Douglas a-1 Skyraider

The AuthorFrederick A. Johnsen is the author of numerous historical aviation books, including Thundering Peacemaker,The B-29 Book, Bombers in Blue, Darkly Dangerous, and The Bomber Barons. His articles and photographshave appeared inAirpower,Airman,Aviation Week and Space Technology,Air Progress, FlyPast,Air Classics,Wings, GeneralAviationNews andFlyer, KokuFan, and other periodicals and books. Fred has degrees in historyandjournalismfrom the University ofWashington, where he worked his way through college in the University'sKirsten Wind Tunnel. He served as the consulting curator to the Museum of Flight in Seattle, Washington,during critical design phases there, and was the founding curator of the McChord Air Museum at McChord AirForce Base, Washington. He has worked as an Air Force historian since 1981, receiving recognition from AirMobility Command and the U.S. Air Force, including the U.S. Air Force Excellence in Wing History ProgramsAward for 1992, for his work.

Douglas

A·1SKYRAIDER

A Photo Chronicle

Frederick A. Johnsen

Schiffer Military/Aviation HistoryAtglen, PA

Front cover artwork by Steve Ferguson, Colorado Springs, CO

PATTON'S SPADOn 9 October 1966, four VA-176 A-1H Skyraiders from the USS Intrepid were vectored deep into NorthVietnam to cover a rescue helicopter trying to reach a downed F-4 Phantom II crew. After pushing through abrief flak barrage, the Spad lead flight pushed further inland where they were set upon by four MiG 17's. In theensuing maneuvers which twisted down to tree top level, the opponents separated and two of the jets wereheavily damaged at the hands ofthe Spad flight leader and his wingman. Seconds later, tail-end-element Lt(jg)Tom Patton in Spad "09" (Bu.N. 13543) reached the fight and dropped down on the last MiG skimming justabove the jungle. The enemy pilot attempted a climbing turn followed with a reverse turn which negated all ofthe MiG's speed. Patton skillfully split-S'ed into point blank range at six o'clock and closed to within 100 feetof the silver intruder. After gutting his target with the last of his 20mm ammo, Patton even tried for a coup degrace with four of his Zuni rockets but missed. The riddled MiG rolled over and plunged out of sight througha low hanging cloud. After a quick turn beneath the thin cloud bank, the victorious Navy aviator caught a glimpseof the MiG driver drifting into the jungle beneath his parachute.

Acknowledgements:Edward H. Heinemann, designer of the Douglas Skyraider, provided many hours' insight into the design anddevelopment of this aircraft. He also read the manuscript in an effort to track down any errors that might havecrept in. General Nguyen Cao Ky gave his perspective and recollections of VNAF Skyraider operations. HarryS. Gann, of Douglas Aircraft Company at the time of my research, was a reliable source of vintage Skyraiderphotos. Museums lending a hand include the National Air and Space Museum, Pima Air Museum, U.S. NavalAviation Museum, and the former, but not forgotten, Pacific Northwest Aviation Historical Foundation(PNAHF). The office of Naval History in the Washington Navy Yard was very helpful.

Many individuals provided anecdotes, photos, research, and technical manuals. These include: JerryBoynton, AI Butterworth, John Campbell, Gary Cave, Jeff Ethell, Dave Feigert, David M. Forrest, Rene J.Francillon, Herb Kissling, Keith Laird, William T. Larkins, Ronald G. Linder, Dave Menard, HoustonMorrison, James and Jean Morrow, Earl Otto, Dennis Peltier, Doug Remington, Bill Riepl, and PaulSwendrowski, among others.

Manuscript typing and proofreading chores were devotedly performed by Sharon Lea Johnsen and HelenF. Johnsen. From his library of vintage aviation publications, my father, Carl M. Johnsen, performed Skyraiderresearch.

The chapter footnote citations are rich with bibliographic material about books and periodicals containingSkyraider information.

Special thanks to Barrett Tillman and Walt Boyne.

Dedication

For Sharon

< ,

Book Design by Robert Biondi

First Edition~1i;..;'r ,t, '}:W:.'t{-t"/I:J:; Copyright © 1994 by Frederick A. Johnsen.;J". '\j • ., .-,-.. .,.""Library of Congress Catalog Number: 93-84499

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or used in any forms or by any means graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or information storage and retrieval systems without written permission from the copyright holder.

Printed in the United States of America.ISBN: 0-88740-512-6

We are interested in hearing from authors with book ideas on related topics.

Published by Schiffer Publishing Ltd,77 Lower Valley Road

Atglen, PA 19310Please write for a free catalog.

This book may be purchased from the publisher.Please include $2.95 postage.

Try your bookstore first.

\

Contents

Preface 5

Chapter I 7Building a Better Bomber

Chapter II 21Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy

Chapter III 55Korea Proves the Skyraider

Chapter IV 65Cold-War Demands

Chapter V 71Able Dogs in Foreign Service

Chapter VI 77Early Asia

Chapter VII 88The Navy in Vietnam

Chapter VIII 91No More Kid Gloves:

New Tricks for an Able Dog

Chapter IX 101Wind-Down in Asia

Chapter X 109Skyraiders for the Future

AD-1 's glossy sea blue wing mirrored its fuselage numbers in flight. (H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collection)

4 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

Preface

T he rubble from the Korean War still smokedfiguratively when I saw myfirst Douglas Skyraider.It was while on a Sunday drive, a time when myfather was fond of checking out the local airports

for unusual birds. Newly-minted, its glossy sea blue wingsfolded overhead, the Skyraider seemed to be all hard pointsand stores-pylons as it reposed on the Douglas ramp.

Skyraider encounter number two came in the summer of1961. America had moved to suburbia, and I was reluctantlyentering a shopping mall to get school clothes for the impending sixth grade when an echelon of rumbling, gray, businesslike ADs from Moffett Field chugged overhead. An impressionstuck in my 10-year-old mind: Supersonic jets had failed tooust the rugged, prop-driven, bomb-hauling Skyraider fromnavy service.

In the late 1970s, I would walk amongst veteran exVietnamese Skyraiders which had probably hauled out moreSouth Vietnamese refugees to Thailand when Saigon fell thanDouglas designer Ed Heinemann could ever have envisionedhis AD carrying. These Skyraiders and others were nowentering the expensive world of privately-kept warbirds.

For so many years, the Douglas Skyraider was simplythere. The legends of its prowess began to accumulate.Company publicists didn't miss a chance to showthe Skyraidercould carry more ordnance than a B-17 heavy bomber ofWorld War II. Single-engine, prop-driven Skyraiders weregiven the pivotal task of carrying nuclear weapons. Lugging aspecial fuel store with a trailing hose, Skyraiders could refuelfleet jets. Bulky radars and electronics systems could benested in the metamorphosing fuselage of the Able Dog (aswe all knew the letters AD really stood for). In far-off SouthVietnam in the very early 1960s, coups and counter-coupswere executed and thwarted with the aid of menacingSkyraiders. Then Bernie Fisher rode his A-1 E through anightmare of enemy fire and debris to rescue his flying buddyon the ground at A Shau, earning Fisher a justly-deservedCongressional Medal of Honor, and his Skyraider a permanent berth in the Air Force Museum. But the capper had to be

the Navy "Spad" drivers who outflew North Vietnamese MiGpilots, and used their A-1 s' cannons to shoot down two MiGsover North Vietnam (see cover).

The study of any aspect of history must be woven in acontext which at least acknowledges the tenor of the times.References to prevailing ideas, technological breakthroughsand limitations, and blind luck season this biography of theDouglas Skyraider aircraft. Interviewees for this book includeEdward H. Heinemann, designer of so many famous Douglasplanes including the Skyraider; General Nguyen Cao Ky,South Vietnam's spirited flying Premier, who grew to love theSkyraider in combat over his homeland; and legions of pilots,crew chiefs, armorers, and para-rescue technicians whorelied on the Skyraider to help them do their jobs. It has beenargued that the classic "war story," whether relayed over abeer in the club hours after a mission, or at a dinner party tenyears later, is quintessentially true in spite of embellishments.The truth lies not in whether a Skyraider took 30 or 300 hitsfrom groundfire, or whether it pulled out of a dive at tree-top orgrass-top height, but rather in the fact that the old Skyraiderdid what had to be done at the time, and delivered its crewshome to talk about it.

I have endeavored to flavor this manuscript with warstories that ring true, interviews with key people in the Skyraidersaga, accounts from official Navy and Air Force historicalsources, and data from company and military tech orders.

My mentors in daily newspaper reporting and in the AirForce history program instilled in me a penchant for attribution. Use the footnote references to gain a perspective of mysources, decide if any conclusions drawn in this manuscriptmatch your own, or will warrant a healthy debate some time.

Some self-proclaimed adventurers of the 1980s longed toround up a handful of Skyraiders, bomb-up, and do battle withcommunist guerrillas in Latin America. Was this hopelesslynostalgic saber-rattling, or an accurate assessment of thebest tool for this task? Read on...

Frederick A. Johnsen

Preface 5


CHAPTER IBuilding a Better Bomber

'This world belongs to the energetic. " Ralph Waldo Emerson

Ed Heinemann peered over the shoulder of pilotVance Breese, sitting ahead of Heinemann in theprototype Northrop-designed BT torpedo bomberC3.s it hurtled toward earth in a vertical dive. Through

the windscreen, landscape seemed distant in a high obliqueview, and did not convey the sensation of speed as theencapsulated aviators wrung out the aircraft.

Steep, nearly vertical dives such as this one in 1937 oversouthern California set up a terrific buffeting in the tail of thescreaming dive bomber when its wing-mounted speed brakeswere deployed to slow its descent. Ed Heinemann was responsible for the design of much of the BT, including thehydraulic cylinders that activated the dive brakes mounted onthe trailing edge of the wing.

Years later, Heinemann recalled how the turbulent airvortices set up by the deployed speed brakes "damn nearshook the tail off."1 Pilot Vance Breese refused to takeHeinemann on any more of the tests because in the dive, thePratt and Whitney engine's carburetor emitted enough unburned gasoline through the hot exhaust to torch, endangering the fabric tail surfaces. This phenomenon apparently wasthe result of rapid barometric changes affecting engine carburetion as the aircraft dived into ever-thicker atmosphere. Noone would ever accuse Ed Heinemann of closeting himself inan office far from the action. He took pride in flying in aircraftwhich bore the Heinemann design touches. Unable to pinpointthe buffeting problem from his perch in the gunner's seat oftheBT any longer, Heinemann took another approach. "TheDepression was on and we were all broke, but I managed tobuy a Bell and Howell motion picture camera and put it on thewing. You wouldn't believe how much that tail oscillated."2

Heinemann returned to the design room. Charlie Helm, aNational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) advisor, suggested the magnitude of the vortices caused by thedeployed brakes could be reduced if air bled through the divebrake panels. Reluctantly at first, Ed inserted rows of circularholes in the speed brakes to allow some of the air to streamthrough the braking panels, rather than forcing all the air toburble overthe brakes.3 The brakes still more than adequatelyslowed the BT, and the bleed-through holes eliminated the tail.buffeting. In retrospect it seemed a simple solution, void offrills or complexities. This simplicity was to become a trademark of Ed Heinemann, who was proud to say his designphilosophy was conservative by nature.

The basic BT layout had been designed under the supervision of John K. Northrop for Douglas Aircraft Company,

OPPOSITE: Ed Heinemann, center, donned Navy khakis for afact-finding tour with the men of the U.S.S. Ticonderoga inthe fall of 1944. What the Douglas designer saw in the Pacificinfluenced the final design of the Douglas Skyraider divebomber. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)

before Northrop left Douglas' employ in 1937. Northrop hadfounded Douglas' EI Segundo, California operation, which heultimately left to form his own company. (Northrop kept someties; when his XP-61 Black Widow night fighter was ready forits maiden flight in May 1942, Northrop relied on veteran pilotVance Breese to take the big twin-engine XP-61 up for the firsttime.)4 "About the time Jack (Northrop) left, we converted theBT's engine and made a lot of changes and came out with anew airplane. That was in the two years after Jack left,"Heinemann said. Next, Heinemann and his associates tookthe second BT airframe and tried many variations, including ashort-lived tricycle landing gear. Changes to the fuselage,engine mount, cowling, powerplant, bomb displacement trapeze, canopy, tail, instruments and other features ultimately

. metamorphosed this aircraft into the famous Douglas SBDDauntless dive bomber. Because John K. Northrop wasinstrumental in the organization which designed the predecessors of the Dauntless, he has sometimes been cited as thecreator of the SBD. But while Northrop was an aeronauticaldesign genius in his own right, the Douglas SBD dive bomberbore enough evidence of Heinemann's handiwork for thepatent on the SBD to be taken out in his name.

The durable Dauntless was exploited by Navy and Marinepilots throughout World War II. But Navy planners soon wereanticipating the SBD's replacement, with improved performance made possible by the use of the new R-3350 radialengine, which generated 2,500 horsepower compared with1,200 horsepower for the Wright Cyclone powerplant of theSBD.

The Douglas company's response to the Navy's quest fora Dauntless replacement was the awkward-looking XSB2D,two prototypes of which were ordered by the Navy in October1943. The XSB2D featured tricycle landing gear, and remoteturrets in the fashion of the Douglas A-26 Invader bomber.One turret was mounted dorsally and another ventrally, tosweep rear and beam attack approaches. In addition to thepilot, a gunner was carried for the turrets. The wing of theSB2D was a cranked inverted gull, not as pronounced as thatof the F4U Corsair fighter. An internal bomb bay carried theplane's offensive ordnance.

The SB2D was only mediocre in performance. Hardly aworthy successor to the storied SBD Dauntless, the SB2Dnever entered service. Instead, the Curtiss SB2C Helldiverwent to sea with the carriers in late 1943. Many naval aviatorshad misgivings about the big, heavy SB2C. Even Curtissofficials referred to the Helldiver by one of its nicknames - "theBeast."5 With some naval aviator pundits, it was only naturalthat the SB2C nomenclature meant "Son of a Bitch, SecondClass." Ed Heinemann had his own reasons to dislike theHelldiver. When the Curtiss plant submitted its bid to the Navy,the Helldiver weighed substantially less, on paper, than theSB2D. When Helldivers were produced, the weight had in-

Building a Better Bomber 7

The abortive XBTD-1 project spawned this Navy bomber withdual nosewheels. It quickly lapsed into oblivion in favor ofthe much more workable XBT2D·1 which was to be theSkyraider prototype. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)

creased to that projected by the Douglas team for the SB2D,and Heinemann had been convinced such would be the casebefore Curtiss' design ever entered service.

The SB2D evolved into a single-seat copy, the BTD,which was evaluated by the Navy in June 1944. Problems withthe airfoil section used in conjunction with an inverted gull wingwere among the disappointments which attended the SB2D/BTD program. The single-seat BTD was the result of a changein Navy operational philosophy. The SBD and SB2D reflectedthe earlier doctrine of employing aircraft as scouts, with abombing capability also. As a scouting plane, the slow Dauntless had made good use of its back-seater, both as a defensive gunner and as another pair of eyes to scan for the enemy.But the BTD and its successors were to be dive bombersprimarily, and torpedo bombers secondarily. Their scoutingrole was downplayed ,and they were to have performance thatwas competitive enough to let a lone pilot engage or eludeenemy air opposition.sln 1944, nobody dreamed this changein doctrine would one day lead to dogfights between pistonengine dive bombers and jet MiG fighters, with the pistonpowered Skyraiders emerging victorious on two separateoccasions.

Though still not a sterling winner, the revised single-seatBTD flew better than its sire, the XSB2D. In the summer of1944, the Navy called representatives from Douglas, Martin,Fleetwing and Curtiss to Washington, D.C., to brief NavyBureau ofAeronautics officials on the status ofthe com panies'dive bomber projects. A hot, humid June day wore on outsideas the BuAer representatives exchanged views on the BTDwith Heinemann and his design assistant, Leo Devlin. WithHeinemann and Devlin were Douglas aerodynamicist GeneRoot and BTD project engineer Reid Bogert. The talks stagnated, so Heinemann boldly asked for the floor to make aproposal. Chairman of the meeting was assistant Bureau ofAeronautics chief Rear Admiral Lawrence B. Richardson, wholistened as Heinemann unfolded his idea. The BTD "Destroyer" was an enigma. Heinemann wanted to cancel theexisting BTD contract and apply its unspent money on an


In 1943, four of the men who would shape the Skyraiderprogram met for a drink. From left to right, Navy LCDR J.A.Thomas, Edward H. Heinemann, CDR J.N. Murphy, andHeinemann's right-hand man, designer Leo J. Devlin. (Photocourtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)

entirely new design which Heinemann had been hatching,using the R-2800 engine. Ed pressed for 30 days to preparethe new design for BuAer approval. Admiral Richardson waswilling to let Heinemann's team submit a new proposal for thedive bomber competition, but the admiral said the new planemust be built around the R-3350 engine, and the first lookwould be made at 9:00 a.m. the next morning, not 30 days lateras Ed had hoped for!?

Heinemann and his stunned engineering associates leftthe cool recesses of BuAer and returned to the Statler Hotel.Ed, Leo and Gene began putting an airplane on paper in ahotel room. When hunger gnawed at the engineers, they sentout for hamburgers and continued their incredible toiling.Heinemann was convinced of one thing: The XSB2D and BTDhad failed in part because the Douglas design team hadcatered to every wish of the Navy. In accommodating anencyclopedic list of features the Navy said it wanted, theaircraft had ultimately become exercises in compromise andits frequent bedfellow, mediocrity. Ed Heinemann determinedto give the Navy a dazzling dive bomber, while professionallyevaluating the wisdom of all of that service's design requests."If the Navy was not right, and we were sure they were notright, we told them."s

When Heinemann, Devlin and Root settheir pencils downat 3:00 in the morning, they surveyed Ed's dimensioneddrawings, Leo's weight computations, and Gene's aerodynamic calculations. "With those pieces of paper," Heinemannlater recalled, "we could pretty well define the airplane."Known initially as the XBT2D-1 ,this design was the beginningof the Skyraider series. "When I think back, I think I was moreconfident than I had any reason to be," Heinemann said ofthatmarathon redesign session. Perhaps part of Heinemann'sconfidence came from a feeling his new airplane was only aninterim plane at best anyway. "When we laid that airplane outoriginally, we thought it would last for five years."9 (That wasin 1944. The last Skyraider was built in February 1957, andSouth Vietnamese Skyraiders flew combat as late as 1975.)

mc:0jtoQ)

mCD::::CD..,.mo30CD..,.

CD

----'f~F5

////

The BT2D-1 was a straightforward design with few quirkS, unlike its failed predecessor BTD prototypes. ThisNovember 12,1945 drawing still bears strong resemblance to the last AD-7 to come off the Douglas production line more than a decade later. (Drawing courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)

