El-Sawah, Ossama M. - Deception in Ramadan War, October 1973

8/11/2019 El-Sawah, Ossama M. - Deception in Ramadan War, October 1973

1/42

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i ews

xpressed

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h isape r

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o tnecessar i ly

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o f

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efenser

ny

f

tsg e n c i e s h is

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no tb e e l e s e d fo ro p e n

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ST RAT EGY

RESEARCH

P R O J E C T

D E C E P T I O NINR A M A D A N

W A R O C T O B E R

1973

BY

BRIGADIER

O S S A M A

M.

E L - S A W A H

Egyptian

rmy

DISTRIBUTION

S T A T E M E N T

A :

Approvedfor

public

release.

Distributionisunlimited.

U S A W C

C L A S SO F

1999

U.S.

A R M YWAR

COLLEGE CARLISLEBARRACKS PA

17013-5050

DTIC

QUALITY

IK

fc^?ii

i

>j'i.diD4

2

5 8


2/42

U S A W C

STRATEGY

RESEARCH PROJECT

D E C E P T I O N

IN RAMADAN W A R ,

O C T O B E R

1973

BY

BG

OSSAMA M.EL-SAWAH

EGYPT

CDRPAULAKAST

PROJECT

ADVISOR

Theviews

expressedin this

academic research

paper

are those

of

th e

author

and

do

not

necessarily

reflectth e

official

policy

or

position

of

th e

U.S.Government ,

th e

Department

of

Defense,or

anyof

it s

agencies.

DISTRIBUTION S TATE ME NTA :

Approved

or

ublic release.

Distribution

is

nlimited.

U.S.A R M Y

W AR

COLLEGE

CARLISLE

BARRACKS,

PENNSYLVANIA

17013


3/42


4/42

A B S T R A C T

A U THO R :

BG Ossama

M .

El-Sawah

TITLE:

eception

in

Ramadan

War,

October

1973

FORMAT:

StrategyResearch

Project

DATE:

7April

1999

PAGES:

41

CLASSIFICATION:

Unclassified

(TOTAL NUMBER

O F

PAGES

F R O M

COVER

TO

LAST

PAGE)

Decept ionhas

been

employedthroughoutth ehistory

of warfare,andmanysuccessful

commanders

have

found

it

to

be

one

oftheirmost

effect ive

weapons.t

is

sovital

that

some

commentators

have

elevated

it

th e

status

of

a

principle

of

war.

t

is

a

key

principle

as

it

enables

th e

attacking

force

not

onlyto

catch th e

enemy

unawares and

thus

retain

th e

initiative

fo r

a

longerperiod;

but

it

alsomultipliesth eeffectof

forceand saves

casualties,

t ime,effortand

resources.

trategicdecept ioncan

only

succeed

if

itis encouraged

and

supported

by

the

top

political

and

military

leadership.Using

th e

Ramadan

War asa

case

study,

this

paper

will

illustrate

how that

most

powerfu l

principleo f w arDeception

andSurprise"

w as

planned,

an d

executed using

th e

tenetsof

military

deception.

This

paper

highlightsth e

importance

of this

signi ficant

factorgiving

recommendat ions

to

be

appliedfor

future

warfare.

in


5/42


6/42

TABLE

O FCONTENTS

ABSTRACT

.i

ii

DECEPTION

IN

R A M A D A N

WAR,

OCTOBER

1973

BACKGROUND

TH E

ROOTS

OF

THE

ARAB-ISRAELICONFLICT

THE

FIRST

ARAB-ISRAELI

WAR,1948-1949

TH ESECOND

ARAB-ISRAELI

WAR,

1956:

TH E

THIRD

ARAB-ISRAELI

WAR,

1967

THE

FOURTH

ARAB-ISRAELI

WAR,

1973:

1 .

HE

PHASE

OF

DEFIANCE

2.HE

PHASE

OF

ACTIVE DEFENSE

.

3.

HE

PHASE

OFW AR OFATTRITION

4 .

HE

PHASE

OFNOWAR, NO

PEACE

THE

R A M A D A N

W A R

PLANNING

FOR R A M A D A N

W AR

THE

A IM

OF

THEOPERATION:

THE

PROBLEMS:

PLANNING

FO R

DECEPTION 0

THE

NEED

FOR

SURPRISE

AND

THE

IMPORTANCEOF

DECEPTION

FO R

THE

RAMADAN

W AR 0

THE

PLAN

1

PRINCIPLES

OF

DECEPTION

AND

THE

RAMADAN

W A R 1

PRINCIPLES

OF

DECEPTION:1


7/42

OBJECTIVE

2

CENTRALIZEDCONTROL/STAFF

COORDINATION 2

PREPARATIONA ND INTEGRATION 4

CREDIBILITY 6

CAMOUFLAGE. . 7

CORROBORATION

8

FLEXIBILITY:

9

TIMING

0

SECURITY:

2

THE

RESULT

OF

R A M A D A N

W AR

3

CONCLUSION

AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

. 6

ENDNOTES

1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

5

V I


8/42

DECEPTION IN RAM ADAN

W A R ,

OCT OBE R

1973

"A s

did

stand

m y

watch

upon

th e

hill,

looked

toward

Birnam,

and

anon,

me

thought

the

w o o d

began

to

move.

"

Shakespeare(From Macbeth)

Deception

is

defined

as

thosemeasuresdesigned to

misleadth e

enemy

by

manipulat ion.

Distortion

or falsification of evidenceto

induce

him to

react

in

amannerprejudicial

to

his

interests.

Deception

hasbeen employed

throughout

th e

history

of

warfare,

and

many

successful

commanders

have

found

it

to

be

oneof theirmos teffectiveweapons.

Indeed

so

vital

is

th e

role-played bydecept ion thatsome

commentators

have

elevated

it

to

th e

status

of

a principal

of

war.tis

akeyprincipal,as

it

enables

th e

attacking

force

no t

only

to

catch

th e

enemy

unaware

and

thus

retainth e

initiative

fora longerperiod;but

also

it

multiplies

th e

effect

o f

forceandsaves

casualties,

t ime,

effort

an dresources.

Deception

isa means

of

achieving

surprise,

which

in

turn isameansof

facilitating

th e

achievement 'of

victory

at

a

lower

cost.

Deception an dsurpriseare

therefore

inseparable.

The

famous

Chinese militarystrategistSun

Tzu

cla imed as

far

backas500BCthat:

"all

warfare

is

based

on deception."

Strategic

deception

can

only

succeed

if

it is

encouraged

and

supported

by

th e

to p

polit ical

and

military

leadership.Although

they

mus t

strongly

support

th e

systematic

use

of

deception,

they

should

nottry

to

directly

control

it

or

intervene

in

it s

planning,

management

orexecution.

t

can

onlybe

planned

andexecuted byexpertsw ho

give

it

their

undivided

attention.All

deception


9/42

plans

shouldprepareth e

average

professional

commander

to

fully

and

correctly

exploitth e

effects

achieved by

deception andsurprise.

2

Theaverage

military

professionalcommander

showslittleinterest

in

deception,

andis

often weary

ofit s

use.

Theonlyw ay

to

change

h is attitude

is

through teachingabout

th e

successful

use

ofdeception byus ingdetailed

historicalcasestudies.

Deception in Ramadan

War,

October

1973

(known

to

th eIsraelis

as

Yom

Kippur War)

is

one

of

th emos t

valuableand

comprehens ive

examples

in

modern

history,especially

because

that

surprisew as

accomplished

in

th e

open

desert

and

deceived

th e

most

updated

intelligencesystem

at

that

t ime.

Using

th e

Ramadan

W ar

as

a

casestudy,

this

paper

willillustrate

how

that most

powerful

principleof

war,deception

and

surprise w as

planned

andexecuted

using

th e

tenets

of

military

deception.n

orderto

study

this

case

properly

and

toachieve

th e

main

objectiveofthis

paper,

w e

must

first

review

th e

general

background of

th e

Arab-Israeliconflict.

