ECOCENTRISMANDANTHROPOCENTRISM:MORALREASONINGABOUT ... · ECOCENTRISMANDANTHROPOCENTRISM:MORALREASONINGABOUT ECOLOGICALCOMMONSDILEMMAS KATHERINE V. K ORTENKAMPAND COLLEEN F. MOORE

ECOCENTRISM AND ANTHROPOCENTRISM: MORAL REASONING ABOUTECOLOGICAL COMMONS DILEMMAS

KATHERINE V. KORTENKAMP AND COLLEEN F. MOORE

University of Wisconsin�Madison

Abstract

When do humans extend their ethical scope to include nature? Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism are twoways of understanding an extension of ethics to nature. In an anthropocentric ethic nature deserves moralconsideration because how nature is treated a¡ects humans. In an ecocentric ethic nature deserves moralconsideration because nature has intrinsic value. In two experiments participants (n=91 and 84) generatedmoral reasoning responses to ecological moral dilemmas. The reasoning was coded as ecocentric, anthropo-centric, or nonenvironmental (i.e., social contracts, truthfulness). Individual di¡erences and situational vari-ables were examined in relation to moral reasoning about ecological dilemmas. Pro-environmental attitudeswere related to more ecocentric and anthropocentric and less nonenvironmental reasoning. The presence ofinformation about the impact of ecological damage on the environment, especially a more ‘‘wild’’ environment,elicited more ecocentric reasoning, while the presence of a social commitment elicited more nonenvironmen-tal moral reasoning. The implications of the research for con£icts over environmental commons dilemmas arediscussed. # 2001 Academic Press

Ecocentrism and Anthropocentrism: MoralReasoning about Ecological Dilemmas

There is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relationto land and to the animals and plants which growupon it. . . The extension of ethics to this third ele-ment in human environment is. . .an evolutionarypossibility and an ecological necessity. (Leopold,1949, pp. 238^9)

Aldo Leopold, sometimes called the father of en-vironmental ethics, expressed these ideas over 50years ago in his revolutionary essay ‘‘The LandEthic.’’ Today we have clearly not accomplished the‘‘ecological necessity’’ he called for. Environmentalcrises, such as species extinction, global warming,air and water pollution, and wild land destruction,are some of the most important problems currentlyfacing our society. How we deal with these problemslargely depends on how we perceive our relationshipwith the land. Do we view nature as property for usto use however we wish for our own bene¢t, or doesnature have intrinsic value, value aside from its use-fulness to humans? A half-century after Leopold

gave us his land ethic, just how far and in whatways have our land ethics developed?

The purpose of this project is to examine some is-sues in how people extend ethics to the natural en-vironment. Environmental ethics was given acentral place in debate among scientists by Hardin(1968) who argued that the human race is faced withthe dilemma of how to prevent overuse and deple-tion of natural resources when individuals desireto maximize their gains. As noted by Dawes (1980),many environmental issues can be construed as so-cial dilemmas:

a) each individual receives a higher payo¡ for a so-cially defecting choice (e.g., having additional chil-dren, using all the energy available, polluting hisor her neighbors) than for a socially cooperativechoice, no matter what the other individuals in thesociety do, but b) all individuals are better o¡ if allcooperate than if all defect (p. 169).

In the present research we examine moral reason-ing about social dilemmas centered on environmen-tal issues.

Environmental ethics is based on the idea thatmorality ought to be extended to include the rela-

Journal of Environmental Psychology (2001) 21, 000^000 0272-4944/01/000000+ 00$35.00/0# 2001 Academic Pressdoi:10.1006/jevp.2001.0205, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

JEVP: 20010205 6.06e/W (Aug 31 2000) GRACY Mohan

tionship between humans and nature. Although the¢eld has its roots in the early writings of JohnMuir, Albert Schweitzer, and Aldo Leopold, environ-mental ethics only more recently began to gain sup-port in the 1960s with the growing popularity of theenvironmental movement. The journal EnvironmentalEthics was founded in 1979 and is devoted entirelyto the topic.

There are a number of di¡erent ways to under-stand an extension of moral consideration to nature(Nash, 1989). For example, is the extension indivi-dualistic or holistic? In other words are individualplants and animals given moral consideration, or ismorality only extended to whole species or ecosys-tems? Another distinction is whether the extensionis rights based or responsibility based; in otherwords does nature have the right to be protected ordo humans simply have a responsibility to protectnature? Perhaps the most important distinction iswhether the moral extension is anthropocentric orecocentric because this determines what is the fo-cus of the environmental ethicJhumans or nature.

The term ‘anthropocentric’ was ¢rst coined in the1860s, amidst the controversy over Darwin’s theoryof evolution, to represent the idea that humans arethe center of the universe (Campbell, 1983). Anthro-pocentrism considers humans to be the most impor-tant life form, and other forms of life to beimportant only to the extent that they a¡ect hu-mans or can be useful to humans. In an anthropo-centric ethic, nature has moral considerationbecause degrading or preserving nature can in turnharm or bene¢t humans. For example, using thisethic it would be considered wrong to cut downthe rainforests because they contain potential curesfor human diseases.

What is referred to here as an ‘ecocentric’ ethiccomes from the term ¢rst coined ‘biocentric’ in 1913by an American biochemist, Lawrence Henderson,to represent the idea that the universe is the origi-nator of life (Campbell, 1983). This term was adoptedby the so-called ‘deep ecologists’ in the 1970s to referto the idea that all life has intrinsic value (Nash,1989). In an ecocentric ethic nature has moral con-sideration because it has intrinsic value, value asidefrom its usefulness to humans. Using this ethic, forexample, one could judge that it would be wrong tocut down the rainforests because it would cause theextinction of many plant and animal species.