BTZD-IDIVE BOMBER

~~~~~

OIlIlGl.' 'IHUtt COtl'AU, lie.n uc;UJOO 'lut

~.

-'I r~

-\I ~ ---------- -------- ----- -------- --- ----------- ~

t~ ~_v\.

rJI - ~ 1

~r1I

,~

~- .~

-'===----=-..;,:;,:--I::::':::;0:::::::::::::-;-_--'-.'

_------~9·4·'-----------

~M(}MITLIJ_I

Douglas Model BT2D-1 three-view drawing. (Courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)


Ed Heinemann's built-up motor mount departed from thenorm, and saved weight and space on the Skyraider. (Douglas Aircraft photo courtesy Harry Gann.)

BuAer pondered Heinemann's new design, and approvedthe use of the remaining BTD funds to flesh out the newXBT2D at Douglas' EI Segundo plant. Martin and Fleetwingwere the competitors to beat, and they each had a half-yearlead on the Douglas team. "We had to know what they weredoing and what their faults were, and capitalize on them,"

Heinemann related. He quickly discarded the idea of using aGrumman-style wing-folding mechanism which streamlinedthe wings back along the fuselage for compact storage aboardaircraft carriers. The mechanism needed a canted spar inorder to fold properly, and this was more complex than atraditional spar. "It didn't appeal to me," the conservativeHeinemann explained. Instead, the XBT2D's lower spar disengaged to allow the wings to fold overhead. "We'd never builta wing fold before, and we were concerned about it." Wherethe Bureau of Aeronautics specified that the wing-fold fittingsshould incorporate five percent overstress, the Douglas teamadded ten percent above that just to be sure the structurewould not fail. 10

The 36-year-old Heinemann organized the XBT2D design team at EI Segundo in the summer of 1944; from theDouglas Santa Monica plant he borrowed engineer HaroldAdams. For the first few weeks Heinemann called meetingsalmost daily for the purpose of focusing the design. Thesessions lasted 30 minutes to an hour or so. Using about adozen copies of a master outline drawing of the XBT2D,Heinemann asked his design team section chiefs to suggestchanges they deemed justifiable. These jam sessions wereproductive. At first, Devlin and Root conceived a Dauntlessstyle wing planform using a straight center section and tapered outer wing panels. But Ed thought this was merely aholdover from the old SSD with no engineering reason to exist,so he chose instead to use a constant taper from root to tip.This constant taper gave a broader wing chord at the root thanthe constant-center section would have, and Heinemann saidthis enhanced structural integrity. Heinemann also found itpossible to design the constant-taper wing at a lighter weightthan the SSD-style planform would have required, he said. 11

As the section chiefs refined the XBT2D's design, theirindividual section specialties of wing, tail, fuselage, stress,weight, powerplant and aerodynamics influenced the outcome. After the meetings, Bob Smith redrew the aircraft toincorporate the latest validated thinking of the working group.

Above left: Deep well for side-mounted dive brake action is visible in this factory view of the BT2D-1 under construction inJanuary 1945. Behind are two tails of ill-fated BTD aircraft on the line. Above right: Among Ed Heinemann's incorporationsinto the Skyraider design was a constant taper to the wing leading and trailing edges from tip to root, which he said easedconstruction and saved weight. (both - Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann.)


BT2D-1 taking shape on the Douglas line in February 1945. (Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann.)

"After aweek ortwo, there were no more changes," Heinemannsaid. Douglas had flirted with this design brainstorming technique on the A-26 Invader attack bomber for the Army AirForces, but the new XBT2D dive bomber was the first ofHeinemann's projects to fully exploit this philosophy. In theyears following the XBT2D's development, Heinemann triedto keep the same engineers doing the same section's tasks onlater designs, to build on their own prior experiences. TheXBT2D's smooth finish was the result offlush-riveting the skinto the airframe structure. Conservative Heinemann eschewedanything as exotic as the spot-welding technique Vought hadused on its sleek F4U Corsair fighter. Heinemann exhorted hisengineers to "...use things we know how to use," rather thanplunge into unorthodox techniques or materials. From hisearly years on the Northrop design team, Heinemann formeda negative opinion of castings and of magnesium - both ofwhich John Northrop placed great store in. Heinemann hadseen polar explorer Lincoln Ellsworth's Northrop Gammacome back with weakened castings, and the impression stuckin his mind as he shepherded the forerunner of the Skyraiderin 1944. He challenged his engineers to prove that alternate

12 Douglas A·1 Skyraider

materials were better than aluminum before committing suchmaterials to the design. 12

The Douglas team worked with Navy counterparts including Captain (later Admiral) John Murphy, head of BuAer'saircraft section; Commander Emerson Fawkes and Captain(later Admiral) John Thomas. The Navy men concurred withHeinemann when he came up with a novel engine mountdesign for the XBT2D. Eight welded tubes originally weredevised to support the engine in a conventional manner. Butthese hampered oil-cooler installation and cluttered the engine accessory section space. Material strength was at theheart of the problem. With the traditional welded steel tubestructure, all eight tubes were necessary. "It took four legs ifwe made it out of sheet." So the plane's motor mount wasradicalized into a built-up truss of one-eighth-inch aluminumwhich resulted in more unencumbered spaceforthe oil cooler,oil pumps, carburetor and other appliances. When confrontedwith this apparent aberration in his conservative-design philosophy, Heinemann shrugged. His eyes flashed the beginnings of a smile as he explained, "Well, you have to makesome progress." The mandated R-3350 engine was large. To

Douglas test pilot LaVerne Browne made the first flight in theXBT2D-1 on March 18, 1945, while carrier dive bombers stillengaged the enemy in combat. Browne, who portrayed"Tailspin Tommy" in a series of 1930s motion pictures, testflew hundreds of Skyraiders for Douglas. Recalling themaiden flight of the prototype of the Skyraider, he said, "Iwish I could interject some dramatic incident that occurredon that first flight. There wasn't any. I just floated around upthere for an hour and a half and brought her down, though Idid do something that's unprecedented, I believe, for a firsttrip. The airplane handled so well that I put it through rollsand Immelmans to check it for maneuverability." (Douglasphoto)

properly streamline a fuselage behind this engine, the fuselage took on a substantial cross section. Fuel stowage in thespacious fuselage was a natural way to give the XBT2D longrange, especially since this aircraft deleted its predecessors'internal weapons bay. Rather than invite problems from fuelleaks that sometimes attended rigid metal fuselage tanks,Heinemann chose the so-called "udder tank," a self-sealingrubber fuel cell which hung from the fuselage ceiling. 13 AsHeinemann followed the service career of his Skyraider design, he learned the planes sometimes tanked enough gas tofly for more than 10 hours, after which the weary, fatiguedpilots occasionally had to be lifted from the cockpits. 14

Later in the summer of 1944, the Navy's Bureau ofAeronautics invited makers of naval aircraft to send engineering representatives to the Pacific Theater of operations tolearn about aircraft operations in actual service. DouglasAircraft tapped Ed Heinemann, and he looked forward to theexperience with professional curiosity. "This was the beginning of one of the most important segments in my life. I was onthe way to a grand symposium which convened aboardcarriers and air stations throughout the South Pacific. I wouldmeet with the men who flew and maintained the planes that mycolleagues in the industry and I had designed and built. I wasabout to discover undeniably just how good or bad ourproducts were."15 Heinemann's counterparts at Curtiss andFleetwing failed to get appointed by their companies, so ratherthan delay any further, the Navy packed Heinemann aboardaConsolidated PB2Y Coronado flying boat on a mail run to thePacific on Friday, 13 October, 1944.

Heinemann shipped out of Hawaii aboard the aircraftcarrier Ticonderoga (CV-14) five days later. He spent timewith the aircraft maintenance crews, patiently hearing theirgripes as well as their praise, throughout which ran a commonthread - a plea for simplicity. Dressed in khakis and sportingan overseas cap, civilian Heinemann blended in well with hisNavy hosts as he circulated among pilots and mechanics, andobserved many launches and recoveries ofHelldivers, Hellcats,and Avengers. From copious notes, Heinemann digesteddiverse recommendations: Chart boards currently in use weretoo heavy; all running lights should be on one rheostat; 20millimeter cannons were preferable to .50-caliber machineguns.16

As Ed Heinemann toured the Pacific in the fall of 1944, theprospect of a protracted war against Japan was very real. In1944, a Navy PB4Y-2 aircrewman wrote, "...we had been atwar with Japan for two and a half years, and we wereconsidering the possibility of a five- to ten-year war ahead ofUS."17In 1945, aU.S. Army Air Forces B"24 Liberator flew withthe legend "Golden Gate in '48" emblazoned beside its cockpit. A less optimistic crew named their Liberator "Breadline in'49." To all but the very few persons who were privy to thenuclear secrets of the United States in 1944-45, peace withJapan seemed several years distant at best. Ed Heinemannfancied that his XBT2D dive bomber would wade into battleagainst Japan, and like a proud father, he wanted to give hisdive bomber all the advantages he could bestow.

On newly-captured Guam in November, Ed observed theravages of coral dust as it coated aircraft and made a gummy,abrasive mixture with oil and grease. It was while on Guamthat he decided to put canvas barriers over the airfoil sectionsofthe wings when they were folded, to keep the elements fromreaching the wing guns and internal equipment. Heinemannhad seen similar canvas boots on the folded wings of Grummanaircraft in the Pacific. But where the Grumman boots had to beremoved prior to extending the wings, Heinemann's divebomber would incorporate canvas baffles which could be leftin place always, thereby simplifying maintenance choreswhile protecting the aircraft. Heinemann returned from thePacific more convinced than ever that a single-place divebomber was in order, and that dive bombers should handlethat role aggressively, sparing fighters whenever possiblefrom compromising their mission by lugging bombs or rockets.18

Back at EI Segundo, Heinemann pushed his team to keepthe BT2D on schedule. Project engineer Reid Bogert, who hadsweated out the early XBT2D drawings in the Statler Hotelwith Heinemann, Devlin, and Root, fell ill and was replaced byLeonard Quick. By now, the BT2D was known as the Dauntless II. The Douglas design team worked under stringentrules: No part could be overweight unless an equal amount ofweight was pared off elsewhere in the design; some partswhich failed to meet minimum weight standards were testedbefore final acceptance, to make sure they were not madestronger - hence heavier - than their maximum loads wouldrequire.

An in-house memo circulated among BT2D project workers explained that the saving of 100 pounds on the aircraft


An XBT2D-1 test in the 1946-47 period was the installation of rocket tubes outboard of the 20-millimeter wing guns. From thetubes, one in each wing, spin-stabilized five-inch rocket projectiles were fired at ground targets. The program was notadopted. (Photo courtesy Douglas via Harry Gann.)


Four Navy AD-1s in echelon show off the ventral dive brake. (Douglas Aircraft Co. photo via Harry Gann.)

could shorten carrier takeoff roll by eight feet, or increasecombat radius by 22 miles, or raise sea-level climb rate byeighteen feet a minute, or boost the speed by about a third ofa mile an hour. By challenging the Navy's original request foran internal bomb bay, Heinemann's crew shaved 200 poundsoff the weight of the earlier BTD by eliminating the bayaltogether. Fuselage-mounted dive brakes on the BT2D saved70 pounds. By making the stub wing a one-piece structure thatpassed beneath the fuselage, rather than a two-piece stubwing, 100 pounds were lopped off the old BTD weight. Thehorizontal stabilizer likewise was a one-piece structure passing through the aft fuselage/rudder area, saving 20 pounds offthe old BTD weight. When all the weight-saving measureswere used, the BT2D was a half ton lighter than Douglas hadpromised the Navy, giving that much more flexibility to Navymission planners who could hang more ordnance orfuel. Afterearly Korean War aircraft losses, armor plate weighing about620 pounds was bolted to the planes, markedly enhancingtheir survivability while remaining within acceptable weights. 19

The BT2D had a gross weight of 16,500 pounds, whichwas 1,500 pounds less than the BTD. If an aircraft deservedto wear the name of Dauntless II in honor of its sterling SBDpredecessor, it was the BT2D. Fuel servicing time per manwas two minutes on the BT2D, compared with 13 on the BTD.If the "udder" fuel tank of the BT2D required removal, the task

required two man hours. For the BTD, this took 72 man hours;for the SBD Dauntless, 144 manhours.

The old SB2D and BTD had better performance in theirhigher speed ranges than they did in slow flight, where theirspecial wing airfoil sections were not at home. The BT2DDauntless II went back to basics, in the form of a morestandard NACA (National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics) airfoil which gave better slow-speed handling, thoughmaybe at the expense of performance at the top end of theplane's speed range. This NACA airfoil gave the Dauntless IIgreater lift than the BTD.20

When the XBT2D was first conceived, the Navy stillplaced value on zero-lift vertical dives. A wing provides lift tocounteract gravity in level flight. In a vertical dive, the airfoil isstill capable of generating "lift", albeit at 90 degrees to the pullof gravity, since the plane is now nosed down. With no similarforce tugging in the opposite direction, the lift factor can causethe diving plane to describe a descent path that is not trulyvertical. Dive brakes which keep a plane's speed from buildingup too fast can help promote vertical dives, but Heinemanncould see problems ahead for the heavy XBT2D if its brakeswere expected to keep the plane slow and stable in a truevertical zero-lift dive. The wing-mounted brakes of the SBDDauntless helped promote zero-lift dives by acting as spoilers,disrupting normal lift over the wing. Heinemann pondered


AD-2 with radar pod, at NAS Alameda in September 1948. (Photo by William T. Larkins.)

wing brakes for the XBT2D, but discarded them because theywould have complicated the wing-folding design and couldcontribute to buffeting. A reversible-pitch propeller was considered, but no prop with adequate characteristics was available. The design teamed even toyed with the idea of usingparachutes as dive brakes, but this plan was not adopted.

Heinemann reasoned he could adequately slow the XBT2DDauntless II with the more-stable fuselage-mounted brakes ifthe Navy would back off from its quest for zero-lift dives. In theprocess, a weight savings over other braking systems couldbe attained with the fuselage brakes. In keeping with his vowto challenge the Navy's design specifications if they seemedunrealistic, Ed Heinemann contested the wisdom of trying to

make the XBT2D fly vertical zero-lift dives.21 In use the SBDDauntless often flew a 70-degree dive. 22 Ultimately, the Navy'sBureau of Aeronautics agreed that the XBT2D would bedesigned for 70-degree dives.

This dive brake philosophical change opened up newrealms for the XBT2D. Where the older SBD had difficultymaintaining level flight with its wing-mounted brakes extended, the XBT2D suffered no loss of lift with its fuselagebrakes. The brakes on the XBT2D Dauntless II could bedeployed for maneuvering advantages for formations or descents, as well as air-to-air combat. With three brake panelson the aft fuselage - one on each side and the third ventrallylocated - the XBT2D reached 300 miles an hour in a dive. In

Early XAD-1W photo shows belly radome, and early-style flat-paned windscreen. (Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann.)


AD-1 in glossy sea blue sported insignia with insignia blue background to stars and bars; flat black anti-glare panel.Grumman F8F Bearcat escorted. (H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collection)

a clean-configuration dive, the big Dauntless II could hit 500miles an hour, though this was of little value in combat sincethe pullout had to begin much sooner at higher speeds.

The XBT2D cockpit went through five mock-ups at considerable expense by Douglas, to ensure pilot comfort, safety,and ease of operation. Special instruments with quarter-inchnumbers were evolved for the XBT2D instrument panel afterHeinemann's team determined this size to be needed toenhance instrument legibility at the average XBT2D cockpitdistance of 24 inches from the pilot's eyes.23

Heinemann's Pacific carrier cruise manifested itself inmany pilot and groundcrew conveniences built into the Dauntless II. Douglas personnel estimated only half as much timewould be required to service the Dauntless II as had beenneeded for the ill-fated BTD. The Dauntless II was nearingcompletion in time for a March 1945 first flight, and its builderswere enthusiastic about the plane's performance on paper.

The landing gear retracted aft into the wings, as the mainwheels rotated 90 degrees to lie flush in wing recesses. Whenit became apparent the production main gear assemblieswould not be ready to meet the March schedule, the Douglascompany procured Vought F4U Corsair landing gear, whichretracted in the same fashion as the gear planned for theDauntless II. This rearward-retracting landing gear offered anadvantage over gear which retracted inboard or outboard.

With rearward-retracting landing gear, less spanwise spacewas consumed by the landing gear, leaving more underwingand underbody space open for hanging external stores. Thisunderwing area would not go wasted on the Dauntless II.

The prototype XBT2D-1 emerged from final assemblysporting a Dash-8 version of the R-3350 engine instead of theDash-24 of the production version, which, like the landinggear, was unavailable. On the 18th of March, 1945, war inEurope was playing out to an inevitable Allied victory, as U.S.Army Air Forces B-29s were continuing a 9 March shift intactics to night incendiary raids against Japanese cities, asopposed to standard daylight precision bombing. While victory in Europe seemed certain on that spring day, the waragainst Japan still showed the potential for dragging onseveral more years. Thus, not a few engineers and navalplanners looked to the Douglas XBT2D-1 as a tool to defeatJapan when the first Dauntless II roared into the southernCalifornia sky that March.

LaVerne Browne was at the controls of the' naturalaluminum XBT2D-1 for that first takeoff. Thirty-two test hopslater, the Douglas team certified the XBT2D-1 for delivery tothe Patuxent Naval Air Test Center in Maryland, on 7 April,1945.24

Meanwhile, the competing Kaiser Fleetwing XBTK wasstill unflown, and the Martin XBTM had been returned to the


Above left: Ground run-up of AD-1 revealed white radar pod on pylon. Above right: Wings folded, showing Ed Heinemann'scanvas wing-root dust boot in place. (both - H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collection)

factory for modification after a less-than-stellar debut atPatuxent River. As the Douglas XBT2D-1 raced through itsNavy tests in only five weeks, Navy test pilots heaped superlatives upon the new bomber. On 5 May, 1945, the Navysigned a letter of intentto buy 548 BT2D aircraft. As productionswung into action, problems cropped up with propeller vibrations and engine exhaust cracks and detonation problems.Production delays ensued as the powerplant and propellerwere debugged.25 The Aeroproducts propeller, which was tobe manufactured by the Aeroproducts-Allison Division ofGeneral Motors, followed the Aeroproducts design philosophy of brazing sheet steel to a forged, ribbed internal structure,providing substantial strength and structural integrity evenwhen punctured by gunfire. After its initial XBT2D-1 teethingtroubles were corrected, the Aeroproducts four-bladed prop

was touted for its durability. Several times during the KoreanWar, direct hits from 37-millimeter rounds tore holes in theseprops without destroying them or ruining their ability to propeltheir aircraft to safety.26

The BTD was lauded by the Navy for its simplicity andperformance. The Heinemann decision to challenge Navydesign requirements which he considered unsound had paidoff in an uncluttered airplane that was not overburdened withcompromises in its design. In February 1946, with reducedpeacetime contracts in effect for both the Douglas and Martinbombers, the name of the BT2D was changed from DauntlessII to Skyraider. The Douglas pattern of Sky-prefixed namesalready included the transport Skytrain, Skytrooper andSkymaster designs; Navy combat planes following theSkyraiderwould bear names like Skyshark, Skyray, Skyhawk,

Outboard hardpoints on this early AD, BuAer No. 122225, carried rails for HVAR rockets. (both - H.G. Martin/Kansas AviationHistorical Society collection)


and Skywarrior, among others. Two months after changingthe Douglas bomber's name to Skyraider, the Navy Department revised its aircraft nomenclature. Thus the BT2D-1became the AD-1 under the new simplified system, whichstood for Attack, Douglas, model One.

The Kaiser-Fleetwing XBTK, powered by the R-280034W engine, never progressed beyond five 1945 prototypes.The Martin BTM became the AM Mauler under the reviseddesignation system. The Mauler airframe rode behind a Prattand Whitney R-4360 engine. The Mauler was three feet longerthan the Skyraider, and weighed about two tons more than anAD-2. The Mauler demonstrated a maximum ordnance loadcarrying ability of 10,689 pounds; in May of 1953, an AD-4Skyraider carried 10,500 pounds of bombs as part of its usefulload which weighed in at 14,941 pounds total. The AM-1Mauler was a viable warplane for the Navy, and 151 of theMartin bombers were built. But the Douglas Skyraider, with itssimple, well-planned design philosophy, was selected for fleetstandardization, resulting in termination ofthe Mauler production run in October 1949. Most of the AM-1 s were assigned toReserve units the following year, and many of the former firstline Mauler squadrons converted to the Skyraider at that time.

Notes1. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20July 1982.2. Ibid.3. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - CombatAircraft Designer, p. 36.4. Frederick A. Johnsen, Darkly Dangerous- The Northrop P-61 Black WidowNight Fighter. Tacoma, Bomber Books, 1981, p.2.5. Service Department, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Airplane Division, Columbus, Ohio, Pilot and Beast: What Every Young Pilot Should Know Aboutthe Helldiver.6. B.R. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, p. 11.7. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - CombatAircraft Designer, pp. 100-105.8. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20July 1982.9. Ibid.10. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Ibid.13. Ibid.14. Ibid.15. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - CombatAircraft Designer, p. 111.16. Ibid.17. Lt. R.L. Meierhenry, publisher, Battle DiaryofVPB-121, San Diego: Fryeand Smith, Ltd., 1945.18. Heinemann's trip was written in report form for the Bureau of Aeronauticsas Report On Trip To Pacific Combat Area, 27 November 1944, ReportNumber ES 6712, EI Segundo Division, Douglas Aircraft.19. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - CombatAircraft Designer, pp. 125-140.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. Barrett Tillman, The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War Two, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976, p.14.23. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - CombatAircraft Designer, pp. 125-140.24. B.A. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, pp. 18-19.25. Ibid.26. "Tough Props," Aviation Week, May 4, 1953.



CHAPTER IIBetween the Wars:

Skyraiders Enter the Navy

P"To something new, to something strange." Longfellow, Keramos

ost-World War II Navy air was not unlike an awk- response-theA3D Skywarrior.3 Meanwhile, in 1949, producward teenager, possessing great strength, but still tion deliveries began of the North American AJ Savageatrifle uncomfortable with its rapidly-nearing adult- nuclear strike aircraft, powered by two reciprocating Pratt and

hood in the simultaneous jet- and atomic-ages. Whitney R-2800 engines and one Allison J33 turbojetNavy planners clearly understood the value of jet propul- powerplant.

sion. Back as early as 20August 1943, the Navy signed a letter The AD Skyraider also had nuclear-weapons capability,of intent asking the young McDonnell Aircraft Corporation to but its rough-and-ready attack role was not especially threatdesign an all-jet carrier-based fighter aircraft. The straight- ened by the advent of the A3D and AJ.wingXFD-1 Phantom became the first American all-jet aircraft While the AD was waging war in Korea, Ed Heinemannto operate on an aircraft carrier when it landed aboard the USS was pondering the Skyraider's successor at Douglas. HisFranklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) on 21 JUly 1946. team worked from 1950 to 1952 on a single-engine jet succes-

Butthe airframes and wing airfoils which capitalized on jet sor, the speedy A4D Skyhawk. The Skyhawkfirstflew 22 Junespeeds sometimes demanded fast landing speeds and long 1954, with squadron deliveries to Navy Attack Squadron VAtakeoff rolls unless flung into the air with a strong catapult. 72 beginning in October 1956.4 The Skyhawk, often affectionEarly jet engines also required more time than propellers to ately called "Heinemann's Hot Rod," could carry a load ofrev up to produce significant power increases. For carrier 5,000 pounds, later raised to more than 9,000 pounds, aloperations, quick applications of power were vital for wave- though the A4D did not enjoy the great range or loiter time ofoffs. The Navy cautiously hedged its bets when ordering the the Skyraider.Ryan FR-1 Fireball in February of 1943. Ultimately, the Grumman A-6 (originally called A2F) In-