CKGROUND

" . . .History

is

thetacticsofth e

pas t

and tacticsareth e

history

ofth e future. . ."

Gen.

Hassan

El-Badry

Egyptian Strategic

Expert

TH E

R OOT S

OFTH E

ARAB-ISRAELI

CONFLICT

The

roots

of

th e

conflict ,which

hasengulfedth e

Middle

East

(ME)

formos t

ofth e

period

since

World

W ar

II

(WWII),include:

4

1 .

The

Diaspora

ofth e

Jews

after

th eRoman

subjugation

of rebellious

Palestine

in

th e

1

s

t

century

AD.


10/42

2.

he

Crusaders '

conquest

of

Jerusalem

in1099.

3.

he Zionis t

Movement

beginninglate

in th e19

th

century.

4 .

he

Balfour

Declaration

of

1917.

5.

he

Allies '

denialof

Arab

expectation in th e

Versailles

Treaty.

6.

he

Nazieffortsto

exterminate

the

Jews

of

Europe

duringWWII.

Theyears

since

1945

have

been

marked byth e

principal

events

offour

periods

of

overt

or

formalinternational

hostilities:

1 .

heFirstArab-

IsraeliWar,1948-1949 .

2.

The

Second

Arab-IsraeliWar,1956 .

3.

The

Third

Arab-Israeli

War,1967 .

4 .he

FourthArab-Israeli

War,

1973.

TH E

FIRSTARAB-ISRAELI WA R .

1948-1949;

Thenineteenth

century

Zionistmovement sofEasternEurope

shared

objectives

with

many

other

nationalists

of

the

t ime,

but

theydid

not

then

possessaland theycould

call

theirown.

6

In

1917,LordBelfour

i ssued

his

declaration

in

which w as

his

promise

of

a

national

home

for

th e

Jewsasa

response

to

their

help

during

WorldW ar

I

(WWI).

Since

thatt ime

a

confl ictbrokeout

between

th eArabs

and

th e

Jews.

Following

WWII,

th e

British

passedth e

Palestine

problem

to

th e

United

Nations

(UN),

w ho

partitioned

i tinto

separate

Arab

an d

Jewish

states.

The

inequitable

distribution

of lands

an d

resources

provoked th e

Palestinian

Arabs

to

war,

but

they

were

no

match

forth e

well-organized

force

ofJewish

WWII

veterans.The

remnants

ofArab


11/42


12/42

blockade

of

th eStraitsof

Tiran

to

all

Israelishipping.

This

action

w as

fol lowed

by

th e

mobilization

of

Egypt ian,

Syrian

and

otherArab

forces.

TheIsraelis

responded

with a

devastating

surprise

attack.

Early

in th e

morningof June

5 ,1967

th e

Israeli

Air

Force

(IAF)

stormed

into

Egyptian

airspace,struckpractically every

Egyptian

airfield

andvirtually

wiped

ou t

th e

Egyptian Air

Force.

J

Taking

advantage

of

complete

air

superiority,

th e

ID F

then

drove

deep

into

Arab

territory with

classic

blitzkrieg operations.

n

si x

days

th e ID Fdestroyed

much

of

th eArab

coalition

forceand

occupied

th e

Sinai

Peninsula,

th e

Gaza

Strip,

an dth eWestBank

of th e

Jordan

River

and

th e

Golan

Heights

in

Syria.

TH EFOURTH ARAB-ISRAELIWA R ,

1973:

The

period

from

June1967

to

October

1973

w ascharacterized

by

various

Arab

attempts

to

pass

from

th e

darkness

of

defeat

into

th e

daylight

of

victory.

The

Egyptian

Armed

Forces

were

determined

to

reconstruct

their

strength

and

fighting

capacity,

an d

they

accomplished

it

in

a

little

less

than

six

years.herecord

of th e

si xyears

preceding

th e

RamadanW ar

1973

can be

divided

into

fourmain

phases:

1.

he

Phaseof

Defiance:

It

fol lowed

th e

defeat

of June

1967

and

lasted

until

August.

Th ema in

objective

o f

th e

Egyptian

armed

forces

during

thisperiod

w as

to

maintain

a

calm

attitude

at first

and

subsequently

to

provide

favorable

conditions

for

reconstruction

while

clearing

away

th e

ruins

as

rapidly

as

possible

an d

preparing

fo r

th edefense

of

th eSuez

Canal

front.

2.

hePhase

of

ActiveDefense

It begun

in

September

1968and

lasted

untilFebruary

th e

conflict

during

this

periodw as

characterized

by

protracted

and

intense

exchanges

offire.

This

certainly

contributed

tolimiting


13/42

th e

freedom

of

movement

of

th e

Israeli

troops

on

maneuversor

reconnaissance,

besidesinflicting

heavy

losses

onbothth eIsraelim en

and theirequipment.

o

avoid

th elosses,

they

began to

establish

a

strong

fortified

line

along

th e

eastern

bank

of

th e

Canal,

th e

so-called

Bar-lev

Line.

3.

he

Phase

of

W ar

of Attrition

Commenced

on

March

8 ,1969

andcont inued

until

Egypt

accepted

th e

Rogers

initiative

in

August

1970.

During

this

periodaseries

of

l imited

successful

attackswere

made

onIsraeli

positions

acrossth eCanalbyda y

and

night.

The

aim

of

this

phase w as

to

reduce

th eIsraeli

military

capabilities

and

raise

th emorale

of

th e

Egyptian

forces.

4.

he

Phase

of

No

War.

No

Peace

In

August

1970,acease-fire

w asimposed

as

aresult

ofth e

Rogers

Init iative,andth e

Arab

guns

remained

silentuntil

they

roared

once

more

on

October

6 ,1973 .

During

this

period,Egypt

entered

into

a

new

phase

of

its

history,

workingsilently

and

patiently,

planning

and

preparing

for

th e

battle

to

recover

dignityan d

self-respect,

and

that

was

w ha t

happened

in

th e

Ramadan

W ar

of

1973.

13

TH E

RAMADANW A R .

Saturday,October

6 ,1973:

th e

t ime

th e

hour

of

mid-day

meal;

th e

place

th e

banksof

th e

Suez

Canal

near

th e

disused

railway

bridge

at

El-Firdan.

group

of

Egyptian

soldiers,some

in

soft

caps,

some

without

any

headgear,

strolled

along

th esandbank

eating

oranges,untidily

scattering peelson th ecleanwhite

slopes.A

little

further

inlanda

water

truck

had

broken

down

and

w as

being

pushed

along

th e

road

by

agroupof

sweating

tired

men.

A n Israeliobserver

atopone

of

th e

Bar-Lev

strong

points

on

th e Eastbank

could

have

been

surveying this

scene.

tw as

much

th esameas

occurred

everyday:not

one

Egyptian

within view

was

wearing

a

steel

helmet.Behind

h is

ow n

position

on

th e

East

bank,

Israeli

soldierswere


14/42

kickinga

footballabout

on

a

sandyfield;downstairs,in

th e

l ivingquartersofth e

"fortress",

w as

in

progress

forth e

more

religious,

an observanceof

"Yom Kippur".

14

Suddenly,at

1405

hours ,

4,000

guns,rocket

launchers,

and

m ortars

opened

up

al l

along

th e

SuezCanalon the

Egyptian

front.

Thisartillery

barrage

w assupported

bystrikesfrom

over30 0

aircraft .

Fifteen

minuteslater,

8,000

troopsin

1,000

rubber

boats

were

crossing

th eSuez

Cana l

and th efirst

fortresson th e

Bar-Lev

line

w as

captured

byelementsof

th e

SecondFieldArmya t

1500 hours exactly.