Very few studies in the past have addressed theconcepts of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. Adistinction between these two concepts was ¢rstbrought into social science research by Dunlap andVan Liere (1977) in a comment on Heberlein’s (1972)

article, ‘Land Ethic Realized.’ Dunlap and Van Liereclaimed that Heberlein was examining ‘. . .the conse-quences [environmental] problems can have for hu-man beingsJrather than the total (nonhuman aswell as human) environment’ (p. 204). In our terms,Dunlap and Van Liere were claiming that Heberleinwas examining anthropocentrism rather than eco-centrism. Nevertheless, Heberlein’s application ofSchwartz’s (1977) norm-activation theory of altruismto explain pro-environmental attitudes and beha-viors led to further research using this model which¢nally did extend into examinations of ecocentrismin a study by Stern, Dietz, and Kalof (1993). Sternand colleagues expanded the assumption inSchwarz’s model that people have a general altruis-tic value orientation to include value orientationsthat are egoistic and biospheric (ecocentric) as well.Meanwhile, Dunlap and Van Liere (1978) went on toincorporate ecocentric and anthropocentric itemsinto their New Environmental Paradigm scale, acommonly used measure of pro-environmental atti-tudes.

Two other studies have also measured these twoconstructs as aspects of environmental attitudes.Dreger and Chandler (1993) developed an anthropo-centrism scale, and Thompson and Barton (1994) de-veloped both ecocentric and anthropocentric scales.Thompson and Barton found that people agreedmore strongly with ecocentric than with anthropo-centric attitude statements. However, the two stu-dies used di¡erent conceptualizations ofanthropocentrism. For example, six of the 12 itemsin Dreger and Chandler’s (1993) anthropocentrismscale refer to the superiority of humans as com-pared to animals. In principle, believing that hu-mans are superior to animals could be independentof an environmental ethic of preservation of naturalresources because natural resources are valuable tohumans. In contrast, in Thompson and Barton’santhropocentrism scale, items refer to either theconsequences of environmental degradation for hu-mans (e.g., loss of rain forest will restrict develop-ment of new medicines), or refer directly to humanwelfare as a motive for ecological conservation.Thompson and Barton’s constructs are closely re-lated to the kinds of ethical reasoning examined inthe present study. However, Thompson and Bartonassessed the constructs as attitudes, whereas thepresent study examines the use of these constructsin ethical reasoning about environmental dilemmas.

In a more directly related study, Kahn (1997) in-terviewed children and coded ecocentric andanthropocentric moral reasoning responses to anecological disaster (the Exxon oil spill of 1989).

2 K.V. Kortenkamp and C. F. Moore


Kahn found that use of both types of reasoning in-creased with age. Even with the oldest children hetested (eighth graders), anthropocentric reasoningcontinued to be used with higher frequency thanecocentric reasoning (58% vs 20% of reasons given).The Exxon oil spill was an environmental disaster.Whether similar results would be obtained withecological dilemmas that are not disasters or withadults is not known. In light of these ¢ndings onethical reasoning about ecological disasters, and inlight of the past research on ecocentrism andanthropocentrism as scale-measured values or atti-tudes (but not spontaneously produced ethical rea-soning), the ¢rst goal of Experiment 1 was tomeasure the ecocentrism and anthropocentrism inadults’ reasoning about ecological moral dilemmasand to determine the relative frequency of use ofeach type of ethic.

A second goal of the research was to explore howimportant aspects of the content of ecological di-lemmas would in£uence moral reasoning. Becauseanthropocentric ethics focus on how nature a¡ectshumans, we hypothesized that if the impact of en-vironmental damage on humans were enhanced ina dilemma, participants would use more anthropo-centric reasoning. In turn, since an ecocentric ethicvalues nature for nature’s sake, we hypothesizedthat if the impact of environmental damage on nat-ure were enhanced, participants would use moreecocentric reasoning. By examining these situa-tional in£uences, our study di¡ers from past workon anthropocentric and ecocentric reasoning. How-ever, it is related to the research applyingSchwartz’s (1977) norm-activation theory. Norm acti-vation theory states that an awareness of conse-quences of environmental damage will compel aperson who believes his or her actions can amelio-rate those consequences to feel a sense of moral ob-ligation to act. In this research, we are examiningthe object of that moral obligation and hypothesizethat an emphasis on consequences to humans willlead to a human object of moral obligation, whilean emphasis on consequences to nature will lead toan ecocentric object.

A third goal of Experiment 1 was to examine therole of environmental attitudes as an individual dif-ference variable that might account for di¡erencesin use of one type of ethic over the other. Axelrod(1994) found that participants’ dominant value orien-tations (e.g., economic, social) in£uenced which rea-sons they chose as important in making decisionsabout ecological dilemmas. In this study we ex-pected that environmental attitudes would relateto use of ecocentric and anthropocentric reasoning.

Finally, we were interested in how di¡erent dilem-ma topics would in£uence moral reasoning. For ex-ample, would a dilemma over ‘wild’ land elicit moreecocentric reasoning than a dilemma over agricul-tural land? Results from Experiment 1 led us to ex-plore dilemma topic di¡erences in more depth inExperiment 2.

Experiment 1

Methods

Participants. The participants were 91 (70 females,21 males, mean age of 18�95 years) undergraduatesenrolled in introductory psychology classes at theUniversity of Wisconsin^Madison. They received ex-tra credit for participating.

Materials and design. The stimuli consisted of eco-logical moral dilemmas modi¢ed from previous stu-dies (Axelrod, 1994; Beringer, 1994). The dilemmaswere modi¢ed in order to make the natural environ-ment more central to the story and in order to addthe experimental manipulations. Four dilemma to-pics were used: overgrazing a commons, loggingold growth stands, cutting ¢rewood in a protectedforest, and building a new land¢ll (the dilemmasare reproduced in Appendix A). In the dilemmasthe main characters were set in situations in whichthey could support or not support actions that da-mage the environment. Within the dilemmas twofactors were manipulated in a 262 factorial design:1) additional information on how the environmentaldamage would impact the environment was eitheradded or not, and 2) additional information on howthe environmental damage would impact humanswas either added or not. Dilemma topic was a with-in-subjects factor and information enhancementwas manipulated between-subjects. The order ofthe dilemmas was counterbalanced with a latinsquares design, and participants were randomly as-signed to one of the four conditions of informationenhancement.