The Fireball combined a conventional tractor Wright R- truder would finish off the remaining Skyraiders in Navy1820 radial piston engine driving a three-blade propeller with service, but the Navy didn't even request design proposals fora General Electric 1-16 turbojet mounted in the aft fuselage. such an aircraft until 1956. The A-6 did not enter service untilThe piston engine and propeller allowed rapid acceleration it flew with VA-42 in early 1963.response; the jet gave a boost in speed, albeit modest, from Thus, while the Navy planted the seeds which grew to bea cruise of 152 miles an hour to a top speed of 404 miles an all-jet replacements for the Skyraider, the piston-engine ADhour at 17,800 feet. Fireballs began carrier qualification trials could not be discarded prematurely.aboard the USS Ranger (CV-4) on 1 May 1945. These When World War II ended in September 1945, orders forunusual aircraft were phased out of the Navy flying inventory many military aircraft were reduced or eliminated altogether.in 1947 following service aboard the aircraft carriers USS The Navy's original request for 548 Skyraiders was quicklyWake Island (CVE-65), USS Bairoko (CVE-115), and USS trimmed to 377 aircraftwhen peaceinthe Pacificwas achieved.Badoeng Strait (CVE-116).1 Soon, this was further pared back to 277 planes.s

With acceleration, expeditious takeoff and landing rolls, The 25 XBT2D-1 s, which bore the X designating anload-carrying capacity, and endurance all compromised by experimental design, but which were builtto production plans,early naval jet fighter aircraft, it was obvious in the 1940s that were delivered to the Navy during 1945. Before a year hadcarrier-borne attack aircraft would still depend on propellers passed, pilots from Navy squadrons VA-3B and VA-4B hadfor the time being, if they were to carry useful payloads and finished carrier qualifications aboard the USS Sicily.perform their intended functions. The early AD-1s bore Ed Heinemann's weight-saving

The Douglas AD Skyraider still had a home in the bur- design philosophy. The main landing gear and its wing attachgeoning jet-age Navy. When Ed Heinemann's team was ments were designed to withstand carrier landing sink rates ofdesigning the Skyraider back in 1944, word from the Navy's 14 feet per second. In 1946, the Navy began noting seriousBureau of Aeronautics projected a five-year life span for this buckling of AD-1 wing structure around the landing gear.aircraft. Heinemann tacked on another five years, and guessed Investigation revealed many landings were made at muchhis attack bomber would be around until about 1955 or SO.2 higher sink rates than had originally been projected for the

As early as 1947, the Bureau of Aeronautics had ex- Skyraider. The vertical forces were driving the landing gearpressed interest in having a carrier-capable jet bomber which into the wings as the AD-1 s slammed into carrier decks.s

could deliver strategic nuclear weapons. It was two years If the actual sink rates could not be kept to a maximum ofbefore Ed Heinemann's design team at Douglas finished their 14 feet per second, the AD would have to be strengthened.

OPPOSITE: A mixture of single-seat attack Skyraiders and Ri~ets were loosen.ing a.nd skin was wrinkling o~ the. AD-~ smulti-place electronics birds stretches into the recesses of gOing through service trials out of Alameda, California, Withthe Douglas plant in a factory portrait of unusually artistic the Navy's Pacific Fleet Air Headquarters. Initial reinforce-composition. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann) ments applied to the AD-1 s failed to halt deterioration of the

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 21

The first production AD-3W shows fuselage compartment crew door ahead of national insignia. This compartment replacedside-mounted dive brakes. Revised windscreen from earlier flat-paned design is evident. (Douglas photo courtesy HarryGann)

Above and below: Two views depict the first AD-4, BuAer number 122853. AD-4s figured prominently in Korean War Skyraideroperations. (Douglas photos via Harry Gann)


AD-4Q shows rear compartment crew door plus side brakes in this retouched photo. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

structure. A major strengthening redesign was instituted byDouglas at EI Segundo. A compromise to Ed Heinemann'soriginal design was inevitable. The Skyraider put on 400pounds to secure its structure against the stresses of carrierlandings. But there was value to Heinemann's weight-conscious design ideas. Only those structures which absolutelyneeded strengthening put on weight; the rest of the originallylightweight structure still left leeway for later payload orstructural additions which might have overgrossed an airplane with an initially heavier weight.

Even with the 400-pound rework, the AD-1 s began exhibiting wing-fuselage joint damage and landing gear leg deficiencies. Skin doublers in the wheel wells, internal wing

strengthening, and reinforcement of the wing skin was added,finally allowing the AD to pass sink-rate tests in excess of 23feet per second. During this evolutionary strengthening ofthedamaged AD-1 s, the structural improvements were incorporated into the remaining AD-1 s and the early AD-2s on theDouglas assembly line.

Where the 277 production AD-1s had achieved a topspeed of 366 miles an hour behind the R-3350-24 enginewhich put out 2,500 takeoff horsepower, the AD-2 of 1948used the improved R-3350-26W powerplant to obtain 3,020horsepower, giving the Dash-2 Skyraider a listed top speed of321 miles an hour at 18,300feet. The AD-2 featured enhancedfuel capabilities and more bomb racks than the AD-1. The

AD-4N, with aft crew compartment and dorsal air vent, carries electronics counter measures pod beneath starboard wing, andsearchlight pod under port wing on April 11, 1952. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)


variants. The first of 178 AD-2s was delivered early in 1948.Twenty-one of these were AD-2Q versions with an elec

tronic countermeasures capability in a compartment behindthe fuselage udder gas tank. Room for an operator was madein this aft-fuselage location, and the dive brakes were retainedoutside the compartment, giving the AD-2Q the same basic

Additional vertical fins aided stability of the awkward-looking AD-4W with its belly-mounted radome. (Douglas photos courtesy Harry Gann)

workhorse Skyraider was evolving into an ever-better combatmachine.

Early AD-2s appeared with the flat-paned windshield ofthe AD-1 and earlier models. Later, AD-2s employed a windshield and canopy which had markedly curved side panels,which were used on the remainder of the single-seat AD

AD-3W aft compartment was packed with gear, as evidenced by this company rendering. (Courtesy Harry Gann)


The tracks of the tides and wakes of ships lace San Francisco Bay behind an AD-1 (BuAer No. 09204) belonging to attacksquadron VA-20A on 2 June 1947. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

performance as a stock AD-2. One AD-2 earmarked for targettug modification was soon outmoded by the development ofthe Mark 22 Dart target, a system which could be mounted toany Skyraider. The AD-2Q was passed by the Patuxent Rivertest center 30 November, 1948.

When the AD-3 followed the Dash-2 down the productionline, a landing gear oleo strut travel of fourteen inches wasused instead oftheten inches previously called for. Some finetuning still was being made to tame abrupt carrier landings.

The AD-3W mounted a radar in a bulbous fairing beneaththe fuselage. Two operators, seated side-by-side in the aftfuselage, manned the radar. As the American fleet had nearedthe Japanese home islands in 1945, kamikaze attacks threatened their advance. Picket ships were posted ahead of themain fleet, to detect incoming Japanese aircraft, but soon thepickets took an unacceptably high toll of losses. If the Navycould elevate radar to increase its line-of-sight, the task ofdetecting incoming hostile planes could be performed withgreater safety, closer to the main fleet. Wartime Navy planners initially favored using the four-engine Douglas C-54transport as a platform for APS-20E search radar, but sea-

soned Navy fighter interception specialists argued that theunarmed C-54s would be decimated in the skies near Japan.Instead, Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress bombers, redesignated PB-1 Ws, were modified for this role, so they could bringtheir dozen .50-caliber machine guns to bear in any combat.?

But the naval Flying Fortresses, which entered service toolate for World War II, required land bases. The big AD-3 of1948 could bring an umbrella of airborne radar protectionaboard the carriers at sea. The Skyraider's Airborne EarlyWarning (AEW) radome first was fitted to the sole XAD-1W,which had started out as an XBT2D-1 .

The AD-3W did not ease into fleet service without operational problems. The large ventral radome created someaerodynamic situations which Douglas engineers found difficult to recreate in a wind tunnel. This led to some surprisesduring flight testing of the radar Skyraiders. On 14 October1948, an AD-3W test aircraft was going through scheduledmaneuvers at Patuxent River. Early indications were routine,with but minor changes being made to the plane to enhancestability.


Bearing pre-1947 style national insignia is the XBT2D-1QSkyraider with countermeasures provisions. EffectiveJanuary 1947, a red bar was to be added to the white barsflanking the star. Long prop dome was unusual forSkyraiders. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann)

This Skyraider was aloft the following day when a fuel tankwhich should have been nearly full registered empty on thegauge as the R-3350 engine wheezed and manifested all thesymptoms of fuel starvation. The test pilot, Lieutenant CommanderWeems, brought the stricken AD-3W down for awaterlanding on the Patuxent River's surface. The broad radomeplaned over the water like a boat hull, and Lieutenant Commander Weems was able to prolong this action until the AD3W slid up on the shallow riverbank.

When the Navy investigated the unusual mishap, theaccident board concluded that the shape of the large radomehad altered the airflow over fuel vents, causing the udder tankto collapse as its gas siphoned overboard. The conditioncausing this fluke was corrected.

The following month, Douglas test pilot R.O. Rahn pushedan AD-3W prototype into a high-speed dive during a testseries monitoring the radome's aerodynamic characteristicsunder such conditions. Rahn was jammed down into the AD'sseat by a violent uncommanded pitch-up and rollover whichprobably resulted in a maximum loading of eleven gs on theAD-3W.a Rahn brought the Skyraider back under control, andflew to the Douglas Santa Monica, California, plant for alanding. The Santa Monica control tower crew told Rahn his

ECM-Iaden AD-1Q, circa 1947. (Photo courtesy Edward H.Heinemann)


The AD-1Q (BuAer No. 09372), with 1947 red added to thebars of the national insignia. Dust boot is in place over theexposed wing root. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann)

radome was gone from the belly of the AD-3W as he approached for landing. This plane had carried only the radomecover, and not the actual radar dish. Rahn had most emphatically found the AD-3W's high-speed dive parameters.

In addition to the 31 AD-3Ws, 124 straight AD-3s weredelivered, along with 15 AD-3Ns for night sorties, and 23countermeasure AD-30s. Two of the -3Ns were converted toAD-3S configuration as submarine killers intended to operatein concert with two AD-3Es modified from AD-3Ws, as submarine hunters.

During 1949, Douglas introduced the AD-4 on the shopfloor. Changes from the Dash-Three included use of a P-1autopilot in the AD-4, replacement of the older APS-4 radarwith APS-19A equipment, and smaller changes. The first of372 AD-4s reached squadrons in 1950. AD-4Bs (the liB"denoted special armament) were modified to givethis Skyraiderthe capability of using tactical nuclear weapons. These totaled165 aircraft. The 307 AD-4Ns were equipped for night operations. Thirty-nine AD-40s carried countermeasures equipment, and 168 AD-4Ws slung the belly-mounted radar scanner.

Mission requirements dictated converting 29 AD-4s toAD-4B configuration, while 63 AD-4s were winterized under

Publicists delighted in comparing the Skyraider's capacity forordnance with the smaller total carried by a World War II fourengine B-17 bomber. This maximum load was photographedin May 1953. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann)

Fifteen bombs of varying capacities are mounted on the external hard points of this AD-4B. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

the designation AD-4L. When 159 AD-4Ns were stripped forday-attack duties, they were classified AD-4NAs. Twentythree more AD-4NAs were built in this configuration. Thirtyseven AD-4Ns were winterized to become AD-4NLs.

The AD-5 marked some major changes in the Skyraiderdesign. Its production was extended in part due to the KoreanWar, which proved the utility ofthe AD in the jet age. The Dash-

Five Skyraider's fuselage was lengthened two feet, and widened to provide for a side-by-side crew seating arrangement.

A main selling point of the AD-5 was this enlarged fuselage, which Douglas said could be converted from the basicAD-5 day attack bomber to an AD-5N night attack version oran AD-5W airborne early warning or anti-submarine patrolaircraft. This basic chassis employed what Ed Heinemann

A total of 12 five-inch high velocity aircraft rockets (HVARs) could be carried by Skyraiders, as seen on this early AD-1. Old·style flat-paned windscreen is readily visible. (U.S. Air Force photo)


Above: One of 63 winterized AD-4Ls, with de-icer boots, carries a pair of 11.7S-inch Tiny Tim rockets in addition to 12 five-inchmissiles and a centerline bomb. Early Skyraider with pre-1947 insignia painted under, as well as on, fuselage dive brakes,carries five-inch and 11.7S-inch air-to-ground rockets. (both - Douglas photo via Harry Gann)


Among the changes built into the basic AD-5 was the lack ofmain wheel doors to save weight, and the relocation of the

have, making it feasible to produce the single-seat AD-6 andAD-7 later when the need arose. 10

The roles offered by Douglas for the AD-5 in 1953 were:

- VIP transport kit, with four plush rear-facing seats fastening tostuds in the floor behind the flight deck, for quick disconnect.- High-density passenger kit, using two center-facing benchseats capable of carrying ten passengers plus a flight crew oftwo.- Cargo kit, featuring a hoist and plywood flooring in the spacebehind the pilot, for carrying up to a ton of cargo.- Ambulance kit, with four litters and a hoist.- Long-range kit, using a pair of 150-gallon fuel tanks, to doublethe internal fuel tankage, plus external tanks.- Tow-target kit, including a belly pod for the target reel.- Photographic kit, featuring five aerial mapping or reconnais-sance cameras.

A·1H carries 84 folding-fin rockets in 12 underwing pods, plus 18 new-type low-drag gravity bombs on multiple ejector racks.(Douglas photo)

called "the Detroit philosophy." This meant the AD-5 starteddown the assembly line in one basic form, and emerged fromthe other end customized to one of the three basic versions,after the fashion of Detroit automobile assembly lines of theday. Special kits offered other multiple roles for the AD-5. In1953, Heinemann was quoted in Aviation Week magazine assaying "We do not advocate doing this to all aircraft." For multiuse planes all too frequently resulted in disappointing compromises in performance.9

Nearly 30 years later, Heinemann was even more to thepoint when characterizing the boxy AD-5: "The Dash-Five waskind of a dog. It was never really accepted, but they (the Navy)bought it and used it." "It was kind of a homeless airplane,"Heinemann added. Heinemann never was totally sold on themulti-use concept. Douglas officials told the Navy the DashFive could be configured for a variety of roles, "and sureenough, they bought some," Heinemann said with a trace ofirony in his voice, for defense planners have a weakness forso-called multi-role aircraft. But the order for AD-5s kept theSkyraider production line open longer than it otherwise would

AD·1 wings stagger to fold, as the system powering the mechanism hefts the weight of the outer wing panels. The squadronis VA-20A at NAS Alameda in 1947. See also photos page 18. (Photos by William T. Larkins)


Retouched Douglas photo of 1949 shows AD-3E with longturtledeck behind cockpit. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

AD-4NL with searchlight pod under wing, and winterizationfeatures in place. Wingtip mounts a test probe in this 31August 1951 company shot. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

radar operator from the aft fuselage to the seat beside the pilotin versions calling for a second crew member. This latteralteration facilitated communication between the two crewmen, enhancing their ability to work as a team. The capaciousAD-5 fuselage made possible inflight servicing of the electronic equipment aboard Dash-Fives so equipped. The regular AD-5 day attack version, with four 20-mm. cannon, couldbe operated by one person. Initially, AD-5s carried only one

AD·3W radome installation. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

A blue bus. This early AD-5 photo, taken November 1952,shows the forward-swept large-store pylons introduced onthis and subsequent Able Dogs. The AD-5 could go to war orcarry passengers and freight, as needed. (Douglas photo viaHarry Gann)

set of flight controls, for the pilot in the left seat. But when theSouth Vietnamese air force began employing AD-5s andAmerican advisors before the United States was overtly flyingcombat in southeast Asia, the Navy added a second set offlight controls, both to train Vietnamese aviators, and in somecases, to obscure the fact that American pilots were actuallymaking combat strikes in VNAF Skyraiders.

Night-flying AD-4N carried flash suppresors on muzzles of 20-millimeter wing cannons, as well as ridge above exhaust stacksto block flame from affecting pilot's night vision. (H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collection)


A Navy AD·4NA, with rear compartment, shows off gray-and-white camouflage scheme initiated in 1955. The photo was takenin 1956 at Moffett Field; AD·4NAs that survived in the inventory until 1962 were redesignated A·1 Ds. (William T. Larkinsphoto)

AD·6s rolled off the Douglas line in dark sea blue paint overall. Navy squadron VA-65 added green and white trim to thisspecimen, photographed at Oakland, California in September 1955. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

The AD-5N could use sonar and a searchlight, to becomea one-ship sub hunter and killer, theoretically obviating theneed for a two-plane hunter-killer team.

To compensate for the belly radome of the AD-5W, thevertical fin-and-rudder area was enlarged 50 percent, insteadof using auxiliary vertical fins as had been done on the AD-4W.All AD-5s carried this larger tail. Two new bomb racks, oneunder each wing, swept forward ahead of the wing leadingedge, adding a rakish appearance while carrying heavierordnance, or fuel stores.

Two independently-sliding canopy sections covered theside-by-side crew seats up front in the AD-5. Two panels in therear of the crew compartment were removable for emergencyegress, and an escape hatch was designed into the bottom ofthe rear compartment. Electrical wiring on the AD-5 wasrerouted in the engine compartment to facilitate easier accessto the oil tank and accessories than had been enjoyed onearlier Skyraiders. Additionally, electrical and hydraulic com-

ponents in the forward equipment compartment were separated.

To save space, the AD-5 used electric trim tabs instead ofmanual tabs as had been used on the AD-4. The sidemounted dive brakes were deleted on the AD-5, but the ventralbrake remained. 11

The number of regular AD-5s built was 212; 239 AD-5Nswere built, 218 AD-5Ws were built, and a single AD-5S wasfinished. Fifty-four AD-5Qs were converted from AD-5Ns.

The AD-6 was a single-seat Skyraider employing some ofthe engineering refinements of the AD-5, plus a low-level divebombing mission role. The AD-6 carried a bomb directorwhich was suitable for either high-or low-level bombing.Removable external armor plate shielded vital areas of theAD-6 from flak and small-arms fire, and could quickly be takenoff if not needed.

(Text continues on page 51)


Above: AD-SW used the larger fuselage of the AD-S plus the radome set for early-warning duties. Pylons are not fitted outboard of the large forward-swept hardpoint. Below: Fuselage and tail differences can be seen in this comparison photo of anew AD-SW (foreground) and an equally new AD-5. (both - Douglas photo via Harry Gann)


, (

Jack Spanich's AD-4NA, restored to represent the Navy's MiG-killing A-1 H from VA-176, captured all the snarling line in this1978 photograph. (Photo by the author)

The South Vietnamese extended the combat life of the A-1 over their countryside into the 1970s. (Photo via Keith Lairdcollection)

Color Gallery 33

USAF Skyraiders provided ground-attack and rescue support in Southeast Asia. (USAF photo)

Museum-piece Skyraider AEW.1 recalls British service. (Photo courtesy of John M. Bowdler)


French AD-4s figured in international diplomacy, including unsuccessful American attempts to get them back for use inSoutheast Asia. (Photo via Jim Morrow collection)

1

I

.-

._---~

--~.--- ~"-

u.s. Navy and Marines occasionally shared dual-marked Skyraiders for stateside use. (Photo via Jim Morrow collection)

Color Gallery 35

, i;

/'

Blue AD-4Q (BuAer No. 124063) served Navy squadron VA·728, a reserve squadron, in the early 1950s over South Korea.(Photo via Doug Remington collection)

AD-4 number H·512 ofVA·728, BuAer No. 123836, between missions in South Korea, circa 1951-1953. (Photo via DougRemington collection)


Ordnance expended, a South Vietnamese Air Force A-1 taxies back to its revetment at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in the last halfof the 1960s. (Photo courtesy of Bill Latner)

Vietnamese A-1 E, with characteristic black and yellow checker fuselage band seen on many 23rd Wing VNAF Skyraiders.(USAF photo)

Color Gallery 37

First Special Operations Squadron A-1 s follow an H-3 to a rescue site in Southeast Asia. (USAF)

USAF A·1 E beside a ramshackle Air Vietnam hangar. (Keith Laird collection)


VNAF A-1, No. 34557, shares ramp space in South Vietnam with civilian Piper Aztec. Hardpoinfare off A·1s wings. (Keith Lairdcollection)

56th SOW A-1H, No. 137593. (Merritt/Holmberg/Morgan collections)

Color Gallery 39

-


Bearing typical.commander's strip~s in this USAF A-1of the 56th Special Operations Wing, photographedfrom the open 'door of a- rescue helicopter. (USAFphoto)

Color Gallery 41


Color Gallery 43

Extra long-range tanks hang from this 56th SOW A-1 H, No. 137713. (Merritt/Holberg/Morgan collections)

Southeast Asia A-1 pilots couldn't resist the open-cockpit appeal of their slower than Mach mounts. This aircraft is a 56thSOW A-1H, No. 137517. (Merritt/Homberg/Morgan collections)


Above and below: USN EA-1 of VAW-13. (Jim Morrow photos)

Striking study of single-seat Navy A-1. (Jim Morrow photo)

Color Gallery 45

"Sock It To 'Em" of the 56th SOW shows oil migration pattern on centerline tank. (Merritt/Holmberg/Morgan collections)

Ex-French AD-4 of the late Jack Spanich in 1982. Spanich was a warbird importer who painted this example to represent aUSAF A·1H of the 1st Special Operations Squadron. (Photo by Paul Swendrowski)


----._~----:-----~ .'

--~~

---"---------_._- 1 · - ~~-<_~, _Aluminum-silver painted AD·4 in French service, No. 12694. (Jim Morrow collection)

----- ~--

---~ ~~~~~~---,.;;.;.-...-."

AD-5W from VAW·11 of the USS Kearsarge. (Jim Morrow collection)

Color Gallery 47

The wooden flight deckof the USS Intrepid felt the impact of this Skyraider's arrested landing as two underwing fuelpods wrenched from the wings and skated ahead of the aircraft as its engine tore loose and crashed to the deck inflames. Earlier in its WESTPAC cruise, this Skyraider had ditched and was repaired. This was its test hop; the planedid not fly again, and the pilot was uninjured. (Photos courtesy of John M. Campbell archives)


The electronics countermeasures AD-5Qs became EA-1Fs with the redesignation system of 1962. Underwing pylons vary to fittheir special purposes on this Skyraider, and guns are absent. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

Gloss blue AD·6 of Navy squadron VA·155 shows white national star painted directly on sea blue fuselage, without the use ofinsignia blue to surround the star - a common U.S. Navy practice in the 1950s. (Photo by William T.Larkins)

Air Task Group One used this AD-6 in 1958. (Photo by William T. Larkins)


VA-115 - the Arabs - flew AD-6 BuAer No. 139731 in 1962 at Moffett Field. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

A clean A-1J from USS Oriskany, seen at Moffett Field in 1963. (Photo by William T. Larkins)


Heinemann's planes in action: AD-6 with buddy store drags a refueling hose for another Douglas product, an A4D Skyhawk,in September 1956. (Douglas photo via Edward H. Heinemann)

The underwing bomb racks of the AD-6 were similar tothose of earlier Skyraiders, although the pylons were positioned 14 inches forward ofthe position on the previous singleseat AD-4 and earlier Skyraiders.

The follow-on AD-7 was the last variant of the Skyraiderto leave the Douglas plant. The Dash-7 acknowledged therigors of low-altitude combat flying by incorporating structuralimprovements in the wing to enhance fatigue life. 12 Where theAD-6 had been powered by an R-3350-26-WA engine, theDash-7 used the -WB version giving comparable performance. When the last of 72 AD-7s was delivered in February1957,3,180 Skyraiders had been built. Into the 1960s, militaryplanners would ponder reopening the line, to crank out more

of these durable attack planes which turned out to be wellsuited for countering jungle warfare in Southeast Asia.

The Navy began pumping Skyraiders into its squadrons in1946 with deliveries to VA-19A (later designated VA-194).Navy Skyraider squadrons peaked out at 29 in the fall of 1955,remaining at that number until the middle of 1957 when thenumber of active Navy Skyraider squadrons began to wane.By late 1965 the Navy operated only 10 A-1 squadrons. 13 Thelast two U.S. Navy Skyraiders left service in 1971. They wereA-1 Es, dispatched to the U.S. Marine Corps Museum atQuantico, Virginia, and to the Military Aircraft Storage andDisposition Center (MASDC) at Davis-Monthan Air ForceBase, Arizona. 14

anne ..qrps began receiVtnSkyraidersin 951, intosquadronVMA-121 (theletter 'M' indicated a: Marine squadron.) At some~tations such~s Seattle, Washington's, old Sand.Point Naval ~ir Station, Skyraiders flown by Reservists wore joint Navy and Marine markings.U.S. Marine Corps Skyraidersquadrons included:VMA,.121, Vf\1A-151 ;Vf\1fk-1, VMC-3 (lat~rVMJC-

MA'.. -2.,_·.·.1.·..... VM,.AT...:·· VMAT.•.·.. 20..·...••·•.•.:VM•... C.. .:.2............. :::< ••• , ••••. "-"'-,;,. ".,:::;,,:,. L ••: ""'.,, ' •••• '•••.••

JC:'2);'y - 51 ,V ....,.,.,.....'.'. 12, VM,LX':225, VMA-~?4, VMA-33n, VMA-33?;and VMA-33.3;

