Eisenhower and the Gaither Report

Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: The Influence of a Committee of Experts on National

Security Policy in the Late 19501

David Lindsey Snead Richmond, Virginia

B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univenity, 1990 M.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uuivenity, 1991

A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the Univenity of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

Univenity of Virginia January 1997

(c) Copyright by David Lindsey Snead All Rights Reserved

January 1997

ii

Eisenhower and the Gaither Report:

The Influence of a Committee of Experts on National

Security Policy in the Late 19505

by David Lindsey Snead

Melvyn P. Leffler, Chairman

(ABSTRACT)

iii

As the United States reeled from the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in late

1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower received a top secret report prepared by a

committee of leading scientific, business, and military experts. The panel, called the

Gaither committee in recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., emphasized

both the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to protect the civil population and

the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack.

The Gaither committee viewed these defense measures--ranging from a missile system to

defend the continental United States to the construction of shelters to protect the

population from radioactive fallout-and the maintenance of sufficient strategic forces to

launch military strikes against Soviet targets as essential for the preservation of U.S.

security. It concluded that in the case of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack the United States

would be unable to defend itselfwith any degree of success. The committee emphasized

the urgent need for the Eisenhower administration to strengthen the country's continental

and civil defenses and to accelerate the development of its strategic striking power.

iv

This study examines the history of the Gaither committee: Why was it created?

What were the backgrounds of its members? What evidence did it examine in performing

its study? Why did it reach the conclusions it did? How influential was it on the

Eisenhower administration? This manuscript illuminates the significance of the Gaither

committee in shaping changes in Eisenhower's national security policies and in the

development of President Kennedy's. It demonstrates that Eisenhower followed a

consistent set of values and used an established decision making system to evaluate the

Gaither committee's findings and to make changes in his national security policies. It

reveals that Eisenhower sought the assistance of experts from a variety of professions to

supplement the advice he received from his official advisers. Finally, it shows that the

Gaither committee reached its conclusions based as much on the preconceptions of its

members as on the evidence it examined.

Acknowledgments

As with any study of this magnitude, I am deeply indebted to many individuals for

their assistance. The staffs of the Alderman Library at the University ofVrrginia, the

Eisenhower Library, the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Archives, the National Archives, and the United States Military Academy Archives

provided invaluable assistance in my research visits. In particular, I would like to thank

Tom Branigar, Dawn Crumpler, and Helen Samuels.

Various scholars provided assistance and support at various stages of this project.

lowe great deal to my close friend and compatriot, Robert Hopkins, for his great

knowledge of intelligence operations in the 1950s. Robert Bowie, Gregg Herken, and

Robert Watson provided insight into specific areas of the manuscript. Brian Balogh,

Nelson Lichtenstein, and Allen Lynch served as readers on my dissertation committee and

offered invaluable advice that helped sharpen my arguments. Last, but not least, Melvyn

Lefller guided this entire project with the precision and alacrity with which he is well

known. I cannot begin to thank him enough.

I would also like to thank the Eisenhower Library for the award of travel grant

which allowed me to make an extra research trip to its wonderful facility in Abilene,

Kansas.

I would like to thank my family and friends who supported me throughout this

study. Lynn and Parker Fretwell and Keith and Cindy Patterson provided unsurpassed

friendships through many trying times. D.C. and Carolyn Hughes followed this project

closely and offered tremendous encouragement. My brothers and sister--Rucker, Billy,

v

vi Mac, and Lynne-constantly supported my efforts to complete this study. I cannot express

the appreciation I have for my mom, Marilyn Snead, nearly enough. She provided

financial support, and more importantly, love and encouragement.

Finally, my wife, Lori, endured many long years of study and research trips. She

supported me on the many nights and weekends when I had to work. She provided

financial support to our family as I pursued this study. She proved to be an invaluable

critic of my work as she read page after page about the Gaither committee. For all of

assistance, I am deeply grateful. Without her love, support, and patience, this manuscript

would have never been completed.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Chapter I - Eisenhower's Core Values and Decision Making Systems

Chapter 2 - The Establishment and Background of the Gaither Committee

Chapter 3 - 1957: A Year ofTunnoil

Chapter 4 - The Activities and Conclusions of the Gaither Committee

Chapter 5 - The Influence of the Gaither Report on the Eisenhower Administration in 1958

Chapter 6 - The Legacy of the Gaither Committee

Conclusion

Bibliography

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1 Introduction

Coming off a landslide victory over Adlai Stevenson in the November 1956 elec-

tion, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began his second administration seemingly posed to

continue the policies of his first term. Ironically, however. 1957 would become one of the

longest and most difficult years of his presidency. Over the course of the year, he strug-

gled with congressional cuts to his defense budget. faced a racial crisis over segregation in

Little Rock, saw the Soviet Union launch the first satellite into space, and observed the

country sinking into a recession. The results were dramatic. In less than a year his popu-

larity in the polls had fallen over twenty percentage points. 1

The crises Eisenhower faced at the end of 1957 can be traced to both domestic and

foreign policy issues. Without underemphasizing the widespread disenchantment with

Eisenhower's handling of race relations and the economy, the concern of most Americans

in late 1957 lay elsewhere. For the first time, the Soviet Union had made a significant

technological advancement ahead of the Unittd States. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet

Union shocked the world with the launch of Sputnik. Coupled with the Kremlin's earlier

claim of a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the launch of -

Sputnik II on November 3, and the embarrassing failure of the United States Vanguard

rocket in December, the Soviet satellite represented a clear challenge to U.S. technological

superiority. More importantly, it raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might be able

to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States using this new missile tech-

I In February 1957. a Gallup Poll revealed that 79 percent of those polled supported Eisenhower. By March 1958. only 52 percent supported Eisenhower. See Chester J. Pach. Jr., and Elmo Richardson. The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, revised edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 175.

2 nology. Eisenhower's attempts to minimize the implications of the Soviet accomplish-

ments only inflated fears as many Americans assumed he was trying to conceal U.S. mili-

tary weaknesses.2

In the midst of this uproar, Eisenhower received a top secret report prepared by a

blue ribbon committee ofleading scientific, engineering, economic, and military experts.

The panel, called the Gaither committee in recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan

Gaither, Jr., emphasized both the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to pro-

teet the civil population and the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in

the event of a Soviet attack. The Gaither committee members viewed these defense

measures-ranging from a missile system to defend the continental United States to the

construction of shelters to proteet the population from radioactive fallout-and the mainte-

nance of sufficient strategic forces to launch military strikes against Soviet targets as es-

sential for the preservation of U.S. security. They concluded that in the case ofa surprise

Soviet nuclear attack the United States would be unable to defend itself with any degree

of success. The report emphasized the urgent need for the Eisenhower administration to

strengthen the country's continental and civil defenses and to accelerate the development

of its strategic striking power. It stressed that the United States either had to respond

immediately to the expanding Soviet military capabilities or face potentially grave conse-

quences.

2 For U.S. reaction to SPutnik. see Robert A. Divine. The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford University Press. 1993); and Walter A. McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985).

3 The Gaither committee recommended that the United States reduce the vulnerabil-

ity of its strategic forces, strengthen and enlarge its nuclear ballistic missile capabilities,

improve the ability of the armed forces to wage limited military operations, reorganize the

Department of Defense, and construct failout shelters to protect the civilian population.

These recommendations would cost $44.2 billion spread between 1959 and 1963. The

price was high, but the committee concluded that the costs for not instituting them would

be higher yet--the possible subjugation of the United States to the Soviet Union. It

stressed that, "The next two years seem to us critical. If we fail to act at once, the risk [of

not preparing for a Soviet attack], in our opinion, will be unacceptable. ,,3 The committee

accentuated that by the end of this two year period the Soviet Union would possess suffi-

cient nuclear forces to overwhelm U.S. defenses and to eliminate U.S. strategic nuclear

capabilities. The only way the United States could avoid this llrisk" was to adopt the rec-

ommendations advocated by the committee.

Eisenhower evaluated the Gaither report in the same manner as he studied most

national security issues. He used the National Security Council (NSC) as the nexus for

discussion of the committee's conclusions and recommendations. After receiving the re-

port in November 1957, the NSC assigned different government agencies responsibility for

analyzing specific parts of the report. By January 1958 the NSC was ready to discuss the

report itself and the agencies' comments. For almost six months, the Gaither report or

issues directly related to it dominated NSC discussions. Periodically, for the remainder of

3 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Defense Production. Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (l'he "Gaither Report" of 1957) [hereafter Gaither Report) (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Offiee [hereafter GPO), 1976),25.

4 the Eisenhower administration and during the Kennedy administration, these same issues

re-appeared in discussions of U.S. national security policies.

The Gaither report significantly influenced Eisenhower's national security policies

for the remainder of his presidency. Ofall the Gaither committee recommendations, Eis

enhower disagreed only with a few. While he opposed construction of fallout shelters and

expanding military capabilities to wage limited war for financial reasons, he approved the

implementation of most of the other recommendations at least in part. His requests for

supplementary appropriations to the FY 1958 defense budget and increases to the FY

1959 budget reveal the importance of the Gaither report. Between the two budgets, Eis

enhower added nearly $4 billion in defense spending. He accelerated the development and

deployment of ICBMs, intermediate range ballistic missiles (lRBMs), and the Polaris sub

marine launched missile system. He ordered the reduction of SAC vulnerability through

the construction of early warning radar, the dispersal of SAC forces to a larger number of

airfields, and the implementation of alert programs. Furthermore, he sought and received

Congressional approval for the reorganization of the Defense Department.

The influence of the Gaither report did not end with these changes. As a senator

and then president, John F. Kennedy championed many of the same programs. After the

contents of the report were leaked to the media in December 1957, many critics, including

Kennedy, challenged Eisenhower's policies. The Massachusetts senator questioned why

the United States was not doing more to overcome the apparent Soviet lead in military

preparedness. While Eisenhower refused to expand military spending beyond certain lev

els, Kennedy did not show the same inhibitions. In the 1960 campaign and his presidency,

5

Kennedy received advice from at least a dozen Gaither committee members. His "flexible

response" military strategy reflected much of the advice contained in the Gaither report.

He accelerated ballistic missile developments, expanded limited war capabilities, and ad-

vocated civil defense programs.

Historiographical Debates and the Significance of this Study

The Gaither committee's conclusions and recommendations had a clear influence

on the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. The report, however, has been ignored

or, at a minimum, underemphasized by most scholars." One of the main reasons for this

slight is that scholars focused on Sputnik as the cause for the changes in Eisenhower's

policies. While the satellite obviously magnified concerns about Soviet missile capabilities,

the Gaither report provided specific recommendations to overcome any possible deficien-

cies in U.S. military preparedness. It has only been in the past decade, as the Eisenhower

Library, the National Archives, and other depositories have begun to release previously

classified documents, that the true importance of the Gaither report has become apparent.

The historiography of the Gaither committee is very limited. Only four scholars--

Morton Halperin, Fred Kaplan, Gregg Herken, and Peter Roman-have performed sub-

stantive research on this topic. With the exception of Roman, all of them have relied on

the Gaither report itself, secondary sources, and/or interviews to obtain their evidence.

4 See for example Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 40-41, 84, 125-7. and 196; Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 173~ McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, 151; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, v. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 434-35; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 185-86; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 111-13.

6

Roman has tapped into some recently declassified documents to bolster his arguments.

While they all examine some of the committee's findings, none of them analyze why it

reached the conclusions that it did or exactly how influential it was in changing Eisen-

hower's policies.

Halperin's 1961 study remains the best published source of infoimation on the

Gaither committee. Halperin primarily used newspaper reports and congressional testi-

mony as the basis for his analysis. He was chiefly concerned with how the presidential

decision making process worked and did not attempt to evaluate the bases for the commit-

tee's conclusions or its impact on the Eisenhower administration. He argues that the

Gaither committee reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the president acquiring

advice from civilian experts. On the positive side, an independent committee can supply

"an additional source of information for the President, unencumbered by future and past

policy responsibility."s However, on the negative side, the "fear of civilian expertise and

the inability of the Gaither group to put any influence back of its recommendations com-

bined with the motives discussed above [bureaucratic struggles between government

agencies and military branches] to explain the failure of administration agencies to support

the Gaither proposals.,,6

For over twenty years, Halperin's article represented the most comprehensive at-

tempt to evaluate the Gaither committee. In the 1980s, both Kaplan and Herken added to

5 Morton H. Halperin. "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," World Politics 13:3 (April 1961), 384. 6 Ibid .. 373.

7 Halperin's assessment in their analyses of the role of experts in decision making.7 Kaplan

examines the influence of the RAND Corporation in the development of U.S. nuclear

strategy. He argues that strategic analysts from RAND played a pivotal role in the Gaither

committee's evaluation of Soviet military capabilities. He stresses in particular that

RAND experts Andrew Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and Spurgeon K~ny were very influ-

ential.8 While Kaplan asserts that these experts influenced the conclusions of the Gaither

committee, he concludes that Eisenhower accepted few of the committee's findings. He

emphasizes that "Eisenhower did not take [Robert] Sprague's comments enough to heart,

did not take the Gaither Report so seriously, as to believe that their fears warranted

spending tens of billions of dollars, on top of an already expanding budget, to shore up a

deterrent that he thought was, for the time being, already quite adequate.,,9

Herken also explores the role of experts in developing U.S. nuclear policy. He ar-

gues that "American nuclear policy since 1945 has always been influenced, ifnot deter-

mined, by a small group of civilian experts-scientists, think-tank theorists, and academ-

ics.',10 He stresses that while Eisenhower rejected most of the Gaither recommendations,

the report did stimulate the president and other experts to re-examine the importance of

arms control. He points to the experiences of three Gaither committee members: Herbert

York, Jerome Wiesner, and Spurgeon Keeny as examples of experts who began to realize

after their work on the Gaither committee the impossibility of constructing an effective

7 Unlike Halperin. Kaplan and Herken bad access to the Gaither report itself. The report was decIassified in 1973 and published by a congressional committee in 1976. g Fred Kaplan. The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1983), 128-30. 9 Ibid .• 152. 10 Gregg Herken. Counsels of War (New York: AIfred A. Knopf, 1985), xiv. See all Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: PreSidential &ience Advisingfrom the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

missile defense system. Herken concludes that ''the report would seem in retrospect the

beginning of a fundamental change in attitude of scientists toward the arms race. "II

While Halperin, Kaplan, and Herken focus on the role of experts, they only per-

fonn a cursory examination of the committee's conclusions and recommendations and

spend even less time analyzing how and why it developed the findings that it did. Roman

takes a different approach. He is concerned with Eisenhower's role in nuclear force plan-

ning from the launch of Sputnik to the Kennedy inauguration. He argues that

"Eisenhower was an active participant in force planning who succeeded in manipulating

the decision process, enabling him to impress his policy objectives on the outcomes." 12

S

While stressing the impact of the Gaither committee on the nuclear debate during 1958, he

criticizes it for failing "to resolve four aspects of nuclear deterrence. These were: the

credibility of nuclear deterrence, reaction time for nuclear forces, reliance on nuclear

weapons in the U.S. defense posture, and whether strategic systems should be designed to

disarm the Soviet Union or to retaiiate.,,13 In making his arguments, Roman was the first

scholar to use newly declassified documents to show the influence of the Gaither commit-

tee. 14

This brief overview of the arguments of these four scholars does not mean to imply

that the Gaither committee has not been discussed elsewhere. However, most other ana-

11 Herken. Counsels of War, llS. 12 Peter 1. Roman. "American Strategic Nuclear Force Planning. 1957-1960: The Interaction of Politics and Military Planning." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1982,2. 13 Ibid., 3S. See also ibid., 43. 14 Similar arguments to Roman's dissertation can be found in his new book. However, be does not focus nearly as much 00 the Gaither committee. See Peter 1. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

9 lyzes rely on these authors for their evidence. IS A common feature of all the literature is a

lack of discussion of the Gaither committee itself. Who were its members? What were

their backgrounds? How did they approach their study? Why did they devise the conclu-

sions and recommendations that they did? The limited historiography now available pro-

vides glimpses at some very compelling issues. Halperin's use of the Gaither committee as

a case study on decision making sheds much light on the benefits and drawbacks of using

civilian committees. Both Kaplan and Herken reveal the important role of experts in ad-

vising the Eisenhower administration. Finally, Roman makes it clear that the Gaither

committee had a significant influence on the development of Eisenhower's national secu-

rity policies in 1958.

Despite these studies, much of the Gaither committee's history is still obscure.

Until recently, scholars faced severe hardships in studying the committee. Although the

report was declassified in the early 1970s, other information related to the committee re-

mains restricted. The release of documents over the past few years, however, allows

scholars to examine the Gaither committee in much greater detail. The new information

provides an opportunity to acquire a greater understanding of the Gaither committee's

IS See footnote 4; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988),335-37; Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic }.fissile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 27-30; Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of Changing Military Requirements, 1957-1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1975),59; and John C. Donovan. The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), 130-49. David Rosenberg also used newly classified documents in examining the Gaither committee, but he really did not add much to the other arguments. See David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," Intemational Security 7:4 (Spring 1983),46-49.

10

significance to the development of national security policies, Eisenhower's decision mak-

ing system, and the president's use of civilian experts to gain policy advice.

Scholars over the past two decades have reversed initial assessments of Eisen-

hower as a do-nothing president who spent more time on the golf course than at the White

House. While critical evaluations of Eisenhower's handling of important issues, in particu-

lar civil rights and the Third World, are becoming more prevalent, most scholars rank Eis-

enhower as a very good president. 16 While this study does not attempt to minimize the

failures and weaknesses of the Eisenhower presidency, it does show that Eisenhower es-

tablished a distinct decision making system, followed a consistent set of values, and ac-

tively supervised decision making during his presidency. While he regretted ever creating

the Gaither committee after the leak of its report, it did not stop him from carefully

evaluating the committee's findings to determine which ones would enhance u.S. security.

Eisenhower based his decisions on an established set of values and through the use

of a highly organized decision making system. In addressing national security issues, Eis-

enhower analyzed the impact a decision would have on the country's military security and

economic strength. 17 In an impassioned plea to the NSC in 1955, he told his advisors:

16 Pach and Richardson, Presidency o/Dwight D. Eisenhower, 238-39. For an excellent overview of the historiography of the Eisenhower administration. see Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: A Century Assessment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995). 1-13. 17 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate/or Change. /953-/956 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963),446 and 488; Robert W. Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenltower and the Corporate Commonwealth," American Historical Review 87:1 (February 1982): 87-122; John W. Sloan, "The Management and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20:2 (Spring 1990): 295-313; R. Gordon Hoxie, "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Bicentennial Considerations," ibid., 253~; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1982). 100-51; Iwan W. Morgan. Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders': The Eisenhower Administration. the Democrats and the Budget. 1953-60 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990); and Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in De/ense Politics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977).

Budget-Making time is always difficult and expenses are mounting. Nevertheless, no official of the Government is truly performing his duty unless he clearly realizes that he is engaged in defending a way of life over a prolonged period and unless he is constantly aware of the weight offinancial burden that our citizens are willing and able to bear. Our Government could force upon our citizens defense and other spending at much higher levels, and our abundant economy could stand it-for a while; but you cannot do it for the long pull without destroying incentives, inflating the currency, and increasing government controls. This would require an authoritarian system of government, and destroy the health of our free society.

We must, of course, do what we must do to defend ourselves. We must not put dollars above the security of the United States. But we must prove, if we are to demonstrate the superiority of our system, that in times of unprecedented prosperity we can pay as we go without passing on intolerable burdens to coming generations.

Consequently, every official of this Government must search out places where we can save a dollar which could be used somewhere else where its contnoution would be vital. This issue is critical. This doctrine should be remembered and preached in every waking hour by every official in this administration. 18

11

Almost four years after leaving the White House, Eisenhower described his belief

system in a letter to his brother. At the time, he was trying to provide direction to the Re-

publican party after it had been soundly defeated in the 1964 presidential election. His

advice for his party reflected the values and principles that guided his decision making. He

told his brother:

Here are some basic convictions in which I have long believed.

18 Memorandum of Discussion at the 270th Meeting of the NSC, December 9, 1955, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [hereafter ELI, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower [hereafter DDE Papers), NSC Series, Box 7. Folder - 270th Meeting of NSC, December 8, 1955,4-5. Eisenhower's concern with the impact of defense spending can be seen as far back as 1945. While Army chief of sta1I: he wrote in his diary, "I'm astounded and appalled at the size and scope of plans the [Army] staff sees as necessary to maintain our security position now and in the future .... The cost is terrific. We'll be merely tilting at windmills unless we can develop something more in line with financial pos5lDilities." See Diary Entty of Dwight D. Eisenhower, December 12, 1945, in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981). 136.

A Americans, individually and collectively, should strive constantly for greater excellence in the moral, intellectual and material structure of the nation.

B. The individual is of supreme importance. The rights guaranteed to him and the states by the Constitution and the "Bill of Rights" must be jealously guarded by government at all levels. The purpose of government is to serve, never to dominate.

C. The spirit of the people is the strength of our nation; human liberty and the American system of self-government with equal rights for all are the mainspring of that spirit ....

D. To be secure and stay free we must be strong morally, economically and militarily. This combination of strength must be used prudently, carefully and firmly to preserve peace and protect the nation's vital interests abroad.

E. Political power resides in the people; elected officials are expected to direct that power wisely and only as prescribed by the Constitu-tion.

F. Government must have a heart as well as a head. Republicans ... insist that solutions must conform to common sense and recognize the right and duty oflocal and state government normally to attack these at their roots before the Federal Government acts.

G. America cannot truly prosper unless all major areas and groupments [sic] in our society prosper. Labor, capital and management must learn to cooperate as a productive team, and reject any notion of "class warfare" bringing about maximum prosperity.

H. To protect all our citizens, and particularly workers and all those who are, or will be, dependent on pensions, savings and insurance in their declining years, we strive always to prevent deterioration of the currency. In the constant fight against inflation we believe that, except in emergencies, we should pay-as-we-go, avoiding deficit spending and adverse balance-of-payments.

1. Under God we espouse the cause offreedom and justice and peace for all people. 19

12

These values and convictions provided the cornerstones for Eisenhower's decision

making. His creation of the Gaither committee and later analysis of its report reflect these

concerns. Eisenhower sought the best advice possible so that he could make the most in-

formed decisions about U.S. national security needs. After receiving the committee's ad-

19 Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, December 3, 1964, EL, Milton S. Eisenhower Papers, 1938-1973. Box 15, Folder - Correspondence - 1964,2-3

13

vice in November 1957, he carefully considered how its recommendations, ifimplemented,

would affect the way of life he sought to preserve. He accepted the recommendations that

he believed were necessary to guarantee U.S. security without undermining individual

freedom or economic solvency.

Eisenhower's use of the Gaither committee represents one way he obtained

councel. When he entered office in 1953, he believed he could improve the organization

of the White House and the entire decision making process. As far as decisions affecting

national security, he viewed the NSC as the natural vehicle for obtaining advice. One of

his first directives was to have Robert Cutler study ways to make the NSC more efficient

and better able to provide guidance to his presidency. Cutler recommended significant

changes in the operations of the NSC. He suggested that the president attend as many

NSC meetings as possible, that the council meet regularly each week. and a new planning

board be established to prepare study papers for the full council. While Eisenhower did

not normally use the NSC to make decisions, he did use it to obtain advice, as a forum for

vigorous discussions, and as a means to disseminate policy to his key advisors. 20

Seldom did Eisenhower make decisions involving national security issues without

at least consulting the NSC. It must be stressed, however, that the NSC always remained

an advisory body, not a decision making one. When a reporter suggested in 1956 that the

NSC made decisions, Eisenhower responded that "The National Security Council is set up

to do one thing: advise the president. I make the decisions, and there is no use trying to

20 Anna Kasten Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," Diplomatic History 7:4 (Fall 1983): 307-26.

14 put any responsibility on the National Security Council-its mine.,,21 He also used it as a

channel to acquire advice from civilian experts. While Halperin, Kaplan, and Herken per-

suasively argue that Eisenhower used experts on several occasions, no scholar has sys-

tematically examined their use. The Gaither committee is a prime example of Eisen-

hower's use of a group of civilian experts to obtain policy advice.

Critics of the effectiveness of Eisenhower's NSC have often relied on the conclu-

sions reached by the Senate Committee on Government Operations in 1961. The commit-

tee stressed that Eisenhower's NSC was plagued by bureaucratic conflicts, reached com-

promise decisions, and failed to challenge already established strategies.22 However, most

scholars who have had access to internal NSC documents have raised serious questions

about these assessments. They argue that Eisenhower's NSC fostered vigorous debate,

facilitated long-term planning, and provided valuable advice.23 This study of the Gaither

21 The President's New Conference of January 23, 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Dwight D. Eisenhower [hereafter PPP-DDE), 1957 (GPO, (958), 74. 22 For the findings of the Senate committee, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 0perations, Organizingfor National Security. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery (GPO, (961); and Heruy M. Jackson, "Organizing for Security," Foreign Affairs 38 (1960): 446-56. For those scholars who have relied heavily on the committee's interpretations, see I. M DestIer, '"The Presidency and National Security Organization, " in Norman A Graebner (ed.), The National Security (New York: Oxford University Press, (986),230; 1. C. Heinlein, Presidential Staffand National Security Policy (Cincinnati: Center for the Study of United Slates Foreign Policy. 1963),48; Richard A Melanson and David Mayers (eds.), Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s (Chicago: University oflliinois Press, (987),2; and Huntington, The Common Defonse, 154. 23 See Anna Kasten Nelson, '"The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National Security Council," in Bischof and Ambrose, Eisenhower: A Century Assessment, 111-25; Nelson, '"The 'Top of Policy Hill'," 324: Phillip G. Henderson, "Advice and Decision: The Eisenhower National Security Council Reappraised, " in R. Gordon Hoxie, The President and National Security Policy (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, (984), ISS; R. Gordon Hoxie, '"The National Security CounciL" Presidential Studies Quarterly 12 (Winter 1982), 109; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, 126; and Stanley L. Falk, '"The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," Political Science Quarterly 74:3 (1964),418.

15 committee supports the conclusion that the NSC played a pivotal and effective advisory

role in Eisenhower's decision making system.

Eisenhower established the Gaither committee to obtain advice that he hoped

would be untainted by bureaucratic interests. This approach had worked for him previ-

ously when he created the Solarium task forces in 1953 and the Killian committee in 1954.

He established Project Solarium to evaluate different national security policies. After the

Soviet Union tested a hydrogen bomb and demonstrated increasing capabilities to deliver

nuclear weapons against the United States, he created the Killian committee to analyze the

ability of the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack against the United States. After the

groups completed their studies, Eisenhower incorporated many of their recommendations

into his national security programs.

Eisenhower's use of experts to acquire advice demonstrates the cooperation be-

tween leading scientific, engineering, business, and educational professionals and the fed-

eral government that had developed in World War IT and increased during the first fifteen

years of the Cold War.24 The government's use of experts continued during the Truman

administration. It was Eisenhower, however, who brought experts to central areas of

policy making. Herken eloquently concludes that ''During the fifteen years since the dawn

of the atomic age this nucleus of experts had for the most part merely witnessed the mak-

24 Brian Balogh. Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power. 1945-1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, (991),22 and 172; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industria/-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press); Albert H. Teich and Jill H. Pace (eds.), Science and Technology in the USA (Essex, UK: Longman House, (986), 20-22; Aaron L. Friedberg. "Science, the Cold War, and the American State," Diplomatic History 20: I (Winter (996), 117-18; Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (eds.), Sc;entists and National PO/icy-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); and Michael A. Bernstein and Allen Hooter, "The Cold War and Expert Knowledge: New Essays on the History of the National Security State," Radical History Review 63 (1995), 3-4.

16 ing of strategy and policy on the bomb. They had remained on the sidelines of the great

national debate over defense. . . . Henceforth, they would be at its center.,,25

In creating the Gaither committee, Eisenhower turned to leading experts who were

either specialists in particular disciplines or possessed a broad understanding of national

security issues. He asked the committee to evaluate whether the United States should

embark on an expensive program of constructing active and passive defenses, including

anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons, early warning radar, and fallout shelters. Based on

his desire to maintain a balance between economic and military security in his national se

curity planning, Eisenhower believed a committee of experts would avoid making recom

mendations that benefited a particular government department or military service but not

necessarily the nation. He failed to recognize, however, that the Gaither committee mem

bers entered the study with preconceived beliefs based on previous experiences or affilia

tions that would color their interpretations and analyses.

The Gaither committee was composed of a group of experts with diverse back

grounds. Its initial director, Rowan Gaither, was well-known for leading non-profit re

search organizations such as the RAND Corporation and the Ford Foundation. William

Foster and Robert Sprague, who co-directed the committee after Gaither became ill, built

their reputations in the chemical and electrical industries, respectively. James Killian and

James Baxter were the respective presidents of Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(M.LT.) and Wtlliams College. Generals James Doolittle and James McCormack had il

lustrious military backgrounds and close ties to the business community. Other members

25 Herkert. Counsels of War. 134.

17 of the committee were equally noteworthy. As a group they did not enter the Gaither

study with a set agenda, political objective, or financial motive. However, they did share a

concern for U.S. national security which went beyond their support for Eisenhower or his

policies.

In summary, this examination is significant for several reasons. First, it reveals the

previously unrecognized influence of the Gaither committee in shaping changes in Eisen

hower's national security policies and in the development of President Kennedy's. Sec

ond, it demonstrates that even in the emotionally charged atmosphere after the Soviet

launch of Sputnik, Eisenhower followed a consistent set of values and used an established

decision making system to evaluate the Gaither committee's findings and to make changes

in his national security policies. Third, it reveals that Eisenhower sought the assistance of

experts from a variety of professions to supplement the advice he received from his official

advisers. Finally, it shows that the Gaither committee reached its conclusions based as

much on the preconceptions of its members as on the evidence it examined.

CHAPTER 1- Eisenhower's Core Values and Decision Making Systems

Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election against Democratic

candidate Adlai Stevenson despite having never previously held a political office. While

both parties had asked him to serve as their candidate in the 1948 election. he had con-

stantly rebuffed any political overtures. It was only in early 1952 that he felt duty-bound

to accept the Republican nomination for president. After Eisenhower's victory, retiring

President Harry S Truman questioned Eisenhower's ability to make the transition from

military officer to president. Truman doubted whether Eisenhower could adjust to the

political arena where orders were often questioned and sometimes not followed. 1 Tru-

man's assessment proved shortsighted. As George Reedy, a key aide to then-Senator

Lyndon Johnson in the 1950s, recalled, Eisenhower's "most important attribute ... was

18

that he had held a number of political positions that the public did not regard as political.,,2

While Eisenhower had only limited experience with Washington politics, he had dealt suc-

cessfully with politics within the Army, at Columbia University, and as a commander of

multinational military forces. This experience and training provided significant preparation

for his time as president.

Prior to World War II, Eisenhower had pursued a successful, yet relatively undis-

tinguished, career in the army. After a quarter century of service, Eisenhower had risen to

I See Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 17-18; Robert H. Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 264; and David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992),412-14. 2 George E. Reedy, The U.S. Senate: Paralysis or a Searchfor Cunsensus (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1986),63.

19 the rank of colonel but had little chance of advancing much further in the peacetime army.

Because of the limited size of the military, promotions were rare and far between. U.S.

involvement in World War IT dramatically altered Eisenhower's career. From working for

General George Marshall's War Plans Division in Washington, D.C. to commanding Al-

lied forces in North Africa to planning and implementing the defeat of Germany in West-

em Europe, Eisenhower quickly rose in rank from an obscure colonel to a five star general

whose name was recognized and praised around the world.

After the war, Eisenhower served as the Army chief of staff from 1945 to 1948.

He then retired in order to become president of Columbia University where he remained

from 1948 to 1951. However, his service to the nation did not end while he was there.

From December 1948 to the late summer 1949, he spent several days a week in Washing-

ton serving as the unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon Truman's request

in late 1950 he left Columbia to become the first supreme commander of NATO's military

forces. He remained in this position until he announced his candidacy for the Republican

nomination in the late spring 1952.3 His experiences during the war and after re-enforced

and clarified his basic system of values and beliefs. Conservative by nature, Eisenhower

learned to cherish the American system of government and the freedoms it represented, to

value the importance of a balanced budget for a sound economy, and to make decisions

based upon a carefully organized and structured decision making system.

3 For a description of Eisenhower's activities between World War II and his presidency, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier. General of the Army. PreSident-Elect, v. 1 (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc .• 1983),433-528.

20

Eisenhower's Basic Values and Decision Making System

Specific values, based on a strong faith in the American democratic system of gov-

emment and in the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, guided almost all of Eisen-

hower decisions.4 While he contemplated Columbia University's offer of its presidency in

June 1947, he reminisced about his military career. In a letter to long-time friend Everett

"Swede" Hazlett, Eisenhower described how through his lifetime "I had absorbed several

simple conceptions and observations that would remain with me until the end of my days."

He then emphatically explained:

I believe fanatically in the American form of democracy-a system that recognizes and protects the rights of the individual and that ascribes to the individual a dignity accruing to him because of his creation in the image of a supreme being and which rests upon the conviction that only through a system of free enterprise can this type of democracy be prepared. Beyond this I believe that world order can be established only by the practice of true cooperation among the sovereign nations and that American leadership toward this goal depends upon her strength-her strength of will, her moral. social and economic strength and. until an effective world order is achieved, upon her military strength. S

Eisenhower's firmly held beliefs originated in a childhood characterized by rugged

individualism. strict discipline, and moral piety. His parents instilled in him and his broth-

ers the principles of hard work. equality, and individual responsibility.6 While these values

provided the core of Eisenhower's belief system, he never systematically examined the

4 See Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story o/the Eisenhower Administration (Westport. Cf: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1961), 155; and Steven Metz. "Eisenhower and the Planning of American Grand Strategy," Journal o/Strategic Studies 14:1 (March 1991),49-50. S Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, July 19, 1947, in Robert W. Griffith (ed), Ike's Letters to a Friend, 1941-1958 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984),40. 6 For descriptions of Eisenhower's childhood and upbringing, see Kenneth S. Davis, Soldier of Democracy: A Biography 0/ Dwight Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1945), 65-98; Bela Kornitzer, The Great American Heritage: The Story o/the Five Eisenhower Brothers (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1955),9-56 and 85-98; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 1, 18-42.

21 concept of democracy before World War II.7 However, after the United States joined the

allies, he emphasized the importance of understanding exactly why the war was being

fought. He argued that "Belief in an underlying cause is fully as important to success in

war as any local esprit or discipline induced or produced by whatever kind of command or

leadership action."s In a letter to his son, Eisenhower identified this underlying cause. He

explained that "no other war in history has so definitely lined up the forces of arbitrary op

pression and dictatorship against those of human rights and individualliberty."g In an or-

der to his commanders in 1942, he added that each American soldier needed to recognize

that "the privileged life he has led ... is under direct threat. His rights to speak his own

mind, to engage in any profession of his own choosing. to belong to any religious denomi-

nation, to live in any locality where he can support himself and his family, and to be sure of

fair treatment when he might be accused of any crime-all of these would disappear," if

Hitler's armies prevailed. 10

In his memoirs of his World War II experiences, Eisenhower further illustrated

these beliefs as he reflected on past, present, and future U.S.lSoviet relations. At a meet-

ing in Berlin in late 1945, Eisenhower met and developed a close friendship with Marshall

7 Kenneth Davis categorizes Eisenhower's beliefs as pan of a frontier philosophy. He explained that "The frontiersman. without thinking about it, stood for diverse multiplicity, for individual freedom. for simplicity, particularism. pragmatism." In discussing Eisenhower's early concept of democracy, Davis argues that the future president "had ... certain underlying principles of action which could be broadly grouped under the Golden Rule, which involved his profound belief in common people and his contempt for selfish egotism and for aristocratic pretensions. There was nothing coldly calculating, nothing relative in his belief in democracy; it was an absolute, instinctively held, upon which all relativities of action must rest" See Davis, Soldier for Democracy, 86-87; and Kornitzer, Great American Heritage, 17, 21, and 55-56. 8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Company, 1948),60. 9 Eisenhower to John Eisenhower, April 8, 1943, quoted in ibid., 206. 10 Eisenhower to Col. William Lee, October 29, 1942, quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 1.,207.

22 Grigori Zhukov, one of the Soviet Union's most successful military commanders. 11 Shar-

ing a common bond from the war, Eisenhower and Zhukov reminisced about their World

War IT experiences. During these conversations, they discussed a variety of topics ranging

from military strategy to the philosophical differences between democracy and commu-

nism. From these conversations, Eisenhower gained a greater understanding and appre-

ciation of the principles he supported "fanatically".

As they discussed the use of infantry during the war, Eisenhower quicldy realized

that he placed a much greater emphasis on the life of the individual soldier than Zhukov

and other Soviet leaders. For instance, Zhukov indicated that when confronting German

positions that were protected by land mines, it was standard Soviet military practice to

send their infantry straight through the minefield rather than to stop and try to clear it. 12

While Eisenhower found the willingness of Russians to die for their country commendable,

he was appalled that the Soviet leaders were so willing to sacrifice their soldiers to clear a

minefield. Furthermore, Zhukov's sincere dedication to communism, a system of govem-

ment that Eisenhower saw as inherently evil, demonstrated how powerful and persuasive

the communist message could be.

Eisenhower's abhorrence of communism did not stem from any systematic study of

that system of government. Rather, it developed from what he saw as communism's re-

jection of basic individual freedoms. He explained how Zhukov asked him to try ''to un-

II See Eisenhower to Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov, December 6, 1945, in Louis Galambos (ed.), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Chief of Staff: VII (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978),591; and Eisenhower to Zhukov, March 13, 1946, ibid, 921. 12 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 467-68. Zhukov told Eisenhower that "When we come to a mine field our infantry attacks exactly as if it were not there." Eisenhower's assessment of the comment was that "Americans assess the cost of war in terms of human lives, the Russians in the over-all drain on the nation."

23 derstand a system [of government] in which the attempt was made to substitute for such

motivations [individual aspirations] the devotion of a man to the great national complex of

which he formed a part.,,13 For Eisenhower, such a government placed the nation's wel-

fare above the individual's welfare. He believed that while communism's appeal to the

common good represented an admirable goal, it, in reality, resulted in "dictatorial rule" .14

He later elaborated this beliefby explaining that "The main issue [between the United

States and the Soviet Union] is dictatorship versus a form of government only by the con-

sent of the governed, observance ofa bill of rights versus arbitrary power ofa ruler or

ruling groUp."lS

These conversations in many ways helped shape Eisenhower's views of the Soviet

Union. While gaining a deep respect for Zhukov as a military leader and for the willing-

ness of the Soviet people to accept sacrifices for their nation, Eisenhower left Berlin with

an even greater loathing of the Communist system and the lack of compassion the Soviet

government seemed to have for its own people. After recounting these conversations, he

concluded his memoirs with a strident defense of democracy and a rebuke of communism.

"We [the democracies of the world]," Eisenhower emphasized, "believe individual liberty

rooted in human dignity, is man's greatest treasure. We believe that men, given free ex-

pression of their will, prefer freedom and self-dependence to dictatorship and collectiv-

ism.,,16

13 Ibid., 472. 14 Ibid .• 476. By January 1946, Eisenhower was circulating a G-2 analysis which concluded that "It is believed that Soviet policy is to increase internal economic and military strength to support expansion, wherever and whenever practicable, in the international field." Galambos (ed.), Papers o/Dwight David Eisenhower: VII, 744n. IS Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Entry, September 16, 1947, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 143. 16 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 477. For a discussion of these conversations, sec ibid., 460-74.

24 Prior to his election in 1952, Eisenhower never clearly articulated how he would

translate these beliefs concerning democracy, individual freedoms, and human dignity into

specific policies. However, he did provide, on occasion, glimpses into how these guiding

principles should be defended. Eisenhower believed that the fundamental role of any U.S.

president was to defend these principles with unflinching determination. In performing

this task, he recognized that in preserving the American way of life much more than mili-

tary defense had to be considered. Specifically, the defense of the United States involved

the protection of its territorial boundaries and citizens, while at the same time, maintaining

an economy that would allow the country to prosper. 17 These goals-preserving a way of

life, building a strong military, and overseeing a prosperous economy-came to guide Eis-

enhower's defense policies in the 1950s.

In testimony before the Military Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations

Committee in 1950, Eisenhower attempted to describe the balance that the United States

needed in its national security programs. While a strong military was obviously necessary,

he resisted increases in defense spending that he thought might undermine the very way of

life that it sought to protect. "If we should deem war imminent," Eisenhower testified

there would be no expense too great and no preparation too elaborate to meet what we would see as an impending crisis. I am not talking in the terms of crisis; rather, I think that we should strive to answer this question on the basis of a period of indeterminate length. Since the purpose is to defend a way of life at the heart of which is the guaranteed freedom of the individual, we ltiust not so-over-burden or tax the resources of the country that we practically enslave or regiment people in the effort to keep them

17 See Raymond J. Saulnier, "The Philosophy Underlying Eisenhower's Economic Policies," in Joann P. Krieg (ed.), Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier. President. Statesman (New York: Greenwood Press, 1981), 99-104.

free from foreign aggression. To wreck our economy, would be as great a victory for the Soviets as they could remotely hope for in a war.,,}8

In January 1952 President Truman presented Congress a $85 billion budget that

25

included approximately $65 billion in spending for national security programs. As submit-

ted, the budget would have created a $14 billion deficit. Eisenhower was shocked at such

spending levels and believed they represented the height of irresponsibility. In one of his

clearest statements of the philosophy that guided his decision making, he articulated the

dangers of high budgets and deficit spending. He recorded in his diary:

I am greatly afraid that certain basic truths are being forgotten or ignored in our public life of today. The first of these is that a democracy undertakes military preparedness only on a defensive, which means a long-term basis. You do not attempt to build up to a D-day because, having no intention of our own to attack, we must devise and follow a system that we can carry as long as there appears to be a threat in the world capable of endangering our national safety.}9

He then explained that "it is necessary to recognize that the purpose of America is

to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes, or lives.

As a consequence of this purpose, everything done to develop a defense against external

threat, except under conditions readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighed and

gauged in the light of probable long-term, internal, effect. ,,20 This theme consistently ap-

pears in Eisenhower's public and private life. He stressed that U.S. strength resided in a

way of life represented by a combination of "devotion to democracy", "free enterprise",

18 Excerpts from Military Sub-Committee of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, quoted in Memorandum for the Record. March [1] 1950, EL, DOE Papers. Name Series, Box 7, Folder - DOE Defense Warnings. 1945-51,8. 19 Eisenhower Diary Entry, January 22, 1952, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 209. Eisenhower's views on budget deficits might stem from the failure of his father's business in the 1880s due in part to the purchase of too many goods on credit After this business disaster, Eisenhower's father "had a lifelong dread of debt." Ambrose, Eisenhower, Y. 1., 19. 20 Eisenhower Diary Entry, January 22, 1952, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 210.

26 "industrial and economic strength", "moral probity in all dealings", and "military

strength".21 Together these qualities set the United States apart from the rest of the

world, and especially, the Soviet Union. Eisenhower believed that as long as the United

States emphasized and protected these values, it would prevail in the cold war.

[n Eisenhower's mind. the budget Truman submitted failed to take adequate cog-

nizance of the dangers inherent in deficit spending. He was especially concerned that the

proposed national security programs were designed to meet a specific period of danger in

the future. Eisenhower believed the fallacy of such planning was that you could never

predict with any accuracy the future actions of a potential adversary. The Truman budget

reflected the contention that 1954 was the year of maximum danger. Eisenhower disa-

greed. He stressed that national security programs should be based on what the country

could afford over an indefinite period. He viewed the Truman budget in a different light.

It emphasized a maximum year of danger without seriously considering the financial bur-

dens that would be experienced by the United States in the years that followed.

After critiquing the dangers of the Truman program. he identified the defense phi-

10 sophy that he would follow in his presidency. He explained that, as Army chief of staff

and then as the unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),

The reason that we [Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal] felt it so important to make some estimates of this kind [planning for the long-term] is that one of the most expensive practices in the maintenance of military force is unevenness in the scale of preparedness and in yearly appropriations. Peaks in one year or a series of years, followed by unwise reductions in a period when economy is the sole watchword, tend to demand extraordinary expenditures with no return. 22

21 Eisenhower Dimy Entry. Mtij 26, i 946. ibid.. 137. 22 Eisenhower Dimy Entry. January 22, 1952. ibid .• 211.

27 Eisenhower saw the proposed Truman budget as producing a fiscal drain on the economy

by producing large budget deficits without really increasing long-term U.S. security. He

then added that he and Forrestal had "very greatly hoped to produce a plan and budget

that would be, in effect, an element of bipartisan policy and which would be as free as

possible of the defects and costs brought about by yearly cuts or increases, usually due to

impulses or aberrations of the moment.,,23 Although not yet developed, Eisenhower was

articulating the basic premise of his New Look policy.

Eisenhower concluded his diary entry with a statement that exemplified the essence

of his national security philosophy. He explained that "We can say only that properly bal-

anced strength will promote a probability of avoiding war. In this sense, we need the

strength soon-but it must be balanced between moral power, economic power, and purely

military power.,,24 The goal of preserving and magnifying these trilateral "powers" guided

Eisenhower in the development of his administration's economic and national security

policies.

During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower championed similar beliefs.

He questioned the increased defense spending resulting from the Korean War, and more

important, from NSC 68.2S Between June 1950 and the 1952 election, spending for na-

tional security programs increased over 200 percent.26 Eisenhower challenged the efficacy

23 Ibid 24 Ibid., 213. 2S NSC 68 represented President Truman's strategy to increase defense spending to meet the perceived Soviet threat I will discuss it more later in the chapter. 26 See Paul Y. Hammond, "'NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament, " in Warner R Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder. Strategy. Politics. and Defonse Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 351-58. For exact amounts spent on national security programs, see The Statistical History o/the United States: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), 1124.

28 of such high spending and openly wondered whether the United States could continue to

afford such defense programs. In a campaign speech in September 1952, Eisenhower elo-

Quently expressed these doubts. He argued that increasing spending on defense would not

necessarily augment U.S. security. The key was to develop a defense strategy that the na-

tion could afford for the indefinite future. "The real problem," he explained, "is to build

the defense with wisdom and efficiency. We must achieve both security and solvency. In

fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is

more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field ofbattle.,,27

After Eisenhower accepted the Republican nomination, the outcome of the No-

vember election was a foregone conclusion. He had tremendous advantages over the

Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson. First, retiring Democratic President Truman was

unpopular. Second, the Democratic Party had been in power for two decades and people

were looking for a change. Finally, Eisenhower was a military hero who Americans be-

lieved could end the Korean War. Together, this fame and the widespread disenchantment

with the Truman administration formed the basis of Eisenhower's resounding victory. As

he entered the White House, Eisenhower viewed the election as a mandate for his political

and economic philosophy and endeavored to create a presidential administration that

propagated his values.28

On several occasions as the Army chief of staff and the unofficial chairman of the

10int Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower had visited President Truman at the White House. While

27 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Text of Eisenhower Address on 'Famine or Feast' Defense Policy," in New York Times, September 26, 1952, Sec. A, 12. 28 See the title of Eisenhower's presidential memoirs for his first term, Mandate/or Change.

29 conceding that the visits did not allow him to acquire a full understanding of how the

presidency operated, they left an impression that he did not like. In his memoirs, Eisen-

hower explained how he saw the reorganization of the White House as one of the priori-

ties of his new administration. He stressed that "With my training in problems involving

organization, it was inconceivable to me that the work of the White House could not be

better systemized [sic] than had been the case during the years I observed it.,,29 Eisen-

hower's military experience had led him to conclude that the best decisions were made

only after careful consideration by all of those involved.30 The reorganization of the White

House along the lines of a military staff system enabled Eisenhower to make careful deci-

sions in a manner that reflected his basic political and economic philosophy.

Contrary to the claims of some critics, Eisenhower did not see organization as an

end in itself.31 He viewed it as an effective means of acquiring, analyzing, and synthesizing

the vast information created by large administrative bodies. Eisenhower elucidated why

developing and maintaining an efficient organizational system was critical for effective

government:

Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent, even less can it, of itself, make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster. Organization makes more efficient the gathering and analysis of facts, and the arranging of the findings of experts in logical fashion. Therefore organization helps the responsible individual make the necessary decision, and helps assure that it is satisfactorily carried out. 32

29 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 87. 30 Oral History of Andrew 1. Goodpaster, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1967, 31. 31 See H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94:4 (October 1989): 963-89; and Henry M.lackson (ed.), The National Security Council (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). 32 Eisenhower, Mandatefor Change, 114.

30

Eisenhower carefully organized the White House to produce maximum effi-

ciency.33 "Because of his long experience with military organization," Chester Pach con-

eludes, ''Eisenhower believed that clear lines of authority radiating from the Oval Office

would ensure the smooth workings of his presidency.,,34 One of Eisenhower's greatest

criticisms of other presidential administrations was the lack of effective coordination

within the White House. To overcome this problem. Eisenhower appointed Sherman Ad-

ams as his special assistant. Adams supervised the White House staff and prepared the

president's schedule. Additionally, Eisenhower appointed other subordinates to supervise

specific areas of presidential policy such as congressional liaison (General Wilton B.

"Jerry" Persons), minority issues (Maxwell Rabb), and top secret national security matters

(first General Paul T. ''Pete'' Carroll and then Colonel Andrew 1. Goodpaster).35 By dele-

gating authority within a well-designed organization, Eisenhower achieved a degree of ef-

ficiency that previous presidents had rarely experienced. 36

The Reorganization of the National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) structure that Eisenhower inherited in 1953

was still relatively new. It had only been in existence since 1947 when Congress estab-

lished it as part of the National Security Act. As with any new organization, the NSC ex-

33 See Greenstein, Hidden-hand Presidency, 124-38; and Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Four Presidents and the Conduct of National Security Affairs - Impressions and Highlights." Journal of International Relations 2:1 (Spring 1977),27-28. 34 Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 38. 35 For descriptions of the organization of the Eisenhower White House, see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change. 115-20; Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. 38-39; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2. 24-26. 36 Oral History of Dr. Arthur S. Flemming. EL, 1988. 13.

31 perienced its own share of growing pains. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in

1950, Truman rarely attended the NSC meetings. However, after the outbreak of the war

and his acceptance ofNSC 68 Truman turned more and more to the NSC for policy ad-

vice.37 For the remainder of his administration, NSC 68 guided many of Truman's na-

tional security policies.38

In two of the most important studies of this period in U.S. history, Melvyn Leftler

and Burton Kaufinan stress the significance ofNSC 68 to the development of U.S. na-

tional security policy. In his masterful treatment of the Truman administration, Leftler de-

scribes NSC 68 as "one of the most significant studies of the entire cold war era.,,39 [n his

study of the Korean War, Kaufinan calls it ''the United States' field manual for waging the

Cold War.,,40 Neither one argues that NSC 68 reflected a significant shift in Truman's

policies, but they do contend that it resulted in a major increase in spending for national

security programs.

Written by the director of the Policy Planning Staff Paul Nitze, NSC 68 viewed the

Soviet Union as a relentless enemy that could only be deterred through the construction

and maintenance of a strong military force. It argued that "Our free society finds itself

37 For Truman's reluctance to participate actively at NSC meetings prior to 1950, see Samuel R Williamson. Jr., and Steven L. Rearden. The Origins of u.s. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 (New York: Sl Martin's Press, 1993),55-56; Anna Kasten Nelson. "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," Journal of American History 72:2 (September 1985), 360-61 and 373-78; James S. Lay, Jr., Organizational History of the National Security Council During the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations (GPO, 1960),5 and 14-22; and David L. Snead, "United States National Security Policy Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower: The Evolving Role of the National Security Council," M.A. Thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991,27-29. 38 For some recent analyses ofNSC 68, see Ernest R May (ed.), American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: Bedford Books ofSl Martin's Press, 1993). 39 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford University Press, 1992), 313. 40 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in CriSis, Credibility, and Command (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 28.

32

mortally challenged by the Soviet System. No other value system is so wholly irreconcil-

able with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its

own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our society.,,41 NSC 68 recommended

the appropriation of more money for defense spending because the military's role was "to

serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us . . . and to defend the integrity

and vitality of our free society and to defeat an aggressor. ,,42

Along with the Korean War, NSC 68 led the Truman administration to increase

spending for national security programs from the programmed $13.5 billion for FY 1951

(July 1, 1950 to June 30, 1951) to over $48 billion by December 1950. These spending

levels continued for the remainder of the Truman administration and reflected a growing

perception of the Soviet threat. The important point to emphasize is that only approxi-

mately ten percent of the spending increase went towards the cost of the Korean War.43

It was the other ninety percent that raised Eisenhower's concern. He did not believe that

the Truman administration had carefully analyzed the long-term impact of these increases

on the United States economy.

When Eisenhower assumed the presidency, he was determined to reduce defense

spending. In order to do this he wanted to examine different policy alternatives, ranging

from containment to roll-back that could possibly lead to a more efficient and effective

defense policy. He anticipated that the NSC would analyze these alternatives. One of

Eisenhower's most important advisors recalled that the president used the NSC to obtain

41 A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950, Papers Related to the Foreign Relations o/the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1950, v. 1 (GPO, 1977),244-41. 42 Ibid., 244. 43 Snead, "United States National Security Policy Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, n 2 L

33 "an integration of views which would be the product of continuous association between

skilled representatives of all elements germane to national security. ,,44 However, Eisen-

hower did not believe the NSC structure that he inherited from the Truman administration

was capable of performing such a study. Before he could assign the NSC this responsibil-

ity, he had to restructure it into the organization that he wanted.

Eisenhower turned to Robert Cutler, a key campaign aide and influential Boston

banker, for advice concerning the reorganization of the NSC. After a brief study, Cutler

recommended several changes to the NSC's structure. After the National Security Act

had been revised in 1949, the NSC only had five statutory members: the president, the

vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Na-

tional Security Resources Board (NSRB). The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the director of the Central Intelligence Agency acted as advisors. Finally. three groups:

the CIA. the senior NSC Staff, and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee served in

a variety of capacities. While the National Security Act established this membership

structure, it did not provide specific guidance as to how the NSC should operate. Before

the Eisenhower administration, the NSC did not operate in either a consistent or particu-

larly systematic manner. 45

Cutler asked several government officials, including Paul Nitze, how the NSC

could operate more efficiently and effectively. Nitze recommended several specific

44 Robert Cutler, No Time For Rest (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965, 1966), 296. 4S Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," 371-78. Prior to the revision of the National Security Act. the NSC's statutory members were the president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. See 1947 National Security Act. Public Law 253. 80th Congress. July 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495), reprinted in United States Statutes at Large, v. 61 (GPO, 1948), 495-97.

34 changes in the NSC's operations. He stressed that an advisory committee needed to be

created to formulate policy papers for consideration before the NSC. This committee

would replace the NSC senior staff. These policy papers should contain both majority and

minority opinions if a consensus could not be reached. This would ensure that the NSC

discussed the issues that could not be resolved by the advisory committee. Finally, he

concluded that the statutory membership of the NSC should remain the same. 46

Cutler incorporated many ofNitze's recommendations in his proposal to Eisen-

hower. He recommended major changes in the NSC's structure. The president should

attend and serve as chairman of as many NSC meetings as possible. Cutler believed that

one of the weaknesses of the Truman NSC was the failure of the president to take an ac-

tive role in its meetings. He argued that the president had to be an integral part of the

meetings for it to operate most effectively. The original senior staff should be replaced by

the newly created Planning Board whose purpose would be to develop policy papers for

NSC discussions. The Planning Board would consist of representatives from each of the

statutory agencies of the NSC. The Planning Board should create papers that reflected a

consensus opinion of its members. However, if there was no consensus or there were dis-

senting views, these opinions should be submitted to the NSC. Finally, Cutler recom-

mended the appointment of a new advisor, a special assistant for national security affairs,

to coordinate the activities of the Planning Board and the NSC.47

46 Paul Nitze to Cutler, February 17, 1953, National Archives [hereafter NA], RG 59, Records of the Dcpartment of State, SIS - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66D 95, Box 11. 47 "Report by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs," March 19, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954. 2: (GPO, 1984),245-57.

35

Eisenhower approved Cutler's recommendations and a few days later he publicly

announced plans for the restructured NSC. He appointed Cutler as his new special assis-

tant for national security affairs. He expanded the NSC's membership to include the sec-

retary of the Treasury, the director of Mutual Security Administration, and the director of

the Office of Defense Mobilization (replaced the NSRB chairman).48 As Cutler recom-

mended, he established the Planning Board to develop papers for NSC discussions. Fi-

nally, he announced that the NSC would periodically seek civilian consultants "to bring to

Council deliberations a fresh point of view, not burdened with departmental responsibili-

ties.,,49

Eisenhower's revamped NSC clearly shows how he desired to incorporate his

philosophy and organizational beliefs into his decision making. First, he expanded the

NSC's membership to obtain a more balanced examination of national security issues. By

including the secretary of the treasury and budget director, Eisenhower emphasized the

importance of analyzing the economic implications of any national security policies. Sec-

ond, by appointing Cutler and by creating the Planning Board, he revealed his desire for an

organization that would examine policy options more systematically. Finally, by occa-

sionally turning to civilian consultants, he recognized the significance of obtaining advice

independent of the government bureaucracy. so

48 Eisenhower also asked the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to attend NSC meetings as an informal member. Later, he created the Operations Coordinating Board to supervise the implementation of the NSC's decisions. See Lay, "Organizational History of the National Security Council," 23-30; and Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," 308-10. 49 Press Release, March 23, 1953, NA, RG 59, State Department Records. SIS - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66095, Box 11, 1. For discussions of the reorganization of Eisenhower's NSC, see Cutler, No Time For Rest, 293-313; and Snead, "United States National Security Policy," 36-39. so Most scholars, including both supporter and detractors, who have examined Eisenhower's NSC have recognized the importance of these factors. See for example Brands, "Age of Vulnerability": 963-89;

36 Project Solarium, NSC 16111, and the New Look

Having completed the reorganization of the NSC, Eisenhower turned to the federal

budget deficit that he inherited from the Truman administration. Forecasts for Truman's

FY 1954 budget predicted a shortfall of approximately S10 billion. To eliminate this

deficit, Eisenhower knew he would have to cut military spending because it represented

over 66 percent of the total budget.sl While Eisenhower had questioned Truman's refusal

to increase spending beyond SIS billion in the late 1940s, he was very reluctant to accept

budgets for national security programs that had tripled in three years to over S50 billion. 52

As with his reorganization of the White House and the NSC, Eisenhower believed that his

national security programs could be developed and implemented in a cheaper and more

efficient manner.

In September 1952, the NSC asked Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, Secretary

of Defense Robert Lovett, and Director of Mutual Security Averell Harriman to prepare a

report that analyzed the status of U.S. national security policies. This small committee

presented its report, NSC 141, to Truman as he prepared to leave office in January 1953.