In addition to the dilemmas, participants alsoanswered the Environmental Attitudes Scale (EAS)(Ebenbach, Moore, & Parsil, 1998; Ebenbach, 1999).The 17-item EAS was used because it distinguishesbetween internally and externally motivated pro-en-vironmental attitudes in a way similar to thedistinction made in recent studies of racial preju-dice (Plant & Devine, 1998) and in older studies ofreligiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985).The EAS internal dimension is a better measure of

Moral Reasoning about Ecological Dilemmas 3


environmental attitudes and a better predictor ofpro-environmental behaviors than environmental at-titude scales that do not take attitude motivationsinto account (Ebenbach, 1999). The scale has goodinternal reliability (EAS-Internal Cronbach’salpha= 0�90; EAS-External alpha= 0�85) and test-retest reliability over a 12-week time period (EAS-Internal r(72) = 0�77, p50�001; EAS-Externalr(72) = 0�45, p50�001). The EAS internal scores alsocorrelate appropriately with other environmental at-titudes scales (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) and mea-sures of pro-environmental behavior (Maloney &Ward, 1973), providing evidence for the validity ofthe scale (Ebenbach, 1999; Ebenbach, Moore &Parsil, 1998). The full scale is reproduced inAppendix B.

Procedure. Small groups of participants (n=2 to 8)met for one session with an experimenter and an-swered the packet of materials individually in writ-ing. For each moral dilemma they were asked todecide whether the main character should or shouldnot support or perform an environmentally dama-ging action. They were then asked to list and ex-plain four factors they had considered mostimportant in making their decision. All individualslisted at least one consideration, and seven was themaximum number listed for any one dilemma. Theyanswered the EAS following the dilemmas.

The moral considerations given by the partici-pants were coded into three categories: ecocentric,anthropocentric, and nonenvironmental. The criter-ia were similar to those of Kahn (1997). For exam-ple, a response was categorized as ecocentric if itreferred to the rights or intrinsic value of natureor proposed protecting nature for nature’s sake. Aresponse was coded as anthropocentric if it pro-posed preserving nature to bene¢t humans or be-cause humans cannot survive without nature, andthe non-environmental category was used when a re-sponse referred to social contracts, guilt, or truth-fulness. An example of an ecocentric considerationis, ‘Plants and animals that live there would have to¢nd a new habitat’. An example of an anthropo-centric consideration is, ‘Additional cattle will de-plete the land of its resources, and make itunusable for many years to come.’ An example of anonenvironmental consideration is, ‘Steve shouldhonor the ‘unwritten’ commitment. Trust is very im-portant. . .’ Twenty percent of the questionnaireswere coded by a second rater for reliability (percentagreement= 85�6). Disagreements were resolved byusing the decisions of the primary coder.

Results

A 2 (Impact on Environment Information)62 (Im-pact on Humans Information)63 (Moral Considera-tions Category) mixed ANOVA was conducted withfrequency of use of each consideration category asthe dependent variable. There was a signi¢cantmain e¡ect for Moral Consideration Category, F(2,172) = 123�79, p50�01. Participants did not use signif-icantly more anthropocentric than ecocentric moralreasoning (M=3�98, S.D. = 2�18; M=3�40, S.D. = 2�15 re-spectively), but did use signi¢cantly more nonenvir-onmental moral reasoning (M=8�82, S.D. = 2�73) thaneither anthropocentric or ecocentric reasoning. Thepresence of information about the impacts of envir-onmental damage on humans had no e¡ect on moralconsiderations, F51.

There was also a signi¢cant interaction betweenImpact on Environment Information and MoralConsideration Category, F(2272) = 21�18, p50�01. Thisresult supports our second hypothesis that provid-ing details of the impacts of environmental damagewould in£uence participants’ use of eco- and anthro-pocentric considerations. The means presented inFigure 1 show that when additional informationabout environmental impacts was present in thedilemmas, participants used more eco- and anthro-pocentric moral considerations but fewer nonenvir-onmental considerations compared to when theinformation was absent. One surprising aspect ofthe results is that the presence of information about

FIGURE 1. Mean number of ecocentric (eco), anthropocentric(anthro) and nonenvironmental (non-env) moral considerationsused as a function of environmental information enhancementin ecological dilemmas.



environmental damage led to an increase in the useof anthropocentric moral considerations.

The results also showed that environmental atti-tudes were correlated with the type of moral reason-ing used. Higher pro-environmental scores on theinternal scale of the attitudes questionnaire werepositively correlated with both eco- and anthropo-centrism (r=0�35 and 0�30 respectively, p50�01) butwere negatively correlated with use of non-environ-mental moral considerations (r=70�40, p50�01).The external environmental attitude scale did notcorrelate signi¢cantly with any of the three typesof moral reasoning (rs = 0�05, 0�09, and 70�09 forecocentric, anthropocentric, and nonenvironmentalmoral reasoning, respectively).

