, and provide deep explanations. They make difficult phenomena trac-ttble. In the case of moral cognition, we are in urgent need of theory because thephenomena are very complex. The issues that arise in the investigation of moralrrrgnition include many that are fundamental to human cognition and agency ingcneral and hence span all of the cognitive disciplines. Many of the issues are very

rrbstract and conceptually difficult-for instance, the question of what it is to beir rnorally accountable agent appropriately held responsible for one's actions. As itlrappens, philosophy has a rich and sophisticated body oftheory on exactly theseissues (see, e.g., McGeer, Chapter 14). In fact, it is no accident that philosophy hasthis body of theory: It is constitutionally interested in high-level, synoptic issuesand conceptually difficult questions. Thus, philosophy has distinctive strengthsthat can make a valuable contribution to the investigation of moral cognition, andtliese strengths are linked to the fact that it is nof focused on narrow testability.

For this reason, although we think that experimental philosophy is a valu-Irble addition to the philosophical toolkit, we do not think it is the right generalrnodel for conducting philosophy. Philosophy is concerned with more than justconcepts; it has a broader role in theory construction on fundamental issues, suchas thJnature of moral agency, for instance. Indeed, the theoretical orientation ofphilosophy means that there can be problems translating philosophical thoughtLxperiments and counterexamples into experiments that investigate how laypeople

think. Philosophical thought experiments and counterexamples are often designedto probe theoretical issues that are relatively distant from everyday problems, andthe reactions of laypeople to such problems may not be particularly relevant to the

theoretical questions being posed by philosophers. For comparison, there is littlereason physicists should care about the responses of layfolk to the Schrodinger'scat thought experiment, which is an analytic tool for investigating the stnrcture ofa theorylhat only a competent physicist can properly understand. The problem oftranslating from a theoretical context to the investigation of ordinary thinking iscompounded when the theory is normative because relations between normativetheoiy and the descriptive nature of lay responses to moral problems are complex,as discussed in the next section. Philosophical thought experiments such as theTrolleyProblem mayprove useful tools for empirical researchers, (as, e.g', employed

by Langdon & Delmas, Chapter 5; Mcllwain et al., Chapter 6), but results shouldbe interpreted with caution because the original thought experiments were framedwith abstract theoretical concerns in mind. They were not otiginally designed toprobe how people actually think about moral issues, and while they might never-ihel"r. provide useful insights in the longer run it may be better to devise moralstimuli that specifically target real-world moral cognition.

One of the ways that high-level synoptic theory is valuable is that it can providea carefully framed context within which more specific empirical questions can be

EMOTIONS, IMACINA I-ION, AIt D MORAL IIF,ASONI N(}

::':1::*:].^:1?,1.:n':tt'cl. otlr.r.tlrirrgs l,t'irrq r',1r*rt. ttr. tiu.r rtrirr ir Prrr::!.::,,:Ifi.i:.:::11,i::,Jrs

art, consisk.rrt, wjrrr rtx.

336 EMOTIONS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASONINOmoreover' trre most moralry admirabre indivicruars rnty be fiiirry rare. It t5;ji.'lf J::: ffi #l*::t:i1,9::g";;t,t ti,ti"u,y,o,.ui rbrrns orcognition are morally objectionable. Th;;;;""'aLroLruarry,ormal tormide"ntrfy rhe ,,ril*"lli,rtributjon of forms

", *::1,": _quite distinct p

and (2) devel.,..^.*^*,-.^ ^r^_ .. ^ moral cognition in the p,lf ",.,;H:H:;,";:*ivecrassincat";;;irb"J:,#,T!T1,":H;l#"r{Dsvchonnrh., oc _^*^rr. :Trl and.morally objectionable, *,fu;;i;,p syc h o p athy as m ora rI v obj

" ;, ;;i; ;;il "Jfl ;