It recommended the continuation of existing policies and the appropriation of additional

Griffith. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth." 87-122; lohn W. Sloan, "The Management and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower," 295-313; Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders '; Huntington, The Common Defonse; Richard D. Challener, "The National Security Policy From Truman to Eisenhower: Did the 'Hidden Hand' Leadership Make Any Difference," in Graebner, The National Security; Aliano, American Defonse Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy, and Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon. SI Statistical History of the United States, 1124. S2 See Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 489. For Eisenhower's desire for more money for defense spending, see Eisenhower Diary Entry, January 8, 1949, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 153.

37 funds to improve continental defenses. S3 This report served as the starting point for

changes Eisenhower wanted to make in U.S. national security programs.

At one of the NSC's first meetings in the new administration, Cutler recommended

that this report be used as the basis for the study and development of new national security

policies. S4 During the spring, Eisenhower and his top advisors discussed ways to cut

spending on national security policies while at the same time preserving U.S. military

strength. In May Eisenhower ordered the NSC to create three panels to review possible

national security policy alternatives. The NSC turned to outside consultants to staff these

groups. Operating under the codename Project Solarium, the panels launched a six week

investigation of current and future U.S. polices.ss The NSC's use of experts outside the

government established a precedent that would be repeated several times in the Eisen-

hower presidency, as when he subsequently established the Gaither committee.

The NSC appointed the directing panel of Project Solarium to develop guidelines

for the study.s6 The panel established three task forces-A, B, and C. S7 The panel ordered

S3 Memorandum for the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Mutual Security, January 16, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,211 and 213. 54 Minutes of the 13 1st Meeting of the National Security Council. February II, 1953, NA, RG 273, Reconts of the National Security Council. Folder - 13 1st Meeting of the NSC. ss For a discussion of the establishment of Project Solarium, see Snead, "United States National Security Policy Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower," 39-41; Glen H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Strategy. Politics and Defense Budgets, 407-10; and William B. Pickett, "The Eisenhower Solarium Notes," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter 16 (June 1985): 1-3. 56 The members of the Directing Panel were General James H. Doolittle (chairman), Robert Amory, Jr., Lt. General L. L. Lemnitzer, Dean Rusk, and Admiral Leslie C. Stevens. See Memorandum to the SecretaryofState, 5/15153, FRUS 1952-1954, 2:1, 327. S7 Eisenhower assigned each task force one of three specific strategies: containment. drawing a line in the sand, and roU-back, and asked them to develop a national security policy based on that strategy. There was evidently a fourth alternative-Alternative D. Although it remains unclear as to what Alternative D was, it was based on "the poSSIbility that time is not working in our favor." See Memorandum for the President. undated [June 19537], NA, RG 273, NSC. Folder - 15Sth Meeting of the NSC, 1. Richard Immerman bas found similar evidence related to an Alternative D. See Richard H. Immerman,

38 Task Force A to assume the position advocated by NSC 141-the continuation ofTru-

man's containment policies-and to recommend a national security policy based on that

alternative. The panel assigned Task Force B the responsibility for developing a national

security policy based on explicitly stating the areas which the United States would auto-

matically defend against a Soviet attack. Finally, the panel ordered Task Force C to de-

velop a policy based on "rolling back" communism. S8 As Glenn Snyder succinctly argues,

Eisenhower's goal in creating these task forces ''was to highlight three dramatically differ

ent policy lines and to develop thoroughly the implications of each. "S9

The directing panel with Eisenhower's approval, selected seven members for each

task force. George Kennan, General James McCormack, and Admiral Richard Conolly

served as the chairmen of task forces A, B, and C, respectively.60 The panels convened in

June at the National War College in Washington, D.C. for a six week study of their re-

spective alternatives. The details of Project Solarium were of the highest confidentiality.

George Kennan stated years later that "It was all highly secret--you have no idea how well

"Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14:3 (Summer 1990), 337. 58 Memorandum to the Secretary of State, May 15, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 2:1,325-26. S9 Snyder, "The 'New Look'," 408. 60 Task Force A consisted of Kennan, Col. C. H. Bonesteel, Rear Adm. H. P. Smith, Col. George Lincoln, C. T. Wood, 1. Maury, and Capt. H. S. Sears. Task Force B was composed of McCormack, Maj. Gen. J. R Deane, J. K. Penfield, P. E. Mosely, Calvin Hoover, 1. C. Campbell, and Col. E. S. Ligon. Task Force C consisted of Conolly, Lt. Gen. L. L. Lemoitzer, G. F. Reinhardt, Col. K. Johnston, Col. A J. Goodpaster, Leslie Brady, and Col. H. K. Johnson. Memorandum of Discussion at the 157th Meeting of the National Security Council, July 16, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,395-96. It remains unclear how and when the members of these task forces were selected. A list of prospective members on May 20, 1953 is remarkably different from the task forces that made presentations to the NSC in July. See Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, May 20, 1953, ibid., 350-52.

39

this was protected; nobody knew [about Project Solarium] the whole summer despite the

fact that fifty to a hundred people were involved in it ... 61

The directing panel ordered each task force to consider three possible courses of

Soviet action before making their recommendations:

1) The Soviets may seek a military decision with the West at any time, based either on a determination to resort to war as an instrument of policy or upon a miscalculation as to free world intentions.

2) The Soviets may maintain, at some risk of general war, aggressive pressure, continuously or interspersed with active phases of "Peace Offensives", to extend their control and weaken the free world coalition.

3) The Soviets may accept a defensive posture in order to consolidate the present position of the Soviet bloc and to avoid a risk of general war, relying upon and encouraging the divisive forces within the free world. 62

These alternatives represented the generally accepted views of U.S. policy makers as to

possible future Soviet actions.

On June 26 the three task forces made preliminary presentations to the NSC.

Cutler wanted to familiarize the Council with the task forces' general arguments and to

acquaint each task force with what the others were doing. Not surprisingly, the recom-

mendations followed the basic arguments assigned earlier to each task force. However, a

common theme did permeate their reports. The theme, best stated in Task Force A's re-

port, was that "On the question of the relation of our defense effort to domestic economic

61 Transcript of "Project Solarium": A Collective Oral History, John Foster Dulles Centennial Conference, Princeton University, 1988,3. See also George F. Kennan, Memoirs, v. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), 182. 62 Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, June I, 1953, FRUS /953-/954,2:1,361.

40

problems, the position will be stressed that the U.S. economy can stand for a considerable

length of time a higher level of defense expenditures than the currently operative ones. ,,63

On July 16 each task force presented its final report to the NSC. Under the direc-

tion of George Kennan, Task Force A recommended continuing the policies advocated by

the Truman administration with slight increases in spending to improve continental de-

fenses. 64 The task force believed that the Soviet Union posed a threat in three broad ar-

eas: its maintenance ofa strong and dangerous military establishment, its control of East-

em and Central Europe, and its ability to subvert democracy throughout the world.6s In

light of these threats, Kennan's panel stressed the need for flexibility in U.S. policy plan-

ning as the directions of Soviet policy could never could be predicted with great accuracy.

It concluded that the United States needed ''to recapture essential flexibility, to effect bet-

ter integration and cohesion within our strategy, and to improve its implementation.,,66

Task Force A criticized the rapid demobilization of American forces after World

War IT and warned that a similar policy at the conclusion of the Korean War would pro-

vide "the most likely invitation to aggression. ,,67 It therefore advocated a policy of main-

taining military forces at a level sufficient to fight either limited or general wars. Military

force and equipment levels, the task force stressed, should be based on analyses of Soviet

63 Notes Taken at the First Plenary Session of Project SolariUlll, June 23, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954.2:1, 389. 64 These policies were summarized in NSC 153. See NSC 153!1 -"A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secreta!y on Restatement of Basic National Security Policy," June 10, 1953, reprinted in Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Basic Documents from the Eisenhower and Kennedy Periods. Including the Basic National Security Papersfrom 1953 to 1959 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988), 19-33. 65" A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "A" of Project SolariUlll," July 16, 1953, NA, RG 273, NSC. Folder - 157th Meeting of the NSC, 7-8. 66 Ibid., 15-16. 67 Ibid .. 22.

41

military capabilities not "the zigzags of Soviet political policy. ,,68 It argued that the United

States needed to maintain adequate military capabilities to achieve its objectives and to

resist any possible Soviet aggression. Flexibility was Task Force A's military strategy.

The United States needed the capability to meet any Soviet aggressive move with an ap-

propriate military response.

Task Force A identified the second objective of U.S. national security policy as

rallying both Americans and non-Americans to the strategy of containing the Soviet Un-

ion. It believed that the public had to understand what was being done to counter the So-

viet threat. Only a well-informed public would support the policies necessary to wage the

cold war. It placed considerable importance on maintaining European support for U.S.

policies. Although the authors believed that Americans would support increased defense

spending and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, they expressed reservations that

Europeans would. "A strong, vitalized and cohesive free Europe, orientated towards the

same general objectives of the United States," the task force emphasized, "would be most

important, if not decisive, factor in the successful resolution of the Soviet threat. ,,69

The last issue addressed by Task Force A concerned a topic ofspedal interest to

Eisenhower. He wanted to balance the budget as soon as possible and knew that defense

spending had to be cut. He, therefore, asked each task force to predict the probable costs

of their policy recommendations assuming the Korean War would end in 1953.70 Task

Force A indicated that under its proposals defense programs would cost between $43 and

68 Ibid., 23. 69 Ibid., 83. 70 See Project Solarium Outline, undated [June 1953?}, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - 155th Meeting of the NSC, 7-8.

42 $44 billion for fiscal years 1954 and 1955 and then gradually decline to approximately $35

billion per year. The task force believed that the United States economy was capable of

meeting this burden of defense spending without raising taxes. However, it supported the

imposition of a new defense tax if additional revenue was needed to offset the increased

costs. In the final analysis, it argued that "The United States can afford to survive.,,71

The Directing Panel assigned Task Force B the alternative of drawing a line be-

yond which any move by the Soviet Union would precipitate a general war with the

United States. Under this strategy, the United States would explicitly state what Soviet

actions would automatically lead to general war. Supporters of this strategy assumed that

if Soviet leaders knew the consequences of their actions, they would by more reluctant to

act aggressively. Task Force B criticized the strategy of Task Force A as too ambiguous

and strongly opposed continuing the policies of the Truman administration. It concluded

that such a strategy "may be beyond the economic capabilities of the United States, will

deprive the nation of the initiative, and will certainly divert the American people from the

task of making the best possible use of their power and resources to be prepared to inflict

decisive defeat on the Soviet Union if it imperils the vital security of this nation by continu-

ing an active policy of expansion.,,72 In its place, the task force recommended developing

a strategy based on waging a general war if Soviet bloc military forces advanced beyond

their current borders.

7\ "A Report to the NSC by Task Force "An,n 1-1,46, and 56. 72 "A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "Bn of Project Solarium, n July 16, 1953, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - 157th Meeting of the NSC, 30.

43

To facilitate the implementation of its strategy, Task Force B stressed that the

United States needed to expand its offensive nuclear power. 1l0ur policy," it concluded,

"will bring into focus the central fact that U.S. strategic power is the ultimate military de-

terrent to Soviet aggression. lI73 The task force believed that by relying on nuclear weap-

ons, the United States would be able to avoid the costly expense of maintaining sufficient

military forces to wage both limited and general wars. In addressing the costs of alterna-

tive B, the task force assumed a position similar to Task Force A It emphasized that, re-

gardless of the cost, the United States had to address the Soviet threat. IIWhatever the

evils of inflation, whatever the economic problems involved in efforts to control it, II the

task force argued, IIthese cannot be weighed in the same scales with the grave danger to

our national survival.1I74 It concluded that IIAlternative B is in effect an announcement that

the United States and the Free World will accept the risk of annihilation before they accept

Soviet domination. 1I7S

The directing panel ordered Task Force C to develop a national security policy

based on the alternative of "rolling-back" communism. This alternative proposed using

every means available, except military force, to undermine communist-controlled coun-

tries. Task Force C stated its broad objectives as "ending Soviet domination outside its

traditional boundaries, destroying the communist apparatus in the Free World, curtailing

Soviet power for an aggressive war, ending the Iron Curtain, and cutting down the

73 Ibid., 13. 74 Ibid., 20. 7S Ibid., 1-4.

44 strength of any Bolshevik elements left in Soviet Russia. ,,76 It believed that the only way

to achieve these goals was to take the foreign policy initiative away from the Soviet Un-

ion. Alternative C required the United States to assume a much more aggressive policy.

Believing that the United States had forfeited the initiative by only reacting to Soviet ac-

tions, it argued that the only way to regain the advantage in the cold war was "by waging

a political offensive." Stated more explicitly the task force asserted that "we must proceed

to bring about the political subversion and liquidation of the conspiracy against us. ,,77

To regain the initiative, Task Force C proposed two strategies-subverting com-

munism and continuing a military build-up. Subversion was the policy of action, the mili-

tary build-up was the insurance if subversion failed. Task Force C recommended that "In

carrying out this policy [of subversion], we recommend that this Government aggressively,

both overtly and covertly, attack the Communist apparatus wherever it be found in the

world .... What we seek to do is to harass and hound every conceivable Communist ac-

tivity using all available political, legal, financial and economic devices in our posses-

sion.,,78 The task force placed few limitations on possible U.S. subversive policies. It ar-

gued that "All means of action ... --short of preventive war-are available under the Al-

temative.,,79 It recognized that this policy embodied a greater risk of war but argued that

the only way to win the cold war was to be aggressive.

76 "A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "C" of Project Solarium. ... July 16, 1953, NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - 157th Meeting of the NSC. 16. 77 Ibid., 9. 78 Ibid., 22. 79 Ibid .• 85.

45 Task Force CIS evaluation of the expense of its policy revealed a greater initial cost

than either alternatives A or B but a smaller amount in the long term because the cold war

would have ended in victory. It called for 560 billion annual defense budgets for fiscal

years 1954 and 1955 and $45 billion for each year thereafter until the United States won

the cold war.so It argued that the cost was worth the benefits of victory. By assuming this

policy, the United States would prevail in any type of conflict with the Soviet Union.

After receiving the task force presentations, the NSC ordered the Planning Board

to analyze the reports and to develop a policy paper incorporating the best features of

each one. The Planning Board established an ad-hoc committee composed of representa-

tives from each of the statutory members of the NSC. For three weeks the committee

studied the three reports. Robert Bowie, the director of the Policy Planning Staff and the

State Department representative on the Planning Board, stated that "the planning board

worked on this ... and attempted to build on what had been in the task force reports, par-

ticularly Task Force A which was pretty much recognized as the principal basis on which

the president had come down. ,,81 The Planning Board presented the draft of it policy pa-

per to the NSC on September 30. This policy paper evolved through three broad stages:

NSC 162, 16211, and 162/2 .

. Eisenhower established the tone ofNSC discussions concerning the issues studied

in Project Solarium when he bemoaned the paradox of defense spending. He explained

that in the struggle with the Soviet Union, "We were engaged ... not only in saving our

money or in defending our persons from attac~ we were engaged in the defense of a way

80 Ibid., 62. 81 Ibid., 22.

46 of life, and the great danger was that in defending this way of life we would find ourselves

resorting to methods that endangered this way of life.,,82 Eisenhower's prescription for

avoiding this paradox was to adopt a level of defense spending that the United States

could afford for the indefinite future. It was the NSC's responsibility to discover that

level.

The question of defense spending divided the NSC. Secretary of Treasury George

Humphrey and Director of the Bureau of Budget Joseph Dodge believed that defense

spending should be limited to between $35 and $36 billion for FY 1955. Dodge argued

that lithe threat to the economy was part and parcel of the Soviet threat." In his view, the

continued budget deficits could lead to a bankrupt treasury. Secretary of Defense Charles

Wilson, who recommended defense spending levels of approximately $42 billion, vehe

mently opposed Dodge's position.83 The debate became so heated that Secretary Hum-

phrey exclaimed, liThe military ought to be so damned dollar conscious that it hurts. 1184

The president resolved the dispute by stressing that the administration's national security

policies would place an equal emphasis on economic security and military strength. as

Tied closely to the issue of the level of defense spending was how the country

should meet the costs of its other national security programs. Humphrey and Dodge ar-

gued that a balanced budget was as important to national security as a strong military es-

tablishment. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that a balanced budget was an

82 Memorandum of Discussion at the 163rd Meeting of the National Security Council, September 24, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, 2:1, 469. See also, Untitled Remarks by Eisenhower to Cabinet, April 20, 1953, EL, DOE Papers, White House Central Files, Subject Series, Box 45, Folder - National Security (I), 1-2. 83 Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council. October 7, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,516. 84 Ibid., 521. 85 Ibid., 522.

47

ideal goal but that it should not be reached at the cost of reducing national security. He

believed that the position of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget

"would be interpreted as an absolute commitment to balance the budget and ... felt such a

commitment at this time to be very dangerous. ,,86 The debate ended when Humphrey and

Dodge reluctantly accepted a higher level of defense spending with the understanding that

a balanced budget remained the ultimate goal.

Discussions ofNSC 162 continued at the Council meetings on October 13 and 29

where the members debated what types of weapons-nuclear andlor conventional-should

fonn the foundation of U.S. military planning. The Ioint Chiefs of Staff (ICS) and the sec-

retary of defense wanted military plans to be based on the availability of both conventional

and atomic weapons. They argued that the proposed cuts in defense spending would re-

quire that tactical nuclear weapons be assigned a more integral role in military planning.

Admiral Arthur Radford, the new ICS chairman, argued that "unless we could use these

weapons [tactical nuclear weapons] in a blanket way, no possibility existed of significantly

changing the present composition of our armed forces. ,,87 Although the president and the

rest of the NSC believed that NSC 162 clearly allowed this option, Eisenhower reaffirmed

this position by concluding that "we should state what we propose to do, namely, to keep

the minimum respectable posture of defense while emphasizing [U.S. atomic] offensive

capability. ,,88

86 Ibid, 524. 87 Memorandum of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 13. 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, 2:1, 547. 88 Ibid., 573.

48 In its final report, the NSC established the basic goal of the United States as

meeting the perceived Soviet threat, while avoiding economic ruin.89 Not surprisingly, it

incorporated recommendations from each of the Solarium task forces. While it viewed the

world through the spectrum of an EastlWest struggle as did the task forces, it placed a

much greater influence on economic security than any of them. To achieve its national

security goals, it established three requirements:

a. Development and maintenance of:

I) A strong military posture with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power;

2) U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of communication; and

3) A mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to insure victory in a general war.

b. Maintenance ofa sound, strong and growing economy.

c. Maintenance of morale and free institutions and the willingness of the U.S. people to support the measures necessary for national security.90

These requirements embodied most of Task Force A's recommendations.91 The differences

arose in NSC 1 62/2's emphasis on both economic and military strength.

89 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, October 13, 1953, ibid., 578. 90 Ibid, 582. 91 Williamson and Rearden argue that Eisenhower's "New Look" strategy was simply a continuation of Truman's policies with a few modifications. While true in part, this argument does not sufficiently explain the sharp spending reductions Eisenhower sought in his military programs. Truman might have been a fiscal conservative, as Williamson and Rearden argue, but Eisenhower was much more of one. See Williamson and Rearden. Origins of u.s. Nuclear Strategy, 105-7, 148-49, and 191-93. For the development of Eisenhower's thinking concerning the New Look, see Samuel F. Wells, "The Origins of Massive Retaliation." Political Science Quarterly 96 (Spring 1981): 31-52.

49

The NSC also adopted the principle that both tactical and strategic atomic weap-

ons would be used in wartime.92 To differing degrees, each task force recommended a

greater reliance on these weapons in case of a military contlict. Accepting this premise,

the NSC argued that "The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the

manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive re-

taliatory striking power if the area is attacked. ,,93 The true meaning of "massive retalia-

tory striking power" became much more clear when the NSC emphasized the important

role of nuclear weapons in any type of contlict. "In the event of hostilities," it argued, "the

United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other muni-

tions. ,,94

While the NSC recognized that the efficacy of atomic deterrence could be limited,

it still believed that reliance on nuclear weapons provided the most cost efficient strategy

for successfully waging the cold war. It concluded that if Soviet leaders knew there were

certain actions that would lead automatically to a U.S. nuclear counterattack, then they

would pursue a more cautious policy. This concept of clearly declaring specific responses

to possible Soviet actions is reminiscent of Task Force B's "drawing the line" .9S The idea

in NSC 162/2 was not to define an entire policy around this concept but to warn the

Kremlin leaders of the possible consequences of their actions. The NSC believed that if

the United States explicitly stated its position regarding Soviet aggressive moves, then the

92 War. as defined here. meant a general conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Conflict in peripheral areas of the world. i.e. Korea. were classified differently. 93 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council. October 30. 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, 2: 1,585. 94 Ibid., 593. 9S Ibid., 581.

50 United States military officials would be able to develop plans based on more clearly de-

tined policies.

In addressing the policy of "rolling-back" communism, NSC 162/2 concluded that

there was little likelihood of detaching a country from the Soviet bloc. However, it did

recommend that the United States "Take overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet

prestige and ideology as effective instruments of Soviet power.,,96 NSC 162/2 accepted

Task Force C's premise that communism could be thwarted in countries not firmly in the

Soviet bloc. The idea was to undermine the governments of countries which had com-

munist leanings, but at the same time, were not directly tied to the Soviet Union. The Eis-

enhower administration clearly adopted this position in its later policies towards countries

such as Iran and Guatemala.97

NSC 162/2 represented the Eisenhower administration's clearest expression of its

"New Look" national security policy. It emphasized that military plans would be devel-

oped under the assumption that atomic weapons would be used in future conflicts,

authorized the use of both overt and covert operations to achieve U.S. goals, and recog-

nized the importance of economic strength to U.S. security. The paper also stressed the

importance of the rest of the world to the United States. The policy paper stated that

"The assumption by the United States, as the leader of the free world, of a substantial de-

96 Ibid., 595. 97 In an infonnativc analysis of the literature describing Eisenhower's foreign policies and the Third World, Robert McMahon argues that Eisenhower failed to take adequate cognizance of the forces ofnationalism in the Third World. Instead, the president viewed revolutions in developing countries as communist inspired. This view led to policies which ultimately weakened the U.S. position in the Third World. See Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73.

51 gree of responsibility for the freedom and security of the free nations is a direct and essen-

tial contribution to the maintenance of its own freedom and Security.,,98

The development ofNSC 162/2 clearly reveals the importance Eisenhower as-

signed to examining policy alternatives thoroughly within a tightly organized decision

making system. By stressing his economic and political philosophies to the participants in

this system, he provided guidance for the development of his policies. General Andrew

Goodpaster, a member of Task Force C and later Eisenhower's staff secretary, recalled

that in the NSC meetings, the president

wanted to get . . . all of the responsible people in the room, take up the issue, and hear their views. He had what amounted to a tacit rule that there could be no non-concurrence through silence. If somebody didn't agree, he was obliged to speak his mind and get it all out on the table ... and then in light of all of that, the President would come to a line of action, he wanted everybody to hear it, everybody to participate in it, and then he wanted everybody to be guided by it.99

This approach allowed Eisenhower to select his preferred national security policy a1terna-

tives.

The Threat of Surprise Attack and the Killian Committee

In early 1954 Eisenhower again turned to the NSC and outside consultants to ex-

amine a problem that had been bothering him for many months. Recent technological ad-

vances, including the successful Russian test of the H-bomb and the development of long-

range aircraft, raised the question whether Soviet Union could launch a successful surprise

98 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, October 30, 1953,584. 99 Transcript of "Projcct Solarium": A Collective Oral Interview, 20.

52 attack against the United States. 1oo The lack of concrete intelligence concerning Soviet

military capabilities or intentions accentuated the concern. In March. Eisenhower turned

to the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization to study

whether the Soviet Union had the capability and/or intention to launch an attack against

North America and what the United States could do to prepare for that possibility.

Eisenhower's fears mirrored the concerns of many earlier U.S. policymakers. In

the immediate aftermath of World War IL U.S. officials recognized the preponderance of

u.S. world power. IOI However, after the Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb in 1949,

u.S. superiority became less certain and accurate assessments of Soviet intentions became

even more paramount. Ever since Pearl Harbor, Americans experienced a foreboding

sense of vulnerability. The Soviet atomic test now raised the specter that the Kremlin

leaders might one day acquire the capability to attack the United States. In assessing the

significance of Soviet possession of the bomb less than two months later, Air Force Chief

of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg revealed that "There are strong reasons to believe that a sudden

surprise attack by Soviet atom bombers would result in not only inflicting unthinkable

mortalities on our people and our industry, but also might cripple our strategic air forces,

thereby denying us the means to redress the balance through retaliation."I02 In a separate

memorandum on the same day, Vandenberg discussed the inadequacies of U.S. air de-

fenses and asserted that "almost any number of Soviet bombers could cross our borders

100 For excellent an exceUent analysis of U.S. assessments of Soviet military strength. see John Prados, The Soviet Threat: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982). 101 Lefiler, Preponderance of Power, 96. 102 Draft Memorandum for the President, November 16, 1949, Library of Congress [hereafter LC}, Papers of Muir Fairchild. Box I, Folder - 9/30/49-1217/49. l.

53 and fly to most of the targets in the United States without a shot being fired at them and

without even being challenged in any way.,,103

During the early 1950s, a Soviet surprise attack was not expected, but the possi-

bility could not be ignored. Most intelligence estimates from this time period, including

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 3, NIE 48, and NIE 64, concluded that the Soviet

Union would not deliberately initiate war. 104 Retired Air Force General Idwal Edwards

chaired a committee for the NSC that examined the capability of the Soviet Union to in-

jure the United States and concluded that if the Soviet leaders launched an attack it

"would be an act of desperation and not an exercise in military judgment." lOS However,

while Edwards's committee and the other NIEs did not expect an attack, they would not

eliminate that possibility. For example, after arguing that the Soviet Union would proba-

bly not initiate a general war against the United States, NIE 48 quickly equivocated and

stressed that "Soviet courses of action can never be predicted with confidence. In particu-

lar the possibility of deliberate initiation of general war cannot be excluded at any time

merely because such initiation would contradict past Soviet political strategy."l06

103 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11116/49, ibid., 5. 104 See NIE 3, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions," November 15, 1950, NA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Box 1 - NIE's Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955, Folder #1,9; NIE 48, "Likelihood of the Deliberate Initiation of Full-Scale War by the USSR Against the US and Its Western Allies Prior to the End of 1952," January 18, 1952, ibid., 1; and, NIE 64 (part ll), "Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action Through Mid-1953," December ll, 1952, ibid., 2. For a description of the Soviet Union's reluctance to go to war, see Leffier, Preponderance o/Power, 488. lOS Memorandum of Discussion at the 148th Meeting of the National Security CounciL June 4, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,369. Eisenhower agreed completely with Edwards's assessment See ibid., 370. For a copy of Edwards's report see NSC 140/1 - Report to the National Security Council by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, May 18, 1953, ibid., 328-49. 106 NIE 48, NA, RG 263, CIA, Box 1 - NIE's Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955, Folder #1, 2. At the same NSC meeting where Edwards presented his report, CIA Director Allen Dulles concluded that the U.S. could "not expect any warning ofa Soviet 'sneak' attack." Memorandum of Discussion at the 148th NSC Meeting, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,369.

54 Eisenhower also received a steady stream of conflicting reports concerning Soviet

capabilities and u.S. wlnerabilities. A notable deficiency in most of these reports was the

lack of a detailed analysis of Soviet intentions. In 1953, the Strategic Air Command

(SAC) initiated Operation Tailwind to discover "How well could SAC survive a Pearl

Harbor type ofattack?,,107 Simulating one possible Soviet attack scenario, SAC launched

ninety-nine bomber sorties against targets in the United States during a 48 hour period

when the Air Defense Command (ADC) was on alert for an attack. Despite the attack

warning and its alert status, the ADC intercepted only six bombers. lOS This dismal per-

formance provided evidence to support SAC's contention that "it is extremely difficult to

effectively prevent penetration of coordinated heavy bomber attacks which hit the early

warning screen from many directions simultaneously. ,,109

Influenced in part by Operation Tailwind, the NSC examined U.S. continental de-

fenses during the summer of 1953. It concluded that

The present continental defense programs are not now adequate to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the USSR is capable of launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of government, the continuity of production, or the protection of the industrial mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and exposed metropolitan centers. This condition constitutes an unacceptable risk to our nation's survival. 110

107 Memorandum Op-36C/jrn. March 18, 1954, reprinted in David Alan Rosenberg. "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours," Intemational Security 6:3 (Winter 1981182),26. Any Soviet attack precipitated on these lines would have required the launching of bombers on one-way missions. At this time, the Soviets Union relied on the TU-4 bomber whose range would not allow two-way missions to the United States without refueling. See SE-36 - Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US Through Mid-1955, March 5, 1953, NA, RG 263, CIA. Box 1 - NIE's Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955, Folder #1 - NIE's Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955,2-5. 108 Memorandum Op-36C/jrn. March 18, 1954, 24. See also L. Weinstein et al., The Evolution o/U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Waming. 1945-1972 (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1975). 103-4. 109 Memorandum Op-36C1jrn. March 18, 1954, 24. 110 NSC 159/4 - Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, September 25, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,478.

55

The NSC, therefore, recommended improving intelligence-gathering capabilities, expand-

ing radar coverage, increasing fighter-interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, developing plans

for government continuity after an attack, and adopting new civil defense programs.lll

These recommendations closely mirrored the views of the JCS at the same time. 112

While these reports made it clear that U.S. defenses were inadequate to stop a

Soviet attack, the question remained as to whether the Soviet Union intended to take such

actions or even if it could. In a striking report, "Magnitude and Imminence of the Soviet

Air Threat to the United States," neither the Air Force, the Navy, nor the JCS expected

the Soviet Union to launch an attack before the end of 1957.113 The Navy representative

summarized this position by arguing that "The preservation of the security of the USSR

under the worst possible contingencies of war will loom large in their estimate of the

situation. In the Soviet mind, overwhelming strength will be required. It is not believed

that the Soviets are likely to conclude, between now and 1957, that they have such

strength." 114

However, Soviet advances in both atomic weapon technology and long-range

bomber capabilities clouded these conclusions. While it would have been difficult for the

Soviet Union to launch an attack, its testing of the H-bomb in 1953 and its introduction of

new medium and long-range bombers in 1954 indicated that it was acquiring the capability

1 II Ibid, 483-85. 112 Memorandum for the NSC, August 21, 1953, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1951-53 Geographic File, Folder - CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 25, 396. See also Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution o/Continental Air Defense. /945-/960 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1991), 193. 113 Magnitude and Imminence of Soviet Air Threat to the United States - 1957, October 30, 1953, RG 218,lCS, 1951-53 Geographic File, Folder - CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec. 5, 1216-18. 114 Ibid., 1217.

56 to do so. liS More importantly, the destructive power of nuclear weapons provided an ag-

gressor the potential capability to win a war through a carefully planned first strike. 116 At

this stage, the perception among U.S. policymakers that the Soviet Union sought world

domination became paramount. Charles Bohlen, the State Department representative on

Truman's NSC senior stat( concluded "there is no important disagreement [among poli-

cymakers] that ifmatters reach the point where the Soviets attain the capability of deliver-

ing a 'decisive' initial blow on the United States without serious risk to their own regime,

they would do so." \17

The question whether the Soviet Union would launch an attack, if it could, was

further complicated by American memories of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had caught the

United States by surprise and mounted a devastating attack to start World War II. The

introduction of nuclear weapons raised the stakes if a similar attack was used to start a

1\5 In 1954, the Soviet Union introduced two new medium and long-range bombers: TU·16 (codenamed Badger) and M-4 (codenamed Bison). See David A. Brinkley and Andrew W. Hull. Estimative Intelligence (Washington. D.C.: Defense InteUigence School, August 1979). chapter 3, reprinted in Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems 0/ National Intelligence Estimating (New York: Defense Intelligence College, 1993),217.18. 116 A. 1. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowe~ Selection and Use o/Strategic Air Bases (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 1963),227. Although not publicly published until 1963, this report was completed and widely circulated within the government in 1954. 117 Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen), March 27, 1952, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,5-6. It must be stressed that Bohlen and most policy makers did not expect the Soviet Union to attack the United Statcs. However, differences did arise between policy makers concerning the risks the Soviet Union would be willing to take to achieve its goals. Regardless, Bohlen's entire statement concerning the assumptions of U.S. policymakers about the Soviet Union is particularly revealing. He argued that "there are certain fun· damental features of the Soviet system which are generally uncontested by all analyses." He then ex· plained that "it is generally accepted that the Soviet system:

a. Is a totalitarian system, heavily armed and continuously seeking to increase its military p0-

tential, where the power of decision rests entirely in the hands of a small group of men; b. By the nature of its state structure, reinforced by its ideology, is fundamentally and unappeasably hostile to any society not suscepUDle to its control; c. The directing group of the Soviet Government and of international Communism are [sic] totally uninluDited by any considerations of a humanitarian. moral, or ethical character which have acted, in history, as restraints upon the use of force ...

57

new war. Jack Nunn, in a pioneering study of the importance of the Soviet first strike

capability, carefully articulates how this capability when tied to the memories of Pearl

Harbor changed U.S. perceptions of its vulnerability. "The Japanese attack [on Pearl Har-

bor]," he argues, "was etched on the collective U.S. consciousness, the name linked with a

vision of a surprise attack-pitting a calculating aggressor against an unaware and unwar-

like democracy.,,118

One Eisenhower's greatest problems was that he did not know what the Soviet

Union planned to dO. 119 While he did not expect the Kremlin to order an attack, he could

not rule out the possibility. If the Soviet Union possessed the capability to attack the

United States with nuclear weapons and U.S. defenses remained vulnerable to such an at-

tack, the enemy posed a potentially deadly threat. This cruel dilemma bedeviled Eisen-

hower. While he did not expect an attack, the assumption that the Soviet Union might

attack, if it believed it could do so without suffering devastating retaliation, formed the

basis of U.S. policies. 120 In essence, Eisenhower had to base his policies on a strategic

alternative that he did not expect to happen.

118 Jack H. Nunn, The Soviet First Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982),55. For the importance of the first strike in 1950s to leading strategic thinkers, see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (princeton University Press, 1991), vii ~ ibid., "A 'Wasting Asset"': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," International Security 13:2 (Winter 1988/89): 5-49~ and Lawrence Freedman. The Evolution o/NuclearStrategy(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, 1983),34. 119 See Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981),253. 120 This assumption can be seen in almost every assessment of the Soviet Union's objectives and capabilities. These assumptions are explained in Brinkley and Hull, Estimative Intelligence, 215-16~ Scott A. Koch (ed.), Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, /950-/959 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), xiv~ James Meikle Eglin, Air Defense in the Nuclear Age: The Post-War Development 0/ American and Soviet Strategic Defense Systems (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988), 272~ and Raymond L. Garthoff, Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration a/Soviet Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), 10.

58 In 1954 Eisenhower continued to view U.S. strength with confidence. However

technological advances in both weaponry and delivery capabilities raised the possibility

that the Soviet Union might soon be able to launch a surprise and devastating attack

against the United States. In March 1954 he expressed this concern to his Science Advi-

sory Committee and asked its members whether technological means existed to obtain

early warning of a Soviet surprise attack and to defend the United States if such an attack

did occur. 121 His concerns led to the creation of a special committee to address these

technological questions. 122

In July 1954, Dr. Lee Dubridge, the chairman of the Science Advisory Committee,

proposed a study that would analyze Soviet capabilities and explore possible scientific and

technological means to meet that threat. Upon Eisenhower's request, Dr. James Killian,

president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Science Advi-

sory Committee, agreed to serve as chairman of the soon to be created Technical Capa-

bilities Panel (TCP). From September 1954 to February 1955, this panel, known as the

Killian committee, assessed the Soviet Union's strengths and weaknesses, the wInerability

of the United States to surprise attack, and the measures needed to improve U.S. offensive

121 Dr. Lee A. Dubridge to Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, May 24, 1954, EL, DOE Papers, White House Central Files, Subject Series, Box 104, Folder - World War III (1) Confidential File, 1-4. For the best summary oCthe activities oCthe Killian committee, see James R Killian, Jr. Sputnik, Scientists. and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977),67-93. 122 In addition to appointing this committee, Eisenhower also established the National Indications Center on July 1 ''for the express purpose of 'preventing strategic surprise'." R Cargill Hall, "The Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framing American Astronautics to Serve National Security," Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives 27:1 (Spring 1995),61-62.

59

and defensive capabilities. The committee presented its 190 page report to the National

Security Council in February 1955.123

The TCP's activities, conclusions, and recommendations are of striking importance

to understanding the Gaither committee. As will be shown in later chapters, many of the

Gaither committee's conclusions and recommendations reflected the influence of the TCP.

Considering their respective memberships, this should not have been surprising. Of the

nine members of the TCP's steering committee, five-Dr. James Killian, Dr. James Fisk,

Dr. James Baxter, Dr. James Doolittle, and Robert Sprague-would later serve on the

Gaither committee in significant capacities. 124 In addition, another five consultants served

on both the TCP and Gaither committee. 125

In the preface to its study, the TCP's steering committee stated that its objective

was to examine "the present wlnerability of the United States to surprise attack and ways

whereby science and technology can strengthen our offense and defense to reduce this

hazard."I26 To address this problem fully, Killian asked outside consultants to sit on three

panels that would examine specific problems related to technological changes. Panel 1,

chaired by Dr. Marshall Holloway, examined U.S. offensive capabilities. Panel 2, headed

by Dr. Leland Haworth, studied U.S. continental defense. Finally, Panel 3 directed by Dr.

Edwin Land, studied U.S. intelligence capabilities. The creation of these three panels re-

flected key assumptions that guided the steering committee. First, it viewed offensive and

123 The Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, February 14, 1955, [hereafter "Killian Report"1 reprinted in Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought, 189-90 (in original document). 124 Ibid., iii. 125 These five were Dr. Albert Hill, Dr. Brockway McMillan. Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Dr. David Beckler, and Col. Vincent Ford. See ibid., 187-88. 126 Ibid .• v.

60 defensive weapons as integrated components in the defense of the United States. Second,

it believed that continental defenses, ranging from early warning to anti-aircraft weapons,

were inadequate. Finally, it recognized that the acceleration of Soviet technological de

velopments increased U. S. vulnerability. 127

The TCP concluded that U.S. offensive forces, comprised at that time primarily by

the Strategic Air Command, were essential to the reduction of U.S. vulnerability to a sur-

prise attack. In reaching these conclusions, it operated under the assumption that "both

'offensive' and 'defensive' forces are essential to accomplish the general mission of de-

fending the United States. Both are deterrents to surprise and, should war begin, both

contribute to the destruction of the enemy power .. Neither one alone is adequate to defend

the United States." 128 The panel concluded that aircraft and later missiles would provide

the United States with a deterrent capability that might force Soviet leaders to reevaluate

any plans to launch a first strike. If the Soviets did order an attack, the survival of an of-

fensive striking capability would allow the United States to retaliate through a devastating

counterstrike. Finally, the existence of an offensive striking force gave the United States

the option oflaunching a first strike ifit so chose. l29 While never the official policy of the

127 In addition to these three panels, Dr. Jerome Wiesner chaired the Communications Working Group that examined the vulnerability of U.S. communication systems. 128 "Killian Report," v. 129 This capability should be viewed as providing two policy options. First, the U.S. could initiate the use of atomic weapons after a war had already begun. Second, the U.S. could initiate either a preemptive or preventive war. For a description of the distinction between preemptive and preventive war, see Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 126; and General Thomas S. Power, Design for Survival (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1964, 1965),39 and 79-84.

61 United States, this option was still being seriously considered in different crisis situations

in the 1950s.130

In evaluating the threat ofa surprise attack against the United States, the commit-

tee gave no real consideration to Soviet intentions. The Killian committee readily ac-

knowledged that it based its conclusions on technological changes rather than on any re-

evaluation of Soviet intentions. It simply accepted the assumption that the Soviet Union's

ultimate goal was world domination and that Soviet leaders would be willing to use any

means to achieve it. Technological advances in weaponry and delivery systems magnified

the threat. The committee was particularly concerned with the Soviet development of a

hydrogen bomb and its research into ballistic missiles. "This evolution of nuclear bombs

and the means to deliver them," the committee stressed, "has given warfare a potential for

swift, complete destruction and sudden decisiveness that is revolutionizing our concepts of

offense and defense." 131

The Killian committee concluded that advances in delivery capabilities posed a

greater threat than improvements in nuclear weaponry. While it did not preclude further

advances in warhead design and/or yield, it stressed that these advances would be rela-

tively minimal. Equally important, it noted that the United States would not be able to

130 For Eisenhower's denunciation of preventive war, see PPP-DDE, 1954 (GPO, 1955),698. In addition. see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 132-46; Tami Davis Biddle, "Handling the Soviet Threat: 'Project Control' and the Debate on American Strategy in the Early Cold War Years," Journal o/Strategic Studies 12 (September 1989): 273-302; Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans (Boston: South End Press, 1987), X-xi, 3, and 5; Paul Bracken, The Command and Control o/Nuclear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983),83-84 and 183-84; Weinstein et al., Evolution o/U.s. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 101 and 201; David Alan Rosenberg, "Toward Annageddon: The Foundations of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1961," Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Chicago, 1983, 197 and 221; and Bundy, Danger and Survival, 251-52. 131 "Killian Report." 3-4.

62 maintain its lead in warhead technology for long since present ''technology is already near

the upper limit of yield per ton of bomb allowed by nature."lJ2 With the imminent emer-

gence of virtual equality in the field of nuclear weaponry, advances in delivery systems be-

came pivotal in the military balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United

States. 133

The committee examined the effectiveness of two types of delivery systems:

bombers and ballistic missiles. It argued that "Attack by manned bombers will continue to

be a threat long after the advent of the intercontinental missiles.,,134 However, it did em-

phasize the potential strategic and psychological consequences of the development of the

ICBM. It concluded that

In the hands of the Soviets such a weapon [the ICBM] would represent an even greater jump in capability since it would to a considerable extent wipe out the present geographical advantage enjoyed by the U.S. With such a capability the Soviets could put pressure on much of the world outside of the U.S., either by direct threat to them or by threat against the U.S. It, therefore, appears urgent to achieve this type of capability before the Soviets, in order to at least match threat with threat. 13S

The defense problems raised by both long-range bombers and ballistic missiles

brought into focus the issues before Panels 2 and 3. Offensive striking forces would be

useless if they could be destroyed before the United States could launch a retaliatory

strike. This dilemma forced these panels to determine the impact of technological ad-

vances in several areas. Panel 2 had to analyze whether the threat raised by these ad-

vances could be countered by improving U.S. defenses. Panel 3 had to determine how

132 Ibid., 7. 133 Ibid., 14. 134 Ibid., 76. 135 Ibid., 64.

63 technological advances could strengthen U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities. For both

panels, technology could either undennine or strengthen U.S. security.

that

In a scathing critique of U.S. continental defenses, the Killian committee concluded

the United States is at present unacceptably vulnerable to surprise attack. Our military defenses are as yet numerically deficient and have serious qualitative weaknesses. The defenses could be avoided or overwhelmed and might even be unaware of an attack until the first bomb exploded. Under these circumstances our cities could suffer millions of casualties and crippling damage, and enough SAC bombers and bases could be destroyed to reduce drastically our ability to retaliate. 136

More specifically, the committee argued that if the Soviet Union launched an attack, the

United States would receive little or no warning because of the weaknesses in its intelli-

gence gathering capabilities and the gaps in radar coverage at both high and low alti-

tudes. 137 These deficiencies opened the United States to a surprise attack if the Soviet

Union decided to launch one.

Because of the existing and expected advances in delivery capabilities and the de-

ficiencies in continental defense, Dr. Land's panel examined how effectively technology

was being used to acquire intelligence of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, the United

States lacked a clear knowledge of Soviet capabilities. The various U.S. intelligence

agencies, including the CIA and the intelligence departments within each branch of the

military, based their estimates of Soviet capabilities on limited first-hand evidence, ex-

trapolations from known U.S. weapons capabilities, estimates of Soviet manufacturing

capabilities, and sightings of Soviet military hardware (often at military parades and air

136 Ibid., 18. 137 Ibid .• 75-6, 96-7, and 101-2.

64 shows).138 The Killian committee aptly concluded that, "estimates of the specific capa-

bilities and immediate intentions of the Soviets have, at their center, only a very small

core of hard facts.,,139 [emphasis in original] Quite obviously, intelligence estimates based

on such evidence could not be totally reliable and might lead to incorrect, or at least, am-

biguous conclusions and recommendations.

Although most of the section of the Killian report dealing specifically with the ac-

quisition and interpretation of intelligence remains classified, enough evidence is available

to indicate the committee's basic conclusions and recommendations. It emphasized that

"there is a good possibility that an enemy's preparations for a massive surprise attack on

the United States would be detected. However, this possibility is not a certainty."I40 Ac-

cordingly, it stressed that "Because we are unable to conclude that the United States

surely will, or surely will not, have useful strategic warning in the event of a surprise at-

tack, we recommend that our planning take serious account of both possibilities.,,141 The

committee recommended that the United States "must find ways to increase the number of

hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic

138 While U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities during the 1950s have become increasingly available over the past few years, there remains considerable ambiguity as to how the U.S. agencies gathered the information they used to make these estimates. For an excellent description of sources of U.S. intelligence and the variety of organizations involved in intelligence gathering and assessment, see Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985); and Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 24-37. For an analysis oftbe limitations on intelligence, see Brinkley and Hull, Estimative Intelligence, 215-22. For an example of the use of aerial overflights (besides the U-2) to acquire intelligence of the Soviet Union, see Robert S. Hopkins, Ill, "An Expanded Understanding of Eisenhower. American Policy, and Overflights," a paper presented at the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations Annual Conference, June 1995. 139 "Killian Report," 25. 140 Ibid., 24. 141 Ibid., 25.

65 warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross

overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat."142 [emphasis in original]

An important question is whether the committee believed that the United States

should launch either a preventive or preemptive war against the Soviet Union. While the

committee never explicitly made either recommendation, evidence suggests that it sup-

ported maintaining a first strike capability.143 For example, it argued that, "Our striking

forces must blunt the attack at its source."I44 In a more extensive analysis, it concluded

that "The importance to the defense of the U.S. ofan offensive air striking force stems

from its ability to attack the Soviet long-range air force on the ground.,,14S By being able

to strike at the "source" or "on the ground," the United States would possess the capabil-

ity of preventive war, or at a minimum, preemptive war. 146

The final Killian report made several specific recommendations to limit the vulner-

ability of the United States to a surprise attack by the Soviet Union. The committee rec-

ommended the acceleration of ballistic missile development, the acquisition of additional

bases for the Strategic Air Command, the completion of a comprehensive review of both

u.S. and Soviet target systems, the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line, the

addition of gap-filler radar, the use of atomic weapons in defense against attacking bomb-

ers and/or missiles, and the study of ways to reduce civilian casualties in the event of an

attack. 147

142 Ibid., 44. 143 This conclusion is based on the declassified portions of the final Killian report and published accounts of the activities of the committee. 144 Ibid., 17. 145 Ibid., 49. 146 See footnote above and Rosenberg. "Toward Armageddon," 221. 147 "Killian Report," 37-46.

66

The Killian committee's findings had a tremendous influence on Eisenhower and

his administration, especially in the areas of accelerating missile development and intelli-

gence-gathering. David Rosenberg argues that "the TCP ... provided an important

benchmark in the evolution of Eisenhower's thinking about nuclear strategy."I48 Eisen-

hower acknowledged in his memoirs how he accelerated the development of both the

IRBM and the ICBM after receiving the Killian report. 149 However, Dr. Land's intelli-

gence panel probably had the most important influence. It recommended the construction

of an airplane capable of photographing the Soviet Union from high altitudes. The rec-

ommendation to build such a spy plane was so sensitive that it was presented to Eisen-

hower directly, instead of to the full NSC. 1SO Eisenhower accepted this recommendation

and immediately initiated the U-2 program. In the view of retired CIA historian Donald

Welzenbach, after the meeting of the TCP, "Killian and Land virtually controlled the de-

velopment of the nation's technical intelligence collections agencies."m

The recommendations of the Killian committee that Eisenhower incorporated into

his national security policies were tremendously influential. They laid the foundation for

the acceleration of U.S. intelligence-gathering and ballistic missile programs. The TCP

exercise provided a clear example of how Eisenhower sought advice from outside consult-

ants who were experts in specific fields. Through the filter of his national security deci-

148 Rosenberg. "The Origins ofOverkiIl: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," 38. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 325. 149 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 208. See also, Memorandum of Discussion at the 257th Meeting of the National Security Council, 8/4/55, FRUS 1955-1957, 19 (GPO, 1990), 100-103. ISO Killian to Herbert F. York, May 27, 1976, Massachusetts Institute ofTecbnology [hereafter M.LT.] Archives, MC 423, James R Killian Papers, Box 13. Folder - Correspondence L-Z, 2. lSI Donald Welzenbach, "Din Land: Patriot from Polaroid, " Optics and Photonics News (October 1994), 23.

67 sion making structure, Eisenhower ordered, received, and evaluated this advice. He ac-

cepted parts, modified others, and rejected some. The result of the entire process was a

policy that reflected Eisenhower's desire to wage the cold war based on a combination of

political, military, and economic strength.

Conclusiolls

Eisenhower succeeded admirably in achieving the goals he established for his first

term as president. Starting with a systematic review of U.S. national security programs in

1953, Eisenhower devised a military strategy based on his country's overwhelming superi

ority in atomic weapons and delivery capabilities. He decided that, rather than react to

every world crisis with the deployment of troops or by increasing the defense budget, the

United States would emphasize the deterrent power provided by atomic weapons. Be

cause of this strategy, he was able to cut overall defense expenditures by reducing the size

of U.S. conventional-non-nuclear-forces. This ''New Look" strategy, as it was called,

enabled Eisenhower to balance two of his first four annual budgets and to maintain the

necessary military capability to launch a devastating counterstrike if the Soviet Union de

cided to attack the United States.

In all of his decisions, Eisenhower attempted to preserve what he viewed as the

twin foundations of American society: democratic government and a viable capitalist eco

nomic system. When making decisions concerning national security matters, he believed

these principles could only be protected by maintaining a careful balance between a sound

economy--meaning low inflation and a balanced budget-and defense spending. An over-

68 emphasis on one would only lead to weakness in the other. Throughout his first term in

office, Eisenhower struggled to maintain these twin goals while resisting almost constant

calls for more spending. 1s2

To ensure the integration of his political and economic philosophies into his na-

tional security policies, Eisenhower employed a decision making system which he had

carefully designed at the inception of his presidency. Utilizing a complex system of

committees and advisory groups, he believed that reviewing a problem or issue step-by-

step from the lowest to the highest levels of policy making would facilitate the develop-

ment of the best possible policy alternatives. Through this process, Eisenhower expected

to obtain advice and guidance based on careful study and discussion. 1s3 On matters of na-

tional security, the NSC stood at the center of this process. Following the advice of Rob-

ert Cutler, Eisenhower streamlined the process for developing policy papers, established a

standardized procedure for presentations at NSC meetings, set the criteria for using out-

side consultants, and expanded the NSC membership to include both the secretary of the

treasury and director of the budget.

Eisenhower used these new procedures to analyze national security issues. On two

occasions during his first term, the NSC turned to outside consultants to examine specific

national security problems. In 1953, it created three task forces as part of Project Solar-

ium to examine different policy alternatives. Eisenhower incorporated many of their final

152 Eisenhower's attempts to balance militaIy spending with economic security are fully detailed in John w. Sloan, Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991); Morgan, Eisenhower Versus The Spenders'; and Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 153 Sec Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), The Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1984), 63-87.

69 recommendations in his new national security policy-NSC 162/2. This policy emphasized

the maintenance of an overwhelming offensive striking power, the use of tactical nuclear

weapons as well as conventional arms in future conflicts, and the employment of covert

operations to undermine communism. In 1954, Eisenhower again turned to outside con-

sultants when he ordered the creation of the Killian committee to analyze the wlnerability

of the United States to a Soviet surprise attack. After receiving the committee's conclu-

sions, Eisenhower accelerated the development of both IRBMs and ICBMs and imple-

mented the U-2 program to acquire intelligence of Soviet military capabilities and possible

intentions.

Scholars, such as H. W. Brands, I. M. Destler, and Samuel Huntington, have

questioned the effectiveness of Eisenhower's organizational structure. They argue that

rather than forcing policy advisors to make clear decisions on controversial issues, the

NSC developed recommendations based on compromise and consensus-building. Eisen-

hower's critics claim that these recommendations were more often than not too broad or

ambiguous. In either case, they provided only minimal guidance in developing specific

policies. Is4

In contrast to the above interpretations, the examples presented in this chapter re-

veal an organizational system that provided the type of advice that Eisenhower sought. ISS

154 For critiques of the Eisenhower NSC, see Brands, "Age of Vulnerability," 986; Oestler, "The Presidency and National Security Organization"; Huntington. Common Defonse, 154; Heinlein. Presidential Staff and National Security Policy); Melanson and Mayers (eds.), Reevaluating Eisenhower. ISS For more positive analyses of the Eisenhower NSC, see John Prados, Keepers olthe Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman 10 Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Falk. "The National Security Council Under Truman. Eisenhower, and Kennedy"; Nelson, "The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the NSC," in Bischofand Ambrose (eds.), Eisenhower: A Centenary, Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security

70 Eisenhower turned to the NSC and outside consultants to acquire the assistance he needed

to make decisions. He utilized the recommendations he received from Project Solarium

and the Killian committee to help fonnulate his policies. These committees and the NSC

provided Eisenhower a means to explore different policy options in an environment con-

ducive to open discussion and debate. From these alternatives, Eisenhower was able to

develop and augment his ''New Look" policies.

The examples of Project Solarium and the Killian committee reveal the reliance

Eisenhower placed on his decision making system. He used outside consultants to obtain

fresh appraisals concerning specific problems and the NSC as a forum for thorough dis-

cussion and debate. Through this system, he was able to develop policies that reflected his

economic, military, and political philosophies. Although not without its faults, the organ-

izational structure Eisenhower constructed and used in making decisions concerning na-

tional security policies during his first term provided clear and effective guidance for

waging the cold war.

Council"; Sloan. "The Management and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower"; and Hoxie, "Dwight David Eisenhower: Bicentennial Considerations," 253-264.

CHAPTER 1 - The Establishment and Background or the Gaither Committee

The New Look policies that Eisenhower adopted in 1953 and 1954 remained the

71

center pieces of U.S. strategy through his presidency as he relied on nuclear weapons and

continued technological improvements to deter the Soviet Union as well as covert and

psychological operations to wage the cold war against communism. The experts involved

in both Project Solarium and the Killian committee helped devise the administration's

policies. The results seemed positive. After a brief economic downturn in 1954, the

economy prospered. Furthermore, while the Soviet Union continued to strengthen its

military forces, the United States augmented its own capabilities by placing greater em-

phasis on strategic nuclear power.

Eisenhower's policies won acclaim with the American population. Without sacri-

ticing security, defense spending was at its lowest since before the Korean War. In addi-

tion, the economy was experiencing steady growth with little infIation--one of Eisen-

hower's most important goals. After defeating the Democratic candidate, Adlai Steven-

son, in the 1956 presidential election, he began his second term with hope and confidence.

Unfortunately, the promising beginning to 1951 proved short-lived. By the end of the

year, his administration was under attack from all angles. In late November 1957, he

wrote a friend that "Since July 25th of 1956, when Nasser announced the nationalization

72 of the Suez, I cannot remember a day that has not brought its major or minor crisis.

Crisis had now become 'normalcy.,,,t

Of all the controversies that plagued Eisenhower in 1957, the question of civil de-

fense had the greatest influence on the establishment of the Gaither committee. Debates

raged over the implications of radioactive fallout, the correct balance between shelters and

evacuation, and the requirements for stockpiling emergency materials.2 These controver-

sies were not new. Ever since the Soviet Union acquired the capability of attacking the

United States, the president and his advisors recognized the potential consequences of a

nuclear exchange for the civilian population, the country's infrastructure, and the govern-

ment's ability to continue to function.3 Months prior to the establishment of the Gaither

committee, Eisenhower told the NSC ''that the picture of the terrific destruction resulting

from a nuclear attack warranted taking a look at the whole matter in terms of determining

how much destruction the United States and its people can absorb and still survive.''"'

The question that concerned Eisenhower the most about civil defense was how to

develop a plan that would "avoid hysteria on one side and complacency on the other. "S

He recognized that U.S. civil defense programs were important to U.S. security, yet he did

I Dwight D. Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, November 18, 1957, in Griffith (ed.), Ike's Letters to a Friend, 190. Eisenhower makes reference to the same letter in his memoirs to highlight the problems he faced in 1957. See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 226. 2 Sec Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 54; and Allan A. Winkler, Lifo Under A Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York: Oxford University, 1993),84-135. See also Letter to President Eisenhower [from eight Representatives], June 7, 1957, EL, White House Central Files, Official Files, Box 526, Folder - (3),2-4. 3 Sec for example, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. August 24, 1951, RG 218, JCS, 1951-1953 - Geographic File, CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49), Sec. 14,5. 4 Memorandum of Discussion at the 306th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 20, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,381. 5 Memorandum of Discussion at the 257th Meeting of the National Security Council. August 4, 1955, ibid., 99.

73 not want to adopt a plan that would undermine the way of life he sought to protect. He

desired a middle ground between regimenting society in preparation for an attack and ac

cepting the destruction of urban centers as unpreventable.6 In January 1957, the Federal

Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) recommended that the United States build a $32

billion shelter system. Eisenhower and his advisers had to decide whether to accept such a

major undertaking.

As he had in 1953 and again in 1954, Eisenhower turned to a group of experts to

study the relationship between active defenses-interceptor aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and

air defense missiles-and passive defenses-early warning radar, evacuation plans, and

shelters. With the assistance of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense

Mobilization (ODM), Eisenhower asked H. Rowan Gaither in May 1957 to establish a

committee of experts formally called the Security Resources Panel but better known as the

Gaither committee. Over the course of the summer and early faIl, the committee examined

U.S. national security programs. When it completed its final report in November, it made

recommendations that reflected the preconceived biases and years of study of its expert

members.

Plans for Civil Defense

The impetus for the creation of the Gaither committee came from growing pres-

sures on the Eisenhower administration to reevaluate U.S. civil defense policies and to

institute a nation-wide shelter program. From January to June of 1956, Representative

6 Eisenhower to Governor [Val1 Peterson, July 17, 1956, EL, DOE Papers, Cabinet Series, Box 8, FolderCabinet Meeting of January 9, 1957 (I), 1-2. See also, Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 397-401.

74 Chet Holifield (D-CA) chaired hearings before the House Military Operations Sub-

committee of the House Committee on Government Operations concerning the adequacy

of u.S. civil defense planning. Holifield believed that the administration was placing too

much emphasis on offensive striking power at the expense of continental and civil defense.