In order to examine the joint in£uences of inter-nal environmental attitudes and the manipulatedenvironmental information on the use of di¡erentmoral reasoning types, hierarchical multiple linearregression was used (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). (In hier-archical regression the increment in the R2 due toeach independent variable is obtained after allother independent variables have been entered inthe regression equation.) The presence of informa-tion on environmental impacts had signi¢cant posi-tive e¡ects on use of both eco- and anthropocentricmoral reasoning (DR2=0�14, b=0�33, p50�01;DR2=0�14, b=0�38, p50�01 respectively) and signi¢-cant negative e¡ects on use of nonenvironmentalreasoning (DR2=0�22, b=70�47, p50�01). Internal en-vironmental attitudes also had e¡ects on moral rea-soning, a result which supports our hypothesis thatindividual di¡erences in environmental attitudesmight account for di¡erences in use of ecocentric,anthropocentric, or nonenvironmental moral rea-soning. Speci¢cally, internal environmental atti-tudes had signi¢cant positive e¡ects on both theuse of eco- and anthropocentric moral considera-tions (DR2=0�05, b=0�25, p50�05, R2=0�09, b=0�30,p50�01 respectively) and had signi¢cant negative ef-fects on use of nonenvironmental considerations(DR2=0�08, b=70�30, p50�01).

Lastly, the e¡ects of dilemma topic on use of eco-centric moral reasoning were tested in a 2 (Environ-mental Information Enhancement)62 (HumanInformation Enhancement)64 (DilemmaTopic) mixedANOVA with mean number of ecocentric moral con-siderations as the dependent variable. There was a sig-ni¢cant main e¡ect for dilemma topic, F(1, 86)=14�25,p50�01. Fewer ecocentric moral considerations wereused in the overgrazing dilemma than in the otherthree dilemmas (see Figure 2). This ¢nding is of par-ticular interest because Hardin (1968) used a grazingdilemma to illustrate the ‘‘tragedy of the commons.’’

Discussion

The results of Experiment 1 reveal that ecologicaldilemmas most frequently elicit moral reasoningthat is not related to the environment but to humanrelationships (e.g., social contracts, guilt, truthful-ness). However, when ethics are extended to the en-vironment, both ecocentric and anthropocentricreasoning are used with equal frequency. The useof all three types of moral reasoning is in£uencedstrongly by information about the impact of ecologi-cal damage on the environment but not by informa-tion about the impact on humans. As predicted,environmental impacts information did cause parti-cipants to use more ecocentric moral reasoning, butthat information also caused an increase in use ofanthropocentric reasoning, something that was nothypothesized. It seems that providing informationon the environmental impacts of actions did inducethe participants to think more about the environ-ment, but it did not a¡ect how they were thinkingabout the environment.

Perhaps how people think about the environment(ecocentrically or anthropocentrically) has more todo with individual di¡erences in attitudes thanwith situational variables. However, the individualdi¡erence variable we investigated in Experiment1, internally motivated pro-environmental attitudes,was positively correlated with use of both eco-centric and anthropocentric moral reasoning. Theitems on the environmental attitude scale that weused were not intended to distinguish between en-vironmental attitudes that are ecocentric or anthro-pocentric. Based on the results of Experiment 1,participants with internally motivated pro-environ-

FIGURE 2. Mean number of ecocentric moral considerations usedby participants as a function of ecological dilemma topic.



mental attitudes found validity in both ecocentricand anthropocentric moral considerations in ecolo-gical moral dilemmas. This study’s inability to sepa-rate proponents of ecocentric and anthropocentricreasoning is in agreement with a related ¢nding inStern and Dietz (1995). In measuring value orienta-tions, Stern and Dietz reported that could not dif-ferentiate biospheric (ecocentric) from altruistic(anthropocentric) values. They hypothesized thatthe clear distinction between these two conceptsthat exits in theory may not exist in the minds ofpeople in the general population but perhaps wouldexist in a population of environmental activists.

Experiment 2

The results of Experiment 1 also raised interestingquestions about the di¡erences among the ecologicaldilemmas. The overgrazing dilemma elicited fewerecocentric considerations than the other dilemmas,even when environmental impact information waspresent. This result is interesting, especially in lightof the extent to which Hardin’s original overgrazingdilemma has become paradigmatic in discussions ofecological issues in general and ecological moral di-lemmas in particular (see Dawes, 1980; Gardner &Stern, 1996). The overgrazing dilemma contains twofeatures not present in the other dilemmas: a) anemphasis on social con£ict, and b) no emphasis onland-use con£ict. In the dilemma the main characterhad a commitment to his peers, and the environmen-tal damage was to land that was not ‘‘untouched’’ byhumans but used for agriculture. In contrast, in theother dilemmas social commitments were much lesssalient, and the damage was done to protected, pre-served, or pristine nature areas. The results fromExperiment 1 prompted us to conduct Experiment 2in which we manipulated both the social and land-use con£icts in the overgrazing dilemma. We hy-pothesized that a dilemma containing a social con-£ict would make ecocentric reasoning less likely,and a dilemma depicting damage to a more ‘‘wild’’ecosystem (emphasis on land-use con£ict) wouldmake ecocentric reasoning more likely. Such situa-tional factors have general importance because theyarise to di¡erent degrees in real world con£icts overenvironmental issues.

Methods

Participants. The participants were 84 undergradu-ates (36 females, 46 males, 2 gender unreported;

mean age= 18�99 years) enrolled in introductory psy-chology classes at the University of Wisconsin-Madi-son. They received extra credit for participating.

Materials and design. The stimuli consisted of anecological moral dilemma on the topic of overgraz-ing a commons, modi¢ed from Experiment 1. Withinthe original overgrazing dilemma two factors weremanipulated in a 262 factorial design: 1) A socialcon£ict was presented or not; and 2) A land-use con-£ict was enhanced or not (see Appendix C). For thesocial con£ict factor, the main character eithershares a commons with other ranchers with whomhe has a commitment not to overgraze the land (so-cial con£ict present) or he alone grazes an area ofland (social con£ict not present). For the land usecon£ict, the grazing area is either land in the moun-tains of a diverse national forest that has neverbeen grazed before (land-use con£ict enhanced) orprivate land that has been grazed for many years(land-use con£ict not enhanced). Both factors weretested within subjects and counterbalanced with alatin squares design. Thus, each participant re-sponded to four separate dilemmas.