Many

others

fellsoon

afterwards.

Simultaneously

th e

engineerswith

theirwater

cannons

were breaking

down

the

sand

rampartson th e

eastern

bank

of

th e

Canalandin

4 .5

hours

had

breached

it

in

80

places. A t

1710

unitsof

th e

Second

Division

Northof

Ismailia

took

th e

first

off icer

prisoners.

By

1930

hoursth e

first

formation

ofth e tw oEgyptian Armies

wereestablishedon

th e

Eastbank

alonga

frontof

170 kilometers.

Eighty

thousand

m en

in

12

waves

had

penetratedSinai

to

a depth of

three

to

four

ki lometers

andwere

welldugin

inside

th e

Bar-Lev

fortified

area.

The

victoryin th e

Ramadan

W arw as

achievedwith hardlabor,swea tandblood

after

a

longstruggle.

A ndsuch

asuccessful

and

brill iantmilitary

action

would

not

have

been

achieved

without a well-designed an d

clever

plan.

1

5


15/42

PLANNING

FOR

R A M A D A N

W A R

"TheEgyptianForces

cross ing

ofSuezCanaln

front

of

th e

uperior

Israeli

Forces

can

be

considered

as

a

remarkable

element

in

modern

war,

which

will

change

military strategy. . ."

Secretary

oftheU S

Ar m y

TH EAIMOFTH EOPERATION:

The

Egyptian

political

aim

of

th eoperation,w as

to

destroy th e

main

enemy

ground

formation

in

th eWesternSinai

and

to

seizeobjectivesofstrategicimportancein

orderto

create

a

favorable

situation for

th e

liberation

of

all

occupied

territories

by

political

pressure

or

if

this

failed

bysubsequent

militaryaction.

1

TH E

PROBLEMS:

Toachieve

th eaim

of

th eoperation,

th e

Egyptian

planners

were

faced

by

th e

following

problems:

1

7

1 .

he

Suez

Canal

:

The

Suez

Canal

is

a

uniquewaterobstacle

170

kilometers

in

length,

with

an

average

widthof20 0

meters

and

a depth

of

about18

meters.

tssidesarecovered

with

layers

ofcemen t

and

iron,and

th ewater

levelvariedwith

th e

tidalflow,which

changesdirectionat

six-

hour

intervals.

2.

he

Sand

Barrier

:The

sand

barrier

on

th e

East

bank,

a

result

of

dredging,

w as

increased

by

Israeli

engineers

toa height

of

up

to

30meters.

3.

ar-Lev

Lineandth e

Fortified

Defense

Area

:

The

Israelis

had

established

adefensive

area

to

a

depth

of

35

ki lometers

to

th eEast

of th eCanal.heso-called

Bar-Levline

represented

th e

mos tforward

part of

it

a nd

consis tedof

31

strong

points ,

each

a

complex

multi-layered

fortification

consisting

ofseveralfloors,andcontainingseveralreinforcedconcrete

bunkers

with

8


16/42

all

round

fine posit ions. ir e

entanglements

and

mine

fields

surrounded

each

strong

point

and

extended

to

a

depth

of

800

meters.

4 .

apalm :ome

points

were

equipped

with

napalm

tanks

giving

th e

ability

to

coverth e

Canal

locally

with

fuel,

which

would

produce

a

sheet

off lames

onemeterin

heightandraise

th e

temperature

of

th e

water

toa

boiling

point.

5.he

Assault

:It w as

impossible

to

assault

theSuezCanaland th e

Bar-Lev

lineexceptfrom

th e front.

Thisis

contrary

to

th e

traditional

method

of attacking

fortified areas.

6.heInitialBridgehead :The

phase

ofth e

battle

afterth e

initial

bridgehead

w as

achieved

would

be

critical,

sinceth e

attacking

infantry

soldiers

would

have

to

fight

enemy

tanks

for

no

less

than

six

hours

before

th e

Egyptian

tanks

and

heavy

weapons

could

cross

th e

Canal.

7.

heIsraeli

Defensive

Plan :

he

Israeli

concept

ofdefense

w as

basedo n

th e

following:

a.

aking

maximum useof

th e

Suez

Canal

and

Bar-Lev

Line

fordefeating

or

delaying

Crossingtroops.

b.

oving

armored

forces

from

posit ions

in

depth

to

dislodge

any

footholds,

which

th e

Egyptiansmigh t

secure.

c.

rganizing

counterattacks

on

anyestablished

bridgeheads

with

armored

forces

closely

supported

by

th e

A ir Force.

8.he

Israeli

Mobilization :

The

Israeli

military

economicsystem

w as

based

ona

policy

of

quickly

switching

manpower

from

th e

industrial

to

th e

militaryrequirements.For

this

purpose

a

meticulously

detailed,

l ightning

mobilization

plan

reportedly

th e

most

efficient

of

any

armed

forces

in

th e

world

had

been

devised

by

th e

Israeli

generalstaff.

For

that

reason th e

GHQin

Cairoassessedthat

in

th e

event

of

a

crossingof

th e

Suez

Canal,

th e

Israeli

reaction

couldtake

tw o

forms:


17/42

a.

heIsraelihigh

command

could

still

adhere

to

it s

48-hour

mobilization

plan

and

Launch

it s

deliberate

counteroffensive

afterthat

period.

b.

hey

could

bepanicked

into

abandoning

their

carefully

worked

out

mobilization

schemes

and

commi t

their

reservesearly.

18

9.TheIsraeli

A ir

Strike:The

experience

o f

th e1967

w ar

had

provedthatth eIsraelistrategy

to

meet

any

sudden

confrontation

with

th e

Arabs

w ascentered

on

a

pre-emptive

airstrike.

19

Because

of

th e

problems

and

difficulties,

which

faced

the

Egyptian

planners,

it

w as

important

to

achieve

decept ion

and

surprise

as

th e

main

means

ofsolvingand

overcoming

these

problems.

PLANNING FO R

DECEPTION

"The

mere factthatwestart

an

attack

at

allwillbe

th e

most importante lementof

surprise ."

Genera l

A bd

El-MunimRiad

Egyptian

CO S

after

June

1967

THE

NEED

FOR

SURPRISE

ND

THE IMPORT NCE

OF

DECEPTION FOR THE

R M D N

W R

Military

textbooks

emphasize

that

surpriseisa

key

principle

in planning

an

offensive;

it

enables

th e

attacking

force

not

only

to catch

th e

enemy

unawareand

thus

gain

th e

initiative

fora

longer

period but also

to

save

casualties,

particularly when

assaulting

prepared

defenses

such as

Bar-Levline.

n

th e

present

case,

however ,

th e

Arabs

hadaneven

greater

necess i tyfor

achieving

completesurprise.

10


18/42

The

Egyptian

appreciation

regarding

th e

achievement

o f surprise

went

beyond

th e

mere

requirement

ofsurprise

regarding

timing.

Thesurprise

mus t

be so

great

asto

throw

th e

Israeli

responsemechanism

out

of

gear.

In order,

therefore,

thattheirintentions

ifnot

their

preparations

be

kept

from

th e

Israelis,th eArabs

se t

aboutunfolding

a

well

thought-out

plan

of

deception to

gohand-in-hand

with

their

security

measures.

21

T H E

PLAN

From th e

military

point

ofview,

th e

plan w asto

deceive

Israel

as to

th e

realintention

of

launching

an

offensive

operation

an dto

conceal

it s

t iming,

th e

direction

of th e

main

blowsand

th esizeof

th e

participating force.

22

In factth edecept ion

plan

in

Ramadan

W arw as

very

accurate

and

neat.

t

followed

cleverly

all

th e

tenets

or

principles

o f

th e

deception

element

exactly

as

mentioned

in-most

of

th e

military

studies.

i thin

th e

following

pages

of

this

paper

for

th e

first

t ime

in

anystudies w e

shall

illustrate h ow

fa r

theseprinciples

were

achieved

in

the RamadanWar.