In January 1957, the committee submitted legislation, H.R. 2125, which if passed, would

have greatly expanded the importance of civil defense. In particular, it would have forced

the federal government to assume control of civil defense planning whether it wanted to or

not.

Holifield subjected the FCDA, headed by former Nebraska governor Val Peterson,

to the most vigorous criticism. Holifield believed that the FCDA placed too much em-

phasis on evacuating the population after receiving warning of a Soviet nuclear attack

rather than providing shelters for the majority of the urban population who would be un-

able to leave. He emphasized that "The FCDA's policy of reliance on evacuation as the

key civil defense measure is weak and ineffective and indeed dangerously shortsighted.'"

Instead of evacuation, Holifield stressed the importance of shelters in protecting the

population and deterring the Soviet Union. 8

Holifield proposed the creation of a Department of Civil Defense, the development

of a national plan for civil defense, and the construction of shelters in predetermined target

areas.9 More specifically, his legislation called for the construction offaIlout shelters that

7 U.S. Congress. House Military Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Civil Defense Plan for National Survival, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956,692. 8 For Holifield's views on civil defense and in particular shelters, see Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandaidfor a Holocaust (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1983),83-99. 9 For a description of the proposed civil defense legislation, see ibid., 195.

75 would provide some protection to the entire American population of 170 million. The

proposed shelter system would cost approximately $20 billion. lo The House of Represen-

tatives rejected most of Holifield's legislation during the spring of 1957, but it did shift the

burden for civil defense planning from the localities to the federal government.

Despite the criticism, Peterson and his assistants from the FCDA supported many

of the Holifield committee's recommendations. Although they had originally emphasized

evacuation, the advent of more powerful weapons and advanced delivery systems led them

to develop a policy balanced between shelters and evacuation. In particular, the FCDA

reevaluated its civil defense plans after the March 1954 Bravo nuclear test fanned the fears

of radioactive fallout. This explosion yielded twice the expected amount of power and

produced fallout that covered nearly 7,000 square miles. II After the deadly results of

these tests became known, the FCDA placed even more emphasis on shelters because of

the "greatly increased radiation hazard from fall-out." 12

In December 1956, Peterson reported that the Soviet Union had the capability to

launch a nuclear attack against the United States using bombers and submarine-launched

missiles. After the advent of the ICBM, the warning time of such an attack could be as

little as fifteen minutes. 13 Because of this potential threat, he submitted a FCDA proposal

10 Ibid., 97. 11 See Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 68-70; Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 27 and 74-75; and Winkler, Lifo Under A Cloud, 93-94 and 116-17. 12 NSC 5509 - Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1954, Pan 5-The Civil Defense Program, February I, 1955, NA. RG 273. NSC, Folder - NSC 5509, 9. 13 Civil Defense Legislative Program. December 20, 1956, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5709 (Background Documents), 2. While it is still unknown whether the Soviet Union was capable oflaunching missiles from submarines in 1956, both the CIA and SAC reported that the Soviets might have this capability. See Memorandum by the Chief of Staff. U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Submarine Guided Missile Threat, September 24, 1956, NA RG 218, JCS, CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec.

76 in January 1951 to build a nationwide system of shelters that would be used in conjunc-

tion with pre-established evacuation plans.14 The report, which became known as NSC

5109, accepted the conclusions of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) which ar-

gued that 80 percent of the casualties in a nuclear attack would result from radioactive

fallout. IS Concerned about the impact of this fallout and influenced by Holifield's call for

shelters, the FCDA concluded that, "Most of the fallout casualties could be prevented by

adequate shelter. ,,16 It recommended spending $32 billion over the following eight years

to build sufficient shelters to protect the entire population. 17

Despite the report's dire warnings, neither Eisenhower nor his top advisors were

willing to spend such a large sum of money on an unproven method of protection. Robert

Cutler, Eisenhower's assistant for national security affairs, argued that while shelters may

have been necessary, without knowledge of their impact on the economy and on domestic

and foreign opinion, a massive construction program could not be immediately imple

mented. 18 Nonetheless, the magnitude of the anticipated destruction from a Soviet attack

sufficiently alarmed administration officials to request further examinations of the problem.

They launched new studies to examine the likely casualties in a nuclear exchange, the ef-

13, 10-18; and Memorandum for the Secretaty of Defense (from Admiral Radford), October 10, 1956, ibid., CCS 334 Air Defense of North America Ad Hoc Comte (9-2056) Sec. 1, 1-2. 14 For a description of the FCDA's position on shelters, see ibid, 100-107. For a description of the Congressional setting where Holifield's legislation met its fate, see Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 388-91. IS "Report of the Federal Civil Defense Administration on A Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program" [hereafter "Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program"1, January 17, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 21, Folder - NSC 5709 - Shelter Program for Civil Defense, A-2. For a description of the NESC report, see FRUS 1955-1957, 19,379-81. 16 "Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program," A-2. 17 ibid., A-3 and A-lO. 18 R.C. Conclusions, March 22,1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 4, Folder - Civil Defense, 1. See also SNIE 100-5-57, "Probable World Reaction to Certain Civil Defense Programs," March 19,1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,442-45; and Memorandum of Discussion at the 3 18th Meeting of the National Security Council, April 4, 1957, ibid, 461.

77 fectiveness of passive defense measures in preventing casualties, the capability of active

defenses to destroy Soviet forces before they reached their targets, and the economic con-

sequences of these defense programs. 19

The Establishment of the Gaither CommiUee

Eisenhower used the NSC to examine these issues. From January to March 1957,

the planning board discussed the FCDA's report on shelters and recommended that the

NSC perform another study that would answer a series of questions, but most importantly,

"What is the optimum balance between active and passive defense measures for protection

of the civil population?,,20 On April 4, 1957, the NSC ordered four studies to answer the

planning board's questions:

19 "Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program." B-I-B-3. 2O"A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense," March 29, 1957, EL, WHO,OSANSA. NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 21, Folder - NSC 5709 - Shelter Program for Civil Defense, 2. It seems that in developing these questions, which were labeled A to L, the Planning Board may have been influenced by Dr. Isidor Rabi. a member of the Science Advisory Committee and future member of the Gaither committee. In a letter to ODM Director Gordon Gray, Rabi wrote:

There is need for a broadly based study in which personnel protection is examined in relation to the following factors: strategic concepts. including conditions of strategic and tactical warning and the deterrent values of shelters; advances in the types and numbers of nuclear warbeads and delivery systems; capabilities of active defenses; the long-range practicability of protecting densely populated urban areas from the effects of blast and cratering; evacuation possibilities; the relative values ofblast and fallout protection; the problems of post-attack recovery under continuing atomic harassment; the costs ofvarious types of structural protection and the relationship of dollars invested to types and extent of protection afforded; the possibility of dual purpose construction, including public building programs of school and highway construction; city planning and future patterns of expansion of industry and population; and national construction capabilities under normal and emergency situations.

I have quoted from Rabi's letter at length because the Gaither committee seems to have examined most of these factors in its study. Dr. Isidor I. Rabi to ODM Director. undated [probably March 19571, quoted in Infonna! Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither. June 27. 1957, ibid., Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 2.

1) A study by an interdepartmental committee composed of representatives from the FCDA, ODM, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the Department of Defense of different shelter programs.

2) A study by the Science Advisory Committee of the ODM of active and passive defense measures for the protection of the civil population.

3) A study by the Council of Economic Advisors of the economic costs of various shelter programs.

4) A study by the Department of the Treasury of providing financial assistance to individuals and industries to stimulate private shelter construction.21

78

The second study by the Science Advisory Committee proved the most important

as it eventually incorporated the findings of the other three in reaching its final conclu-

sions. To perform this study, the NSC turned to the decision-making system it had used

so successfully in the cases of Project Solarium and the Killian Committee. It requested

that the Science Advisory Committee appoint a panel of experts to study U.S. active and

passive defense measures. 22

The Science Advisory Committee gave Dr. James Killian, one of its members, the

responsibility for selecting the project director. He recommended that the committee ap-

point Gaither, a long-time friend from their days at the World War II Radiation Labora-

tory, to oversee the study.23 Based on this recommendation, Eisenhower asked Gaither to

ZI Memorandum of Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council, April 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,463-64. 22 Among the members of the Science Advisory Committee at the time of the Gaither study were Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, Dr. Hans A. Bethe, Dr. Det1ev W. Bronk. Dr. Hugh L. Dryden. Dr. James B. Fisk. Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, Dr. Albert G. Hill, Dr. James R. Killian. Jr., Dr. Edwin H. Land, Dr. Emanuel R. Piore, Dr. Isidor I. Rabi, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Dr. Alan T. Waterman., and Dr. Jerrold R. Zacharias. n J.R. Killian to Herbert F. York. September 9, 1976, MI.T. Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder - Correspondence L-Z, 2.

79 serve as the director of the soon to be created Security Resources Panel. 24 Through the

early summer, Gaither and the ODM selected individuals to serve on this pane~ aptly

called the Gaither committee. Gaither divided the committee into two principle groups:

the Steering Committee and the Advisory Panel. After he was diagnosed with arterial

thrombosis, he stepped down as the committee's director in September to be replaced by

Robert Sprague and William Foster. Sprague and Foster directed the Steering Committee

which also consisted of Dr. James Baxter, Dr. Robert Calkins, John Corson, Dr. James

Perkins, Dr. Robert Prim, Dr. Hector Skifter, William Webster, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, and

technical advisor, Edward Oliver. The Advisory Panel included Gaither (after his illness),

Admiral Robert Carney, General James Doolittle, General John Hul~ Dr. Mervin Kelly,

Dr. Ernest Lawrence, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, and Dr. Frank Stanton. In addition to

these individuals, two other groups played important advisory roles: a subcommittee of

the Science Advisory Committee containing Dr. James Fisk. Dr. James Killian, and Dr.

Isidor Rab~ and a committee from the Institute for Defense Analyses composed of Gen-

eral James McCormack and Dr. Albert Hill.

In addition to its permanent members, the Gaither committee recruited nearly sev-

enty expert consultants from leading scientific organizations, engineering firms, strategic

think -tanks, and business institutions to provide advice and make recommendations.2S

These consultants provided invaluable background material and technical support to the

committee. In fact, some scholars have argued that several of these advisors actually

24 Eisenhower to Gaither, May 8,1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subserics, Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (1) July '56- May '57, 1. 2S For a complete membership list. see Gaither Report, 41-45.

80 played much larger roles than their titles as technical consultants would indicate. In par-

ticular, Colonel George Lincoln and Paul Nrtze seemed to have had great influence on the

final report. 26

The high caliber of this committee was without question. A sample of the qualifi-

cations of some of the members of the Steering Committee and Advisory Panel should

provide ample evidence of the committee's expertise. Killian and Baxter served as the re-

spective presidents ofM.LT. and Wtlliams College. Because of his research at the Radia-

tion Laboratory on molecular beams, Rabi won the 1944 Nobel Prize for physics. During

the last years of the Truman administration, Lovett and Foster acted as the Secretary and

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, respectively. These men and the rest of the Gaither

committee represented some of the best minds in the country.

The Gaither committee was comprised of the type of experts which Eisenhower

and his NSC used to acquire policy advice. The president wanted the assistance of con-

sultants who were either specialists in particular fields or possessed a broad understanding

of U.S. national security issues. Eisenhower's belief that experts could provide invaluable

advice dated to his experiences in World War II. While serving as the Army chief of staff

immediately after the war, he implored his key subordinates to recognize the essential

contnoutions that scientists, business leaders, and other experts had made to the war ef-

fort. He explained:

The lessons of the last war are clear. The military effort required for victory threw upon the Army an unprecedented range of responsibilities, many

26 See Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon, 128-34; David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War (New York: HarperCollins Publisbers, 1990), 167-71; and Steven L. Rearden. The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine: Paul Nilze and the Soviet Challenge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984),41-46.

of which were effectively discharged only through the invaluable assistance supplied by our cumulative resources in the natural and social sciences and the talents and experience furnished by management and labor. The armed forces could not have won the war alone. Scientists and business men contributed techniques and weapons which enabled us to outwit and overwhelm the enemy. Their understanding of the Army's needs made possible the highest degree of cooperation. This pattern of integration must be translated into a peacetime counterpart which will not merely familiarize the army with the progress made in science and industry, but draw into our planning for national security all the civilian resources which can contribute to the defense of the country. rJ

He concluded by explaining that ''The association of military and civilians in educational

81

institutions and industry will level barriers, engender mutual understanding, and lead to the

cultivation offiiendships invaluable for future cooperation.,,28

Background of Key Gaither Committee Members

More than a decade later, Eisenhower took this advice to heart when he ordered

the establishment of the Gaither committee. Its members were well known and widely re-

spected within the Eisenhower administration. Most had either advised the administration

earlier or had published their views on matters related to active and passive defenses.

Without exception, the Gaither committee members viewed the expansion of Soviet mili-

tary capabilities with great concern. They did not question the assumption that if the So-

viet Union acquired the capability to launch a devastating attack on the United States

without suffering a massive counterstrike, it would not hesitate to do SO.29 Most impor-

tandy, they believed that advances in Soviet nuclear weaponry and delivery capabilities

27 To Directors and Chiefs of the War Department General and Special Staff Divisions and Bureaus and the Commanding Generals of the Major Commands, April 30, 1946, reprinted in Galambos (ed.), Papers o/Dwight David Eisenhower. VII,1046-47. 28 Ibid., 1049. 29 See Chapter 1. In most American assessments of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin leaders' intentions were not normally examined extensively. It was assumed that their intention was world domination.

82 raised the specter of a growing Soviet threat that had to be confronted with stronger

U.S. strategic retaliatory forces, expanded continental defenses, and improved civil de-

fenses.3o

The Directors

As director of the new pane~ Gaither assumed a position with which he was quite

familiar. Throughout his career, he had repeatedly served the government, industry, and

research institutions as an advisor in a variety of capacities, and on several occasions su-

pervised the activities of groups of experts. While practicing law in California during

World War II, Gaither was asked by the Radiation Laboratory at M.LT. to become the

associate director in charge of administration. "His job," Dwight Macdonald explains,

"was to coordinate the work of the scientific staff and to act as liaison officer between the

Laboratory and the anned services.,,31 While at M.I.T., he became acquainted with lead-

ing scientists, engineers, and social thinkers, including Killian, Rabi, and Hill. Gaither's

activities at the Radiation Laboratory earned him a reputation for efficient administration

and leadership.32

30 An internal State Department Policy Planning Staff report sheds light on problems of basing policy on preconceptions and assumptions. It concluded that "there is danger that policy may develop unduly on the basis of preconceptions and assumptions." It then explained that after World War II, and especially after the advent of long-range bombers and intercontinental missiles, the United States searched for something to blame for its new sense of vulnerability. The report argued that "The instinctive, almost visceral reaction of a nation undergoing so disillusioning an experience is to seek an explanation that is psychologically satisfying. Something had gone wrong. The cause, the evil thing must be identified and personified. The Soviet Union became the candidate for diabolus ex machina in this situation. It satisfied all requirements. It was evil, powerful, implacable. The cold war was on. Soviet Communism was the enemy." L. W. Fuller, "An Inquiry into United States Policy Respecting the Soviet Union," April I, 1958, RG 59, State Department, Policy Planning Staff Records, Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 (January-April), 1 and 4. 31 Dwight Macdonald, The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions (New York: Reynal & Company, 1956), 10. 32 Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, May 8, 1957, EL, WHO, ass, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (I), I; and Author's Interview with

83 After the war Gaither returned to California to teach law at the University of

California Law School. 33 His tenure there was short, however, as the RAND Corporation

asked him to assist in its transition to a non-profit organization. RAND had been created

during World War II as part of the Douglas Aircraft Company to perform research and

development for the Army Air Forces. After the war, questions arose as to whether the

military and a specific company should be tied so closely together. The Air Force and the

Douglas Company agreed to spin offRANO as an independent, non-profit corporation.

Beginning in late 1947, Gaither joined RAND's Board of Trustees to lead it through this

transition. From 1948 to his death in 1961, with the exception of only one year, Gaither

served as the chairman of the RAND Board ofTrustees.34

Gaither's leadership at RAND led to opportunities in other areas. One of

Gaither's responsibilities was to arrange financing for RAND's operations. Through his

contacts with former M.I.T. President Karl Compton. he obtained a meeting with Henry

Ford II to discuss a possible grant for RAND. Gaither's presentation so impressed Ford

that the automotive heir not only gave RAND a $1 million grant, but asked Gaither to join

the Ford Foundation and write a report proposing the future objectives of that organiza

tion.35 Gaither promptly accepted.

Dr. Albert Hill, August 14, 1995. For descriptions of the Radiation Laboratory, see John Burchard, Q.E.D.: MI. T. in World War II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1948),215-36; Ivan A. Getting. All in a Lifotime: Science in the Defense of Democracy (New York: Vantage Press, 1989), 187-201; and Daniel 1. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modem America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 303-8. 33 Eleanora W. Schoenebaum (ed.) Political ProfiJes: The Eisenhower Years (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1977), 219. 34 Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966),67 and 185. 35 Macdonald, Ford Foundation, 11.

84 In his final report for Ford, Gaither reached several conclusions that are relevant

to his later work on the Gaither committee. He saw the Ford Foundation as an organiza-

tion that could provide financial support for "studies and analyses by special committees,

individuals, or research institutes" in an environment unhampered by political pressures. 36

He believed that it was essential that the United States government avoid overly defensive

or negative policies. He stressed that "If such a defensive attitude is allowed to control

our planning and thinking, our national effort will be diverted unduly to expedient and

temporary measures from the more important tasks ahead, and we may grow like the thing

we fight. ,,37 Gaither's work on this report led to his appointment in 1951 as the Ford

Foundation's associate director and in 1953 as its president.38

After Gaither fell ill in August 1957, he was unable to continue his duties as the di-

rector of the committee. He was succeeded by William Foster and Robert Sprague who

had equally illustrious backgrounds. Foster had served the Truman administration in a va-

riety of capacities and was currently the vice president of the Olin-Mathieson Chemical

Company. Sprague was the president of Sprague Electric Company and had advised the

Eisenhower administration on continental defense questions on several occasions prior to

1957. Together, they completed the task that Gaither began.

Foster rose to prominence in the manufactured steel industry during World War ll.

Because of his position as the president of the Pressed and Welded Steel Products Com-

36 Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program (Detroit, MI: Ford Foundation, 1949),58. 37 Ibid., 22. 38 Schoenebaum. Political Profiles: The Eisenhower Years, 219. For a more in-depth description of Gaither's study for the Ford Foundation, see Macdonald, Ford Foundation. 137-40.

85

pany, he served on several government committees during the war that were concerned

with small business manufacturing. After the war, Secretary of Commerce Averell Harri-

man asked President Truman to appoint Foster undersecretary of commerce. Foster

served in that position from January 1947 to the summer of 1948. When Harriman was

appointed ambassador-at-Iarge to Western Europe to supervise the operations of the Eco-

nomic Cooperation Administration (ECA), he asked Foster to join him as his assistant.

Foster rose from this position to become the deputy administrator of the ECA in 1949 and

administrator in 1950. While serving in the ECA, he helped integrate Greece into the

Marshall Plan, briefed Congress on European economic needs, and, after the start of the

Korean War, negotiated loans with European countries to encourage their participation in

the war.39

In 1951, Truman appointed Foster deputy secretary of defense. From this posi-

tion. Foster became acquainted with the most controversial military issues and learned a

great deal about the formulation and implementation of Defense Department policies.40

Two of his most important assignments during his tenure as the deputy secretary were to

brief Congress on the efficiency of the Defense Department's organization and to head a

panel of experts which made a comparative study of U.S. and Soviet military strength.41

39 Eleanora W. Schocnebaum (ed.), Political Profiles: The Truman Years (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1978), 175-76. For descriptions of some of Foster's activities on the ECA, see Michael 1. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain. and the Reconstruction o/Western Europe. 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),222,283, and 388-91; and Sallie Pisani, The eM and the i\-farshall Plan (Lawrence. KA: University of Kansas Press, 1991),95-96. 40 Leffler. Preponderance o/Power, 497-98. 41 Schoencbaum, Political Profiles: The Eisenhower Years, 211-12.

86 Of particular importance to his later work on the Gaither committee, he became aware

of the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategic Air Command. 42

Foster resigned from the Defense Department to become the president of the

Manufacturing Chemists Association when Eisenhower took office. In 1955, he became

the executive vice president of the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation. 43

Sprague maintained much closer ties to the Eisenhower administration than Foster.

Sprague was Eisenhower's first choice for the position of under secretary of the Air Force

in 1953. However, Sprague was unable to accept the appointment because he could not

relinquish his stock holdings in his own Massachusetts electric company.44 This problem

did not long impede his opportunities for government service.4S In October 1953, Senator

Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) requested Sprague's assistance in examining u.S. continental

defenses.46 Sprague traveled to SAC headquarters and received a two-day briefing from

General LeMay concerning the relationship of SAC forces to continental defense.47 He

also gained access to numerous top secret studies and reports from the Department of

Defense, Army, Air Force, Navy, Atomic Energy Commission, National Security Council,

42 William Foster to General Curtis leMay, September 10, 1952, LC, Papers of General Curtis LeMay, Box 72, Folder - Visits to SAC, l. 43 Scboenebaum, Political Profiles: The Eisenhower Years, 212. 44 Robert Sprague to General Vandenberg. February 10, 1953, LC, Papers of General Hoyt Vandenberg, Box 31, Folder - S (General), 1-3; and Robert C. Sprague Oral History, August I, 1964, John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, Princeton University, 2-3. 4S For a summary of the Sprague's involvement as an advisor, see Memorandum for the Files, December 9, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. 46 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, October 20, 1953, NA. RG 218, JCS, Records of Admiral Arthur Radford, Folder - CJCS 381 (Continental Defense) 1953, l. 47 Notes for the Commander, November 10, 1953, LC, LeMay Papers, Box B 10430 Folder - LeMay Diary #5, 1.

87 and Central Intelligence Agency.48 Fmally, JCS chairman Admiral Arthur Radford

briefed him on the ability of the Soviet Union to prevent a retaliatory strike, the impact of

such a strike on that country, and the wlnerability of the United States to a surprise at-

tack.49

Sprague presented his report to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March

1954 and later also briefed the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and the House Armed

Services Committee. so He recommended expanding early warning radar coverage, in-

creasing the number and quality of interceptor airplanes, and strengthening anti-aircraft

defenses around SAC bases. SI He concluded that the problems of continental defense

"will never be static," and that the United States will have "to face up to the fact that the

threat ofan air-atomic attack introduces a new factor in our way of life. Living with it

may not be so comfortable as before, but it is a burden which the country can abide, still

remaining free. It means doing the things which must be done, paying the bills which must

be paid, and running the risks which must be run. ,,52

48 Memorandum for Adm. Gardner, Gen. Partridge, Gcn. Lemnitzer, and Gen. Twining, November 27, 1953, NA, RG 218, lCS, Radford Records, Folder - CICS 381 (Continental Defense) 1953, 1; Memorandum for Admiral Radford, December 9. 1953, ibid., 1-2; and Memorandum for Admiral Radford, December 4, 1953, ibid., I. In his oral history interview, Sprague reported that he bad access to all documents related to U.S. continental defenses, except for a report prepared for the lCS on "an assumed air atomic attack by the United States on Russia." Admiral Radford refused to release the report because the lCS had not even had the opportunity to review the report. However, Radford did brief Sprague for two hours concerning the content of the document See Sprague Oral History, 3-4. 49 Memorandum for the Record, December 12, 1953, NA, RG 218, lCS, Radford Records, Folder - CICS 381 (Continental Defense) 1953, 1-2. so "Report on Continental Defense to the Senate Armed Services Committee," March 8, 1954, EL, DDE Papers, Administrative Series, Box 33, Folder - Sprague, Robert C. Material, 1. For a description of the briefing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, see Memorandum for Admiral Arthur Radford, March 26, 1954, NA, RG 218, lCS, Radford Records, Folder - CICS 381 (Continental Defense) Jan.-Mar. 1954, 1. For a description of Sprague's briefing ofboth the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and the House Armed Services Committee, see Memorandum for Admiral Arthur Radford, March 30, 1954, ibid., 1-2. 51 "Repon on Continental Defense," 2-5. Large portions of this report remain classified. 52 Ibid, 6.

88 Sprague reached even more alarming conclusions three months later after Soviet

scientists tested a one megaton nuclear device and the United States completed a series of

tests on thermonuclear weapons. The tests indicated that the Soviet Union was not far

behind the United States in nuclear weapons technology and highlighted the gradual de-

cline of U.S. military power relative to the Soviet Union. Sprague believed that the

United States was more vulnerable to an atomic attack than the Soviet Union. He also

stressed that the initiative in a conflict would remain with the Kremlin leaders. and "the

moral character of the Soviet rulers is such that the thought of wide-spread death and de-

struction in an atomic war is of no significance [to them] in deterring such a war.,,53 He

then identified three possible policy alternatives. First. the United States could construct a

defensive system capable of withstanding any possible Soviet attack. Second. it could

"strike the first blow." Third. it could "Live with the USSR in a state of equilibrium

brought about by mutual fear of atomic attack. ,,54

After becoming a consultant to the NSC on continental defenses in June 1954.

Sprague reported that the danger from a Soviet surprise attack had grown. He argued

that since the United States had tested new thermonuclear weapons, the Soviet Union

could not be far behind. Furthermore, these new weapons produced so much radioactive

fallout that each nuclear explosion was now much more dangerous. Finally, the Soviet

development of the Type 39 jet bomber signaled a potential Soviet capability to launch a

surprise attack against the United States. Sprague concluded that "These three new ele-

S3 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, June 23, 1954, NA. RG 218, Radford Records, FolderCJCS 381 (Continental Defense) Jun.-Dec. 1954, 1. This memorandum discusses a briefing that Sprague presented to Senators Saltonstall, Styles Bridges (R-NH), Harry or Robert (1) Byrd. and Adm. Radford. 54 Ibid., 1.

89 ments of danger enormously increase the threat to our national survival in the event of a

Soviet surprise attack against the continental United States.""

Less than a year later, Sprague presented a new report to the NSC. While making

an obvious reference to the recently completed Killian report, Sprague argued that the

years from 1958 to 1960 represented the "period of greatest danger-when Russia will

have a large enough stockpile of multi-megaton weapons and the means for delivering

them on continental U.S. targets.,,'6 When the NSC examined this report, Eisenhower

stated that he believed that Sprague may have overestimated Soviet delivery capabilities.

But, he did not question the great value of Sprague's report. Its importance "lay in mak-

ing us reassess our programs . . . for the purpose of seeing if we were placing proper em-

phasis on the right programs. ,,51

Committee Members and Adviserrs

While Sprague worked extensively as a consultant with the Eisenhower admini-

strati on, many other Gaither committee members had served in advisory roles. Several of

its members had developed close professional relationships with one another while work-

ing at the Radiation Laboratory during World War II. This was particularly true for Kil-

55 "Report of Robert C. Sprague (NSC Consultant) to the National Security Council on Continental Defense," November 24, 1954, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, Folder - Continental Defense, Study of - by Robert C. Sprague (1953-1954) (12), 1. 56 "Report of Robert C. Sprague (NSC Consultant) to the National Security Council on Continental Defense," June 16, 1955, ibid., Folder - Continental Defense, Study of-by Robert C. Sprague (1955) (3), 3. 57 Memorandum of Discussion at the 252nd Meeting of the National Security Council, June 16, 1955, FRUS /955-1957, 19,89. 58 This section will contain descriptions of some of the experts who served on the Gaither committee's steering panel, advisory panel, and sub-committees. The authors of the final report will be discussed in a separate section.

90 lian and Hill. Killian had served as the vice-president of M. I. T. during the war. S9 In this

capacity, he worked closely with the Radiation Laboratory. ~ a physics professor, di-

rected the laboratory's Division Five dealing with transmitter components.60 After the

war, Killian and Hill collaborated closely on many problems involving M.I.T. and defense

Issues.

In 1953 they co-authored an article for Atlantic magazine. Killian and Hill argued

that the United States "must achieve a stronger defense without weakening or subordinat-

ing our offensive power.,,61 They were concerned that if the United States continued to

neglect continental defenses while emphasizing offensive capabilities, the Soviet Union

might acquire the ability to attack North America.62 They identified five military priorities:

controlling the seas, defending the continent, maintaining a nuclear counterstrike capabil-

ity, protecting Western Europe, and preventing small wars from becoming larger ones.63

They stressed that the United States needed to develop a reliable early warning system,

anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses, and the ability to destroy enemy forces at long

range. 64

As M.LT.'s president, Killian played a pivotal role in establishing the Lincoln

Laboratory in February 1951. By this time there was a growing concern within the Air

Force that the Soviet Union might acquire the capability to attack the United States. Be-

cause the Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Hoyt Vandenberg did not believe that the

S9 Getting, All in A Lifetime, 205. 60 Ibid., 192. 61 James R. Killian and A. G. Hill, "For a Continental Defense, n Atlantic 192:5 (November 1953), 38. 62 James R. Killian, The Education a/College President: A Memoir (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1985), 74. 63 Killian and Hill, "Continental Defense," 37. 64 Ibid., 40.

91 Air Force itself could analyze U.S. air defenses effectively, he approached Killian about

establishing an independent research and development organization similar to the Radia-

tion Laboratory. After months of negotiations, M.I.T. accepted a tri-service contract from

the Army, Navy, and Air Force to establish a laboratory to perform military research.

With Killian's approval, Dr. Hill directed the new laboratory until 1955.6s Its main re-

sponsibility was to develop the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defense

system.66

In addition to its involvement with the Lincoln Laboratory, M.1. T. provided sup

port facilities for several studies of U.S. defense issues.67 In 1950 M.LT. physics profes-

sor, and future Gaither committee member, Jerrold Zacharias developed the concept of the

summer study program when he directed Project Hartwell, a Navy sponsored examination

of underseas warfare. In 1951 and 1952, Hill supervised Project Charles and Project Lin-

coln--two separate studies of U.S. air defenses. In these same years, fifteen scientists par-

ticipated in Project Beacon Hill, a study of Air Force intelligence and reconnaissance ca-

pabilities.68 Together, these summer studies emphasized the need for "measures to reduce

the wlnerability to surprise of our strategic air power, to keep the sea lanes open, to im-

65 For a discussion of the creation of the Lincoln Laboratory, see "Draft - Lincoln Laboratory, and the Years 1945-1955," MIT Archives. MC 365 - Hill Papers, Box 14, Folder #4,3-5; Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 145-56; and Leslie, The Cold War and American Science, 32-43. 66 The Lincoln Laboratory researched and developed the SAGE system until 1958, when it turned it over to a non-profit organization. the MITRE corporation. See MITRE: The First Twenty Years, A History of the MITRE Corporation (1958-1978) (Bedford, MA: The MITRE Corporation, 1979), 12-16. 67 For a complete list of the different summer study projects, see Special Reports - Studies and Projects, undated [1977J, M.I.T. Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder - Backup O-Z, 5. 68 Wclzenbach, "Din Land," 22.

92 prove our military communications and gathering of hard intelligence, [and] to acceler-

ate our ICBM programs. ,,69

Of these studies, Project Charles and Project Lincoln were the most important in

shaping Killian's and Hill's views concerning continental defenses. Project Charles vividly

described the problems faced by the United States in planning air defenses. "The problem

of the defense of the Untied States against air attack," it concluded,

is characterized above all by a lack of knowledge of what we have to defend against. The enemy has the initiative. Our intelligence tells us essentially nothing about his plans; informs us only partially about his present capabilities; and as to his future capabilities leaves us essentially dependent on assumptions that he can, if he chooses, do about as well in any aspect as we expect to do ourselves.70

Project Lincoln addressed these problems by recommending the extension of the Distant

Early Warning (DEW) Line to provide earlier warning ofa Soviet attack. The study also

called for the development of an effective interceptor force and suggested that plans be

devised to meet the threat posed by the ICBMs.71

After their 1953 article, Killian and Hill continued their involvement in studies of

U.S. continental defenses. Killian directed the extremely influential 1954 Technical Ca-

pabilities Panel. This group, which contained many future Gaither committee members,

perceived a potentially significant threat as the Soviet Union acquired advanced nuclear

weapons and delivery capabilities. It recommended the development of an intercontinental

ballistic missile, the reduction of SAC vulnerability, and the strengthening of continental

69 Killian, Sputnik, &ientists, and Eisenhower, 103. 70 "Problems of Air Defense, Final Report of Project Charles," v. I, August I, 1951,3, quoted in Nunn, The Soviet Threat, 118. 71 Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 174-75.

93 defenses. More specifically, it advised that the United States needed to construct addi-

tional SAC bases, institute an emergency dispersal plan for SAC forces, and develop ac-

tive defenses surrounding SAC bases.72

As a member of the Science Advisory Committee, Killian's influence on Eisen-

hower did not stop with the panel's final report. In a meeting with Eisenhower in 1956,

Killian and Dr. James Fisk, another member of the Science Advisory Committee and later

of the Gaither committee, reiterated the need for strengthening U.S. continental defenses.

They argued that the United States had to accelerate ''the development of high altitude

radar, SAC dispersal, and quicker reaction time for SAC in case of attack. ,,73 Without

these improvements, they feared the Soviet Union would be able to launch a successful

attack against the United States.

Demonstrating his confidence in Killian, Eisenhower asked him to chair a new

committee, the President's Board ofConsuitants on Foreign Intelligence, that would ex-

amine the effectiveness of the CIA in performing its responsibilities. In addition to Killian,

the committee consisted offuture Gaither committee members, General James Doolittle

and Robert Lovett, Admiral Richard Conolly, Benjamin Fairless, General John Hull,

Josesph Kennedy, and Edward Ryerson.74 Eisenhower gave the board broad discretion in

its investigations so that it could determine if the "policies and programs pursued by the

CIA and other elements of the intelligence community are sound, effective, and economi-

12 See chapter 1. 73 Memorandum ofa Conference with the President, May 18, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,303. 74 John Steven Chwat, "The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: An Historical and Contemporruy Analysis (1955-1975)," Congressional Research Office, 1975,5.

94 cally operated.,,7S While most of its activities remain classified. the committee did meet

with Eisenhower five times and held nineteen other meetings between 1956 and 1961.76

One of the most important conclusions that the committee did reach was that the "Quality

of foreign intelligence-Both National and Departmental Intelligence with respect to the

Soviets is seriously inadequate in all fields and at allievels."n

Hill served the Eisenhower administration more indirectly than Killian. In addition

to acting as the director of the Lincoln Laboratory until 1955, he also served as the direc-

tor of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) and as the vice president of the

Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). The JCS created WSEG in 1948 and assigned it

three broad objectives:

1) To bring scientific and technical as well as operational military expertise to bear in evaluating weapons systems.

2) To employ advanced techniques of scientific analysis and operations research in the process.

3) To approach its tasks from an impartial, supra-Service perspective.7S

In this capacity, WSEG studied numerous defense issues, including an examination of

continental defenses in 1955 under Hill's direction.79 While it did not reach any new con-

75 Eisenhower Diary EntIy, January 24, 1956, in Ferren (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 312. 76 Chwat, "The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board." 6. The committee was officially created by e.xecutive order 10586, February 8, 1956. 77 Perfonnance of Function of CIA, undated, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers. Box 36, Folder -President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board [7I8J, 2. 78 John Ponturo, Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience. 1948-1976 (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1979), X.

79 Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision on JCS 1812151 on Program of Future Work for WSEG, May 4, 1955, RG 218, JCS, 1957 Decimal File, Folder - CCS 334 WSEG (2-4-48) Sec. 5, i.

95 elusions, it enabled Hill to become acquainted with General leMay and to learn about

SAC.SO

In 1956 both SAC and CIA intelligence estimates indicated that the Soviet Union

could acquire the capability to launch missiles with nuclear warheads from submarines.81

If the Soviets possessed this capability, they could possibly launch an attack against the

United States without warning. Accordingly, JCS chairman Admiral Radford asked Hill

to lead a new ad hoc committee to study U.S. air defenses.82 Hill's committee reached

shocking conclusions. After arguing that "The goal for the defense of North America

against air attack should be the achievement and maintenance of a level of air defense ef-

fectiveness sufficient to give a reasonable chance of defending approximately 80 percent of

the vital target areas of the nation," it stressed that the United States was falling danger-

ously short of these capabilities.83

Hill's involvement in the IDA stemmed from his close association with Killian.

One of Killian's overriding goals as the president ofM.LT. was to foster close coopera-

tion between scientists, academic institutions, and the government. In 1956, Killian

worked with the Department of Defense to establish a university consortium to support

80 leMay to Ll. General S. E. Anderson, December 29, 1955, LC, LeMay Papers, Box B205, FolderB50703.1. 81 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff. U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Submarine Guided Missile Threat. September 24, 1956, NA, RG 218, JCS, Folder - CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec. 13, 10-18. 82 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, October 10, 1956, ibid, Folder - CCS 334 Air Defense of North America Ad Hoc Comte (9-20-56) Sec. 1, 1-2. In addition to Hill, the committee consisted of General Carl Spaatz, General Thomas Handy, and Admiral John Ballentine. See Memorandum for General Carl Spaatz, General Thomas Handy, Admiral John Ballentine, and Dr. Albert Hill, November 7, 1956, ibid., 1. 83 "Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ad Hoc Committee on Air Defense, n June 30, 1957, quoted in Note by the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Briefing Presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Levels of Defense Effectiveness, October 18, 1957, ibid, Folder - CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89 RB. 2395.

96 WSEG. He organized five universities-M.I.T., California Institute for Technology,

Case Institute, Stanford, and Tulane-into the non-profit IDA He hoped that the IDA

would be "a means of lending scientific prestige to the enterprise [WSEG], facilitating ac-

cess to the scholarly research community, and promoting a working climate that would

appeal to civilian research analysts."" Hill became the IDA's vice president. The IDA

later proved instrumental in the development of the Gaither report. Both Hill and General

James McCormack, M.l. T. 's vice president for Industrial Relations, served as the IDA's

advisors to the Gaither committee.85 "The [Gaither] Committee," one scholar concludes,

"called on IDA as its prime contractor to help support the panel participants with technical

assistance, research and fact-finding, managerial and administrative services, editorial and

publication support, security, and the like.,,86

As an expert on continental defense issues, Hill also studied civil defense problems.

In the 1950s he served on two committees that were concerned with these issues: the

1952 Project East River and the 1955 Review of Project East River. These committees

contained several future Gaither committee members, including General Otto Nelson and

Dr. Lloyd Berkner. This 1952 study, named after the river that flows through New York

City, laid the foundation for most civil defense plans developed in the Eisenhower admini-

strarion.87 In its six volume final report, the initial Project East River committee reached

several conclusions that were of direct relevance to the Gaither committee. The report

84 Pooturo. Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs ofStafJ, xv. 85 McConnack also bad an extensive background in strategic matters. For instance, he served as the director of Task Force B of Project Solarium. See chapter 1. 86 Pooturo, Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 164-65. 87 Sec the influence of the 1952 Project East River in Memorandum for President Eisenhower, April 10, 1953, EL, DOE Papers, Miscellaneous Series, Box 4, Folder - President's Advisory Committee 00 Government Organization - Government Reorganization Civil Defense, 2.

97 stressed that the United States had to improve both its air defenses and civil defenses.ss

It then emphasized that continental and civil defenses were interchangeable components in

the security of the United States. An air defense system must "be devised that aims at de-

stroying substantially all of the airborne attackers prior to the time that they reach the

United States. If this is not achieved, Civil Defense becomes unmanageable and largely

futile.,,89 In the area of civil defense, the committee called for achieving the greatest pos-

sible warning of an attack, constructing shelters, and educating the public to the dangers

of radioactive fallout. 90

In 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, FCDA Director Peterson, and

ODM Director Arthur Fleming requested that Nelson, Berkner, and Hill create a group to

review the findings from the 1952 report and determine whether the United States had

strengthened its continental and civil defenses in the intervening years. Wilson, Peterson,

and Fleming told the group that "Most ofall we need the thinking of those of you who are

away from the day to day activities of the Federal Government, but who are still thor-

oughly concerned with the basic problems.91 After their review, Nelson's committee con-

eluded that "Despite the efforts made [between 1952 and 1955], it is necessary to report

that the nation's preparations and progress in non-military defense are still far from what

88 For a description of the 1952 Project East River, see Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 172-91. 89 "Military Measures Precedent to a Manageable Civil Defense, Part IIA of the Report of Project East River," June 26, 1952,63, quoted in Joseph T. Jockel. No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada. the United States. and the Origins of North American Air Defonse. 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 28. 90 Project East River: Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, part 5 (New York: Associated Universities, Inc., 1952),60a. 91 "1955 Review of the Report of Project East River,'" October 17, 1955, NA. RG 218, JCS, Folder - CCS 384.51 (10-31-46) sec. 10 BP Planning for Civil Defense of U.S., iii.

98 they should be. ,,92 They attributed the deficiencies to rapid technological advances and

the lack of positive leadership in developing non-military defenses. Without improvements

in these areas, they believed the United States was in serious danger.

The review committee of civilian experts was particularly influenced by the poten-

tial implications of the rapid advances in nuclear weapons technology. "The most impor-

tant consequence of the rapid progress in making much more powerful and cheaper nu-

clear weapons and the resulting increasingly serious problem of radioactive fallout," it

concluded, "is that the potential disaster area will be larger than any city boundary and will

frequently overlap several state boundaries. ,,93 They recommended the strengthening of

u.s. non-military defenses, especially the protection of the civil population. They believed

the best way to achieve these results was to create an intelligence gathering apparatus

which would provide the maximum strategic warning of a Soviet attack and to design

plans for both the evacuation and sheltering of the civil population if such an attack was to

occur. 94

Testimony before the 1956 Holifield Committee on civil defense echoed the find-

ings of both the 1952 and 1955 Project East River committees. Representative Holifield

invited many experts, including Hill, Berkner, Killian, and Nelson, to come before his

committee. They all emphasized the inadequacies of U.S. civil defense programs and the

need to recognize the close relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities in

deterring the Soviet Union. Hill argued that "it is impossible to defend our offensive

92 Ibid., 2. 93 Ibid., s. 94 See ibid., 7 and 15.

99 strength without defending the civilian population as well.,,95 In evaluating the relation-

ship between offensive and defensive capabilities, Berkner explained that "By remaining an

easy and inviting target, we encourage an uncompromising enemy to believe that war

against us is an easy and feasible way to succeed in his objectives ... 96 In his testimony,

Killian stressed that, "While our main deterrent to war and to an attack against the United

States is our capacity to inflict terrible damage on the enemy, this deterrent needs to be

augmented and accompanied by the deterrent strength of an adequate defense against

atomic attack and an adequate civil defense to reduce the damage of an atomic attack

should it come."cn Finally, Nelson argued that U.S. civil defenses "could become the criti-

cal, determining factor that might persuade the Soviets, in even a period of great rashness

and madness, that they should not risk an atomic war.,,98

Other future Gaither committee members corroborated these findings in separate

studies. Dr. Mervin Kelly, the vice president of Bell Telephone Laboratories, and Dr.

James Baxter, the president of Williams College, participated in studies in 1952 and 1953

which examined U.S. air defenses. In 1952 Truman's secretary of defense, Robert

Lovett, also a future Gaither committee member, asked Kelly to chair a panel that would

study u.s. air defenses.99 Although Kelly's committee concluded that an absolute defense

9S Civil Defense Plan for National Survival, 83. 96 Ibid., 97. 97 Ibid., 215. 98 Ibid., 671. 99 Memorandum for JCS, Janwuy 26, 1953, NA. RG 218, JCS, 1951-1953 Geographical File, FolderCCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec. 23, I. In addition to Kelly, the committee consisted of Walker Cisler, the president of Detroit Edison Company, S. C. Hollister, dean of Engineering at Cornell University, F. L. Hoyde, president of Purdue University, C. C. Lauritsen, physics professor at the California Institute for Technology, Arthur E. Raymond, vice president of Douglas Aircraft Company, and R E. Wilson, chairman of Standard Oil Company.

100

network could not be built and offensive capabilities bad to be emphasized, it neverthe-

less called for the development of "a comprehensive plan for air defense," the extension of

the early warning radar network "as far as possible from US borders," and the implemen-

tation of "a vigorous civil defense program."UIO

The Kelly report prompted Eisenhower to appoint two new committees to study

u.S. continental defenses. The first, headed by retired General Harold Bull, presented its

report in July and provided the foundation for the Eisenhower administration's first policy

statement concerning continental defenses--NSC 159. The Bull report reached similar

conclusions as the Kelly committee. 101 In evaluating the Bull committee's findings, Eisen-

hower turned to a second committee of outside consultants, including Baxter, for its

opinions. 102 At a September 1953 NSC meeting, this committee supported NSC 159 but

stressed the importance of continuing the administration's emphasis on reducing the

budget. 103

While various experts were lamenting the inadequacies of u.S. civil and continen-

tal defense plans, Eisenhower was growing concerned about the inability of the United

States to acquire accurate inteUigence assessments of the Soviet Union. His creation of

the Killian committee reveals just how disturbed he was about the possibility of the Soviet

100 Robert 1. Watson, History o/the Joint Chiefs o/Staff: The Joint Chiefs o/Staff and National Policy. 1953-1954, v. 5 (GPO, 1986), 119-20. For a description of the Kelly Report, see Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 185-90. 101 See Watson. History o/the Joint Chiefs o/Staff, v. 5, 126-27. 102 Memorandum for the JCS, July 28, 1953, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1951-1953 Geographical File, FolderCCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec. 24, l. In addition to Baxter, the committee consisted of James Black, president of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Alan Gregg, vice president of the Rockefeller Foundation, David McDonald, president of the United Slates Steel Workers of America. and Arthur Page, former vice president AT & T. 103 Minutes of the 163rd Meeting of the National Security Council, September 24, 1953, NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - Minutes of the 163rd Meeting, l.

101

Union being in a position to launch a surprise attack against the United States. His

concern stemmed from the changing technological environment and the secrecy that en-

veloped the Soviet Union. Eisenhower attempted to identify and rectify some of the diffi-

culties in intelligence gathering by asking General James Doolittle, a trusted advisor and

World War II hero, to examine the effectiveness of the CIA's operations.

Doolittle became a national hero after leading a surprise air raid on Tokyo four

months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His expertise went beyond this ac-

complishment. Prior to the war he was a Rhodes scholar and earned a Ph.D. in aeronauti-

cal engineering from M.LT. After the war, he became the vice president of Shell Oil

Company. In addition to working at Shell, Doolittle continued to advise the Air Force.

From 1950 to 1958, he served on the Air Force Science Advisory Board and acted as its

chainnan for the last three years. 104 While this position may not seem illustrious, it pro-

vided Doolittle personal access to the Air Force chief of staff. One of his contemporaries

recalled that «Jimmy [Doolittle] carried much more weight in Air Force affairs after he re-

tired than the titles he held would indicate, and the reasons ... were his reliability and his

credibility." lOS

It was not surprising that Eisenhower turned to Doolittle in 1954. Not only was

Doolittle already serving on the steering committee of the Technical Capabilities Panel,

but he possessed a philosophy that comported with Eisenhower's. Doolittle recognized

104 Thomas A. Strum, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years. 1944-1964 (GPO, 1967),45. Dr. Mervin KeUy, a future Gaither committee member, also served on this board from 1951 to 1957. lOS Herbert F. York, Making Weapons. Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987),88.

102 the importance of both economic security and technological advancement. In a 1949

speech, he emphasized that "Economy should be the watchword in our military thinking.

Waste plays directly into Russia's hands. Balance between the services must be achieved

with national. not individual service, welfare in mind. The course is clear: The first step in

avoiding war with Russia is to avoid waste and to remain technologically ahead of her." 106

At an Air Force Science Advisory Board meeting during the same year, Doolittle dis-

cussed the importance of maintaining technological superiority over the Soviet Union. He

explained "that the only thing that is going to keep us out of war is our technological ad-

vantage. It is far better to keep out of war than to win a war. If we permit a potential en-

emy to get ahead of us technologically ... that is the surest way to start a war." 107

When Eisenhower turned to Doolittle in 1954, he wanted to obtain "some indica-

tion of the over-all adequacy of our National Intelligence Program and the manner of its

implementation." He added that "we should briefly review the activities of all agencies of

government charged with the collection, interpretation and dissemination of intelligence

dealing with the plans, capabilities and intentions of potential enemies.,,108 For three

months, Doolittle and the other committee members, William Frank, Morris Hadley, and

William Pawley, examined U.S. intelligence operations. In their examination they had ac-

106 James H. Doolittle, "A Program for World Peace," address at Georgetown University, April 30, 1949, reprinted in Eugene M. Emme (cd), The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics, (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959), 800. 107 Minutes of Air Force Science Advisory Board Meeting, November 3, 1949, quoted in Strum, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 33-34. 1~ Charter for Doolittle Committee, July 13, 1954, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subserics, Box 12, Folder - Doolittle Committee (July 1954-Febmary 1955), L

103 cess to all available information concerning U.S. intelligence activities including covert

operations. 109

Eisenhower treated the committee's report with the utmost sensitivity. He ordered

CIA Director Dulles "to show it to no one else," when he analyzed its recommendations

and conclusions. 110 The White House press release describing the committee's findings

did little more than say that the committee had found a few areas that needed improve-

ment, but, on the whole, the CIA was in good shape. III It is now clear that this press re-

lease understated the problems in U.S. intelligence operations. The study called for a new

policy in waging the cold war. "It is now clear," Doolittle's committee pronounced,

that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing concepts of 'fair play' must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy. 112

As with his views on technology and the economy, Doolittle advocated intelligence poli-

cies that Eisenhower liked. The president had already followed such policies in Iran and

Guatemala.

109 Wayne G. Jackson, "Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961," v. 4 - Congressional Oversight and Internal Administration, NA, RG 263, CIA. BoxAllen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence Agency, 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961, Folder - Volume #4, 112. 110 Eisenhower Diary Entry, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 284. III Press Release - The White House, October 19, 1954, EL, White House Central Files, Official Files, Box 320, Folder - Task Force to Investigate CIA. 1. 112 Quoted in U.S. Congress, Senate. "Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental 0perations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," 94th Congress, 2nd Session. 1975,52-530.

104 The Writers

The last two Gaither committee members that must be examined in some detail are

Paul Nitze and Colonel George Lincoln. In his memoirs, Nitze claims that" Abe [Lincoln]

and I were mentioned as 'project members' at the back of the [Gaither] report, which

masked the fact that we shared importantly in shaping the substance of the final ver-

sion.,,113 While Nitze may have overstated their importance, they certainly did influence

the final report. Their earner writings adumbrated the recommendations and conclusions

contained in the subsequent Gaither report.

Although Paul Nitze is the more famous of the two men, his reputation should not

overshadow Lincoln's accomplishments. Nitze himselfwrote that Lincoln was his "most

reliable mentor and advisor.,,114 Lincoln acquired his reputation as a strategic planner

while working on the staff of General George Marshall's Operation Division (OPD) dur-

ing World War II. He served as the OPD's chief of Strategy and Policy Group, a role that

"included, not only military planning, but also meshing the military side of international

statecraft with the political side ofstrategy."m As part of this job, Lincoln served as a

member of the 10int Planning Staff Planners. 116 He also acted as a military advisor to As-

113 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 167. 114 Nitze to Colonel G. A. Lincoln, January 30, 1961, USMA, Lincoln Collection, Subject Files - Names, Box 194, Folder - Nitzc, Paul, 1956-61, 1. liS Roger H. Nye, "George A. Lincoln: Architect in National Security," undated, United States Military Academy [hereafter USMA), George A. Lincoln Collection, Personal Papers, Box 1, Folder - Lincoln, George A., 3. A shorter version of this essay was published in Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr. (ed.), Issues of National Security in the 1970s: Essays Presented to Colonel George A. Lincoln on His Sixtieth Birthday (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967). See also Ray S. Cline, United States Anny in World War II: The War Department. Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Anny, 1951), 194.299-300, and 329-30. 116 Ibid.

105 sistant Secretary of War and future Gaither committee member 10hn J. McCloy on is-

sues involving the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. 117 He described his work

with McCloy as trying to arrange the "official marriage of political and military policy of

the State Department and the War Department." 118

After the war, Lincoln continued to serve on the OPD in the military's transition

from wartime to peacetime status. 119 Despite his prominent position and his bright future

in the Army, he decided in 1947 to retire from active service and to teach at the United

States Military Academy. When he announced his retirement, Eisenhower, the Army chief

of staff, attempted to persuade Lincoln to reconsider. Over sixteen years later, Eisen-

hower recalled that "I used every pressure 1 could bring to bear on him to persuade him to

stay in the Pentagon because of the high value 1 placed upon his knowledge, thoroughness

and good sense."I20 After reluctantly accepting his resignation, Eisenhower wrote Lincoln

that "I attribute in very great part to you a noticeable growth in the soundness and clarity

of military policy pertaining to U.S. security .... 1 personally have leaned heavily on your

advice since my arrival here, confident that your solutions would be the best that hard

work, outstanding intelligence, integrity and devotion to duty could provide.,,121

Lincoln's contributions to military planning did not end with his retirement from

the Army. He periodically returned to Washington to provide advice. In 1950 Ambassa-

dor Averell Harriman asked Lincoln to be his military advisor on the Temporary Council

117 Leffier, Preponderance 0/ Power. 29. 118 Quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post, 330. 119 For examples of the collaboration between Eisenhower reliance on Lincoln after the war, see Galambos (ed.), Paperso/Dwight David Eisenhower. VII, 5750, 577-780, 7610, 8500, 931n, and 961n. 120 Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, Apri16, 1963, EL, Milton S. Eisenhower Papers, 1938-1973, Box 15, Folder - Correspondence - 1963, 2. 121 Eisenhower to Lincoln, undated, quoted in Nye, "George A. Lincoln," 1.

106 Committee for NATO. The committee examined the military, political, and economic

capabilities of each NATO country to determine a practical strategy for the defense of

Western Europe. Harriman later recalled that "I looked to Abe [Lincoln] to help me rec-

oncile every factor.,,122

Lincoln's publications proved even more important. In 1954, he revised a compi-

lation of essays, &onomics and National Security. In this work, Lincoln addressed three

issues of particular importance to the later Gaither committee. First, he outlined what he

saw as the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union. Second, he discussed the impor-

tance of maintaining a high level of economic mobilization. Finally, he emphasized the

significance of technological changes to national security programs.

Lincoln believed that the only way to coexist peacefully with the Soviet Union was

to create an armistice "made by power and preserved by power."l23 He further explained

that "Soviet communism is committed to world conquest, and we cannot rely on it

changing this policy in our time.,,124 Lincoln did not expect the Soviet Union to initiate a

war, but he believed a war could happen at any time due to miscalculation. He stressed

that the successors to Stalin were not likely

to be tempted to rash actions gravely imperiling the Soviet base of communism. On the other hand continual pressure and struggle are basic tenets of communism, and failure to take advantage of an opportunity for advance is a cardinal sin in the communism code. The movement has a discipline usually described as 'Prussian.' It is versatile and resourceful. It is continually at war with the remainder of the world and uses a strategy that un-

122 Quoted in Nye. "George A. Lincoln. " 8. 123 George A. Lincoln, Economics of National Security: Managing America's Resources for Defense. 2nd cd. (Englwood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc .• 1954).24. 124 Ibid.

derstands the weaknesses and appreciates the tactics in the fields of politics, economics, and psychology. 115

107

Because he saw the Soviet threat as ''world-wide,'' "total," and "of indefinite dura-

tion," Lincoln argued that the United States had to maintain an economy based on prepar-

edness and government control. 126 Until the Soviet Union recanted its philosophy or ac-

cepted defeat in the Cold War, Lincoln believed that the United States had little choice but

to prepare for war. He argued that "the choice must be made between the hazards of

greater and lesser evils .... When the greater evil is the threat to survival, the choice

should fallon the lesser evil-which is a considerable expenditure of resources for a sus-

tained level of preparedness, an all-out effort in case of war, and adequate measures to

keep the economy strong and healthy meanwhile."I21 He later added that ifthe threat of

war became probable, then concern over the strain of defense spending on the economy

should become second to survival. 128

Lincoln also addressed the relationship of science and technology to national se-

curity. Reminiscent of Eisenhower's memorandum to his subordinates at the end of

World War IT, Lincoln viewed the war as providing important precedents for sustaining

cooperation between the scientific community and the military establishment. He believed:

125 Ibid.

1) Science must be integrated with military strategy in the future.

2) Military research and development are of the same order of importance as industrial preparedness and manpower reserves.

126 Ibid., 2S and 44-45. 127 Ibid., 43. 128 Ibid., 85

3) Timing of technological advances has become all important. The race for technological advantage is a major part of the race for survival in a power struggle. 129

108

Lincoln feared that if the Soviet Union achieved some technological breakthrough before

the United States, it might use that advantage to move against U.S. interests oppressively.

When Lincoln finished revising his book in 1954, the United States and the Soviet

Union were in the midst of an accelerating technological race. The new thermonuclear

weapons were a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hi-

roshima and Nagasaki. The introduction ofintercontinentaI bombers and the anticipated

development of ICBMs raised the possibility that an aggressor could win a war in the ini-

tial strike. Lincoln stressed the importance of the United States maintaining its techno-

logical lead over the Soviet Union. He argued that "The time element . .. has been mag-

nified by modem technology in at least three ways. Fi~ the race for technological advan-

tage is decided before hostilities. Second, the aggressor has an increasing advantage paral-

leling the upward slant of technological change. Third, and related to the preceding point,

the surprise aggression becomes more attractive and harder to meet." 130 [Emphasis in

original]

Lincoln's work did not go unnoticed in Washington. Eisenhower repeatedly asked

Lincoln to serve as an advisor to the administration. In 1953 Lincoln worked on Task

Force A of Project Solarium. In 1956, he participated in a committee that examined the

psychological aspects of U.S. strategy for Eisenhower's adviser Nelson Rockefeller. 131 In

129 Ibid., 364. 130 Ibid., 378. 131 For a description of Project Solarium. see chapter 1. For a description of the Rockefeller study group, also known as the Quantico II Panel. see FRUS /955-/957, 19, 153-4.

109 that same year, Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Lincoln to

direct the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Although Lincoln could not take the

job, the offer reveals Eisenhower's continued interest and respect for the West Point pro-

fessor. 132

In addition to serving on the Gaither committee in 1957, Lincoln wrote an influ-

ential essay that discussed U.S. capabilities to wage limited military operations. In this

paper, he asked, "Are we of the Western World so committed to deterrent nuclear force,

and so fearful of the slightest nuclear threat that we lack the means, or wit, or both, to

deal with local and limited situations?" 133 In raising this penetrating question. Lincoln was

in essence challenging the reliance of the Eisenhower administration on massive retalia-

tion.