Procedure. Small groups of participants met forone session with an experimenter and answeredthe questionnaires individually in writing. For eachdilemma they decided whether the main charactershould or should not buy additional cattle. Theywere then asked to list and explain four factors theyhad considered most important in making their de-cision; however, in the coding process the number ofdi¡erent factors mentioned was not limited to four.Finally, participants were asked if the main charac-ter’s dilemma was ‘moral’ and why or why not. Fol-lowing the dilemmas, they answered the EAS.

The moral considerations were coded, using thesame methods from Experiment 1, into ecocentric,anthropocentric, and non-environmental moral con-sideration categories. Twenty percent of the ques-tionnaires were coded by a second rater forreliability (percent agreements= 88�3). Disagree-ments were resolved by using the decision of theprimary coder.

Results

A 2 (land-use Con£ict)62 (Social Con£ict) withinsubjects ANOVA with the number of ecocentric mor-al considerations as the dependent variable was con-ducted to test the hypothesis that land-use andsocial con£ict information would in£uence use ofecocentric reasoning. There was a main e¡ect forLand-use Con£ict, F(1, 81) = 14�54, p50�01, and a



main e¡ect for Social Con£ict, F(181) = 17�05,p50�01. When a social con£ict was present in themoral dilemma, participants used less ecocentricmoral reasoning compared to when it was absent(M=1�07, S.D.=0�08; M=1�40, S.D. = 0�11 respectively).Also, participants used more ecocentric reasoningwhen a land-use con£ict was emphasized comparedto when it was not (M=1�38, S.D. = 0�10; M=1�09,S.D. = 0�09 respectively). When no land-use con£ictwas combined with a social con£ict, participantsused the least amount of ecocentric moral reason-ing (see Figure 3). This latter result replicates theenvironmental impacts information condition ofExperiment 1.

In order to compare the di¡erential e¡ects of so-cial and land-use con£icts on all three types of mor-al reasoning, a 2 (Social Con£ict)62 Land-useCon£ict)63 (Moral Consideration Category) re-peated measures ANOVA was conducted, with num-ber of considerations in each category as thedependent variable. There was a signi¢cant interac-tion between Social Con£ict and Moral Considera-tion Category, F(2, 162)=27�20, p50�01. Although thepresence of a social con£ict caused less use ofecocentric reasoning, it induced more use of non-en-vironmental reasoning, and had no e¡ect on anthro-pocentric reasoning (see Figure 4). There was also asigni¢cant interaction between Land-use Con£ictand Moral Considerations, F(2, 162)=3�9, p50�05. Adilemma with a land-use con£ict elicited more eco-centric considerations but there was no e¡ect ofland use con£ict on use of non-environmental or

anthropocentric reasoning (see Figure 5). Therewas also no main e¡ect of Moral Consideration Ca-tegory. Overall, participants did not use signi¢-cantly more nonenvironmental reasoning than eco-and anthropocentric reasoning.

As in Experiment 1, internal pro-environmentalattitudes again correlated negatively with use of

FIGURE 3. The e¡ect of social con£ict and land-use con£ict on par-ticipant’s use of ecocentric moral considerations.

FIGURE 4. Mean number of ecocentric (eco), anthropocentric(anthro), and nonenvironrnental (non-env) moral considerationsused as a function of social-con£ict presence in a grazingdilemma.

FIGURE 5. Mean number of ecocentric (eco), anthropocentric(anthro), and nonenvironmental (non-env) moral considerationsused as a function of stressing the land-use con£ict in a grazingdilemma.



non-environmental moral reasoning (r=72�37,p50�01). However, the EAS internal scale did notcorrelate signi¢cantly with ecocentric and anthro-pocentric moral reasoning (although the correla-tions were in the positive direction, r=0�19 and0�13 respectively, n.s.).

Discussion

The results from Experiment 2 help to explain thedi¡erences that were found between the grazing di-lemma and the other dilemmas in Experiment 1. Thepresence of a social con£ict and absence of an em-phasis on land-use con£ict caused participants toreason less ecocentrically, but these same variableshad no e¡ect on use of anthropocentric reasoning.This result is consistent with Experiment 1 becauseanthropocentrism was used as frequently in thegrazing dilemma of Experiment 1 as in the otherthree dilemmas. Perhaps the land-use con£ict hadno e¡ect on anthropocentric reasoning because re-gardless of whether land is pristine or used for agri-culture, it is still useful to humans in some way(i.e., for recreation or food production). The socialcon£ict manipulation also had no e¡ect on the useof anthropocentric reasoning. Including an explicitsocial con£ict does not detract from anthropo-centric reasoning because anthropocentrism in-cludes a focus on both people and the environment.On the other hand, nonenvironmental thinking isonly focused on people, so when a social con£ict isabsent, this type of reasoning is no longer elicitedas frequently.

Non-environmental reasoning was not more com-monly used overall than ecocentric or anthropo-centric reasoning in Experiment 2, in contrast toExperiment 1. This is most likely due to the inclu-sion of additional environmental impact informa-tion in all versions of the dilemmas in Experiment2. In Experiment 1, the additional environmentalimpact information was found to increase use ofecocentric and anthropocentric reasoning and todecrease use of non-environmental reasoning.

General Discussion

The present research shows that both individual dif-ferences and situational variables are important fac-tors related to the expression of environmentalethical reasoning. Internally motivated pro-environ-mental attitudes were negatively associated with useof nonenvironmental moral reasoning and positivelyassociated with use of ecocentric and anthropo-

centric reasoning. Our results also show a verystrong in£uence of situational variables on environ-mental ethical reasoning. Inclusion of informationabout environmental impacts elicited more eco-centric and anthropocentric and less nonenviron-mental moral reasoning. It is clearly more di⁄cultto take the interests of the environment into consid-eration if those interests and the e¡ects on themare either not known or not salient. For example, aperson who does not know that over-fertilizing citylawns has a negative impact on nearby waterwayswould not perceive lawn fertilization as an ecologi-cal dilemma and would not take the waterways intoconsideration when making decisions about apply-ing fertilizer.