U.S.(Navy squa ronSOper? tng yr?iderincluded: VA-19A(laterVA-194), VA-1B (VA~24),VA-28 (VA·25), VA-3B (VA-44), VA-4B(VA-45),VA-5B (VA-64), VA-6B (VA-65), VA-20A (VA195), VA-34, VA-114, VA-154,VA-155, VA-175,VC-12 (VAW-12),VA-35, VF-54 (VA-54), VA-55,VA-74,VA-75, VA94, VA-12A (VA-115), YA-~ 74,VA-175, VC-l1 (VAW-l,1), V~,.15i VA-923 (VA-125r,VA~7p2 '. 4§),:V.fk~~~0lM~!~~)'iYC!35 (VAAW,.35)'( ,. 28;(VA:~~p5);VF7J~4(V A196), VA-95, VA,.105, VA-104'; VA-16,VA-176,VA-215, VA-216, VF-92, VC~4 (VFAW-4),VA-96,VA-126, VA-52, VA-122, VA-144, VA-152, VA165, and VA-135. 15 (In Navy usage, the letter Vindicated 'squadron'; A indicated 'attack'; F was'fighter', and so forth.)


The bUddy store mounted to the centerline rack as seen onthis AD-6 in October 1955. A trailing hose could be winchedout to refuel fleet jets who ran low. (Douglas photo viaEdward H. Heinemann)

A clean AD-6 shows off its many hardpoints and the demarcation between the white undersides and gray upper surfaces. Fuselage colors blended with a soft spray line; wingleading edge was gray sharply masked to white below theleading edge. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

In May of 1958, an AD-6 of VA·35 refuels a McDonnell F3H-2N from VF-31 over the Mediterranean Sea. (Douglas photo viaHarry Gann)


When the last AD-7 rolled out in February 1957, Navy and Douglas officials gathered to honor the rugged Skyraider. Standingin the center of the grouping in a dark business suit is Ed Heinemannn, designer of the AD. (Douglas photo courtesy EdwardH. Heinemann)

Notes1. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy AircraftSince 1911, pp. 295-296, 362-363.2. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20July 1982.3. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy AircraftSince 1911, pp. 186-188.4. Ibid., pp. 305-309.5. B.R. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, p. 19.6. Ibid., p. 21.7. Frederick A. Johnsen, Winged Majesty - The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortressin War and Peace, Tacoma: Bomber Books 1980, pp. 31-33.8. B.A. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, p. 24.

9. "AD-5 Converts from Bomberto Transport," Aviation Weekmagazine, Aug.24, 1953, pp. 24-26.10. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20July 1982.11. "AD-5 Converts from Bomber to transport," Aviation Week magazine,Aug. 24, 1953, pp. 24-26.12. "Standard Aircraft Characteristics - AD-7 Skyraider", Douglas AircraftCo., Inc., EI Segundo Division, 7 November 1955.13. B.A. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, pp. 137-138.14. British Aviation Research Group, A History of the Douglas Skyraider,AEw'1,p.8.15. B.R. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, pp. 137-138.16. Ibid.


Blue single-seat Skyraider came to grief on a carrier deck as crash team raced to protect pilot. (Campbell Archives)


1950 in Naval Aviation News, arguments in favor of propdriven planes like the Skyraider centered on loitering time overtarget and its attendant morale value on friendly troops below,as well as the short-field and rustic terrain advantages propplanes held over their slow-to-accelerate jet brethren. Jetbackers claimed speed would replace loitering time as a virtueto pinned ground troops, and argued that jets were moreaccurate ordnance delivery platforms.1

The heavy demands that were quickly placed on Navyand Marine attack aviation beginning in the summer of 1950over Korea gave no room for debate. The available Skyraidersand Corsairs roared into combat, delivering bombs, rockets,and gunfire while F9F Panther jets typically prowled overheadin shifts, looking for air opposition.

Days after the United Nations resolution urged militarysupport of South Korea, U.S. Navy Skyraiders from the U.S.S.Valley Forge were attacking communisttargets north of Seoul.2

The "Happy Valley" was the Navy's lone aircraft carrier in theregion at the time. "Valley's" attack bombers hit airfields andother transportation complexes around Pyongyang on July 3and 4, before withdrawing to Okinawa to help guard against apossible Chinese invasion of Formosa. Ultimately, other patrol forces would watch the approaches to Formosa for acommunist Chinese invasion that was never launched. Meanwhile, Valley Forge steamed back to Korean waters in time toprovide close air support for the First Cavalry Division'slanding at Pohang on the east coast.

Opposition failed to materialize for the Pohang landings,so Valley Forge's planes, including Skyraiders, turned tocoastal targets like the petroleum refinery at Wonsan, whichthey devastated. The Valley Forge was the core ofTask Force77, with Carrier Air Group Five aboard. During that first hecticJuly, CAG Five's pilots began nicknaming parts of Korea afterthe way enemy vehicles littered the roads. The stretch fromSeoul to Pyongtaek was known as "Wreckage Row," afterrepeated workouts from VA-55's Skyraiders, which had beenthe first ADs to enter combat in July.

Ground/air coordinators of strikes in Korea were amazedwhen they first employed Skyraiders. "A single plane, the AD,could make run after run on enemy installations and still haveenough load to handle all targets in the area," a Navy correspondent wrote in 1950.3 The Skyraider legend was borneand it would endure for decades of service.

The Valley Forge was joined near Korea by the carriersBoxer and Philippine Sea in time for the September 15, 1950,amphibious invasion at Inchon. Ultimately, during the KoreanWar, the Navy would operate Skyraiders in 12 attack squadrons, four composite squadrons, and two fighter squadrons ofthe Seventh Fleet. The Marines put ashore two attack squadrons of Skyraiders, and one Marine composite reconnaissance squadron to bolster the combat effort.4

CHAPTER IIIKorea Proves the Skyraider

'J!\n undying hatred and a wound never to be cured. " Juvenal, Satires

~e Korean peninsula is a series of folded granite andlimestone mountains jutting from China, and sharinga brief border in the extreme northeast with Russia.

Only about 20 percent of the land is flat, and most of this is inthe southwest, where Korea's major rice crop flourishes.Korean summers can be hot and muggy, with monsoon rains.The winters are cold and dry, with crusty snow accentingterraced rice paddies and frozen rivers.

Koreans are proud and industrious, and work their uneven terrain to produce crops and industrial goods that gainedworldwide markets in the 1980s.

The evolution of a Korean state is marked by centuries ofinvaders and foreign occupiers. The Chinese moved troopsdown into the Korean peninsula in 109 B.C., remaining in forcenearly 400 years. A rising kingdom within Korea led to theShilla dynasty by 668 AD., during which a unified Koreanidentity emerged. Mongol invaders in the 13th Century allowed much of the Korean social structure to remain. Theseizure of power by General Yi Song-gye in 1392 establishedthe durable Yi Dynasty, which further entrenched the Koreanidentity. In 1910, Japan established colonial rule over Koreawhich lasted until American and Russian troops split thecountry and defeated the Japanese in 1945.

The same post-World War II land-grabbing goals whichprompted the Soviet Union to blockade Berlin in 1948 in aneffort to take West Berlin led to the Soviet arming of NorthKorea. The United Nations had plans for the reunification ofthe two Koreas, separated by the 38th Parallel, but a Sovietbacked attack from the North on June 25, 1950 made combatthe only alternative to a Soviet-dictated combining of the twoKoreas.

While the United States moved quickly to evacuate Americans from threatened South Korea, the long-term Americancombat commitment was made under the aegis of a UnitedNations multi-national force sent to Korea to return the borders to their pre-1950 invasion position as a prelude to anyfuture peace.

More than four decades later, the 38th Parallel still marksan armed truce between the communists to the north, and theRepublic of Korea (ROK) to the south. South Koreans, stilloutraged at indignities suffered under Japanese rule, areloathe to accommodate the North Koreans who attacked themfrom the north. Even now, some pundits say the large American military presence in the south may be needed more to

. keep the South Koreans from zealously attacking the north,instead of vice versa! After a resolution from the U.N. SecurityCouncil asked member-nations to help the Republic of Korearepel its invaders, American support began in earnest.

In 1950, some U.S. Navy planners argued about therelative merits of prop-driven attack planes such as the AD,and fast-moving jets. In a study ultimately published in August

Korea, Proves the Skyraider 55

VA-195's famous kitchen-sink bomb, lugged to a Korean target by an AD. (McDonnell Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann)

The amphibious invasion at Inchon was critically timed tomatch the optimum height of the region's 30-foot tides. TheUnited Nations counter offensive at Inchon, in the rear of thecommunists' newly-held territory, was intended as a thrust forSeoul, a major transportation hub from which the communistshad to be routed. The U.N. plan placed the burden of airsupport near Inchon upon the Navy's carriers, which nowincluded the smaller Sicily and Badoeng Strait in addition tothe three fast carriers Valley Forge, Boxer, and PhilippineSea. The Royal Navy furnished HMS Triumph to round outthecarrier force available for the Inchon landings. Boxer wasfresh into the fray after ferrying 145 U.S. Air Force F-51Mustang fighters, 2,000 tons of Air Force supplies, and 1,000military passengers to the Far East for combat.

On September 12, 1950, three days before the invasion,aircraft from Valley Forge and Philippine Sea began striking inthe Inchon area. The hammering was taken up on the 14th byplanes from the Sicily and Badoeng Strait. When the Marineslanded at Wolmi-do and next Inchon itself, they found theenemy's beach defenses decimated by CAG-Five's air strikes.

Overhead air support helped the Marines advance towardSeoul, and retake Kimpo airfield in a couple days. By September 19, Marine squadrons from Japan arrived at Kimpo, andbegan operational missions from there the following day.


The Skyraider excelled in the close air support role,causing naval aviation's official house organ, Naval AviationNews, to state in December 1952: "The load carrying ability,the accuracy of dive bombing, and the ruggedness of the ADSkyraider attack plane employed from carriers and by theMarines has been the most devastating attack factor in theKorean air war."

By October 1950, the U.N. counter-offensive was takingeffect, and optimists forecast an end to the war. But U.N.forces soon engaged increasing numbers of communist Chinese troops sent down to help North Korea's faltering conquest. The following month, in early November, plans weremade to stem the flow of Chinese troops into North Korea bysevering bridges across the Yalu River, which split Korea fromChina. Navy dive bombers got the tasking on November 8,with a frustrating caveat: They were forbidden to fly across theYalu into Chinese airspace. This precluded attacks down thelength ofthe bridges straddling the river, and also did not allowthe naval aviators the chance to silence antiaircraft guns onthe Chinese side of the river. The gunners in China had noorders keeping them from firing across the river on theAmerican planes.

To compound the problem ofthe Yalu border bridges, theNorth Koreans staged their newly-acquired Russian MiG-15

jet fighters in Manchurian sanctuaries, from which they coulddefend the vital Yalu bridges. Classic Navy jet-and-proptactics were employed in the Yalu operation, as seen onNovember 9, when Skyraiders were joined by other pistonengine attackers - F4U Corsairs - for a bridge busting strike.Fifty minutes after the Skyraiders and Corsairs cleared thecarriers, a flight of F9F Panther jet fighters launched for theYalu, followed by two more jet flights at 15-minute intervals.Long before the slower Skyraiders and Corsairs reached thetarget, they were overhauled by the first jet escort elementwhich flew top cover inbound to the target. The second jetflight relieved the fuel-guzzling first jets over the target, and thethird and final jet flight escorted the prop planes out of the fray.The jet escort relays worked - throughout November, none ofthe bridge-busters was lost to MiGs as long as a fighter escortwas present. The Panther pilots, meanwhile, claimed threeMiG-15 kills, and several probabies for the loss of one F9F.5

Though hampered by airspace restrictions, the Skyraidersand Corsairs dropped bridge spans, slowing Chinese advances. The hard freeze of the Korean winter put an end to thebridge busting by late November, when the Yalu froze andallowed the Chinese to cross it without benefit of bridges.6

The Chinese hit Marine ground forces and forced anevacuation from the Chosin reservoir in November. Carrierplanes covered the Marines' withdrawal. As the communiststook over airfields, carrier air, including Skyraiders, becameincreasingly vital to United Nations operations in Korea. TheChinese continued to push south below the 38th Parallel, butthe see-saw land war would reverse again, enabling MarineSkyraiders to fly from Korean soil.

Interdiction became a way of life for the AD pilots, replacing some of their close air support duties. Now, bridges, trains,convoys, and any form of transportation used by the enemywas targeted by the ADs.

But one of the most unusual air support strikes of theKorean War was executed by torpedo-laden Skyraiders fromU.S.S. Princeton in May 1951. Their target was not shipping- the torpedoes were destined to burst the floodgates of theHwachon reservoir in central eastern Korea. United Nationsforces had dug in behind the Pukhan River. The communistssought to lower the depth of the river to facilitate crossing byclosing the Hwachon floodgates upstream.

The Skyraiders of Air Group 19, escorted by Corsairs,carried the first torpedoes launched by Navy air since WorldWar II. The reservoir strike also was the debut of Skyraidertorpedo tactics in combat. One of the floodgates was destroyed, another ripped open below water level, and otherparts of the 200-foot-high dam suffered damage.

The Able Dog fliers had to jink around ridges and settleinto a short run-in to the dam, barely reaching the properaltitude above water when it was time to release their tin fish.The exit was obstructed by high-tension lines and mountains,forcing the Skyraiders into abrupt climbouts after droppingtheir torpedoes into the fresh water reservoir. The torpedoattack succeeded where earlier conventional bombing hadfailed; the river was allowed to rise again.?

The communists' spring offensive of 1951 was defeatedby United Nations forces. As the year unfolded, carrier aircraftwere directed to serve U.N. needs in northeast Korea, which

coincidentally removed the ship-based Skyraiders from thearena of air-to-air combat. Peacetime tests had shown the ADto be a contender when matched with piston-engined fighterslike the F8F Bearcat. And years later, over Viet Nam, NavySkyraiders would twice make world news by downing NorthVietnamese MiG jet fighters. But Korea was not to be adogfight war for the Able Dog, except in isolated bouts withnight nuisance hecklers. The commander of Navy Task Force77 employed his Skyraiders almost exclusively for interdictionnow. His fast-flying Panther jets and bomb-laden Skyraidersand Corsairs adopted a routine for interdiction sorties that wasvital, but lacked razzle-dazzle. The task force commanderdescribed the day-in, day-out interdiction campaign as "a dayto day routine where stamina replaces glamour and persistence is pitted against oriental perseverance."B

During this period, persistent Skyraider fliers participatedin a six-strike effort to remove a North Korean rail bridge fromthe war forever. A ravine of about a ninth of a mile separatedtwo tunnels near Songjin in the north. Lt. Cdr. Clement M.Craig spied the railroad bridge while winging home from acombat mission. That same day, Navy fliers damaged one ofthe bridge's approaches. A cycle of bombing and rebuildingbegan, with the Navy keenly interested because this span wasa choke point for all traffic moving into northeast Korea fromManchuria. The day after the first strike, VA-195's Skyraiders,led by the squadron commander, Lt. Cdr. Harold G. Carlson,removed one bridge span and damaged two more. The sitebecame known as "Carlson's Canyon." Soon a second spancrashed to the bottom of the ravine after raid number three.But about ten days into the game, communist builders hadmade major repairs with temporary timbers. Strike four wipedout the new construction, but within two weeks the bridge wasrebuilt and awaiting the laying of rails to accommodatesouthbound communist war supplies. Strikes five and sixwereexecuted by hefty blue Skyraiders loosing one-ton bombs,which Navy correspondents said put an end to efforts torebuild the "Bouncing Bridge of Carlson's Canyon."9

Communist power plants on the Yalu River and nearbyattracted an armada of carrier air, shore-based Marines, andFifth Air Force planes on June 23 and 24, 1952. The first day'sstrikes employed Skyraiders in a mixed bag of 223 carrierbirds and 77 ground-based Marine aircraft. The mix of bluebirds included Panthers and Corsairs in addition to the durableADs. On the 24th, the carriers launched about 323 planeswhile the Marines mustered 60. The fliers wearing goldenwings took credit for a significant part of the muscle used toactually bomb the power plants. 1o

The Joint Chiefs of Staff originally scheduled thepowerplant strikes for June 19, but slipped the beginning toJune 23 for the benefit of Vice-Admiral Robert P. Briscol,commander of Naval Forces Far East. This allowed Briscol'sforces time to muster four fast carriers forthis major joint effort.This marked the first time so many fast carriers were amassedsince the Hungnam evacuation operations of December 1950,when carrier air support covered the evacuation of U.S.Marines by keeping Skyraiders and Corsairs loitering at thebeck and call of the Marines as they withdrew down amountain road lined by the communists. ll

Korea Proves the Skyraider 57

As late as June 19, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washingtonhad changed the power plant attack plan by adding thegenerating plant at Sui-ho to the target list. Sui-ho lay a scant38 miles from a major MiG concentration at Antung. ViceAdmiral J.J. Clark, the Seventh Fleet's new commander,wanted to get carrier air into the fray, and he flew to Seoul topropose to the Air Force that the Navy ought to have a handin the Sui-ho strike. For the first time since the frustrating Yalubridge attacks of 1950, the Sui-ho mission put Navy air up MiGAlley. Sui-ho was to be hit first by Navy and Air Force fighterbombers. With Sui-ho under attack, Fifth Air Force planeswould tackle the Chosin plants Three and Four and the Fusenplants Three and Four. Meanwhile, Navy air would strike atFusen plants One and Two and four plants located at Kyosen.That night, Air Force B-29s were to bomb Chosin plants Oneand Two, using SHORAN navigational bombing equipment.12

The morning of June 23, 1952, cloud cover rendered theYalu River powerplants obscured, and all crews stood down.As the day wore on, the cloud cover shifted south, exposingthe targets and masking the approach and departure pathsthe United Nations planes would use. The die was recast, andat 1600 on June 23,35 Skyraiders from Boxer, Philippine Sea,and Princeton rolled into their attacks on the works at Sui-ho.Panthers flew flak suppression and Air Force Sabres watchedfor MiGs. Inexplicably, the MiGs did not attack, and in fact anestimated 160 communist planes fled to Manchuria, probablyin fear of airfield attacks by the American force. 13

While Sui-ho burned, Fifth Air Force F-51 Mustang fighters, sturdy prop-driven retreads from World War II, attackedFusen Three and Four. Carrier-based Skyraiders joined Corsairs and Panthers in hitting Fusen One and Two, as well asthe Kyosen four-plant system. Returning Skyraider pilots saidthe flak at Sui-ho was admirably suppressed by the F9F jets,allowing the Able Dogs a clear shot with an aggregate of 90tons of bombs. As the Skyraiders slipped back into cloud coverafter the attack, 79 F-84 Thunderjets and 45 F-80 ShootingStars from the Air Force took their turn over Sui-ho. TheKyosen raid was a Corsair show, with only six ADs in thegaggle.

Fusen One and Two reeled under the firepower of about90 Navy planes, including a contingent of Skyraiders. Fliersobserved one power house cave in, and watched the demolition of a transformer yard. The next day, the Navy ignored theuseless rubble at Sui-ho, and sent bombers against Kyosenand Fusen. From Princeton, Skyraiders followed the flakkilling Panthers over Fusen. The ADs dumped five-thousandpound bomb loads here, proving themselves again withoutequal in the dive bombing role. 14

The Air Force continued hammering the power plants twomore days. When it was over, Navy sources said seven of thenine targeted plants were destroyed, and the other two werenearly useless. The shared tasking between Navy and AirForce units worked well. Lt. Gen. Glen E. Barcus, Fifth AirForce commander, sent a message to Admiral Clark atSeventh Fleet, saying, "My hat's off to the Navy for a terrificjob. We must get together again sometime."15

Air planners of the decisive powerplant raids were chagrined when members of Parliament in England criticized theattacks as provocative, and U.S. congressmen raised ques-


tions over the timing of the attacks. This lack of United Nationssolidarity has been viewed by Air Force historians as bluntingthe overall effect the otherwise successful strikes had on thewill of the communists. 16

The Navy pioneered remotely-controlled bombs duringWorld War II, ranging from explosives-laden PB4Y-1 liberators like the one which took Joseph Kennedy to his death inEurope, to Bat glide bombs carried under the wings of PB4Y2B variants of the Privateer patrol bomber. A more successfulmarriage of explosives and remote-control electronics wasthe direction of F6F-5K Hellcat drones by AD-4Q Skyraidersduring the Korean War.

On August 28, 1952, the Navy's Guided Missile Unit 90,aboard U.S.S. Boxer, unleashed drone Hellcats for the firsttime in combat.1? As the unmanned F6F, toting a 2,000-poundbomb, roared down Boxer's lefthand catapult, an AD-4Qalready launched on the right side shepherded the drone bymeans of a television guidance system. A second Skyraidermother ship on deck guided the Hellcat through takeoff untilthe airborne AD-4 took control. Droning was used whentargets were too heavily defended by the communists topermit a manned attack. In the stand-off Skyraider, the droneoperator, watched a television image ofthe Hellcat's "view" ashe guided the F6F flying bomb on its final combat sortie. Thespacious AD-4Q fuselage accommodated the drone-directionequipment and operator aft of the pilot. A half-dozen droneHellcat attacks were controlled by Skyraiders during thisKorean War operation.

Whether flying nameless interdiction sorties or spectacular powerplant attacks, the blue Skyraiders over Korea provedthey were more than a flash in the pan. What the Corsair didwell with bombs, the AD did better. Where the fast-flying jetswere only secondarily suited to bombing, the Skyraider wasbred for the task. Combat over Korea proved a real needexisted in the 1950s for Ed Heinemann's AD, and productioncontinued with newer models.

As new Skyraiders rolled off the line back home, theUnited Nations air forces began a new campaign of sustainedpressure on the communists in October 1952. The Navy'sTask Force 77 launched "Cherokee" strikes - mass fighterbomber strikes against enemy troops and supply dumps nearthe fighting arena. The task force typically launched eightSkyraiders, eight Corsairs, and up to a dozen Panther jets ona Cherokee strike. This firepower, including the Skyraider'sincredible capacity for repeated bomb runs, stood a goodchance of neutralizing the target. In its own fashion, the FifthAir Force also highlighted juicy targets worthy of mass attacks.18

On the ground, the Eighth Army designated a bomb linebehind which no U.N. air strikes could be targeted withoutpositive control by an airborne controller or a tactical aircontroller. The intent was to spare friendly casualties fromwayward bombs, but the bomb line sometimes extended asfar as 10,000 meters in front of Eighth Army lines. To honor thebomb line meant rounding up controllers for on-scene strikework. This procedure robbed the Cherokee strikes of thelightning spontaneity necessary to get the most effect fromCherokee's massed firepower. 19

Shrapnel riddled the fuselage of this Navy Skyraider over Korea, but failed to stop the plane. (McDonnell Douglas photocourtesy Harry Gann)

Fifth Air Force went to bat, and persuaded Eighth Army toshorten the bomb line to about 3,000 meters out from friendlyoutposts. Another 25 miles out (approximately) an imaginaryline divided general support missions from interdiction sorties.This gave the Cherokee fliers a field day in the area between3,000 and about 20,000 meters ahead of the Eighth Army'spositions. Cherokee foretold of future ground support combatin Vietnam, where again Army commanders would have, attimes anyway, a surfeit of airpower at their disposal. Takinghits and spreading ordnance with a quickness that chilled theenemy, the armored ADs contributed mightily to the successof Cherokee operations. Air Force scholars said Cherokeestrikes seemed to take a serious morale toll of the communists. Some Eighth Army officers called Cherokee "airpower'smost potent contribution" to the condition of static lines ofcombat in Korea.2o

Among the Marines' contributions to Korean combat wasthe placement of VMA-121 ,the Wolfraiders, with AD-3s on theKorean peninsula. As part of Marine Air Group (MAG) 12, theAD-3s bombed in concert with F4U and special attack AU-1Corsairs flown by VMA 212 and 323. These ground-basedsquadrons were the closest Marine units to the scene of battle,

and pilots, armorers, and mechanics sometimes carried smallarms and wore steel pots as they traveled out to their Skyraiders,in acknowledgment of the potential for guerilla attacks, Navyjournalists wrote. Col. Robert E. Galer, a World War II ace whodowned 13 Japanese planes, commanded MAG 12. Thegroup's seven-day-a-week war was fought from a formerJapanese fighter base, constructed during the Second WorldWar when the Japanese feared American air attacks on theiroccupied Korea. But runways and aprons sufficient to supportlightweight Zero fighters could not handle heavy, bomb-ladenADs, so U.S. Army engineers beefed up the field for Skyraiderand ground-attack Corsair operations.21

Local Korean labor earned as much as a dollar a dayassembling bombs which Marine ordnancemen loaded underthe Skyraiders and Corsairs for the next day's sorties. TheWolfraiders' ADs were under the operational control of FifthAir Force. They dropped bombs to support Army troops andKorean units as well as ground-pounding leathernecks. As thewar progressed into 1952, the Marines found themselvesmore frequently flying pre-briefed strikes, a departure from thefree-wheeling nature of close-air support where they hadloitered in their ADs over friendly troops, just waiting for a call


to attack a hot spot. A Navy journalist put it this way: "...Underthe present set-up, the close air support is not quite so closeas it used to be."22