".lll,,l;_1ll Ji"l "11,,,."r# lm5::t';1! !!1nr,rt'.p[""r ""."eptuar anarysis is not;1#1'""r;;jl*:;11."-n,i-'.::;;:i"i#iJ:l3f,i'IJ;',,lffi"jphiloso.h_ oi r-^-+,^ ],"o-frnity attitude, f.. tf."i, ,o."1",r"""

"rll_,0Phitosophy at teast has the ;;;;";;il'rrr":ffiffiil*1lffi,if:critical scrutinv; it wi, be

" pr;i;;r" ri;;;". of objectivity obscuresof normative irtritio.r, in empirical research. In the cesc nf ^"_, r.-_^.appropriatenormativecras#'"',#id;;?i:l_T. jii;;j.:".Tff ni*Ti

i: l:"::$: i,: :frl,:h i,; :*1,;, lx, t" b; i i ;;i ; ", " ",:i",r,,,gventions -o.".r.,*r1"r,,, *"^ -.^--- me-more fine-grained aniventions -or" po-Lrful, the

"".r""i*" ,rr"# rr,i,ffiX"rr* l:llH*ff,some cases more consequential, foi" "^urot".psychopathic or nlrll,,".,^r;^- r^---r . . '' it-*'y be possible to pr,p syc h o p ath i c or M ac h i au,er r ; il ";;p #; [i; jl#:l ffi f :,;,Jf

^;:"it?;fi :11ffi:1,,l,:il**1, iff :1."H l:i,*ii: ri dl JJ'Ji IJ I I i #" ",,,,,r\J puwerruJ rntervention lechniorres become auailable. farents, !varied knowredge and g*rr, r'iii ,"r;;';;;k" ,r,", ,i.ffiffi.:;rs may[#T,tT: :ilrj:i,I j=,9."_*]:',r, ii' l. " "i "*r """ " d a n d dys ru nc tionar. o r]may attempr ro detiberat{,:_j::: *" "ir",1, "i ,# "?,ilr,T[:il_rr;llx;'lffi: B:HIff""d in a caree*u"h u. business ;,1;;i Ent'i"p,ene

In such a conrcyr ",:::f.:{ willpromulgate advice *iJ"ry.

"' """'In such a context.

"u."f,i .r,1"'-r,o ff;;!}#:Ii,1:ll *iil b" a vitar iff : :kn:ffit :il1[,:1'-'";'.;.' ; ;" i, o',ig, n" cr as si ncar ion or pathorbgieswill be imnnrrqn+ *^**.^u^"laro,

techniques. Normative models of irrorrt ..,rriwiltbeimportantboth*"1-"o;;;;ffiT"tr',",ffi ffi i:ffIJlfrT:,;;::iinterventions' Again, these are reasons for close engagement between phirosoand the empiricil ai,"rprir". ri;dil;;ii*r,,,o,.

MORAL COGNITION AND COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE,tjfiri Ul is not a good model also because Iarmportant implications fnr -^..r ^^^--:!j- . 1g:1

theories of cognition can hat mporr ant i m pticar ions !r r:*.t ".g^,.,.r. ",rlffi

il;ffifi lill,f#Tedge takes and the way that r, ,f,*""r'f"ir"i.)nittn is tL" t"rf.-"1.?herl.li-_ *^-_r -_ ..., p1.t o[ underslanding moraln it ion is th e tas k o r ", b"d a i, ; ;;;H; ;;r'il.r. L:;:[::J*i-" I"Ul:;"J;iz:::;?;:*::;lf:*:::"",.:""-'""*tervtackrethisaroneBycoEnu

ff !:f,"3;;:,;:,*ffi :,;Umi1i,*$i"fi:""#f 11"?:ffiff iiWhat are ,fr" ."i."r""irr;.,,t "-J ^-^^^ -. atter, how are the systems related$whararetherepresentili.*j,;an;";; j:li,::[.,TJ[,,Jf ,"#:;"J""rlHaidt's appeaj to dual-process accounts i.;". "g, zoori,, "r.rr*ple of howbroader conceptions of cognitive architecture