A second situational variable found to be impor-tant was an emphasis on a land-use con£ict. Land-use con£ict evoked more ecocentric reasoning. Aland-use con£ict between pristine land vs degradedland causes more of a focus on the damaging e¡ectsto the environment, perhaps because this damage isviewed as more extreme. In contrast, when the con-£ict is over agricultural land versus degraded agri-cultural land, the environmental damage may beviewed as less extreme, and therefore more accepta-ble. Also, it is possible that agricultural land maynot be viewed as a part of nature by some indivi-duals. Because ecocentric reasoning requires a fo-cus on the intrinsic value of nature, withoutviewing agricultural land as nature there can beno ecocentric reasoning. The ¢nal important situa-tional variable was the presence of social con£ict is-sues, which elicited less ecocentric and more non-environmental reasoning. Salient social issues seemto attract people’s focus away from thinking aboutland issues.

One limitation on the generalizability of this re-search is that the sample consisted of college stu-dents who strongly endorsed pro-environmentalattitudes (the mean on the 1 to 9 scale for internalpro-environmental attitudes was 6�50). In view ofthis, it is perhaps even more impressive that suchstriking e¡ects of the situational variables were ob-tained. It would be interesting to study the use ofecocentric and anthropocentric ethical reasoningin samples of other populations, such as the generalpublic, environmental activists, and those who usenatural areas for recreation (hunters, anglers, hi-kers, campers, mountain bikers, etc.). It is likely thatecocentric and anthropocentric reasoning will varyamong such interest groups because such groupshave been shown to di¡er in their evaluation of re-creational impacts on nature (Shindler & Shelby,1993).



Another potential limitation of our study is thatthe participants were not necessarily personally fa-miliar with the dilemmas we used. Would they haveused the same moral reasoning when consideringpersonal decisions about ecological dilemmas? Oneway to ¢nd out would be to use dilemmas based onenvironmental issues that college students are morelikely to encounter and make decisions about, suchas food consumption habits or use of campus natur-al areas. Another alternative would be to have theparticipants generate environmental dilemmas fromtheir own experiences and then explain their moralreasoning (although a problem with this is the widevariability among individuals in the types of eventsthat would be posed as ecological dilemmas). Pastmoral reasoning research based on Kohlberg’s ap-proach has shown that real-life dilemmas providedby participants elicit di¡erent moral orientationsthan hypothetical dilemmas (Walker, 1989). There-fore, it is possible that real-life ecological dilemmasmay also elicit di¡erent types of environmental ethi-cal reasoning than hypothetical dilemmas. Such aresult would be consistent with our ¢ndings that si-tuational variables in the dilemmas have a strongin£uence on the environmental moral reasoningshown. If participants were to report or invent theirown ecological moral dilemmas (as was done fornon-environmental moral reasoning in Walker,1989), the dilemmas would be likely to vary in manyways including the degree to which they include so-cial contracts, violations of law, impacts on humans,as well as known impacts on nature itself. Thus, thepresent research may provide an approach for pre-dicting why familiar dilemmas may evoke reasoningthat di¡ers from that shown in unfamiliar moral di-lemmas. A careful content analysis of the dilemmasproduced by participants might reveal a focus ondi¡erent aspects of the situation (speci¢cally, hu-man relationships vs nature itself) that are shownby our research to be powerful in£uences on envir-onmental moral reasoning.

This study makes valuable strides forward by ex-perimentally examining ecocentrism and anthropo-centrism in the context of moral dilemmas, sinceup until recently these concepts have been studied,and minimally at that, with correlational studies ofattitudes and values. Studies of ethical reasoning forenvironmental dilemmas are very important becausemost real world environmental issues can be consid-ered to be social dilemmas, social traps (Dawes,1980), or ‘‘tragedies of the commons’’ (Hardin, 1968).Examples given by Dawes (1980) include air pollu-tion caused by auto tra⁄c and world overpopula-tion. Such issues are highly controversial, both in

the U.S. and globally. The present research showsthat both individual di¡erences and situational fac-tors in£uence the type of moral reasoning an indivi-dual may bring to bear on a tragedy of thecommons. These results have importance for socialcon£icts that arise around speci¢c environmentalissues. Where knowledge or beliefs about the envir-onmental impacts di¡er between so-called ‘stake-holders,’ our research provides reason to expectdi¡erences in moral reasoning. Those who believethe environmental impacts of a project are lowerwould be expected to emphasize non-environmentalmoral issues such as social contracts, whereas thosewho believe that environmental impacts are largewould be expected to emphasize both the moralityof damaging nature and the impacts on humans ofdamage to nature. Thus, satisfactory con£ict resolu-tion is not likely to result from simply bringing sta-keholders together to negotiate because they arespeaking in di¡erent moral voices.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported in part by a HilldaleResearch Grant from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Special thanks to the Psychology of Envir-onmental Issues Research Lab (Scott Caldwell, Mat-thew Kolinski, Ellen Merten, Penny Pobiecke, andDavid H. Ebenbach, Ph.D.), Elizabeth Kortenkamp,and Nancy Kortenkamp for all their help with con-ducting this research.

Note

Reprint requests and correspondence should be ad-dressed to Colleen F. Moore, University of Wiscon-sin, Department of Psychology, 1202 West JohnsonStreet, Madison.WI 53706, U.S.A. E-mail cfmoore@-facsta¡.wisc.edu

References

Allport, G. W. & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious or-ientation and prejudice. Journal of Personality and So-cial Psychology, 5, 432^443.

Axelrod, L. J. (1994). Balancing personal needs with envir-onmental preservation. Journal of Social Issues, 50,85^104.