"Close" or not, the Marines added to the combat log of theSkyraiders over Korea. Chains of command which delayedresponse time were not the making of the Marines whomanned the blue ADs - when called, the flying leathernecksexploited their Skyraiders' abilities to punch out enemy bunkers, guns, or troop concentrations. The Wolfraiders used thehuge capacity of their Skyraiders to surpass a Corsair recordfor highest bomb tonnage dropped by a squadron in a singleday. Previously, "Deathrattler" Marines in Corsairs set themark at 218,000 pounds of bombs. Without disclosing theWolfraiders' new high tonnage mark, possibly as a bow towartime censors, Naval journalists said the ADs ofthe groundbased VMA-121 carried 2,OOO-pounders to beat the old Corsair tally.23

Toward the end of combat in the first half of 1953, MarineAir Wing One put a pair of ADs, with radar and an operator forthe set in the planes' bellies, at a forward base where NorthKorean "Bedcheck Charlie" nuisance flights disrupted thenocturnal peace. The radar, intended as a bombing aid, wasadapted for night stalking. The quarry were slow-flying NorthKorean PO-2 aircraft which harassed the United Nationspositions. Radar-equipped jet interceptors were at a loss toget down with the slow PO-2s in the darkness. Majors RobertH. Mitchell and George H. Linnemeier piloted the Marine ADsassigned to this night combat air patrol. The Skyraider couldhang in at 90 knots to do battle with the annoying PO-2, but theintercept had to be made in darkness, at minimum altitude,over terrain which jutted up several thousand feet abruptly.The radar operator, like his World War II counterpart in ArmyAir Forces P-61 Black Widow night fighters, shared the nightshift by mapping the terrain with radar while tracking BedcheckCharlie. Major Linnemeier killed a PO-2 with 20-millimetercannon fire, but found his glossy sea blue AD targeted bycommunist AA gunners in what may have been a trap.Linnemeier escaped the flak and returned home victorious.The next night was Robert Mitchell's date to intercept Charlie.Mitchell claimed hits on his bogey, but he had to break off theattack when the big Skyraider overhauled the communistplane too fast. 24

It is fitting that Marines, legendary for possessing the gritand ingenuity to bulldoze obstacles, turned Skyraiders intonight fighters over Korea. Marine units working the AD inKorea included VMA-121 at K-3 beginning in the fall of 1951,flying AD-3s; VMA-251 at K-6 in June and July 1953, flyingAD-3s; and VMC-1, based at K-16, flying AD-2Qs and AD3Ns.

Navy squadron VC-35 put successive Skyraider nightattack teams to sea with Task Force 77 for 34 months ofoperations. Though VC-35 was mainly an anti-submarineunit, its radar-equipped ADs were suited to nocturnal hecklingalong communist supply lines. The pilot and two radar operators scanned roads and railways for signs of activity. A sightingcould bring a brilliant burst of light from a flare dropped by theSkyraider. If a target presented itself under the canopy of theflare, the Able Dog roared in for battle. The plan was to deny


the communists the advantage of darkness for moving warsupplies to the front.

In spite of land battle reverses early in the fighting, theKorean air war favored the United Nations fliers. To be sure,flak and weather were mortal foes, and MiGs challengedespecially the Air Force, but a tongue-in-cheek cockinesspeNaded Naval air war stories relayed home by correspondents. These anecdotes flesh out the Skyraider's Korean Wardiary:

In the first months of combat in 1950, VA-55 AD-4 pilotstook ribbing from jet pilots aboard their carrier who snickeredat the propeller-driven dive bombers. The Skyraider driverstook pride in the fact they had license to do what any redblooded fighter pilot longs for - the ADs could "flat hat" attreetop level in search of targets, while the jets milled overhead, or came down for specific attacks. The AD pilots rubbedit in with an Op Order saying "Window-peeking is herebyauthorized." Honors of "chief peeker" went to VA-55's Lt. BudGallagher. On one exhilarating "flat hat" sortie, Ensign "Atomic"Aldrich of VA-55 obseNed two trees doing the impossible moving closer together on a railroad track. A quick squirt of 20millimeter fire from the wings of Aldrich's Skyraider knockedout a handcar loaded with eight enemy soldiers.25

During this early period, a VA-55 pilot experienced theeffect of his own 1,OOO-pound general-purpose bombs. Hewas east of Seoul in 1950. making his third run on a communist-held railroad bridge. As he pulled out from the bomb run,the sound and impact of an explosion shook him and heeledhis blue AD-4 into a steep bank. Recovering, the flier found hehad no aileron response and scant hydraulic pressure. limping back to his carrier, the Skyraider pilot applied rudder tocontrol the plane's wings-level attitude. The LSO waved himoff once, but the ADA plunked down in a good landing nexttime around. Two chunks of shrapnel, products of theSkyraider's own wrath, had embedded themselves in the AD4. One fragment damaged hydraulic lines in the port stub wing;the other punched through the bottom of the fuselage, cuttinghydraulics, electrical wiring, and ruining aileron controls before spending its energy in the pilot's parachute pack. 26

Ensign R. Sanders of VA-65 was piloting his blue AD-4 onSeptember 17, 1950, a few miles southeast of Seoul whensmall arms fire dropped his Skyraider's oil pressure to zero.Sanders scrambled for altitude, but the Skyraider's radialengine gave up without oil at 3,000 feet. Between ruggedterrain and unacceptable rice paddies, only a dirt road promised much in the form of a place to park the silent Skyraider.Sanders popped the plane's three fuselage-mounted divebrakes. His path was leading him to a stout tree; to clear thetree would mean missing the road on this deadstick one-timeonly approach. So Sanders ploughed into the thick tree trunkwith his wing root, touching down on the dirt road at 135 knots.The extended belly dive brake vaulted the skidding Skyraideronto its nose until the brake ripped free. The plane draggedthrough the dirt another 100feet before nosing up, and rockingback to a halt. Shaken but mobile, Ensign Sanders walkedaway from the smashed Skyraider, noting that the plane'sradio continued to broadcast its scratchy litany as the plane laywrecked in the dirt.27

The Skyraider pilots looked for incongruities on the ground,which sometimes gave away communist camouflage. In 1951 ,Ensign Louis Page took his Skyraider from the Philippine Seafor a sortie along the west coastline of Korea. Page saw ahaystack, neatly placed in the middle of a railroad yard."Haystack and railroad yards just don't go together," Pagelater recounted. So he pushed his AD into a strafing run andpumped 20-millimeter into the hay. A resounding explosionshowed there was much more than a needle hiding in thishaystack. With the aggressive pride of a fighter, Page wasquoted as saying, "It was a wonderful day. Everything I shotat burned."28

Ice glazed the deck of the Valley Forge on a frigid earlymorning in February 1952 when Lt. Cdr. William "Buck" (ofcourse!) Rogers gunned his AD-3 "Guppy" radar bird andbraced for the expected jolt of a catapult launch into thedarkness. With no help from the still-cocked catapult, theSkyraider was sliding down the deck toward the carrier's bow.Rogers brought back the throttle and tapped the brakes, butthe icy deck offered no resistance. The pilot jammed full power

on and alerted his two radar operators for a ditching. The bulkyAD with its large, drag-producing belly radome, dipped beneath the Valley Forge's bow as pilot Rogers raised landinggear and nudged back on the stick. The radome smacked thewaves smartly, and the AD careened back into the air in ashower of sea spray. Rogers coolly nursed the Guppy atwave-top height as flying speed increased. Back on deck,Rogers and electronics men Donald Backofen and RaymondFrausto checked out impact damage to their Skyraider'sradome. A faulty holdback ring on the catapult had allowed theSkyraider to skid forward when Rogers first throttled up. Aswith the Patuxent River incident where a Skyraider Guppyboated to shore on its belly radome, this bulbous housingproved amazingly seaworthy.29

Also in 1952 aboard the "Happy Valley," eight ensignpilots found a novel way to mark their passage to lieutenant,junior grade. They orchestrated an all-ensign air strike, flyingtheir VF-194 Skyraiders under the lead of one of their numberthey had picked. The raid was pulled off a day before they allwere scheduled for promotion. Each of the eight Skyraiders

The Marines stayed on after the Korean truce. This AD-3 bought some trouble at airfield K·6 in August 1954, while assigned toMarine attack squadron VMA-121. (Photo courtesy Dick Berry via Dave Forrest)


was loaded with 4,000 pounds of bombs which the ensignsdelivered to bridges, railroads, and other targets. CharlesBrown led the raid, backed up by Robert Miller, Frank Melton,Dean Hofferth, Joe Akagi, Joe Molnar, Ken Wittman, and StanBroughton.30

Lt. Cmdr. Lynn DuTemple was pulling away from hisfourth pass on a rail bridge in Hamhung when the canopy ofhis AD crystallized in a fractured pattern. He thought it wassmall-arms fire, and trotted the damaged VA-195 asset backto the Princeton. When he entered the pattern and madeappropriate prop and throttle adjustments, the hollowAeroproducts propeller howled so loudly the LSOs on thedeck could hear it. When the prop ticked to a halt, one bladebore a 37-millimeter AA hole as big as a man's hand.31 A photoof lucky DuTemple and the blade later was used byAeroproducts in advertisements touting the toughness oftheirpropellers.

Another Princeton AD pilot in 1952 found himself invertedover Wonsan after anti-aircraft fire exploded 20-millimeterammo in the wing ammunition cans of his plane. Lt. Og) BillButtlar was banking away from an enemy train at 400 knotswhen the explosions in his wing cranked the Skyraider over onits back. Buttlar regained control. and made an emergencylanding.32

After massive hydroelectric powerplant strikes in 1952, Lt.Cdr. M.K. Dennis of VA-195 made the age-old off-handcomment, "We dropped everything on them but the kitchensink." Navy wags were not going to let this pass - not as longas the hefty, bomb-hauling Skyraiders of VA-195 were available. Aviation mechanics R.B. Deland and H.J. Burdett pickedup Dennis' comment, and worked a fix with Princeton'smaintenance people to permit a genuine sink, complete withS-trap drain pipe, to be lashed to a 1,OOO-pound bomb.33

Nay-sayers predicted the contraption could not get airborne, or that the blocky sink would create problems during

the bombing dive. Lt. Og) Carl B. Austin took the apparatusunder his AD for a sortie over North Korea's capital city ofPyongyang. Lieutenant Austin said flak over the capital citywas so intense he pondered whether he could get in closeenough to drop the sink bomb. He did deliver the ordnance,making it clear the communist war effort was going down thedrain.34

Another Princeton Skyraider driver, Lt. Og) Jack Everling,neared his target at Kowan in 1952 when something struck hisAD with enough force to knock the control stick from his grip.As this happened, the Skyraider's clock cover glass splintered. spraying shards inside the cockpit. Everling climbedand leveled off to assess the trouble. His wingman followed,and radioed to Everling the news that his plane's left elevatorhad a huge hole in it. Reports later said the gap was largeenough for a man to crawl through. Everling found he couldapply some stick back pressure and use trim to keep his ADlevel as he motored back to the deck of the Princeton.Following a safe landing, the Skyraider was assessed fordamage. More than 200 shrapnel holes were counted. Theblast which tore open the elevator produced enough concussion to pop a rivet from the armor plate behind his seat. Thismissile rivet struck the clock and sent glass flying. Butthe AD'sstructural integrity brought it and its pilot home safely.35

The night Skyraiders which used radar to help find anddestroy communist road traffic sometim~s were nicknamed"Roadrunners". Lt. Dawn D. Tanner's previous profession ofCalifornia Highway Patrolman suggested another patch forhis Skyraider squadron off the Korean coast. In a shieldreminiscent of the California patrol logo, these nocturnalSkyraiderfliers from the Princeton wryly called themselves theKorean Highway PatroL They no doubt caused more accidents in North Korea than their California police counterpartscould have administered aid to back home.36

Clean AD-3 (BuAer No. 122799) of VA·95 at Oakland, California. October 17, 1953. (Photo by William T. Larkins)


Notes1. "Close Air Support With Jets", Naval Aviation News, August 1950,pp.9-11.2. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy AircraftSince 1911, London: Putnam, 1976.3. "Carrier War Off Korea", Naval Aviation News, December 1950, p. 12.4. Data provided by aviation historian Rene J. Francillon.5. "Naval Air War", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, pp. 4-56. Ibid.7. "First Torpedo Attack", Naval Aviation News, July 1951.8. "Naval Air War", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 7.9. "Navy Wrecks Korea's 'Bouncing Bridge"', Naval Aviation News, February1952, p. 13.10. "Naval Air War", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 7.11. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953,Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 482-489.12. Ibid.13. Ibid.14. "Navy Hits Korean Power Plants", Naval Aviation News, August 1952,p.16.15. Ibid.16. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953,Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 482-489.

1

17. Data provided by aviation historian Rene J. Francillon.18. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953,Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 618-619.19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. "Land-Based Marine Air Hammers Reds", NavalAviation News, September 1952, pp. 10-11.22. Ibid.23. "Record Smashers", Naval Aviation News, February 1953, p. 9.24. "AD Night Interceptor", Naval Aviation News, October 1953, p. 6.25. "Legalized Flat-hatters", Naval Aviation News, November 1950.26. "Pilot Collects Own Bomb", Naval Aviation News, December 1950.27. "Landing the Hard Way", Naval Aviation News, January 1951.28. "Railroad Haymaker", Naval Aviation News, June 1951.29. "Grunt and Groan", Naval Aviation News, April 1952.30. "All-Ensign Air Strike", Naval Aviation News, August 1952, p. 13.31. "The Whistler", Naval Aviation News, September 1952, p. 19.32. "Shoots Himself', Naval Aviation News, September 1952, p. 19.33. "Including a Sink", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 13.34. Ibid.35. "Grateful Pilot", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 13.36. "Skyraider Patrolman", Naval Aviation News, August 1953, p. 10.



CHAPTER IVCold-War Demands

A fleet pilot, early for his practice, loosed a 500-poundbomb, oblivious to the red, yellow and gray Skyraider. "Youcould hear it coming, just like in the movies! I swore at that pilotfor hours." The hefty Skyraider was skidded sideways by theblast, but emerged from the range none the worse for wear.

"It wasn't a very accurate way to judge, I'll tell you that. Itwas kind of seat-of-the-pants," Morrison said.

On target sleeve runs, the deployment of the sleeve wellbehind the AD on a steel cable was hardly noticed by the crew.With nearly 3,000 horsepower, "the weight was not a factorwhen you had that many ponies pulling you," Morrison remembered. Comparing notes, the VU-1 crews agreed destroyers were the least likely to hit the target sleeve, and onoccasion even gave the AD a run for its money with their AAfire. Much more stable in the water were fleet oilers, whosegunners enjoyed a high percentage of hits on the sleevestowed by the ADs of VU-1.4

On 23 July 1954, communist Chinese fighters doggedlyattacked a commercial DC-4 transport, firing at the Douglasairliner until it crashed into the sea near Hainan. World powerstensed as they would nearly 30 years later when Russian jetswould down a Korean 747 airliner north of Japan. The USSPhilippine Sea, simmering in the heat of July, was nearenough to launch patrols to search for survivors of the DC-4shootdown.

Philippine Sea's aircrews included a mixture of combatveterans and new fliers who were more familiar with peacetime flying-hour reductions than they were with live fire andcombat turns. For several days, they flew their F9F-6 Cougars, F4U-4 Corsairs, AD-4Ns and AD-4W "Guppy" radarSkyraiders in search of evidence of the downed airliner.5 On26 July, 15 AD-4s and two Corsairs searched for the crash andprovided protection to one AD-4W in their midst for relayingcommunications back to ship. Eleven of the Able Dogs werestationed in three groups, at altitudes of 500,3,000, and 5,000feet. Near the north end of Hainan, while the American flierswarily honored Chinese claims to a 12-mile territorial limit, twounidentified aircraft initiated a firing pass on the AD-4s. TheSkyraider pilots knew what to do, and quickly carried the fightback to their attackers. The attacking aircraft were identifiedas Soviet-made Lavochkin La-7 single-engine fighters. TheseWorld War II holdovers were said to be capable of exceeding400 miles an hour. Their closely-cowled radial engines andunderslung belly-mounted oil coolers occasionally caused theLa-7s to be mistaken for P-51 Mustangs. But the roundedwingtips and tail of the La-7 left its own signature.

The pilots of these two camouflaged La-7s near Hainanwere presumed to be Chinese. Their attack on U.S. NavySkyraiders would prove as costly to them as the Libyan Sukhoiattack on U.S. Navy F-14s in similar circumstances more thana quarter century later. The first La-7 made his pass only to find

OPPOSITE: Folded wings reveal six hardpoints beneath eachwing of these blue AD-5s of VC-33. Cowling over nose waspainted anti-glare flat black to reduce the reflection of theglossy sea blue in front of the pilot. (McDonnell Douglasphoto courtesy Harry Gann)

"He who did well in war just earns the right to begin doing well in peace. " Robert Browning, Luria

A fter Korea, no doubt existed aboutthe Skyraider'sutility as a ruggedly reliable dive bomber. Kept inproduction for the peacetime, post-Korean War

Navy, the boxy multi-place AD-5s were superseded by improved single-seaters - AD-6s and AD-7s - which would seecombat in southeast Asia 10 years later. 1

Publicists were fond of pointing out the Skyraider's abilityto carry a heavier bomb load than a World War II Boeing B-17Flying Fortress four engine bomber. The Navy harnessed theSkyraider to carry atomic weapons in view of the AD'sHerculean qualities.

When the United States used small Pacific atolls likeKwajalein and Eniwetok for atmospheric testing of atomicweapons, the planes dropping these cataclysmically hot loadsincluded Douglas Skyraiders.2 Later, during the time whenU.S. Navy Skyraiders participated in the Vietnam war through20 February 1968, A-1s sometimes sat cocked on a carriercatapult, armed with nukes which never were unleashed.3 Ifsitting nuclear alert was the penultimate in responsibility andimportance for some Skyraider pilots, other AD crews earned

, their pay in the less prestigious but sometimes dangerous jobof target towing.

Navy Utility Squadron One (VU-1) employed a mixed bagof aircraft at NAS Barber's Point, Hawaii in the early 1960s fora variety of target duties. Drone F9F Panther jets of KoreanWar vintage, North American FJ-3 Fury jets, F8U Crusaders,TV-2 Shooting Stars, Piasecki HUP-2 helicopters and brightlypainted AD-5 Skyraiders executed their tasks for the squadron.

The AD-5s had dark gray fuselages highlighted withyellow and red wings for high visibility. The Skyraiders towedtarget buckets for anti-aircraft gunners in the fleet, and scoredbomb strikes from about 500 feet off the deck "and not very farout" from the target area, recalled former Aviation Machinist'sMate Houston Morrison. Morrison frequently was tapped forright-seat duty in the big AD-5s. His job consisted of "radio andeyeballs," he explained. Scoring bomb strikes near Molokaifor fleet units held its own brand of excitement for the ADcrews. "One morning we damn near got it," Houston explained. Making an inspection run overthe target during a timeperiod when the range was supposed to be safe from activity,Morrison soon was startled by the fact he could hear ascreaming noise above the roar of the AD's big R-3350engine.

Cold-War Demands 65

The end of Navy blues is evident in this mid-1950s portrait of two VC-33 AD-5s warming up for launch. (McDonnell Douglasphoto courtesy Harry Gann)

Classic weekend warriors - AD-4Bs of NAS Atlanta show off white paint, Dayglo orange markings, and black exhaust paths,common in the late 1950s and early 1960s. (Photo courtesy Frank Price via Dave Forrest)


Above: AD-5Q at Moffett Field April 29, 1961. Below: A practice nuclear store rides the centerline of this AD-6 of VA-196, May16,1959. (Both photos by William T. Larkins)

himself on the receiving end of 20-millimeter fire from an AD4. The Lavochkin summarily struck the water. The second La7 enjoyed a temporary reprieve as an excited AD pilot forgotto arm his cannons. A brace of Skyraiders and Corsairs closedon the lone Lavochkin. Four Skyraiders and one Corsairshared in the subsequent kill. Anticipating international inquiryinto the peacetime combat off the China coast, the AD andF4U fliers actually figured as an example in international lawcases dealing with the right to overfly an attacker's territory ifin hot pursuitofthe attacker. In fact, a U.S. Navy veteran of the

engagement recalled, the fight never left international skies.6

The Cold War 1950s provided the framework for U.SSkyraider operations of that era. From nuclear weaponsdelivery to antisubmarine patrols to carrier onboard delivery(COD), the threat was perceived to be Soviet, and possiblyChinese, hostilities. In this setting, some nuances of Skyraideroperations helped define the character of Ed Heinemann'sAble Dog and the men who flew it.

Maintenance officers cringed when their beloved carrierbased ADs took part in Pinwheel operations. Pinwheel in-

Cold-War Demands 67

EA-1F of VAW-13 at NAS San Diego, January 28,1967. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

This AD-4 sported antennae, including probably an AT-53 blade angling down and back from lower fuselage. (U.S. Navy photovia Don Keller)


volved lashing Skyraiders to the carrier deck, and rewing theirpowerful R-3350 engines to maneuver the carrier in port intight places. But it worked.

In cities like Seattle, Washington, Naval Air Reserve unitssometimes shared their aircraft with reserve Marine aviatorsin the 1950s and early 1960s. Seattle's Sand Point Naval AirStation was a choice close-in flying field long coveted by nonaviation users who eventually succeeded in carving it into apark. Sand Point NAS hosted boxy AD-5s in gray and Daygloorange paint, bearing the dual legends "Navy" and "Marines"on their fuselage sides. Some of the Marine Corps reservistscouldn't help but exercise the combat techniques they hadhoned as regulars in years gone by. Ships in Puget Soundwere considered fair game for mock dive bombing runs. Butthe plum was the Aurora Bridge carrying Highway 99 over aship canal near Lake Union. It was a high bridge with clearspans large enough to allow a Skyraider to pass. And rightthrough this urban Seattle neighborhood a reserve Leathernecktook his AD-5, for all the usual reasons ...

And in early 1954, another Marine, MajorWarren Schoeder,strapped into a blue AD-2 at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)EI Toro, California and showed how 250-gallon napalm tankscould be converted to carry fire retardant instead.7 This forestfire-battling Skyraider did not become a firefighting tool, however. Surplus aircraft, in which permanent tanks with doorscould be mounted, became the preferred firebombers, replacing the idea of dropping a tank which would burst on impact.

Notes1. The French rebuffed U.S. efforts to get back surplus French AD-4s for usein Viet Nam, placing a heavy load on the available AD-5s, -6s, and -7s inAmerican stocks.2. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20July 1982.3. Ibid.4. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Houston Morrison, July 1982.5. Rosario Rausa, Skyraider - The Douglas A-1 "Flying Dump Truck",Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1982,pp. 101-105.6. Ibid.7. Information provided by aviation historian Rene J. Francillon.

Cold-War Demands 69

Gaggle of four Royal Navy Skyraiders shows two placements for fuselage roundel/number combination. (Douglas photo viaHarry Gann)


shipboard service. The first AEW.1 s were checked atFarnborough for compatibility with British arrestor systemsand catapults. It became 778 Squadron's responsibility toevaluate the Skyraider's American electronics in the RoyalNavy operating regime. The Royal Navy envisioned a veryactive use of the AEW.1 s' radar, enabling these Skyraiders tocontrol carrier air patrols and direct strike aircraft, as well asdetect surface ships at great distances.4

In July 1952, the evaluation role of778 Squadron changedas the squadron was redesignated a front-line squadron, No.849 Squadron. In November 1952, 849 Squadron's A Flightwas formed, borrowing Headquarters Flight Skyraiders sincethe first four AEW.1 s to arrive in Great Britain were still the onlyRoyal Navy Skyraiders on hand. The ship HMS Perseusdelivered 13 more AEW.1 s on the 19th of February, 1953,followed a little over a month later by another shipment ofSkyraiders. A Flight and B Flight equipped themselves withaircraft, with C Flight forming early in June. By December, DFlight and E Flight were formed. These were sufficient to allowone flight for each Royal Navy aircraft carrier then being built.But construction delays on the carriers kept all RN Skyraidersexcept those of A Flight land-based for their first year ofservice. This delay further prompted the British to pare theirSkyraider flights back to four (A through D).

The Squadron Flights of 849 Squadron remained inpermanent commission, regardless of the status of theirparticular aircraft carrier. As deployed by 849 Squadron, theSkyraider AEW.1 s were used mainly for airborne early warning against low-flying aircraft, anti-submarine searches,weather reconnaissance, and the British equivalent of COD(Carrier Onboard Delivery).5

Spare engines and parts were in short supply for theRoyal Navy Skyraiders, according to British aviation historians. By late 1958 several of the 50 British AEW.1 s were beingrobbed of parts at Royal Naval Air Station (RNAS) Donibristle,where major airframe reconditioning took place on the BritishSkyraiders. 6

On 29 January 1953, A Flight went to sea for the first time,on the HMS Eagle.

On 16 April 1956, Eagle, carrying A Flight's Syraiders, leftport. Eagle was kept in the Mediterranean due to mideasttensions, and in the fall of 1956, Eagle's A Flight and HMSAlbion's C Flight launched AEW.1 s to provide airborne earlywarning protection forthe Anglo-French fleet engaged in Suezoperations, and for ship-to-shore duties. The Suez intervention was named Operation Musketeer. The last embarkationfor A Flight as a Skyraider unit came on 13 April 1959, aboardHMS Eagle. The next month, A Flight was reduced to threeSkyraiders, and in August this dwindled to a pair of AEW.1 s.The first Fairey Gannet arrived in September for A Flight, and