"1 ,1*p" ";J;;;n proposahon the nature of morar cognition. e""..airf* duar-process trr"".irirg, there is

REFLECTIONS ON EMOTIONS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASOT'{ING 337

6 lirst, high-capacify autornatic system and a slow, Iow-capacity conscious system(nr,r' livans, 2008, for a review). Mackenzie (Chapter 11) and Kennett (Chapter 12)nrgrrc that major moral decisions induce moral reasoning that plausibly influencestil,r'isions and that even when moral ludgments or actions are fast and automaticI lu ,y will often have been shaped by a prior history of moral learning that involvedIrrl ional reflection. But, if all rapid moralludgments, and the actions thus insti-gtrlcd, are purely automatic, as dual-process theory suggests, our rational moralItg(rrrcy is still very limited and somewhat robotic-for instance, we can review andlrlrrn ahead rationally, and rationally learn new response dispositions, but in theIrcrrt of the moment we operate on autopilot.

It is arguable, however, that an important class of cognitive processes doesrrot fit into either pole ofthe dual-process taxonomy. Specifically, these processesrl'r' controlled but relatively low effort, rapid, and relatively high capacity. Theser,lraracteristics might allow effective cognitive control of proximal action in time-plcssured situations, contrary to dual-process theory. If such cognitive processesr,xist, they might support controlled moral ludgment in proximal action control.'l'lre question then is what reasons there are to think these processes exist. To beginwith, consider controlled cognition. Although the paradigm form of controlled cog-rrition is reasoning-extended linguistic deliberation-there are a variety of kindsol'controlled cognition. Mental rotation is a nonlinguistic example (e.g., imagine arcd Volkswagen Beetle; now rotate the mental image 180 degrees in the horizontalplane), as is visual search (e.g., scanning the room for your keys). Controlled cogni-live processes can be used to make rapid explicit judgments (e.g., a visual compari-son to decide which of two objects is larger), and controlled judgment processes

338 EMOTIONS, IMACINATION, AI\lD MORAL REASONINCI

practiced contr.lletl:""I'l:lt]:li, c-rnpl.yirrg a rich sitrr.ti,rr rnorlerl.i't6e air.rrrlicircu mstances ( Endstc-y. lgg5).

. . wn! these pieces in place we can now tease out the connection to mrlrrrl r

il::1, lT:"?i,Yffi5",;: !"hp,:l,1ll and Kennett (chapter izipoinr ,,,t,are all moratly skiled; rhrougli chitdh""J ;;J;:;;f ;:;;,,1*,Jiru, u,,,,Ill*,lf""yl::ll3: lT,-:llllcr us with astock of p."r;n?;;1,Jg..,,,responses-we do not

"::d..o thmk through whether,.:ril;;;;r,1,;g";;",;

ffi5,-j: ::"j1:,";:jll,^:1,: ry:11d" ,,"*ith , u"ay "il.;'^ii,,ffiag" ,",, ,draw on to make controlled. mirrt lrdg.n"r;;; ".;;fly.

;;; ;riil::T: ffi;lY""rn_"":1,:3:l,"llg,1:11"1,,.u* rEi"g,*tful is a complex.kilr that _,rsitimes draw on rich situational informati8n, ililG;;#""ii,,',1" _r",i*::."::: *":1? *t\r",e to, and tf,"r ,"-"*t experiences. We are o{ten tactlren ta(because we are thoughtliss, urd

"o.rr"rr"ly being tactful requires thoughtLy::: il,^"I],::l i"ticipating, choosing o.,, *o.dl "r,"f,,Iyj.'J,;;jir." trr" ,we can shape our actions using controlj-ed eralua,r,. ifrriir."J;;;.u"Ii rrr,.#::::*:::T1"":,iy:} In,,l*" ,,,gg"st, it is possibl" to _*k" "o,,,;d","d moreljudgments in the heat of the momen, iiJ .o