Lincoln presented ten propositions to elaborate his philosophy concerning the re-

lationship between technology, politics, and war. He emphasized that while the United

States had to prepare for a general, atomic war with the Soviet Union. the most likely fu-

ture conflicts would be limited in nature. He stressed that the United States had to main-

tain the capability to wage either general or limited wars and to be able to use either con-

ventional or nuclear weapons. The key was maintaining a level of flexibility in military

capabilities. Lincoln believed that technological changes widened the political and military

options available to states yet raised the stakes of waging war. "The hazards arising from

132 Nyc, "George A Lincoln," 11. 133 Colonel G. A. Lincoln and Lt Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Technology and the Changing Nature of General War," Military Review 36 (May 1957), 13.

110 the opportunities and temptations for rash, desperate, or just uninformed leadership,"

Lincoln concluded "are increasing." 134

Lincoln's close friend and sometimes professional collaborator, Paul Nitze, played

an active role in government affairs during the Truman administration. He participated in

the assessment of the effects of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.13S He sub-

sequently joined the State Department and then directed its Policy Planning Staff from

1950 to 1952. He was the principal author ofNSC 68, calling for much larger military

expenditures. 136

Nitze's tenure at the State Department came to an abrupt end after Eisenhower

took office in 1953. Although Eisenhower's new defense secretary, Charles Wtlson, of-

fered Nitze a new position his department, he met fierce resistance from congressional

Republicans, especially Senate Majority Leader Wtlliam Knowland, who believed that

Nitze was tied too closely to the previous administration. Secretary of State Dulles found

Nitze's continued presence in the administration appalling and demanded his dismissal.

Bowing to pressure, Wtlson asked for and received Nitze's resignation. Nitze was embit-

tered and thereafter despised Dulles. 137

134 Ibid., 7. \3S Herken. Counsels of War, 17; Rearden, Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, 2-4; and United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (pacific War) (GPO, 1946). The summary report. which Nitze helped write, reached several conclusions that influenced his later writings. It stressed the importance of maintaining offensive retaliatory power, building continental defenses, developing and implementing civil defense plans, preserving technological superiority, and increasing intelligence capabilities. See Summary Report, 29-32. 136 See chapter I. 137 For descriptions of the controversial dismissal ofNitze, see Emmet lohn Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Antheneum. 1963), 120-21; and Callahan. Dangerous Capabilities, 150-52.

III Before he left the State Department, Nitze set forth his opinions concerning

continental defense. Although be wanted a considerable increase in U.S. offensive capa-

bilities, he did not believe they alone could preserve U.S. security. He believed that the

United States also needed to construct civil and continental defenses. In one ofbis last

memoranda while still at the State Department, Nitze explained that "In dealing with the

problem of continental defense it is important to recognize the inter-relationship of military

defense, offensive striking power, and the civil defense program. These three elements are

complementary and mutually supporting.,,138 Four years later when he helped write the

Gaither report, these views remained paramount.

In 1954, Nitze became an outspoken critic of the Eisenhower administration and in

particular the policies articulated by Secretary of State DuDes. After listening to DuDes's

massive retaliation speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Nitze privately circulated a

dissenting paper. He argued that by placing primary reliance on atomic weapons, the

United States was guaranteeing that any future conflicts would involve the use of these

weapons. He argued that "If we are to obtain victory, or peace with justice and without

defeat, we must attain it with non-atomic means while deterring an atomic war.,,139 With

this paper, Nitze began a campaign which would last until the Kennedy administration to

force the government to recognize the importance of maintaining sufficient conventional

forces to supplement U.S. nuclear capabilities.

138 Memorandum by Nitze and Savage, May 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, 2, 322. 139 Paul Nitze, "Critique of Dulles' 'Massive Retaliation' Speech" reprinted in Kenneth W. Thompson and Steven L. Rearden (eds.), Paul H. Nitze on National Security and Arms Control (Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Inc., 1990),41; and Rearden, Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, 37-38.

Years later, Nitze described in his memoirs how he viewed the strategic situa-

tion in the 1950s. He explained:

In the event of a crisis involving a serious possibility of war with the United States, how might the problem be seen from the Kremlin? Being careful planners, the Soviets undoubtedly would have carefully prepared war plans for a variety of contingencies. One could therefore theorize with some confidence that Soviet plans would include a disarming first strike, if we responded with the remains of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) byattacking Soviet base structure and nuclear attack facilities, the exchange ratios would go against us very quickly. In two, three, four, or at most five exchanges, the United States would be down to a woefully low level of capability while the Soviet Union could still be at a relatively high one. We could then be at their mercy. Ifwe choose to attack their populations, we would invite almost total annihilation in the United States. 140

112

Nitze's explanation clearly indicates his preoccupation with the Soviet Union's capabilities

while giving little thought to its goals or intentions. 141

In an article in Foreign Affairs in 1956, Nitze expounded an alternative strategy to

massive retaliation. He argued that Eisenhower's policies were inconsistent because the

United States military did not possess the ability, beyond atomic weapons, to wage the

war against communism. 142 He explained that the country needed to acquire the capability

to raise the stakes in a conflict gradually rather than immediately resorting to massive re-

taliation. He emphasized ''that it is to the interest of the West that the means employed in

warfare and the area of engagement be restricted to the minimum level which still permits

us to achieve our objectives. Our basic action policy must therefore be one of 'graduated

deterrence. ", 143 By responding in kind to an aggressive act, Nitze believed the United

140 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 165. 141 Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 160. 142 Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," Foreign Affairs 34:2 (January (956), 198. 143 Ibid., 188.

113 States could limit the scope of the conflict and the area affected by the military en-

gagements. But. in 1956, Nitze believed that the United States did not possess the neces-

sary capabilities.

Nitze stressed that the United States needed to expand its offensive retaliatory ca-

pabilities, build defenses against a surprise attack, and prepare to wage limited wars. Re-

cent developments in nuclear weapon and delivery technology particularly concerned him.

"The side which has lost effective control of the intercontinental air spaces will face a truly

agonizing decision. It may still have the capability of destroying a few of the enemy's cit-

ies. But the damage it could inflict would be indecisive and out of all proportion to the

annihilation which its own cities could expect to receive in retum."l44 Accordingly, he

stressed that "It is important that the West maintain indefinitely a position of nuclear at-

tack-defense superiority versus the Soviet Union and its sateUites.,,14S Consequently, the

United States needed to "develop an air defense system which makes full use of the

West's geographic advantages."l46

While not satisfied with either U.S. offensive retaliatory or defense capabilities, the

Eisenhower administration's cuts in conventional forces particularly bothered Nitze. He

believed U. S. commitments exceeded its military capabilities. He emphasized that the

United States needed to be able to wage limited wars with and without atomic weapons.

The United States should be able to meet aggression initially without atomic weapons. It

should expand hostilities only if no other alternative existed to rectify the situation. If it

144 Ibid .• 196. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid., 197.

114 decided to use atomic weapons, it should use them only against military targets. Non-

atomic capabilities, therefore, were needed to lower its dependence on atomic forces. 147

These policies would enable the United States to institute his strategy of "graduated deter-

renee."

Two months prior to the presentation of the Gaither report to the NSC, Nitze

published another article that denounced the Eisenhower administration's reliance on

massive retaliation. "Secretary Dulles' massive retaliation statement," Nitze wrote, "did

not announce a new doctrine but a return to a pre-1950 doctrine [pre-NSC 68]. It is not a

step forward; it was a step backward - a step back dictated not by new strategic consid-

erations but by domestic political and budgetary considerations. Ever since, the rationale

of our military-political doctrine has been a shambles of inconsistencies, inadequacies, and

reappraisals."I48 Nitze stressed the need for a full range of military capabilities that would

later be included in the Gaither report. "1 see little purpose," Nitze concluded, "in making

every war, even a limited war, a nuclear one.,,149

Conclusions

As he had on previous occasions, Eisenhower established a committee of experts

in 1957 to examine a vexing national security problem. When the FCDA proposed a $32

billion shelter system in January, the president had to decide whether such a program

would sufficiently improve the country's security to justifY its cost. While he was satisfied

with the status of U.S. military strength and his national security programs, he recognized

147 Ibid., 196. 148 Paul Nitze, "Limited Wars or Massive Retaliation?," The Reporter 17 (September 5, 1957), 41. 149 Ibid, 41.

lIS that others were justly concerned about the consequences of a nuclear war. ISO Eisen-

hower believed that the Gaither committee would provide answers to at least one key

question. Should the United States attempt to reduce the vulnerability of its population

through an elaborate system of continental and civil defenses?

The creation of the Gaither committee to address this very question represented

Eisenhower's reliance on a decision-making system that he used throughout his presi-

dency. Eisenhower wanted to receive advice from those who were the most qualified.

While he respected and valued the advice of his official advisers, he realized that they were

not always the best experts in particular fields. He, therefore, turned to consultants out-

side the government. Eisenhower explained in his memoirs that the Gaither committee

"had been formed to bring new minds and background experience to bear on major prob-

lems of government. It was empowered to receive information from government agencies

and departments and to come up with an independent appraisal. With nO vested interest in

a particular department, and no federal jobs to protect, the panel was a means of obtaining

independent judgments." IS I

The Gaither committee was composed of experts whom Eisenhower respected and

admired. They came from a variety of backgrounds. Some, such as Rabi, Berkner, and

Hill, were specialists in the fields of nuclear weaponry, radar, and radiation. Others, like

Sprague, Fisk., and Doolittle, had built their reputations in studies of U.S. continental de-

fense, fallout shelters, intelligence operations, and military forces. Finally, there were con-

ISO Winkler, Lifo Under A Cloud,84-85. lSI Eisenhower. Waging Peace, 220.

116 sultants, such as Gaither, Foster, and Killian, who were known for supervising and co-

ordinating diverse groups in the development of advisory reports.

These men shared many of the president's basic beliefs. Most were concerned

with balancing economic and military strength. Almost all of them viewed the rapid tech-

no logical changes of the 1950s with a sense of accomplishment and dread. They saw u.s.

security as dependent on the interplay of offensive and defensive military capabilities, a

strong economy, and continued close relations with its allies in Europe and around the

world. Eisenhower believed that their advice could help him comprehend and make deci-

sions concerning questions that went beyond his expertise.

Eisenhower's use of experts raises several historiographical issues that transcend

the importance of the Gaither committee itself. World War IT had transformed the rela-

tionship between scientists, engineers, and other experts and the federal government.

Prior to the war, there was little close cooperation. While experts worried about the pos-

sible restrictions resulting from government involvement in their work, political leaders

questioned spending money on projects that did not guarantee some direct benefit to the

public. World War II forced both groups to work together. The government needed ex-

perts to develop new technologies that would help the war effort, and the experts sought

funding that only the federal government could provide. Whether in the development of

the atomic bomb, radar, or some other technology, this relationship proved relatively con-

genial. 1S2

152 For summaries of the impact of World War II on the relationship between experts. expertise. and the federal government, see Balogh. Chain Reaction, 4-13 and 21-23; Kevles, The PhysiCiSts, 302-67; Friedberg, "Science, the Cold War, and the American State," 108-9; Leslie, The Cold War and American Science. 6-7; Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York:

117 After the war, the quickening pace of scientific and technological advances

precluded any layman from keeping abreast of all the changes. Furthermore, the exorbi-

tant costs of research forced scientists and engineers to look for funding from different

sources. As a result, the continued cooperation of experts and the government was only

natural. Through expanded funding for research and development, the federal government

maintained a pool of experts to call upon when it needed assistance in making decisions

concerning highly technical issues. On the other hand, with the available funding scientists

and engineers were in a position to perform research that they could not have on their

own. m

The Gaither committee represents one example of the federal government utilizing

experts during the early Cold War to acquire scientific and technical advice. Prior to

World War II, this type of committee would have been unnecessary. However, with the

expansion of knowledge during and after the war, political leaders needed some means to

understand the complicated technological and scientific problems they faced. By the end

of his administration, Eisenhower recognized the transformation that had occurred in de-

cision making since 1945 and lamented the possible repercussions. In his now famous

farewell address, he warned the American people:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience ....

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965),39-86; and Robert Gilpin. "Introduction: Natural Scientists in PolicyMaking," in Gilpin and Wright (eds.), Scientists and National Policy-Making, 3-6. 153 See Balogh. Chain Reaction; Leslie, The Cold War and American Science; Lapp, The New Priesthood, 12-15; and Friedberg, "Science, the Cold War, and the American State," 107-118.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic process ....

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever presentand is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. 1S4

1I8

Despite these warnings, it was Eisenhower who expanded the role of experts in presiden-

tial decision making and left a precedent for their use in future administrations. As Gregg

Herken persuasively concludes, "The culminating irony of Eisenhower's presidency was

the fact that he himself had done more than anyone else to raise the role of experts and

expertise to prominence in the government." ISS

154 Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People by President Eisenhower, January 17, 1961, reprinted in Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen (cds.), The Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961: A Documentary History (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971). 1375-76. ISS Hcrlcen, Counsels o/War, 133.

119 CHAPTER 3 - 1957: A YEAR OF TURMOIL

The question of civil defense was only one of many problems that Eisenhower

faced in 1957. Although the year began with Eisenhower's popularity at its height, he

soon faced a sequence of serious problems. Legislatively, he was at loggerheads with a

Democratic Congress. PoliticaIly, new civil rights legislation and the confrontation in

Little Rock, polarized the nation. Economically, the country slowly slipped into a

recession. TechnologicaIlyand militarily, the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik and the

continued disappointments in U.S. space programs engendered soul-searching about the

superiority of American science and the military security of the United States. I

Politics of the Defense Budget and a New Recession

Iwan Morgan argues that when Eisenhower entered office in 1953 he believed that

"the nation faced economic ruin unless fiscal responsibility was quickly re-established as

the guiding principle of budgetary policy.,,2 By the end of 1956 Eisenhower thought that

he was restoring fiscal prudence. He lowered annual defense spending from $43.8 billion

in FY 1953 to $35.5 billion in FY 1956, and produced budget surpluses of$3.2 billion and

$4.1 billion for FY 1956 and FY 1957, respectively. 3 These figures were in sharp

contrast to the $5.3 billion deficit Eisenhower inherited in the FY 1954 budget.4

I In this argument. I am accepting the main premise of one of the seminal works on Eisenhower's national security programs. Samuel Huntington argues that "Military policy cannot be separated from foreign policy, fiscal policy, and domestic policy." See Huntington, Common Defense, x-xi. 2 Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', be. 3 Statistical History of the United States, 1123-24. 4 Ibid., 1105. Eisenhower had to make significant reductions in the FY 1954 budget that he inherited from Truman to have only a $5.3 billion deficit Truman's original budget would have produced a $10 billion deficit. See Iwan W. Morgan, "Eisenhower and the Balanced Budget. " in Shirley Anne Warshaw (ed.), Reexamining The Eisenhower Presidency (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 125.

120 Despite his success in limiting government spending, in January 1957 Eisenhower

presented Congress with the largest peacetime budget in u.s. history-573.3 billion for FY

1958. Although he expressed concern that further increases in spending could lead to

higher taxes and greater inflation, he believed that this budget reflected a careful analysis

of the domestic needs and international responsibilities of the United States. In particular,

Eisenhower recognized that as long as the United States and the Soviet Union remained

locked in the cold war, there were limits to how much overall spending could be cut. In

this budget, he requested $43.3 billion for major national security programs. The

president regretted the need for such high spending levels, but he felt ''the size of the

national budget largely reflected the size of the national danger. ,,5

Some of his advisers remained concerned about the large budget. Treasury

Secretary George Humphrey lamented at a press conference on January 15 that

I would deplore the day that we thought we couldn't ever reduce expenditures of this terrific amount, [and] the terrific tax we are taking out of this country. Ifwe don't over a long period of time, I predict that you will have a depression that will curl your hair, because we are just taking too much money out of the economy that we need to make jobs that you have as time goes on.6

Humphrey's oft-quoted prediction of "a depression that will curl your hair", grabbed

headlines around the country. Although he did not expect a depression, he wanted to

warn Americans of the dire consequences of spending levels that required high taxes, large

deficits, or both. When Eisenhower attempted to defend the secretary, he implied that

S Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 129. 6 For the text of the press conference, see Nathaniel R. Howard (ed.) The Basic Papers o/George M. Humphrey (Cleveland: Western Reserve Historical Society, 1965),236-52.

121 Congress should make cuts in the budget. 7 The point seemed clear to both Democrats and

Republicans. The budget was fair game for politically beneficial cuts. 8

Eisenhower expected Congress to increase the defense budget and believed he

would have to fight to hold the line on defense spending.9 He was surprised when "The

Democrats inexplicably became economy-minded."lo Public opinion seemed to be

demanding budget cuts and Democrats wanted to get on the bandwagon. Eisenhower's

chief of staff, Sherman Adams, remembered that "There was a prairie fire of public

opinion that the federal government was about to spend too much of the people's money

and the conservatives of both parties took advantage of the prevailing sentiment to cut

programs left and right." II

Opposition to the budget came from both parties. Within the Republican Party,

Eisenhower represented the views of the more moderate wing who accepted some of the

social welfare programs of the New Deal and supported international policies, such as

membership in NATO and the UN. 12 The conservative Republicans, or Old Guard, were

led by Senators William Knowland, Styles Bridges, Joe McCarthy, and Barry Goldwater.

They advocated a smaller role for the federal government, limiting the involvement of the

United States in international organizations, and more aggressive policies against

7 The President's News Conference of January 23. 1957, in ppp, DDE. 1957, 74. 8 See Morgan. Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders " 84; Thomas A Gaskin. "Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Eisenhower Administration, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1957-60," Presidential Studies Quarterly 24:2 (Spring 1994),341; Robert A. Divine, Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History, 3rd ed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 78-80; and Kinnard. President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, 67. 9 Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 168. 10 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 129. II Adams, Firsthand Report, 366. 12 For a discussion of Moderate Republicanism, see Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1956).

122 commurusm. They did not criticize Eisenhower's defense policies, but they concluded that

he was spending too much on social programs and foreign aid. 13

The Democrats welcomed the fissures in the Republican Party as an opportunity to

gain political support for their programs. 14 Led by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon

Johnson (0-TX) and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX), the Democrats argued

that the budget could be reduced without cutting existing programs. They stressed that

substantial savings could be achieved by eliminating government waste. In particular, they

saw the budgets for the Defense Department and the Mutual Security Agency as good

areas to find savings. With bipartisan support, Congress passed a defense budget in July

that reduced Army spending from $8.465 to $7.265 billion, Navy spending from $10.487

to $9.866 billion, and Air Force spending from $16.471 to $15.930 billion. IS With an

additional $1.7 billion in cuts from the rest of the budget, including $1 billion from the

Mutual Security program, Congress was able to reduce the president's spending plans by

nearly $4.0 bi1lion. 16

The spring 1957 budget crisis represented a new problem for Eisenhower and his

advisors. In his first term, he had to protect the economy against demands for additional

spending. In 1957, he found himself defending the military budget against the calls for

more cuts. He sent a letter to the Speaker of the House Rayburn requesting that Congress

13 See Eisenhower. Waging Peace. 130; and Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 84. 14 Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 84-88. See also Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 390; Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 168; and Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defonse and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1966),245-52. IS Charles H. Donnelly, United States Defonse Policies in 1957 (GPO, 1958),83. 16 Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 88. The House Appropriations Committee justified its cuts by arguing that "the nature and e.~ent of a military threat against the United States and its allies appears, in certain respects to have somewhat abated. n Quoted in Donnelly, United States Defonse Policies in 1957,83.

123 reconsider its reductions. He explained that "I most solemnly advise the House that in

these times a cut of any appreciable consequence in current expenditures for national

security and related programs would endanger our country and the peace of the world." 17

He further added that "a muitibillion-doUar reduction in 1958 expenditures can be

accomplished only at the expense of the national safety and interest.,,18 His request went

unheeded.

As debate over the FY 1958 budget came to a close, economic indicators revealed

the economy was slipping into a recession.19 William McChesney Martin, the chairman of

the Federal Reserve Board, believed the economic problems were tied to inflation and

raised the discount rate from 3 to 3 112 percent. Instead of stimulating the economy, the

increase stymied economic growth.20 In late 1957 and early 1958, exports declined

precipitously, industrial production feU 14 percent, corporate profits declined 25 percent,

and unemployment rose to 7.5 percent. It was only in May 1958 that the economy began

to recover. 21

Eisenhower reacted to the new economic situation with his usual caution. Other

than reducing the discount rate to 3 percent in November 1957 and releasing $177 million

for the housing industry in December, Eisenhower and advisers did little to combat the

17 Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the 1958 Budget. April 18, 1957, reprinted in PPP-DDE, 1957, 304. 18 Ibid., 305. 19 Eisenhower's chainnan of the CEA, Raymond Saulnier, made this announcement at a cabinet meeting on May 3, 1957. Quoted in Sloan, Eisenhower ond the Monagement o/Prosperity, 143-44. 20 Ibid., 144; and Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 94. 21 The figures are reported in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 305; Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 93-94; and Sloan, Eisenhower and the Monagement 0/ Prosperity, 144-45.

recession.22 In particular, he resisted calls for a tax cut and emergency public works

programs. He explained to his former CEA chairman, Arthur Burns, the reasons for his

response:

I trust that I am not getting stubborn in my attitude about logical federal action in this business slump, but I am bound to say that I cannot help but feel that precipitate, and therefore largely unwise, action would be the worst thing that we could now do. I realize that to be conservative in this situation . . . can well get me tagged as an unsympathetic, reactionary fossil. But my honest conviction is that the greatest service we can now do for our country is to oppose wild-eyed schemes of every kind. I am against vast and unwise public works programs ... as well as the slash-bang kinds of tax-cutting from which the proponents want nothing so much as immediate political advantage. 23

124

While Eisenhower held true to his principles to limit the role of the federal government in

the economy and to avoid deficit spending, his popularity and effectiveness suffered

another blow.24

Civil Rights and Preserving the American Constitutional System

Eisenhower's struggles in 1957 were not limited to his disagreements with

Congress over the budget and the economic recession. He also faced major civil rights

controversies. For the first time since Reconstruction, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act

to strengthen the voting rights of black Americans, and the president used military force to

support the integration of southern schools.2S These civil rights issues illuminated

22 For descriptions of Eisenhower reaction to the recession, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 305-10; Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 93-98; and Sloan, Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity. 143-51. 23 Eisenhower to Arthur Burns, March 12, 1958, quoted in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 309. 24 Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 176-77. 2S The best study of Eisenhower's civil rights policies remains Roben Frederick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984). For an excellent roundtable discussion of civil rights in the 1950s involving some of the Eisenhower

125 Eisenhower's desire to limit the role of the federal government yet guarantee individual

rights. He was also very worried that the country's racial problems would hinder his

ability to wage the cold war.

In his State of the Union address in January 1957, Eisenhower announced that one

of his goals for the coming year was to obtain the passage of a Civil Rights Act that

protected the voting rights of black Americans. His Attorney General Herbert Brownell

developed a bill that would have given federal courts greater leeway in preserving access

to the voting booths, allowed the Justice Department to file suits more easily in cases

where an individual's voting rights had been obstructed, and created a non-partisan civil

rights commission to study and report on the status of racial relations.26 While modest,

Eisenhower saw the legislation as a step towards improved race relations. He insisted that

racial divisions within the country could only be bridged gradually through a process of

education.27 He wrote to Congressman Adam Clayton Powell:

It is my conviction now, as it has always been, that progress must steadily be made in assuring to all citizens equality under our Constitution and under the laws. Moreover, I have repeatedly stated my conviction that it is not in laws alone that rapid achievement of this purpose will be found, but rather that citizens will more readily respond to the dictates of fair and just

administration's key participants, see Shirley Anne Warshaw (ed.), The Eisenhower Legacy: Discussions of Presidential Leadership (Silver Springs, MD: Bartleby Press, 1992), 63-88. 26 See Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 146; and Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 208-17. 27 James C. Duram, A Moderate Among Extremists: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the &hool Desegregation (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, Inc., 1981), viii and 116-19. Eisenhower's beUefin the imponance of education as a means to overcome racial animosity can be seen in a letter he wrote his brother in 1946. Milton Eisenhower, the president or Kansas State University, asked Dwight's advice in establishing the objectives on a new 'Citizenship' course. Eisenhower replied that "In presenting the objectives of the course I should bear down bard on elimination of racial intolerance." [emphasis in original] Eisenhower to Milton Stover Eisenhower, March IS, 1946, reprinted in Galambos (ed.), Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, VI!, 942.

laws if explanation, understanding and moderation as well as firmness of purpose are used by officials of government at every level. 28

Eisenhower's call for civil rights' legislation met a fairly positive response. The

House passed a civil rights' bill in June that was very similar to the one proposed by

126

Brownell. The Senate, led by Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, was more resistant to the

administration's proposals. However, the Texas senator realized that the passage ofa bill

would raise his national stature as a potential candidate for the 1960 presidential election.

Accordingly, he worked to frame legislation that provided greater civil rights to black

Americans, but at the same time was politically palatable to the white South.29 The

resulting compromise bill contained most of the provisions Eisenhower requested, but also

included an amendment that allowed juries to render verdicts in voting rights' cases. The

amendment almost guaranteed that any case initiated by a black plaintiff would be brought

before a white jury that would not be sympathetic to civil rights' complaints. While

Eisenhower was opposed to this amendment and even considered vetoing the entire bill,

he decided that minimal civil rights' legislation was better than none at all.30

Almost immediately after signing the bill, Eisenhower faced a new and potentially

violent crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas. Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.

Topeka Board of Education, most schools in the South remained segregated in 1957.31

28 Telegram to Congressman Powell of New York in Response to His Request for a Meeting, September 18, 1957, PPP-DDE. 1957,677. 29 Merle Miller, Lyndon: An Oral Biography (New York: Ballentine Books, 1980),249-58. See also Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years. 1954-63 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988),220-21. 30 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 159-62. 31 Harvard Sitkoff reports that "In 1960, only one-sixth of one percent of the black students in the South went to a desegregated school." Harvard Sitkoff, The Strugglefor Black Equality. 1954-1992, Revised Edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981, 1993), 36. Eisenhower did not agree with the Brown decision. In expectation of that decision, Eisenhower told South Carolina governor James Byrnes that he feared the

127 The court's ruling in 1955 that it was the responsibility of the states and localities to

integrate schools "with all deliberate speed" allowed the southern states to establish a slow

pace for desegregation.32 In Little Rock. the school board implemented an eight year plan

in May 1955 to integrate schools gradually, and on several occasions, courts ruled that the

plan represented a legitimate means to achieve the objective of integration. With its

emphasis on slow and incremental change, this plan represented what Eisenhower saw as

an appropriate way to educate the population in a non-inflammatory way.

There was widespread opposition to even gradual integration in the Southern

states. Traditional organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and new groups like the White

Citizens' Councils resisted integration. Furthermore, state and local politicians, including

both those who shared racist attitudes and those who simply recognized the pitfalls of

encouraging desegregation, campaigned against the Supreme Court's decision. In 1956,

over one hundred congressmen signed the Southern Manifesto declaring their opposition

to desegregation and calling for the reversal of the Brown decision. In addition, several

Southern states, including Alabama and Texas, experienced incidents that foreshadowed

the coming crisis in Little Rock.33

consequences of court-ordered desegregation. He explained "that improvement in race relations is one of those things that will be healthy and sound only if it starts locally. I do not believe that prejudices, even palpably unjustified prejudices will succumb to compulsion. Consequently, I believe that federal law imposed upon our states in such a way as to bring about conflict of the police powers of the states and of the nation. would set back the cause of progress in race relations for a long, long time." Eisenhower Dimy Entry, July 23. 1954, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 246-47. 32 Brown v. Board o/Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct 753,99 L.ED. 1083 (1955), reprinted in Roland D. Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes 3rd ed. (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1989),495. This case is often referred to as Brown II as it was the follow-up case to the original Brown decision. The question before the Supreme Court was what was an appropriate time frame to expect desegregation. 33 For descriptions of some of the desegregation disputes in the South, sec Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 159-61,167, and 186; and Duram, Moderate Among Extremists, 56-59, 123, and 134-35.

128 As the school year began, Central High School in Little Rock was earmarked to be

integrated under the local school board's plan. There had been surprisingly little

opposition to the proposal in the months leading to the new school year. However, in late

August a parent sought a court injunction to stop the scheduled integration. Although

granted by a local court, a federal appeals court ordered Central High to be opened to

both black and white students. In an act of open resistance, Arkansas Governor OrviIIe

Faubus ordered the National Guard to prevent the attendance of the black students. He

argued that their presence could provoke violence. Eisenhower faced a delicate crisis: a

state governor was blatantly challenging the Supreme Court's right to judicial review and

the federal government's authority to enforce the laws of the land.34

The stalemate between Faubus and the federal government continued until

September 20 when Faubus ordered the National Guard to withdraw. Although the crisis

seemed over, an important question still remained. Without the National Guard present,

would anybody try to stop the black students from attending school on Monday,

September 23? On that day nine black students entered the high school relatively

uneventfully. However, as the day progressed a mob grew outside. By mid-day, the

police asked that the black students be sent home for their own safety.3s

The mob violence forced Eisenhower's hand. He believed that the federal

government had the responsibility to preserve public order and to enforce laws when the

34 For a description of the Little Rock crisis, see ibid, 144; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 162-75; and Diary Entry of the President, October 8, 1957, in Ferrell (cd), Eisenhower Diaries, 347-48. 3S For an excellent description of the tensions at the school, see Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High. Little Rock. 1957-58 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1980),39. See also, Burlc, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 185-86.

129 states could not or would not do so. "Cruel mob force," he exclaimed "had frustrated the

execution of an order of a United States court, and the Governor of the state was sitting

by, refusing to lift a finger to support the local authorities. ,,36 The president called the

occurrences in Little Rock "disgraceful" and explained that he would ''use the full power

of the United States including whatever force may be necessary to prevent any obstruction

of the law and to carry out the orders of the Federal Court.,,37 He authorized the dispatch

of 1,000 troops from the Army's 10Ist Airborne Division to Little Rock to restore peace

and guarantee respect for the law.38

The struggle for the Civil Rights Act and the crisis in Little Rock indicate clearly

the underlying principles that guided Eisenhower's decision-making and the domestic

tensions that plagued the country in 1957. He believed that the federal government should

only be involved in people's lives in areas that the individual, locality, andlor state could

not manage. He temporized on issues unless the federal government had a clear

prerogative to intervene. Several scholars and contemporaries argue that Eisenhower

failed to provide leadership on civil rights issues when he had an opportunity to make

dramatic changes.39 To a degree, these criticisms are valid. At times, Eisenhower

attempted to avoid civil rights issues, and he did disagree with the Brown decision.

However, he did initiate the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruction and did use

36 Eisenhower. Waging Peace, 168. 37 Statement by the President Regarding Occurrences at Central High School in Little Rock, September 23, 1957, in PPP-DDE, 1957,689. 38 Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little Rock. September 24, 1957, ibid, 690-2. 39 See for instance Hughes, The Ordeal a/Power, 243-45; SitkotI: Struggle/or Black Equality, 31; and Robert F. BurIc. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and Civil Rights Conservatism," in Krieg (ed.), Dwight D. Eisenhower. 51-52.

130 federal troops to insure compliance with the court's orders concerning integration. These

decisions were neither easy nor popular, but they comported with his principles to limit the

role of the federal government as much as possible while at the same time protecting the

rights of the individual. 40

Eisenhower was also concerned about the impact of the civil rights issues to U.S.

foreign policy. He decried how the crisis in Little Rock continued ''to feed the mill of

Soviet propagandists who by word and picture were telling the world of the 'racial terror'

in the United States.,,41 In his address to the American people he lamented:

At a time when we face grave situations abroad because of the hatred that Communism bears toward a system of government based on human rights, it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world.

Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation. We are portrayed as a violator of those standards of conduct which the peoples of the world united to proclaim in the Charter of the United Nations.42

Another Pearl Harbor

Within weeks after the federal government's intervention in Little Rock, the Soviet

Union shocked the world by launching Sputnik. The potential implications of the Soviet

rocket capability had a profound impact on the Gaither committee and how its findings

would be received by Eisenhower, Congress, and the country at large. Sputnik raised

40 Duram. Moderate Among Extremists, viii; Stanley I. Kotler, "Eisenhower, the Judiciary, and Desegregation: Some Reflections," in Bischofand Ambrose (eds.), Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, 100; and Michael S. Mayer, "Regardless ofSration. Race, or Calling: Eisenhower and Race," in Krieg (ed.), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 39. For a description of the decline of Eisenhower's popularity due in part to the civil rights disputes, see Pach and Richardson. Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 175. 41 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 171. 42 Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little Rock, September 24, 1957, in PPP-DDE. 1957,694.

131 questions about Eisenhower's ability to lead the nation, the United States military position

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and the status of the United States among the world's scientific

and technical elite.43

Americans had become convinced of their scientific superiority and were amazed

that the Russians could beat the world's most technically advanced country to outer space.

The implications of the launch of Sputnik were frightening. If the Soviet Union could

send a satellite into space, why could it not launch a nuclear-tipped missile across the

oceans?44 Newsweek concluded that Sputnik represented a "defeat in three fields: In pure

science, in practical know-how, and in psychological cold war."4S Life argued "Let us not

pretend that Sputnik is anything but a defeat.,,46 Public opinion polls revealed that 49

percent of the American people believed that the Soviet Union was "ahead of the United

States in the development of missiles and long distance rockets. ,,47

Senators and congressmen reached similar conclusions. Comparisons to the attack

on Pearl Harbor were widespread. In special hearings to address the adequacy of U.S.

missile programs, Senator Lyndon Johnson claimed that "We meet today in the

atmosphere of another Pearl Harbor.,,48 Charles Donnelly, a legislative assistant,

43 For U.S. reactions to Sputnik, see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; and McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth. 44 For the reaction of David Beckler, a Gaither Committee member, see Memorandum for Mr. Victor Cooley, Acting Director ODM, October 8, 1957, EL, WHO, OSAST, Box 3, Folder - Space October 1957-October 1959, 1. He argued that "Although the satellite is not a military weapon, it tends to be identified in the minds of the world with the impressive military and technological strength of the USSR In a military sense it underscores Soviet long-range missile claims. In a technological sense it shows the Soviets to have impressive technological sopbistication and resources." 45 "Into Space: Man's Awesome Adventure," Newsweek, 50:16 (October 14, 1957),37. 46 Quoted in McDougall, ... The Heavens and the Earth, 145. 47 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, v. 2 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1521. 48 United States Congress, Senate, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1957-1958,342.

132

explained that ''there were few in January [1957] who foresaw that, before the end of the

year, the United States would suffer a Pearl Harbor in the Cold War and be striving to

repair its damaged prestige just as desperately as, in 1942, it was trying to reconstitute its

battered naval strength. ,,49

While the media, public, and Congress were stunned by Spu~ Eisenhower

exhibited little concern.so The president's initial reaction was to determine how and why

the Soviet Union was able to achieve this capability first and what were its possible

implications. The consensus of his advisors was that the Soviet Union had deliberately

linked its missile and space programs to launch a satellite as Quickly as possible. Deputy

Secretary of Defense Quarles explained to Eisenhower that "There is considerable

intelligence to indicate that the Russian satellite work has been closely integrated with and

has drawn heavily on their ballistic missile developments. "Sl In contrast, the United States

had followed a policy of developing a satellite capability separate from its military's missile

programs.

Eisenhower decided that three facts should guide his administration's explanations

to the American public concerning the Soviet achievement:

a. The U.S. determined to make the Satellite a scientific project and to keep it free from military weaponry to the greatest extent possible.

b. No pressure or priority was exerted by the U.S. on timing, so long as the satellite would be orbited during the IGY 1957-1958.

49 Donnelly, United States De.fonse Policies in 1957, 1. so See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 211-12; McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth, 146-50; and Divine, Sputnik Challenge, xiv, 7-8, and 16-17. . 51 Memorandum for the President, October 7, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 7, Folder - Earth Satellites, 4. Quarles bad resigned as the Secretary of the Air Force earlier in the year to become the deputy secretary of defense.

c. The U.S. Satellite program was intended to meet scientific requirements with a view toward permitting all scientists to share in information which the U.S. might eventually acquire. 52

133

Eisenhower emphasized that Sputnik did not pose any significant military threat to

the United States. He recognized that launching a satellite into space was much less

difficult than hitting a target thousands of miles away with an ICBM. By stressing these

principles he hoped to address the concerns raised by his advisors about the implications

of Sputnik. Quarles believed that "two main cold war points are involved: (1) the impact

on public imagination of the first successful invasion and conquest of outer space, and (2)

the inferences, ifany, that can be drawn about the status of their [the Soviet Union's]

development of military rocketry.,,53 Eisenhower calculated that his military prestige and

popularity would reassure the nation and hoped he would not have to initiate new and

expensive military projects. He could not have been more wrong.

Prior to his first press conference after the Soviet launch, Eisenhower explained

that his goal was "to allay histeria [sic] and alarm," while not belittling the Russian

accomplishment.s", In a two page statement, released on October 9, he described the

development of the United States satellite program and defended its progress. He only

mentioned the Soviet achievement once. He congratulated the "Soviet scientists upon

putting a satellite into orbit. ,,55 In answering questions at the press conference,

S2 Conference in the President's Office, October 8, 1957, ibid, 1. S3 Memorandum for the President, October 7, 1957, ibid., 6. 54 Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 8, 1957, EL, DDE Papers, DDE Series, Box 27, Folder - October 1957 Staff Notes (2), 1. At this 5:00 p.m. meeting, Eisenhower had Dr. Detlev Bronk, the chairman of the National Science Foundation, read the statement and offer suggestions. Bronk approved the statement with only a few corrections. ss Statement by the President, October 9, 1957, EL, WHO,OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23, Folder - Satellites [October 1957- February 1960J (I), 2. Two of Eisenhower's principal critics,

134 Eisenhower asserted that the United States was not in a race with the Soviet Union. He

emphasized that the United States satellite program would still be directed towards

scientific, not military, goals and would continue on its current pace towards a launch in

December. He tried to reassure the country that Sputnik did not pose a security risk. 56

Over the next few months, Eisenhower continued his attempts to calm fears. He

argued that the planned launch of a satellite using the Vanguard missile in December was

an opportunity to prove that the United States possessed similar capabilities to the Soviet

Union. But on December 6, Vanguard exploded on takeoff"as if the gates of Hell had

opened Up.,,57 The implications seemed clear. The United States was far behind the

Soviet Union in missile capabilities. 58

The president's attempts to persuade Americans that Sputnik did not represent a

significant threat failed. Even he began to question his response. He told a group of

legislators that he "had been trying to play down the situation, but perhaps had been guilty

of understatement in regard to the strength of the Nation's defenses despite Sputnik."S9 In

a recent study of the impact of Sputnik on the United States, Robert Divine reaches the

same conclusion. He argues that "Eisenhower, for all his prudence and restraint, failed to

meet one of the crucial tests of presidential leadership: convincing the American people

Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson., call his response to Sputnik "Operation Soothing Syrup". Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson., U.S.A. - Second-Class Power? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958),5. 56 See Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 7-8. 57 Quoted in McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth, 154. 58 Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 73-74. 59 Legislative Leadership Meeting, January 7, 1958, EL, ODE Papers, Legislative Meeting Series, Box 3, Folder - Legislative Minutes 1958 (1) January-February, 1.

135

that all was well in the world. His inability to understand the profound uneasiness and

sense of impending doom was a political failure of the first order."6O

Challenges to the New Look

The launch of Sputnik brought to the forefront possible deficiencies in

Eisenhower's New Look military strategy. Since 1953, critics had questioned whether the

strategy could effectively meet U.S. commitments and objectives. The critics asked

several questions:

1) Did the New Look strategy guarantee that nuclear weapons would be used in any future conflict?

2) Did it rely too heavily on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces?

3 ) Was it based on an accurate analysis of the targets that needed to be attacked in the Soviet Union and its satellites in the event of hostilities?

4) Did the strategy place too much emphasis on offensive weapons while leaving the country vulnerable to attack?

While these questions had circulated since 1953, they now became more relevant.

Although many criticisms were leveled at the New Look, no statement received

more attention than Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's address to the Council on

Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. In this speech he introduced the doctrine of

massive retaliation. which became synonymous with the New Look. Dulles argued that

"Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.

A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that

60 Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, viii. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 341-42.

136 suit him.'.61 He then emphasized that ''the way to deter aggression is for the free

community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its

own choosing.,,62

Dulles's speech raised considerable controversy inside and outside the government.

For those who were already skeptical about the New Look, Dulles's emphasis on "massive

retaliatory power" seemed to indicate that any future conflict, however big or small,

would be resolved through the use of nuclear weapons. This belief raised at least two

major concerns. First, the reliance on nuclear weapons would produce extraordinary

casualties in any future conflicts. Second, by emphasizing the importance of nuclear

weapons, the administration seemed to be subordinating the role of conventional forces.

While Dulles may have overstated the importance of nuclear weapons to the New Look,

Eisenhower had no intention of sacrificing the nation's ability to wage a variety of

different types of conflicts. 63 "We had never proposed to strip ourselves naked of all

military capabilities except the nuclear weapon," he remonstrated during a National

Security Council discussion in June 1954. "It was ridiculous to imagine anything of this

sort.,,64 But, despite the president's insistence that the New Look did not mean exclusive

reliance on nuclear weapons, critics remained unconvinced.

By the time of Sputnik, debate raged over the adequacy of Eisenhower's New

Look strategy. Some critics believed that by relying so heavily on nuclear weapons the

61 John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," Department o/State Bulletin 30:271 (January 25, 1954), 108. 62 Ibid. 63 See John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution 0/ NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford University Press, 1995), 124-30. 64 Memorandum of Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the National Security Council, June 14, 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, 2, 690.

137

United States was restricting its options in future conflicts. Others argued that the

emphasis on nuclear weapons was correct, but the administration had cut the budget too

much to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent force. Still others claimed that the New Look

strategy w~s too ambiguous and did not provide adequate guidance for military planning.

The debates over these strategic questions were heightened by military service rivalries

and the bureaucratic conflicts that plagued the implementation of the president's policies.

Eisenhower constantly reminded his military advisors that they represented the

nation, not a particular military branch. From his own experiences as the Army's chief of

staffand as an adviser to the JCS, he was well aware of the potential for conflicting

interests. In fact, he called himself"a fanatic" on the need for cooperation between the

military services.6S During his presidency, Eisenhower reiterated on several occasions "the

need for each Chief to subordinate his position as a champion of a particular Service to his

position as one of the overall national military advisors.,,66 In one particularly frustrating

moment, Eisenhower exclaimed that ''Everyone in the Defense establishment should nail

his flag to the staff of the United States of America, and think in terms of the whole. ,,67

Eisenhower was concerned that comments from military officials were producing

the impression that the administration was not united behind its national security policies.68

At least one subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee reached this very

65 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, November II, 1945 in Griffith (ed.), Ike 's Leiters to a Friend, 29. 66 Memorandum ofa Conference with the President, March 30, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,281. See also Memorandum for General Nathan F. Twining. February 4, 1956, LC, Twining Papers, Box 92, Folder-1956 White House, 3; and Memorandum ofa Conference with the President, April 5, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,286,289. 67 Ibid., 287. 68 See A. 1. Baccvich, The Pentomic Era: The u.s. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986),42-«).

138 conclusion. Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO), a former secretary of the Air Force,

chaired the Air Power Subcommittee and delivered a scathing indictment of Eisenhower's

policies at the beginning of 1957. The subcommittee concluded that "Financial

considerations have often been placed ahead of defense requirements, to the serious

damage of our air-power strength relative to that of Russia; and hence to our national

security. ,,69 Although Eisenhower obviously disagreed with these conclusions, what

bothered him most was that they were reached because of the advocacy by many military

officials for greater spending for their particular military branch.

Critics also raised questions about the selection of Soviet targets to strike in the

event ofa war.70 In his seminal essay on the influence of targeting on nuclear strategy,

David Rosenberg criticizes Eisenhower for failing to limit the growth of the United States

nuclear arsenal. Rosenberg argues that the president's inability to resolve the disputes

between the military branches over strategy and targeting led to the growth of a nuclear

arsenal well-beyond what the United States needed.71 He concludes that "Eisenhower

never took action to cut back the production of weapons designated for the strategic air

offensive, despite his growing conviction that the nation already had more than adequate

striking power." 72

One of the main debates that Rosenberg analyzes was the types of targets that the

United States should attempt to destroy ifwar occurred with the Soviet Union. In 1950,

69 "Air Power and National Security," from the Air Power Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Senate Committee on Anned Services, January 25, 1957, 85th Congress, 1st Session, reprinted in Emme (ed), The Impact of Air Power, 704. 70 See Freedman, Evolution o/Nuclear Strategy, 95. 71 Rosenberg. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," 69. 72 Ibid., 66.

139

the lCS adopted targeting guidelines that provided the foundation for U.S. nuclear war

planning for the entire decade. The chiefs of staff assigned first priority to destroying the

Soviet Union's capability to deliver atomic bombs, second priority to retarding Soviet

military advances, and third priority to destroying Soviet war-making capacity.

Codenamed BRAVO, ROMEO, and DELTA, respectively, these plans led to a continually

increasing target list and in conjunction, an expanding nuclear weapons stockpile.73

Targeting debates revolved around how the New Look strategy should be

implemented. There were clear divisions between the positions of the Army and Navy and

that of the Air Force.74 The Air Force recommended attacking BRAVO or counterforce

targets--the Soviet air-missile nuclear forces--first. After destroying these, it would then

focus on other targets. The Army and the Navy, on the other hand, stressed that it would

be virtually impossible to destroy the enemy's entire offensive nuclear capability even

under the best conditions; therefore, they argued that priorities should be established to

recognize the limited number of targets that could and/or needed to be hit. Instead, Army

and Navy representatives recommended giving equal emphasis to counterforce and

countercity (DELTA) targets.75 By developing a more limited, yet more defined target

list, they hoped to create a nuclear strategy that was not dependent on the availability of

the entire United States nuclear striking force. 76

73 Ibid., 16-17 and 23. 74 See Oral History Interview with Lyman L. Lemnitzer. OH #301. Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1973.56. Lemnitzer argued that from 1957 to 1960, "We in the anned forces were probably having the greatest controversy that existed among the services in my time at least, and that had to do with the role of the various services in the Strategic Bombing area. .. 75 For succinct definitions ofboth counterforce and countercity strategies. see Huntington. Common Defense. 103. 76 Rosenberg. "Origins of Overkill." 51-55.

140 The debate also revolved around timing of when targets should be struck.

Although it is clear that Eisenhower considered and rejected plans to launch a preventive

war against the Soviet Union in 1953 and 1954, the possibility of preemption remained

part of U.S. policy throughout the 1950s." Preemption meant that if the United States

discovered preparations for a Soviet attack, it would launch a military strike to prevent or

preempt it. The Air Force's emphasis on counterforce strategy reflected this belief.'8

The preemptive strategy can clearly be seen in the thinking of Air Force General

Curtis leMay, commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1948 to 1957. In

December 1949, he told Chief of Staff Force Hoyt Vandenberg:

it would appear economical and logical to adopt the objective of completely avoiding [an] enemy attack against our strategic force by destroying his atomic force before it can attack ours. Assuming that as a democracy we are not prepared to wage a preventive war, this course of action poses two most difficult requirements:

(1) An intelligence system which can locate the vulnerable elements of the Soviet striking force and forewarn us when [an] attack by that force is imminent, and

2) Agreement at [the] top governmental level that when such information is received the Strategic Air Command will be directed to attack. 79

77 See Diary Entry of the President, January 23, 1956, reprinted in Kaku and Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War, 105; Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 132; and David Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear War Planning, 1945-1960," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Testing (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 44. An Air Force study in 1953-54 called Project Control sheds light on the widespread consideration of aggressive policies by the United States against the Soviet Union. The plan called for the United States to gain control of the Soviet air space and force the Kremlin to change its policies. See Biddle, "Handling the Soviet Threat": 273-302. 78 For a counterforce strategy to work, the enemy's offensive striking power would have to be hit before it could be launched. See Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill", 63. 79 LeMay to Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, December 12, 1949, LC, LeMay Papers, Box - B195, FolderB3II,3.

141

He reiterated this strategy in a lecture at the National War College in 1954. He argued

that "We [SAC] think the best chance of preventing attacks on this country is to get those

airplanes on the ground before they take off: rather than depending on the Air Defense

Command to shoot them down after they got [sic] here."so

leMay's views are important because they shed light on a debate raging among

Air Force commanders, and because he was an influential witness before the Gaither

committee. At their annual conference in 1957, Air Force commanders discussed a

recently completed report that emphasized the basis of a successful strategy in a future

war was "to select and destroy a target system, the destruction of which is possible in the

event of initiation of war by the u.S. or after Soviet surprise attack."sl As indicated, one

strategic option envisioned the United States initiating a war with the Soviet Union. On at

least two other occasions the commanders discussed preventive and preemptive wars.

While they did not recommend either strategy, it is clear from their discussions that as late

1957 they had not ruled out such actions.82

As important as the debates were about targeting and preemption, they paled in

comparison to questions concerning the capability of the United States to wage limited

military operations.83 In 1957, two of the decade's most influential books on nuclear

strategy were published-Robert Osgood's Limited War and Henry Kissinger's Nuclear

80 General Curtis leMay. 'The Strategic Air Command: Question Period." lecture given at the National War College. Janwuy 28. 1954. ibid.. Box 8204. Folder - 8-33815. I. 81 Memorandum to the CbiefofStaff-Enclosure D. September 30. 1957. LC. Papers ofTbomas D. White. Box 6. Folder - General White-McConnell Report. 2. 82 Sec "5 November 1957". ibid.. Folder - Conference 4 November 1957. 5-6; and "6 November 1957". ibid .• 1-3. 83 Sec Herken. Counsels of War. 99; Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon. 185-200; and Kinnard. President Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 42-46.

142 Weapo1ls and ForeigTl PoliCY. Numerous articles appeared at the same time emphasizing

the need to abandon or reduce the Eisenhower administration's reliance on strategic

nuclear weapons.84 Eisenhower generally did not follow the debates of civilian strategists

closely, and reportedly, questioned "What the hell do they know about it [nuclear

strategy]?,,8S Nevertheless, he was aware of their arguments and even passed a brief of

Kissinger's book to Secretary of State Dulles. 86

The various limited war strategies owe much to the writings of British Rear

Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, the former director of British Naval Intelligence.87 In

January 1956, Buzzard argued that "all our fighting should be limited (in weapons, targets,

area, and time) to the minimum force necessary to deter and repel aggression, prevent any

unnecessary extension of the conflict, and permit a return to negotiation at the earliest

opportunity-without seeking total victory or unconditional surrender. ,,88 He explained

that this strategy, "by providing an intermediate deterrent, guards against these dangers

[limited wars], and gives more latitude for our diplomacy, without reducing our deterrent

against all-out attack.,,89

84 For excellent bibliographies of the writings concerning limited war strategies, see Morton H. Halperin, Limited War: An Essay on the Development o/the Theory and An Annotated Bihliography (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1962); and Department of the Army, Pamphlet 20~0: Bibliography on Limited War, Headquarters, Departmem of the Anny, February 1958. 8S Oral History of Andrew Goodpaster, #477, EL, 1982,30. 86 See Heruy Cabot Lodge to the President, July 25,1957, EL, DDE Papers, Administrative Series, Box 23, Folder - Kissinger Book; "Synopsis 'Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy' by Henry A. Kissinger," ibid.; Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State, July 31, 1957, ibid, DDE Diary Series, Box 25, Folder - July 1957-DDE Dictation; and "Transcript of Remarks by Henry A. Kissinger Before the Board of the Research Institute of American," [September 19571], DDE Records, White House Central Files, Subject Series, Box 7, Folder - Atomic Energy & the Bomb (10). 87 Freedman, Evolution 0/ Nuclear Strategy, 113. See also John Baylis, "Anthony Buzzard, .. in John Baylis and John Garnett (eels.), Makers o/Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991).0 88 Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard, "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence," World Politics 8:2 (January 1956),229. 89 Ibid .• 230.

143

In 1957 Buzzard elaborated on these ideas in an unpublished paper that circulated

among members of the Gaither committee. He argued "that the key to achieving this

essential balance of power is to establish a firm distinction between local tactical atomic

war and total global war.,,90 He explained that "If only we would firmly and publicly

establish that tactical atomic war was a strictly limited affair and need not spread to total

war, it would of course, take a large step towards counterbalancing the inherently superior

Communist conventional strength, and thus restoring the tactical balance of power. ,,91

[emphasis in original] He further expounded why a limited war capability added to U.S.

deterrent power. He stressed that "It is sometimes forgotten that a deterrent has two

elements-severity and certainty of application, and--particularly, with the Russians--it is

more important for our deterrent to be reasonably severe and certain of being applied than

for it to be disastrous in its consequences and quite uncertain of being applied. ,,92

[emphasis in original] He finally concluded that for a limited war strategy to be successful,

the belligerents must have agreed before the outbreak of a conflict to limit war aims, the

boundaries of the conflict, the types of weapons to be used, and the number of legitimate

targets.93

Kissinger adopted many of Buzzard's arguments in his study of nuclear weapons.94

He explained that "In a limited war the problem is to apply graduated amounts of

destruction for limited objectives and also to permit the necessary breathing spaces for

90 "Paper by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard." June 19, 1957, USMA. Box 63A. Folder #10 - Gaither Committee, 1957, l. 91 lbid.,6. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., 8-9. 94 For a good short summary of Kissinger's strategic ideas, see Lawrence Freedman, "Henry Kissinger," in Baylis and Garnett (eds.), Makers of Nuclear Strategy.

144 politi~al contacts."9S He stressed that "The purpose of limited war is to inflict losses or to

pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute. The more

moderate the objective, the less violent the war is likely to be ... 96 He further added that

''the result of a limited war cannot depend on military considerations alone; it reflects an

ability to harmonize political and military objectives.,,97 By providing a clear explanation

of U.S. intentions and providing an alternative to all-out war, Kissinger and Buzzard

believed that they were providing a strategy that allowed greater flexibility.

Osgood reached similar conclusions. He argued that "Only by carefully limiting

the dimensions of warfare can nations minimize the risk of war becoming an intolerable

disaster.,,98 He then explained that for a limited war strategy to succeed there had to be

agreed upon limits in political objectives, geographical areas of conflict, weapons, and

targets.99 Of particular importance were his arguments concerning the establishment of

political objectives and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Osgood contended that it is

necessary that "the government establish concrete, feasible objectives, sufficiently well

defined yet flexible enough to provide a rational guide for the conduct of military

operations, and that it communicate the general import of these objectives ... to the

enemy."IOO He also explained that by limiting weapons that might be used in a conflict a

country was not forsaking the use of tactical nuclear armaments. Osgood concluded that

9S Henry A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1957). 156-57. 96 Ibid .• 145. 97 Ibid. 98 Robert Endicott Osgood. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1957). 26. 99 Ibid .• 237-59. 100 Ibid .• 239.

145 "if the American government were to adapt tactical nuclear weapons to a well-conceived

strategy of limited-war, based upon a policy of graduated deterrence, then it should not be

difficult to erase this stigma [that tactical nuclear bombs were substantially different from

conventional explosives] by publicizing the facts in a sober and candid fashion.,,101

Buzzard, Kissinger, and Osgood represented only a small number of the limited

war strategists. Their ideas triggered an intense debate concerning nuclear strategy in

1957. Officials within the Eisenhower administration pondered the need for acquiring

more diversified military capabilities in order to achieve greater policy flexibility. Robert

Cutler told Eisenhower that the question of limited war was receiving widespread

attention in the NSC's planning board meetings. He advised the president ''that continuing

attention should also be given to the U.S. capabilities to deal with hostilities short of

general war."102 He finally suggested ''that some way be found to elevate in the highest

councils the need for such continuing attention, without calling for increased financial

expenditures. ,,103 [emphasis in original]

Within the State Department, the Policy Planning Staff also discussed a paper that

called for the development of an alternative policy to massive retaliation. It concluded

that "Unless there is a national doctrine for limited war and a definition of means by which

limited war will not expand into global holocaust, the United States stands in danger of

starting a chain of events which might lead to national disaster.,,104 It rationalized that

101 Ibid.,257. 102 Memorandum for the President, August 7, 1957, EL, WHO,OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 12, Folder - Limited War (2) 1957-61, 1. 103 Ibid. 104 R. McClintock. "A National Doctrine for Limited War," October 4, 1957, NA, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Records, 1957-61, Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military and Naval Policy, 2.

146 with the development of increasingly more powerful nuclear weapons, the possibility of

victory in a general war becomes unlikely. The paper recommended limiting objectives

and the types of weapons, and relying on indigenous forces to wage Wars.105 In a not so

veiled critique of the administration's policies, the paper concluded that"A philosophy for

limited war implies cool-headed policy and self-restraint in the choice of objectives and the

tactics to achieve those limited ends."I06

Even John Foster Dulles, the author of the massive retaliation phrase, left room for

modifying his own strategy. In an October 1957 article in Foreign Affairs, he explained

that it may "be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It

may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to

make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt." 107 If such a policy

were adopted, "would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional

aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war.,,108

While these comments do not indicate the abandonment of the massive retaliation

doctrine, they do indicate that key officials in the Eisenhower administration were

beginning to question whether the United States possessed adequate military capabilities

to wage limited military operations.

The discussions concerning limited war capabilities were most relevant to the

military branches. Of the three, the Army was the most persistent advocate of a limited

lOS Ibid., 6-7. 106 Ibid., 7. 107 John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs 36: 1 (October 1957),31. I<XI Ibid., 31. Duffield reports that as early as November 1954, Secretary of State Dulles argued that the United States and NATO needed to maintain flexibility in their military forces. Duffield, Power Rules, 114.

147 war strategy. In defending their positions, Anny leaders stressed that most wars through

history were fought for limited objectives and that with the advent of multimegaton

nuclear weapons there would be even more incentive to keep them that way. Both

Generals Matthew Ridgeway and Maxwell Taylor resigned from the JeS in 1955 and

1959, respectively, because of what they saw as the administration's lack of commitment

to the Anny's needs. 109 They did not necessarily advocate the abandonment of massive

retaliation, but sought a better balance between the military branches so that the Anny

could meet its commitments in all types of military conflicts.

While the Army was the most consistent advocate of a limited war strategy, both

the Air Force and the Navy seriously considered it as well. In December 1957, the Air

Force Science Advisory Board held a conference on limited war. 110 Although it was not

designed to reach specific conclusions~ the conference did provide an opportunity for open

discussions of both the advantages and disadvantages ofa variety of limited war strategies.

[n January 1958, the Navy completed a report that concluded "Military superiority in

unlimited war no longer connotes an ability to 'win' -nobody wins a suicide pact. Thus

all-out war is obsolete as an instrument of national policy."lll [emphasis in original]

While both the Air Force and the Navy had their own reasons for embracing a strategy

109 Baccvicb. Pentomic Era, 48. 110 Science Advisory Board Meeting on Limited War on December 4, 5, and 6 Tentative Agenda. November 5, 1957, LC, Twining Papers, Box 6, Folder - Diary ofCJCS 8115157 to 12131/57, 1-2. Among the military leaders making presentations were General Lemnitzer, Army Vice Chief of Staff, Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, General White, Air Force Chief of Staff, and General Power, SAC Commander-in-Chief. III Summary of Major Strategic Considerations for the 1960-70 ERA, January 22, 1958, NA, RG 59, State Department Records, Policy Planning Staff Records (1957-61), Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military and Naval Policy, 1.