PRINCIPLESO F

D E C E P T I O NANDTH E

R A M A D A N W A R

"Among themore

perplexing

aspectsofth e

Arab

surprise attack

on

Israel

o n

Yom

Kippur

inOctober1973

was

the

affair

ofM ay

1973 . . . "

Israeli

BG

Yoel

Ben-Porat

23

PRINCIPLES

OF

DECEPTION:

Th e

principles

ofdeception

are mentioned

an d

described

in many

military

studies

and

doctrines.

From

th e

Western

and American

point

o f

view

these

principles

are:

object ive

1 1


19/42

centralized control/staff

coordination,

preparation,integration,credibility,

corroboration,

flexibility,

t imeliness

andsecurity.

24

In

th e

followingparagraphsw e

shallexplainhow

these

principles

were

achieved

in

RamadanWar.

OBJECTIVE:

Deception

must

have

aclearly

defined

objective.

heobjective

of

deception

in

th e

Ramadan W arwas:

1 .o

deceive

th e

enemy

as

to

th e

possibility

of

th euseof

th e

armedforcesin

any

assault

operation.

2.

o

maintain

th e

concept

of

th e

offensive

operation

in

complete

secrecy.

3.o

conceal

th e

t iming

of

th e

beginning

of

th e

war.

25

CENTRALIZED

CONTROL/STAFF

COORDINATION

Deception

in Ramadan

W ar

is

considered

a good

example

for

how

this

principlecould

be

achieved.

1 .

he

Egyptian President

Sadat

believed

it would

be

necessary

to

establish a

second

front

at

th e

openingof

th e

war,which

would

require

th e

collaboration

of

Syria an dJordan.

n

January

1973a

joint

military

command

w as

established

be tween E gypt an d

Syria.

26

n August,

Jordan

agreed to supportth e

planned

military

operation

code

named

Operation

Badr.

Diplomatic

efforts

succeeded

in

having

Syria

agree

with

th e

objectives

of th e

plannedattack

recovering

th e

territories

lost

in

1967.

27

2.

he

planningfordeception

startedwith

only14 officers(eight

Egyptians

and

six

Syrians),

on

August

22,1973in

Alexandria.

Theywere,

th e

Egyptian

Minister

of

War,

th e

Syrian

Minister

ofDefense,

th e

chiefs

ofStaff,

th e

DirectorsofOperations,th e

Directors

of

Intelligence

and

th e

Commanders

of th e

Navy,A ir

Forceand

A ir

Defense;

(in

Syriath elasttwo

12


20/42

appointments

were

held

by

oneofficer)

in addition,

th e

Chief

of

Staff

of

th e

Federal

Operational

General

Staff.

3.

n

th e

first

three

days

of

September

1973,

th e

commanders

of

th e

tw o

armies,which

were

to

attack

across

th e

Canal,

joined th e

planners.

4 .n

October2,1973,th e

heads

ofall

service

departments

were

informed

during

a

meeting with

Pres identSadatwith

th e

w ar

council .om e

of thosepresent

in

that

meetingo f

course

knew almost

all

of

th e

plan;

th e

rest

were

aware

that

a countdown had

started,

though they

did not

know

h ow orwherehostilitieswouldbegin.

28

5.

n th esame

day,

October

2,1973,

there

w as

a

meetingof

th e

National

Security

Council,

which

included,

in

addition

to

th epresidenthimself,

th e

tw o

vice

presidents,

tw o

assistantsto

th e

president,

th e

vice

prime

ministers,

th e

Ministerof

War,

th e

directors

ofgeneral

armymilitary

intelligence.

The

Presidentexplained that

it might

be

necessaryto

breakth ecease-

firewith

Israel.

6.n

October

3,1973

General

Ahmed

Ismaiel,

th e

Egyptian

Minister

ofWar,

flew to

Damascus.

There he

m et

in

conference

with

th eSyrianMinister of

Defense.

They

agreed

upon

alloutstandingquest ionsrelated

to

Operation

"Badr",

thecode

name

of

Ramadan

War.

29

7.

iv is ion commanders

were

not

giventh e

orderforOperation"Badr"unti l

3

October;

platoon

commanders

and

theirmen

werenot

informed

until

si x

hours

before

th eattack

commenced.

8.

oordination with civilandpublicaffairs

ministersof

information,foreign

affairs

and

defense)

to

prepare

fordeception,also

coordination

withSyria

took

place

in

orderto

launch

th e

operation

atth e

same

t ime.

1 3


21/42

9.

ollowing

th e

example

ofMontgomery

in

Alamen,studies

of

th edeception plan

had

begun atth esame t imeas ,an d

covered

allfields,military,

diplomatic

and informational.

PREP R TION

N

I NTEGR TION

1 .

enerally

th e

preparation

for th e

Ramadan

War,

w as

integrated w i th

th e

deception

plan.

t

included

th efollowing:

a.

tudy

ofth e

Israeli

theory

andconcept

of

defense.

b.

utt ing

th ecountry

on

a

war

footing.

c .

ettingth e

scene

politically

for

th e

battle.

d.

reparing

th e

Egyptian

Armed

Forces

for

war.

e.

reparing

th e

theatre

ofoperations.

f.lanning

for

th e

offensive

operation

including

th edeception

plan.

2.

The

Israelisdid

not

expect

th emodern

weaponsand

n ew tactics wh i ch

th e

Egyptians

used

and

prepared

in

th e

Ramadan

War,

for

example:

a.The

modern

anti-tank weapons

usedby

th e

Egyptians

in

incredible quantit ies

had

a

horrifying

effect on

th e

Israeli

tank

charges

that

had

beenso

successfulin

1967.

One

brigadein

th eSouthernsect ionof

Sinaibeganacounterat tack

at

1600

with

approximately

100

tanks,

by

th e

next

morning

only

23remained.

31

b.The

Egyptians

had

another

surprise

forth e

Israelis.

No t

only

were

th e

air

defense

umbrellas

extremelydense,

but

alsoit

contained

tw o

weapons,

th eSAM-6

andSAM-7,

thatth e

Israeli

pilots

had

not

faced

before.

c.

Theuse

of

water

pressure

from

water

cannons

toopen

gaps

through

th esand

barrier

w as

agreatsurprise to

th eIsraelis.

14


22/42

d.

There

w as

no

main

effort th e

Egyptians '

plan

called

foran

attack

allalongth e

canal.

heybelievedthatthis

would

enhanceth e

element

o f

surprise

and

delay th eIsraeli

33

response.

3.The

deception planw as

to

be

achieved

byinducing

Israel

into

believing

th e

Egyptian

forces

were

merely

perfectingtheir

defense

preparations

and

raisingtheir

fightingefficiency

through

normal

maneuvers.

4 .efore

October

1973,

th e

defenses

on

th eWes t

Bankwere

improved,

th e

sandbank

w as

raised

and

aseries

oframparts

were

constructed

aboveth e

sandbank itself.verth e

days

th e

impression

w as

given

that

th e

Egyptians

were

busy

strengthening

these

positions

for

defensive

purposes

only.Alsothissandramparthelped to

conceal

th e

concentration

of troops

and

th e

preparation

fo rth e

crossing.

5.

n

factth e

build

up

along

th e

Suez

Canal

started

immediately

after

1967war,

when th e

Egypt ians

began to

build

fortifications

along

th e

Canal.

6.uring

th efall

maneuvers,

the Egypt ianswe re

careful

toconfuse

th e

issue.Ammunit ion

w as

not

sent

v ia

ammunit ion

trucks

because

it

had

already

movedup

by

railat

th e

t ime

of

May.