CHAPTER VAble Dogs in Foreign Service"My country is the world, and my religion is to do good. " Thomas Paine, Rights of Man

It is axiomatic that an aircraft as versatile, rugged, andlong-lived as the Douglas Skyraider will serve more usersthan it$ original customer. From Scandinavia to the

tropics, a variety of Skyraiders were welcomed into the airservices of at least eight countries.

Long before America's MilitaryAssistance Program (MAP)began supplying A-1 s to South Vietnam, the British tookdelivery of 50 AD-4W radar birds beginning in November1951. The AD-4W provided early-warning radar capability tothe fleet at sea. Its origins were traceable to the 1944 'CadillacProject' at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology's MountCadillac facility, where first a TBM was fitted with a large earlywarning radar as an intended response to aggressive Japanese kamikaze attacks. 1 The Cadillac Project also convertedfour-engine Boeing B-17Gs as PB-1Ws for Navy use, butneither the radar-fitted TBMs nor the PB-1Ws saw combatbefore World War II ended in 1945.

The AD-4W improved on earlier radar-equipped Skyraidersby housing new APS-20A radar in its belly fairing, and by usingan autopilot, new instrument panel, and redesignedwindscreen. Under provisions of the Mutual Defense AidProgram (MDAP) 50 AD-4Ws were earmarked for use byGreat Britain's Royal Navy. Twenty were brand-new planesfrom the U.S. Navy's production run atthe Douglas EI Segundoplant, while the other 30 Skyraiders for Britain were taken outof the U.S. Navy's inventory.2

The new British Skyraiders underwent modernization atNAS Quonset Point, Rhode Island, or NAS Alameda, California, prior to ferry flights to NAS Norfolk, Virginia, where radarSkyraiders received electronic equipment. From Norfolk, theBritish Skyraiders were shipped to Glasgow, Scotland.

In British service, the AD-4Ws were redesignated AEW.1 s.They wore a glossy sea blue finish, with large Royal Navyroundels on the fuselage sides; the undersides of both wingsnear the tips; and the top surfaces of both wings, inboard evenwith the aileron trim tabs. Individual aircraft codes and otherlettering were white with few exceptions. During the Suezcrisis in 1956, AEW.1 s which intervened wore black-andyellow invasion stripes around the wings and fuselage. Theseinvasion markings, also applied to participating FrenchAeronavale F4U-7s in the Suez operations, were for thebenefit of Anglo-French troops which were landed in an effortto block fighting between Israel and Egypt. The stripes gavethe ground-pounders a quick means of verifying whetheraircraft overhead were friendly when they were still too distantfor regular markings to be seen c1early.3

Royal Navy 778 Squadron took the first four SkyraiderAEW.1 aircraft in November 1951. The British Skyraidersbypassed the usually long-winded carrier suitability trials,since this aircraft type was already well accepted in U.S. Navy

Able Dogs in Foreign Service 71

Factory shot of a Royal Navy Skyraider AEW.1 shows outboard placement of roundels, which accommodated code letters onwing. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

by December 1959, A Flight operated three Gannets and twoSkyraiders. In February 1960, A Flight relinquished the lasttwo of its Skyraiders.7This scenario was typical for Royal NavySkyraiders.

Half of B Flight's Skyraider aircrews trained in the UnitedStates. When the Flight's complement of Skyraiders arrived,B Flight's first assignment was a tour of five months at RoyalNaval Air Station Hal Far, Malta. B Flightwas assigned to HMSArk Royal in 1955, and sailed with that carrier in October ofthatyear for a Mediterranean cruise. When Ark Royal was dockedfor refitting in 1956, B Flight remained at Culdrose as A and CFlights gave sufficient airborne early warning support for theSuez operation that year. Continued refit operations took ArkRoyal out of service again in 1957 and 1958, so B Flight'sSkyraiders were re-assigned to HMS Victorious. A number ofcruises in British home waters as well as the Mediterraneancemented the bonds between B Flight and the Victorious. 8

C Flight began Skyraider work in June 1953, embarkingwith A Flight aboard Eagle, and later that year flying out to HalFar, Malta, to relieve B Flight. During C Flight's 1953 Maltaduty, it became the only AEW Skyraider Flight to embarkaboard a wartime class light fleet aircraft carrier, the HMSGlory, for about two weeks from 30 November. In October1958, C Flight joined HMS Albion for a 1O-month cruise whichincluded Cyprus, Karachi, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and South America.9


D Flight flew from HMS Eagle in 1953, and the followingyear, the Flight moved to RNAS Eglinton to confirm U.S. Navyperformance data on the search radar. D Flight's subsequentcarrier embarkations included the Bulwark, Albion and Centaur. Following operations with HMS Girdle Ness during trialsof the Seaslug missile in 1959, D Flight returned to Culdrose.A 10-month Far East cruise aboard HMS Albion, ending 15December 1960, was also the end of front-line Royal NavySkyraider service. The next day, D Flight disbanded. Its fourSkyraiders were sent to Abbotsinch for disposal.1o

E Flight was a casualty of the 1954 reorganization ofBritish Skyraider Flights, when it was relettered as D Flight. EFlight served at RNAS Hal Far, Malta during its brief existence,as well as at Culdrose, before assuming D Flight's identity.11

The replacement of British Skyraider AEW.1 s with FaireyGannets in the Royal Navy signaled advances in airborneearly warning aircraft, but not the expiration of the BritishSkyraiders as usable airplanes. The Skyraider's legendaryloitering ability and hauling capacity had already led to the useof U.S. Navy ADs as target tugs, and when Sweden neededtugs, 12 surplus Royal Navy AEW.1 s filled the bill.

Aircraft-carrier gear, including tail hooks, and the bulgingbelly radomes and radars were stripped from the AEW.1 s soldto Sweden late in 1961. The target winch operator occupiedthe former radar observer's cabin in the fuselage. The radomeoriginally had prompted the use of two additional vertical fins.

In April 1972, AEW.1 number WT121 was airlifted into RoyalNavy Air Station Yeovilton for display in the Fleet Air Armmuseum collection there. (John Bowdler collection)

With the radome removal came the removal of these fins aswell. The Swedish Skyraiders were painted bright yellow, andregistered to Svensk Flygtjanst AB at Bromma, Sweden. Theywere modified to tow differing targets for the Swedish Army,Navy, and Air Force. They also could be fitted with radardefeating pods under their port wings. In 1973, Sweden beganreplacing its Skyraiders with Mitsubishi MU-2Fs and Learjets.12

After years of outside display at Yeovilton, Skyraider WT121was moved indoors for exhibition. (Photo by John Bowdler)

French armed forces were the recipients of varied American aircraft from the time the Free French began fightingGermany in World War II with Martin B-26s, through the useof Bell P-63 Kingcobras, Douglas A-26s, and ConsolidatedPB4Y-2s in Indochina, and on to Republic P-47 Thunderboltsand A-26s against Algerian rebels in the 1950s. From 1954until Algeria wrestled its independence in 1962, the French

A French AD-4 revs up in Algeria in 1963. (J.P. Hoehn collection)


Silver paint was standard for French Skyraiders like this AD-4NA of the 20th TFW, photographed at Chateaudun Air Depot inJune 1966. (J.P. Hoehn collection)

fought the rebels with ground-attack aircraft. The aging P-47sneeded a replacement; the Skyraider's Korean War groundattack exploits made it a most desirable substitute.

In 1959, France received the first of 40 AD-4NAs and 53AD-4Ns. French AD-4s were pressed into service in Algeria.The Algerian rebels had no airpower, and only light antiaircraft capabilities. The French aviators fought a war unmarked by spectacular air actions. When ordered not to dropbombs on some Algerian villages, some of the French balkedat the prospects of letting suspected rebel hideouts go unscathed. So they harassed the Algerian rebels in a time-testedmanner: Empty beer bottles were dumped from the FrenchAD-4s. 13 Long before, airmen had learned a falling empty beerbottle would catch the wind and howl like a bomb in flight.When no bomb explosions followed, the targeted villagers(and rebels) could speculate on delayed-fuse bombs lying inthe earth.

By 1965, the United States was scrambling to keepSkyraiders operable. Both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Forcewere using A-1 s in Southeast Asia, as was the growing airforce of the Republic of South Vietnam (VNAF). In theory, itwas reasonable for American planners to expect the Frenchto return the AD-4s when they were finished with them. But aminor international incident between the United States andFrance brewed when the French instead gave 10 ADs toCambodia's Prince Sihanouk in 1965, followed later by fivemore Skyraiders. The Cambodian Skyraiders probably sawmore service against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamesecommunists afterSihanouk'sfalifrom power in 1970thantheydid earlier, but sabotage, attrition, and inexperience removedCambodian Skyraiders from service in the ensuing period. 14

Though French colonies had waned, France continuedclose ties with a number of African states in the 1970s. TheRepublic of Chad, Central African Republic, and Gabon all

A late French AD-4 freshly overhauled, circa 1972. (J.P. Hoehn collection)


Last stand for the French AD-4s was Africa, where a Djiboutibased Skyraider of 21 Escadrille awaited armorers. AnotherAD-4 and a Skyraider hulk keep company in the distance.(J.P. Hoehn collection)

made use of French AD-4s, with Gabon replacing theSkyraiders with variants of a Macchi jet trainer in the 1980s.But in fact, according to French aviation historian Rene'Francillon, French crews operated the Skyraiders in theseemerging African nations.

But the key foreign user of Ed Heinemann's ruggedSkyraider was South Vietnam's VNAF, a fighting force worthyof its own definitive history book, and its own sections in thisvolume.

Ex-French AD-4, nearest camera, shared ramp space inPhnom Penh with Cambodian-marked AD-6, circa 1972.Published accounts indicate Cambodia had AD·4s fromFrance; swept pylons and serial number 137587 under tailshow this gray Skyraider to be an ex-U.S. Navy AD-6 whichwas sent from NAS Quonset Point, R.I. to NAS Alameda,California, in late 1963, where it was stricken from Navyrecords. Perhaps 137587 went next to the South Vietnameseair force. Its subsequent dilapidated condition in Cambodianmarkings is still not fully explained. (Photo by R. Linder.)

Notes1. British Aviation Research Group, A History of the Douglas SkyraiderAEW.1,1974. p. 8.2. Ibid, p. 20.3. Frederick A. Johnsen, F4U Corsair, London: Janes, 1983. p.534. British Aviation Research Group, A History of the Douglas SkyraiderAEW.1, p. 19.5. Ibid, p. 20.6. Ibid, p. 20.7. Ibid.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Ibid.13. InteNiew, Rene Francillon with Frederick A. Johnsen, 1 August 1984.14. Rosario Rausa, Skyraider - the Douglas A-1 'Flying Dump truck',Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation, 1982. p. 223.


IS':v -

758

Gray Skyraider paint scheme predominated in the early to mid 1960s in Southeast Asia, as seen on these VNAF A·1 Hs. VNAFinsignia was a modification of U.S. marking, with red border on bars and red perimeter to blue star field. Bars beside whitestar were yellow, split with red.


A-1 H. The Air Force obtained surplus A-1 Es from Navystorage, and added a second set of pilot controls, a feature notrequired by the Navy. The extra controls enabled a SouthVietnamese pilot to participate in strikes during a time whenAmerican military advisors in Vietnam were not supposed tofly solo combat.

In May of 1964, 50 A-1 Es and 25 single-seat A-1 Hs werebeing readied at NAS Alameda for combat in Vietnam with theRepublic of Vietnam Air Force. U.S. Navy pilots were toprovide transition training at Bien Hoa for the Vietnamese.

The following month, U.S. Air Force crews led by Lt. Col.John M. Porter flew six A-1 Es on a hop from the Philippines tothe USAF Special Air Warfare Center also at Bien Hoa. TheSkyraider was employed in a familiar role of ground-attack,dumping napalm and bombs from the many hard pointsbeneath the wings and fuselage. Limited warfare in southeastAsia demanded rugged, simple bomb-carriers with long loitering time, and not necessarily speed. The previous decade hadseen both Navy and Air Force emphasize high-speed nuclearequipped strategic aircraft. "In the strategic sense, the 1957era found Naval aviation locking horns with the Strategic AirCommand for equitable distribution of strategic targets," wroteLt. Cdr. A. Dodge McFall in an article sympathetic to thecontinued use of the A-1.2

While the Navy and Air Force fought over who got to bombwhat in the event of total war, the fact remained that by 1964no suitable replacement for the venerable A-1 existed. Underthe acronym COIN (COunter INsurgency), new propjet planeswere proposed as replacements for the Skyraider. Conventional jets also stood ready.

But in mid-1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S.McNamara reviewed the new COIN proposals and said theyoffered little improvement over the A-1. Even when given a$123,000 overhaul before shipment to Vietnam, the bigSkyraider was a bargain when compared with sophisticated$4 million Grumman A-6 Intruders for the same mission. AirForce Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert voiced support for sending A-1 s to Vietnam in 1964, saying an exhaustive evaluationof the Skyraider by the U.S. Air Force Special Air WarfareCenter at Eglin AFB, Florida showed "that because of itssimplicity of operation, versatility, maintainability, minimumrunway requirements and other capabilities, the A-1 would behighly successful for its role in South Vietnam."3 In fact,queries were made into the feasibility of reopening the Skyraiderproduction line to meet the needs of combat in SoutheastAsia,but the cost was deemed prohibitive.

Coups and internal bickering periodically plagued thegovernment of South Vietnam, and the Douglas Skyraiders ofthe Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) were employed both incoup attempts and anti-coup activities. In early 1962, rebelling

CHAPTER VIEarly Asia

'~ great country cannot wage a little war. " Wellington, to the House of Lords, 16 January 1838.

In the summer of 1964, a generation of Americans knewof war only as something seen at the movies, or relatedby older family members who had participated in World

War II or Korea. But a new war - a shooting war - was buildingin Southeast Asia even as President Lyndon B. Johnsonpursued an aggressive space program and his vision of aGreat Society at home.

Bitter ironies attended the fighting in Southeast Asia fromthe start. When France withdrew from French Indochina in1954, the resulting Geneva Accord signed by France bannedthe use of combat jets in that fighting arena. Although theUnited States did not sign the Geneva Accord, Americansupport for the provisions in that document extended to the jetban.

Though it mattered little· to the communist troops inVietnam whether the bombs which felled them were lugged tothe target by a jet or a piston-powered airplane, Americanplanners were reluctant to make an overt breach of theGeneva Accord after voicing support for the Accord's contents, which included free and independent elections in Vietnam.

But reconnaissance jets - RF-1 01 Voodoos and RB-57Canberras -were deployed by the U.S. Air Force in Vietnamin 1964. After all, American defense planners reasoned, suchplanes were not "combat" jets in the strictest interpretation ofthe word. Claude Witze, senior editor for Air Force Magazinein 1964, said the jet ban prompted one sensitive militaryplanner to suggest "that newsmen should not mention the typeof engine that propels the Army's Huey helicopter. A turbineturns the rotor blades, which makes it technically a jet."1 AndHueys were already deployed in Vietnam.

The Air Force utilized piston-engine ground-attack aircraft in Vietnam both as a means of honoring the GenevaAccord, and because the rugged simplicity of some of theunsophisticated prop planes lent itselfto the little brushfire warbeing waged in southeast Asia. North American T-28 trainerswere fitted with bomb racks and machine guns, and joinedDouglas B-26 Invaders in the early Vietnam war. When aT-28and a B-26 crashed, cries of structural weakness promptedcongressional hearings. Subsequently, the Douglas Invaderswould be beefed up by On Mark Engineering in Van Nuys,California to strengthen their wing spars and otherwise updatethem for modern ground attack duties; the T-28 would bewithdrawn from attack use by the U.S. Air Force Air Commandos and replaced by a Navy attack aircraft: The DouglasSkyraider. In fact, the South Vietnamese gained some AD-6sin 1960.

With the uniform aircraft designation system adopted forNavy and Air Force aircraft in 1962, the multi-place AD-5became the A-1 E, and the single-seat AD-6 was redesignated

Early Asia 77

VNAF pilots nosed their AD-6 Skyraiders toward the Saigonpalace of President Ngo Dinh Diem in an attack which failedto harm Diem.

The first batch of AD-6s had been shipped to the Republicof Vietnam by the Eisenhower administration in 1960 whenthe VNAF commander at that time, Col. Nguyen Xuan Vinh,grounded his squadron of Grumman F8F Bearcats, declaringthe Grummans to be no longer safe for flight. Early logisticssupport for the AD-6s was inadequate, and a number of thebatch of 25 VNAF Skyraiders languished on the ground,awaiting parts.

Though these VNAF AD-6s failed to oust Diem in 1962,they were more instrumental in his removal from office duringa coup executed on 1 and 2 November 1963. Coup leaderssensed the time was right for action as the Diem government'srepressive measures against Buddhists stirred internationalopinion. With Army of Vietnam (ARVN) units dispatched tofight the ground war, Diem would be hard-pressed to maintainhis security in the face of a serious coup challenge. Coupleaders quickly seized the VNAF commander, while his deputycollaborated with the rebels, and launched an air missionwhich included four A-1 Hs (redesignated from the earlier AD6 nomenclature) against the presidential palace in Saigon.

When ARVN troops loyal to Diem attempted to interveneon his behalf, the potential for air raids thwarted them. On 2November 1963, President Diem and his brother, Ngo DinhNhu, head of the secret police, surrendered to the rebels andwere killed. The Skyraider's muscle had been used ininternecine warfare by Vietnamese fliers against their countrymen. 4

General Duong Van Minh tried to head the new Saigongovernment, while purging Diem officials from office. Government disarray was evident, and sparked concerted enemyattacks. Dissatisfaction with Minh's stewardship led Maj. Gen.Nguyen Khanh, commander of I Corps, to undertake anothercoup on 30 January 1964. Khanh, mindful of the VNAF's rolein the Diem overthrow the previous year, retained a selfproclaimed "anti-coup" officer, Nguyen Cao Ky, as commander of the VNAF.

In his 1981 book, The United States Air Force in South- .east Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, published by the Officeof Air Force History in Washington, D.C., author Robert F.Futrell said, "Col. Nguyen Cao Ky had won command of theVietnamese Air Force for his part in the Minh coup, andpolished his prestige by supporting the Khanh coup." In a July1982 interview, Ky said he rose to the position of VNAFcommander in the Minh regime after another commanderfailed to work out. "After the coup against Diem," Ky related,"a new commander of the Air Force was named. I guessbecause of connections and friendship they named a manwho was not a flier." Ky recalled that his predecessor lastedabout 10 days, after which the Armed Forces Council askedhim to take charge of the VNAF.

From this point, Ky's record was that of an anti-coupofficer. Still later, in 1965, when Ky became prime minister ofthe Republic of Vietnam amid rumors he had been instrumental in yet another coup, he denied the contention. "Actually, I'man anti-coup officer. I never staged a coup, because to


effectively stop the communists, we must work together," hesaid later.

According to author Futrell, VNAF A-1 sortie rates wereadversely affected because Air Vice Marshal Ky needed a"Palace Guard" flight of standby A-1 Hs at Tan Son Nhuttasked to thwart coup attempts. Part of Ky's own elite 83rdSquadron, these pilots were hand-picked for their flying abilities as well as their loyalty to the government. Routinely, theyflew air strikes against Viet Cong in South Vietnam's III and IVcorps areas when not flexing their Skyraiders' muscles insupport of the government beginning in 1964.

In addition to his role as Air Vice Marshal, Ky personallycommanded the 83rd Squadron at Tan Son Nhut. He becamea colorful figure in the international news media, as he wasoften photographed wearing the black flying suit and lavenderflying scarf of the 83rd. The insignia of this squadron featureda dragon's head surmounted by five stars. In Vietnamesebeneath this was the legend THAN PHONG. This was theVietnamese translation of the Japanese word "kamikaze,"and meant "Wind of a God" to the VNAF A-1 pilots, with noneof the suicidal connotations history has attached to "kamikaze." The lavender scarf, Ky explained, represented a Vietnamese wildflower called Xim, which had been popularized bya Vietnamese poet whose words later influenced the lyrics ofa song about the flower. s

Khanh's judgment of Ky's loyalty paid off in September1964 when disaffected ARVN troops following Brig. Gen. LamVan Phat moved armor into Saigon in an attempted coupagainst Khanh.

Ky and VNAF remained loyal to the Saigon government,and A-1 s were launched as a warning to the rebels. "Weconsidered them an enemy," Ky said. "We didn't have to dropone bomb." Ky figured the rebel troops would respect thepotency of the VNAF A-1 s, having called them in for many airstrikes against communist positions. "We just scrambled oneor two flights and flew over their heads, and that was it," Kyrecalled. An L-19 dropped a message to the rebel leader,underscoring the intention of the VNAF to defend the government of Khanh. The coup was thwarted, under a smallumbrella of Skyraiders which never unleashed ordnance.6

In the summer of 1965, Air Vice Marshal Ky was engagedto a strikingly beautiful Air Vietnam stewardess who was tobecome his wife. Over dinner one night in Mayor June of thatyear, the future Madame Ky told her fiance she would beworking a DC-6 flight out of Tan Son Nhut the next morning.The VNAF commander possessed a military pilot's inherentlove of unorthodox flying, and Ky determined to fly formationon his girlfriend's airliner. The young general soon learned theonly VNAF aircraft available which could maintain formationflight with the powerful DC-6 was an A-1 Skyraider, also at TanSon Nhut Air Base as part of a special operations squadron hehad set up. "So I came down to the A-1 squadron and said 'Ineed one'," Ky recalled.

The 83rd Squadron's flying safety officer said he could notlet the Air Vice Marshal fly an A-1. Ky remembered hisresponse: "What do you mean? I'm the boss. If you won't letme, you're out of a job!"

"Of course, Iwas wrong," the general reflected years later.

South Vietnam's General Nguyen Cao Ky, 1965. (Nguyen CaoKy collection.)

Though squadron officers balked, they nonetheless gave theVNAF leader a helmet. Ky had never before flown the big A1. "OK, start the engine for me," the general requested. Kylisted the A-1 's flight procedures on a knee pad strapped to hisleg, and made ready for his first flight in the roaring Douglaswarplane.? "So here I am, in the cockpit. Fortunately, I hadsome basic training on the T-6. It's very similar," Ky said. Headvanced the throttle and roared down the Tan Son Nhutrunway, charging into the morning sky, buoyed byadrenalinand the excitement of a new flying adventure. Going over hisscribbled post-takeoff checklist and cleaning up the landinggear, the general found himself at 10,000 feet, and lost, whenthe procedures were completed. "But talking with the controltower, I eventually could see her airplane." Ky moved in on theDC-6 for some formation air work. "It scared the pilot. He knewI never flew an A-1 before." After about 15 minutes of flying inconcert with the DC-6 airliner, General Ky broke formation atthe urging of his fiance speaking on his radio frequency.

Chugging noisily back to Tan Son Nhut, Ky's A-1 was onfinal approach with the gear down and locked. Ky prepared fora smooth touchdown, but the reality was something else. "Imade the worst landing in all my life - three or four bigbounces," General Ky said. Not satisfied, Ky shoved in thethrottle and accelerated back into the sky as the A-1 's prop

took hold. "The second time was perfect, like a true A-1 pilot,"Ky recalled years later, with the hint of a satisfied smile subtlyanimating his face. 8

Nguyen Cao Ky embraced the Skyraider as the idealground attack aircraft available for Vietnam. "I liked the A-1better than the A-37 (an attack jet version of the small CessnaT-37 trainer) - particularly for the ground support role; youcould stay longer in the air." Ky also remembered the durabilityof the A-1 under fire. After his initial flight, Ky became proficientin the A-1 and participated in combat strikes, staying currenteven after his governmental rise to the post of Prime Ministerin June 1965. Ky retained control of the VNAF during this time."I always liked combat missions," he later remarked. Ky saidhis 83rd Squadron had a strength of between 18 and 24Skyraiders. He enjoyed the challenges imposed by the bigprop-driven A-1, and said the huge engine's torque made forsome squirrelly handling that was "more fun" than flying jets.

"With a propeller, you have to learn about the plane, andthere is some personal feeling attached to that. While with ajet flying high and fast, you feel like you are sitting in amechanized robot. But the A-1 is still an airplane," Ky explained.

VNAF A-1 operations in the mid-60s appealed to Ky'sfighter-pilot instincts. "At the beginning, we had a really goodgroup of fighter pilots. We had good esprit d'corps. Thosewere the best years of our lives." Ky said he watched thiscamaraderie and skill-level erode from the A-1 flying squadrons, as well as other VNAF units, as his country's air forceexpanded and adopted some Americanized features of organization. "We had so many good combat fighter pilots behindthe desk doing red tape."9