148 that provided greater flexibility, their efforts to incorporate limited military operations into

their plans reflected the influence of limited war arguments.

Conclusions

The dramatic events and debates of 1957 transformed the setting in which the

Gaither committee's findings were going to be assessed. The crises over the budget, the

debacle in Little Rock, and the start of an economic recession damaged Eisenhower's

reputation and hamstrung his attempts to govern the nation. Furthermore, Sputnik raised

concerns about the Soviet Union's ability to attack the United States and expanded

debates about Eisenhower's national security policies. After all of these crises,

Eisenhower could no longer rely on his own reputation to reassure the nation.

By the time the Gaither committee delivered its report in November, conditions

had markedly changed from its inception the previous May. When it was created,

Eisenhower still hoped that his budget would be passed with few modifications; he saw a

victory on the horizon in the passage of the first civil rights legislation since

Reconstruction; and he viewed U.S. military strength with pride. Little did he realize that

the future was not nearly so bright. When the Gaither committee presented its conclusions

and recommendations, the nation was prepared to believe its dire outlook. Six months

earlier that would not have happened, but in this case, timing meant everything.

CHAPTER 4 - The Activities and Conclusions of the Gaither Committee

When Eisenhower ordered the establishment of the Gaither committee in May

149

1957, he conceived ofa group which would analyze two important, yet limited, national

security issues: active and passive defense. He believed that by making improvements in

these areas the United States might be able to strengthen its deterrent power against the

Soviet Union. This strategy of deterrence formed the basis of Eisenhower' s national se-

curity policies. 1 He assumed that if the United States maintained sufficient military power

to strike the Soviet Union even under the worst circumstances, the Kremlin would be

unwilling to initiate war and risk annihilation. The president's press secretary, James

Hagerty, summarized the administration's position in 1955. The strategy of deterrence, he

said, was based on "blunting the threat of attack by establishing an adequate continental

defense and building up our guided missiles here at home, and secondly, to emphasize the

retaliatory concept of warfare by putting more money into the air and developing a better

early warning system.,,2 Two key parts of this strategy, continental defense and early

warning, fell into the areas of active and passive defense that Eisenhower asked the

Gaither committee to study.

After listening to countless briefings, studying numerous reports, and examining

the most secret intelligence estimates, the committee reached some troubling conclusions.

It found the United States facing an adversary who was expanding its military power at an

I For descriptions of deterrence theory in the Eisenhower administration, see Freedman, Evolution o/Nuclear Strategy, 81-89; and Deborah Welch Larson, "Deterrence Theory and the Cold War," Radical History Review 63 (Fall 1995), 86-95. 2 Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty), January 3, 1955, FRUS /955-/957, 19,4.

150

alarming rate and who sought world domination. It argued that the United States had to

make significant changes and additions to its active and passive defenses. It also recom-

mended that the United States expand its offensive retaliatory capabilities in order to pres-

ent a greater deterrent to the Soviet Union. The programs that the committee proposed

would cost $44 billion over five years. The final Gaither report challenged the effective-

ness of the Eisenhower administration's national security policies and forced its advisors

to confront some very complicated issues.

Parameters and Organizational Strocture of the Gaither Committee

Some government officials who knew about the proposed study were concerned

that the Gaither committee's analysis would expand beyond what the NSC initially re-

quested. Gaither met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles on June 19 to

discuss the parameters of the proposed study.3 Quarles worried that if the Gaither com-

mittee made recommendations like the Killian panel the Defense Department would have

difficulty implementing them. In the early summer of 1957, the Defense Department was

just beginning to deal with the adverse effects of congressional cuts on "the operational

readiness dates of the early warning system, the Continental Air Defense System, and the

dispersal of the Strategic Air Forces.,,4 Requests for additional programs would have only

exacerbated this dilemma.

3 Diary - Donald Quarles, Wednesday,lune 19, 1957, EL, Quarles, Donald: Papers, Box I, Folder - Untitled [5/1/57-12/31/571, l. 4 Memorandum for the President.luly 10, 1957, EL, WHO, 055, Subject Series, Dcpartmem ofDefensc Subseries, Box 6, Folder - Military Planning, 1958-1 % 1 (l), 6.

151 Eisenhower gave Robert Cutler, his assistant for national security affairs, and Gor-

don Gray, the director of the ODM, the responsibility for formulating the guidelines of the

Gaither committee study. After Quarles expressed his concerns, Cutler reassured him that

the president's intention was not to obtain a thorough re-evaluation of U.S. national se-

curity programs. Rather, Eisenhower wanted broad advice "derived from wide experi-

ence" and careful study. S Cutler told Quarles that liThe broad-brush study which is sought

from the [Gaither] Committee relates to whether it is advisable for the U.S. Government

in future years to embark on a greatly enhanced program of passive defense (shelters) or

whether monies that would be devoted to that purpose had better be used instead for ac-

tive defense, accepting whatever risk may be entailed." Cutler then added that "The last

thing the President wants to come out of this study is a series of detailed recommendations

for changing our defense programs.,,6

At a meeting on June 27, 1957, Cutler presented instructions to Gaither and a few

other committee members which emphasized the importance of performing a broad over-

view of U.S. active and passive defense measures, but one which did not offer specific

guidelines for the president to follow.7 Cutler elaborated:

In arriving at its broad opinion with respect to protection of the civil population against nuclear attack, the Panel should take into account (a) the degree of protection afforded by passive defense programs now in being and programmed for the future, (b) the degree to which such protection would be afforded by existing and programmed active defenses, and (c) the benefits and risks to our military and non-military defenses which would be entailed, and the economic and political considerations which would be in-

5 Robert Cutler's Personal Notes, June 20, 1957, ibid., OSANSA, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, Folder File - June 1957 (4), l. 6 Ibid. 7 For a list ofthosc who attended this meeting, see Memorandum for File, June 28, 1957, ibid., NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subscries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (3), 1.

volved, in any decision to undertake a significant shift of emphasis with regard to either active or passive defenses. The end result of the study should be to suggest which of the various active and passive defense measures are likely to be most effective, in relation to their costs, in protecting the civil population.8 [emphasis in original]

152

In July, Gaither and William Foster approached Cutler to expand the parameters of

the study.9 Cutler readily consented because he believed that a larger view of U.S . na-

tional security programs would facilitate the development of the most accurate opinions.

In his memoirs, he recalled this exchange. "Its leaders, Rowan Gaither and WIlliam Fos-

ter," Cutler wrote, "asked permission to extend its [the Gaither committee's] inquiries into

the overall U.S. defense programs, as having an obvious relation to what the national

economy might be called upon to bear. The request seeming reasonable, I gave my assent

without foreseeing the result." 10

The request to expand the scope of the study may have stemmed from meeting

between members of the committee and Eisenhower on July 16. The president reportedly

asked the panel, "If you make the assumption that there is going to be a nuclear war, what

should I dO?"ll By offering credibility to a Soviet action that he did not expect, Eisen-

hower may have inadvertently given the committee the wrong premise from which to

work. Instead of developing opinions based on the belief that the Soviet Union might at-

tack, but probably would not, it assumed that there would be a nuclear war. Foster, in

8 Infonna! Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 25, 1957, ibid., 3-4. 9 Fred Kaplan argues that Alben WohIstetter persuaded Gaither to expand the scope of the committee's study. After meeting with Wohlstetter, "Gaither was talking about something potentially larger-a Presidentially appointed commission, packed with prominent names, that might change the whole focus of the Eisenhower Administration's skimpy and unimaginative defense policies." Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 128. See also, Herken, Counsels, 114. 10 Cutler, No Time for Rest, 355. II Quoted in Winkler. Lifo Under a Cloud, 119.

153 fact, believed that Eisenhower "thought it was time for a fresh assessment of the balance

of this country in relation to Russia in science, education, foreign trade, domestic econ-

omy, national morale, military strength and world friends.,,12

As the committee and the president's assistants attempted to sort out the study's

parameters, Gaither, with the help of the ODM, continued to select advisors. 13 By the end

of July, he created a steering committee and an advisory panel as well as obtained the

services of the Institute for Defense Analyses. 14 He organized four subcommittees:

Evaluation Quantitative Assessments, Active Defense, Social-Economic-Political, and

Passive Defense. These subcommittees were chaired by Robert Prim and Stan Lawwill,

Jerome Wiesner and Hector Skifter, John Corson and Robert Calkins, and Wtlliam

Webster and James Perkins, respectively. IS Each subcommittee examined specific issues

and developed conclusions that the steering committee and advisory panel used in making

their final analysis.

12 William C. Foster, "Search for Survival," June 1958, EL, WHO, 08S, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Folder - Foster, William C. May-July 1958 (1), 1. Foster further explained why the committee asked to expand its study. "The reasoning. " he wrote, "was simply: We had come together to study the best means of protecting America's civil population from nuclear extinction in case of attack. But we knew our military strategy was based on the assumption that any defense is worthless unless it has absolute capability of returning an attack. And when you return an attack, you are then on the offensive. Defense alone as a national policy is an invitation to oblivion. Offensive power is key to defense." Ibid., 4. See also Nitze, From Hiroshima 10 Glasnost, 166. 13 Memorandum for File, June 28, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, FolderFallout Shelters (3), 1-2. 14 Sec Cutler to H. Rowan Gaither, June 18, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, Folder - June 1957 (4), 1; Passive Panel- Preliminary Roster as of July 11, 1957, ibid., 1-2; and Group Visiting President, July 16. 1957, ibid., NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, FolderSecurity Resources Panel, 2. IS Gaither Report. 30.

154

Briefings Received by the Gaither Commillee

By late Augu~ the Gaither committee and its various subcommittees were ear-

nestly examining the complex issues that surrounded U.S. strategic capabilities. For active

defenses, the committees studied how the United States could prevent attacking Soviet

forces from reaching their targets. Generally, this meant the development of sufficient

forces of interceptor airplanes, anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles to destroy

attacking Soviet bombers and/or missiles. In conjunction with its examination of active

defenses, the experts explored passive defense measures designed to protect the civil

population from the effects of a nuclear attack if Soviet bombers and/or missiles reached

their targets. These measures were designed to achieve the earliest possible warning of an

impending Soviet attack and to shield the population from the worst effects of nuclear

explosions. Finally, Gaither and his colleagues examined the relationship between active

and passive defenses and offensive striking power.

The Gaither committee had access to voluminous sources which detailed U.S. of-

fensive and defensive capabilities. The committee received briefings from the Defense

Department, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC, the CIA, the AEC, the FCDA,

the ODM, and the NSC Representative on Internal Security.16 In addition to these brief-

ings, the committee had access to both CIA and Air Force intelligence estimates, to special

studies performed by the agencies mentioned above, and to studies by private organiza-

tions like the Rand Corporation and the National Academy of Sciences. The committee

16 Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither. June 25, 1957,3-4. See also Prados, Soviet Threat, 68-69.

155 members also questioned the nation's top military leaders and inspected its key defense

installations. 17

The Gaither committee's subcommittees and their various staff groups met fre-

quently to discuss the key issues concerning U.S. capabilities for resisting a Soviet attack.

The content of these meetings remains a mystery. With only a few exceptions, the notes

are either classified or lost. 18 However, an analysis of the briefings that have become

available, along with the known views of some of the participants, provides a revealing

picture of the advice that the Gaither committee received.

The Gaither committee met some initial resistance from within the military estab-

lishment in its attempts to acquire information, but ultimately, received the assistance it

requested. 19 The JCS denied the committees request for eight briefings but did agree to

provide three. The first covered all aspects of the Soviet threat; the second identified U.S.

continental defense capabilities; and the third reviewed U.S. retaliatory capabilities.20

The Air Force initially provided the committee "the 50-cent tour for visiting fire-

men" of SAC headquarters 21 Later, however, General Thomas Power, the new SAC

commander after General LeMay was promoted to vice chief of staff of the Air Force,

presented a much more detailed briefing. He described SAC's most secret intelligence es-

17 See Foster, "Search for Survival,'" 1-2; and Memorandum for lames S. Lay, Jr., December 24, 1957, NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (background documents), 1. 18 Very little information on the proceedings of the Gaither committee between its establishment in May and the presentation of its report to the NSC in November actually exists. I have been unable to determine why that is this case. I have bad little luck obtaining the declassification of documents. For the various archival sources that I have examined, see the bibliography. 19 See Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, July 31, 1957, NA, RG 218, JCS, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 84 RB, 1; and Col. Robert H. Warren to Gaither, August 16, 1957, ibid. 20 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, July 11, 1957, NA, RG 218, JCS, CCS 384.51 (10-31-46) Sec. 14, 1. 21 Foster, "Search for Survival,'" 7.

156 timates of Soviet capabilities and answered "questions with great precision and compe-

tence and, as requested, philosophized with clear forethought and understanding about

deterrence, Soviet future capabilities and intentions, and so on.,,22

The Gaither committee's second SAC briefing symbolized a change in how the

committee was now going to be treated. At the new briefing, LeMay "was completely

candid in answering questions, and regained for the Air Force the respect of the panel

leaders.,,23 While notes and memoranda from the briefing are unavailable, an examination

of LeMay's statements around the same time should provide an idea as to what advice he

gave the committee?4 In 1956 he argued that the Soviet Union was "bent upon dominat-

ing the world by imposing upon nations and peoples everywhere a way of life radically and

irreconcilably opposed to all of the things we believe in.,,25 He then explained that the

outcome of the next war will be determined in the first few days of the conflict. He

stressed that the only way to prevent a Soviet attack was to make its leaders realize that

they would face a devastating counterstrike.26

In remarks before the Air Force Science Advisory Board in May 1957, LeMay dis-

cussed several issues relevant to the Gaither committee. He enunciated that a strategy of

22 Carroll L. Zimmennan, Insider at SAC: Operations Analysis Under General LeMay (Manhattan, KA: Sunflower University Press, 1988), 115. See also Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 132. 23 Zimmennan.. Insider at SAC, 114. See also Gaither to LeMay, August 26, 1957, LC, LeMay Papers, Box B 107, Folder - Personal Correspondence July-Dec. 1957, I. 24 I have to thank Robert Hopkins for providing me a copy of a government records transmittal form that identifies some of the Air Force's briefings and meeting during the summer and fall 1957. He found the form at the National Security Archive. At the time of this writing, my request for the declassification of this infonnation is still pending. See Transmittal of Government Records, Ac. 61-AI449, RG 341, Records ofHq USAF. The records are still under Air Force custody. 2S General Curtis E. leMay, "Strategic Air Command and World Peace", reprinted in Emme, Air Power, 668. 26 Ibid .• 670.

157

deterrence would only be successful if the enemy was positive it could not successfully

attack the United States. He emphasized that "unless our forces are clearly capable of

winning under operational handicaps of bad weather and no more than tactical warning,

and despite any action the enemy may take against them, our forces are not a genuine de-

terrent. By 'winning' is meant achieving a condition wherein the enemy cannot impose his

will on us, but we can impose our will on him. ,,27 [emphasis in original] He then descn"bed

how "the most important contribution of air defense systems is provision of warning to

enable the air offensive forces to get underway before they are destroyed at base. ,,28 He

stressed that while the United States currently maintained the capability to strike the So-

viet Union, he feared that if SAC did not improve its ability to penetrate Soviet defenses

by 1962, then he "could not be confident of winning the Air Power Battle.,,29

Fred Kaplan argues that in LeMay's briefings to the Gaither committee, the new

Air Force vice chief of staff was even more explicit in his plans for defeating the Soviet

Union. On one of the committee's visits to SAC headquarters, it witnessed a surprise alert

drill. When SAC bombers were unable to take offin less than six hours, Robert Sprague

questioned why LeMay was not upset. The general responded that the United States flew

intelligence missions over the Soviet Union every day and would know about any attack

well in advance, and his bombers would have more than six hours to get off the ground.

27 General Curtis E. leMay, "The Operational Side of Air Offense," remarks to the USAF Scientific Advisory Board. May 21, 1957, LC, LeMay Papers, Box B206, Folder - B60725, 2-3. 28 Ibid., 3. 29 Ibid., 6.

158 He then argued that if attack plans were discovered, the United States would not hesitate

to launch a pre-emptive strike. 30

On September 17, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White briefed the

Gaither committee. He made three key arguments:

1) The threat to our nation is not simply a great and static threat, but rather one which is evolving, and growing at a rate which should no longer surprise us. The threat is largely a military threat and within the military category, it is essentially an air threat.

2) Our military structure must be designed to counter this threat. In describing and modeling the development of our military structure, we concentrate effort in keeping with priorities which derive from the need to counter the threat.

3) Today, more than ever before, defense is in large part, even primarily, a product of offensive capability. The two are tightly joined and each defies decision in isolation from the other. This stems from both military and economic considerations.31

He concluded by arguing that while the Air Force could operate effectively on a $20 bil-

lion budget in 1958, there would have to be significant increases in the future. 32

Each of the other military branches also briefed the committee. However, the only

briefing for which we have a record was the one given by the Commandant of the Marine

Corps Lt. General Randolph Pate in late September. In his presentation, he focused on

two issues that were significant to the committee: the role of tactical nuclear weapons in

warfare and the growing relevance of limited war capabilities. He stressed that the Ma-

30 Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon, 132-34. See also Hopkins, "An Expanded Understanding of Eisenhower, American Policy, and Overflights," 6-9; and Richard H. Hahn and Joseph P. Harahan (cds.), "U.S. Strategic Air Power, 1948-1962," International Security 12:4 (Spring 1988): 78-95. 31 White to Sprague, September 23, 1957, Le, White Papers, Box 7, Folder - White House, 1. See also Sprague to White, September 18, 1957, ibid., 1. 32 Letter from White to Sprague, September 23, 1957, 1-2.

159 rines "must possess these characteristics: READINESS, VERSATILITY, FLEXIBIL-

ITY, [and] OFFENSIVE POWER.,,33 [emphasis in original] He lamented that the Marine

Corps' ability to accomplish its tasks had "already been appreciably lowered by personnel

losses. ,,34

In his explanation for why the Marines remained essential to U.S. military efforts,

Pate differentiated between general and limited war. He argued that after the initial atomic

exchange in a general war, the Marines and other mobile forces would "most likely be the

ultimately decisive element in insuring defeat of the enemy.',3S He also argued that he had

"become increasingly convinced that the deterrent forces of each side are such that the

mutual holocaust of an all-out, unlimited nuclear war suddenly starting is unlikely. This

being the case, I believe that wars of limited forces and scope are much more likely.,,36

Accordingly, the United States had to be prepared to wage limited military operations. He

then stressed that the military's only amphibious force, the Marines, could use tactical nu-

clear weapons to help achieve their objectives. "We found," he claimed, "that atomic

weapons are not just to be feared. By the exploitation of these weapons, the amphibious

force can compress days of preliminary bombardment into a few minutes of time. ,,37

According to Paul Nitze and George Lincoln, the Gaither committee's various

meetings raised two categories of questions about limited wars. The first category dealt

with the political question surrounding such wars: Where were these wars most likely to

33 Statement by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to Gaither Committee, September 25, 1957, USMA, Lincoln Papers, Box 63A, Folder #10 - Gaither Committee 1957, I. 34 Ibid., 10. 35 Ibid., 8. 36 Ibid., II. 37 Ibid .• 4.

160 occur? What level of support would the United States receive from the people and the

governments in the areas of the conflict? And what should U.S. objectives be in view of

its over-all world strategy? The second category involved the military implications of lim-

ited wars: What forces, both U.S. and indigenous, were available? What types ofweap-

ons should be used? And what targets should be attackedf8

From the briefings, Nitze and Lincoln concluded that the Air Force believed that

U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars were restricted by the forces and weapons available

to the enemy. If the adversary possessed comparable capabilities, it would be difficult to

keep the conflict limited and still achieve a successful resolution of the conflict. But if

SAC maintained its superiority, the Air Force argued it would deter limited as well as gen-

eral wars because it did not think an adversary would risk annihilation.39 The Navy, on the

other hand, questioned the efficacy of nuclear weapons in limited wars, fearing that they

would lead to the escalation of a conflict into a general war.40 The Army insisted that the

key to a successful limited war strategy was maintaining flexibility to respond in a variety

of ways. This flexibility would include the use of tactical nuclear weapons "if their use is

to our military advantage.,,41

The Army's views on limited war can be elaborated further by examining presen-

tations delivered by Army Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer in 1957. He

made similar presentations to the Army Policy Council in September and the Air Force

38 [Col. George Lincoln and Paul Nitze), "Limited Military Operations," undated [December 19571, EL. WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 11, Folder - SRP, lO-1 L 39 Ibid., 2. 40 Ibid., 5. 4\ Ibid.

161 Science Advisory Board Conference on Limited War in December.42 Lemnitzer criticized

the doctrine of massive retaliation. He contended that "Those who talk ofa war for sur-

vival or who insist that we must first fight and win the air battle, or who assert that the

capacity to retaliate massively is the vital element in any war strategy are being tyrannized

by their own doctrine .... This doctrine implies that every modem war must inevitably be

a total war. ,,43 Lemnitzer elaborated:

The decisive limitation in limited war is that the war must be fought for a limited objective. . .. The only rational course is to act on the assumption that wars can be limited and develop a strategy which will at the same time enable us to deal with limited wars and to minimize the risk of an all-out war.

If we proceed on the assumption that total war is not inevitable, and if we develop a doctrine for limited war, then we should be able to employ armed forces as required to support national security policies, and still overt an all-out conflict.44

The Army and Air Force also argued that the nation's missile defenses needed to

be improved. The Soviet announcement in August 1957 that it had successfully tested an

ICBM raised considerable concern about the vulnerability of the United States. Repre-

senting the Air Force position, General E. E. Partridge, the commander of the Continental

Air Defense Command, argued that "It is apparent that, in the ballistic missile field, the

Soviets are developing a serious threat to our survival. To counter this threat, the United

States must take positive and immediate action with the state-of-the-art to attain a defen-

42 The presentation to the Army Policy Council occurred at the same time as the Army's presentation to the Gaither committee. [do not know if they are related. 43 [General Lyman Lemnitzer), "The Philosophy of Limited War," Briefing for Army Policy Council, September 9, 1957, RG 59, State Department, PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military and Naval Policy, 13. 44 Address by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, December 4, 1957, LC, White Papers, Box 18, Folder - Science Advisory Board, 14.

162 sive capability.,,4S Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor also emphasized "that de-

velopment of the anti-ICBM system should be accelerated to the extent ofa national pri-

ority equal to the national priority accorded the development of the ICBM.,,46

The briefings received by the Gaither committee were not limited to presentations

by the military. On at least two occasions the State Department's Policy Planning Staff

met with the committee met to discuss U.S. national security policies. As with the military

briefings, one of the most important topics was limited war capabilities. Possibly influ-

enced by Secretary of State Dulles's apparent shift away from the massive retaliation doc-

trine, a PPS study argued that ''unless there is a national doctrine for limited war and a

definition of means by which limited war will not expand into global holocaust, the United

States stands in danger of starting a chain of events which might lead to national disas-

ter.,,47 The report concluded that "A philosophy for limited war implies cool-headed pol-

icy and self-restraint in the choice of objectives and the tactics to achieve those limited

ends.,,48

4S Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force on Ballistic Missile Defense, September 4, 1957, NA, RG 218, lCS, 1957 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 85, 2334-35. For other examples of the Air Force's support ofa ballistic missile defense system, see Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, November 14, 1957, ibid., CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89, 1; and Department of Air Force Decision, Septcmber 19. 1957, LC, White Papers, Box 5, Folder- 1957 Chairman of Staff Decisions, 1. 46 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, Septcmber 15, 1957, RG 218, lCS, 1957 Geographic File. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89,2. 47 R. McClintock. "A National Doctrine for Limited War," October 4, 1957, NA, RG 59, State Department, PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military and Naval Policy, 2. 48 Ibid., 7. At a meeting in October, the Gaither committee and PPS discussed the committee's tentative conclusions. See Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting, October 1, 1957, ibid., Box 117, Folder -Civil Defense, 1-2.

163 Studies and Reports Examined by the Gaither Committee

When Cutler discussed the parameters of the study with Gaither in June, he told

the committee chairman that the panel would have access to any information pertinent to

its study, including Air Force, SAC, and CIA estimates of the Soviet Union's military ca

pabilities.49 In addition, it could examine the reports produced by the Net Evaluation Sub-

committee of the NSC (NES) which had been charged to consolidate the various intelli-

gence estimates of the Soviet Union's capability to damage the United States. Finally, it

would have the authority to acquire any other government or non-government study that

would assist in its examination.

While no declassified record exists which details the specific sources of intelligence

that the Gaither committee used in making their evaluations, the evidence indicates that

the committee eventually gained access to every report or study it requested. However, it

apparently did not examine the U-2 intelligence. A review of the declassified national in-

telligence estimates between 1955 and 1957 reveals certain common conclusions. The

Soviet Union was unlikely to initiate a nuclear war in the near future. so While the it was

not likely to start a war, the Soviet Union's strategic capabilities were increasing at an

alarming rate, and represented a significant potential threat if used against the United

States.51 Although the institution ofa nationwide fallout shelter program would initially

cause some confusion and alarm throughout the world, it would eventually be seen as an

49 Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 25, 1957, EL, WHO,OSANSA. NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 3-4. At this point, I have been unable to locate any records which state what happened at these briefings. so See NIE 11-4-57. November 12, 1957, FRUS /955-1957, 19,665. 51 See NIE 100-7-55, November 1, 1955, ibid .• 134.

164 understandable defensive program. S2 These three broad trends can be seen in the Gaither

report. While a Soviet attack was not expected, it couId not be ruled out; therefore, the

United States needed to prepare for all possible Soviet actions.

The NIEs suggested that the Kremlin sought world domination, but would not

jeopardize the security of the communist regime itseifin pursuit of this goal.S3 NIE 11-4-

54 reported that "The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that during the period of this

estimate [to mid-1959] the non-Communist world will possess such strength in major

components of military power that general war would involve not only the certainty of

widespread destruction within the USSR but the possibility of the destruction of the So-

viet system itseIf"S4 An estimate in 1956 reached a similar conclusion:

It seems unlikely that US action short of overt military intervention or obvious preparation of such intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to take steps which it believed would materially increase the risk of general war. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the US nuclear-air capability remains superior to that of the USSR, and have probably concluded that at present the USSR, even if it launched a surprise attack, would receive unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange with the US. ss

Another NIE predicted that the Soviet Union would avoid actions that would "gravely risk

general war," but would "probably regard itself as progressively achieving greater freedom

52 See SNIE 100-5-57, March 19, 1957, ibid., 442-45. 53 For descriptions of the process used in developing an NIE, see Shennan Kent, "The Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate: An Examination of the Theory and Some Recollections Concerning the Practice of the Art," in Donald P. Steury (ed.), Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study ofIntelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994),56-115; and Freedman, US Intelligence, 32-41. 54 NIE 11-4-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1959," NA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, NIE's 1950-1992, Box 2, Folder #66, 34. 5S SNIE 12-2-56, "Probable Developments in Eastern Europe and Implications for Soviet Policy," October 30, 1956, reprinted in Scott A. Koch, Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union. 1950-1959 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1993),3.

165

of maneuver in local situations. ,,56 These estimates were consistent in predicting the So-

viets would not attack, but they never questioned the assumption that the Soviet Union

sought world domination. If a general war was to occur, it most likely would result from

miscalculation, not deliberate actions.

In their attempts to predict whether the United States would be able to detect a

Soviet attack, the NIEs presented somewhat contradictory estimates. SNIE 11-8-54 ex-

ami ned the probable warning that the United States would receive in the event of Soviet

aggression. It argued that such an offensive would be preceded by heightened political

tensions that should provide fifteen to thirty days ofwarning.S7 But. NIE 11-6-55 con-

eluded that if the Soviet Union could keep political tensions low, it might strike the United

States with "a high degree of surprise. ,,58

The NIEs consistently predicted military capabilities based on estimates of Soviet

maximum production levels. NIE 11-4-57 concluded that while the Soviet Union was not

producing as many bombers as earlier predicted, it still maintained a long-range bomber

force of 1,500 airplanes. 59 Another estimate asserted that the Soviet Union would have 10

ICBMs in 1958, 100 in 1959, and 500 in 1960. By comparison, it reported that the

United States planned to have only 10 ICBMs in 1959,30 in 1960, and 50 in 1961. Even

ifIRBMs were included, the picture was not much brighter. By 1961, the United States

56 NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957. 19,665. See also NIE 100-7-55, "World Situation and Trends," November I, 1955, ibid., 134. 57 SNIE 11-8-54, "Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid-I 957," September 14, 1954, NA, RG 263, CIA, NIE's 1950-1992, Box 2, Folder #66, 2-3. 58 NIE 11-6-55, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid-1958," July I, 1955, ibid., 13. 59 NIE 11-4-57, FRUS 1955-/957, 19,671. By mid-1957, intelligence estimates of Soviet bomber production were shrinking remarkably. See Freedman, US Intelligence. 66-67; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 43-50, and Ford. £mmative Intelligence, 217-22.

166 planned to have only 120 IRBMs and 3 nuclear submarines carrying 16 Polaris missiles

each.60

The last NIE of significance to the Gaither committee, SNIE 100-5-57, examined

the possible world reaction to a U.S. fallout shelter program. It concluded that among

allied countries, such a program would initially produce doubts about U.S. commitments

and strategies, but that most countries "would probably come to recognize that the shelter

program, taken by itself, was a defensive measure and did not necessarily indicate any ba-

sic change in US foreign policy or substantially affect the likelihood of general war.,,61 It

stressed that the Soviet Union would attempt to exploit the program by arguing that it was

one more piece of evidence that the United States was preparing for war. However, it

emphasized that the Soviets would probably not believe that the program represented any

significant shift in U.S. strategies.62

In addition to the NIEs, the Gaither committee relied on SAC and Air Force intel-

ligence estimates. The Air Force and SAC consistently developed estimates of Soviet

bomber and missile strengths that were higher than those of the CIA and the other military

branches. Sherman Kent, the director of the Office of National Estimates, recalled that in

60 Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability, January 5, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. This estimate was probably part ofNIE 11-4-57 or SNIE 11-10-57. After reading this estimate, one member of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research exclaimed that "We must, then, reckon that in one year the United States may well, with absolutely no direct defense, confront a Russian capability for shattering devastation of the homeland." The ICBM Threat to the United States, December 23, 1957, NA, RG 59, State Department, Records of the Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director, 1949-1959, Box 9, Folder - SIP, I. Another member of the Office of Intelligence Research and AnalysiS called the report "Doom." See Memo from R. P. Joyce to Mr. A. Evans, January 6, 1958, ibid., Box 10, Folder - ICBM, l. 61 SNIE 100-5-57, "Probable World Reaction to Certain Civil Defense Programs," March 19. 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,444. 62 Ibid., 445.

167 determining the emphasis that the Soviet Union was placing on long-range bomber pro-

duction, the Air Force argued "that the Soviets would continue to give a high priority to

the Bison [long-range bomber] Force and enlarge it very considerably.,,63 At Senate

hearings in 1956, General LeMay asserted that between 1958 and 1960 the Soviet Union

'\viII have a greater striking power [in long-range bombers] than we will have . . . under

our present plans and programs.,,64 The Gaither committee had to decide whether the

Soviet Union was producing bombers at maximum levels as SAC argued or at the more

moderate levels estimated by NIE 11-4-57.

The Gaither committee also relied heavily on the intelligence assessments devel-

oped by the NES. Under the guidelines contained in NSC 5511, the NES was established

to develop "integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of gen-

eral war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations over-

seas, and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those

net capabilities.,,6s Composed of the chairmen of the JCS, the AEC (starting in 1956), the

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-

nal Security, and the directors of the ODM, FCDA, and CIA, the NES integrated the in-

telligence estimates of the various military and government agencies to produce annual

reports for the president.66

63 Kent, "Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate," 81. 64 United States Congress, Senate, "Report of the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Anned Services," (GPO, 1957),57. See also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 43-46; and Freedman, US Intelligence, 67. 6S NSC 551 I - A Net Evaluation Subcommittee, February 14, 1955, quoted in FRUS 1955-1957, 19,56. 66 See Memorandum for the Record by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, January 23, 1956, ibid., 190.

168 By the time the Gaither committee completed its final report, the NES had already

presented assessments to the NSC in 1955 and 1956. The 1955 analysis focused on the

consequences of a Soviet attack on the United States. It war-gamed two potential attack

scenarios. Plan A involved an attack where the United States received no warning prior to

the launch of the attack. Plan C assumed that the United States would obtain sufficient

strategic warning of an impending attack to place its military and civil defenses on full

alert.67 In analyzing both plans, the NES had access to the best estimates of Soviet mili

tary capabilities through 1958.68 Under both scenarios, the NES concluded that approxi-

mately 65 percent of the American population would need some form of medical attention

after the attack, and for at least six months, the economy would be practically inoper-

able.69 The only significant difference between the two plans was that Plan C would allow

the United States the initiative to launch a preemptive strike if it discovered Soviet prepa-

rations for an attack. In either a preemptive or retaliatory strike, the subcommittee con-

cluded that the United States would inflict even worse damage on the Soviet Union. 70

The NES performed its 1956 evaluation using the same two scenarios as in its first

study. In this report, the NES concluded that if the United States did not maintain an ade-

quate alert status for its nuclear retaliatory forces, a Soviet nuclear attack in 1959 would

kill or injure over fifty percent of the civil population and lead to the Soviet Union's emer-

67 Memorandum of Discussion at the 263rd Meetiog of the National Security Council. October 27, 1955, ibid., 127. There was 00 Plan B as far as I can tell. 68 Ibid, 128. 69 Diary Eotry By the Presideot, January 23, 1956, ibid., 187. 70 Ibid, 187-88. Regardless whether the United States launched a preemptive or retaliatoty strike, it would use the same types of forces. In 1956, these forces consisted of medium and loog range bombers. The main differeoce between the two is that if the United States allowed the Soviet Union to attack first, a sufficient number of U.S. bombers and runways would have to survive to permit a retaliatoty strike.

169 gence as the world's greatest power. It stressed that regardless of U.S. nuclear capabili-

ties a Soviet nuclear attack would, in the age of the ballistic missiles, cause massive dam

age if adequate civil defense plans were not introduced. 71

Although the Gaither committee had access to NlEs, the NES evaluations, and top

secret briefings, it does not appear that it examined intelligence gathered by the U-2. At

least three different members of the committee: lames Killian, Herbert York, and Paul

Nitze, claim that they did not see any of the U-2 intelligence at the time of the study.72

York, who analyzed Soviet military capabilities for the committee and later had access to

the U-2 data, explained that "At that time I knew much of the intelligence we had concern-

ing the status of Soviet developments and deployments, but I knew little about how we

got it.,,73 While it appears that the committee did not have access to the U-2 intelligence,

at least some of its individual members did know about the overflights. Richard Bissell, a

consultant to the committee, ran the U-2 program for the CIA, and Killian had partici

pated in the establishment of the U-2 program in 1954.74

7\ Memorandum of Discussion at 306th Meeting of the NSC, December 20,1956, ibid, 380. 72 See Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167; Handwritten Notes by Killian, [undated], M.l. T. Archives, Me 423 - Killian Papers, Box 25, Folder - Greenstein, 1; and Herbert F. York, "The White House Years (1957-1961)," ibid., Box 66, Folder - Correspondence, xyz. 1965-87,42. 73 York. "White House Years," 42. 74 See chapter 1 and also, Herbert F. York and G. Allen Greb, "Strategic Reconnaissance," Bulletin of the Atomic &ientists (AprllI977): 33-42. Dino Brugioni argues that General Doolittle also bad access to the U-2 photographs. See Dino A. Bmgioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991),32. A significant issue raised by the Gaither committee's apparent inability to examine the U-2 photographs is whether that information would have altered its ultimate conclusions. While it is impossible to know with certainty, the answer is probably no. This conclusion can be reached for two reasons. First, when the committee met. the U-2 program was only a year old. While it produced excellent intelligence, there were limits to what the few overtlights which had already occurred could reveal. Second, while the CIA used the U-2 to prove what military capabilities the Soviet Union actually possessed, it was also attempting to show what the Soviets did not have. When DO ICBMs were photographed, it seemed to show that they did not exist. However, with the relatively limited coverage provided by the U-2, it could also be argued that the Soviet missiles simply had not been seen. Between January 1959 and June 1960, only 13.6 percent of Soviet territory considered suitable for maintain-

170 Government Reports Examined by the Gaither Committee

Even without the U-2 photographs, the Gaither committee still had access to a full

range of information. Beyond the briefings, intelligence estimates, and the NES evalua-

tions, the committee was able to examine reports produced by government agencies. In

August 1956, the Air Force presented its own views on SAC vulnerability to the NSC. In

a briefing, General R. C. Lindsay identified four major weaknesses in SAC's capabilities.

There were an insufficient number of air bases to provide effective dispersal of SAC's

long-range and medium-range bombers. Their were gaps in radar coverage, especially at

high and low altitudes, that could be exploited by the Soviet Union in a surprise attack.

Since at best only II percent of SAC forces could take otfwith 15 minutes warning, this

was a significant vulnerability.7s SAC's communications and control systems remained

underdeveloped and relatively unprotected from a nuclear blast. u.S. nuclear weapons

were stockpiled at only 45 locations with over 50 percent of the weapons at 13 sites.76

ing ICBM forces had been photographed by the U-2. Office of Research and Reports, "Visual-Talent Coverage oftbe USSR in Relation to Soviet ICBM Deployment, January 19S9-June 1960," July II, 1960, reprinted in Kevin C. Rufliler (ed.), Corona: America's First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), 106. See also CIAlNPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, "Chronological Development oftbe Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka and Tyuratam Missile Test Centers, USSR, 1957-1963," November 1963, reprinted in Ruffiler, Corona, 191-96; Jeffrey Ricbelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987), 146; and Gartboff. Assessing the Adversary, 41-42. 75 Henry M. Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program (Office oftbe Historian, Headquarters SAC, Offutt Air Force Base, NB, 1988), 1. A memorandum sent to Eisenhower presented even more pessimistic numbers. It said that only 134 out of SAC's 1654 heavy and medium bombers would be able to take off with two hours warning. See Memorandnm for the President, October 25, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1-2. 76 Memorandum of Discussion at the 292nd Meeting of the National Security Council, August 9, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,339-41. The Gaither committee definitely got to see a copy oftbe report presented by Lindsay. See Transmittal of Govemment Records, AC-AI449, RG 341, Records oftbe Headquarters USAF. The report is still in Air Force custody.

171 The Air Force made several recommendations to remedy these problems. It ar-

gued that the government should construct additional air bases to facilitate a wider disper-

sal of SAC forces and study the possibility of using civilian airfields in wartime. It also

recommended allotting additional funding to build radar sites to fill the gaps in coverage at

high and low altitudes. It requested money to accelerate its implementation of an alert

force program. It asked for additional funding to construct more efficient and secure

communication lines. Finally. it advocated further study of how the vulnerability of the

nuclear weapons stockpiles could be reduced. 77

The JCS foUowed this Air Force study with the creation of an ad hoc committee to

study u.S. air defenses.78 The impetus for this study originated from both SAC and CIA

estimates which revealed that the Soviet Union might possess the capability to launch bal

listic missiles from submarines.79 In November 1956. the JCS appointed Dr. Albert HilL a

future member of the Gaither committee. to chair a panel which included General Carl

Spaatz., General Thomas Handy. and Admiral John Ballentine to study U.s. air defense

needs.80 This committee. which completed its report in June 1957. argued that "The goal

for the defense of North America against air attack should be the achievement and mainte-

nance of a level of air defense effectiveness sufficient to give a reasonable chance of de-

77 Memorandum of Discussion at the 292nd NSC Meeting. August 9, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,339-40. See also Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991 (Office of the Historian. Headquarters SAC, Offutt Air Force Base, NE, 1991),4-5. 78 The Gaither Committee definitely examined this report, officially called the Report of the JCS Ad Hoc Committee on the Air Defense of North America. The report remains classified. 79 See Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Submarine Guided Missile Threat, September 24, 1956, NA. RG 218, JCS, CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec. 13, 10-18; and Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (from Admiral Radford), October 10, 1956, ibid., CCS 334 Air Defense of North America Ad Hoc Comte (9-20-56), Sec. I, 1-2. 80 Memorandum for: Spaatz, Handy, Ballentine, and Hill. November 7, 1956, ibid., l.

172 fending approximately 80 percent of the vital target areas of the nation. n81 Although the

report remains classified, analyses of Soviet strategies from the time period indicate that if

the Soviet Union launched an attack, its military forces would concentrate first on U.S.

retaliatory capabilities and then political, industrial, and economic centers.82 The commit-

tee concluded that most target areas were very wlnerable.

The other study that the Gaither committee explicitly requested was the Continen-

tal Air Defense Objectives Plan, 1956-1966. Its assumptions about the Soviet Union's

ultimate goal and objectives in a general war are illuminating. "It is accepted," the report

stressed, ''that the ultimate national aim of the Soviet Union is world domination. ,,83 It

then argued that if a general war developed between the two superpowers, the Soviet ob-

jectives would be:

a) to secure the Soviet Union against a retaliatory attack, by both offensive and defensive operations against any force capable of significantly threatening its security. b) To gain control of Eurasia, and to gain control of or neutralize the United Kingdom and the island chains of the Far East; c) To neutralize North America's war-making capacity to the extent necessary to success in a. and b. d) Ifpossible, without prejudice to a., b., or c., to reduce North America's economic and social structure to the point where North America could not, for many years, constitute a threat to the expanded Soviet Empire. 84

81 "Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ad Hoc Committee on Air Defense," June 30,1957, quoted in Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Briefing Presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Levels of Defense Effectiveness, October 18, 1957, ibid., CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89 RB, 2395. 82 William Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds.) Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 86. For the JCS's assessment of the attack strategies the Soviet Union might employ in an attack against the United States, see Request for Assistance in Determination of the Soviet Atomic Threat Against North America in 1960, January 9, 1957, RG 218, JCS, 1957 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 75, 2106-25. 83 Notes to the Secretaries of the Joint chiefs of Staff on Briefing Presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Levels of Defense Effectiveness, November 12, 1957, ibid., CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89 RB, 2391. 84 Ibid., 2391-92.

173 According to the report, the most important U.S. requirement was to develop the neces-

sary defenses to prevent a successful Soviet attack.

The Gaither committee also had access to government studies from non-military

agencies. Most importantly, numerous NSC studies provided invaluable information re-

lated to the committee's tasks. Of obvious importance was the Killian committee report.

Not only did it address some of the same issues as the Gaither committee, it also was

composed of some of the same people. Six additional studies undertaken either by the

NSC itself or by groups under its direction were very significant. NSC 5606, a FCDA

study, Part 5 ofNSC 5720, a report by a special committee on shelters, and economic

analyses of shelter programs performed by both the CEA and the Treasury Department.

In 1956 the NSC issued its first full report on continental defense in nearly two

years-NSC 5606. Heavily influenced by Robert Sprague, the report concluded that "The

strength of the United States which must be maintained is an integrated complex of offen-

sive and defensive elements. Each of these elements has its proper role in deterring an at-

tack [by the Soviet Union] and in the defense of the United States should an attack oc-

cur."SS Additionally, the report contended that "The deterrent effect of U.S. power will be

dangerously lessened if Soviet production of multimegaton weapons and an adequate de-

livery capability is achieved before the United States develops an adequate warning and

defense system and significantly reduces the wlnerability of its retaliatory nuclear

power. ,,86 It, therefore, recommended achieving maximum tactical warning, defense

against both air vehicles and ballistic missiles, expanding the passive defenses of the coun-

85 NSC 5606 - Continental Defense. June 5. 1956. NA, RG 273. NSC. Folder - NSC 5606. 2. 86 Ibid., 4.

174 try's retaliatory capability, and implementing new civil defense programs. NSC 5606 pro-

posed a gradual increase in spending on these measures from $3.8 billion in 1956 to $11.5

billion in 1960.87

Later in 1956, the findings of an FCDA panel added weight to the recommenda-

tions ofNSC 5606.88 After studying the effects ofa nuclear attack on the United States,

the panel delivered a set of alarming conclusions to the president and the NSC. The panel

analyzed the consequences of an all-out Soviet attack that struck at least half of the met-

ropolitan centers in the United States. Such an attack, it predicted, would cause 50 mil

lion American casualties, including between 30 and 35 million deaths.89 It argued that "In

the event of a massive nuclear attack on the United States, of the proportions assumed

without drastically improved preparation of the people, support of the National Govem-

ment and of the war effort would be in jeopardy, and national disintegration might well

result. ,,90 [emphasis in original] To avoid such devastation. the panel advocated stockpil-

ing essential food and medical supplies, developing plans for recovery after an attack, re-

hearsing carefully developed evacuation plans, and building shelters for those unable to

leave a target area.91

87 Ibid, 15-18. In the part of the NSC meeting on NSC 5606, "Mr. Sprague commented on the vital importance that SAC be in a position to get the required percentage of SAC planes otfbases and in the air within the estimated warning time ofRussiao attack." Memorandum of Discussion at the 288th Meeting of the NSC, June 15, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,328. 88 See Wm. F. Vandercook, "Making the Very Best of the Worst: The 'Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons' Report of 1956," Intemational Security 11:1 (Summer 1986): 184-95. 89 "The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development," November 21, 1956, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 9, Folder - Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development, 9. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid, 13. Operation Alert in 1957, the Eisenhower administration's annual test of its civil defense programs, reached similar conclusions. See Operation Alert 1957 - Final Exercise Progress and Evaluation Report, July 19, 1957, EL, DDE Papers, Cabinet Series, Box 9, Folder - Special Cabinet Meeting on 0peration Alert-July 19, 1957,2.

175 Part 5 ofNSC 5720, the NSC's assessment of the status of U.S. national security

programs in 1957, reached similar conclusions. Produced by the FCDA, this report did

not predict a Soviet attack but concluded ''that the USSR has the capability of attacking

any target within the United States or its possessions.,,92 Soviet intentions were not im-

portant to the FCDA unless the possibility ofan attack could be eliminated. Since U.S.

military plans were based on what the Soviet Union might do, the FCDA operated under

similar assumptions. It concluded that if the Soviet Union attacked in 1957, current

evacuation plans and shelter space would be inadequate. It stressed that, "Most of the

radiation casualties resulting from [a Soviet] attack (and these would have numbered in

the millions) could be attributed to insufficient protection from fallout, plus inadequate

radiological defense programs. ,,93

Although the preceding studies were significant, the reports developed by three

groups that were created simultaneously with the Gaither committee were even more im-

portant. As with many of the other studies discussed earlier in this chapter, the reports

developed by the special committee on shelters, the CEA, and the Treasury Department

remain restricted. However, recently declassified memoranda do contain important sum-

maries of the assumptions used by these groups in reaching their conclusions. The special

committee studied the effectiveness of different shelter systems in limiting the casualties

from a Soviet attack. The CEA and Treasury Department then analyzed the economic

implications of implementing these programs.

92 NSC 5720 - Status of National Security Programs on June 30,1957, Part 5 - Civil Defense Program. EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Status of Projects Subseries, Box 7, Folder - NSC 5720 (5), 19. 93 Ibid., 3.

176 After developing possible Soviet targeting strategies, the special committee exam-

ined the effectiveness of eight different shelter programs ranging from fallout shelters to

protect a limited part of the population to combinations of blast and fallout shelters to

shield the entire population.94 The first three programs represented partial shelter plans

costing from $5.1 to $16.5 billion, while the last five provided at least complete national

protection from fallout and ranged in costs from $24.5 to $70.0 billion. Each program

would be implemented over an eight year period beginning in FY 1958 and concluding in

FY 1965.95 The committee calculated that if the United States did not build any new

shelters, casualties resulting from a Soviet attack would range between 67 and 116 million

depending on the strike pattern.96 Each successive shelter program would reduce the

number of casualties with the most significant improvements in survival rates occurring

between the most expensive partial shelter plan ($16.5 billion), the least expensive com-

plete shelter program ($24.5 billion), and the next one ($43.5 billion). After this point, the

potential return on the shelter investment diminished.97

After the special committee finished its examination, the CEA and Treasury De-

partment analyzed the economic implications of the shelter programs. The CEA examined

four of the eight shelter plans--the SIO.I, S24.5, $49.4, and $70.0 billion programs.98 It

calculated that if the United States Gross National Product (GNP) grew $16 billion an-

94 See Memorandum for Gaither, Director Security Resources Panel, ODM, Science Advisory Committee, July 23, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series. Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1-2; and Memorandum for Mr. Smith, October 18, 1957, NA, RG 59, State Department. PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder· SIP Papers 1958 (Jan.-Apr.) (from William Leonban), l. 95 Memorandum for Mr. Smith, (Attachment 1), October 18, 1957, ibid., 1 96 Ibid., 2. 97 Ibid. 98 Memorandum for Mr. Smith, (Attachment 2), October 18, 1957, ibid., 1.

177 nually, federal revenue increased S3 billion annually, and federal expenditures were held to

a 1 percent increase, then the economy would produce a S30 billion surplus between FY

1959 and FY 1962. These assumptions, however, depended on the country avoiding a

recession, maintaining current tax levels, and keeping spending in check. The CEA con-

c1uded that while the first three shelter plans could be accommodated by the federal econ-

omy, only the S10.1 billion program was really manageable. It argued that the programs

costing beyond SI 0.1 billion would have an inflationary impact and strain stee~ cement,

and labor supplies.99

Treasury Department officials examined ways to finance a shelter program. They

studied the possibility of providing tax incentives to industry and civilians to encourage the

construction of private shelters. They also calculated possible ways to raise federal reve-

nues to pay for shelters. They concluded that tax incentives would primarily aid the

wealthy while providing only limited additional shelter space, and that increasing federal

expenditures would measurably increase tax liabilities. 1°O Accordingly, the Treasury De-

partment opposed the construction of any shelters because of its potential drain on federal

revenues. More pointedly, it argued that even if the United States could finance a shelter

program without raising the current level of expenditures, it would still oppose such a

venture because the country ''would have to forego tax reductions to release funds for the

activity and investment necessary for sustained economic growth through private initia-

tive. ,,101

99 Ibid. 100 Memorandum for Mr. Smith. (Attachment 3), October 18,1957, 1. 101 Ibid., 1.

178 Reports by Non-government Organizations and Experts

The Gaither committee's study groups supplemented these government estimates,

studies, and briefings with books and reports produced by civilian experts. The study

groups turned to the works ofleading experts to analyze the best possible national security

programs. On issues concerning SAC vulnerability, active defense measures, and military

preparedness, reports by the RAND Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, Rockefeller

Foundation, and 10hns Hopkins University significantly influenced the committee's con-

c1usions. The studies examined by the committee concerning passive defense measures are

too extensive to list, but a sampling of the organizations which produced them should be

sufficiently revealing: the Stanford Research Institute, the Walter Reed Army Institute of

Research, the National Academy of Sciences, and 10hns Hopkins University.102 Finally,

the works of Henry Kissinger and Anthony Buzzard influenced the Gaither committee's

assessment of U.S. military strategies.

The RAND Corporation played a particularly influential role in helping the Gaither

committee develop its conclusions. The committee received briefings from several RAND

experts, including Albert Wohlstetter, Spurgeon Keeny and Herman Kahn.103 In addition,

the committee had access to several RAND studies of SAC wlnerability and weaknesses

in U.S. air defenses. In particular, R-266 - Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, and

R-290 - Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s, laid the bases for

102 For a complete bibliography of the sources used by the Passive Defense subcommittee, see Security Resources Panel, Volume 2 - "Passive Defense", November 27, 1957," EL, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-1961, Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, v. II (2), 88-100. 103 Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon, 129-30. See also R-322-RC, Report on a Study of Non-Military Defonse. July I, 1958, RAND Corporation. Kahn was responsible for writing this report.

179

the Gaither committee's conclusions that U.S. strategic retaliatory forces were vulnerable

to a Soviet nuclear attack.

In his monumental study of U.S. air bases, Wohlstetter and his colleagues at

RAND examined four different alternatives for selecting SAC base locations and analyzed

which of them provided the optimum balance between security from an enemy attack and

maintaining the capability to reach enemy targets effectively. The first alternative repre-

sented the United States strategy in the early 1950s to place SAC forces at overseas bases

to allow the quickest access to enemy targets. The second alternative proposed maintain-

ing SAC forces overseas but at bases further from the front lines. The third alternative

was to locate SAC forces in the United States and depend on aerial refueling to reach en-

emy targets. The last alternative called for basing SAC forces in the United States while

relying on overseas bases as ground-fueling staging areas. 1M It concluded that U.S. re-

taliatory forces were currently vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack because SAC overseas

bases were located within range of Soviet aircraft and poorly designed to withstand at

tacks. lOS It stressed that the best base system would be the last one because it reduced the

wlnerability of SAC forces without adding the cost of aerial refueling. 106

Another RAND study which examined measures to protect U.S. strategic power

proved equally influential. It evaluated the vulnerability of the United States to a surprise

Soviet attack and discovered that with relatively limited forces, the Soviet Union could

104 Smith. RAND Corporation, 212. lOS A. 1. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R 1. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, Selection and Use o/Strategic Air Bases R-266 (Santa Monica. CA: RAND Corporation, 1963),375-83. 106 Smith. RAND Corporation, 213. See also Memorandum for Director of Plans, April 6, 1955, NA. RG 218. lCS. Radford Records. Folder - 381 (1955). 1-4.

ISO cause mass destruction. It asserted that a surprise Soviet attack involving as few as 150

heavy bombers and 150 ICBMs could devastate the ability of SAC to launch a counterat-

tack. To meet this potential threat, the report recommended dispersing existing forces,

hardening SAC bases, constructing active defenses around SAC bases, and developing

better early warning capabilities. 107

Two other groups involving some Gaither committee members completed studies

in 1957. The Army contracted with the Operations Research Office (ORO) at Johns

Hopkins University to study U.S. air defenses. At the same time, the RockefeUer Foun-

dation established several panels to examine U.S. domestic and foreign security. One

pane~ including Gaither committee members Colonel George Lincoln, Dr. James Fisk, and

General James McCormack, studied the military aspect of international security. Both

groups completed their reports by January 1958.

According to Dr. Ellis Johnson, the director of the Johns Hopkins study, the ob-

jective of the ORO study was to find weaknesses in U.S. air defenses and determine ways

to eliminate them. The study concluded "that the U.S. is falling behind the Soviets in

military power." 108 Furthermore, it stressed that the country "absolutely must face up to

the fact that the price for moral leadership is that we must spend much more than the So-

viet on thermonuclear attack and defense systems since we will be attacked if we are so

weak as to invite attack, and the U.S. will be that weak unless we are sure of having

enough SAC left, after the surprise Soviet attack, to clobber them in retum."I09 [emphasis

107 For a discussion ofR-290, see Kaplan, Wizards, 117-21. 108 "Interview with Dr. Ellis A. Johnson Who Directed the Top-Secret Johns Hopkins Report, " U.S. News and World Report 44:5 (January 31, 1958), 50. 109 Ibid, 54.

181 in original] To meet the Soviet threat. it recommended increasing annual defense spending

by SIS billion for an indefinite period. 110

The RockefeUer Foundation acquired the assistance of over 150 experts, who

worked on seven different panels, to study U.S. domestic and foreign security in the late

1950s. 111 Panel n. which examined the military aspects of international security, per-

formed a similar study to the Gaither committee. The panel concluded that "Mankind ..

is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to seek world domination that

seeks to exploit all dissatisfactions and to magnify all tensions; and the new weapons tech-

nology capable of obliterating civilization.,,112 Furthermore, while it recognized that the

United States would be able to meet any Soviet attack during the next two years with "a

crushing reply," it was concerned with the period beyond that time frame. 113 It lamented:

In looking at the strategic equation for all-out war there is reason for serious concern. Our retaliatory power is imperiled by Soviet advances in the missile field and by the inadequate dispersal and protection of our Strategic Air Command. Our active defense designed against manned planes will have to be redesigned for the missile age. Our civil defense program and that of our allies is completely inadequate. 114

To remedy the deficiencies that it saw in U.S. military programs, it recommended

spending an additional S3 billion annually on defense programs. liS It specifically recom-

mended modernizing the Air Force with new aircraft, developing ICBM and IRBM ca-

pabilities, reducing SAC vulnerability by improving warning, reaction times, and base

110 Ibid., 53. III Prospect For America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), xv-xxvi. 112 Ibid, 97. 113 Ibid, 108. 114 Ibid., 111. liS Ibid, 152.

182 structures, expanding the military's capability to wage limited military operations, and

constructing fallout shelters. 116 In its argument for improving U.S. civil defenses, the re-

port claimed "that it is long overdue. It does not make sense for the free world to engage

in a major military effort without at the same time protecting its most important resource:

its civilian population.,,1l7

Some of the last items that the Gaither committee examined were the writings of

civilian strategists. Lincoln, who himselfhad been active in publishing his views on strat-

egy, sent a memorandum to other committee members that contained excerpts from Henry

Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Poi icy. 111 The passages that Lincoln cited re-

veal a fundamental critique of Eisenhower's national security strategy. Kissinger argued

that "The purpose of our capability for all-out war will be to deter Soviet aggression

against us by developing a retaliatory force of a size which can inflict an unacceptable

amount of damage on the enemy, no matter what level of destruction he may accomplish

by a surprise attack.,,1l9 In addition, he emphasized that the United States needed to de-

velop a capability to wage a limited war in Europe. Kissinger stressed that if the United

States did not develop this capability, then "In every crisis it will force us either to resort

to a suicidal nuclear war which would not save Europe from being overrun or to violate

our solemn pledge [to defend Europe]."l20 He concluded that while it was understandable

1\6 Ibid., 150-51. 117 Ibid., 141. 1\8 Memorandum for Mr. Sprague, Mr. Foster, Security Resources Panel, October 21, 1957 (from G. A. Lincoln), USMA, Lincoln Papers, Box 63A, Folder # 10 - Gaither Committee 1957, 1. 119 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 96. 120 Ibid., 274.

183 that some government officials wanted to maintain defense spending at current levels, it

was also foolish. 121

Views o/Gaither Committee Members in the late 1950s

One last way that the reasons underlying the Gaither committee's conclusions can

be explored is to examine the reports and testimony produced by some of its members in

the late 1950s. Many of the committee members studied specific problems for the Defense

Department and testified before congressional committees. Jerome Wiesner and Sprague

publicly discussed the Soviet threat and capabilities. Doolittle and Mervin Kelly testified to

weaknesses in U.S. air defenses. Nitze and Lincoln wrote a report emphasizing the need

for increased conventional forces to wage limited war. James Corson and Fisk analyzed

the weaknesses in U.S. military defense organizations. James Baxter, David Beckler, and

Foster stressed the need for fallout shelters. Finally, Albert Hill criticized the Eisen-

hower's administration's emphasis on a balanced budget at the risk of national security.