Beringer, A. (1994). The moral ideals of care and respect.In European university studies: Series 20, philosophy(Vol. 425, pp. 10^260). Berlin: Frankfurt am Main.

Campbell, E. K. (1983). Beyond anthropocentrism. Journalof the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 19, 54^67.



Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983). Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (2nded.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review ofPsychology, 31, 169^193.

Donahue, M. J. (1985). Intrinsic and extrinsic religious-ness: A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Personal-ity and Social Psychology, 48, 400^419.

Dreger, R. M., & Chandler, E. W. (1993). Anthropocentr-ism: Construct validity and measurement. Journal ofSocial Behavior and Personality, 8, 169^188.

Dunlap, R. E., & Van Liere, K. D. (1977). Land ethic orgolden rule. Journal of Social Issues, 33, 200^207.

Dunlap, R. E., & Van Liere, K. D. (1978). A proposed mea-suring instrument and preliminary results: The ‘‘newenvironmental paradigm.’’ Journal of EnvironmentalEducation, 9, 10^19.

Ebenbach, D. H. (1999). Behind beliefs and controversies:The relationship between motivation and the expressionof pro-environmental attitudes. Unpublished doctoraldissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Ebenbach, D. H., & Moore, C. F. (2000). Incomplete infor-mation, inferences, and individual di¡erences: Thecase of environmental judgments. Organizational Be-havior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 1^27.

Ebenbach, D. H., Moore, C. F., & Parsil, S. A. (1998). Intern-ally and externally motivated environmental attitudes.Paper presented at the annual convention of theMidwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.

Gardner, G. T., & Stern, P. C. (1996). Environmental Pro-blems and Human Behavior. Needam Heights, MA: Al-lyn & Bacon.

Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science,162, 1243^1248.

Heberlein, T. A. (1972). The land ethic realized: Some socialpsychological explanations for changing environmen-tal attitudes. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 79^87.

Kahn, P. H. (1997). Children’s moral and ecological reason-ing. Developmental Psychology, 33, 1091^1096.

Leopold, A. (1949). A Sand Country Almanac: With Essayson Conservation from Round River. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Maloney, M. P., & Ward, M. P. (1973). Let’s hear from thepeople: An objective scale for the measurement ofecological attitudes and knowledge. American Psychol-ogist, 28, 583^586.

Nash, R. F. (1989). The Rights of Nature: A History of Envir-onmental Ethics. Madison, WI: University of Wiscon-sin Press.

Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and externalmotivation to respond without prejudice. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 75, 811^832.

Schwartz, S. H. (1977). Normative in£uences on altruism.Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 221^279.

Shindler, B. & Shelby, B. (1993). Regulating wildernessuse: An investigation of user group support. Journalof Forestry, 91, 41^44.

Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., & Kalof, L. (1993). Value orienta-tions, gender, and environmental concern. Environ-ment and Behavior, 25, 322^348.

Stern et al. (1995). Values, beliefs, and pro-environmentalaction: Attitude formation toward emergent attitudeobjects. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25,1611^1636.

Thompson, S. C. G., & Barton, M. A. (1994). Ecocentricand anthropocentric attitudes toward the environ-ment. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 14, 149^157.

Walker, L. J. (1989). A longitudinal study of moral reason-ing. Child Development, 60, 157^160.

Appendix A

Information contained within the brackets repre-sents the information enhancement manipulation.Enhanced information on impacts to the environ-ment is to the left of the slash, and enhanced infor-mation on impacts to humans is to the right of theslash. When no information was enhanced, thebracketed sentences were left out.

Grazing

A common area of grazing land is shared by tenranchers. All the ranchers know that the commongrazing land is the perfect size for the total amountof cattle that they collectively own. [If all the ran-chers bought extra cattle they would overgraze theland, causing plant cover depletion, soil infertilityand erosion, and the pollution of nearby waterways./If all the ranchers bought extra cattle they wouldrun each other out of business.] The ranchers havean ‘unwritten’ commitment not to overuse the com-mon grazing land. Though all the ranchers are busi-ness associates, they rarely socialize and are notreally friends with each other. One of the ranchers,Steve, comes across a special deal where he can pur-chase a number of additional cattle for a very lowprice.

Should Steve purchase additional cattle?

Old Growth

Up until recently a large area of old growth foresthas been set aside as parkland in a small town inBritish Columbia. Now the local lumber company,which owns the forest land, is planning a clear-cutharvest of the old growth trees. It has been a lowperiod for the town and this new project means jobsand income for a number of years. Marie has livedin this town all her life. Most of Marie’s friends andprevious co-workers are very excited about the newharvest and want to see the project happen. BothMarie and her husband were recently laid o¡ bythe company and will be rehired when this new har-vest begins. [However, she has learned that about98% of old growth forests in North America havealready been destroyed and that the unique old



growth ecosystem is home to many rare species thatcannot survive in other habitats. /However, she haslearned that the jobs created by the harvest willonly last until all the trees are cut, a few years, atwhich time Marie and her husband will again belaid o¡.]

Should Marie actively support or oppose the har-vest?

Garbage

A regional area in the Midwest has a beautiful nat-ure preserve [that supports a diverse ecosystem ofnative plant and animal species/that is a very popu-lar place for recreational activities.] But this regionalso has a growing problem with what to do withthe people’s garbage. The land¢ll site is almost atcapacity. The local governmental department ofwaste management has developed two proposals todeal with the situation. The ¢rst is to build a secondland¢ll site. The best location for the new site is thenature preserve. [If the land¢ll is sited here itwould completely destroy the preserve’s ecosystem./ If the land¢ll is sited here it would decrease prop-erty values of the many neighboring residences.]However, the land already belongs to the districtand no new fees would be required under this pro-posal. The second proposal would involve creating anew collection system that would force all people toseparate their garbage a into seven categoriesJsixfor recycling and one for composting. Substantial¢nes would be charged to anyone who doesn’t abideby the new regulations. Additionally, the residentsof the greater regional area would be charged witha monthly fee in order to pay for the added costsnecessary to run this waste collection system. Sar-ah and Kurt, residents of the area, will participatein a public vote on this issue next week.