"r" them in prox,,,r, "."#::"tX[fiTJn this case we should reject the apparent ,imitation on mora, reasoninfimplied by dual-process theory because. i.,j" nru* argued. duar-process theory hoversimplistic in negrecting the possibility of pervasive decision making that is furtand relatively effortress but contioiled u,ri."l'"ti r"ry,,r"r"upJrt"Jc"rrerarizirrg

from this case, the nature of cognitive ,."hit""trr" wiil impose strong constrtrintlon many aspects of morar cognition, and conseque"try it *iri;; iil;fu", to rerulrmoral cognition to globar tf,eories of cognition. At this point, ii may be worthreturning to the question of the reration"betwee, phirosophy'u.ri in" scieneoq,Before, we claimed that phirosophrcar theories _of

ug"rr"y ""iirrr,r*sing againutempirical challenges like that of gnidt (e.g., 200f, and we cited Rlvenscron,r(chapter 4) survev of empiricar "ua"rr""'fE.taining - n".ru""-:. (rrns, rggz)theory of the role of fictio; in morar

"ogritio, as an example of how such buttresn.ing might occur. The critique we have j;ust given of duar-process theory is anothErexample, and conceptually the iss.,e of cJgnitive archiiecture is an appropriat.intermediate lever for theory bridging bet#een more specific forms of.cognitiwresearch and theories of agency. Tf,e#i", of "ogritive

arihitecture and theories of::i,y:T:l1l-::1..:ly m:sheq. both because"ru"t, "r,o,i "og",i," "*t ,tect*rowill b e cons traints on t he orie s of aggncy

"" J ; ; ;;; ;;;;;;3#""":;"r.*ll;

higherJevel understanding of the.i" ,ilri ""g"itive architecture performs. If thoyare meshed it will be easier to rerate theories zl agercy to empiricar findings aboutcognition, and chalrenges rir

40 EMOTIONS, IMAQII{ATION, AND MORAL REASONINQ

not ntoral frortr a gc-rreralist point o[.vit,w will ,point of ui"*; thJrormative distinction *,-,,,"11',1#-,1i,]'.;t'.J-i:l".apartirur,L ur vruw; rne normative distinction trrus arlbcti.g the crescriptive*-",1L":^T"na

to fe investigated. A., "rrpt*ri, on moral rules and ofor instance, m ay obs cure

""1"""a

-

r,,""rffi ffi J::l:';: tH.illr.,:#-

1""yil:"1,:llT:1,*,:T:,;_',"# ;rd;;;dren,as ..increasingry

deontic,lmay be right, but onlv part of th" ,tory. ih"r;t ;*; J',H:I,HyrfiTT;i1i:?.l:: :T:TiTo,l*"j.,.",,a th" 7*.ii.",r consequence. of ,,o,,r vioraibut atso can be more fl,id

""a "ort"r1r";:",#ililJ.t;'ffi:HfrTiJl",ifl:;il1f..:Tl *::.f ,":. crude rute r.rfo*"r, f"t sophisticated morat interun:l]:.:*:,slupmuttiple*".-lry;;t";;;;ffi ffi ;rJ;[,:T:#T:l#Ti:::Y:_]:1qT:,.1":*p"re churchrana, zoo0, ctark ree6, 2000). rs itIie sometimei, for instance, to protect ,o_"orl;r"". d]il;ffi; illfi,f.:T:*i:l*l."Tl::l1r r"1,g 1"1,^ii" r"",r storep Maybe nor so much,also possibte that the"re are individuar arn"."""", ,i:;l;i:i';"-*d#[tsome individuals tending toward n ""i"".rrt, .ure-oriented styre ani others*,:Ty?:,:: :?li,h" emprasircs "o","**,i1,;s**;.'*-

r,/,u a,,uIf it is hard to even d6fin" trr" r"op""l??;T#;, more specific tu*onorl