Wiesner told a national television audience in June 1958 "that the Soviets have

managed to make a considerably more effective air defense system than we have; I think it

is perfectly obvious to everyone that they are ahead of us in the missile field. I believe that

their limited war capability both in quantity and quality is superior to ours, and their sub-

marine fleet is certainly a much larger one than we have at the present time." 122 In the

same broadcast, Sprague argued that "in the near future, we are vulnerable to a surprise

121 lbid.,427. 122 Transcript of NBC Briefing Session #13: "Has U.S. Complacency Given Leadership to the Sovietsr .. June 17, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries. Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 7.

184

air nuclear attack on our continental bases of our Strategic Air Command, and if such an

attack were successful, this would neutralize our ability to massively retaliate, which, in

turn, would destroy our national policy of deterrence, and in the long future-and I am

thinking possibly from 1970 on-our people face the possible danger of total annihilation

in a nuclear war."I23

Doolittle and Kelly served together on the Air Force Science Advisory Board

(SAB) and maintained close ties to that military branch. Kelly told Senator Lyndon John-

son's preparedness subcommittee that "When we look at where we stand in the missile

field in relation to our competition, it is shattering and very worrisome." 124 At the Air

Force's annual conference, in November 1957, Doolittle told his fellow officers that the

Air Force needed to request a defense budget in excess of$38 billion and emphasize air

defense more. l2S He testified before the Johnson subcommittee that the goal of the Soviet

Union "is world communization and world domination."I26 He stressed the importance of

increasing the number of aircraft, developing and accelerating missile programs, dispersing

SAC forces to hardened bases, and improving SAC alert statuS.127 He did not believe that

the Soviet Union was currently stronger than the United States but argued that "Russia's

Rate of Progress is more rapid than ours, and, unless we continue to forge ahead at full

speed, she will soon overtake us." 128

123 Ibid. 6. 124 Inquiry into Satellite, 1805. 125 6 November 1957 - Afternoon. LC, White Papers. Box 6, Folder - Conference 4 November 1957, 1; Gen. E. E. Partridge to Gen. Doolittle, November 8, 1957, LC, Doolittle Papers, Box 3. Folder - Qen. E. E. Partridge, 1; and Doolittle to Partridge, November 12. 1957, ibid., 1. 126 Inquiry into Satellites, 112. 127 Ibid., 113. 128 Ibid .• 127.

185 In December 1957, Nitze and Lincoln co-wrote a report on U.S. limited war ca-

pabilities. They stressed that the United States needed to give greater attention to waging

limited wars. They argued that "It is conceivable that a general war can be avoided for the

indefinite future. It is almost inconceivable that limited military operations can be deterred

indefinitely in all the various areas where United States interests are presently commit-

ted.,,129 They questioned whether the United States could fulfill its declaratory policy, i.e.

its various commitments around the world. "At some point," they exclaimed, ''there must

be a connection between this psychological deterrent and the actual military situation.,,13o

Assessing the military capabilities that the United States needed to maintain, they empha-

sized that conventional military capabilities should be augmented because of the dangers

of escalation produced by nuclear weapons. "If the enemy is presumed to have nuclear

weapons," they wrote, "serious questions arise as to the military advantage if any which

we would obtain through initiating their use.,,131

One area of particular concern to the Gaither committee was the slow and ponder-

ous pace the Defense Department followed in developing new strategies and incorporating

new scientific and technological advances into military plans. Both Corson and Fisk ar-

gued that there were serious problems in the organization of the defense establishment.

Corson stressed that the United States faced a critical danger within two years "from an

aggressively posed and rapidly developing enemy.,,132 He concluded that "To maintain

129 [Lincoln and Nitzel, "Limited MilitaIy Operations", 9. 130 Ibid, 8. 131 Ibid., 10. 132 J. Corson & L. Carulli, "Effective Organization for MilitaIy Defense", November 18, 1957, EL, WHO, OSAST, Box 6, Folder - Department of Defense (1957) (1), 1.

186

superiority for conducting military operations, there is a vital need for creating organiza-

tional machinery that will expediate the translation of technological concepts into weapons

systems that can be produced prior to conflicts." 133 Fisk argued that "The Russians appear

to have matched the United States in many significant areas of science and military tech-

nology and are surprising the United States in others.,,134 He concluded that the United

States needed to emphasize research and development much more. 13S

Baxter, Beckler, and Foster complained that U.S. leaders failed to recognize the

importance of protecting the civilian population in the case of nuclear war. Baxter argued

that the construction of fallout shelters would enhance the credibility of the massive re-

taliation doctrine by making the use of nuclear weapons less threatening to the popula-

tion.136 Beckler stressed that "unless the shelter program is developed on a government-

wide basis in the context of our over-all national policies and programs, it may not get the

attention and support it merits as an essential protective measure for national survival

during the uncertain days of nuclear parity in the years ahead.,,137 Foster provided a dif-

ferent rationale for building shelters. He argued that "It is known that shelters would

provide a tremendous extra burden not on us, but on Russian strategy. Shelters would

mean that any Soviet missile or bomber attack would have to be almost doubled to para-

lyze the United States beyond recovery. Thus, a shelter program is not a many billion

dollar gamble against the day that the Soviet Union might attack. Rather, it is as much a

133 Ibid. 8. 134 [1. B. Fisk). "Efficiency and Results in U.S. Military Technology". October 1957. ibid. Series 1: Alphabetical Series. Subseries B: non-Top Secret File. Box 6, Folder - Department of Defense (1957) (1). 1. I3S Ibid. 5. 136 Organizing!or National Security. 82. 137 Memorandum for Arthur S. Flemming. December 13. 1956. EL, WHO, OSAST. Box 13. FolderOCDM and Civil Defense, Dec. '56-Oct. '60 (1), l.

187 positive deterrent as are our missile and Strategic Air Command bombers." 138 [emphasis in

original]

More than any other Gaither committee member, Dr. Albert Hill captured the

committee's skeptical mood concerning Eisenhower's emphasis on maintaining a balanced

budget. While the committee met in the faIl, Hill sent Sprague a poem he had written de-

scribing his view of the president's policies. In the poem entitled "Ode to Eternity," he

wrote:

I'd rather be bombed than be bankrupt, I'd rather be dead than be broke. Tis better by far to remain as we are. I'm a solvent if moribund bloke.139

The Reports of the Gaither Committee's Subcommittees

The Gaither committee's top secret discussions intensified between September and

November. One committee member recalled that "It was like looking into the abyss and

seeing Hell at the bottom.',I40 Foster recalled the sensitivity of the committee's work:

"Documents taken from our office at night had to be carried by security officers. And

when sessions were held at my home, guards were stationed at the house for protection of

the documents.,,141 The committee had to process the information in these documents and

then write a coherent and persuasive final report. Before this could occur, the committee

had to analyze the reports of the four subcommittees that had been created to study spe-

138 Foster, "Search for Survival", 18. 139 Hill to Sprague, September 28,1957, MI.T. Archives. Me 365 - Hill Papers. Box 37, Folder #4, enclosure. 140 Herken. Counsels to the PreSident, 114. This quote and a similar one: "I felt as though I was spending ten hours a day staring straight into hell.", have been attnbuted to Robert Lovett, Foster and Sprague. See Stewart Alsop, "Can we Afford Survival," New York Times; and Prados, Soviet Estimate, 70. 141 Foster, "Search for Survival," S.

188

cific problems. The final conclusions of these groups were compiled into three volumes:

Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability, Passive Defense, and Economic, Social, and Po-

litical.142

The subcommittees examining U.S. active defenses and SAC vulnerability con-

eluded that U.S. air defenses were inadequate to meet the Soviet threat. They argued that

"At the present time the ability of either military or civilian activities to utilize warning is

essentially zero."143 They feared that the Soviet Union could possibly launch an attack

without strategic warning. Even worse, with the deficiencies they found in both high and

low altitude radar coverage, they believed the United States might not even have tactical

warning of a Soviet attack. 144

One of the major problems faced by the Gaither committee in assessing the cap a-

bilities and intentions of the Soviet Union was the lack of actual infonnation from within

the communist bloc. 145 Rennan York described how he and Jerome Wiesner calculated

Soviet ICBM strength for the committee. He explained:

we knew that they had had a substantial long range missile development program underway for a long time and that they had recently conducted successful flight tests. We knew absolutely nothing about any missile development, but we did know something about their overall manufacturing

142 Parts of each volume are classified. Volume I on active defense and SAC vulnerability is especially restricted. 143 Security Resources Panel, Volume I • "Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability," November 27, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box IS, Folder· Security Resources Panel, Vol. I (2), B· 7. 144 Ibid., B.12.

145 Sherman Kent argues that "To the normal difficulties of piercing Soviet secrecy in even the most mun· dane of matters we confronted two exceptional ones. The Soviets redoubled their efforts to conceal the nature of their forces in being and made far greater endeavors to obscure their plans for future changes in the scale and nature of the strategic attack and strategic defense forces. Basically our task was not only to identify and enumerate the operational forces of the principal strategic weapons systems but also to project the probable size and deployment of such forces, three, five and sometimes ten or more years in the future. These flights of fancy into the outer reaches of the unknowable were forced upon us by the exigencies of our planners." See Kent, "Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate," 113.

capabilities. In the absence of any contrary indications, we assumed the worst. I recall Jerome Wiesner and I estimating that they could produce 1000's of ICBM's in the next few years and urging that the Gaither Committee base its conclusions and recommendations on that fact. 146

189

Using this type of information, the subcommittees had the Soviet Union launching 1,800

ICBMs against the United States: 125 at SAC bases, 675 at U.S. ICBMs bases, and

1,000 at civilian targets. 147 Nitze recalled that "We calculated that ninety percent of our

bomber force could be knocked out on the ground by a surprise Soviet bomber attack, let

alone an attack by Soviet ICBMs." 148

The subcommittees lamented that "there is only meager intelligence directly con-

ceming their [Soviet] ICBM and IRBM programs. The estimates of Soviet capabilities ..

. are based almost entirely on the U.S. ICBM and IRBM capabilities, and on inferences

from Soviet achievements in related fields." 149 With the paucity of estimates based on

concrete intelligence, analysts tended to credit the Soviet Union with capabilities based on

the maximum that Soviet industry could produce. They admitted that "Since there is re-

cent evidence that the Soviet technical and economic capabilities have been underesti-

mated in the past, the threat described in this report may reflect an unconscious corrective

bias tending toward overestimation."IS0 They argued that the United States needed to

harden SAC air bases against the pressures produced by a nuclear blast and construct ac-

146 York. "The White House Years", 42-43. York. Making Weapons, Talking Peace. 147 Security Resources Panel, Volume 1- "Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability," November 27, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box IS, Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 1 (7),0-97. 148 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167. 149 Security Resources Panel, Volume 1 - "Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability," November 27, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box IS, Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. I (5), 0-6. ISO Ibid, 0-1.

190 tive defenses against both bombers and missiles. m They emphasized that "An all-out

crash program must begin immediately in order that these defense capabilities can be

achieved." IS2

The Passive Defense subcommittee created three sub-groups to study the effec-

tiveness of passive defenses in protecting industry, ensuring the safety of civilians, and re-

ducing SAC vulnerability.ls3 The subcommittee examined current FCDA plans for

evacuation and shelters that were designed to protect the civilian population and military

equipment in the event of an attack. It argued ''that evacuation is no longer an acceptable

alternative for shelter to protect the civil population."IS4 The committee members con-

eluded that shelters would "forcibly augment our deterrent power in two ways: first, by

discouraging the enemy from attempting an attack on what might otherwise seem to be a

temporarily unprepared target; second, by reinforcing his belief in our readiness to use, if

necessary, our strategic retaliatory power."ISS

After examining different types of shelters, the subcommittee concluded that a na-

tionwide fallout shelter program costing $25 billion over six years should be initiated,

while the effectiveness of blast shelters should be studied further. 156 It recommended that

shelters be constructed no more than a mile apart or in locations that the average person

could reach in ten minutes. IS7 However, it emphasized that there is "a common aspect of

151 Ibid., 0-4-0-5. 152 Ibid., Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 1 (6),0-72. 153 Security Resources Panel, Volume 2 - "Passive Oefense," November 27, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (I), 2. 154 Ibid., Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (2), 7l. ISS Ibid., 8O-8l. 156 Ibid., Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (1),46. 157 Security Resources Panel, Volume 2 - "Passive Defense," November 27, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (1), 45.

191 all [shelter] programs: none offers absolute protection, and even with a prohibitively ex-

pensive program we must anticipate heavy casualties ifwe are attacked.nlsl

The final volume of reports contained background infonnation on the Soviet Un-

ion's economic potential, the ability of the United States to pay for the proposed pro-

grams, and how the recommendations should be implemented. The subcommittees found

that while the Russian GNP amounted to only 40 percent of the United States GNP, the

Kremlin devoted nearly the same amount to the military. More importantly, the commit-

tee members described that while U.S. defense spending was expected to remain constant

at approximately $38 billion annually in the future, the Soviet Union was expected to in-

crease its expenditures. Based on these calculations, they concluded:

If the Soviet threat is measured in terms of annual expenditures for defense and investment purpose, relative to our own, it is formidable indeed. Soviet economic strength has already been sufficient to build an impressive military capability. It is reinforced by a political structure that permits (or forces) single-minded concentration of economic resources on military objectives and promises to be sufficient to build a military capability substantially greater than our own before 1970, in the absence of increased effort on our part. In addition, increasing Soviet economic strength makes possible a continuing politico-economic offensive to extend Soviet influence throughout the world. 1S9

Writing and Presentation of the Gaither Report

Using the findings of the four subcommittees and the other evidence discussed

earlier in this chapter, the steering committee spent most of late October devising it own

conclusions and writing a final report. The committee assigned Sprague and Baxter the

158 Ibid .• 74. 159 Security Resources Panel. Volume 3 - "Economic. Social and Political." November 27.1957. EL. WHO. NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series. Box 16. Folder - Security Resources Panel. Vol. 3 (1). 14-15.

192 unenviable task of drafting this report. Almost immediately, Sprague deferred much of the

writing to Baxter, who had won a Pulitzer Prize in History for his 1946 study, Science

Against Time. Realizing the gravity of the task of distilling hundreds of pages of research

into a short report, Baxter asked Lincoln and Nitze to assist him. 16O Nitze and Lincoln

quickly assumed primary responsibility for writing the final report. Nitze later recalled

that, "Abe [Col. Lincoln] and I were mentioned as 'project members' at the back of the re-

port, which masked the fact that we shared importantly in shaping the substance of the

final version. ,,161

As Nitze and Lincoln composed the final report, the advisory panel presented a

summary of its conclusions and recommendations to Eisenhower. Gaither spoke for the

committee and identified six major conclusions. The currently planned active defense

system was inadequate. The programmed passive defenses did not provide sufficient pro-

tection for the civilian population. SAC was vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack. By

1959, U.S. vulnerability would increase with the advent oflCBMs. The risks to the

country would continue to grow until there was a workable arms control agreement. Fi-

nally, Gaither stressed that "The long-run peril to the U.S. civil population demands

prompt and effective measures for increasing our basic and inherent strengths and for

melding the will and resources of the free world.,,162

160 See Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167; and Kaplan, Wizards, 136. 161 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167. See also Killian, Sputnik, 97-98. Kaplan stresses the importance ofNitze in writing the final report. While Nitze did help write the report, the evidence does not suppon Kaplan's view that Nitze played an imponant role in shaping the committees final conclusions. See Kaplan, Wizards, 136-41. 162 Security Resources Panel Advisor's Notes for Conference, November 4, 1957, ibid., OSS, Subject Series. Alphabetical Subseries. Box 13, Folder - Gaither Report November 1957-December 1958 (I), 2-3.

193

After identifying these conclusions, Gaither discussed the rationale for the commit-

tee's findings:

The employment of this Russian military power must be deterred and contained by the United States and its allies until an enforceable worldwide arms limitation plan is achieved. In this interim of unpredictable duration our security must rest primarily upon the full effectiveness of deterrents and, if deterrents fail, upon our capability to survive as a nation and to retaliate with swift decisiveness. Any weakness in deterrents and any important gap in our defenses if deterrents faiL imperil the U. S. civil population and national survival. A sober appraisal of the threat and of U.S. and allied strengths has, as we have indicated, brought us to the conclusion that today and in the decade ahead our deterrents are inadequate and that the U.S. civil population might be exposed to casualties of fifty percent or more of our total population-a catastrophe which defies imagination and which almost certainly would bring national disintegration. 163

Gaither proposed that the United States needed to protect and augment its strate-

gic offensive striking power, reorganize the defense establishment, coordinate the free

world's procurement and use of vital resources, educate the public to the dangers of a

Soviet attack, and strengthen passive defenses. l64 On this last point, Gaither explained

that "A 'fall-out shelter program' may in our final deliberations be recommended as the

only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the haz-

ards of radiation. We frankly confess surprise that a fallout shelter program may be rec-

ommended. Our initial skepticism is yielding to the analysis of the megatonnage which

will elude the best defensive systems now predictable.,,16s

On November 7, the Gaither committee presented its complete report to the NSC.

Five committee members participated in describing specific parts of the report. Sprague

163 Ibid., 4-5. 164 Ibid., 5-8. 165 Ibid., 7.

194 introduced the committee's task and discussed the timetable on which the committee

based its conclusions. Wiesner addressed the need for expanding active defenses. William

Webster made a presentation on shelters. Robert Calkins gave a briefing on the costs and

feasibility of the committee's recommendations. Finally, Foster summarized the proposed

changes in defense organization and offered some concluding remarks. 166

The committee members wasted little time defining the Soviet threat in its final re-

port. Instead, it accepted the basic American Cold War attitude that the Soviet Union

sought world domination. It argued that "We have found no evidence in Russian foreign

and military policy since 1945 to refute the conclusion that the USSR intentions are ex-

pansionist, and that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of

Soviet defense.,,167 The threat as the committee members envisioned it encompassed both

economic and military factors.

Although it recognized the current economic superiority of the United States, the

committee viewed this advantage as fleeting. It argued that while the United States was

economically much superior to the Soviet Union, this difference was shrinking at a rapid

rate. When coupled with the Soviet Union's emphasis on military spending rather than

producing consumer goods, the decline of U.S. economic strength in comparison to the

Soviet Union seemed even more stark. The Gaither report emphasized that while the two

adversaries presently spent almost equal amounts on defense, current trends in spending

indicated that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in defense spending by

166 Presentation by the Security Resources Panel to the National Security Council, November 7, 1957, ibid., l. 167 Gaither Report, I.

195

the 1960s. It concluded that "This extraordinary concentration of the Soviet economy on

military power and heavy industry makes ... available economic resources sufficient to

finance both the rapid expansion of their impressive military capability and their politico-

economic offensive by which, through diplomacy, propaganda and subversion, they seek

to extend the Soviet orbit." 168

The committee found the Soviet military threat closely paralleling the economic

one. After examining recent military and technological developments, the committee pre-

sented a picture of an ever-strengthening communist menace. It stressed that the Soviet

development of atomic weapons, long-range aircraft, both ICBMs and IRBMs, a huge

submarine force, an extensive air defense system, and an anny composed of 175 divisions

posed a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Together with the economic

threat, the Soviet Union's growing military strength challenged the supremacy of U.S.

world power. 169

The committee issued three "broad-brush" opinions. First, the active defense sys-

terns currently in place and those planned for the future offered little defense against a de-

termined Soviet attack. Second, the passive defense measures designed to protect the ci-

vilian population provided little or no protection from the effects of a nuclear blast and/or

radioactive fallout. Finally, because of the low levels of both active and passive defenses,

the security of the United States rested primarily on SAC. The committee warned that

"The current vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack during a period oflessened world

168 Ibid., 4. 169 Ibid., 4-5.

196

tension (i.e. a time when SAC is not on a SAC 'alert' status), and the threat posed to SAC

by the prospects of an early Russian ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial action. " 170

The committee made several recommendations to help strengthen U.S. continental

and civilian defenses. The highest priority was to reduce SAC wlnerability and to in-

crease the strategic retaliatory capability of U.S. nuclear forces. SAC forces, the commit-

tee argued, should be able to react with between 7 and 22 minutes warning. Additional air

bases needed to be constructed to augment the dispersal of strategic forces. Active de-

fenses surrounding SAC bases through the use ofNIke-Hercules or Talos surface-to-air

missiles should be strengthened. Additionally, it emphasized the need to accelerate and

expand the introduction of both ICBMs and IRBMs into U.S. strategic retaliatory forces.

It recommended expanding the number of planned IRBMs and ICBMs from 60 to 240 and

from 80 to 600, respectively. Finally, it stressed that the United States needed to improve

the ability of its military forces to wage limited operations that fall short of general war. 171

In addition, the committee advocated programs of slightly less priority. The

committee made its recommendations based on the belief that "Protection of the civil

population is a national problem requiring a national remedy."l72 It estimated that if the

Soviet Union launched a nuclear attack, the American civil population would suffer be-

tween 70 and 150 million casualties (between 35 and 75 percent of the estimated 1965

population).173 It questioned the capability of the United States to acquire sufficient

warning of a Soviet attack to initiate civil defense plans and to notify the population if an

170 Ibid, s. 171 Ibid., 6-7. 172 Ibid, 10. 173 Ibid., 18-20.

197 attack was indeed underway.174 It concluded that the implementation of a $25 billion pro-

gram of fallout shelters and civil defense planning "would symbolize our will to survive,

and our understanding of our responsibilities in the nuclear age. ,,17S [emphasis in original]

The committee also made recommendations in other areas. It stressed the need to

improve the organization of the Defense Department so that it could effectively incorpo-

rate scientific and technological advances into its programs. It emphasized the importance

of obtaining a greater understanding of Soviet intentions through hard intelligence. Fi-

nally, it argued that any changes in U.S. policies to reduce its wlnerability needed to be

integrated with a broader foreign policy that would insure that allied countries would not

see it as "a retreat to 'Fortress America. ",176

The committee calculated that these recommendations would cost approximately

$44 billion spread over five years (FY1959-FYI963). The active defense measures, in-

cluding the reduction of SAC wlnerability, the construction of missile defense systems,

and the expansion of U.S. military capabilities, would cost $19 billion, while the measures

to protect the civilian population with improved radar and fallout shelters would cost $25

billion.177 The committee concluded that the United States could afford these programs

although they "would necessitate ... an increase in taxes, a somewhat larger federal debt,

substantial economies in other government expenditures, and curbs on intlation."I78

174 Ibid., 7-8. 175 Ibid., 22. 176 Ibid., II. 177 Ibid., 22. 178 Ibid., 12.

198 The committee stressed the importance of implementing these recommendations

immediately or risk losing the military advantage to the Soviet Union. It argued that dur-

ing the next two years, 1958 and 1959, the United States would be in a position to launch

a decisive attack on the Soviet Union if necessary, while at the same time, it would remain

in position to negotiate from a position of strength. Beyond this period, the committee

expressed grave concerns about the future of the United States. "The next two years," the

committee emphasized, "seem to critical. If we fail to act at once, the risk in our opinion

will be unacceptable.,,179

After the presentation to the NSC, Sprague and Foster were granted one more op-

portunity to express the committee's concerns to the president. At this invitation only

meeting, Sprague presented information that he believed was even too sensitive for the

NSC. ISO He wanted to warn the president about the vulnerability of SAC. lSI He believed

that one of the best ways to minimize the vulnerability was to obtain better intelligence of

Soviet intentions and capabilities. He argued that the acquisition of strategic warning and

hard intelligence of a planned Soviet attack "would be extraordinarily important to the

United States and permit it to take an aggressive reaction, rather than just a retaliatory re-

action." 182 While it is unclear what Sprague exactly meant by "aggressive reaction," at

179 Ibid., 14. For the time table the committcc used in making its recommendations, see ibid., 15-17. ISO Memo for General Whisenand, November 5, 1957, LC, Twining Papers, Box 6, Folder - Diary of CJCS, August 15, 1957 to December 31, 1957, 1. 181 Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 7, 1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, Box 6, Folder - Military Planning, 1958-1961 (3), 1-2. 182 Sprague Oral History, 31.

199 least three members of the Gaither committee thought that the United States should

launch a preventive war. 183

Conclusions

Why did the Gaither committee reach the conclusions that it did? The evidence

points to two primary reasons. First, when Eisenhower established the committee, he was

asking for assistance from people who had already developed opinions about Soviet inten-

tions and U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. A review of earlier chapters reveals that

many of the committee members had previously examined topics such as active and pas-

sive defense and SAC vulnerability. In addition, most of them had been associated with

organizations or specific policies that influenced their thinking. When Sprague's recom-

mendations for more spending on continental defense, Killian and Hill's advocacy for im-

proved early warning radar, Doolittle and Kelly's support for reducing SAC's vulnerabil-

ity, and Berlmer and Nelson's arguments concerning civil defense are taken into consid-

eration, the conclusions the committee reached should not have been a surprise. The

committee members entered this study with backgrounds that were bound to influence the

way they interpreted the available evidence.

A'second reason for their conclusions is that the evidence they collected and used

to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. active and passive defenses seemed to confirm their

183 Appointments, November 9, 1957, EL, DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Folder - November 1957, A. C. W. Diary (2), 1. These three committee members remain unidentified. In a conversation with Secretary of State Dulles. "Sprague argued that for the next two and a half years [1958-1960], the U.S. position vis-A-vis the Soviet Union will be at its strongest, and that during this period we can knock out the Soviet Union's military capability without taking a similar blow from the Soviet Union." Memorandum of Conversation, Janwuy 3, 1958, EL, Dulles Papers, General Correspondence Series, Box I, Folder - Memoranda of Conversation -General- S (I), l.

200 preconceived beliefs. Some of the most important information that the committee used

were the intelligence estimates produced by the CIA and military services. The NIE's re-

vealed a growing apprehension of the Soviet threat and an emphasis on increasing Soviet

capabilities. While they did not predict a Soviet attack, they did not rule out that possibil-

ity. Furthermore, as the two superpowers approached nuclear parity, the NIEs predicted

that the Soviets would probably become more assertive on the periphery, increasing the

risk of a war arising from miscalculation.

One of the fundamental problems that helped skew U.S. intelligence estimates was

the lack of careful analysis of Soviet intentions. U.S. officials and analysts assumed that

the Soviet Union sought world domination and would use military force, if necessary, to

achieve it. As shown earlier, Doolittle echoed this theme when he testified that the Soviet

goal was ''world communization and world domination." The Gaither committee never

carefully considered why the Soviet Union would want to dominate the world or assume

the risks that country would have to take to do so. 184 In his analysis of the influence of

184 See Eglin. Air Dejense in the Nuclear Age, 272. In making this argument. I am not discounting the inflammatory rhetoric originating in the Soviet Union after Sputnik. For example, the committee did read a threatening statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force Air Marshall K. A. Vershinin. Descnbing the vulnerability of the United States, Vershinin explained:

the calculation that America's remoteness will safeguard it from military blows in case of another world war is no longer tenable. Great distances will no longer play a decisive role in the age of reactor technology and atomic energy. What was inaccesstble before has now become quite accessible. The modem means of air attack which have tremendous speeds and can operate over vast distances, are capable of striking at any point of the globe. The means of conveyance for hydrogen bombs, the most formidable weapons, make it possible to bring them instantly to the remotest areas of any continent of the world by intercontinental ballistic missiles. . ..

It stands to reason that should the adversary make use of these weapons, the Soviet Union would suffer losses. But these losses would be smaller than those of the countries with a greater density of population and greater concentration of industries.

This applies, above all, to the west European countries and to the United States of America .... Many of the major cities of the United States and some Western coun-

201 perception on policy makers, Robert Jervis provides an apt comparison to the mindset of

the Gaither committee. He argues that "all too often statesmen assume that their opposite

numbers see the world as they see it, fail to devote sufficient resources to determining

whether this is actually true, and have much more confidence in their beliefs about the

other's perceptions than the evidence warrants." 18S

By assuming Soviet hostile intentions, policymakers and intelligence analysts raised

the importance and difficulty of analyzing Soviet capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities. As

the Gaither committee members attempted to estimate Soviet strategic capabilities they

were hampered by the lack of concrete intelligence and information. Intelligence analysts

had to rely on the few photographs provided by the U-2 or other spy planes, electronic

intercepts from along Soviet borders, interviews with political refugees, Soviet announce-

ments and published statements, observations of Soviet military parades, and extrapola-

tions of manufacturing capabilities to estimate Soviet capabilities. Needless to say, their

conclusions were speculative. As Herbert York recalled in calculating estimates of the

number of ICBMs the Soviet Union would build, he assumed it would produce the maxi-

mum number of missiles possible. Having accepted Soviet hostile intentions, the Gaither

committee believed that the Russians would increase their military capabilities to the

maximum.

tries may. in the event of war. be attacked by rockets and bombers as well as by submarines.

Excerpt from Pravada. September 8. 1958. translated and quoted in Memorandum for the Steering Committee. October 1957. EL. WHO. OSAST. Series 1: Alphabetical Series. Subseries B non-Top Secret File. Box 6. Folder - Department of Defense (1957) (1). 1-2. See also McDougall •... the Heavens and the Earth. 237-62. 18S Jervis. "Deterrence and Perception. n 4.

202

Once the committee determined that the Soviet Union posed a threat and con

cluded that it was producing weapons at maximum levels. it had to decide where the

United States was vulnerable and how the country should respond. Based on the commit

tee's assumptions and the information it examined, several of its recommendations were

obvious. Many of its members had already concluded that if SAC was made less vulner

able through dispersal and by reducing reaction times, it would pose a much greater deter

rent to the Soviet Union. Others had realized that shelters could reduce the wlnerability

of the civilian population. These conclusions were confirmed in their analyses of other

studies. Whether it was produced by some government agency, the RAND Corporation,

or some other organization, the reports examined by the Gaither committee presented a

consistent conclusion--the wlnerability of the United States could be reduced by a combi

nation of active and passive defenses.

A final factor that must be considered in explaining why the Gaither committee

reached the conclusions that it did are the debates concerning various military strategies.

The committee advocated increasing U.S. nuclear striking power, building active and pas

sive defenses, constructing a nationwide shelter system, and expanding the military's ca

pabilities for limited military operations. This last recommendation was of particular im

portance to the strategic debates of 1957. Many strategists. including Nitze and Lincoln,

had published their views on limited war. Kissinger's study of nuclear weapons and U.S.

foreign policy was particularly influential. The Gaither committee's recommendation to

augment u.S. limited war capabilities reveals the influence of these arguments.

CHAPTER 5 - The Influence of the Gaither Report on the Eisenhower Administration in 1958

203

Nearly four decades since the meeting of the Gaither committee, mystery still sur-

rounds how Eisenhower and his advisers actually reacted to the November report. Did the

president simply reject the report as a product of war-mongering extremists? Did he have

access to intelligence information that undermined the basis of the committee's conclu-

sions? Was he so blinded by his devotion to a balanced budget and controlling inflation

that he failed to see an actual Soviet threat? Was his willingness to accept only some of

the committee's conclusions and its recommendations a product of an astute understand-

ing of U.S. economic, military, and political power or simple fortune?

The Gaither committee's findings raised some significant issues. Its assessment of

Soviet military capabilities posed serious questions for U.S. security. If the committee's

conclusions were accurate, the president faced a real dilemma. He based his approach to

government on carefully balancing the nation's many needs and responsibilities. He once

told a friend "that the critical problem of our time is to find and stay on the path that

marks the way of logic between conflicting arguments advanced by extremists on both

sides of almost every economic, political and international problem that arises.,,1 Now,

however, the Gaither committee was making recommendations that would fundamentally

alter the balance on which Eisenhower's policies were based. To accept such conse-

quences, the president had to be convinced that the United States was really at risk.

I Dwight D. Eisenhower to B. G. Chynoweth. July IS, 1954, quoted in Duram, Moderate Among Extremists, 54.

204 One of Eisenhower's most pressing concerns in contemplating how to handle the

committee's findings was to determine what impact the proposals would have on the

economy. He feared that increasing defense spending to the levels proposed by the

committee would create budget deficits and inflation. If either of these economic prob-

lems developed, Eisenhower believed the federal government would have to regiment the

economy through such policies as higher taxes, price controls, and rationing. Eisenhower

wanted to avoid these infringements on individual rights at all costs.

Eisenhower turned to the NSC and other government agencies to address the

many issues raised by the Gaither report. Paul Nitze identified some of them when he re-

called four questions that perplexed the committee and remained to be answered by the

president himself and his closest aides:

1) "What is it we [the United States] should be attempting to deter by our nuclear offensive and defensive armament under conditions which seem likely to arise in the foreseeable future?,,2 2) "In the years ahead is it to our interest that there be more or less emphasis upon nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy?,,3 3) "Should we prepare primarily for a strategy of disarming the U.S.S.R. in a strike which precedes the receipt ofan attack by the U.S.S.R., or should we prepare primarily for a strategy of deterrence through having a capability to do unacceptable damage to the Russians through a retaliatory bloweven though we had been struck first?,,4 4) "How much emphasis should be given to quick reaction capabilities and how much to delayed reaction capabilities?"s

2 Untitled Paper by Paul Nitze, [January 1958], EL, WHO, OSAST, Box 14, Folder - SRP June 1957-November 1960, 1. 3lbid., 10. 4 lbid., 4. 5 lbid., 9. Nitze defined quick reaction capabilities as those forces which had to be launched as soon as a Soviet attack was detected. These forces would have included land-based ballistic missiles and aircraft. Delayed reaction capabilities were those forces that did not have to be launched immediately. Nitze concluded that submarine-launched missiles and bombers after they were in the air offered these capabilities.

205

Eisenhower and his advisers spent most of the first half of 1958 attempting to an-

swer these questions. Stephen Ambrose argues that the president ultimately "rejected the

Gaither Report. He refused to bend to the pressure, refused to initiate a fallout shelter

program. It was one of his finest hours.,,6 This is a rather short-sighted view of the intlu-

ence of the Gaither report. Between January and July, the committee's recommendations

remained at the forefront of the Eisenhower administration's deliberations concerning na-

tional security issues. The first three NSC meetings of 1958 dealt primarily with the

Gaither committee and the comments made by the various government agencies concem-

ing specific recommendations. Beyond these meetings, the NSC periodically examined

issues raised by the committee over the next six months. In particular, the administration

evaluated ways to limit SAC vulnerability, accelerate ballistic missile capabilities-

including ICBMs, IRBMs, and the Polaris system-improve limited military operations ca-

pabilities, reorganize the defense establishment, improve continental defenses, and imple-

ment various shelter strategies. It can be argued that the Gaither committee did not pres-

ent any revolutionary new ideas or programs, but "It certainly helped, and pushed and

prodded," many of them. 7

The National Mood and Initial Reactions to the Gaither Report

By the time the NSC received the Gaither report on November 7, Eisenhower was

already under intense pressure to modify his national security programs. The launch of

Sputnik and the Soviet announcement of a successful ICBM test raised considerable pub-

6 Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 435. 7 Comments by R.C. [Robert Cutler] on W. C. Foster article, May 29,58, EL, WHO, NSC Series, Briefmg Notes Subserics, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (2), 1.

206

lic concern about U.S. military strength.8 Previously, Eisenhower had been able to quell

criticisms of his defense policies by reminding the American people of his widespread ex-

perience and knowledge in these fields. After October 1957, things were different. Eisen-

hower's status as a war hero and popular president were no longer sufficient to allay the

people's doubts about weaknesses in U.S. security. Over consecutive weeks in late Octo-

ber, A viation Week argued that Eisenhower and his advisers "have been and still are em-

barked on a fiscal policy that is shaking the military, scientific and industrial foundations of

our national defense system so badly that only emergency action with the utmost speed

will prevent a major deterioration of our atomic airpower strength in relation to the Sovi-

ets in the immediate future.,,9 The following week it claimed that "In the face of this

overwhelming mass of evidence on the growth of Soviet military strength from new tech-

nological weapons, our own national leadership has been executing a policy aimed at re-

ducing our own atomic-airpower strength in being, artificially retarding the pace of our

military technological development and thoroughly discouraging the best efforts of both

military and scientific leaders concerned with this vital program."IO

Similar concerns were shown by the general population. A public opinion poll in

late November 1957 found only 26 percent of Americans satisfied with U.S. defense poli-

cies and 53 percent advocating that they be reexamined. 11 After the embarrassing failure

8 Newsweek found that "Most Americans are in favor of a crash program to put the U.S. ahead in the missile race. . .. There was concern but no panic. Rather Americans seemed to have suffered a severe blow to their pride. They weren't used to being second best, and they wanted to catch up. Above aU. they understood that catching up might well be a matter of survival. 'The U.S., Ike, and Sputnik, '" Newsweek, 50:18 (October 28, 1957),30. See also "The Moon's Meaning.'" ibid., 50:16 (October 14, 1957),39. 9 Robert Holtz, "Why Mr. President?,'" Aviation Week 67:16 (October 21, 1957),21. \0 Ibid., "Intelligence Without Leadership," Aviation Week 67:17 (October 28, 1957),21. \I American Institute of Public Opinion, November 24, 1957, reprinted in Hazel Gaudet Erskine (ed.), "The Polls: Defense, Peace, and Space,'" The Public Opinion Quarterly 25:3 (Fall 1961),483.

207

of the Vanguard rocket in December, the national mood grew more somber. U.S. News &

World Report claimed that the "U.S., today, is far behind Soviet Russia in the big race for

superrockets.,,12 A week later, it reported a growing awareness and fear of nuclear war.

"These new fears about war," it opined, "seemed more immediate and personal than war

fears in the past. When past wars threatened, people worried about whether their sons

might be called into service. . .. Now, all at once, war became a personal thing for every

one-something that could hit you, yourself, right in your home." 13

In December, Newsweek interviewed senators and congressmen from both parties

about the feelings of their constituents and found "The American people have been se-

verely shaken by the sputnik era and are losing confidence in their leadership." It con-

eluded that there was: "A crisis in national confidence produced by the conviction that the

Soviet Union was now the world leader in science and technology;" "An aching need for

bold leadership--and a shaken faith in the soldier-statesman whom they had twice elected

as the man best qualified to deal with national security;" and "A readiness to make the

sacrifices necessary to 'catch up. ",14 In an analysis of public opinion in the aftermath of

Sputnik, one scholar concludes:

In general, American opinion in the post-Sputnik era may be characterized (a) as being aware of foreign and defense problems and attributing substantial importance to them; (b) as being aware of American vulnerability in the present military situation; (c) as having been shocked, in the short run, by the Soviet demonstration of scientific and technological prowess, and as having lost confidence in the conduct of American foreign policy in the immediate post-Sputnik period; and (d) as having substantially recovered

12 "U.S. Satellite - A Myth Exploded." U.S. News & World Report 43:24 (December 13, 1957),31. 13 "The Changing Mood in America," ibid., 43:25 (December 20, 1957),43. 14 "What Congress Hears: We'd Better Get Busy," Newsweek 50:26 (December 23, 1957), 15.

from this loss of confidence and accepted the Administration interpretation of the relative positions of the United States and the U.S.S.R. 1S

208

Eisenhower was quite dismayed by such fears. He did not understand why Ameri-

cans could not recognize the continued superiority ofD.S. military strength. Although he

was quite concerned with Soviet technological achievements and increasing Soviet military

strength, he disagreed with those who criticized his policies. He believed that current and

planned U.S. defense programs would continue to deter the Soviet Union and provide

adequate military forces to handle any limited war situations. After Gaither's presentation

on November 4, Eisenhower explained that "he thought our strategic forces are stronger

than the group may have indicated." He then stressed that "With regard to the ICBM,

here is one case in which a central position is not an advantage to the Soviets. The free

world holds the periphery and can pose a threat from a multiple of points." 16

On the same day the Gaither committee presented its report to the NSC, Eisen-

hower began a campaign to reassure the American people of the country's continued

military strength and technological excellence. He made a series of appearances where he

attempted to address the public's concerns and discuss what the United States was going

to do to improve its strategic position. Many of his comments reflected his initial assess-

ments of the Gaither committee's conclusions. He told a national television audience that

advances in science and technology would enhance, rather than undermine, national se-

1 S George A Almond. "Public Opinion Polls and the Development of American Public Opinion. .. The Public Opinion Quarterly 24:4 (Winter 1960), 567. 16 Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 4, 1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (3) [November 1957- April 1956], 2.

209 curity. In particular, he explained that technological advancements would improve U.S.

defenses. 11

On November 13, he delivered a widely publicized speech in Oklahoma City. He

identified four tasks for U.S. military forces: possessing sufficient retaliatory strength to

deter the Soviet Union, insuring flexibility in military capabilities in order to meet any form

of aggression with an effective response, maintaining continental defenses in a high state

of readiness, and retaining reserve strength to handle any emergency situations. IS To fulfill

these tasks, he said that a high level of citizen participation would be necessary as well as a

willingness to bear any additional financial burdens. He concluded by detailing U.S. plans:

To continue, over the years just ahead, to maintain the Strategic Air Command in a state of maximum safety, strength, and alert, as new kinds of threats develop, will entail additional costs. This means accelerating the dispersal of Strategic Air Command to additional bases .... we have been providing facilities for response to emergency alarm. This, too, should be speeded up .... to achieve maximum possible warning of any future attack, we must carry on additional improvements throughout our warning line that are now scientifically feasible .... Another need is to develop an active defense missile system against missiles . . . . to increase retaliatory power, we shall be adding long-range missiles. 19

While the president attempted to encourage the American people, the NSC asked

various government agencies to make initial comments about the committee's findings. It

requested that the Defense Department evaluate the feasibility of the committee's recom-

mendations related to the military. It asked the State Department to examine how the

implementation of the committee's conclusions would affect U.S. allies. It ordered the

17 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Science in National Security," November 7, 1957, reprinted in The Department a/State Bulletin 37:961 (November 25, 1957),821. 18 Ibid., "Our Future Security," November 13, 1957, reprinted in The Department o/State Bulletin 37:962 (December 2, 1957), 868. 19 Ibid., 869.

210 Bureau of Budget, the CEA, and the Treasury Department to assess the impact of the

committee's recommendations on the nation's economy. It asked the CIA to examine

ways to improve intelligence and to acquire strategic warning of a Soviet attack. Finally,

it requested that the FCDA, in collaboration with other agencies, study the committee's

shelter recommendations. 20

Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy assigned the lCS responsibility for developing

the military's response to the Gaither committee's findings. The lCS completed its report

in early December and reached several significant conclusions. It opposed the extension

of the DEW line south of Midway because there was little likelihood that the Soviet Union

would attack from that direction. 21 It directed that the protection of SAC bases be aug-

mented.22 It recommended dispersing SAC's forces to a greater number ofairfields.23 It

stressed that "an anti-ICBM is an urgent requirement. ,,24 Finally, it argued "that a rea-

sonably effective air defense system against all types of aircraft and missiles, including bal-

Iistic missiles, can be achieved.,,25

The lCS made three other recommendations. It agreed with the Gaither commit-

tee that the country's limited military operations capabilities needed to be reevaluated in

relation to all U.S. military objectives, the Soviet threat, and the resources available during

the period under consideration.26 In addition, the lCS accepted that a fallout shelter pro-

20 Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 343rd Meeting, November 7, 1957, EL, WHO. OSS. Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 19, Folder - NSC - Record of Actions, 1957 (7), 2-3. 21 Decision of JCS 21011284, December 4, 1957, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1957 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 73, 2539. 22 Ibid., 2539. 23 Ibid .• 2545. 24 Ibid .• 2540. 2S Ibid., 2544. 26 Ibid .• 254 1-42.

211 gram was "the only feasible means of providing shelter protection that can be undertaken

on a nation-wide scale at the present time.,,27 Finally, it supported the construction of

hardened ICBM launch sites as soon as feasible.28

Defense Secretary McElroy presented similar recommendations to the NSC in De-

cember. He addressed four issues: improving SAC reaction times, protecting SAC bases,

accelerating the development ofIRBMs and ICBMs, and strengthening the country's ca-

pabilities to wage limited military operations. He explained that during 1958 and 1959,

defense officials were primarily concerned with the threat from enemy bombers. In the

years that followed, they saw the main threat emanating from missiles. He recommended

that by January 1958 SAC should be able to launch 157 bombers with warning of between

30 and 120 minutes. By July 1959, he expected SAC to get 515 planes off the ground

with the same warning.29 With the expected reduction of warning time to less than 15

minutes after the introduction of ICBMs, McElroy requested that SAC be able to launch

240 bombers in July 1960 and 465 by July 1961 with 15 minutes notice.30 As far as reduc-

ing SAC's vulnerability, the defense secretary ordered the construction of Ntke-Hercules

surface-to-air missile sites around SAC bases. He advised protecting 4 of 31 SAC bases

by January 1958, 16 of44 bases by July 1959, and 29 of 52 bases by July 1960.31 While

27 Ibid .• 2543. 28 Ibid., 2546. 29 "Comments and Recommendations on Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee," December 16,1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, Defense-I. 30 Ibid., Defense-S. 31 Ibid., Defense-5.

212

recommending these air defenses, he viewed the construction of shelters for SAC bombers

as impractical. 32

While the Gaither committee recommended augmenting the number of U.S.

IRBMs from 60 to 240 and ICBMs from 80 to 600 by 1963, the Defense Department re-

quested increases on a smaller scale. It initially recommended the construction of 120

IRBMs (60 Thor and 60 Jupiter missiles) and 130 ICBMs (90 Atlas and 40 Titan mis-

siles).33 The committee also advised increasing U.S. capabilities to wage limited military

operations. McElroy agreed "that action should be taken to augment the capabilities and

increase the readiness of U.S. and allied forces which are organized and equipped to com-

bat local aggression and to increase the mobility and flexibility of these forces. ,,34

The NSC asked the State Department to analyze the possible impact of the imp le-

mentation of the committee's recommendations on U.S. allies. There was a concern that

if the United States constructed fallout shelters, U.S. allies might perceive such an action

as a move towards isolationism. The State Department argued that if the Eisenhower

administration decided to build shelters, it needed to offer assurances to its allies that it

would remain committed to them. The State Department stressed that "If not carefully

integrated into our foreign policies, any substantial new programs to reduce the vulner-

ability of the United States might be widely misinterpreted as a fundamental change in

U.S. policy which could have most serious effects on U.S. relations with our allies and the

uncommitted nations. ,,35

32 Ibid., Defense-II. 33 Ibid., Defense-13-I4. 34 Ibid., Defense-I9. 3S Ibid., State-l.

213

The three agencies dealing with the economic implications of the Gaither commit-

tee's recommendations: the Bureau of Budget, the CEA, and the Treaswy Department

expressed serious doubts about some of the committee's economic assumptions. The

Budget Bureau asserted that the Gaither committee made two key mistakes in calculating

the economic implications of its programs. It argued that the committee overestimated the

future growth of the federal budget and underestimated non-defense expenses.36 The

CEA emphasized that the committee exaggerated federal revenues and underrated the in-

flationary impact of its recommendations.37 The Treasury Department concluded that the

committee failed to recognize the economic costs and consequences of its recommenda-

tions. Treasury officials were particularly concerned that the implementation of the

Gaither committee's programs would produce an overly regulated economy and lead to

demands from the American people for the immediate construction of shelters. 38

The last two agencies to present their evaluations of the Gaither committee were

the CIA and the FCDA The CIA agreed with the committee that the United States

needed to strengthen its intelligence gathering capabilities.39 The FCDA supported the

committee's recommendations for assigning the shelter program a highest priority.40

As the various government agencies examined the Gaither committee's recom-

mendations, Eisenhower was completing his proposed FY 1959 budget. Prior to Sputnik,

the administration was trying to limit defense spending so that it could meet the budget

36 Ibid., Budget-3. 37 Ibid., CEA-l-cEA-2. 38 Ibid., Treaswy-3-Treasury-4. 39 Ibid., CIA-I. 40 Ibid., FCDA-I-FCDA-S.

214 guidelines produced by Congress earlier in the summer. 41 After October 4, priorities

changed. Amidst the uproar and shock created by the Russian achievement, people ques-

tioned how the Soviet Union could have made such a technological achievement before

the United States and wondered what the president would do about it.42 Administration

officials now deemed that the current proposals for the FY 1959 budget were inadequate.

At a meeting between Eisenhower and his military advisers on November 11, the

president explained that the country had to raise the pay of its military personnel and ac-

celerate the alert and dispersal of SAC. Furthermore, he added, "there are several things

we must do--we must keep SAC alert and dispersed, we must keep up our 15 carriers, and

we must build submarines. ,,43 Considering his earlier views, he made a surprising pro-

nouncement about defense spending. He "stressed that there is nothing sacrosanct about

the $38 billion figure [for defense spending] .... He felt we could do what needs to be

done for approximately $39 billion or $39.5 billion.,,44

At two other meetings during the next few weeks, Eisenhower articulated how the

decisions for additional appropriations should be made and why they were needed. He

explained that he wanted to approach proposals for increased expenditures for national

security programs "not on the basis of' can we do it in response to the public outcry,' but

41 See Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President. July 10, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,540-46; Memorandum ofa Conference with the President. July 10, 1957, ibid., 547-48; and Memorandum of Discussion at the 332nd Meeting of the National Security Council, July 25, 1957, ibid., 556-63. 42 See for example World Gallup PoU, October 27, 1957, reprinted in Erskine (ed.). "The Polls: Defense. Peace, and Space, n 486. 43 Memorandum of Conversation with the President. November 11, 1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, Box 2, Folder - Budget. Military (6) (September 1957-January 1959), 3. 44 Ibid., 3.

215 'should we do it. ",45 To obtain the right balance in his proposals, Eisenhower understood

the importance of meeting military requirements and building the confidence of the people.

He described in December how he was "really giving a lot of thought to what is the

[defense budget] figure that will create confidence. He thought that a feeling of greater

confidence in the security sphere might go over into economic confidence as well, and

thus help the economic picture." He added that he thought two-thirds of the supplemen-

tary funds are more to stabilize public opinion than to meet a real need for acceleration.,,46

Eisenhower did not rush to judgment or try to make immediate decisions in re-

sponse to either Sputnik or the Gaither report. He wanted his advisers to analyze carefully

what changes and additions needed to be made in his administration's national security

policies. By the third week in November, Eisenhower received preliminary figures for

additions of$2.14 billion above the planned $37.66 billion defense budget for FY 1959.

The increases would provide pay raises for military personnel, improvements in SAC alert

and dispersal, enhanced ICBM detection, accelerated IRBM and ICBM programs, in-

creased research and development, new satellite and outer space programs, improvements

in anti-submarine warfare, and the reorganization of the Army's divisions along Pentomic

lines.47

Discussions involving the president came to a temporary halt when he suffered a

mild stroke on November 25. After convalescing in Denver, Colorado, however, Eisen-

4S Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 22, 1957, ibid., 1. 46 Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 5, 1957, ibid., 2. 47 Informal Notes, November 22, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Chronological Subseries, Box 5, Folder - November 1957 (2), 1. See also Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, November 17, 1957, LC, Twining Papers, Box lOS, Folder - Memos., November 1957, 1.

216 hower was able to resume most of his activities by early December. When Eisenhower

returned to the White House, he had to decide what additional increases needed to be

made to the FY 1958 defense budget. He realized that the additional appropriations in the

FY 1959 budget would not go into place until Iuly 1958 and that something needed to be

done before then. McElroy proposed and Eisenhower agreed to seek an additional $1.26

billion for the FY 1958 defense budget to accelerate and/or augment the Polaris missile

system, SAC dispersal, missile detection, and the development of IRBMs and ICBMs.48

While Sputnik could account for some of these increases, the specific recommendations

indicate the influence of the Gaither committee's conclusions. Robert Cutler, Eisen-

hower's assistant for national security affairs, explained that "Many of the measures as-

signed the highest relative value by the [Gaither] panel have been included in the Defense

Department program for FY 1959 and the augmentations for FY 1958.,,49

Leak of the Gaither Report

On November 23, the White House released a statement that identified the mem-

bers of the Gaither committee's steering and advisory panels and announced that the

committee had performed a secret study for the administration. so The statement did not

describe the activities of the committee or the contents of the report. Not surprisingly,

48 Memorandum ofConfereoce with the President, December 5, 1957, ibid., OSS, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, Box 2, Folder - Budget, Military (6) (September 1957-January 1959), 1. 49 Status of the Gaither Report, [December 1957], ibid., OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. See also 1. R Killian, Jr. to Donald Quarles, November 30, 1957, ibid., OSAST, Series 1: Alphabetical Series, Subseries B: ooo-Top Secret File, Box 6, FolderDepartment of Defense (1957) (1), 2; Notes 00 Dr. Killian's Aide Memoire, November 30, 1957, ibid., 1-2; Memorandum for Dr. Killian, [late 1957], ibid., 1-5. 50 Notes, November 23, 1957, ibid., OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, FolderSecurity Resources Panel, I.

217 information about the committee began to filter out after the announcement and requests

for access to the report bombarded the White House.51 Noted N~ York Times columnist,

Arthur Krock, hypothesized about the contents of the report after hearing a speech that

William Foster delivered in early December. "We," Foster proclaimed, "must get away

from the strange dichotomy with which we have traditionally viewed force, refusing to

consider it except as a last resort, then approaching it in a crusading manner with a

'punish-the-bandit' view which has been prevalent in our recent conflicts." In his analysis,

Krock wrote, "This [speech] strongly implies that the [Gaither] report to the N.S.C. gave

the most powerful support thus far in the United States to the military policy of striking an

enemy before an assault he obviously is about to make on this country."S2

In addition to its specific recommendations, the Gaither committee advised the

president and the NSC that the administration needed to raise public awareness about the

steps the nation had to take to meet the Soviet challenge. In late November, Foster met

with Eisenhower about this proposal and the president "seemed anxious to mobilize public

opinion."s3 They decided that Foster should arrange "an off the record unpartisan discus-

sion of national security matters."S4 The White House saw two principal advantages deriv-

51 For an example of one of the leaks, see Robert A Hawkins to Senator Leverett Saltonstall, December 2, 1957, ibid, OSAST, Box 4, Folder - SRP June 1957-November 1960,1. Hawkins served on the Gaither study group that examined anti-ICBM missile defenses. 52 Arthur Krock, "'A Clue to the Top-Secret N.S.C. Report," New York Times, December 20, 1957, l. 53 William Foster to Killian, October 31, 1975, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, FolderJRK Book - Correspondence A-I{. I. 54 Foster to Lincoln, November 26, 1957, USMA. Lincoln Papers, Box 63A, Folder - #10 - Gaither Committee 1957, l.

218 ing from the meeting. It hoped to gain support for both its mutual security and defense

reorganization programs. 55

Sparked by Eisenhower's apparent interest, Foster invited over twenty national

leaders to his home to discuss the challenges facing the nation. Along with Foster, the

other Gaither committee members present included Nitze, Lincoln, and Frank Stanton. In

addition, Roswell Gilpatric, Laurence Rockefeller, Elmo Roper, John Cowles, Thomas

Dewey, Frank Lindsay, Eric Johnson, Hugh Calkins, Bradley Gaylord, Harold Boeschen-

stein, George McGhee, and Vice President Richard Nixon, attended the dinner. 56 The

group's actual discussions were not recorded. However, one reporter described the

meeting as an attempt by Eisenhower to organize "a group of leading Americans who feel

that the country requires a special, abrupt and continuous alarm bell on the danger from

the Soviet Union. ,,57

On December 20, any remaining secrecy concerning the Gaither committee's con-

elusions disintegrated in a front page story in the Washingtoll Post. The headlines read:

"NATO VOTES MISSILE BASES, PEACE TRY; SECRET REPORT SEES U.S. IN

GRA VE PERIL. II In the ensuing article, reporter Chalmer Roberts disclosed the commit-

teels most important findings. He wrote:

The still top-secret Gaither Report portrays a United States in the gravest danger in its history.

It pictures the nation moving in frightening course to the status of a second-class power.

55 Memoranclum, [November 1957], EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Folder - Gaither Report (November 1957-January 1958) (1), 1. 56 [Untitled list of names], ibid., I. 57 Robert F. Whitney, "President Backs 'Alert' Advocates," New York Times, December 12, 1957, 11. For other newspaper reports on the dinner, see ibid., December 11, 1957, 8; and ibid., December 13, 1957, 26. For descriptions of the dinner based on interviews with some of the participants, see Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," 374; and Kaplan, 152-53.

It shows an America exposed to an almost immediate threat from the missile-bristling Soviet Union.

It finds America's long-term prospect one of cataclysmic peril in the face of rocketing Soviet military might and of a powerful, growing Soviet economy and technology which will bring new political propaganda and psychological assaults on freedom all around the globe. S8

219

Robert's article intensified requests that the report be released. George Reedy, a

key legal assistant of Senator Johnson on the Senate preparedness subcommittee, recalled

that "one of the big struggles was to get hold ofa copy of the Gaither Report."s9 During

the subcommittee's hearings between November 1957 and January 1958, Johnson stated

he had between ten and fifteen conversations with administration officials about releasing

the report.60 Senator Stuart Symington, an outspoken critic of Eisenhower's policies,

claimed that he also had about fifteen conversations with administration officials about the

same issue.61

There remains much confusion as to where the leaks of information from the

Gaither report originated. At least eighty-five copies of the report were distributed and

58 Chalmer Roberts, "Enormous Anns Outlay Is Held Vital to Survival, n Washington Post, December 20, 1957, Sec. A, pp. 1, 19. Roberts was not the first to write about the Gaither repon, but his article provided the most in-depth description and discussion of it For early articles, see the New York Herald Tribune, November, 23,1957,1; andAviation Week 67:22, December 2,1957,28. S9lnterview XII with George E. Reedy, December 21,1983, LBJ Oral History Foundation, AC 84-54, 1. IiO Inquiry into Satellite, 2038. See also ibid, 923-24; Senator Lyndon B. Johnson to the President, December 4, 1957, EL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 676, Folder - OF 133-R, 1; Killian to Foster, October 24, 1975, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder - JRK Book - Correspondence A-I<, 1-2; and Minutes of Telephone Conversation between JFD and LBJ, December 23, 1957, EL, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Call Series, Box 7, Folder - Minutes of Telephone Conversations - General, November 1, 1957 -December 27, 1957, 1. See also Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 78. 61 Inquiry into Satellite, 1340. For examples of other requests, see Senator Joseph S. Clark to the President, December 17,1957, EL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 676, Folder -OF 133-R, 1; Henry C. Kittredge to [Sherman] Adams, December 29, 1957, ibid, 1; General Roben E. Wood (ret.) to Eisenhower, December 30, 1957, ibid, 1; and Holifield to Eisenhower, January 6, 1958, ibid, 1.