Until his election as South Vietnam's vice president in1967, General Ky remained commander of the VNAF. Duringthis time, VNAF A-1 s supported troops battling the Viet Congin South Vietnam, and occasionally flew leaflets to NorthVietnam, to warn civilians of impending American bombardment. "For some reason, I never kept records of my flyingtime," Ky said, adding that he did not keep a journal or diarybecause to do so seemed presumptuous at the time. Frommemory, Ky recalled his longest A-1 mission lasted fourhours. Sometimes, he carried a centerline fuel tank to stretchthe range or loitering capability of his A-1 . But the Viet Congbrought the fighting uncomfortably close to home. "Withfighting in the III Corps area," he explained, "you were fightingas soon as you got up to altitude. You didn't have to go far tofight the enemy," he said, especially during the last two yearsbefore Saigon fell in April 1975.

While still VNAF commander, prior to his 1967 vicepresidential election, Ky and other Vietnamese pilots wereenjoying the conviviality of a black-tie formal affair when BienHoa Air Base came under a nocturnal Viet Cong attack. TheSkyraider contingent on the ramp at Bien Hoa had to be takenaloft right away to avoid destruction on the ground by enemyfire. Ky sent his subordinates out in formal attire to fly A-1 s,while wisely electing to ground himself out of respect for thevolume of alcohol he had consumed in the course of theevening. 1O

Early Asia 79

Vietnamese Skyraider pilots learned to judge when torelease their bombs, from experience, and by visual judgments, General Ky said. "Normally once you get enoughexperience, you go in with the feeling. You automatically hadthe right angle and speed." "Normally we didn't use divebrakes," Ky continued. He said VNAF pilots were instructed topeel into a roll for initiating a diving attack, but in actual practicein the rush of combat, targets sometimes were acquiredsimply by pushing the stick forward and lining up with thetarget.

When responding to a call for A-1 air strikes, Ky said, theVNAF usually tried to dispatch three Skyraiders to do the job,but sometimes only a pair of the Douglas warplanes would go.Ground forces often specified A-1 s when calling in an airstrike, Ky said, because the A-1 s could carry more ordnanceand loiter longer than the VNAF's diminutive A-37s. The A-1 salso tended toflytheirwarat a lower altitude, andthe chuggingroar of radial 3350s was a morale booster to ARVN troops onthe ground.

By about 1968-69, the U.S. Air Force had established agood pipeline of parts for VNAF Skyraiders through a supplydepot at Bien Hoa Air Base, according to General Ky. Gone,at least for awhile, were the parts shortages which hadgrounded many of the VNAF's original AD-6s in the beginningof the decade.

Ky said his A-1 fliers and their American advisors generally cooperated well. "As airmen, we didn't have any problemto deal with other airmen. It's not like the other services. Weshare the common spirit of pilots." Ky said the first time USAFcaptains would meet with VNAF pilots, "they (the Americans)thought they were the champs." But, Ky continued, the skillsof some of the VNAF A-1 crews surprised their Americanadvisors, who began to loosen up and adopt local styles andhabits. "They shared everything with us. They started to eatVietnamese food and go to town with us and live the Vietnamese way," Ky said.

On 24 April 1~:llO, USAF and VNAF tactical aircraft beganstriking targets in Cambodia occupied by North Vietnameseand Viet Cong troops. The missions were in anticipation of anincursion into Cambodia on 29 April and 1 May by 48,000South Vietnamese and 42,000 American troops, authorizedby President Richard M. Nixon. 11

At this time, Nguyen Cao Ky was vice president of theRepublic of Vietnam. Though he had relinquished commandof the South Vietnamese air force when elected vice president, Ky still flew when possible. A sure rarity among seniorpoliticians was this flying vice president who undertook acombat sortie into Cambodia in a VNAF A-1 during the 1970offensive in that country.

General Ky's A-1 was called in on a small anti-aircraftposition consisting of one 75-millimeter gun - a weapon witha considerable bite. The general's ordnance load consisted of500-pound bombs without fuse extenders and 20-millimeterammo for his Skyraider's wing-mounted cannons. The roaringA-1, diving low and laden with bombs, had a high intimidationvalue. The communist gunners· abandoned their weaponrather than keep firing at Ky, he said. "If they were not reallyprofessional or courageous, at the sight of an airplane diving,


they just jumped," Ky explained. Ky made only one pass on the75-millimeter gun emplacement. "After that the ground troopssaid, 'OK! thank you!'," indicating the gun had been knockedout of the fight. Had ground forces not transmitted the victorymessage, Ky said he was prepared to wheel back in for astrafing run. So the vice president returned to base, with thesweat of combat making his flight suit cling to his wiry frame. 12

As American forces pulled out of Vietnam in the firstquarter of 1973 under Henry Kissinger's negotiated peaceplan, the VNAF had grown in numbers of personnel andaircraft. By the previous December, VNAF strength was42,000 personnel, plus an additional 10,000 being trained,with about 2,000 aircraft. Yet left to their own defense, theSouth Vietnamese found themselves unable to check Hanoi'spersistent pushes south.

General Ky found himself at odds with South Vietnam'spresident Nguyen Van Thieu. Ky's strong anti-communistbeliefs caused him grief as he observed the enemy exertingrelentless pressure on South Vietnam. Ky felt the war hadbeen lost by a directionless United States military presence,which now had departed, leaving a void. "America came toVietnam without a firm policy to win the war," Ky said. "I told(Presidents) Johnson and later Nixon: Why do you sendalmost 600,000 Americans to Vietnam if you have a no-winpolicy?"

"We should have gone north and finished the war withinthree months," when America was present in Vietnam, Kysaid. We could have done this with all the power we had."13

Against this backdrop of a losing war, Nguyen Cao Kymade his last flight in an A-1 Skyraider during 1974. "I was sodepressed," Ky remembered. Hopping into a multi-seat A-1 Ewith another pilot, Ky flew to the coast to escape the rigors ofthe city for a few hours. "It was a night flight with a full moonand it was beautiful. I think that is why I still flew when I wasPremier. When you are depressed with too many problems,you feel better."

Ky and his fellow aviator chugged over the Asian landscape, letting the luminous full moon and the satisfaction offlying with finesse in a reliable A-1 temporarily hold theircountry's woes in check. The pilots stayed overnight on thecoast, and flew back the following day.14

Nguyen Cao Ky's affair with the Douglas Skyraider beganand ended with joyrides which buoyed his spirits. In the nineyears between those flights, Ky planned, and sometimes flewin, VNAF Skyraider combat and internal security operationswhich proved the mettle of the durable Douglas design.

"When you look at the old A-1 ," Ky reminisced, "it's like alady."

The alliance between the U.S. Air Force and the air armof South Vietnam went through phases and evolutions, as didthe war and politics of the era. On 14 April 1961 , the U.S. AirForce's 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, forever tobe known by its nickname, "Jungle Jim", was created at EglinAFB, Florida. The archetypal Jungle Jim fliers were hardyadventurers who sometimes wore the moniker "Air Commandos."

Jungle Jim was charged with the responsibility for trainingforeign air forces in counter-insurgency techniques. In prac-

tice, this training role would put the air commandos themselves into combat. In 1961, the Jungle Jim roster of aircraftincluded C-47s, Douglas B-26s, and North American T-28trainers which were modified for interdiction bombing andstrafing.15 While Jungle Jim's band of airmen evolved theircounter-insurgency syllabus in Florida in 1961, the air force ofSouth Vietnam - VNAF - struggled to keep its few AD-6Skyraiders flying sorties against insurgents. A long supplypipeline back to the United States kept some of these earlyVNAF AD-6s on the ground; operational lapses kept othersfrom doing their job. Once, in the fall of 1961, a handful ofVNAF AD-6's was ordered to attack Viet Cong troops massedacross a river from the edge of Phuoc Thanh province. Acumbersome South Vietnamese Rule of Engagement required the Skyraider pilots to delay attacking until the PhuocThanh province chief approved the air strike in his territory.When the provincial leader could not be located, the Vietnamese AD-6 drivers loitered for three hours. The Viet Cong hadlong since crossed the river to press their attack while thearmed Skyraiders could do nothing.16

Into this convoluted scenario on 11 October 1961 President John F. Kennedy authorized sending Jungle Jim to SouthVietnam, expressly "as a training mission and not for combatat the present time."17 The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Frederick Nolting, requested Jungle Jim's aircraft arrivein VNAF markings. Back at Eglin, those Jungle Jim forcesreadying for deployment to Vietnam were designated Detachment 2A of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, andwere code named Farm Gate. They departed Florida 5 November 1961, reaching Bien Hoa air base.

The commander of the 4400th, Col. Benjamin H. King,earlier had been briefed by Gen. Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chiefof Staff, that his Farm Gate crews would participate in combatin Vietnam while training VNAF airmen. This was a touchysubject in 1961, for the overt presence of American combatants in Vietnam was downplayed as long as possible by thegovernment of the United States. In early operations, FarmGate crews in armed T-28s followed Vietnamese crews in AD6s to obseNe VNAF attack procedures, and occasionally tofire on targets when authorized. The Farm Gate crews wereanticipating a combat role against the communists, and thiswas good for their morale.

But erratic policy guidelines caused the mission of FarmGate crews to be in doubt, and to emphasize training insteadof combat. Some clarification came about on 6 December1961 when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff formally authorizedFarm Gate aircraft to partake in combat sorties if Vietnamesewere on board the planes fortraining. This doctrine would leadto the use of dual flight controls in Farm Gate A-1 Es threeyears later.

On 26 February 1962, a pair of VNAF pilots strayed froma Mekong delta airstrike and pressed an attack against thepalace of South Vietnamese President Diem. Purpose oftheirrenegade mission turned out to be a grudge against Diem'scontroversial brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, head of South Vietnam'ssecret police. The 1st Fighter Squadron of the VNAF gavechase in more AD-6s, to no avail. It was apparent the miscreant AD-6 pilots held the potential for mayhem, so some Farm

Gate aircraft took to the ai r to avoid possible destruction on theground. South Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners knocked downone of the Skyraiders. Its pilot was captured. The other flierfailed to inflict any damage, and crash-landed his AD-6 inCambodia.

NeNous over this apparently isolated event, and mindfulof his countrymen's potential for launching a coup, Diemgrounded the VNAF in the aftermath of the February palaceattack, although that attack lacked the feNor of a full-fledgedcoup. When he returned the VNAF to flying status, PresidentDiem denied his aircraft all ordnance larger than 20-millimeterammunition. Still later, Diem reintroduced bomb loads forVNAF strike aircraft, but in practice the amount of suchordnance still was restricted on VNAF planes in II and IIICorps, the geographic regions closest to Diem's Saigonpalace. 1B

While Diem's VNAF bomb load restrictions were in placein early 1962, U.S. ambassador Nolting received the goahead to employ USAF Farm Gate aircraft in support ofground combat operations, as long as VNAF AD-6s accompanied the Farm Gate flights. This caveat was to deflect anyimpression that the United States was assuming responsibility for the air war. 19

On 4 March 1962, VNAF AD-6s, armed only with their 20millimeter cannons, scrambled to attack 50 to 70 VC near ariver bend 30 miles from Tan Son Nhut. Farm Gate planes,exempt from Diem's bomb ban, were asked to join the attack.The following day, optimistic Vietnamese reports listed 50 to60 Viet Cong killed in the air attacks; a U.S. advisor scaled thisdown to 25 dead.

Captured Viet Cong guerrillas revealed the locations of 12communist headquarters, most of which were near the Cambodian border. President Diem approved bombings, to befollowed by an airborne assault, on 2 January 1963. Allavailable VNAF AD-6s, numbering 26 Skyraiders, joinedFarm Gate's two dozen T-28s and 16 B-26s in a day-longtactical role that killed as many as 1,000 enemy soldiers, andpaved the way for the Vietnamese paratroopers and rangerswho followed. It was a textbook application of tactical airsupport in the III Corps area, and American advisors wereencouraged by its success. Perhaps the VNAF Skyraiders,augmented by Farm Gate planes, were overcoming theirearlier logistical and political hobbles.20

Farm Gate crews patterned techniques for coming to theaid of friendly outposts under night attack from the Viet CongoThe strategy was passed on to the VNAF, which kept C-47son alert as flare-droppers. These flare ships would illuminateoutposts under night attack, permitting strike aircraft to directtheir ordnance at the attacking Viet Congo But in 1963, thecommander of one VNAF fighter squadron at first balked atusing his A-1 H (formerly AD-6) crews for night combat, citinginexperience. The commander yielded partially to Americanpressure and took on about half the nocturnal missions hissquadron had been given. As 1963 pressed on, the VCintensified operations in South Vietnam, creating greaterneed for VNAF response. In the face of heightened combat,the commander of the 516th VNAF Fighter Squadron cut fourT-28s from a squadron detachment, to release those crews for

Early Asia 81

A-1 upgrade training. The commander of a VNAF fightersquadron sometimes ignored requests for napalm strikes andin September 1963 he occasionally released only nine of his26A-1 Hs to the air operations center for combat use. The restof his flyable A-1s, he said, were needed for pilot upgrading.

Through 1963, combat experience showed the value ofair escorts for convoys. The Viet Cong were often reluctant toattack a convoy if an L-19 spotter plane was flying overhead,because the L-19 could call in an air strike on the attackers. Onthe last day of 1963, the Vietnamese 5th Division had a rangerbattalion surrounded by about twice as many Viet Cong in IIICorps, 10 miles west of Ben Cat. While South Vietnameseground troops worked their way toward their besieged rangercomrades, a forward air controller in an L-19 and at least twoA-1 Hs armed with bombs and cannons orbited overhead,asking for clearance to strike. But 5th Division tried usingarmed Bell UH-1 helicopter gunships instead. The chopperattacks did not blunt the Viet Cong attack, but without clearance to join the fray, the armed A-1 s were powerless to help.The big gray Skyraiders chugged back to Bien Hoa andlanded, without participating in the rangers' battle. The nextday, rescuing ground troops entered the scene of battle to findthe rangers had ultimately been scattered and defeated by thelarger VC force. The rangers sustained six fatalities, 12wounded, and 31 missing. American strategists were dismayed that the South Vietnamese had failed to capitalize onthe Skyraiders at their disposal.21

In 1964, VNAF's commander, Col. Nguyen Cao Ky, tooksteps to centralize control of his squadrons. Previously, Corpscommanders in the Vietnamese corps areas had guarded airassets in their corps, sometimes not releasing them to neighboring corps. Now Ky planned to assign new wings to geographical corps areas, but not to the corps commanders. Thisgave Ky the centralized control of these air assets for deployment wherever needed.

Meanwhile, wing failures in Farm Gate B-26s and T-28sprompted the withdrawal of most of these two aircraft typesfrom combat. The old craft were being loaded beyond theirlimits in wrenching maneuvers that overstressed their wingspars. Some B-26s would return to Southeast Asia as B-26KCounter Invaders with strengthened wings and more underwing ordnance racks. Butthe real solution tothe gap in groundattack aircraft left by the B-26s and T-28s was to send moreSkyraiders overseas. The dual-control A-1 Es (AD-5s) whicharrived in 1964 gave Farm Gate fliers a chance to get intocombat with Vietnamese crewmen aboard, to legitimize theoperations in the eyes of American planners who still insistedthe U.S. role was advisory.

Viet Cong groundfire was becoming more concentratedand more accurate. A defense to this was the use of four-shipattack formations, allowing two A-1 s to cover the two makingan attack. The U.S. Air Force planned to have three Skyraidersquadrons in South Vietnam by 1965. In part, these U.S.Skyraiders would shore up sortie rates which sagged. Theother forecast benefit, reasoned General Joseph H. Moore,Second Air Division commander, would be the example toVNAF fliers set by USAF A-1 E crews flying timely air supportstrikes, with their token Vietnamese crewmembers aboard.


But to avoid widening the appearance of U.S. involvement, thethird U.S. Skyraider squadron was turned down in Washington, with more A-1 s diverted to the VNAF instead.

The facade of USAF pilots flying only training or supportmissions was torn several times. On 8 March 1964, a singleseat VNAF A-1 H crashed, killing USAF Col. Thomas M.Hergert, deputy chief of the Military Assistance AdvisoryGroup (MAAG) Air Force Section. Colonel Hergert had beenflying as wingman to a Vietnamese Skyraider pilot on aninterdiction mission. A loose interpretation of the "supportand-training-only" doctrine had been employed, whereby USAFpilots were flying combat, but not leading flights, or being thefirst to attack. The Americans were not to continue if theVietnamese flight leader aborted the attack. Later that month,letters written by another USAF Farm Gate pilot who was killedrevealed the use of basic Vietnamese airmen who were notreally pilot candidates as the token VNAF on-board personnelfor some Farm Gate combat sorties. The Farm Gate airmensomewhat derisively referred to these required VNAF members as "sandbags." By using the "sandbags" who were notpilots, Farm Gate missions did not tie up actual VNAF flierswho could be more productively used in other aircraft.

Renewed emphasis was placed on building up VNAFSkyraider squadrons, while banning USAF participation incombat missions except where bona fide training could becited. The three VNAF fighter squadrons, flying A-1 s, were tobe enlarged to four by October 1964, and then to six by early1965, according to plans hatched by MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam). Along with this increase in VNAFA-1 aircraft came a push to enlarge the number of VNAF pilotsavailable to fly the big Skyraiders. The aim was to increase theratio from 1.5 pilots per plane to 2 per plane. Training ofVNAF516th and 520th Fighter Squadron pilots was split betweenthe USAF's 34th Tactical Group and the U.S. Navy's VA-152squadron at Bien Hoa. The 34th received the original flight ofsix A-1 Es on 30 May 1964, ferried from Clark Air Base in thePhilippines to Bien Hoa. The E-model Skyraider, under therevised designation system for American military aircraft, wasthe multi-seat AD-5. The day after their arrival, these A-1 Esflew combat. The 34th Group had a dozen A-1 Es by the endof June, with which to train Vietnamese pilots.

During this period, frailties in USAF-VNAF tactical operations manifested themselves. In July 1964, the Nam Dongspecial forces camp was besieged by Viet Cong at night.While a flareship remained on station and illuminated the areauntil dawn robbed the VC of cover, VNAF A-1 Hs did not arriveon scene with an 0-1 forward air controller until daylightbecause the A-1 drivers were not released for night sorties. Tocompound this delay, the 0-1 was bound by Vietnamese ruleswhich forbade FACs from marking targets near friendly forceswithout positive identification. The FAC over Nam Dong wasunable to raise the ground forces on radio. Later that month,USAF A-1 Es, ostensibly with qualified VNAFtrainees aboard,pressed attacks coordinated by a U.S. Army 0-1 pilot. Butsubsequent Vietnamese Skyraider pilots in this battle refusedto strike targets pointed out by the U.S. controller and aVietnamese ground observer. By the time a Vietnamese FACwas on station, the VC were gone from the battle scene.23

As the second half of 1964 wore on, American plannerstried to make ground attack aviation in Vietnam more effective. More A-1 s were earmarked for the VNAF, and the JointChiefs of Staff proposed letting the "sandbag" VNAF observers fulfill the need for VNAF observers aboa~dUSAF A-1 Es onstrike missions. The use of "sandbags" was resisted bySecretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Ambassador toSouth Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, who were loathe to see theAmerican air combat role expanded in Vietnam. As forecast,the fourth VNAF A-1 squadron came into existence in October. By December, the men of this unit, the 520th FighterSquadron, were ready to fly combat in their A-1 Hs. Theirintended base of Can Tho (the name of which was laterchanged to Binh Thuy) was still under construction, andsecurity for the Skyraiders could not be provided after dark. Sofive 520th Skyraiders deployed to Binh Thuy daily from BienHoa, to spread the A-1 umbrella over a larger part of SouthVietnam.

By December 1964, the USAF's 34th Group could musterabout 50 Skyraider sorties daily, some 17 of which wereusable for combat. Though plagued by engine maintenanceproblems, the 34th kept an operational readiness rate of 80percent. A comparable Vietnamese A-1 operational rate ofthat period was 58 percent,24

On 1 November 1964 a Viet Cong mortar squad got closeenough to the Bien Hoa flightline to lob projectiles in the darkof night for a half hour. Five USAF B-57s were destroyed;other USAF and VNAF planes were destroyed or damaged.Four persons were killed and 72 injured in the VC attack.Washington was at once outraged at the attack and indecisiveon how to respond. While the Americans mulled over theirresponse, on the night of 6 November Air Vice Marshal Kycommanded a flight of 32 VNAF A-1 Hs which struck a VietCong camp in Zone D Northeast of Saigon. The SouthVietnamese made it known this air raid was a response to theBien Hoa mortar attack. By their own tallies, the SouthVietnamese claimed to have inflicted 500 Viet Cong casualties in this Skyraider fight. Whatever the casualty count, thisraid showed an increased capability on the part ofVietnameseSkyraider squadrons.

By year's end, 48 USAF A-1 Es and 92 VNAF A-1 s werecounted in South Vietnam. Together these Skyraiders couldmount about 60 combat sorties daily plus training missions.25

The Vietnamese contribution to this mission tally was limitedby Air Vice Marshal Ky's anti-coup flight of Skyraiders at TanSon Nhut. These A-1 s were manned by dependable, loyalfliers. Though the palace guard drew combat missions, theseplanes sometimes were withheld from action if dissidenceseemed to warrant this.

VNAF and USAF pilots learned to love their big radialengine bombers. Some pilots requested A-1 s for the experience of flying a propeller-driven, tailwheeled design reachingback to World War II, when their fellow flying class graduateswere testing the limits of supersonic jets. Some new navigational aids, and the Yankee crew extraction parachute system,helped ease the Skyraider into its mid-Sixties war.

The U.S. Air Force flight manual for A-1 aircraft, upgradedfor changes through 30 April 1972, explains the nature of the

Vietnam-era Skyraider which confronted USAF and VNAFpilots. For the dual-control A-1 Es, an additional throttle controllever was installed on the center console, enabling the pilot inthe righthand seat to make throttle adjustments with his lefthand, which was standard for stick-and-throttle aircraft. Thisright-seat throttle was directly connected to the original pilot'sthrottle on the left console of the aircraft, and the right seaterdid not have his own throttle stops or friction locks. Additionally, the right seatthrottle had a stowable guard which coveredthe spare throttle when the left seat pilot was flying, to preventaccidental movement of the throttle controls by the rightseater.26 Some A-1 Es were fitted with right-seat rudder pedalsidentical to those for the left seat. The right-seat pilot, somewhat euphemistically called the "assistant pilot" in the USAFSkyraiderflight manual, had at his disposal a control stick gripidentical to the pilot's grip, with appropriate trim tab switches,gun trigger, and external-stores release switches. The assistant pilot's control stick could be removed and stowed in abracket on the outboard side of the righthand console. Whenthis was done, crews were admonished to install a dust capover the control stick housing's electrical connector to avoidshort-circuiting the trim tab or armament release circuitry.Some A-1 Es were fitted with an assistant pilot's rudder trimcontrol knob which was identical to the pilot's rudder trimequipment. The assistant pilot could use this to trim the rudderwhen the trim selector switch was turned to the positionmarked CO-PILOT.

Aircraft supplied to foreign countries were identified asMilitary Assistance Program (MAP) equipment. The Air ForceSkyraider flight manual makes distinctions between equipment typically installed on USAF A-1 s versus the equipmentin MAP Skyraiders. Among the USAF-reserved options wasthe XM-47 mine disperser, and autopilot gyro horizon indicator.

According to the flight manual, many USAF and VNAFSkyraiders flew with the stall warning system deactivated.Some others did not use the speed brakes. But for USAF andMAP A-1 s which retained functional dive brakes, features andlimitations were discussed in the flight manual. For A-1 Es withoperable brakes, the brake was a hydraulically-actuated flatsurface that hinged from the bottom of the fuselage. A switchon the control stick actuated the brake. The brake had a blowback feature which retracted the brake at airspeeds above348 knots indicated airspeed (lAS) to avoid structure damage.An interconnect between the landing gear and the speedbrake prevented extending the brake when the landing gearwas down. This feature also retracted the brake if it was in thedeployed position when the landing gear handle was movedto the Down position. An override made it possible to havegear and brake extended simultaneously for emergency operation. This override was located on the lefthand console onA-1 Es so equipped.

Single-seat USAF and MAP Skyraiders had three fuselage-mounted brake panels: One ventral and two sidemounted.No mechanical linkage tied the three panels together. Rather,each brake panel's operating cylinder operated simultaneouslywith the other two. On the single-seaters the speed brakecontrol was situated on the left console. When activated, the

Early Asia 83 ,