:T:;: :^:?.:l ::F,'.,.i,research 1J nol r,r"ryl.I" ,","i "L"'..1,*. ,,n,of the morat emotions wil be "r" "f ,h;;;;id;:i:il:r:i::.Jffi,il;i"T:'::,::^:": Tl.TT1,,or in this,,or, *".' l{r'.ote d in Langdon and M acken :introduction, defi nitions

"1 "iprgrl "r.r;;H;;:HTi,Jfr"#Hawes. and Dadds rChapter sj d"hr" ;r"n;",}emoathtt /rhc "ho.;-^ ^r --^.r , , ' ,

Y as encompassing bothempathq (rhe sharins oirnoth".i "*oil;; ffi).;il ffi;n ,,r";i:',f,

ffiTlXlil1Tf ;k*::.Xj"ll1U #ji_Tn et ar (chapter 6) adopt aIar distinctio,i b"t,"", hot and, ";i;';:,^p;rhu r" Iiii;lii1T"t"i.o*X'xl;

lfl"Ss"} I i'j':iT:* j:t:.ll l::l o'iJ "il g, *r p e r s p e c t i a e,, r,,,1 g.Tiffi ::',tX"'l[t-ff :$1'"'"r'"ffi ;i;i:;::.""y^:r:":{;':r;"ilT{:lmore acri\/e emnn+tn;^-^",rl."irr* lT?li""r^(,ypically sadnesr'o. "t."".r,), ;rd_more active cmpathic role_.taking (distinct IrJ* perrp""tlu" takfng). n;llnl?i;:: ;:l: "T,:lt ::,1""i"",,ifi

p1,i,y,.,,"1, i ng r he experience or the e nof the other; simpty understanding the'e;"i,;;;i;i"J" ;i,ff :..*:i:fl ;and indeed ,ot iecessary, ""cordirg to nrrr*r".oft.One point to note in assessing th""r" ,ru.io,r, usages of the term empathy is t

IH:;:::f _*fl""-"_lf"*"y il h";*;r.;;;;";;h;i;, illf, ,, *" *h J[[ ffi .'I TrTfl::lr s o that i ";";;;;, " -1i,,,/ii?":ffi :ilX;misht nrefe, .l^n-;*,^--3f::"_ "i" stipulate that it does. On the othe"r hand,m ight prefer defi nition s th at are fi ner'-t;;; ;;i;d,'il""? ;ilfi "lllt;IXT;f,m*X* *:f:f oxfo.rrt Ameri".o," Dt"tton*r, .l^i^rn i, .tr," ubito understand and share tn" r"rmg, oi;ffi;j;;

.;". i;,ijiiliiiJ,]irl?l;tion contagion does not couat as stifficient for empathy on this definition beemotion contagion r""lrr t!:. understanding component (so we disagree ,rflm;# Ji"iT;:il:i lfl: l*: 1,9 ?, tn.orn". r,ini'-" lg*" *,.r,Rosnav and trink lchanrer 2r rhai

".po r,1',. ; ;iil;t- l,illl;,Il,1pJl:Jl:i::theory of mind. we think.trr" ."rirffi;;i il;p*"tion is to conceive empathy adi:::*Ay: ;?:ffi : : ::Ifl^:,: tJ :llv^*q,i,""a, emotjon m i rrori ng and emotionknowtedge. Empathy invorves ";;;;;; ;;;;"ry#iil:d;ffiTtrJ;[T,T;

REFLECTIONS ON EMOTIOTJS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASONING 341

llrirt the experricfrrxrtl crrrotion is that of the other. In c+II'ect, this way of deliningr,rrrpathy limits it to de Rosnay and Finks second fbrm, in which case their firstlirrrn is better understood as sympathy rather than empathy. Sympathy is distinctlirrrn empathy in that the emotion may complement rather than mirror the other;li,r'ling concerned for someone else is not necessarily sharing their emotion, for,,xirrnple (see Goldie, 2000, Chapter 7, for a similar view).