220 most of those involved with the committee had access to it.62 Several committee members

lobbied for the release of the report or at least a sanitized description of it contents.63

Newsweek reported that Roberts's article was based on over twenty interviews.64 Killian

recalled that Roberts received a general draft of the report which Jerome Wiesner devel-

oped in fuller detail.6s

Public knowledge of the report made the administration's evaluations more diffi-

cult. As an internal document, Eisenhower and his advisers had great freedom in assessing

the report's worth. However, in the public arena that was still reeling from the shock of

Sputnik, the report became more important. It seemed to symbolize U.S. weaknesses.

Eisenhower had no assurances that the release of a sanitized version of the report would

alleviate fears, but by refusing to do so, he was creating the impression that he had some-

thing to hide.66

The administration remained split over whether to release some version of the re-

port through most of January 1958. The debate within the administration focused on two

issues: whether the release of the report would quell national fears or would multiply de-

mands for more information about other presidential advisory panels. Secretary of State

Dulles, Vice President Nixon, and at times, Eisenhower favored the release of a sanitized

62 See Notes of Meeting , November 7, 1957, ibid., OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Folder - Gaither Report November 1957-December 1958 (1), 1; and Memorandum for 1. Patrick Coyne, November 19, 1957, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724, 1-2. 63 See Jim Fisk to Killian, December 19, 1957, EL, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee Papers, Correspondence - B (I), Box 6, Folder - Correspondence-F, 1; Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 152-53; and Sprague to Killian, August 24, 1972, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder - Correspondence L-Z, I. 64 "Secret Service," Newsweek 51: 1 (January 6, 1958), 35. 65 Handwritten Notes by Killian, [undated1, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 25, Folder -Greenstein, 1. 66 See political cartoon in "Perils, Problems, The Job Ahead," Newsweek 51:2 (January 13, 1958).

221 version.67 Dulles reported that NIXon's "feelings are becoming strong that in order to kill

it [the Gaither Report] we should put something out.,,68 This position, however, was bal-

anced by Robert Cutler's adamant disapproval. Cutler explained that "There is no way in

which to release to the American people information vital to the national security without

it becoming available to those dedicated to destroying the American people. ,,69

Eisenhower's final decision to withhold the report may have stemmed from the

opposition of key Gaither committee members. In early January, Killian asked Gaither

whether he would "be willing to prepare and release the substance of the recommenda-

tions contained in your Panel's report, without revealing information that I might consider

must remain secret for the protection of the nation?,,70 Gaither responded that after dis-

cussing the request with Robert Sprague and James Perkins, he was opposed to the re-

lease of either the final report or even a sanitized version. He argued that the former

"would be a dangerous precedent for the invasion of executive privilege for receiving pri-

vate advice," while the latter "would be ineffective and dangerously misleading.,,71 Echo-

ing some of the same concerns, Eisenhower decided to deny all requests for the report. He

told Senator Johnson:

67 Memorandum of Conversation with the President. December 26, 1957, EL, Papers of John Foster Dulles and Christian A Herter, 1953-1961, Whiter House Memoranda Series, Chronological Subseries, Box 5, File - Meetings with the President. 1957 (1) [November-December}, 1. 68 Telephone Conversation between JFD and Ni."(on, January 8, 1958, EL, JFD Papers, Telephone Call Series; Box 8, Folder - Memorandum of Telephone Conversations General January 2, 1958-March 31, 1958 (4), I. 69 Adams to Kittredge, Janwuy 6, 1958, ibid., Records of Bryce Harlow, Box 6, Folder - Gaither ReportA Summary, 1. This letter was written by Cutler. 70 Draft Letter to Mr. Gaither, Janwuy 9, 1958, EL, WHO. OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13. Folder - Gaither Report November 1957-January 1958 (3), 1. 7\ Gaither to Killian, January 14, 1958, ibid., OSAST, Box 14, Folder - SRP June 1957-November 1960. 1.

... throughout history the President has withheld information whenever he found that what was sought was confidential or that its disclosures would jeopardize the nation's safety or the proper functioning of our Government.

I mention this consideration because of my conviction, which I am sure you share, that in such a matter as this we must be careful to maintain the proper separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government ....

Only by preserving the confidential nature of such advice is it possible to assemble such groups or for the President to avail himself of such advice. 72

Handling of the Gaither Committee Recommendations in 1958

222

At the same time as the president and his advisers wrestled with whether to release

the Gaither report, Eisenhower presented his annual message to the Congress. He vividly

described the threat posed by the Soviet Union:

The threat to ou~ safety, and to the hope of the peaceful world, can be simply stated. It is communist imperialism.

This threat is not something imagined by critics of the Soviets. Soviet spokesmen, from the beginning have publicly and frequently declared their aim to expand their power, one way or another, throughout the world.

The threat had become increasingly serious as this expansionist aim has been reinforced by an advancing industrial, military, and scientific establishment.

But what makes the Soviet threat unique in history is its alIinclusiveness. Every human activity is pressed into service as a weapon of expansion. Trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of ideas-all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion.

The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war. 73

Eisenhower then identified eight specific areas that needed immediate attention.

The military establishment required reorganization to facilitate more effective decision-

72 Eisenhower to LBJ, January 21, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Administration Series. Box 4. Folder - NSC Agenda and Minutes - 1960, 1. 73 Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 9, 1958, PPP-DDE. 1958,3.

223 making and operations. The United States had to improve its military capabilities, espe-

cially in the areas of acquiring warning of a Soviet attack as well as protecting and increas-

ing retaliatory forces. The United States needed to continue its mutual aid programs. The

United States had to expand trade. Congress needed to pass legislation to allow the freer

exchange of scientific and technical information between the United States and its allies.

The country needed to increase spending for education and research. The people had to

be willing to accept additional burdens and sacrifices. Finally, the United States had to

seek the peaceful exchange of information throughout the world. 74

Less than a week later he presented Congress his proposed FY 1959 budget and a

request for supplementary funding for FY 1958. Eisenhower asked for an increase of ap-

proximately $1.3 billion in the current FY 1958 defense budget and an additional increase

of$2.5 billion in the FY 1959 defense budget.7s He explained that the increases did not

reflect any substantial weaknesses in current U.S. military strength but would help the

United States meet the challenges created by new scientific and technological advances.

He argued that "Our defenses are strong today, both as a deterrent to war and for use as a

crushing response to any attack. Now our concern is for the future.,,76

Congress acted quickly. On January 23, the House of Representatives voted

unanimously to supplement the current FY 1958 budget with a $1.26 billion. Congress

allotted $218.6 million for SAC alert and dispersal plans, $329 million for a ballistic mis-

sile detection system, $333.4 million for the acceleration of both IRBM and ICBM pro-

74 Ibid., 7-13. 75 Annual Budget Message to the Congress. January 13. 1958. ibid .• 17-18. 76 Ibid., 19.

224 grams, $350 million for augmenting and accelerating the Polaris missile system, and $29

million for the SAGE air defense system.77 The House argued that its purpose was "to

accelerate and expand certain high priority programs in the interest of shortening the time

by which our military capabilities will have been advanced so as to more arrestingly deter

war and more swiftly and devastatingly respond to any attack. In short, it is to buy

time. ,,78

As the president and Congress implemented initial changes in U.S. national secu-

rity programs in January, the NSC began to deliberate the Gaither committee's conclu-

sions more fully. At the first NSC meeting of the new year, Deputy Defense Secretary

Quarles presented his department's recommendations concerning the Gaither committee's

proposals to expand U.S. ballistic missile capabilities. He presented a startling comparison

of estimated U.S. and Soviet missile strength. He asserted that based on the best available

intelligence estimates, the Soviet Union would have 10 ICBMs in 1958, 100 in 1959, and

500 by 1960. By comparison, he said the United States planned to have 10 ICBMs in

1959,30 in 1960, and 50 in 1961. Even adding in IRBMs did not make the picture much

brighter. By 1961, the United States planned to have 120 IRBMs located in Europe and 3

nuclear submarines carrying 16 Polaris missiles each. 79

77 Memorandum for the Record, January 27, 1958, EL, WHO, NSC Staff. Special File Series, Box 3, Folder - Gaither Report, 2-3. In comparison to these figures, the Gaither committee recommended adding $450 million for alert and dispersal programs, $190 million for early warning, $700 million accelerating IRBMs. ICBMs, and SLBMs, and $130 million for air defense to the FY 1959 budget. Gaither Report, 34. 78 Memorandum for the Record, January 27, 1958, EL, WHO, NSC Staff, Special File Series. Box 3, Folder - Gaither Report, 1. 79 Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability, January 5, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. After reading this estimate, one member of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research exclaimed that "We must, then, reckon that in one year the United States may well, with absolutely no direct defense,

225 Quarles reported that the Defense Department currently planned to have 130

ICBMs operational by the end ofFY 1963 as opposed to the 600 recommended by the

Gaither committee. He explained that the United States could potentially build 600, but

the Defense Department questioned whether the country should undertake such a pro-

gram. Quarles revealed that "The problem was not the construction of the missiles, but

building bases for them.,,80 He argued that the selection, construction, and hardening of

the bases would be very time-consuming and expensive. The Defense Department,

moreover, was hesitant to make such a large commitment to first generation missiles

which would soon be obsolete.81

In February, the Air Force began recommending an increase in the number of

ICBMs to levels resembling those advocated by the Gaither committee. It recommended

the construction ofa 600 ICBM force by FY 1964.82 The Navy also made requests con-

cerning the Polaris missile submarines that were similar to the Gaither report. It recom-

mended accelerating the number of Polaris submarines to 3 in 1961, 13 in 1962,25 in

1963, and 37 in 1964. By late February, it advised expediting the number of submarines

from 1 in 1960 to 39 in 1964.83

confront a Russian capability for shattering devastation of the homeland." "The ICBM Threat to the United States," December 23, 1957, NA, RG 59, State Department, Records of the Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director, 1949-1959, Box 9, Folder - SIP, 1. Another member of the Office of Inlelligence Research and Analysis called the report "Doom." See Memo from R P. Joyce to Mr. A. Evans, January 6, 1958, ibid., Box 10, Folder - ICBM. 1. 80 Memorandum of Discussion at the 350th NSC Meeting, January 6, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box 9, Folder - 350th Meeting of the NSC, 17. 81 "Comments and Recommendations," December 16, 1957, Defense-14. 82 Memorandum for the Record, February 25, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. 83 Ibid., 2.

226 In March 1958, the JCS asked for additional funding for other programs. It re-

quested $400 million for the Polaris missile system, $100 million for developing solid

propellant IRBMs and ICBMs, and $100 million for the Titan ICBM.84 Later, in the same

month, the JCS recommended increasing the number ofIRBM squadrons to 16 (240

missiles) just as the Gaither committee had requested.8s The rcs based its decisions in

part on a WSEG study on U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities which proposed hard-

ening Atlas bases, acquiring more Titan missiles, and augmenting the number of Polaris

submarines.86

In ApriL the NSC discussed the question of expanding the number of IRBMs. Sec-

retary of Defense McElroy decided to request 12 squadrons (180 missiles). Eisenhower

questioned why the country needed to expand its IRBM force beyond 120 missiles. He

feared that they would become obsolete quickly and have to be scrapped.87 Deputy Secre-

tary Quarles told the president that the proposal for 12 squadrons had been selected as a

compromise between the Gaither committee's recommendation of 16 squadrons (240

missiles) and the original Defense Department's proposal of8 squadrons (120 missiles).

Quarles insisted that the 180 missiles were the minimum needed to meet the proposed

81 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Appendix A, March 19, 1958, LC, Twining Papers, Box 105, Folder - Memos 13-31 MR 1958, 1 85 "Report by Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staf(" March 24, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76, 2665. 86 "Report by Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs ofStaf(" March 26, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76, 2670-73. See also Ponturo, Analytical Support, 166-67. 87 Memorandum of Discussion at the 363rd Meeting of the NSC, April 24, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 10, Folder - 363rd Meeting of NSC, April 24, 1958, 2.

227 NATO deployment ofIRBMs.88 Although the recommendation did not meet his desire to

limit spending, Eisenhower reluctantly agreed to the request. 89

At the same time as administration officials were examining ballistic missile capa-

bilities, they were also discussing how to reduce SAC wlnerability. The Gaither commit-

tee recommended five specific ways to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory forces:

increasing alert capabilities, dispersing SAC forces, obtaining greater warning, hardening

SAC bases, and building anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses. In his memoirs, Eisen-

hower explained that of all the committee's recommendations, he "was personally inter-

ested most in the measures to put more SAC bombers on an alert status and to disperse

our SAC bases.,,90 With the exception of hardening SAC bases, the Eisenhower admini-

stration adopted these recommendations at least in part.91

SAC worked under two scenarios in developing plans to reduce its reaction times.

Under the first, the presumed Soviet attack would use bombers which would be detected

at least 30 minutes prior to reaching their targets. Until 1960, SAC expected any Soviet

attack to provide this amount of warning. After 1960, SAC planned for the second sce-

nario where the Soviet first strike would involve ballistic missiles. Under such an attack,

SAC forces would receive less than 15 minutes warning. One scholar aptly concludes that

"It would be difficult to overstate the impact that this time reduction [from the introduc-

88 Ibid., 4. 89 Ibid. 6. 90 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 222. At the an NSC meeting in January 1958, Eisenhower asserted that "money expended on improving the early warning system and the dispersal of SAC bases to be money well spent" Discussion at the 350th NSC Meeting, January 6, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box 9, Folder - 350th Meeting of the NSC 18. See also Memorandum for General leMay, January 20, 1958, LC, White Papers, Box IS, Folder - ChiefofStaffSigoed Memos January 1958-December 1958, 1. 91 Memorandum for General Cutler, April 23, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel. 1-2.

228 tion of the ICBM] had on the analysis of national security and on u.s. society.,,92 At the

end of January, SAC proposed the achievement of the following reaction times: by mid-

1959,515 bombers should be on 30 minute alert; by mid-1960, 321 should be on 15 min

ute alert; and by mid-1961, 465 should be on 15 minute alert.93 In March, SAC again ac-

celerated the implementation of 15 minute alert status. It proposed having 158 aircraft on

15 minute alert by mid-1958, 355 by mid-1959, 425 by mid-1960, and 480 by mid-1961.94

Of these aircraft, SAC expected to have 858-52 bombers on 15 minute alert in 1959, 140

in 1960, and 165 in 1961.95 SAC made substantial progress in achieving its goals. In

October 1958, SAC commander Power announced that "Since initiating our alert force

operations in October 1957, SAC has steadily progressed towards so posturing the force

that one-third of the bombers can be launched within 15 minutes.,,96 8y May 1960, he

could disclose the fulfillment of this goal.97

Tied closely to the reduction of reaction times was the Gaither committee's rec-

ommendation to disperse SAC forces to a larger number of airfields. The committee was

concerned that U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities would be concentrated at a limited

number of vulnerable airfields. It recommended the construction of additional SAC bases

and possibly using non-SAC andlor commercial airfields as alternatives. In February

92 NUIlIl, The Soviet First Strike Threat, 159. 93 Memorandum for the Record. January 31, 1958, NA. RG 51, Records of the Office of Management and Budget, General Budgetary Administration, Subject Files, Series 51.14a - Subject Files for the National Military Establishment and Department of Defense, 1953-1961, Box 3, Folder - Defense Department Air Defense Programs, 2. 94 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report, " March [7] 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 3. 95 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 21, 1958, RG 218, JCS, 1958 - Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76 RB, 4. 96 Power to White, October 22, 1958, LC, White Papers, Box 19, Folder - Top Secret Files #4, 1. 97 Polmar, Strategic Air Command, 69.

229 1958, Defense Secretary McElroy announced that the supplementary appropriations for

FY 1958 and the funding contained in the FY 1959 budget would "provide for completion

of the dispersal of the heavy bomber wings and of a substantial number of the medium

bomberwings.,,98 He told Senator Johnson's subcommittee that by 1960 all 33 8-52

squadrons would be located at their own bases.99 As far as using non-SAC or commercial

bases, both SAC and the JCS opposed the idea as unnecessary. 100

While reducing the reaction time of SAC forces and dispersing SAC squadrons to

more airfields won widespread support within the administration and in military circles,

hardening SAC bases did not. The Gaither committee recommended building blast shel-

ters to protect SAC aircraft, equipment, and personnel. The JCS and Defense Department

concluded that "Any program to harden other than the SAC numbered Air Force com-

mand control centers does not appear to be warranted at this time."lol They explained

that while hardening might protect personnel and planes, it would not prevent the destruc-

tion of the runways or reduce the dangers posed by radiation. 102

98 Statement of Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 26, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries. Box 1, Folder - Department of Defense Vol 2 (5) February 1958, 8. 99 Inquiry into Satellite, 2324. 100 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report," March [1] 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 4; Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 21, 1958, RG 218, JCS, 1958 - Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76 RB, 3; and Memorandum for the Secretary ofDefenselSAC Alert Status, March 28, 1958, Le, Twining Papers. Box 105, Folder - Memos 13-31 MR 1958, 1. 101 "Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Provision of Blast Shelters at SAC Bases," February 19, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 75, 2585. 102 Memorandum for the Record, Janwuy 31, 1958, NA, RG 51, Office of Management and Budget Records, General Budgetary Administration, Subject Files, Series 51.14a - Subject Files for the National Military Establishment and Department of Defense, 1953-1961, Box 3, Folder - Defense Department Air Defense Programs, 2.

230 In addition to the issues of alert, dispersal, and hardening. the Gaither committee

made two other recommendations which were designed to reduce the wlnerability of SAC

and protect the continental United States. It advocated acquiring early warning of an at-

tack and constructing active defenses against both aircraft and missiles. In October 1957,

the JCS identified major areas of weakness in U.S. defenses. It found that the United

States would receive little warning ofan attack carried out above 50,000 feet or below

2,000 feet, or launched by submarines. 103 It concluded that up to 22 SAC installations

would receive no warning of a Soviet attack launched from submarines. Furthermore,

even if the attack occurred at between 2,000 and 50,000 feet some SAC bases would still

receive little or no warning. 104

In February 1958, the NSC issued NSC 5802 which described U.S. objectives and

programs for continental defense. While it still emphasized the need for an effective nu-

clear retaliatory capability, it also stressed that "The United States should continue to im-

prove, and to maintain at a high state of readiness, an effective, integrated system of air

surveillance, weapons, and control elements, providing defense in depth capable of detect-

ing, identifYing. engaging, and destroying enemy aircraft or missiles approaching over the

North American Continent before they reach vital targets."IOS To achieve these objectives

the United States had to be able to detect a Soviet attack and possess the defensive capa-

bilities to thwart the enemy's ability to reach its targets.

103 Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SAC Alert Warning Times (Appendix), January 21, 1958, NA, RG 218, JeS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 92, 251 I. 104 Ibid., 2511-12. lOS NSC 580211 - U.S. Policy on Continental Defense, Febrwuy 19, 1958, NA, RG 273, NSC, FolderNSC 5802, 3.

231

There were two types of warning that the United States could hope to achieve. It

could acquire strategic warning that the Soviet Union was planning an attack. This type

of warning was difficult to obtain since it depended on determining specific Soviet inten-

tions prior to an attack. If strategic warning could not be achieved. the next best a1terna-

tive was to obtain tactical warning by detecting the attack as soon after it was initiated as

possible. The Gaither committee recommended improving U.S. capabilities in both areas,

but it emphasized acquiring tactical warning since obtaining strategic warning was much

more difficult.

The Soviet Union possessed, or would in the near future, the capability to launch

an attack against the United States using airplanes, ICBMs, and submarine-launched mis-

siles. Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles argued in January 1958 that while obtaining tac-

tical warning was a desirable goal, it would be very expensive and could never provide

100 percent protection. 106 Nevertheless, Secretary McElroy approved spending $427 mil-

lion to expand radar coverage of likely Soviet attack routes; the JCS recommended

spending over $1 billion to acquire more anti-ICBM capabilities; and the Air Force began

awarding contracts to companies that would study and implement an early warning sys-

tem. 107

After evaluating the Gaither committee's proposals for air defense weapons sys-

tems, the JCS decided to "provide for NIKE and/or HAWK protection at 55 SAC (41

106 Memorandum of Discussion at the 350th NSC Meeting. January 6,1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 9, Folder - 350th Meeting of the NSC, 16. 107 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report." March [1) 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, I; and Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff to the Joint Chief of Staff. January 21, 1958, NA, JCS, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Ge0-graphic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 74 RB, 2565a.

232 bomber, 9 refueling and 5 missile) bases, with incidental protection afforded 15 (8 bomber,

6 refueling and 2 missile) additional SAC bases for a total of 10 projected bases, by end

FY 1961.,,108 Furthermore, it recommended the performance of ' 'vigorous research" on

the development of defenses against ICBMs. 109 It also emphasized that the "operational

availability ofBMEWS [Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] for ICBM should be ac-

tively pursued." 110

As was the Gaither committee, the lCS and Defense Department were very con-

cemed with advances in submarines capable of launching missiles. One joint committee of

the Senate and the House of Representatives captured this fear when it argued that "The

day is rapidly nearing when the Soviet Union can possess, first a few, and then a large fleet

of intermediate-range ballistic missile-launching nuclear-propelled submarines .... Our

existing and presently planned defensive system could not stop such a missile attack.

Therein lies the peril." III Secretary McElroy echoed this view when he testified before the

Johnson subcommittee "that the Navy did not request a [aircraft] carrier in the Fiscal '59

budget, electing instead to put the bulk of these funds against additional modem antisub-

marine warfare readiness." 112

lOS "Repon by the 10int Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," March 3, 1958, NA. RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 75 RB, 2605. 109 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (Area Defense Against ICBMs), March 31, 1958, LC, Twining Papers, Box 105, Folder - Memos 13-31 MR 1958, 2. 110 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (BMEWS), March 28, 1958, ibid., 1. See also "Repon by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," March 24, 1958, NA. RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76, 2655. 111 "Repon to the Underseas Warfare Advisory Panel to the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy," Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, August 1958,5. 112 Statement of Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 26, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, Box I, Folder - Depanment of Defense Vol. 2 (5) February 1958,4.

233 The concern over the submarine threat led to an increase in the FY 1959 budget of

$262 million more than had been requested prior to the Gaither committee.113 An even

more telling indication of the fear generated by submarines was a JCS plan for dealing

with them. The JCS argued that ''the most practical solution [to the submarine threat] lies

in establishing control over the launching submarine prior to the launching of its missiles.

In peacetime, this control includes detection, tracking, identification, hold-down tactics,

and in certain situations constituting an immediate and vital threat to the security of the

United States, destruction of the submarine.,,1l4

One of the last Gaither committee recommendations concerned augmenting U.S.

limited military operations capabilities. The committee was very worried that the admini-

stration's reliance on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent against the Soviet Union re-

duced U. S. military options in the event of a crisis and made a nuclear war more likely.

This concern was echoed by CIA analyst Raymond Garthoff who argued:

the employment of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is necessary in the United States concept [of war], but not in the Soviet one. The Soviets thus retain a greater freedom of choice. If a genuine stalemate in intercontinental capabilities is achieved in a prehostilities period, the United States might be endangered by the neutralization of its entire strategy, and hence of its ability to act, whereas the Soviet strategy would be served by this development. lIS [emphasis in original]

The debate over limited war capabilities coincided with General Nathan Twining's

tenure as the JCS chairman. He later claimed that in the late 1950s, "never could the JCS

113 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report, .. March [1] 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSe Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 7. 114 Report by the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, July 17, 1958, NA. RG 218 JeS, 1958 Geographic File, ees 381 US 91-31-50) Sec. 78,2751. 1\5 Raymond L. Garthoff, "Air Power and Soviet Strategy," Air University Quarterly (Fall 1957), reprinted in Emme, Air Power, 538.

234 agree on a definition of limited war.,,116 Civilian strategists had been debating various as-

pects of limited war strategies since at least 1954 with the discussions reaching a peak af-

ter the pUblication ofHeruy Kissinger's work in 1957. The Gaither committee did not

recommend specific increases in limited war capabilities but did call for a study of whether

the United States was prepared for such conflicts. The problem was that there was simply

no consensus concerning an appropriate limited war strategy. Disputes centered on such

issues as whether or not to use nuclear weapons, how to restrict the geographic areas of

conflict, how to limit political objectives in a conflict, and exactly what forces were neces-

sary to wage limited war.

Initially, the Defense Department opposed the creation of an interdepartmental

committee to study U.S. limited military operations capabilities as the Gaither committee

recommended. It preferred to make its own study without the involvement of other gov-

ernment agencies. Its proposal ran into sharp opposition from the State Department. In

fact, the State Department's PPS recommended that the NSC accelerate the creation ofan

interdepartmental panel to study limited military operations capabilities. 117 When the De-

fense Department recommended delaying the study at a January NSC meeting, Secretary

of State Dulles raised serious doubts. 118 He stressed the importance of the study of limited

military operations by an interdepartmental committee which could examine the varied

implications of increasing U.S. capabilities. 119

116 General Nathan F. Twining. Neither Liberty Nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy (New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1966), 105. m Memorandum to the Secretary of State, January 4, 1958, NA. RG 59, State Department. PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder - SIPI Papers 1958 (January-April), 4-5. 118 Memorandum of Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the NSC, January 22, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series. Box 9. Folder - 352nd Meeting ofNSC (January 22, 1958),2. 119 Ibid., 2.

235 On March 5, the NSC ordered the creation of a study group to examine current

and future limited war capabilities. For purposes of the study, the NSC argued that

Limited Military Operations include any armed conflict short of an overt engagement of U.S. and USSR armed forces which has been directed by or concurred in by competent political authority. There exists the possibility of isolated incidents involving small units of the U.S. and USSR forces which would not lead to war. The degree of participation in limited military operations by the United States may vary from furnishing of military supplies to the engagement ofa portion of the U.S. armed forces. l20

[emphasis in original]

The study group was charged to discover the most likely areas where the United States

could become involved in a limited war and to determine whether U.S. military forces pos-

sessed adequate strength to deal with those situations. 121

While the study group performed its examination, the NSC discussed limited mili-

tary operations capabilities in its review of U.S. basic national security policies in May

1958. Cutler introduced the subject by explaining how the planning board was trying to

make changes in u.S. policies in light of the emerging nuclear parity between the two su-

perpowers. He argued that the proposed changes were "designed to ensure that the

United States would have a flexible capability so that it could determine the application of

force best serving U. S. interests under the circumstances existing in each case of limited

military aggression." 122 Cutler's recommendation received support from Army Chief of

Staff General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and

Secretary of State Dulles. Taylor explained that "the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability was

120 Memorandum for the Executive Secretary the National Security Council, March 5, 1958, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (background documents), 2. 121 Ibid., 1-3. 122 Memorandum of the Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the NSC, May 1. 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 10, Folder - 364th Meeting of NSC, May 1, 1958,3.

236

essentially a shield, whereas our active military capabilities must be those designed for the

conduct of limited war." 123 Dulles and Admiral Burke made similar arguments. Dulles

"thought new conditions are emerging which do not invalidate the massive retaliation con-

cept, but put limitations on it and require it to be supplemented by other measures." 124

"Our need," Burke argued, "is not rigidity, but an ability to move effectively into big, in-

termediate or small operations." 125

The Defense Department, Air Force, and Eisenhower questioned whether the

United States did not already possess the necessary capabilities to wage limited military

operations. Secretary McElroy expressed concern at the increased costs involved in aug-

menting u.S. conventional forces. 126 Deputy Secretary Quarles doubted any war with the

Soviet Union could be fought without nuclear weapons and feared that if the United

States announced that it could occur, then it would encourage Soviet aggression with

conventional weapons. 127 Both Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White and JCS Chairman

Twining "insisted that the United States already possessed strong capabilities for fighting

limited war.,,128 President Eisenhower acknowledged concerns that he had with augment-

ing U.S. forces for limited military operations. He believed that "Each small war makes

global [nuclear] war more Iikely."I29 He also raised the question of cost. He told his ad-

visers:

123 Ibid,S. 124 Memorandum for Record. May 9, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 21, Folder - Nuclear Exchange (September 1957-June 1958) (3), 1. 125 Ibid .• 3. 126 Memorandum of the Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the NSC, May 1, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 10, Folder - 364th Meeting ofNSC, May 1, 1958, 4. 127 Ibid., 4. 128 Ibid., 7. 129 Ibid., 10.

We really are faced with two possible courses of action. If we strengthen the mobile and tactical types of forces, either we do so by decreasing the strength of our nuclear deterrent force or else we will have to accept a massive increase in the resources to be devoted to our military defenses. If we accept the latter alternative, we have got to decide promptly by what methods we are going to maintain very much larger military forces than we have previously done. These methods would almost certainly involve what is euphemistically called a controlled economy, but which in effect would amount to a garrison state. 130

237

While the NSC debated limited military operations capabilities, its interdepartmen-

tal study group completed a 250 page examination in June. Unfortunately, most of its re-

port and the discussions related to it remain classified. However, it evidently reached sev-

eral general conclusions. While the United States could use more limited war capabilities,

its current forces were adequate. If a limited war did occur, the United States needed to

notify the enemy of its intentions. The public needed to be educated about the role of nu-

clear weapons.131 The NSC planning board expressed serious concern about informing the

enemy of the country's intentions. It explained:

The communication of limited objectives to potential aggressors is, as the Study states, an important means of minimizing the likelihood of miscalculation by the aggressor and the risk of general war. However, can communication of limited intentions be made in advance of every resort to limited hostilities without paying the unacceptable cost of encouraging the aggressor by reassuring him of the limited extent of the risk he is taking in initiating aggression? Should the communication of U.S. limited objectives be made (a) generally, long before a limited military operation may be undertaken, (b) a short time before a limited operation may be undertaken, (c) just after a limited operation is undertaken?132

130 Ibid, 10. 131 Conference, June 17, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 21, Folder -Nuclear Exchange (Sept. 1957-June 1958) (3), l. See also Memorandum for the National Security Council, June 18, 1958, NA RG 59, State DepartmentlOCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 63095, Box #111, 2. 132 Memorandum for the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, July 2, 1958, NA, RG 273, NSC, NSC 5724 (Background Docs.), 5.

238 The interdepartmental group's final report did not lead to any substantial changes in Eis-

enhower's programs concerning limited military operations.

The last two Gaither committee recommendations dealt with the reorganization of

the defense establishment and shelters. Since the beginning of his administration, Eisen-

hower had attempted without much success to make the Defense Department operate

more effectively. In making its recommendation concerning reorganization, the committee

concluded that the defense establishment was not incorporating scientific and technologi-

cal advances into is military programs in an efficient manner and was plagued by bureau-

cratic conflicts. Through its proposed changes, the committee sought to overcome these

problems.

In his 1958 state of the union address, Eisenhower argued that "The first need is to

assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of

the military establishment in maintaining the security of the nation." 133 He found the de-

fense establishment unable to meet the challenges posed by the modern world. He an-

nounced that he had established a special committee to study how the defense establish-

ment should be organized. The committee was composed of William Foster and Robert

Lovett from the Gaither committee, Charles Coolidge, General Alfred Gruenther, General

Nathan Twining, Admiral Arthur Radford, and General Omar Bradley. 134 After receiving

the committee's recommendations, he submitted his proposal to Congress in April.

133 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress oCtbe State oftbe Union. n JanuaIY 9, 1958, PPP-DDE. /958, 7. 134 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 244.

239

Eisenhower made six recommendations for changes in the organization of the de-

fense establishment. Troops deployed overseas should be led by a designated unified

commander rather than a commander from a particular service branch. The designated

unified commander should answer directly to the Secretary of Defense who answered to

the president. The JCS should serve the Secretary of Defense directly rather than particu-

lar military branches. Each chief should concentrate on managing his respective branch,

not on developing operational plans. A new position of Director of Defense Research and

Engineering needed to be created. Congress should appropriate funds to the Secretary of

Defense rather than to the individual services. 135

The president's proposals met some initial resistance in Congress. "The real

problem," one scholar explains, "was how to apportion control of the modem military es-

tablishment, furnishing real security without compromising the traditional balance between

executive and legislative power.,,136 Some members of Congress, led by the venerable

representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), believed that the proposals would weaken congres-

sional influence over defense policies. 137 However, in August, Congress sent Eisenhower

a bill that contained most of what he requested. It increased the president's control over

the defense establishment and strengthened the Secretary of Defense's authority over the

service chiefs. 138

\3S Ibid., 247-48. See also Chris Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in /958 (GPO, 1959), 48-50. 136 Brian L. Ducbin. "'The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of the Year': President Eisenhower and the 1958 Reorganization of the Department of Defense," Presidential Studies Quarterly 24:2 (Spring 1994),254. 137 See ibid., 248-53. 138 Duchin, "'The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of the Year'," 256-57.

240

The Eisenhower administration's response to the five year $25 billion shelter pro-

gram was generally negative. Secretary of State Dulles found the Gaither committee's

argument for shelters unconvincing. Sprague recalled that at the November 7 NSC meet-

ing, Dulles asserted that the committee "had over-exaggerated our weaknesses and rec-

ommended a number of things that were militarily unnecessary and economically unfeasi-

ble. My general distress was that I thought Mr. Dulles had pretty well washed down the

drain the six months work of, I thought. quite a competent group in carrying out an as-

signment they were asked to do.,,139 Dulles explained to Eisenhower later that he was

simply temperamentally opposed to shelters. 140

When the NSC examined the shelter recommendation in January, the FCDA was

the only government agency to support the program without reservations. Leo Hoegh,

the FCDA's director, argued that shelters would bolster the deterrent power of retaliatory

forces, strengthen the position of U.S. negotiators, and would reduce casualties in a war

139 Sprague Oral History, 23. 140 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, December 26, 1957, EL, JFD Papers, White House Memoranda Series, Chronological Subseries, Box 5, File - Meetings with the President, 1957 (1) [November-December] , 1. There may have been personal reasons for Dulles's rejection of the Gaither committee's recommendation concerning shelters. When he discovered that Paul Nitze participated in writing the report he was left aghast. He even questioned his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, how Nitze became an adviser to the committee. See Killian, Sputnik, Scientists. and Eisenhower, 97-98; Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 185; and Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Allen Dulles, November 18, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Call Series, Box 7, Folder - Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, General, November I, 1957-December 27, 1957, 1. The secretary's view did not represent the consensus of opinions of officials in the State Department. Its PPS recommended the construction of the shelter program. See Memorandum for Mr. Gerard Smith, December 5, 1957, NA, RG 59, PPS Records, Lot 67D 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 (January-April), 1; Memorandum for Mr. Smith, December 6, 1957, ibid., I; Memorandum for Mr. Gerard Smith, December 7, 1957, ibid, 1; Memorandum for Mr. Smith [from Christian Herter], December 9, 1957, ibid., 1; and Minutes of Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Secretary Anderson, December 27,1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series. Box 7, Folder- Memoranda of Telephone Conversation - General, November 1, 1957-Deccmber 27. 1957 (1). 1.

241 35 to 45 percent. 141 Opponents, such as Secretary Dulles, Robert Cutler, and AEC chair-

man Admiral Lewis Strauss, questioned the costs and effectiveness of shelters, thought

they might make war more likely, and wondered about their impact on U.S. allies.142

Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon expressed serious reservations about the

effectiveness of shelters in maintaining the viability of the country after a nuclear ex-

change. The question for them was not whether the shelters would reduce casualties.

They recognized that shelters would substantially lower casualty rates. The president

"noted that it had been said that fallout shelters might save 50 million people, a reduction

of 3 5% in casualties. In talking about such figures, we were talking about the complete

destruction of the United States."l43 NIXon was even more blunt. He:

suggested that it be assumed that 40 million people would be killed in event of enemy attack ifwe had shelters, and 60 million would be killed ifwe did not have shelters. If 40 million were killed, the United States would be finished. He did not believe we could survive such a disaster. Our major objective must be to avoid the destruction of our society. Would 40 million vs. 60 million make much difference to the USSR as to the deterrent? Since we have limited resources, we must concentrate on those measures which might deter attack rather than on shelters, which will not stop an attack. 144

After these discussions, the NSC decided not to accept the Gaither committee's shelter

recommendation. But, it did create an interdepartmental committee to study passive de-

fenses, institute a public education program, and support research on different types of

shelters. 145

141 Memorandum of Discussion at the 351st NSC Meeting, January 16, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 9, Folder - 351st Meeting of NSC, January 16, 1958, 2. 142 Ibid., 6-11. 143 Ibid, 8. 144 Ibid, 11-12. 145 Ibid., 4.

242 The Gaither committee's steering panel reconvened in February and met with

Cutler to discuss how the administration was responding to its report. l46 Cutler wanted to

assure the panel members that the administration was carefully considering the report.

The steering panel members took the opportunity to question why administration officials

seemed to be ignoring the recommendation for a nationwide shelter program. They ar-

gued that "The Gaither recommendations with respect to active and passive defenses

should be regarded as an integrated combination. That is to say, a nation-wide fallout

shelter program was to be taken in conjunction with recommendations for improving ac-

tive defense and as a complementary thereto in protecting American lives.,,147

Over the next month and a half, Sprague corresponded with Killian and Cutler in

an attempt to obtain their support for a shelter program. He explained that a one megaton

nuclear ground burst would kill 70 percent of the population within 13 square miles of the

explosion because of either blast pressures or thermal heat. Unsheltered people within a

radius of 600 miles would receive a lethal dose of radiation within seven hours.l48 Spra-

gue argued that "These figures give very persuasive support to the urgent need of a fall-

out shelter to protect military and civilian personnel, whether within urban or rural ar-

eas.,,149 Although Sprague's arguments impressed Cutler, Killian was not convinced of

146 Memorandum for General Robert Cutler, February II, 1958, EL, WHO. OSAST, Box 14, Folder - SRP lune 1957-November 1960, 1. 147 Memorandum for General Cutler, February 14, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 1. 148 Sprague to Killian, February 28, 1958, EL, WHO, OSAST, Box 13, Folder - OCDM and Civil Defense, December 1956-October 1960 (1), 1. Sprague sent a copy of the same letter to Cutler on March 19. 149 Ibid., 2.

243 the utility of shelters. He did not even want to educate the public about shelters lest it

generate demands for a nationwide program. ISO

After the interdepartmental committee completed its report in March 1958. the

NSC again addressed the question of shelters. Many of the same points made at the first

meeting were heard again. After FCDA Director Hoegh spoke in favor of shelters. Treas-

ury Secretary Robert Anderson argued that "The problem posed by a shelter program ...

was not only a grave financial problem. The main problem lay in the fact that we simply

do not know enough at present to determine whether to go ahead with a large Federal

program of shelter as a means which will really contribute to the survival of the United

State in a terrible nuclear war."m Eisenhower later claimed ''that this was one of the

hardest problems in the world on which to make a wise decision." 152

The NSC finally recommended spending $35 million in FY 1959 for certain mini-

mal shelter studies. 153 It proposed:

1) "A research and development program;" 2) "A limited program of prototype construction of relatively smallcapacity fallout shelters;" 3) "A nation-wide survey;" 4) "Initiation ofa program of public education;" 5) "The elements of a base for rapid acceleration;" and 6) "The incorporation offallout shelter in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings." 154

ISO Cutler to Sprague, March 19, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, I; and Memorandum of Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the NSC, March 27, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 10, Folder - 360th Meeting of the NSC, March 27, 1958,8. lSI Ibid., 3. IS2 Ibid., 10. IS3 [Untitled], March 28, 1958 - R.C., EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, I. 154 Record of Actions by the NSC at its 360th Meeting, March 27, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box 2, Folder - Record of Actions by NSC 1958 (1) Action nos. 1839-1893,2-3.

244 Conclusions

Although surprised by some of its contents, Eisenhower did not reject the Gaither

report as some of scholars have claimed. lSS The Gaither committee made recommenda-

tions in five main areas: increasing U.S. offensive striking power, reducing the wlnerabil-

ity of SAC and the continent, improving U.S. limited military operations capabilities, con-

structing fallout shelters, and reorganizing the defense establishment. [n every area except

for fallout shelters and conventional forces, the administration made major changes in its

programs in 1958. Eisenhower was more reluctant than some of his advisers to alter his

programs, but he did accelerate U.S. missile developments. He also emphasized the need

for SAC alert and dispersal programs, ordered a study of U.S. limited military operations

capabilities, and reorganized the defense establishment.

Eisenhower expressed reluctance at increasing the number of first generation

IRBMs and ICBMs that the United States should build. However, he did agree to deploy

130 ICBMs, 180 IRBMs, and additional Polaris missile launching submarines. ls6 While

these force levels are far different from the committee's recommendation of600 ICBMs

and 240 IRBMs, the distinction is not a clear as it appears. Eisenhower did not oppose

increasing U.S. offensive striking power; he only had doubts whether first generation

missiles should be the basis of these forces. Because he had much more faith in the deliv-

ery capability of heavy bombers, he believed the United States should deploy a minimum

number offirst generation missiles while concentrating on improving their accuracy. He

told the NSC in April 1958 "that he still had more faith in the delivery capabilities of the

ISS See Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 435; and Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment, 185-88. IS6 See Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 127.

245

aircraft than he had in all these missiles at the present time."IS7 Accordingly, while he

supported enhanced alert and dispersal programs for SAC, he approved only a relatively

limited number of first generation missiles.

As far as augmenting U.S. limited war capabilities, Eisenhower questioned the

Gaither committee's contentions that small wars would remain limited. He did agree,

however, to a new study of whether U.S. limited military operations capabilities were suf-

ficient to address possible trouble spots in the world. The president ultimately based his

decision to not expand conventional forces on his belief that future wars would be short

and waged with nuclear weapons. IS8 He explained his views in 1956:

I have spent my life in the study of military strength as a deterrent to war, and in the character of military annaments necessary to win a war. The study of the first of these questions is still profitable, but we are rapidly getting to the point that no war can be won. War implies a contest; when you get to the point that the contest is no longer involved and the outlook comes close to destruction of the enemy and suicide for ourselves-an outlook that neither side can ignore-then arguments as to the exact amount of available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues. ls9

Of all the Gaither committee recommendations, the most palatable to Eisenhower

was its proposal to reorganize the defense establishment. The Gaither committee was only

one of many groups recommending change. Eisenhower was already well aware of the

157 Memorandum of Discussion at the 363rd Meeting of the NSC, April 24, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box 10, Folder -·363rd Meeting of NSC, April 24, 1958,6. 158 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 12, 1958 LC, Twining Papers, Box 105, FolderMemos MR 1958 1-12, 1. 159 Eisenhower to Richard L. Simon, April 4, 1956, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 25. Folder - Greenstein, 1. See also Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 12, 1958, LC, Twining Papers, Box 105, Folder - Memos MR 1958 1-12.2.

246

problems and made reorganization one of his legislative priorities in 1958. He successfully

persuaded Congress to make substantial changes in the defense establishment. 160

While many of the Gaither committee's recommendations received widespread

support within the administration, its call for a nationwide system of shelters met stiff re-

sistance. There was some support from the FCDA, the ODM, and the PPS. However,

most of Eisenhower's advisers opposed the recommendation because of the costs of she 1-

ters, the knowledge that in a nuclear exchange millions would still die regardless of pre-

ventive measures, or the implications of a shelter program to U.S. allies. Cutler later re-

called the administration's reasons for rejecting the recommendation. He explained that

"All of this about the need for shelter from fall-out overlooks the many factors which have

puzzled the NSC and are still being researched. It is too one-sided. It overlooks foreign

repercussion, effect on economy, human practicality, whether it shouldn't be done at local

level, effect on national morale, etc. It argues all on one side.,,161

The Gaither committee asked for an incredibly comprehensive security system. It

requested military capabilities that would have allowed the United States to launch a pre-

ventive war or an overwhelming retaliatory strike, and to wage limited wars with or with-

out nuclear weapons. Although Eisenhower wondered whether he could "carry out all of

these plans and still maintain a free economy in the United States," he still carefully con-

sidered the committee's conclusions. 162 While he did not accept all of them, he did find

160 OucbiD. '''The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of that Year:','" 256-57. 161 Comments by R C. on W. C. Foster article, May 29, 1958, EL. WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (2). 2. 162 Memorandum of Discussion at the 3S6th Meeting of the NSC. February 28, 1958, EL. DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 9, Folder - 356th Meeting of the NSC, February 27, 1958, II.

247 many of the recommendations necessary and incorporated them into his national security

programs with a careful eye on limiting their impact on the economy.

248

Chapter 6 - The Legacy of the Gaither Committee

By July 1958, the Eisenhower administration had thoroughly evaluated the Gaither

committee's conclusions and recommendations. In contrast to some interpretations, the

committee's findings significantly influenced Eisenhower's national security policies. I

While the Gaither report itselffaded from NSC discussions after 1958, the issues and

questions it raised continued to dominate policy making. For the remainder of his presi

dency, Eisenhower struggled to guarantee U.S. capabilities to strike the Soviet Union and

preserve the security of the United States, while at the same time, not undermining the

American way of life that he treasured.

The influence of specific members of the Gaither committee members on the Eis

enhower administration continued to the end of his presidency. James Killian acted as

Eisenhower's national science adviser until 1959. Herbert York served as the director of

the Defense Department's Office of Research and Development. William Foster headed

an American delegation to Geneva in late 1958 to discuss with Soviet representatives

ways to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack. Many other committee members also

continued to serve in a variety of other capacities, including as advisers to PSAC and the

Defense Department.

Although Eisenhower did not believe that the communist leaders intended to

launch an attack, the presence of these advisers, additional technological advances, and

intelligence estimates which indicated that the Soviet Union had a quantitative lead in nu

clear missiles forced the president to re-examine his policies. While he never seriously

I See footnote 4 in the introduction.

249

questioned his strategy of deterrence, he did conclude that he needed to strengthen the

u.s. military. By the time he left office, he had expanded his initial proposals for ap-

proximately 350 nuclear missiles to almost 1400. Furthennore, he continued to disperse

SAC, improve alert status, construct anti-missile defenses, and build early warning radar.

Despite significantly expanding U.S. military programs in the three years after

Sputnik and the Gaither committee, Eisenhower faced almost constant criticism that his

defense policies failed to provide adequate guarantees for the nation's security. More

specifically, his policies were challenged in two areas: missile strength and limited war

capabilities. Senators Stuart Symington, Lyndon Johnson, and John F. Kennedy led a cho-

rus of opposition to Eisenhower's military programs. Symington claimed in early 1958

that "It is a tragic fact that, even after the warnings contained in the Sputnik launchings,

and despite the previously known deficiencies in SAC, nothing has been done to rectify

those deficiencies.,,2 The leak of the Gaither report played an instrumental role in further-

ing the perception that u.S. missile capabilities were inferior to those of the Soviet Union.

One recent scholar aptly concludes that while the Gaither report did not create the missile

gap or fears of a national emergency, it "was essential to their circulation beyond the intel-

ligence community and, ultimately, outside the administration.,,3

The debates over Eisenhower's national security policies became pivotal in the

1960 presidential campaign.4 Democratic candidate Kennedy and his running mate, Lyn-

2 Statement of the Senate Democratic Caucus on The Current Status of the Strategic Air Force by Senator Stuart Symington. January 7, 1958, LC, White Papers, Box 17, Folder - Congressional (M-Z), 6. 3 Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 33. 4 Obviously, the debate over national security issues was only one of the many areas of differences between Kennedy and Nixon.

250 don Johnson, argued that the Eisenhower administration failed to recognize the deficien-

cies in U.S. military capabilities because it was too concerned with balancing the budget

and controlling inflation. While Kennedy and Johnson saw these policies as admirable

goals, they believed that the danger posed by the Soviet Union was much greater than Eis-

enhower, and more importantly at this time, Republican candidate Richard N'IXon realized.

Capitalizing on perceptions of the missile gap and deficiencies in the massive retaliation

strategy, the democratic nominee challenged whether the United States could survive the

continuation of Eisenhower's military policies with Nixon as president. Kennedy won the

election in part because of his promises to strengthen U.S. warfighting capabilities.

During the 1960 election campaign and then in his presidency, Kennedy sought the

advice of numerous Gaither committee members. He studied the committee's report early

in his administration. Paul Nitze, in particular, served as Kennedy's primary adviser on

defense and foreign policy issues and became the new president's Assistant Secretary of

Defense for International Security Affairs. Foster helped negotiate the 1963 ban on at-

mospheric nuclear tests. Killian continued to advise Kennedy on science and intelligence

issues. Jerome Wiesner became Kennedy's national science adviser. At least another

eight Gaither committee members served the Kennedy administration in a variety of ca-

pacities.

After his inauguration, Kennedy immediately began to alter the national security

policies he inherited from Eisenhower. The new president expanded U.S. strategic missile

capabilities, augmented limited war forces, and improved SAC's alert status. He also fo-

cused renewed attention on the question of civil defense. While it is impossible to tie the

251 Gaither report directly to the policies introduced by Kennedy, the similarities between the

committee's recommendations and the new administration's flexible response strategy are

readily apparent.

Eisenhower's National Security Policies, 1958-1961

For the last two and half years of his presidency, Eisenhower attempted to formu-

late national security policies that would continue his emphasis on balancing the country's

economic and military needs. While he was also worried about Soviet military and techno-

logical advances, he questioned the willingness of the Kremlin to risk their own destruc-

tion by attacking the United States. He argued that "until an enemy has enough opera-

tional capability to destroy most of our bases simultaneously and thus prevent retaliation

by us, our deterrent remains effective. We would make a mistake to credit him with abso-

lute capabilities."s Rather than seeking to out-produce the Soviet Union or embarking on

expensive and unproven programs to protect U.S. civilians, he pursued policies that he

believed would guarantee U.S. capabilities to retaliate even under the worst possible

conditions and would not hurt the economy.6

During the first six months of 1958, Eisenhower instituted alert and dispersal pro-

grams, expanded early warning radar coverage, programmed anti-aircraft and anti-missile

defenses, and accelerated the development and deployment of several different missile

systems. While the specific recommendations did not reflect complete agreement with

5 Memorandum of Conference with the President, February 6, 1958, quoted in Nunn, The Soviet First Strike Threat, 188. 6 See Robert Cutler to Admiral Arthur W. Radford, July 9,1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subserics, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 2.

252 those of the Gaither committee, they do show its considerable influence. After the sum-

mer of 1958, the Gaither report was rarely discussed within the Eisenhower administration

or mentioned in public debates. However, the report's obscurity during this time does not

signify its lack of importance in helping shape debates concerning U.S. national security

programs. The changes in these programs during the first half of 1958 were only the first

of many to occur before Eisenhower left office.

While he often approved increases reluctantly, Eisenhower eventually accepted

recommendations from his advisers to create a missile force substantially larger than the

one proposed by the Gaither committee. Several factors influenced Eisenhower's decision

making. Until the introduction of satellite intelligence at the end of 1960, estimates of So-

viet missile capabilities remained speculative and continued to emphh;)l!.e the communist's

quantitative superiority.7 Eisenhower also received recommendations from his military

advisers for expanded missile programs that reflected their inability to overcome interserv-

ice rivalries. While Eisenhower did not have to accept their recommendations, he faced

great opposition if he did not. The rapid development of more reliable second generation

missiles, moreover, made their deployment more acceptable and important.

In addition to expanding missile forces, Eisenhower also continued to disperse

U. S. nuclear delivery systems, increase SAC alert capabilities, expand radar coverage, and

construct active defenses. The president viewed these policies as essential to guarantee

the capability of the United States to retaliate regardless of the circumstances. He agreed

with Secretary of State Dulles who asserted that ''the United States should not attempt to

, The influence of satellite intelligence on intelligence estimates will be discussed more fully later in the chapter.

253 be the greatest military in the world. . . . In the field of military capabilities enough was

enough. Ifwe didn't realize this fact, the time would come when all our national produc

tion would be centered on our military establishment."s By expanding U.S. missile capa-

bilities and reducing their wlnerability, Eisenhower felt confident that the Soviet Union

would avoid taking any risks that might result in its own destruction.

The Gaither committee proposed the expansion of five separate offensive missile

systems: Thor and Jupiter IRBMs, Atlas and Titan ICBMs, and the Polaris SLBM. By

the end ofFY 1963, It recommended the deployment of240 IRBMs, 600 ICBMs, and 6

Polaris submarines carrying 16 SLBMs each by the end of 1963. In total, these forces

would have consisted of almost 940 nuclear missiles.9 Over his last three years in office,

Eisenhower met and then surpassed these force levels. In August 1958, the Defense De-

partment studied expanding the programmed ICBM force to 200 missiles (110 Titan and

90 Atlas). 10 In November 1959, the Defense Department proposed and Eisenhower ap-

proved a force of270 ICBMs (140 Titans and 130 Atlas).11 By Kennedy's inauguration in

January 1961, Eisenhower had programmed the deployment of810 ICBMs (130 Atlas,

140 Titan, and 540 Minuteman).12

Eisenhower also supervised a similar expansion of the development of Polaris

missile submarines. He saw the Polaris as a major hedge against the Soviet Union

8 Memorandum of Discussion at the 363rd Meeting of the NSC, Apri124, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box to, Folder - 363rd Meeting ofNSC, April 24, 1958,5. 9 Gaither Report, 34. 10 See Neufeld. Ballistic Missiles, 190; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 179. 11 See Neufeld. Ballistic Missiles, 184; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 197. 12 Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 150-1 and 187. By the time Eisenhower left office, he had deployed 12 Atlas ICBMs and launched two Polaris submarines carrying a total of 32 SLBMs. Sec Desmond Ball, 1'he Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983," in Ball and RichelsoD, Strategic Nuclear Targeting,57.

254

launching a surprise attack. By providing a virtually inwlnerable second strike capability,

the Polaris would force Soviet leaders to consider even more seriously the consequences

of attacking the United States. In 1958, Eisenhower approved plans to construct 9 Polaris

submarines. A year later, he agreed to expand the force even further to 15. 13 By July

1960, the president approved the construction of 24 Polaris submarines.14 These 24 sub-

marines added 384 SBLMs to the already planned 810 ICBM force.

In addition to the ICBM and Polaris forces, the Eisenhower administration imp le-

mented its plans to deploy both Thor and Jupiter IRBMs overseas. In April 1958, Eisen-

hower had agreed to a Defense Department recommendation to deploy 12 IRBM squad-

rons (9 Thor and 3 Jupiter) containing 15 missiles each. Ultimately, four Thor and 3 Jupi-

ter squadrons became operational in Great Britain, Turkey, and Italy between 1959 and

1962. IS The Eisenhower administration limited the deployment of IRBMs to seven squad-

rons when it realized that reliable ICBMs would be available which would make the

IRBMs unnecessary and obsolete. However, while the IRBMs were plagued with short-

comings, they "demonstrated America's resolve to defend its allies and represented the

only display of strategic missiles in Europe.,,16

The ICBM and IRBM forces and the Polaris submarines represented only two legs

of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The third part of the nuclear triad remained SAC bombers.

The Gaither committee did not recommend substantial increases in bomber force levels,

but it did emphasize the importance of reducing SAC wlnerability. It proposed the im-

13 Roman. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 184. 14 Ibid., 190. IS Neufeld. Ballistic Missiles, 224-26. 16 Ibid .• 232.

255 plementation of alert forces, the further dispersal of bomber squadrons, the improvement

of early warning, and the construction of active defenses. Eisenhower and the NSC fo-

cused on each of these issues between 1958 and 1961. Additionally, Eisenhower adopted

proposals to modernize the composition of the bomber and tanker forces. While he

phased out the B-36 in 1958 and began to reduce the importance of the B-47 in 1959, he

increased the deployment of B-52 bombers from 243 in 1957 to 567 in 1961. Further-

more, he modernized the tanker force by introducing the KC_135. 17

Besides determining strategic force levels, the most pressing military question ad-

dressed by the Eisenhower administration between 1958 and 1961 was to determine the

optimal force requirements for fighting either general or limited wars. As shown in earlier

chapters, the distinction between limited and general wars had been a controversial topic

for military strategists. Civilians like Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood,

Paul Nitze, and William Kaufinan insisted that the United States should develop greater

military capabilities to wage limited wars. However, there was no consensus as to how

these types of wars should be fought. Should nuclear weapons be used or should conven-

tional forces be relied upon? How should political objectives be determined and conveyed

to an enemy? How could the geographical areas of conflict be limited? Without providing

specifics, the Gaither committee recommended that the United States perfonn a study to

determine the best composition and role for its limited war forces.

17 Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991 (Offutt Air Force Base, NE: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1991),77. See also, Peter J. Roman, "Strategic Bombers over the Missile Horizon," Journal o/Strategic Studies 18 (March 1995), 200-10.

256 As a result of the Gaither committee recommendations, the NSC created a task

force in the spring of 1958 composed of representatives of the State Department, Defense

Department, JCS, and CIA to study U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars through July

1961. The task force concluded that "United States capabilities for limited military opera-

tions are adequate to undertake and carry out limited operations.,,18 However, this opin-

ion was not unanimous within the administration. Another study completed in September

1958 by the Defense Department's Defense Science Board found "The limited-war capa-

bility of the United States is inadequate from the viewpoint both of military operations and

of research and development." 19 Furthermore, it argued that the "present capability [of

the United States] is limited in strength and cannot be exercised quickly or effecrlvely.,,20

This type of criticism reappeared on several occasions during the remainder of the Eisen-

hower administration.

In 1960, two separate committees, a PSAC panel and an inter-agency study group,

examined U.S. limited war capabilities. The panel found what it believed to be several se-

rious deficiencies. It concluded, in particular, that the military branches focused so much

attention on maintaining forces for general war that they neglected ''the specialized weap-

ons and systems for limited war."21 To remedy these deficiencies, the panel recommended

18 Memorandum for the National Security Council, June 18, 1958, NA. RG 59, State Department, Records of the OCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 66095, Box 111,2. 19 "Final Report of the Task Group on Limited War, Defense Science Board,'" September I, 1958, NA, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology, Subject Files, 1957-62, Box 58, Folder - Limited War - Army, 3. 20 Ibid., 6. 21 Memorandum of Meeting with the President, August 25, 1960, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subserics. Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (6) July 1959-August 1960, 2.

257 augmenting U.S. airlift capabilities, developing ground support aircraft for limited war,

and placing more emphasis on the development of non-nuclear weapons.22

The inter-agency study group composed of representatives from the CIA, State

Department, and the Department of Defense performed a similar study to the one insti-

gated by the Gaither committee recommendations in 1958. The impetus for this examina-

tion was the belief among some members of the Eisenhower administration that the 1958

study failed to resolve the role of nuclear weapons in limited war.23 The group's final re-

port remains classified, but discussions concerning its conclusions provide a revealing look

at the disagreements over limited military operations.24 The study group examined five

possible locations of limited war confrontations: Berlin, Iran, Laos, Korea, and the Chi-

nese Offshore Islands ofQuemoy and Matsu.2S It concluded that the United States had

"an adequate capability for anyone of the situations studied but cannot handle two at

once.,,26 More specifically, it stressed:

U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our Allies are generally adequate to conduct anyone of the limited military operations studies but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to

a. Initiate partial mobilization. b. Augment existing military [air]lift capabilities. c. Expand the war production base.