Moreover,th e

ammunit ion

itself

w as

concealed

in

underground

storagesites,

so

that

itsexact

amount

couldnotbe

determined.

7.

he

Egyptians

used

th e

opportunity

provided

by

th e

annual

maneuvers

to

mask th e

preparationnecessary

forwar.uns,

heavy

equ ipment ,otheritems

were deployed

forwardand

masterfully

camouflaged

under

sand

colored

netting

orburied.

Troops

were

moved

into

assault

posit ions.

For

example,

each

day

brigade

size

formationswouldmove

east

to

th e

Canal

during

daylight

and

return

in

th e

evening.

What th eID F

did

notknow w as

that

only

one

battalion

from

15


23/42

each

brigade

actually

returned;th eothers

took up

concealed

positions

along

th eCanal.

34

Special

bridgingequ ipmentw asmovedin

crates

to

hide

it s

identity.

8.heassembling

of

th e

troops

w as

done

over

a

periodof

four

months

by

moving

unitsin

smallelements

and

graduallyaccumulat ing

strength

near

th e

front.

The

major

elements

were

shifted

to

th e

frontthree

weeks

before

th e

attack

under

th e

pretense

of

undertaking

engineering

preparations.

35

9.ransportation

ofspecial

equipment

which

would

make

th e

Egyptians '

intentions

obvious,

w as

delayed:water

cannonsto

be

used

forblasting

Israelisand

rampartsand

some

bridging

equ ipment

w as

sent

to

th e

Canal

at

th e

last

possible

moment .

10 .

As

partof

th e

deception

plan

it

w as

decided

that

th e

finaldisposition

of

th e

troops

should

be

madeby pretending

to

preparefor

theannual

fallmaneuversunder

th e

code

name

Liberation

23 .

1 1 .Theplan alsoincludeda well-practiced

mobilization

of

reserves

at regular

intervals

in

aw ay

that

would

allow

th e

greatestpart

of

th e

reserves

tobe

ready

an d

standing

by

for

action

at

th e

Zero

hour.

36

12.Finally,

th e

plan

included

preparing

th e

troops

in

order

to

surprise

Israel

by

th elevel

of

their

trainingand th e n ew weaponsthey

had obtained.

CREDIBILITY

1 .

he

deception

plan w as

designed

to

li e

on

Western

and

Israeli

perceptions

that

th e

Egyptians

would

be

unable

to

keep

any

secretsandthattheir

equipmentw as

not

sufficiently

prepared

fo r

war.

2.heEgyptians

andSyrianssucceeded

in

convincing

Israel

thatth e

intensive

military

activity

in

Egyptto

th e

West

of

th e

Suez

Canal

between

M ay

an dOctober1973w asaseries

oftraining

maneuvers

in preparation

for

an

annual

major

exercise.

16


24/42

3.uring

May,

Augustandlate

Septemberth e

Egyptians

mobilized threetimes.

O n

th e

first

tw ooccasions

the

Israelis

responded

by

mobilizing

in theirturn

at

th ecost of

some

10

million

dollars

for

the

M ay

mobilization

alone.tis

perhaps

not

surprising that

a

"cry

wol f

syndrome"

developedand

opinions

in Israel

became

split.

Th eSeptemberEgyptian mobilization took place

under

cover

of

annual

maneuvers

and

seemedto

have

finished

on

5

October,

when

large

numbers

ofEgyptian

soldiers wenthome

on

leave

bypublic transportthrough th e

center

ofCairoat

midday.

3 7

4 .

o

addto

th e

deceptionit w as

decided

to

demobilize

20,000

soldiers'

4 8

hours

priorto

th e

initiation

of

operations,

that

making

sure

that

this

operation

would

be

observed

by

Israeli

intelligence.

38

5.gypta nd

Syria

succeeded

in playingonperceptions

that

theywere

unable

to

go

to

w ar

because

their

Soviet

equipment

w as

deteriorating

(even th e

Daily

Telegraph

published

an

article

on

this).

C A M O U F L A G E

The

camouflage

w as

verysimple

and

neat.

t

w as

carried

out

at

alllevels

as

follows:

a.

pecial

units

known

as"Lazy

Squads"

were

detailed to

sit

on th e

Canal

bank

an d

fish,

dangle

their

feet in th e

water,

play

footballand

swim

in th eCanal.

39

b.

oldiers

were

forbiddento

pu t

on theirhelmets.

c.fficers

w ho

hadbeen

invited to

parties

and

attendedthem.

d.

if e

continued

as

usual,

whatever

activities

they

undertook,

if

discerned

by

th e

Israelis,

must

appeara s

routine

repetition

of previous

practice

th e

usual

non-warlike

40

postures.

1 7


25/42

CORROBORATION

1 .

he

deception plan

called

for

spreading

misinformation

as

well

as

for

action

within

different

elementsofpower.

twasanoverwhelming

success

andmisled foreign intell igence

service

bodies

including

theCIA,

as

well

as

Israeli

intelligence.

4 1

2.

heEgyptianspretendedthattheyweredeveloping

some

sortof

diplomatic

solution through

th e

UNand

th e

Non-AlliedNationsConference,

andthat

th e

build-up

of

troopsw as merely

sable

rattling.While

th e

press

and

radio

were

encouraged

to

play

up

th econcern

of

Egypt

andSyria

over

th esearch

for a

peaceful

solution

to

th e

Middle

East

(ME)

conflict,and

to

refer

with

disapproval

to

th e

bell igerent

speeches

and

actions

of

th e

Palestinian

Fedayin

(Commandos).

42

3.ressarticles

frequently

described

friction

withth eSoviet

Advisers,

which

ledto th e

well-

publicized

ai revacuation

back

to

th eSoviet

Union justbefore

6October.

4 .he

tour

of

President

Sadat

before th e

w ar to SaudiArabianQuatar

andsome

other

countries

w as

to

a

large

extentpart

of

th e

elaborate

decept ionplan,

to give

th e

impression

that

th e

President,like

everyone

elsein Egypt,w as

simply

goingabouth is

normal

business.

5.

olitical

activities

and

an

active

misinformation

campaign

were

alsoutilized to

further

strengthen th e

Israeli

perception

that

w ar

is

not

imminent .PresidentSadat

informed

a

European

foreign

minister

of

his

confidential

plans

to

visitth e

U N

in Octoberknowing

that

hisconfidant

wouldinform th e

Israelis.

4 3

6.ther

newspapers

announced

that

Sadat

would

make

an

important

speech

on

October16 ,

(to

give

th e

impression

that

nothing m ight happen

before

that date).

7.

nSeptember

1973,

Egyptian

Foreign

Minister

Zayat

(who

w as

not

kept

informed

about

th e

Egyptian

intentions)was

sent

to Washington,

D.C.

torekindle

th e

U.S.role

asamediator

and

1 8


26/42

"give

peace

another

chance. . ."

and

w asscheduled

to

meet

M r.

Kissinger

on

October

5

to

discuss

apolitical

solution.

44

8.

n

September

th e

Egyptian

newspaper

"Al-Ahram"

carried

a

story

that

th e

Army

w as

drawing

up

a

listo f

officers

w ho

wished

to

perform

th e

winter

(Haj pilgrimage

to

Mecca.

45

9.

he

Egyptiannewspapers

also

announced th e

visit

o f th e

Romanian

Defense

Ministerto

Cairo

during the

first

halfofOctober.

46

10 .

Additionally,

th e

Egyptians

had

begun

spreading

rumors

long

before

th e

w ar

abouttheir

lo w

combatreadiness

due

to

th e

shortages

of

sparepartsand

lo w

maintenancelevels

in

some

of

their

units.

That w as

written

even

in

th e

British

newspapers .

4 7

11 .Anotherminor

butunplanned

coincidence

w as

that

at

aboutthis

t ime

an American

company

signed

an

agreementto

build

an oil

pipeline

at Adabiyah

on

th e

Suezgulf,which

wouldbewithin the

same

area

of

hostilities.