This way of defining empathy is consistent with the appraisal view of emo-lions advocated by Mackenzie and the picture articulated by de Oliveira-Souzarrrrrl Moll, which see moral emotions and other morally relevant cognitive statesirs involving the coordination of multiple systems and processes. They suggest thatrrrrrral behavior involves the engagement of eoent-structured complexes, whichirrc procedures evoked by specific contexts, and they define psychological statesis eoent-feature-emoti.on complexes, which involve the coordinated activation ofsocial knowledge, emotions, and motivations. One way that the involvement of cog-rrition in the emotional response is significant is that it can permit higher-orderrcgulation. For example, consider a hypothetical case involving a man who, to pun-ish his wife, seems to forget her blrthday. In the definition of empathy proposedlrere, if he simply knows she will be hurt and unhappy then he is using emotionl

42 E/VIOTIONS, IMACINATION, AND MORAL REASONING

;n";Xfi::[:t'"r] work sit,ations: rhe person had unhappv *,rari,rrrcf'positions the ,.,",*^. H:l*::^1jT n1"* b"'fo."- tr,rt, i.la.tl'ii,'u t,,,,s *uriof positions th" o"..,.,, a*, "orr"";;ff; #i""#f:J"#.;ffijlfr:f tm"';L,:;*,"::,f :Ti",1",:3^" l,:,;1:"":Tissociarryocrd,ancry,rrr,to won der i f he m isht n11l

", t r" u. t fffi #ffii" "#;1x?#ff1 yi i'J llempathic response dechnes.From a normative poinr orriew the cognir ire rormat ion o[interpr

14 EMOTIONS, IMACINATION, AND MORAT-. REASONIN(]

emPathyitl rnrlrlil deveftlllrncrrt,,it will Irr'-irnportaut t. I,.k at tlrcl rriLtrrrrr.1.*::; :::.":I:,^ti.I"*,in reratiou to .rr"I.r" of interprerive schc,rnns irrmorat evaluation and in serfcontrol D; R;r;;;*j'o:,rto"iJi,i,lillJ,Ij',ill,,l::,tTj::::,"::':'":::: r,lt l:,' h" d i rection : tt, lv, t o* ir,,tr.,lIr,;j:il' rs,r' r r rrself-concept are associa'ted with -..; ;;;;;:;:iilJlj,TJtgner

rev.rs ,lThe issue of conscience, however, ,"i.", qr"rtions about the natur-e ,r'mojryation. The conception of the moral domiln in terms of nhtia,.+;^-.- .,..est.ictionoi,Jm',#ffi .'ilJilf, ::ffi1'liT"ltrfl:|];:mml

Moral agents avoid actions th"y *oirld Jh";;ir" want to perfo-rm. De R.snuylr:f:11,*tter

2) discuss-" "f

*"r"r"""" ,r'.".*. of awareness of the ,es,psychological consequences of morar "iorutrorrl

is consistent *r,r, irrrr, ;:r-"rffiI..il:,*_1,::"':::l ::::l T:11""1"", Morar. agents seek to "",J *",,iir iad acnrnBut some moral agents, at least

'o,"" oi,-#i,;","J,q"r,H#';ilffil illilffif,T'l'JY"T 3}r::':*l:",'l' becau se,.h? "., ty:, r,"*. r,

","i,?.n ro tctrRring, we may need to consider l"*"-r"g r" *frr"f,

"f.ifa.", Jir#iltilJl#Xlbeing good' as we' as Iearning in whiii tn"y "orr"