Should Sarah and Kurt vote for building the newland¢ll or vote to establish the new collection system?

Gathering Firewood

In a rural area, a government forest preserve hasbeen set up as part of a project to restore the moun-tain forests. The forests are rapidly disappearing be-cause so much wood is needed by the village peoplefor cooking and heating. On the mountain slopesthat have been deforested, the soil is being washedaway by the heavy rains which makes it very di⁄-cult for young tree seedlings to grow into maturetrees. [As a result the de¢cient forest is unable tosupport a diverse and healthy animal population. /As a result the de¢cient forest is unable to support

the ¢rewood needs of the community.] Past the for-est preserve there is a designated ¢rewood gather-ing area. The local women all have the daily job ofwalking up the steep mountain slopes toward thedesignated area to cut ¢rewood for use in cookingand heating. This task grows harder over time be-cause the women have to go farther and farther be-fore they can obtain enough wood for their families’needs. One of the women, Sandy, hikes past thenearby forest preserve and thinks to herself, ‘‘Mytask would be so much easier if I could only cutthose trees.’’ She would then be able to bring backsome extra wood to sell. However, she knows thatit is against the law to take trees from the preserve,and that anyone who is caught doing so will be se-verely punished. But she also knows the forest ran-ger has gone to the city for a few days. She wonders,‘‘Perhaps today I will cut just one tree.’’

Should Sandy cut a tree from the government forest?

Appendix B

EAS

Please read the following statements carefully, and,in the space provided, rate your agreement witheach of the statements, on a scale from 1^9(1= strongly disagree, 5 =neither agree nor disagree,9 = strongly agree).strongly neither agree stronglydisagree nor disagree agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91. ______I______ I try hard to carry my pro-

environmental beliefs over into all theother parts of my life.

2. ______N______ I try to appear pro-environmental toplease others, but I really don’t believeenvironmental issues are important.

3. ______-I______ Because of my personal values, Ibelieve that ignoring environmentalmatters is OK.

4. ______E______ I try to act pro-environmentallybecause of pressure from others.

5. ______N_____ Although today’s PC (PoliticallyCorrect) standards pressure me toexpress pro-environmental views, Idon’t really believe the environment isthreatened.

6. ______I______ When it comes to questions about theenvironment, I feel driven to know thetruth.



7. ______E______ If I did something that might harm theenvironment, I would be concernedthat others would be angry with me.

8. ______-E______ I do not attempt to appear pro-environmental to others.

9. ______-I______ According to my personal values,ignoring human impacts on the largerecosystem is OK.

10. ______-E______ It is not important for me to appearpro-environmental to others.

11. ______I______ I am motivated by my personal beliefsto try to protect the environment.

12. ______-I______ The interrelatedness of all living thingsin the ecosystem is something I have ne-ver felt personally compelled to consider.

13. ______E______ I try to express only my pro-environmental views in order to avoidnegative reactions from others.

14. ______-I______ What happens to the larger ecosystem,beyond what happens to humans,doesn’t make much di¡erence to me.

15. ______-I______ I have not found it essential to try toprotect the larger ecosystem, beyondwhat happens to humans.

16. ______E______ Because of today’s PC (PoliticallyCorrect) standards, I try to appearpro-environment.

17. ______E______ It is personally important to me to tryto protect the larger ecosystem, beyondwhat happens to humans.

Appendix C

Information contained within the brackets representsthe land use con£ict manipulation. Enhanced land-use con£ict is to the left of the slash and not en-hanced land-use con£ict is to the right of the slash.

Social Con£ict

[A national forest in the mountains of the westernU.S. supports a diverse and sensitive ecosystem of

native plant and animal species and is a very popu-lar place for recreational activities. An area of thenational forest that was never previously used forgrazing has recently been leased to ten ranchers. /An area of private land in the western U.S. has along history of grazing use and is currently sharedby ten ranchers.] All the ranchers have been in-formed that the common grazing area is the perfectsize for the total amount of cattle that they collec-tively own. If all the ranchers bought extra cattlethey would overgraze the land, causing plant coverdepletion, soil infertility and erosion, and the pollu-tion of [nearby waterways within the national for-est. /nearby waterways.] They would also run eachother out of business. The ranchers have an ‘unwrit-ten’ commitment not to overgraze the land. One ofthe ranchers, Steve, comes across a special dealwhere he can purchase a number of additional cat-tle at a very low price.


No Social Con£ict

[A national forest in the mountains of the westernU.S. supports a diverse and sensitive ecosystem ofnative plant and animal species and is a very popu-lar place for recreational activities. An area of thenational forest that was never previously used forgrazing has recently been leased to a local rancher,Steve. / An area of private land in the western U.S.has a long history of grazing use and is currentlyused by a local rancher, Steve.] Steve has been in-formed that the grazing area is the perfect size forthe total amount of cattle that he owns. Extra cattlewould overgraze the land, causing plant cover deple-tion, soil infertility and erosion, and the pollution of[nearby waterways within the national forest./ near-by waterways.] Steve comes across a special dealwhere he can purchase a number of additional cat-tle at a very low price.




AUTHOR QUERY FORM

HARCOURTPUBLISHERS

JOURNAL TITLE: JEVP DATE: 25/5/2001ARTICLE NO. : 20010205

Queries and / or remarks

ManuscriptPage/line

Details required Author’s response

No Author Query


Documents

ECOCENTRISMANDANTHROPOCENTRISM:MORALREASONINGABOUT ... · ECOCENTRISMANDANTHROPOCENTRISM:MORALREASONINGABOUT ECOLOGICALCOMMONSDILEMMAS KATHERINE V. K ORTENKAMPAND COLLEEN F. MOORE