Thisw as

taken

as

a

further

indication

that

Egypt

w as

expecting

a long

period

of

peace.

FLEXIBILITY:

1 .

he

deception

plan

w as

based

on taking

advantage

of th eenemy ' s

reactions.The

armed

forces

were

made

tolook

as

if

defensively

deployed ratherthan prepared

foroffensive

operations,in

case

some

of

th e

deception plan

activities

struck

th e

Israelis

as

actualand

operationalrather

than

routine.

While preparationscontinued,defensive

lines

in

depth

were

built

to

meet

an y

sudden

Israeli

attacks.

4 8

2.

hen

th e

High

Command

went

to

"Center

number

10"(the

operational

headquarters),

th e

walls

werecovered

with

th e

maps

of

"Liberation

23"(The

maps

of th e

annual

maneuver).

And

it

w as

then

a

simpleand flexible

m atter

to

switch

th e

troops

from

"Liberat ion

23 "

to

their

position

to launch"Badr"th e

codename

of th e

real

assault .

19


27/42

TIMELINESS

.mong

th e

principal

factors

that

contributed

to strategicsurprise

w as

th eselection

of

th e

t iming

for

th e

offensive.his

process

includedthe

select ion of

th e

most

suitable

month

ofth e

year,

th e

mos t

convenient

day

of

the month,

an d

th ebes thourofth e

da y

for

launching

th e

attack.

49

2.

he

Month :

The

mon th

ofOctoberw as

chosen

because

of

th e

followingconsiderations:

a.

srael

would

be

preoccupied

with th egeneralelections

to

be

held

on

October

28 .

b.

he

Israeli

calendar

w as

marked

with

several

religious

festivals

(such

asth e

Yom

Kippur,

th eD ay

of

th e

Jewish

New Year) .

c.

ctober

coincided

with

th e

month

of

Ramadan

with

it s

deep

effect

upon th eEgyptian

Armed

Forces.

he

Israelis

would

notexpec t

an

offensiveduring th e

Muslim

t ime

of

religious

fasting.

d.

he

nights

we re

longenough to

provideth e12hours

of

darkness,

which th e

crossing

plan

required.

e.

tw as

th elast

mon th

before

th e

winter

snow

in

Syria

and the

weather

conditions

were

perfectfor

mount ing

operations.

f.tw as

about

th e

earliest

t ime

at

which

th e

Armed

Forces

could

guarantee

to

be

fully

prepared

in

th euse

of

their

new

equ ipment .

g.his

month

also

suited

th e

naval

operations

considering

th e

air andsea

conditions.

50

3.

he

Day :

hesixth

d ayof

th e

month was

selected

because

ofth efollowing:

a.

t

coincidedwith th e

day

of

Kippur(and

also

Saturday),

when

activities

in Israel

would

be

at

a

standstill .

b.he

moon

w as

full

from sunsetuntil

it

se t

atmidnight .

This

al lowedsufficient

20


28/42

moonlight

fo r

th econstruction ofbridges

and

ferries.hereafter

darkness

would

cover

theiruse.

c.

he

t idal

characterist icsof

th e

Canal

were

mos t

suitable.

Thedifferencebetween

ebb

and

tide

levels

were

th e

minimum,

which

facilitated

crossing

an d

bridging

operations

over

th e

Canal.

d.ny

dateafterthis

would

have

involved

a

fullm oon

and

a

greater

quantity

ofwater

in th eCanal.

51

4 .The Hour :

4 00

hours

w as

chosen

as th e t ime

forH hour

(al lowed

3.5hoursof

day

l ight

before

th e

last

light)

for

th e

following

reasons:

a.

tpermitted

th eassaultcrossing

of th eCanal

andth e

capture

of

th e

Bar-Lev

line

before

darkness.

b.

he

Egyptians

had

somehours

of

daylightforth ecrossing

followed

by

six

hoursof

moonlight,during

which

th e

bridging

of

th e

Canal

w as

completed,anda furthersix

hours

of

total

darkness

duringwhich

th e armors

werebrought

across.

c.

here

w as

t ime

for

tw owavesofair strikes

during

daylight.

d.here

w assufficientt ime

before

darkness

to

bring

forward

engineerequipment

from

its

assembly

areas to

th e

Canalandto

breach th e

sand

barrierwithwaterpumps .

e.tsuited th e

Egyptians'

intentions

to

dropairborne

forces

in the

rear

of th eIsraelis

justbefore

nightfall.

f.

he

daylight

hours

also

gavean

opportunity

to

the Arab

artillery

to

directit s

fire

accurately.

g.

he

Egyptians

wouldbe

attacking

out

of

aloweringsun with

obvious

disadvantageto

th e

Israelis

w ho

would

have

th e

setting

sun

in

their

eyes.

21


29/42

h.

It

conformed

to

th e

requirements

of

th e

first

phase

of th eSyrian

attack

on

th e

Golan

Heights,

i.

It

would

give

Israel

no

t ime

to

concentrate

it s

air

force

during

daylight

andwould

not

be

able

to

retaliateuntil

th e

morningof

th esecond

day.

52

SECURITY:

1 .

he

operational

security measurestaken

by

th e

Egyptians

wereextremely

effective.

5 3

The

planning

disguised

as

routine

strategic

planning w as

confined

to

th econference

rooms

of

th e

general

headquarters.

2.

he

room

in

which

th e

14 officers

m et

had

been

checked

and

rechecked

fo r

any

possibili ty

of

bugging.

No

electronicdevicesofanysortwereal lowed.

No

notes

were

to

be

takenexceptby

one

officer

th e

Egyptian Director

of

Operations,w hokeptthe

minutes

in pencil

and

subsequently

made

tw ocopies

only

forth e

Egyptian

and

Syrian

presidents.

When

they

hadleft

th e

room,

none

of th eofficers

were

allowed

tocommunica te

with

one

another

by

writ ing

or

by

telephone,

only

by word

of

mouth.

3.

nth eseveralcommand postsof

th e

Egyptian

armedforcesth ef inaltoucheswereapplied

priorto

the

initiation

ofth eoperation.

Maps

and

documents

for

th e

ongoing

maneuvers

were

removed.Lockedsafes

were

opened an d

th ereal

maps

anddocuments

were

unfolded.

54

4 .t th e

outset

of

th e

planningstageth e pattern w as

mixed

in

a w aythat

would

insure

absolute

secrecy.

The

"successive planning"

method

w as

chosen

so

that

requirements

for

action

gradually

were

shifted

from

onelevel

to

a

lowerlevel

in

accordance

with

afixed

t imescheme.

Planning

on

alllevels

w asconfined

to

a certain

limited

groupofstaff

officers.

No

officers

outside

this

groupwere

al lowed

to

handle

the

plan

documents .

55

22


30/42

5.

tfirstth e

secret

w as

preserved

because

only tw o

people

shared

it

PresidentSadat

and

GeneralIsmaiel,th eMinister o f

Defense.

However ,

asthe preparations

progressed,

more

and

more

individuals

wereincluded.rders

hadto

be

drafted

carefully

with

miss ion paragraphs

being

in

different

forms

and

at

some

levelswithin

th e

framework

o f different

formation

exercise

instructions.

6.

lmost

al l

orderswere

issued

less

than

4 8

hoursbeforehandan d

some

pilots

received

orders

as

they

got

into

their

cockpi ts .ome troops

in th e3

rd

FieldArmy

had

only15minutes

warning.