to appreciate the negative cu,rsequences ol being bad.Another way we may need to take an active view of morar agency relates baukto the role orinrerpretation discussed arreadl. our,emphasis on the controileduse ol mental moders is consistent with a strong, role fi, i*ngrr-rrtio, in cogrtrrtion, and we agree yitl .Mack:nzie^ (Chapter fi) tt rt ,_"!i""r,r* engagernootwith situations wilr be an important form Jr-*:llr_l"rroningi we arso agree wrthRavensr.rolt (Chanter 4) and Nussbru.iLsgs. j997r that n.iio, *il play a strongrole in cultivatins'imaginative capacity- nri nu,r"rrr"roft s ,rr"r, of th" ."sponse t0fiction strikes us is too passive. in that he doesn.t ailow enough o[a rore for controland interpretation' Ravenscrofr s view of the dangers of vioience in fiction seerngstill ro regard the consumers o['fiction as passive. noninterprerive imitators. Tltoempiricat eviden.e on the impacr of ficrir e [1"r.= ,; ;;;i_#;ii" Ience may bomore mixed than his su.r'eylndicates, with

ferguson rzoosi "*i-g doubt on ulink between viorent computer games and ,riol"ri b"hr,rio, ,; b.r "

{". exampre,youth violence has decrinid subltantiart;;; as sares.ilrri""ri.*puter gameshave been int'reasinq. From a th".."ir"il,iandpoint. rae r,rourcr erpecr that chir.dren r'rith sophisticated interprer'* rJ,lr"r *iiirr" .r,,lr";; o;,t;*rishing fic-tive from real viorence ",rd

nLi" a "";.f iil former."r"tiu"ty o[ii. vo.,r,g nry*may fantasize abour being Barman o," u 1"di *",g.,r. nri ili lrff; realize rhat,unfortunately, the worrdt"hey ""arrtty11rr" - lp"rut", on di{'ferent rures.Ficr ion provides chi rd ren wirh conceptrot ,..t

"*ur. ,il ; p-b;; arso reachesthem [o be sophisticaied narigators or*r,.ftrrr sr.hemas. distinguishing difter.-entperspectivesandactireryinrerpretinganievaluating rr";;ili."aycurrivatingtheir own point of view. ]!e righi r.r"J'"i p"*"tar encorragement nray promoteactive interpretation and facihlate th" dd,"ioprrent of reflective skirs. Activeinterpretation is a double-edged sword, h;;;;% and in ,o*"

"ur", "hrI,r."., ,ruybecome resistant to the mori m"rrng"" tt "t iarents and other members of. societyare sending them. The generar point'is ,rrriiiitl be important to understand thespecific conceptuar structures ihna

"rr"rg" ir, *o.nt developrne.t and the activeprocesses of engagement and interpretatiSn eniployed fry tfrJ"frifa. -.,.

I,II,]III ,I,,(I'IIONS ON EMOTIONS, IMACINAI'IOIj, AND MORAL IIEASOI\INC 345

'l-h

EMOTIONS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASONINA

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ENDNOTES

l.Theideathatsciencewillreplacephilosophyisanotuncom^montrope(see,e.g.,aN ew f ork Tim.e s article discuising H aidt s research; B rooks' 2009 )'

2. The nature "f,fr"'iri"iii"* iria""a in philosophical theorizing is-controversial'

buttheyu."u.g,,ubly,otingeneralthegutfeelingspositedbyLlaidtssocialin[u.itionist model. g."cJ.ding to" Sosa (2007) intuitions are cognitive

competencies,

whileGoldman(2007)seesintuitionsasassociatedwiththecontentofconcepts:Possessing a concept gives rise to beliefs,in accord with the concept

3. Toughening .'rp u "iit[ fo. the-rigors of life is not an uncommon parental strategy'"

i""Ei"JirrE .itra i" ,ritory ,"h#1r a traditional method, whereas the song "A Boy

Named Sue" poignantly describes a more unconventional approach'

+. fo. "*r*p,". a"b'fij'rr-Souza and Moll tChapter 7) say th.at

-113.1i1 tor defining ...

motivations u, .*o.ul, is their abllity to o,r"r"oir" the (pioximate) interests of the self

or agent"'5.ourthankstoCatrionaMackenzieforhelpfulCommentsonanearlierdraftofthis

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emotion.

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