22 Ibid., 4-5. 23 See Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. September 28, 1960, NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (Background Documents), 1; and Memorandum for the Acting Secretary, October 5. 1960, NA, RG 59, Records of the OCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 66095, Box Ill, 1 24 See Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, September 28, 1960. NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (Background Documents), 1-3. 2S Memorandum for the Acting Secretary, October 5, 1960, NA, RG 59, Records of the OCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 66D 95, Box Ill, 2. 26 Memorandum of Conversation, September 27, 1960, ibid., 3.

258 d. Waive financiallimitations. rT

The State Department found that U.S. capabilities in these fields were insufficient.

State Department representative Gerard Smith told Secretary of State Christian Herter

that" Although the language of the present study's conclusions is carefully hedged, its im-

port seems to me inescapable. The US does not have now an adequate limited war capa-

bility.,,28 Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant emphasized that "There is una-

nimity in the State Department about the need for a greater limited war capability.,,29 He

then explained that "The State Department . . . believes it is difficult to have an effective

and successful foreign policy if the US lacks the capability of dealing with at least two

limited war situations concurrently without an unacceptable degradation of our general

war capability. ,,30

U.S. military leaders also analyzed the inter-agency group's report. Their overrid-

ing conclusion was "that our limited war capability is basically dependent on our general

war capability and our determination to risk general war.,,31 One of the key questions they

could not answer was whether nuclear weapons would be used in limited war situations.

JCS Chairman Twining explained that "we must assume that when we get in a shooting

war we will have to have a supplemental budget and step up our airlift. . .. On the use of

27 "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to July 1, 1962," excerpt quoted in Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Appendix, December 9, 1960, EL, WHO. OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 5, Folder - Limited Military Operations, Appendix - 1. 28 Memorandum for the Acting Secretary, October 5, 1960, NA, RG 59, State Department, OCB and NSC Records, Lot 66D 95, Box Ill, 1. 29 Ibid., 5. 30 Ibid., 6. 31 Memorandum of Conversation, September 27, 1960, NA, RG 59, State Department, OCB and NSC Records, Lot 660 95, Box Ill, 2.

259

atomic weapons we cannot prejudge.,,32 Army Chief of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer concurred.

He argued that it is not "possible to decide in advance whether to use nuclear weapons .

. . . Therefore, it is necessary to have a proper balance between nuclear and conventional

forces so we won't get musclebound.,,33 Overall, the lCS stressed that "the United States

does not have forces in being adequate to cope with all envisaged limited war situa-

tions.,,34

Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Arleigh Burke and Air Force Chief of Staff General

Thomas White raised the issues of U.S. prestige and will. Burke argued:

The US will is important. The Soviets will push us at every opportunity and we need to have the will to resist. For example, in the Berlin situation it is easy to consider letting Berlin go rather than fight a general war. However, we need to stand up to the enemy if we want to keep the free world on our side. We must keep Berlin or lose our prestige and respect. If general war is necessary, we might as well have it now and take the risk oflosing our nation.3S

White expressed his complete agreement. "We need," he stressed, "national determination

in a situation where general war must be risked. We should use whatever weapons are

necessary. ,,36

Questions concerning U. S. capabilities to wage limited wars were also raised by

Nitze and General Maxwell Taylor, who retired as the Army's chief of staff in 1959.

Taylor believed that Eisenhower's reliance on massive retaliation significantly limited U.S.

capabilities to respond to military crises short of general war. He argued that "Massive

32 Ibid., 2. 33 Ibid., 4. 34 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Appendix. December 9, 1960, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 5, Folder - Limited Military Operations, 1. 3S Ibid., 3-4. 36 Ibid., 4.

260

Retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there is an ur-

gent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs. In its heyday, massive retaliation could

offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise

and retreat. ,,37 Taylor claimed that the United States needed to expand the capabilities of

its conventional forces to wage limited wars to insure that it would not have to respond to

every military crisis with nuclear weapons.38

Nitze was the most vocal proponent on the Gaither committee for expanding lim-

ited war capabilities. In June 1959, he argued that as programmed by the Eisenhower

administration, U.S. military forces were inadequate to meet the range of threats posed by

the U.S.S.R. He explained that "If one grades the various threats which Soviet-

Communist initiative can present to the free world in order of the violence of the means

involved, one finds a wide band starting with reasonably mild but disturbing words at one

end of the spectrum and an all-out surprise nuclear attack on the United States at the other

end of the spectrum.,,39 He believed that the United States needed to be prepared for all

contingencies. The United States should possess a secure retaliatory capability, expanded

limited war capabilities, and strong security alliances. 40

37 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1959, 1960), 5. 38 Ibid., 6-7 and 136-64. See also A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986),44. 39 Paul Nitze, "An Alternative Nuclear Policy as a Base for Negotiations," in East-West Negotiations, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1959), reprinted in Kenneth W. Thompson and Steven L. Rearden (eds.), Paul H. Nitze on National Security and Arms Control (Lanham. MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1990), 140. 40 Ibid., 105-6.

261 Eisenhower saw several basic flaws in the arguments of the critics of his limited

war policies.41 He believed that they underestimated the deterrent factor of U.S. strategic

capabilities and the convertibility of these forces for limited war operations. He ques-

tioned whether any limited war between U.S. and Soviet forces would remain that way for

very long since he believed that any engagements would quickly escalate into a general

war. He further argued that any other limited conflicts could be controlled with existing

forces in being at least until the United States had time to mobilize additional manpower

and armaments.42 Accordingly, during his last few years in office, he did not waver from

his reliance on nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems as the principal deterrent to

the Soviet Union. 43

The last major issue that the Gaither committee addressed and the Eisenhower

administration had to discuss was the question of civil defense, and in particular, fallout

shelters. The Gaither committee recommended that the United States should spend $25

billion over five years to construct fallout shelters for the civilian population. No one seri-

ously questioned that a system of fallout shelters would reduce substantially the number of

casualties from a Soviet nuclear attack. As the NSC studied the Gaither committee's rec-

ommendation for shelters, it ordered an examination of the consequences of a massive

nuclear exchange (approximately 15 million kilotons). The study concluded that in an at-

tack of this magnitude, only 94 million out of the estimated U.S. population of 192 million

41 Eisenhower was well aware of these specific studies criticizing his limited war forces. See Memorandum of Mecting with the President, August 25. 1960. EL. WHO. OSS. Subject Series. Alphabetical Subseries. Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (6) July 1959-August 1960. 42 See ibid .• 5-6. 43 Roman. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap. 82; Charles H. Donnelly. United States Defense Policies in 1958 (GPO, 1959). 12-17; Charles H. Donnelly. United States Defense Policies in 1959 (GPO, 1960), 18-20; and Charles H. Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in 1960 (GPO, 1961), 23-24.

262

would survive even with a nationwide fallout shelter system.44 While the study found that

67 million people would have lived because of the shelters, the question was whether the

loss of almost 100 million people would allow the continued existence of the United States

as a nation.

Eisenhower and his advisers continually struggled with this question. The cost of

the shelters created a dilemma. When FCDA director Leo Hoegh recommended modify-

ing existing federal buildings for use as shelters at a cost of$5 million in FY 1960, Eisen-

hower did not oppose the idea. He simply did not feel "he knew exactly what to do about

it.,,45 In December 1958, the NSC decided to authorize up to $35 million to continue re-

search, construct a small number of shelters, survey potential existing structures for shelter

spaces, initiate a public education program, and incorporate shelters in new federal build-

ings.46

By the end of his administration, Eisenhower's civil defense programs revealed lit-

tie influence from the Gaither committee. Based on the 1958 program, the FCDA studied

possible existing shelter facilities and built almost 150 prototype shelters. However, it did

not incorporate shelters into new federal buildings as was earlier planned because of in-

adequate funding. A lack of consensus concerning shelters hamstrung the FCDA and the

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM).47 While certain groups, like the

44 Memorandum to the Secretary [of State), July 10, 1958, NA. RG 59, State Department. PPS Records. Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 (Jan. -April), 2. 4S Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the NSC, December 11, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series. Box 10, Folder - 390th Meeting of the NSC, December 11, 1958,3. 46 NSC 5807/2 - Measures to Carty Out the Concept of Shelter, December 24, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 24, Folder - Shelter Program, 1-6. 47 See for example, Memorandum to the Secretmy, October 6, 1960, NA, RG 59, State Department. PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 (January-April), 1-2.

Gaither committee and the Rockefeller Pane~ and individuals, like Congressman Chet

Holifield, recommended the construction of shelters, neither the public nor Congress

showed a strong willingness to support expanded expenditures for shelters. Although

people supported the idea of a community shelter, only 39 percent supported spending

$500 to build a private, family shelter in 1960.48 Even more glaringly, Congress cut the

OCDM budget 40 percent between 1959 and 1961.49 Without a consensus on shelters,

Eisenhower felt no concerted pressure to expand his civil defense policies.

The Missile Gap and the 1960 Presidential Election

263

As Eisenhower and his advisors attempted to devise plans for strengthening u.s.

strategic forces, they faced some of the same problems experienced by the Gaither com-

mittee. They wanted to maintain sufficient military capabilities to deter the Soviet Union

from launching a nuclear war. To do this, they needed to know approximately how large

the Soviet bomber and missile forces were and what the Kremlin's intentions were. Intel-

ligence analysts from the CIA, military branches, and other government agencies had to

rely on limited information to derive their estimates of Soviet capabilities. so A leading

scholar of the missile gap controversy persuasively argues that after Sputnik ''the question

of Soviet intent assumed an even greater importance in any effort to determine the future

48 See Gallup, Gallup Poll, v. 3, 1671; and Kerr, Civil Defense in the United States, 115. 49 See Kerr, Civil Defense in the United States, 114; and Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 120. 50 See Donald P. Steury (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces. /950-/983 (Washington. D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), xii; and Noon. The Soviet First Strike Threat, 173.

264 course of Russian missile programs and the Soviet's willingness to use this power to pur-

sue their foreign policy goals. ,,51

Claims ofa missile gap periodically resurfaced between 1958 and the 1960 presi-

dential election. 52 Senator Symington wrote Eisenhower in the summer of 1958 that "we

[Symington and his advisers] believe our national intelligence system is underestimating

the enemy's current and future ballistic missile capability .... As a result we also believe

that our national defense plans and programs are not being effectively related to sound es-

timates of Soviet capability. ,,53 Others criticized the administration for failing to recognize

and overcome the emergence of the alleged Soviet quantitative lead in missile capabilities.

If the Soviet Union did have such a lead, Eisenhower's critics argued that the communist

leaders might be more willing to take policy risks in pursuit of its goal of world domina-

tion. Senator Lyndon Johnson's chieflegal counsel captured the essence of the critics'

concerns when he argued that "we [U.S. leaders] have been unwilling to face the disagree-

able facts that we are actually in a state of war, that the enemy has prepared for war and

that unless we work 365 days a year with an urgency, as though we were in a war, we are

liable to be licked and become a second-class country."S4

Although the critics were wrong, there were legitimate reasons for concluding

that there was a missile gap. The national intelligence estimates during these years consis-

tently predicted a prospective Soviet missile force much larger than the one possessed by

51 Bottome, The Missile Gap, 66. 52 See Robert 1. Watson. "The Eisenhower Administration and the Missile Gap. 1958-1960," paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, Washington, D.C., 1996; Roman. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 138-39; and Bottome, The Missile Gap, 115-46. 53 Stuart Symington to the President, August 29, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, Harlow Records, Box 2. Folder[Missiles] Sen. Stuart Symington, 1958,6. 54 InqUiry into Satellite, 2469.

265 the United States. While the projected gap was always in the future, the estimates pointed

to a period in the early 1960s when the Soviet Union would have a substantial quantitative

lead in ICBMs. A NIE in June 1958 estimated that the Soviet Union could have 100

ICBMs in 1959,500 in 1960, and 1000 in 1961.55 A NIE later in the same year predicted

that the Soviet Union would have 10 ICBMs in 1959, 100 in 1960 and 500 by 1962.56

NIE 11-8-59, which was not released until February 1960, estimated that the Soviets

would have 35 ICBMs by mid-1960 and between 140 and 200 by mid-1961.57 Finally,

NIE 11-8-60 estimated that the Soviet Union would have between 10 and 35 ICBMs in

1960 and between 50 and 200 in 1961.58

The problem for intelligence analysts was determining the intentions of an adver-

sary who resided in a restricted society and whose assumed goal was world domination.

Herbert York and Alan Greb explain that "In such circumstances [where the enemy resides

in a closed society], it often becomes necessary to plan to cope with what the other side

might be doing rather than what it actually is doing. And what it might be doing is limited

only by human imagination rather than by physical reality. ,,59 [Emphasis in original] When

the Gaither committee made its estimates, it assumed that the Soviet Union would pro-

duce military hardware at maximum levels. Based on this assumption, it reached some

55 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 79. 56 NIE 11-5-58, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," [December 195811, reprinted in Stewy (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities, 67-68. See also NIE 11-4-58 which contained similar estimates. See Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 40. 57 NIE 11-8-59, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964," February 9, 1960, reprinted in Stewy (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities, 75. See also descriptions ofNIE 11-4-59 in Prados, The S0-viet Estimate, 89; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 43. 58 NIE 11-8-60, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack Through Mid-I 965," August 1, 1960, reprinted in Stewy (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities, 3. See also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 89. 59 York and Greb, "Strategic Reconnaissance," 36.

266 frightening conclusions. The intelligence community had to deal with some of the same

problems.

In 1959, Defense Secretary Neil McElroy attempted to explain to a congressional

committee one of the difficulties in making accurate intelligence estimates. He testified

that "We concede the capacity of the Soviets to do a good many things, if they make the

determination to do so .... We do concede them capacity, but no one that I know can be

inside of the Russian mind and decide what proportion of that capacity they are going to

use.,,60 Because of the difficulty in determining Soviet intentions, the intelligence analysts

adopted ''the position that they were not very much interested in intentions, they were only

interested in capabilities.,,61 JCS Chairman General Nathan Twining elaborated on the

difficulties of estimating Soviet capabilities. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee that "I would like to establish a point which should be borne in mind at all times

when considering the United States versus the Soviet weapons comparison: Our informa-

tion on what we now have is exact, while that given for the Soviets is often estimated

from assumptions and requirements. . .. In other words, because we can do things, we

assume they can and they have requirements, therefore, they are developing these mis-

siles.,,62

With little concrete evidence, intelligence analysts had difficulty developing con-

clusive estimates. The result was an overestimation of Soviet capabilities and, accord-

60 U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Hearings before the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Activities, MisSile and Space Activities, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1958, 15-16. 61 Oral History of James H. Douglas, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1973, IS. 62 U.S. Congress, Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vol. X (GPO, 1980),63.

267

ingly, a potentially much greater threat to the United States.63 George Reedy, a legislative

assistant to Senator Johnson, explained how these exaggerated estimates led to the belief

of a missile gap:

We [the members of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee] didn't realize a very simple thing, that what they [the intelligence analysts] were doing was extrapolating on the basis of Russian capabilities, but using actual figures for what the United States was doing. Now their assumption was that the Soviet Union was producing missiles to capacity, and so when they extrapolated on that from the standpoint of what they knew the Soviet Union produced at one point, they were able to get such a tremendous imbalance between the Soviet Union and the United States.64

The press also made substantial claims about the supposed missile gap. Joseph Al-

sop reported in July and August 1958 that the United States was falling dangerously be-

hind the Soviets in missile capabilities. He argued that while the U.S.S.R. would have 100

ICBMs in 1959, 500 in 1960, and 1000 in 1961, the United States would have 0 in 1959,

30 in 1960, and 70 in 1961.65 Taken together, all of these calculations painted a frighten-

ing picture. Although they were only estimates, if they proved accurate, the United States

faced a potentially deadly threat. Robert Amory, a CIA analyst, remembered that "Taking

our earliest estimate of when they [the Soviets] could have five hundred [ICBMs] and then

comparing that with the known projection of American strengths, . . . you came up with a

potential missile gap.,,66 [emphasis in original]

63 The exaggeration of Soviet missile capabilities by intelligence analysts was not realized until the advent of the Corona satellite program beginning in 1960. See Kenneth E. Greer, "Corona." Studies in Intelligence. Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973), reprinted in Ruffner (ed.) Corona, 24 and 38. For the impact of satellite photography on intelligence estimates, see NIE 11-8/1-6, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces," September 21, 1961, printed in Ruffner (ed.) Corona, 127-55. 64 Interview XI with George E. Reedy, December 20, 1983., LBJ Oral Hist0IY Project, 41-42. 6S See Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 177; and Roy E. Linklider, "The Missile Gap Controversy," Political Science Quarterly 85:4 (December 1970),615. 66 Robert Amory, Jr. Oral History, February 9, 1966, John F. Kennedy Library [hereafter 1FKL). 87.

268 The 1960 presidential election brought into focus many of the criticisms of Eisen-

hower's national security policies. Democratic candidate Kennedy and his running mate,

Senator Johnson, were among the most vociferous critics of the Eisenhower administra-

tion. As the Senate majority leader and the chairman of the preparedness subcommittee,

Johnson maintained constant pressure on the administration to improve u.S. military

strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He told Defense Secretary McElroy in July 1958 that

he was disappointed in the progress made since the preparedness subcommittee reached its

initial conclusions at the beginning of that year.67

Kennedy was an even more persistent critic. In August 1958, he delivered a

scathing attack on Eisenhower's national security policies. He claimed the president and

his advisers "tailored our strategy and military requirements to fit our budget-instead of

fitting our budget to our military requirements and strategy.,,68 He then accused the ad-

ministration oflosing the military advantage to the Soviet Union. "The fact of the mat-

ter," Kennedy argued, "is that during that period when emphasis was laid upon our eco-

nomic strength instead of our military strength, we were losing the decisive years when we

could have maintained a lead against the Soviet Union in our missile capability. ,,69

After lambasting Eisenhower's national security policies, Kennedy described what

the United States needed to do to overcome its military deficiencies. He advocated adding

more tanker aircraft to SAC's forces, accelerating the development and deployment of

ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs, improving continental defenses, expanding airlift capabili-

67 Inquiry into Satellite, 2447. 68 "Speech to the Senate on the Missile Gap by John F. Kennedy," August 14, 1958, reprinted in Senator John F. Kennedy, The Strategy a/Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960),40. 69 Ibid., 41.

269 ties, and increasing manpower for limited military operations.70 He complained that if

these measures were not implemented, the Soviet "missile power will be the shield from

behind which they will slowly, but surely, advance-through Sputnik diplomacy, limited

brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation, and subversion, internal

revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies. The

periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away. The balance of power will

gradually shift against us." 71

In a subsequent interview, Kennedy made similar claims:

In military preparedness I think that the reasoning of the Eisenhower administration is comparable to the prediction ofBritains [sic] Stanley Baldwin during the Thirties-the enemy's capabilities are grossly and constantly underestimated. There isn't any doubt that the Russians are able to build accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles. I believe that the dangers of an unbalanced budget are far less than the danger to which the administration is determined to subject us by keeping us behind the Soviet Union in the ultimate weapon. When some people still say we are equall [sic] with the Russians in military strength, I would ask how much of our strength will be left after we have sustained a surprise blow; How equal are we after the first attack had been made by them on us? 72

As Kennedy sought the Democratic nomination, he turned to Paul Nitze and sev-

era! other Gaither committee members for advice on national security issues.73 Kennedy

asked Nitze to chair a committee that included former Gaither committee member James

Perkins, Roswell Gilpatric, and David Bruce to make recommendations concerning U.S.

national security policies. During the group's deliberations, it talked to many experts on

70 Ibid., 42. 71 Ibid., 37-38. Kennedy made similar arguments in a book review of General James Gavin's War and Peace in the Spa-:<! Age (1958). Senator John F. Kennedy, "General Gavin Sounds the Alarm. " The Reporter 19:7 (October 30, 1958),35. 72 Interview with [John F.J Kennedy by Philip Deane, undated [March 1959?], JFK Librcuy, PrePresidential Papers, Senate Files, General Files, 1953-1960, Folder - President's Office Files - Defense, 1. 73 Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 185-92.

270

defense issues including Foster, Lincoln, and Robert Lovett from the Gaither committee.

The group concluded that U.S. nuclear forces had to be expanded and improved to meet

any possible Soviet challenge.74

These conclusions proved appealing to the new president. In his run for the presi-

dency, he advocated increased defense spending and the acceleration of U.S. missile ca-

pabilities. Specifically, he proposed reducing SAC vulnerability by maintaining 25 percent

of its planes in the air at all times, accelerating the production of Atlas missiles, increasing

spending for the development of both the Polaris and Minuteman missiles, and augmenting

conventional forces. 75 Kennedy recognized that these programs would require higher

spending and possibly unbalanced budgets. He explained to his Senate colleagues the di-

lemma faced by U.S. decision makers and made a clear distinction between his position

and that of the Eisenhower administration. He argued that "We cannot be certain that the

Soviets will have, during the term of the next administration, the tremendous lead in mis-

sile striking power which they give every evidence of building-and we cannot be certain

that they will use that lead to threaten or launch an attack upon the United States. Conse-

quentIy those of us who call for a higher defense budget are taking a chance on spending

money unnecessarily. But those who oppose these expenditures are taking a chance on

our very survival as a nation. ,,76

In a campaign speech in October 1960, Kennedy cited the Gaither report in his ar-

guments that Eisenhower was not doing enough to meet the Soviet threat. He claimed

74 Ibid .. 187-89. 7S Senate Speech by John Kennedy on American Defense Policy, February 29, 1960, reprinted in Branyan and Larsen (eds.), The Eisenhower Administration, 1233-35. 76 Ibid., 1228.

271 that during the Eisenhower administration, "The Soviet Union decided to go all out in

missile development. But here in the United States, we cut back in funds for missile de-

velopment. We slashed our defense budget. We slowed up the modernization of our con-

ventional forces-until, today, the Soviet Union is rapidly building up a missile striking

force that endangers our power to retaliate-and thus our survival itself" n

Eisenhower reacted in dismay to such criticisms. He adamantly believed in the

adequacy of U.S. military programs. He simply considered it foolish to expand U.S. mili-

tary power further when there was little likelihood that it would ever be needed. Despite

intense pressure, he successfully resisted demands for significant increases in military

spending. He failed, however, to allay the nation's great concerns.78 McGeorge Bundy

succinctly explains this failure:

Eisenhower did not adequately explain himself His failure to give a full explanation of his disbelief in a prospective missile gap was reinforced in its unfortunate effects not only by his failure to spell out publicly his view of the deterrent strength of the forces on both sides, but also by his failure to press on his countrymen the understanding he had expressed so clearly back in 1954, that in matters of this magnitude Soviet leaders would predictably be most cautious. So while he did sensible things and resisted foolish ones, he allowed the ensuing public arguments to be led by men who did not understand matters as well as he did. 79

The 1960 election proved a great disappointment to Eisenhower. Although he was

not completely enamored with Nixon, he was adamantly opposed to Kennedy. When

Nixon's chances looked dim in the month leading to the election, Eisenhower began to

77 "Speech to the American Legion by John F. Kennedy," October 1960, quoted in "Kennedy on National Defense," Aviation Week and Space Technology 73:17 (October 24, 1960),21. 78 Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections: 195211960 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974),242. 79 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 349.

272 campaign vigorously for his vice president. His efforts proved to no avail. While still per-

sonally popular, Eisenhower could not rally the Republican party to victory. In one of the

closest presidential races ever, Kennedy won by less than 120,000 votes ~fthe 68 million

that were cast.80 Eisenhower viewed the results as a repudiation of his eight years in of-

Kennedy's Defense Policies - An Overview

After winning the election, Kennedy resolved to alleviate any deficiencies in U.S.

military strength and raise u.S. prestige abroad. Jean Smith concludes that "On military

policy Kennedy's views remained fixed: the United States should maintain forces in being

to deter and defeat aggression at any point on the spectrum ofviolence.,,82 To carry out

such a policy, Kennedy rejected the massive retaliation doctrine of the Eisenhower ad-

ministration and adopted a strategic approach that emphasized the maintenance of a

greater variety of military options to meet any possible challenge. In developing his poli-

cies, the influence of the Gaither committee is clear. Over a dozen of the committee's

members served as advisers to Kennedy, including Wiesner, Nitze, York. Foster, Killian,

Robert Sprague, Spurgeon Keeny, Vmcent McRae, Brockway McMillan, Richard Bissell,

and John McCloy.83 Furthermore, during his first weeks in office, Kennedy studied the

Gaither report.84

80 James N. Giglio, The Presidency 0/ John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas. 1991), 18. 81 Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 604. 82 Jean Edward Smith. "Kennedy and Defense," Air University Review 18:3 (March-April 1967), 48. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 352; and Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment, 203, 215, and 227-28. 83 See Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 23; and Herken, Cardinal ChOices, 127-45. 84 See The President's News Conference of February 1, 1961, in Public Papers o/the Presidents o/the United Siales, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, [hereafter ppp, JFK] 1961 (GPO, 1964),40.

273 Kennedy's strategy to expand U.S. military capabilities encompassed three re-

quirements: augmenting U.S. nuclear forces, enlarging U.S. conventional forces for lim-

ited military operations, and strengthening civil defense.8s Kennedy succeeded in expand-

ing U.S. missile capabilities even beyond the levels prescribed by the Eisenhower admini-

stration. He placed a greater emphasis on limited war capabilities, and especially, the de-

velopment of counter-insurgency forces. Finally, he announced a civil defense plan that,

although not varying greatly from Eisenhower's approach, had a much greater impact be-

cause of the president's public pronouncements.

Despite his initial reluctance in 1957 and 1958, Eisenhower greatly expanded U.S.

nuclear capabilities before he left office. Kennedy inherited the nuclear triad-SAC bomb-

ers, ICBMs, and SLBMs--that formed the foundation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Reflect-

ing the advice ofNitze's advisory committee, Kennedy believed that the United States

needed more. In his first message to the Congress in January 1961, the new president

proposed the expansion of the entire missile program. By the time he was assassinated in

November 1963, the United States had deployed 631 ICBMs and 160 SLBMs and had

programmed the deployment of an additional 800 missiles. 86

When Kennedy entered the White House, he had access to a new source of intelli-

gence that had only become available in the last few months of the Eisenhower admini-

stration. In August 1960, Eisenhower received the first satellite photographs which "in

one mission provided more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all previous

8S See Michael Brower, "Nuclear Strategy of the Kennedy Administration, ,., Bulletin o/the Atomic SCientists 18:8 (October 1962): 34-41. 86 Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 50-1.

274 U-2 missions.,,87 Although it is unclear whether Kennedy was informed of the new intelli-

gence during the campaign. he gained access to the intelligence information after the No-

vember election.88 The satellite photographs dispelled any possibility of a missile gap in

favor of the Soviet Union.89 Despite this knowledge, Kennedy remained detennined to

expand U.S. missile capabilities. He immediately initiated plans to increase Eisenhower's

proposed FY 1962 defense budget ofS40.8 billion. During his first nine months in office,

Kennedy added an additional $1.95 billion to the defense budget in March, $225 million in

May, and $3.45 billion in July. By August 1961, Kennedy had expanded the defense

budget by nearly $6 billion. 90

The March 1961 appropriations were geared primarily to accelerate the expansion

of U.S. strategic forces. In particular, Kennedy wanted to augment the Polaris submarine

forces. While Eisenhower had planned to build 19 submarines carrying a total of 304

missiles by June 1965, Kennedy's program accelerated the deployment to 29 submarines

carrying 464 missiles. In addition to expanding the Polaris forces, Kennedy also added 60

Minuteman ICBMs to Eisenhower's program of 540.91 In the FY 1963 budget, Kennedy

completed the deployment of the Atlas ICBMs (129 missiles) and Titan ICBMs (108

missiles) and funded sixteen squadrons of Minuteman ICBMs totaling 800 missiles. Ken-

87 Ruffner (ed.), Corona, xiii. See also Kenneth E. Greer, "Corona." Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973): 1-37, reprinted in ibid., 22-26. 88 Herken, Counsels o/War, 140. 89 For the impact of satellite photography on intelligence estimates, see NIE 11-8/1-61, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces," September 21, 1961, printed in Ruffner (ed.), Corona, 127-55. 90 See Kolodziej, Uncommon Defonse and Congress, 390-92; and Giglio, Presidency of John F. Kennedy, 46. 91 Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 114-16.

275 nedy also again augmented the deployment of Polaris submarines to 41 carrying 656

missiles. Finally, he increased the 8-52 bomber force to 600 aircraft.92

As part of the policy oftlexible response, Kennedy advocated the growth of U.S.

conventional military capabilities. As early as 1957, he had argued that the United States

needed to adopt a military strategy that maintained large nuclear forces and sufficient con-

ventional forces to meet any possible challenge.93 The new president had been influenced

by the thinking of General Maxwell Taylor, General James Gavin, and Nitze who argued

that the United States needed to expand its military options to meet the variety of military

threats posed by the Soviet Union. In particular, Taylor and Nitze saw the need for ex-

panded conventional forces to wage limited wars. Herbert York, who served in both the

Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, remembered the change in emphasis in defense

policies: "There was a definite change in attitude between the Eisenhower administration

and the Kennedy administration. . .. I never got anywhere trying to sell much in the way

of limited war ideas to Tom Gates [Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense], or persuading

him that it needed more, whereas [Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara

started off with the assumption, that more needs to be done in that area.,,94

Kennedy and his advisers believed that" A posture of flexible response was deemd

[sic] to be more credible in support of American security interests and foreign policy ob-

jectives, because a clearer and closer correspondence could be struck between the military

force that was to be applied by the President and the political stakes and the scope of the

92 Ibid., 50-51. 93 John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 36:1 (October 1957),48. 94 Oral History cfHerbert York. JFK Library, June 16, 1964, 1 L

276 military conflict at issue between the United States and an enemy power. ,,95 In the March

additions to the FY 1962 defense budget, $850 million was directed to improve U.S. lim-

ited war capabilities. Reflecting a general agreement with the limited war studies com-

pleted in 1960, most of the funding went to the expansion ofair and sea lift forces and the

procurement of conventional weapons. In May Kennedy added $237 million to the de-

fense budget to enhance U.S. limited war capabilities. The final $3.2 billion increase in

July for FY 1962 facilitated increases in both conventional and nuclear capabilities. By the

end of July 1961, Kennedy had proposed and Congress accepted the expansion of U.S.

military personnel from the 2,493,000 requested by Eisenhower to 2,743,000. Over half

the increase went to the army.96

Kennedy did not announce a position on civil defense during the presidential cam-

paign. However, during his first year in office he gave more public attention to it than any

other previous president. Kennedy stated in May 1961 that shelters should be viewed "as

insurance for the civilian population in the event of such a miscalculation [a Soviet attack].

It is insurance we trust will never be needed-but insurance which we could never forgive

ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe." He then added that ''there is no point

in delaying the initiation of a nationwide long-range program of identifYing present fallout

shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program

would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of a

large-scale nuclear attack.,,97

9S Kol0d7iej, Uncommon Defense and Congress, 328. 96 Ibid., 385-89. 97 John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs: Address of the President of the United States,'" May 25, 1961, quoted in Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 118.

In the midst of the renewed Berlin crisis two months later, Kennedy told a TV

audience:

In the event of an attac~ the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families, and to our country.

In contrast to our friends in Europe, the need for this type of protection is new to our shores. But the time to start is now. In the coming months, I hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to protect his family in case of attack. I know you would not want to do less.98

Secretary of Defense McNamara presented Kennedy's civil defense plans to the

277

Senate Appropriations Committee the next day. As the first phase of a plan to find shelter

spaces for over 100 million people, McNamara requested $207.6 million to identify exist-

ing shelter spaces and to stock them with necessary emergency supplies. With the Berlin

Crisis acting as an impetus, Congress approved the entire amount. 99 When compared to

the Eisenhower programs, there was not much difference. However, Kennedy's public

announcements raised a national hysteria. 100

Kennedy's proposals to build community shelters met much less success with

Congress. Billed as the Shelter Incentive Program, Kennedy proposed giving $25 per

shelter space to non-profit facilities such as hospitals, libraries, and schools that built them.

For FY 1963, the newly formed Office of Civil Defense (OCD) requested $695 million for

this shelter program, but Congress only granted $113 million. For FY 1964, the OCD re-

98 John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,'" July 25, 1961, quoted in Kerr, Civil Defonse in the U.S., 119. 99 Kerr, Civil Defonse in the U.S., 120. 100 See Winkler, Lifo Under a Cloud, 12-30; Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon. 309-14; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifilin Company, (965), 747-49; and Stanley L. Newman. "Civil Defense and the Congress: Quiet Reversal,'" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 18:9 (November (962),35.

278

quested $346.9 million and received $11.6 million.101 Congress' response to Kennedy's

proposals reflected its general unwillingness to support major expenses for the construc-

tion of new shelters. 102

Conclusions

Eisenhower reacted cautiously to the Gaither report and attempted to limit its in-

fluence on his national security policies. He approved those recommendations that he be-

lieved would strengthen the United States but resisted those proposals that he thought

would undermine U.S. economic security. As a result of his caution. he constantly re-

sisted calls for significant increases in defense spending. Therefore, while he did expand

U.S. nuclear capabilities and improve U.S. defenses, he refused to adopt a nation-wide

shelter program because he did not believe it would insure the continued viability of the

United States after a nuclear war. In his mind, the cost of shelters simply would not reap

many benefits. He also rejected demands to increase U.S. limited war capabilities because

he already believed that the United States possessed the military forces to meet any likely

conflicts of this type.

Eisenhower justified his military policies on two primary grounds. He continually

argued that the Soviet Union would not risk a nuclear war in pursuit of its policy goals.

Additionally, he stressed that there was little possibility of a limited war with the Soviet

Union because such a conflict would quickly escalate into a nuclear war. He emphasized

101 Kerr, Civil Defonse in the U.S. 126-31; Giglio, Presidency of John F. Kennedy, 82; and Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 314. 102 See Bundy, Danger and Survival, 355-56; Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 128-32; and Newman, "Civil Defense and the Congress," 33-37.

279 to the NSC in 1960 that "the only hostilities the U.S. was really concerned about was an

all-out atomic attack."I03 Eisenhower did not mean to imply that limited wars might not

occur, but he believed such conflicts would be waged between U.S. and non-Soviet

forces. In these types of engagements Eisenhower was confident that U.S. forces in being

were more than adequate. 104

Although Eisenhower felt strongly that his policies would guarantee U.S. security,

many people shared the Gaither committee's view that the United States needed to spend

more on defense. Stimulated by Sputnik and the leak of the Gaither report, critics of the

Republican administration claimed that Eisenhower was allowing the Soviet Union to ob-

tain a lead over the United States in ballistic missile capabilities. These assertions of a

missile gap dogged Eisenhower until he left office. In retrospect, it is clear that Eisen-

hower held a more nuanced view of the Cold War in the late 1950s than his critics. How-

ever, he failed to clearly articulate this view to the public. This failure allowed the Demo-

crats to capitalize on the missile gap issue and regain the White House in 1960.

During his campaign and presidency, Kennedy asked many former members of the

Gaither committee to serve in important advisory roles. The new president shared many

of the committee's views and attempted to include them in his policies. In particular, he

turned to Paul Nitze for advice on defense and foreign policy issues. After his election,

Nitze continued to advise the president along with Wiesner, Killian, Foster, and others

103 Memorandum of Discussion at the 453rd Meeting of the NSC, July 25, 1960, quoted in Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 189. 104 Memorandum of Meeting with the President. August 25, 1960, EL, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23, Folder, Science Advisory Committee (6) July 1959-August 1960, 5-6. See also Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap. 189-90.

280 from the Gaither committee. Not surprisingly then, by the end of 1963, most of the

committee's recommendations, with the significant exception of fallout shelters, had be-

come part of U.S. policy.

Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy "believed that the economy could benefit from gov-

ernment spending, and he was therefore less concerned about allowing the military budget

to rise during his presidency."lOs He expanded U.S. nuclear forces even more, increased

U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars, and recommended an enlarged civil defense pro-

gram. In implementing these changes, he increased expenditures for the military services

from $41.3 billion in 1960 to $47.9 billion in 1963 and added approximately 225,000

military personnel to Eisenhower's recommendations. 106 At a news conference in 1963,

Kennedy bragged that "The fact of the matter is, when we came into office we had 11

combat ready divisions; we now have 16. We increased the scheduling of Polaris, nearly

double per year. We've increased the number of planes on 15 minute alert from 33 per-

cent of our strategic air force to 50 percent. In a whole variety of ways ... we've

strengthened ourselves in defense and space." 107

lOS Bernard J. Firestone, "Defense Policy as a Fonn of Arms Control: Nuclear Force Posture and Strategy under John F. Kennedy," in Paul Harper and Joann P. Krieg (cds.), John F. Kennedy: The Promise Revisited (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988),58. See also Alan Wolfe, America 's [mpasse: TheRiseand Fall o/the Politics o/Growth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 124-25. 106 Statistical History o/the United States, 1123 and 1141. 107 The President's News Conference of April 3, 1963, in ppp, JFK, 1963,308.

281 Conclusion

Beginning in 1957, Eisenhower faced tremendous pressures to reexamine U.S: na

tional security policies. Through his first term, he attempted to moderate the defense

policies of the Truman administration and achieve a balanced budget. He was successful.

However, with significant scientific and technological advances in nuclear weapons and

delivery systems, the president's New Look policies came under increasing attack. One of

the most important criticisms raised in 1956 and 1957 was whether the United States was

doing enough to protect its civilian population. To answer this question, Eisenhower

asked a panel of experts to examine U.S. active and passive defenses. The Gaither com

mittee, as the panel became known, concluded that there were significant deficiencies in

u.S. national security policies which could only be rectified by increased defense spending

and expanded civil defense programs.

This study illuminates Eisenhower's decision making process concerning national

security issues. Until recently, records related to the Gaither committee remained hidden

from the scholar's view. Although the Gaither report itselfwas declassified in the 1970s,

most of the documents related to its development and dissemination continued to be re

stricted until the 1990s. The recent release of many of these records has allowed a clearer

understanding of the significance of the committee's conclusions, and at the same time,

provided another avenue to evaluate Eisenhower as a decision maker.

This study has drawn heavily from the depositories at the Eisenhower Library, the

National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

282 and the United States Military Academy. By piecing together widely scattered documents.

it reveals that the Gaither committee was of vital importance in creating the impression of

a missile gap and pressuring Eisenhower to change his national security policies. Further-

more. it underlines the difficulties Eisenhower experienced in trying to assess and imple-

ment the committee's recommendations. The president attempted to maintain a balance

between the needs of national security and what the nation could afford. 1 Eisenhower

feared that if he disrupted the economy through excessive spending on defense programs

then the government would have to become more directly involved in everyday life. In his

mind, such involvement would undermined the individual rights that he viewed as fonning

the basis of the American system of government and life.

When Eisenhower created the Gaither committee, he used an advisory system that

had worked well previously. He entered the presidency believing that one of the central

ingredients to decision making was to obtain advice that had been thoroughly discussed

and analyzed by his key advisers. He viewed the National Security Council as the organi-

zation that could evaluate issues related to national security most effectively. During his

first months in office. Eisenhower quickly approved the reorganization of the NSC to 50-

lidify its position in his decision making system. For the remainder of his administration,

the NSC served in the unprecedented role as one of the president's most important advi-

sory organizations.2

I See for example Griffith. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth. " 87-122; Sloan, "The Management and Decision-Making of President Eisenhower" 295-331; and Greenstein, HiddenHand PreSidency, 100-51. 2 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 712.

283 In addition to revamping the NSC, Eisenhower turned to consultants outside the

government for policy advice. The new president had realized during World War IT that

science and technology were evolving so quickly that no man or group could understand

all of the changes. The advances in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems in the late

1940s and 1950s made it even more difficult to comprehend the implications of the tech-

nological changes. While the members of the NSC were highly trained in certain fields,

they lacked the expertise to understand fully the impact that scientific and technological

advances would have. Eisenhower, therefore, sought the advice of specialists who had

expertise in specific fields or a broad understanding of the technological changes that

might impact u.s. national security.3

On three occasions during his two terms in office, Eisenhower asked the NSC to

create advisory panels to evaluate national security issues. In 1953, the newly elected

president initiated Project Solarium to study different strategies. Composed of three pan-

els of consultants, Project Solarium provided advice that Eisenhower and the NSC used to

develop the administration's New Look national security strategy. In 1954, Eisenhower

again turned to a group of consultants, known as the Killian committee, to evaluate the

threat of a surprise attack. After the committee submitted its report to the NSC in early

1955, Eisenhower accelerated U.S. missile programs and initiated the top secret U-2 intel-

ligence program. Finally, in 1957, he created the Gaither committee to examine the effec-

tiveness of U.S. active and passive defenses against an attack.

3 For Eisenhower's use of experts, see Griffith. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth." 87-122; Kaplan. Wizards 0/ Armageddon, 11-247; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 69-123; and Hcrken, Counsels o/War, 102-34.

284

Since the completion of its examination in November 1957, the Gaither committee

has been misunderstood by historians and other scholars. The committee has been de-

scribed as of little importance.4 This examination does not support this conclusion. The

Gaither committee finished its report at a time in the Cold War of extremely high tension.

The Soviet launch of Sputnik I in October and Sputnik II in November raised serious

Questions of the wlnerability of the United States. While it was much easier to launch a

rocket into space than to hit a target with a nuclear weapon thousands of miles a way, the

Soviet satellites seemed to indicate that country's nuclear superiority over the United

States. This conclusion was shortsighted, especially when U.S. Strategic Air Command

bombers were included in a comparison of U.S. and Soviet strengths. However, it was

hard for most Americans to feel secure when Sputnik could orbit the United States with

impunity.

The Gaither committee was not immune to the fears created by Sputnik. Its con-

clusions were pessimistic and its recommendations reflected deeply held fears of the So-

viet Union. But, with a few exceptions, the committee members did not want war, and in

fact, saw the strengthening of U.S. military forces as the only way to avoid it. The views

held by the Gaither committee were not at the extremes of American society. There was a

widespread fear of the Soviet Union and a belief that the United States needed to expand

its military power. Consequently, the Gaither committee recommendations served as a

starting point for the re-evaluation of Eisenhower's national security policies in late 1957

and early 1958.

" For assessments of the Gaither committee's lack of influence, see Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 434-35; and Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment, 185-86.

285 Eisenhower ordered the creation of the Gaither committee after serious questions

were raised about U.S. civil defenses and its ability to defend against a Soviet attack. The

growing fears about radioactive fallout led the Federal Civil Defense Administration to

recommend in early 1957 the construction of a nationwide system of fallout shelters. The

advent of ballistic missiles brought into doubt u.s. capabilities to detect the launch ofa

Soviet attack, to defend the country if such an attack did occur, and to retaliate, if neces-

sary. These questions did not have easy answers; therefore, Eisenhower turned to con-

sultants who either had expertise in specific technological fields or a broad understanding

of the problems of active and passive defenses.

The committee met sporadically in the summer of 1957 and then much more in-

tensely in the fall. It received briefings from the nation's ranking military leaders, exam-

ined numerous reports which had evaluated U.S. military policies, and studied intelligence

estimates of Soviet military strength. By the time the committee presented its final report

to the NSC in November 1957, it had examined U.S. military policies as thoroughly as

time would allow. Its conclusions were frightening and its recommendations were unset-

ding, but based on the evidence it examined, they were perfectly understandable.

The committee concluded that within two years the United States would lose its

nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. It, therefore, might find itselfwlnerable to a

Soviet surpri~ attack. With these conclusions in mind, it recommended increasing nuclear

forces to maintain U.S. superiority, or at a minimum, the ability to retaliate; expanding

U.S. early warning radar capabilities; dispersing SAC forces; constructing anti-missile de-

fenses; building fallout shelters; reorganizing the Defense Department; and augmenting

286 limited war capabilities. These programs would not be cheap. The committee estimated

that they would cost $44.2 billion more than currently programmed in the fiscal years

1959 through 1963 defense budgets.

The committee's recommendations created a dilemma for the Eisenhower admini-

stration. Spending, on average, an additional $9 billion a year would have meant increas-

ing annual defense budgets by nearly 25 percent. If Eisenhower accepted these increases,

he would have had to accept higher taxes and deficits-both of which he abhorred. The

president feared that higher taxes and deficit spending would force the government to

regiment the economy and intrude on the rights of the individual. Nevertheless, Eisen-

hower was willing to accept higher spending, if national security depended on it. In

evaluating the Gaither report, Eisenhower sought to balance the consequences of higher

defense spending with the preservation of national security.

Between November 1957 and July 1958, the Gaither report remained the center-

piece ofNSC discussions. Various government agencies, including the Defense Depart-

ment, the JCS, the State Department, the CIA, the Treasury Department, the Budget Bu-

reau, and the FCDA, evaluated the Gaither report and presented their recommendations to

the NSC. After numerous discussions, Eisenhower adopted changes to his national secu-

rity policies which reflected the influence of the Gaither committee's recommendations.

By July 1958, he increased force levels for IRBMs, ICBMs, and SLBMs; ordered the dis-

persal of SAC forces to more airfields and improved in SAC's alert status; expanded early

warning radar coverage; constructed additional anti-missile defenses; reorganized the De-

fense Department; and initiated studies ofD.S. limited war capabilities and fallout shelters.

287

While he did not accept all of the Gaither committee's recommendations, their impact is

clear.

The influence of the Gaither committee did not end in the summer of 1958. For

the remainder of his presidency, Eisenhower continually reevaluated the policies that the

Gaither committee brought into focus. During these years, the specific Gaither committee

recommendations lost their relevance as new reports and intelligence estimates forced the

administration to reevaluate U.S. strategic needs. However, the import of the committee's

conclusions, specifically its calls for greater strategic capabilities, limited war forces, and

fallout shelters, provided a continued impetus for discussions of U.S. national security

needs.

Part of the lasting influence of the Gaither report rested in the political atmosphere

it helped create. More than anything, Sputnik raised the awareness that U.S. technological

superiority was not guaranteed.s After it was leaked to the press in December 1957, the

Gaither report furthered this fear by posing the possibility of a missile gap in favor of the

Soviet Union. Without trivializing their real concerns about U.S. security, many Demo-

crats saw the "missile gap" as an issue which they could use to criticize the Republican

administration.6 Eisenhower's refusal to release the report to Congressional leaders fueled

fears that the president was trying to hide the country's weaknesses. Until it was finally

dispelled by new satellite intelligence in 1961, the missile gap remained pivotal in debates

about U.S. national security.

5 See McDougall, Heavens and the Earth, 7-8; Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, vii and xiii-xviii. 6 See Bottome, The Missile Gap, 37-61 and 11'5-46.

288 Senator John Kennedy was one of the most vocal proponents of the missile gap

theory and harshest critics of the Eisenhower administration. He attacked U.S. military

deficiencies on the Senate floor in 1958 and 1959, and campaigned against the Republican

administration's policies in 1960. During his presidential run and administration, Kennedy

on several occasions turned to former Gaither committee members for advice and even

read the Gaither report. It would be too much to argue that the Gaither report specifically

influenced Kennedy's policies, but the ideas it espoused were surely important in the de

velopment of the new administration's flexible response strategy.

When Kennedy entered office in 1961, he saw two areas of U.S. military power

that needed strengthening-nuclear missiles and conventional forces. Kennedy expanded

the nuclear triad he inherited from the Eisenhower administration to insure U.S. superior

ity over the Soviet Union and augmented U.S. conventional force to control conflicts

short of general war. He further revisited the Gaither committee's call for a nationwide

system of fallout shelters. During his three years in office, Kennedy successfully expanded

U.S. nuclear forces, augmented limited war capabilities, and located new shelter sites.

Along with showing the influence of the Gaither committee on the Eisenhower and

Kennedy administrations, this study evaluates why the committee reached the conclusions

it did. As it met in the summer and fall of 1957, the committee's members struggled to

develop recommendations which reflected their understanding of the Soviet threat. While

they were selected to advise Eisenhower, their opinions did not always coincide with the

president's own views. They perceived a much greater Soviet threat than did Eisenhower.

At later Senate hearings, both Robert Sprague and James Perkins questioned whether Eis-

289

enhower and his advisors really understood the threat posed by the Soviet Union. "I be-

lieve," Sprague testified, " ... that the danger is more serious than the President has ex-

pressed himself to the American public.'" Even more scathingly, Perkins argued that "the

nature of the threat was not fully realized," and later concluded that "the Government did

not have its eyes open in the summer and fall of 1957. ,,8

Most of the committee members entered the study with deeply held opinions.

With few exceptions, they had participated in other studies that addressed some of the is-

sues found in the Gaither report. It is striking how closely the committee's conclusions

resembled the findings of the MIT summer studies, Project East River, Project Solarium,

and the Killian committee. Many members of these groups served on the Gaither commit-

tee. Furthermore, most of the members were influenced by their past or current affilia-

tions. While it does not appear that the committee directly sought to benefit one group or

another, its conclusions supported many of its members' affiliated groups. For instance,

James Doolittle and Mervin Kelly were closely tied to the Air Force; James Fisk had been

a consistent proponent for increased funding for research and development; and James

Killian, Albert Hill, and James McCormack maintained very close ties to MIT and were

advocates for obtaining financing for improved early warning radar. The members' insti-

tutional ties and the knowledge they gained from earlier studies helped formulate the

opinions they held when they entered the Gaither study.

Once the committee began its examination, the members' preconceived opinions

were re-enforced by the evidence they analyzed. The military leaders consistently stressed

7 Organizing for National Security, SS. g Ibid .• 293 and 294.

290

deficiencies in their respective military branches and requested additional funding. Various

reports created by government and civilian organizations concluded that the United States

was deficient in strategic missile strength and vulnerable to a Soviet missile attack. Fi-

nally, the intelligence estimates predicted Soviet missile force levels which, if accurate,

could have posed a significant threat to the United States. Taken together, this evidence

provided committee members no reason to alter their earlier opinions.

In his memoirs, Eisenhower criticized the Gaither committee for failing "to see the

totality of the national and international situation.,,9 However, with their backgrounds and

the available evidence, it is difficult to criticize the committee too much. It reached con-

elusions and made recommendations that were widely accepted. 10 Nevertheless, two

significant criticisms can be directed at the committee. It made recommendations for

significant increases in U.S. military force levels, yet, it never articulated how or when

they should be used. The implication of the committee's recommendations was that the

United States should prepare for all possible contingencies without regard for their prob-

ability, their economic consequences, or their impact on foreign policy. II

Even more telling, the committee developed its conclusions based on an assump-

tion about Soviet intentions rather than on a careful evaluation of why the Soviet Union

might take particular actions. 12 At the beginning of its report, the committee stated that

9 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 221. 10 Both the Rockefeller Panel Report and Johns Hopkins Report reached similar conclusions to the Gaither committee. See chapter 4. II See Roman, •• American Strategic Nuclear Force Planning," 38. 12 For the role of perceptions in decision ~g, see Jervis "Deterrence and Perception;" and David L. Snead, "Eisenhower, the Gaither Committee, and Intelligence Assessment: The Problem of Equating Capabilities with Intentions," Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, April 1996. For discussion of the exaggerations of Soviet capabilities and intentions by intelligence analysts, see Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 30-47~ Prados, SoViet Estimate, S7-126~ Freedman,

291

the Soviet Union's goal was world domination. At no point in the subsequent pages did

the committee attempt to evaluate whether this really was the Soviet Union's goal or what

risks its leaders would be willing to take to achieve it. The committee had available stud-

ies of the casualties that the United States could expect in a nuclear war, including several

that predicted 100 million Americans would be killed. For the Soviet Union to risk a nu-

clear exchange with the United States, it would have had to consider the possible conse-

quences for its own population. In making its recommendations, the committee failed to

evaluate the likelihood of the risks the Soviet Union might take to achieve its goals;

therefore, it proposed major increases in defense spending that did not reflect the improb-

ability of a Soviet attack.

These criticisms are significant because without articulating a new strategy for how

to utilize the expanded military forces and failing to analyze Soviet intentions, the commit-

tee placed a much greater emphasis on Soviet capabilities than it might have otherwise

done. In doing so, it recommended the expansion of military forces to preserve the supe-

riority of the United States without truly evaluating whether those forces and the costs

associated with them were necessary.

As already explained, Eisenhower and his advisers carefully evaluated the Gaither

report, and after much study, modified some of the administration's national security poli-

cies. Questions still remain as to the effectiveness of Eisenhower's decision making sys-

tern in dealing with the Gaither report. Was the establishment of the Gaither committee

the best way to obtain the advice he wanted? Did his "hands off' approach to manage-

US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 67-80; and Stewy, Intentions and Capabilities, 5-7 and 55-57.

292 ment permit the committee to overstep the intended scope of its study? Did he articulate

his administration's response to Sputnik and the Gaither report in a clear and re-assuring

manner? Did his national security policies after 1957 reflect a nuanced assessment of the

Soviet threat and U.S. strategic needs? The answers to these questions provide a unique

opportunity to reevaluate the effectiveness of Eisenhower as president.

During his administration, Eisenhower followed a strategy of deterrence in devel-

oping his national security programs. In pursuit of this strategy, he attempted to maintain

a strong military while limiting defense spending. He believed his presidential responsi-

bilities included protecting the nation's physical integrity as well as preserving a way of

life. He recognized that a strong military could provide national security but spending too

much could undermine the economy and challenge freedoms guaranteed by the Constitu-

tion. He told a friend during the 1958 congressional election campaigns that "The brick-

bats that will be thrown at me I shall ignore, and I shall concentrate, as I have tried to do

in the past, upon our national security, upon inching toward a just and durable peace for

all the world, and upon sustaining the health of the American economy.,,13 He, therefore,

always carefully evaluated the economic impact of potential policies.

Eisenhower established the Gaither committee to obtain advice that would allow

him to find the proper balance in his policies. Eisenhower recalled that, "With no vested

interest in a particular department, and no federal jobs to protect, the panel was a means

of obtaining independent judgments." 14 If he really believed that he could obtain such

"independent" advice, he was mistaken. More importantly, it represents his failure to

13 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, February 26, 1958 in Griffith. Ike's Letters to a Friend, 199. 14 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 220.

293 comprehend the views already held by the Gaither committee members. He had access to

the reports of Project East River, Project Solarium, and the Killian committee, and had

received briefings from Sprague, Doolittle, Killian, and Fisk concerning their perceptions

of weaknesses in U.S. military or intelligence operations. Eisenhower knew their views

and should have foreseen their conclusions. To have expected otherwise was remarkably

short-sighted. There was simply no way the Gaither committee or any other group of ex-

perts could reach conclusions unaffected by preconceived beliefs or past affiliations.

This assessment leads to a necessary re-evaluation of Eisenhower's decision mak-

ing system. Fred Greenstein persuasively argues that Eisenhower followed a "hands off'

approach to decision making. IS This approach is readily apparent in the president's su-

pervision of the Gaither committee. After ordering its creatio~ Eisenhower allowed his

subordinates to oversee the selection of the committee members and their activities. Other

than once in July, Eisenhower did not have direct contact with the group between May

and the end of October. While it must be recognized that he had to allow the committee

to do its work, his lack of oversight permitted the committee to expand its mandate well-

beyond an examination of active and passive defenses. The result was a report that

evaluated the entire U.S. national security program and made extensive calIs for revisions-

-an outcome the president did not want.

After receiving the committee's report, Eisenhower and his advisers carefully

evaluated its recommendations and conclusions. This stage of Eisenhower's decision

making system worked well. The NSC assigned the respective government departments

IS Greenstein. Hidden-Hand PreSidency, 58-65 and 80-92.

294

relevant sections of the report to analyze. After receiving feedback, the NSC held discus-

sions and made recommendations to the president. Through the entire process, Eisen-

hower participated actively in the NSC discussions and then made his decisions. By July

1958, the entire Gaither report had been thoroughly evaluated.

The changes Eisenhower made in his policies in 1958 and beyond represented his

attempt to maintain a balance in his programs. He wanted to preserve national security,

maintain an economy based on low inflation and balanced budgets, and protect individual

rights. Although he was not convinced of the existence ofa missile gap, he recognized

that if the intelligence estimates were close to accurate, he could not allow the Soviet Un-

ion to acquire a lead in missile capabilities. He, therefore, reluctantly increased the coun-

try's offensive and defensive military capabilities.

Who was right? Did the Gaither committee illuminate a more potent threat than

Eisenhower recognized or was Eisenhower's caution a reflection of a more prudent analy-

sis of the available evidence? In retrospect, it seems clear that Eisenhowers more cautious

approach was the most appropriate one. From the standpoint of the late 1950s, however,

this view was hard to defend. The briefings, intelligence estimates, and the studies exam-

ined by the Gaither committee clearly indicate that many leading experts, both civilian and

military, believed that the Soviet Union posed a significant threat to the United States.

Although this assessment was inaccurate, it does not negate the fact that many people

agreed with it. 16

16 It was not until the early 19605 that U.S. intelligence estimates fully recog--jzed the deficiencies in S0-viet missile technology. See NIE 11-8/1-61, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces," September 21, 1961, printed in Ruffner (ed.), Corona, 127-55: and Steury (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities, 121-38.

295 David Rosenberg has criticized Eisenhower for failing to regulate the expansion of

the United States nuclear arsenal during the 1950s. He argues that Eisenhower recog-

nized that the United States possessed sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet

Union but allowed the arsenal to continue to groW. 17 This conclusion has much validity,

but it does overlook the control that Eisenhower maintained over delivery systems. The

president faced tremendous pressure over his last few years in office to expand defense

budgets and military programs even more. It is to his credit that he kept spending as low

as he did.

Eisenhower's handling of the Gaither report provides clear evidence of his struggle

to limit defense spending. While defense spending increased after Sputnik and the Gaither

report, these funds were used to address specific strategic needs. Even though Eisen-

hower did not think the Soviet Union would attack and believed that the intelligence esti-

mates exaggerated Soviet capabilities, he recognized that he had to plan on the possibility

that he might be wrong. He showed remarkable prudence in the implementation of his

missile programs. He recognized the limitations of first generation missiles and deliber-

ately restricted their deployment. He only expanded ICBM force levels when the second

generation missiles, and especially the Minuteman, became available. Additionally, he

foresaw the deterrent value of Polaris. Was it "overkill," as Rosenberg suggests? Yes,

but it was predicated on the belief that the forces might be necessary to deter an enemy

whose intentions remained unclear.

17 Rosenberg. "Origins ofOvcrkill," 8, 44, and 65-66.

296 Heretofore, the history of the Gaither committee and its influence on the Eisen-

hower and Kennedy administrations was obscure. Changes in U.S. national security poli

cies in the last few years of the Eisenhower presidency generally have been explained as

the administration's reaction to Sputnik. This study reveals that Sputnik offered only the

most obvious incentive for change. The Gaither committee provided a blueprint for

meeting any challenges posed by the Soviet Union. [t recommended a U.S. military pro

gram that would have allowed the president to pursue any policy he chose. Eisenhower

did not accept all of the committee's findings, but he was sufficiently persuaded by the

panel of experts that he did modifY some of his national security policies. Now, almost

forty years later, it is clear that the Gaither committee played a pivotal role in the escala

tion of the Cold War in the late 1950s.

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