7.s

a

l ieutenant,commanding

th e

Mortar

Company

o f an

Infantry

Battalion

in El-Quantara

South

of

Port-Said,

I

w as

informed

about

the operation

only

at

1200

hours

on

th e

1 0

th

da y

of

Ramadan

(6

October1973)

when

ourCommandercalledth e

officers

for

a

meeting

saying:

"Gentlemen,beprepared,oday

m ay

be

weshal l

have

our

breakfast

(for

Musl imsbreakfastinth eholy

monthofRamadan

is

a tth etimeof

sunset)

onBar-

Lev

Line

o rin paradise.he fire

preparat ion

forth e

warwill

s tart

at

1405.. .Al-

Hamdo-L-Allah

(thanks

G od) "

THE

RE S UL TS

O F

R A M A D A N

W AR

"The

Bar-LevLine

proved

itself

apieceof

Gryere

Swiss

cheese,

havingmore

holesthancheese

itself...

"

Dayan,Minister

ofIsraeliDefense

During

Ramadan

W ar

As

General

Ismai l

noted,

th e

RamadanW arhad

several

results

of

whichth e most

important

are:

1 .

tled

to

a

total

Arab

unity, neverbeforeachieved.

2.t

confirmednational

unity

in

a

w ay

never

experienced

before

in Egypt.

3.

t

restored conf idenceto

th e

Egyptian Armed

Forcesan dso

restoredth e

Egyptian people 's

faith

in theirArmy.

23


31/42

4 .

tput

an

end

to

th e

myth of th e

invincible

Israeli

Army.

5.tchanged

militarystrategy

al l

overth e

world.

Military

staffsof

th e

majorpowersare

studying

and

analyzing

th e

Ramadan

War.

om e

countries have

stopped

produc ing

weapons

thatth e

w arproved

were

outdated.

6.

tsubstantiallymodifiedworldmilitary equil ibrium.

7.

t

animated

thedormantMiddle Eas t

crisis,

leading

th e

whole

world,East and

West ,

to

inquire

about

th e

Palestinianpeople.

?

BesidesCfromm y

ow n

pointof

view):

8.

t

led

to

a t remendous

victory

o f th e

Egyptians

an d

Arabs,as

well

as

to

the

liberationof

entire

territories

ofSinai

which

w as

occupied

afterth e1967

war.

9.

hat

victory

w as

th e

starting

point

forSadat's

peaceinitiativein

1976andth e peace

agreementsbetween

Egypt

an dIsrael

in

"Camp

David."

From

m y

point

ofview

that is

considered

a new

international

phi losophyfor

how

to

solve

armed

conflict .

10 .

Also

i t

is

considered

th e

main

reason

for

th e

peace

movement s

taking

place

n ow between

th e

Arabs

and

Israel.

11 .O nth e

otherhand

it

restoredth eArabic

and

internationalrespect

to

Egypt and

it s

leadership

which hadcollapsed

afterth e

1967war.

12.

The

Ramadan

W ar

w as

on eof

th e

main

reasons

behind th e

reevaluation

of

th eU.S.strategy

towards

th eM E,

which

later led

to

strong

relations

with

Egypt.

13 .It provedthat

th e

Egyptiansoldieris

still

abrave

an d

bold

soldier

ashe

has

been

since

ancienthistory.Prophet

Mohamedstated

aboutth e

Egyptian soldier:

"H e

is

th e

best

soldier

on th e

globe."

24


32/42

CONCLUSIONAND

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

"Strategicdiversionandth eelementofsurprisearestill

poss ib leif theyare

well

reared,

despite

all listening an d photographic devices.. ."

Anwar

El-Sadat,Former

President

ofEgypt

The National

Security

Strategy

should

perform the

national

interests

of

th e Nation.

Oneof

th e

main

national

interests

ofan y

nation

is to

protect

and

defend

it s

borders

against

foreign

aggressions.o

successfully

execute

this

objective,

the

leadership

of

th estateshould

perfectly

assess

th e

ends ,

ways

andmeans through

accurate

evaluation to

th e

enemy,

theatreof

operations,

capabil it ies,intentions,

t iming

and

any

other

problems.

Ramadan

W ar(October

1973)

w as

agood

example

f or

th e

Egyptian

processin

evaluating

every

single

poin t

in their

situation.

They

skillfully

understood

how

fartheir

ends

could

be

an d

what

were

th e

waysan d

means

to reach it .

The

sufferingof

si x

years

after

their

defeatin 1967

w as

th e

spark

of their

success.

Becauseof

th e"n ow ar no

peace"

situation afterAugust1970 th e

case

w asfrozen.

The

Egyptiansdecided

to

solve th eproblem

in

their

ow nway.

Their

goalw as

to

crossth eSuez

Canaluntilal imiteddepth

in

th eeastern

bank

andseize

decisive

objectivesin order

to

createa

favorable

envi ronment

for

a

peaceful

solution.A t

that

t ime

th e

only

w ay

to reach

these

ends

w as

a

well-planned

successful

assault to th e

Suez Canal.

Consequently

th e

only

means

to

launch

suchasuccessful

operation

should be

a well-prepared

armed

force.

In

cooperat ion

with

th e

Syrians,

th e

Egyptian

planners

faced

many

diff icult

problems.

Theytriedto solve

most

of it .Butstill

th e

element

ofsurprise

w as

essential

to ensuretheir

success

and

to

overcome

allthose

problems.

25


33/42

During

the

Ramadan

War,

decept ion

proveditself one

ofth emost

effective

principles

of

w ar

and

can

beconsidered

th e

foremost

one.

The

Egyptians

andSyrianssucceeded

in

achieving

a

brilliant

deception

plan,in

which

all

principles

of

deceptionwere

accomplished

in a

very

integrative,balanced

and

comprehensive

way.

The

decept ion

plan,

th eoperationalsecurity,

th e

qualitativeimprovementsin

Egypt 's

forces

since

1967,

th e

advanced

weapons

and

th e

cohesiveEgyptian/Syrianstrategy,al lthese

factorscertainlycontributedto

Israeli

confusion

and

defeat.O nth eotherhand,

th e

Israelisdid

not

believe thatthe

Arabs

were

able

to attack

depending

on

themselves,

they

di d

not

consider

th e

Arabsmighthold

a

differentdefinition

of

victory.

his

hubris

and

inflexibility

of

th e

Israelis

created

self-deception

an d

afalsesense

ofsecurity.

A

final

word

is

that

th e

Ramadan

W arw as

different

from th efirstthree

rounds

in many

aspects.

The

firstone

in

1948

w asafter

th e

establ ishment

o f

Israel.n

fact

it w asnot

a

deeply

feltseriousoperation"

n

1956

th e

British

and

French

supported

th e

Israelis.

n

1967

their

pre-

emptive

strike

against

th e

Egyptian

A ir Forcegavethem th e

superiorityofth eskiesand

they

heldth e

initiative.Bu t

this t ime,during

th e

Ramadan

War,

it w asdifferent

as

it is

considered

th e

firstrealexaminat ionforth eEgyptian

soldier

and his realfirstconfrontat ion faceto

face

with

th e

Israelisoldier.Thist ime

came

asa

completesurprise

and a

t remendous

victory

for

Egypt

and

th eArabs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1 .

The

deception

plan

in

th eRamadan

W arw as

th e

main

factor

of

victoryan d

it

is

therefore

very

important

thatespeciallystrategic

leaders

shouldstudyit.

tisalso

worthy

of

specialconsideration forw ar

in

central

Europe

andsome

othercountries

because

of th e

many

rivers

and

water

obstacles,

which

occur

in

it .

26


34/42

2.ik eth e

operational

plan,

th e

deception

plan

should

bepreceded by

adetailed

appreciation

of factors

effectingexecution.

3.pecial

significance

should

be

givento

th efactorof

surprise.

Principles

of

Deception

Inorder tosuccessfullyachievethedeception

plan,

weshouldperformal lthe

principles

of

deceptionfo r

whichI

recommend

th efollowing:

1 .he

objective

of th e

deception

plan

should

correspond to

th e

aim

of th e

operational

plan

as well

as

to

th e political

moves

(Ends) .

2.

he f ewerplanners

for

deception,

th e

more

successful

it

is to accomplish

th e

principle

ofcentralized

control.

3.here

should

be

accuratecoordination

between

all

th e

authorities

of

th e

nation(s)

involved

in

planning

and

to

al l

levels,

butn o tto

th e pointthatthism ay

ruin th e

secrecy

of

planning.

4 .

he

preparations

for

deception

should

be

made

carefully

that

th e

real

intentions

would

not

be

indicated

to

th e

enemy.

5 .

redibility

can

be

achieved

if

w esucceed

toattractth e

attention

o f th e

enemy

to

oppositeintentions.

6.

e

should

make

use

of

all

th e

resources

outside

and

inside

th e

country to

provide

th e

enemy with false

information,

thus

achieving

th e

principle

ofcorroboration.

7.

lexibility

should

be

considered

during

th e

preparation

ofdeception.

8 .

To

surprise

th e

enemy,

t iming

(d-dav.

h-hour)

should be

carefully

selected

according

toall

factors which

migh t

affectth e

plan.

27


35/42

9.

For

security

reasons

specialcare

shouldbe

given

to

th e

secrecy

of

the

planning.There

should

be

aminimum number of

planners,

which

can be

gradually

increased.

In

order

to

integrate

th e

principles

of

deception,

I

recommend

considering

th e

following principlesas

one

factor

on eintegrativeelement):

1.entralized

control,

staff

coordination

and

security.

2.

redibility

and

corroboration.

3.

reparation

and

flexibility.

I

also

recommend

adding

th e

following

principles:

1.implicity :hedecept ion

plan

should be

very

simple

to

be

easily

controlled

and

secured.

2.riginality

:

Activities

in

th e

plan

better

not

be

a

repetition

of

previous plans.

Unexpec ted

and

new ideasare

required.

3.

ntegration

:hecorrespondence

and

integration

ofcarrying

out

allprinciplesand

activities.

4 .omprehensiveness :he

plan

is

to

includeall

principles

ofal llevels(strategic,

operational

andtactical),allelementso f power,al lsectors,etc.

As

many

operations

as

possible

should

move

in th e

same

direction.)

T oavoida

sudden

attackfroman

enemy,

Irecommendplanning

an

anti-deception

planbasedonth e

following

principles:

1.

rediction :By studying

th e

currentpolitical,

economic ,

military

andsocial

situation,

w ecan

predict

th e

possible

threats

to

th e

nation

in

th e

future.

28


36/42

2.

uspicion :e

should

be

suspic iousof

any

movements

or

changes

regarding

our

enemy,because

it

could

be

directed

against

us.

3.nvestigation :

he

role

ofintelligence

is

importantto

provide uspermanent

informationaboutany

activities

and

intentions

o f ourenemy.

4 .

arning

:

n

case

of

discovering

an y

offensive

intent ions

of

our

enemy,w e

should

immediately

warn allthe

authoritiesin

th e

country,especially

th e

armedforces,

as

to

respond

in

suitable

time.

5.esponse:

A ssoon as

th e

warn ing

is

issued,

w e

have

to

respond

withgreatcare

and

never

ignore

any

warning.

6.eadiness :o

respond

at

th e perfect

t ime,

th e

entire

nat ion,

especially

th earmed

forces

must

be

always

ready to

face

any

aggression.

7.nitiative :According to

th esituation,it

is

betterto

hold

initiative

before

an y

action

from

th e

enemy.

8.

lexibility :

o

hold

initiativefrom

th eenemy.

A ll

th e

elements of th enation's

power,

including

th e

armed

forces,

should

be

able

to

modifyits

efforts

and plans

to

execute

their

response.

9.

obilization :

A

well-planned

mobilization plan

is

essent ia l

to

perform

readiness,

initiative,

flexibility

and

agoodresponse.

10 .Reserves

:Maintaining

appropriate reserves

to

face

any

sudden

attack.

W o r d Count:8 ,145

29


37/42

30


38/42

E NDNOTE S

1

Michael

J.

Handel ,On

Deception,

Class Notes

from Clausewitz,Intelligencean d

Study

of

War,U.S.

NavalW ar

College,1992.

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

4

ErnestR.

Dupy

and Trevor

N.

Dupy,

TheEncyclopediaof

Military

History

(New York:

Harper

and

now,

1986),

p.

1221.

5

Ibid

p.

1221-1222.

6

Hassan El-Badri,

Taha

El-Magdoub

and

Mohamed

Dia

El-DeinZohdy,The

Ramadan

W ar

1973

(Dunnloring,

Virginia:

T.

N.

Dupuy

Associates,

Inc.,

1978),

p.l.

7

Frank

Aker,October1973.

TheArab

IsraeliW ar

(Archon

Books,

1985),

p3.

8

Joseph

F.

Dunford,The

1973

War:

Deception

and

Surprise(research

paper,

Polit ics

219,

Fall

1991),

p.3.

9

I

bidp.4.

10

Ernest,The

Encyclopedia,

p.1227.

1 1

Ibid,

p.

1231.

12

Joseph,

1973

War,

p.

4-5 .

13

Badry,

The

Ramadan,

p.10-14.

14

D.

K.Palit,

Maj

Gen,V.

C.

FRGS,

Return to

Sinai,

th e

Arab

Offensive.

October1973

(Palit

&

Palit

publishers,

Dehra

Dun,

New

Delhi,

April

1974),

p.

77-80.

15

Badry,

The

Ramadan,

p.

9.

16

Ibid,p.

16 .

17

Ibid,

p.30-35 .

18

Palit,

Return,

p.

44 - 45 .

19

Ibid,p.

4 4 .

20

Ibid,p.

4 4 - 4 5 .

3 1


39/42

21

Ibid,

p.4 7.

22

Badry,The

Ramadan,

p.

4 5 .

23

Yoel

Ben-Porat,

BG ,

ID FMagazine.

Ja n1987.

24

TheArmy

Field

Manual,

Vol

I

.

part

5,

Deception and

Surprise,

Army

Staff

College,

Camberly,

UK ,

1987.

-

Joint

Pub3-58Joint

Doctrine

ForMilitary

Deception .31M ay1996,

p. 1-2,1-3.

25

Badry

The

Ramadan,

p.

4 5 .

26

Edgar

O'Ballance,

No

Victor

No

Vanquished:The

Y om

Kippur

W ar

(San Rafael ,

CA;

Presidio

Press,

1978),

p.33 .

27

Ibid,p.37.

28

Mohamed

Heikal,

The

Road

to

Ramadan .

1975 .

29

Badry,The

Ramadan,

p.

27 .

30

Saad

El-Shazly,

The

Crossingofth e

Suez

(San

Francisco,

CA;

American

Mideast

Research,1980),

p.

211.

3 1

Chaim

Herzog,

The

Arab

IsraeliWars

(New

York,

Random

House,

1982),

p.

248 .

32

Joseph,1973War,p.22.

33

Ibid,p.

21 .

34

Ibid,p.

18 .

35

Badri,

The

Ramadan,

p.4 6 .

36

Ibid,p.4 7 .

37

Heikal,

The

Road

to

Ramadan.

38

Badry,The

Ramadan,

p.4 7.

39

Palit,

Return,

p.

77.

4 0

Ibid,p.

4 7.

32


40/42

4

Badry,The

Ramadan,

p.4 7.

4 2

Heikal,TheRoadto

Ramadan.

4 3

Richard

K.

Betts,

Surprise

Attack

(Washington,

D.C.;

The

Brookings

Institution,

1982),

p.

72.

4 4

Michae l

F.

Handel,

Percept ion,

Deception

and

Documents

El-Sawah, Ossama M. - Deception in Ramadan War, October 1973