On 1 July 1966, this modified A·1G of the VNAF 524th Tactical Fighter Squadron suffered a landing gear collapse, with theusual severe bending of the hollow Aeroproducts propeller. VNAF tail marking was yellow with red stripes; 524th Squadronemblem on cowl (both sides) featured a red disc edged in yellow, with a black bomb, white lightning bolt, yellow '524' andwhite inscription 'Thien Loi'. This A-1G carried no national insignia on its wings. (Photos by Earl Otto.)


three brake panels took about two and a half seconds to open.A manual lockout valve could be set to prevent the ventralbrake from deploying when large stores, which might interfere, were carried on the centerline rack. A solenoid safetylock prevented use ofthe brakes on single-seat Skyraiders onthe ground.

The speed brakes were designed to allow steep diveswithout building up excessive speed, which made stick forcesgreater and prolonged recovery from a dive. USAF and MAPSkyraider pilots were cautioned never to use the moveablestabilizer for dive recovery. Only elevator back pressure onthe control'stick was permitted, to avoid excessive loadswhich could cause structural failure. Crews were also told,when making dives with the speed brakes extended, to keepthe brakes deployed until the dive recovery was well underway and the Skyraider was nearly level. If the brakes wereretracted in the dive before pull-up, the dive speed wouldincrease and possibly be joined by a nose-down trim change.27

Though it may seem incredible, the statistics of flightinclude several instances in which the pilots of folding-wingaircraft attempted to take off in their machines while the wingswere still folded. The USAF Skyraider flight manual detailed afeature of the A-1 which would, it was hoped, deter this costlyoversight. Crews were admonished that "the wing pin lockdoor and the wing fold handle should be kept in the open(unlocked and folded) position at all times when the wings arefolded ...The angular position of the wing pin lock door, whenin the full open position and restricting the movement of thepilot's knee, serves as a warning to the pilot to spread thewings before takeoff."

USAF and VNAF pilots learned the fundamentals of thetwisting and folding main landing gear mechanism on theirsturdy Skyraiders. As the main struts streamlined and retracted aft, they automatically telescoped in, compressing tofit between the wing spars.

The men who flew Skyraiders for the VNAF and USAF insoutheast Asia were warned never to set or reset their planes'G-2 gyro compass while flying the Skyraider with the P-1autopilot in use. If the G-2 compass was set in this mode, itcould induce in the autopilot abrupt and violent rudder forcesstronger than the design limits of the A_1.28

These Skyraider pilots had the Yankee crew escapesystem at their disposal. A rocket pulled the crew memberfrom the cockpit as his seat bottom folded downward. With thecrew member pulled into a standing position and automatically separated from the partially extracted seat, the rocketseparated from the crewman and the parachute deployed.The firing sequence activated a canopy cutter to createopenings forthe pilot and right-seater in the A-1 E; in the A-1 H,the entire canopy was jettisoned before the extraction sequence would work. Two angled rocket nozzles spin-stabilized the Yankee rocket; two lines between the crewman'sparachute and the rocket were attached with a swivel to avoidfouling. The Yankee system was viable even at ground level.

In the event passengers were aboard the A-1 E in seatsbehind the pilots, the following instructions for abandoning theairplane in flight were given by the Air Force to its Vietnam-erastudents:29

WARNING

It is imperative, if passengers are occupying the middlecompartment, that the aft canopy be jettisoned beforethe forward canopy.

Failure to observe this precaution will cause anextreme pressure drop within the airplane. At speedsgreater than 250 KIAS, the result may be structuralfailu re to the aft fuselage section and collapse ofthe aftcanopy with an inward burst of shattered plexiglass. Atspeeds below 250 KIAS, the reduced pressure maydangerously hinderan attemptto jettison the aft canopy.

When abandoning the airplane from the middlecompartment, care must be taken to keep the body aslow to the compartment rail as possible during bailout.Upon gaining the proper position for bailout, give avigorous coordinated push with the feet and pull-pushwith the hands and arms while diving for the wing. Thisis necessary to ensure a clear breakaway from thefuselage, wing, and horizontal stabilizer. The bodyshould be doubled up with the legs and arms welltucked in upon leaving the airplane. Bailout should beaccomplished from a point as far forward as possible.This will provide the individual with some protectionfrom the slipstream, during the initial roll over the rail,and will aid in clearing the horizontal stabilizer.

Whenever possible, bailout should be made fromthe right side of the airplane.

EqUipped with this knowledge and much more provided byseasoned pilots, VNAF and USAF Skyraider pilots gained theconfidence needed to maximize their use of the A-1 as acombat aircraft.

A normal takeoff run was described in the Air Force A-1flight manual as follows:

TAKEOFF

Release brakes and advance throttle smoothly to fullpower, do not exceed predicted TOP or allowable MAP.As the aircraft accelerates, the pilot should be in nohurry to raise the tail. During the initial roll, the pilotshould concentrate on heading control. The rudderbecomes effective at an airspeed of 15 to 20 knots. Itmay therefore be necessary, especially in a calm orlight wind condition, to apply small amount of brakingaction to help maintain directional control until the airspeed atwhich the rudder becomes effective is reached.The tailwheel should be held on the runway for the firstpart of the roll, as this will help maintain directionalcontrol and minimize the need for braking. After therudder becomes effective, back stick pressure is relaxed and enough forward pressure is applied to raisethe tailwheel off the runway to position the airplane ina slightly flatter than takeoff attitude. To maintain astraight takeoff roll, it is necessary to change rudderpressure as the airspeed increases. At takeoff speed,rudder pressure should be almost neutral. The flatter

Early Asia 85

attitude is held until takeoff airspeed is approached atwhich time the airplane is rotated slightly and allowedto lift from the runway. No attempt should be made topUll it off. Typical takeoff speeds with wing flaps up andgross weight of 18,500 pounds are 95 to 100 KIAS. With25-degree wing flap setting and a gross weight of25,000 pounds, takeoff speed Is 110 KIAS. The landinggear should retract in a maximum time of 9 seconds.The throttle lever should not be retarded until thewheels are retracted and the airplane has attainedsufficient altitude and airspeed to permit safe control inthe event of sudden engine failure.

For landing the Skyraider, the manual for USAF and VNAFpilots instructed:

LANDING

liThe most important factor in landing is a good approach and airspeed. For the best aircraft control onapproach, maintain a speed 20 percent above stallingspeed for aircraft weight (Section VI). Use power asnecessary to maintain airspeed on final. Leave thepower on when making wheels landings, during crosswind landings, or when encountering turbulence. If thelanding is to be made three point, then all three wheelsshould contact the runway simultaneously. Under thiscondition the tail wheel is on the ground immediatelyand the chances of a ground loop are reduced. Thethree point attitude should be established just prior totouchdown. In making a wheels landing, the aircraftmust be flown to a touchdown point with power on andlanding on the two main gear only.

On touchdown the power is gradually eased offwhile lowering the tail wheel to the runway. After the tailwheel is on the runway, hold the stick full back withaileron into the wind, check the throttle closed, trim fullnose up, and raise the flaps. Use rudder and aileronaggressively to maintain directional control. Placingthe stick into the crosswind will help to keep the aircraftrolling straight with approximately one third less rudderdisplacement. The raised upwind aileron is keepingthe wing from raising; the lowered downward aileron iscreating drag, preventing to some degree theweathervane tendency. As airspeed decreases duringthe rollout and the controls become ineffective, quicklyslide your feet up on the brakes and cautiously begin touse differential braking for directional control. Do not


land with feet on the brakes. The application or reduction of power, variations in wind direction or speed,landing in a crab, over controlling on the part of thepilot - all of these, separately or in combination cancause the airplane to rapidly change its heading. If thisheading change is not correctly countered it can develop into a vicious swerve. For this reason, the pilotmust be especially alert and immediately responsive toany heading deviation on the ground.

When VNAF and USAF pilots jumped from the two-seat A-1 Eto the single seat A-1 H, some alterations in flying techniquewere advised in the flight manual:

A-1 H LANDING

With very few exceptions, procedures and techniquesused in landing the A-1E can be employed in landingthe A-1 H. The rudder is about three feet smaller in totalarea than the E and the rudder has a stiffer feel due togreater rudder spring tension in the controls. For thesereasons be more alert in the H than in the E for deviations in roll-out heading. The shorter control stick is asignificant difference and will require a few changes intechnique. Because of limited lateral displacement ofthe stick, when landing in strong cross-winds, the legon the upwind side of the cockpit will sometimes haveto be raised to obtain full aileron deflection.

Without a bomb ejector cartridge, Skyraider centerline stores,particularly empty fuel tanks, could strike the fuselage uponrelease. Jettisoning large centerline stores could also causethe Skyraider to nose over.

The Americans and South Vietnamese were not the onlypersonnel in Southeast Asia with a Skyraider syllabus. TheKhmer Rouge in Cambodia prepared a somewhat rustictraining document for ground troops. Translated by lieutenant Colonel Sok Sambaur of the Khmer (Cambodian) AirForce, part Four of the "Aircraft Shooting Lesson" is entitled"Howto ShootA-1 (orT-28)." Crediting these prop planes witha rather incredible speed of 600 kilometers per hour, thedocument stated: "We must lead him by three times the lengthof his fuselage, because he almost has the speed of an OV10. We must all shoot together at the karman Uuncture ofwings and fuselage), pointing our guns at the same placewhen he is diving."30

The accuracy of groundfire in Southeast Asia would takea toll of the Skyraiders over the years of conflict.

Notes1. Air Force Magazine, August 1964.2. "Farewell to 'Spads'," by Lt. Cdr. A. Dodge McFall, USN, U.S. NavalInstitute Proceedings, April 1965.3. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 1, 1964, p. 16.4. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, Office of Air Force History,Washington, D.C., 1977, p.27.5. Interview, Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky with Frederick A. Johnsen, 22 July 1982.6. Ibid.7. Ibid.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Ibid.11. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, Office of Air Force History,Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 141-142.12. Interview, Gen. Nguyen Cao Kywith Frederick A. Johnsen, 22 July 1982.13. Ibid.14. Ibid.15. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to1965, by Robert F. Futrell, Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C.,1981, pp. 79-84.

16. Ibid, p. 75.17. Ibid, p. 80.18. Ibid, p. 129.19. Ibid, p. 129.20. Ibid, pp. 156-157.21. Ibid, p. 197.22. Ibid, p. 218.23. Ibid, pp. 220-224.24. Ibid, p. 237.25. Ibid, p. 263.26. Flight Manual, USAF Series A-1 E/G/H/J Aircraft, T.O. 1A-1 E-1 , 30 April1971 (change 2-30 April 1972).27. Ibid.28. Ibid.29. Ibid.30. Aircraft Shooting Lesson, How to Shoot A-1 (or T-28), translated 15August 1971 by Lt. Col. Sok Sambaur, Cambodian Air Force. Translationfurnished by Colonel Ronald G., Linder, USAF (Retired).

Early Asia 87

CHAPTER VIIThe N,ctvy in Vietnam

"Once more upon the waters! Yet once more!" Byron, Chi/de Harold

A n American presence in French Indochina built month advising and training the Vietnamese Air Force, acsubtly for years. During World War Two, Army cording to a report published in the January 1965 issue ofAir Forces B-24 Liberator bombers hit Japanese Naval Aviation News, the Navy's official flying house organ.

targets in occupied Indochina while Navy fighters and bomb- Overt U.S. Navy combat missions in A-1 s began Augusters ranged over the land. After the end of the Second World 5, 1964, in retaliatory strikes launched from the USSWar, colonial France fought a gentleman's war against com- Ticonderoga and Constellation after North Vietnamese patrolmunist and nationalist insurgents who sought to remove the boats attacked American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. AFrench from power. When the French garrison at Dien Bien total of 64 sorties included A-4 Skyhawks and MiG-cap F-8Phu faced a major siege by the insurgents, French reinforce- Crusaders, as well as A-1 Hs from VA-52 and VA-145.2

menttroops were flown in by U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster Five targets in North Vietnam were hit during the four-hourtransports. operation of August 5. In addition to an oil tank farm at Ninh,

A familiar pattern emerged in Vietnam. The communists the planes of the fleet hit four patrol boat bases. Following thecontrolled the northern part of the country, contiguous to strike, Robert McNamara, secretary of defense, estimated 25communist China, while the non-communists fled to the south. patrol boats were destroyed. A Skyhawk was downed and itsThis geography would later produce frustrating rules of en- pilot captured. Lt. Gg) Richard Sather's Skyraider from Congagement allowing communist jets to escape pursuit by flying stellation was another victim of anti-aircraft fire. A secondacross the border into China. Skyraider from the Constellation sustained damage requiring

But in the late 1950s the concerns were not over jet it to divert to Danang in South Vietnam where the pilot landedwarfare. Rather, in observance of Geneva accords, the United safely. Sather initially was listed missing in action. 3

States sought to bolster South Vietnam's air forces with For nearly four years, the Navy would launch Skyraiderspropeller-driven planes instead of escalating a hardware war on southeast Asia combat sorties from carriers in the Southby introducing jets. South Vietnam had been flying F8F China Sea. The American posture in the early years offightingBearcats. The U.S. Navy, with its lingering use of piston- in southeast Asia frequently linked communist raids withengine shipboard planes, had more to offer the Vietnamese specifically-cited retaliatory air strikes designed to instill athan did the fast-flying jet U.S. Air Force of the period. Not cause-and-effect reaction among the communists. Commusurprisingly, AD Skyraiders were picked for the growing air nist attacks which killed American advisors in South Vietnam,force of South Vietnam, as chronicled in the previous chapter. and allegations of increased communist atrocities against

The U.S. Navy trained South Vietnamese air force pilots civilians, provided the "cause" for the "effect" of raids launchedin Skyraider operations in 1960 when some AD-6s were given by the carriers Hancock and Coral Sea in the first part ofto the Vietnamese. Initially, six officers and eight enlisted February 1965. The second strike, launched February 11,members of the VNAF (Vietnam Air Force) trained at Corpus was a responsive strike against North Vietnamese and VietChristi, Texas, for a month and a half before joining with attack· Cong barracks and staging areas. Among the naval particisquadron VA-122 for more training out of North Island, San . pants were the sturdy Skyraiders of VA-125, joining A-4C andDiego, California. The Vietnamese aviators flew single-seat A-4E Skyhawk attack jets. F-8C and F-8E Crusaders providedAD-6s. They participated in training exercises off the Califor- fighter escort. Though three jets were downed, the A-1snia coast and over the expansive desert near Yuma, Arizona. escaped this fate. The Skyraider was back in combat with theThe original AD-6s for the South Vietnamese came under the U.S. Navy, and serving reliably.4auspices of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact,1 On June 20, 1965, four A-1 H single-seaters from VA-25

Four years later, in October 1964, the U.S. Navy was mixed it up with North Vietnamese MiG jets, downing a MiGgiven the task of training 22 U.S. Air Force officers how to fly 17 and discouraging another. Navy Lt. Clint Johnson wasA-1 H Skyraiders at Corpus Christi. Training Squadron 30 (VT- credited with squeezing off the 20-millimeter rounds which30) had the job at Corpus. The Air Force fliers were subse- doomed the enemy jet fighter. Johnson, flying VA-25's A-1 Hquently assigned to South Vietnam to advise VNAF Skyraider number 139768, caught the MiG-17 slow and in front of him asfliers. Ultimately, USAF Skyraider pilots would train their own the jets attempted to dogfight in the A-1 s' speed range. Ain use of the A-1, but in the early 1960s, the Navy had the second A-1 pursued the attack on the MiG, joining Johnson inexpertise. a classic scissors maneuver. One A-1 fired from above and

In South Vietnam, Detachment Zulu of U.S. Navy squad- the other from below the communist jet, according to aron VA-152 trained more Vietnamese pilots in the tactical contemporary account of the fray in the June 28, 1965, issueemployment of the Skyraider in the early 1960s. The detach- of Aviation Week and Space Technology. The Aviation Weekment presented A-1 qualification certificates to successful clientele of aerospace engineers and related industry profesVNAF graduates. The detachment flew nearly 1,000 hours a sionals doubtlessly were amazed to see the old and slow


Skyraider emerge victorious in a dogfight against jets, thoughthe outcome was less profound to them than it was to the MiG17 driver that June day.

Nor was VA-25's kill to be the only jet downed by aSkyraider over Vietnam. On October 9, 1966, Lt. Ug) W.T.Patton, flying A-1 H number 137543 of VA-176, engaged aMiG over North Vietnam. Patton wasn't certain whether hisbogey was a MiG-17 or a -21. The enemy jet was attacking afellow Skyraider at low altitude and subsonic speed. Pattonentered the engagement from about a half mile above theMiG, diving to build up speed against the faster jet.

The MiG pilot broke off his attack and sought to gainaltitude in a climbing left turn. Patton's diving speed broughthim to within about 200 feet of the MiG, where rounds from theA-1 H's four cannons punctured the jet aircraft's structure. Asthe MiG rapidly departed controlled flight and went inverted,the North Vietnamese pilot ejected. Subsequent accounts ofPatton's victory suggest his quarry was a MiG-17.

In 1966, Lt. Ug) Norman Lessard told a war correspondentwhat Skyraider bomb strikes were like, from launch to recovery aboard the USS Ranger. Sometimes laden with four tonsof bombs, Lessard's Skyraider hurled off the Ranger to joinother VA-145 A-1 s en route to the target. Radio silence wasseldom broken by Lessard and his squadron mates, whochose instead to motor within 30 feet of each other for signlanguage or, if at night, light signals.5

Plunging earthward in an attacking dive, Lessard had notime to contemplate his vulnerability to the intense communistanti-aircraft fire. He concentrated on attack angles and sightcomputations, registering bomb release by the distinct feelinghis A-1 had when heavy ordnance fell from the wings. Then itwas into a muscle-tugging 4.5g pullout for Lessard and his"Spad." If the target were important enough, or the groundfirenegligible, a second run-in might be initiated.

There was some frustration for Lessard and his comradesbecause their targets frequently were obscured by the jungle'scanopy. Only the occasional secondary explosion hinted attarget destruction. Far more visible was the return fire fromautomatic weapons and heavy anti-aircraft guns.6

It was the intense groundfire which damaged the A-1 H ofNavy Lt. Ug) Dieter Dengler on February 1, 1966, as the flierfrom USS Ranger struck North Vietnamese targets near theLaotian border. The Skyraider remained controllable, soDengler headed west, managing a crash landing in Laos.Dieter vacated his Skyraider and hid from searchers whom hethought to be of no good to his cause. He slept in his sleepingbag that night, and commenced his foot travel again atdaybreak. A pair of Pathet Lao men caught Dengler aboutnoon, and relieved the Navy flier of his watch and compass.For the next week and a day, Dengler was abused by hiscaptors. He was staked to the ground where leeches andinsects infested him, and marched from village to village. Onone occasion, Dengler faced whistling bullets when he wastied to a tree as his captors intentionally shot branches fromthe tree.

Dengler, a naturalized citizen born in Germany, probablyconfounded his tormentors because he still carried an expiredGerman passport to explain his accent. Two weeks aftercrash-landing his A-1 , Dieter Dengler was brought to a prison

in the jungle where six other prisoners were kept. Monthspassed as the prisoners contemplated an escape, waiting formonsoo ins they thought would aid their getaway. Gettingwind of guards' inclinations toward executing the prisoners,the captives made their break June 29, 1966. Skyraider pilotDengler slipped out of his wooden restraints and stole fourAmerican and Chinese guns. A firefight erupted, during whichseveral guards were shot and probably killed. Dengler andU.S. Air Force 1 Lt. Duane Martin paired up and slipped intothe jungle, barefoot and ill. The two built a raft and traveleddown a stream until losing the vessel in a waterfall.

Ten days after their violent escape, Dengler and Martinstumbled across an abandoned village where they spent thenight. Days later, Dengler tried signal fires, but drew nofriendly aircraft. A week later, as Dieter Dengler and Martinapproached what they thought was an abandoned village, aman leaped from a hut and set upon Martin with a machete.The Air Force lieutenant fell, dying from wounds hacked by hisattacker, who then turned on Dengler who had been behindMartin. When the swung machete missed Dieter, he managedto escape into the jungle. That night, Dengler torched thevillage where the attack had taken place.

Twenty-two days after escaping the prison, Dengler triedagain to signal planes by laying out an S.O.S. message withremnants of a parachute flare. Another Skyraider pilot - AirForce Lt. Col. Eugene Deatrich - saw Dengler's sign andushered a rescue helicopter to where Dengler waited for thelowered sling.?

As 1966 closed, Navy carrier Airborne Early WarningSquadron 33 ryAW-33) retired its last two EA-1 E "Guppy"Skyraiders, so nicknamed for the ventral radomes they carried. The EA-1 E entered seNice under the old designationAD-5W. The Guppies of VAW-33 intercepted. and photographed Soviet Badger jet bombers reconnoitering 1964NATO exercises, and flew support missions for the splashdown recoveries of five Gemini space capsules. The retirement of VAW-33's last pair of Guppies marked the end ofoperational ASW (antisubmarine warfare) EA-1 E seNice inthe Navy.s (Some electronics-laden EA-1 F-models seNed awhile longer.)

When VA-75 launched the first jet A-6 Intruder attacks inJuly 1965, the inevitable draw-down of A-1 s was apparent.The radar of the Intruder gave the jet an attractive all-weathercapability, and its electronics jamming abilities were turnedagainst the surface-to-air missiles which increasingly madeflying over North Vietnam dangerous. VA-25 took NavySkyraiders out of combat in the first quarter of 1968, but A-1 sflew combat with the U.S. Air Force and the air force of SouthVietnam for several years to come.

Notes1. "South Viet Nam to Get Skyraiders", Naval Aviation News, October 1960,p.30.2. "For This Unprovoked Attack", Naval Aviation News, September 1964,p.11; plus information provided by aviation historian Rene Francillon.3. "For This Unprovoked Attack", Naval Aviation News, September 1964,p.11.4. "Vietnam: War at Sea and Ashore", Naval Aviation News, May 1965, pp.18-22.5. "Today's Pilots for Today's Conflict", Naval Aviation News, 1966, p.B.6.lbid.7. "A Grounded Eagle Escapes Captors", Naval Aviation News, November1966, pp. 18-19.B. "VAW-33 Retires EA-1E 'Guppies"', Naval Aviation News, 1967, p.16

The Navy in Vietnam 89


OPPOSITE: The paraphernalia of modern warfare is luggedfrom a Skyraider by U.S. Air Force A·1 pilot Ronald G. Linder,who flew combat and trained south Vietnamese pilots. (Photofrom the collection of Col. Ronald G. Linder, USAF Ret.)

CHAPTER VIIINo More Kid Gloves:

New Tricks for an Able Dog

B"Let us not be too particular. It is better to have old second-hand diamonds than none at all." Mark Twain

y 1965, American air operations in Vietnam were C-123s took. In March, the Second Air Division revived theincreasingly overt and aggressive, in the wake of forestfire idea, suggesting saturating the windward area oftheNorth Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks viewed woods with fuel to be ignited by bombing. It was hoped the

as provocations. As 1965 began, the U.S. Air Force pondered wind would spread this fire into the defoliated target acreage.a way to avoid the need for a lengthy ground battle by using MACV bought the scheme. Choices ranged from having lowairpower to rout a Viet Cong base from the Soi Loi Woods, a flying KC-135 tankers spray fuel from altitudes of 300-500tropical forest 10 miles from the Cambodian border, and some feet, to having transport planes dump barrels of fuel.25 miles northwest of Saigon, within South Vietnam. On 31 March, 24 C-123 sorties dumped 1,200 gallons of

The American answer to the problem intended to deny the diesel fuel each from drums, along with flares intended toViet Cong use of the forest in which to hide their base. To do ignite the splashed fuel. Skyraiders swept over the fuelthis, plans called for stripping the trees of their leaves by soaked woods, dropping napalm on. the same area. Thechemical defoliation, and then burning the denuded trees with conclusion ofthe Soi Loi firebombing experiment was eight Sa fueled fire. American advisors supported the idea, and the 57 sorties, sowing M35 incendiary bombs ahead of the mainSouth Vietnamese government agreed. Vietnamese officials fire in an effort to induce the flames to spread in that direction.2

asked the U.S. Air Force's Ranch Hand defoliation operation Two thunderstorms followed the bombers that day, andto spray 18,500 acres in the Soi Loi Woods where, the quenchedtheflames.ThefireshadnotfannedfarfromwhereVietnamese believed, one Viet Cong regiment and two guer- the flares and Skyraider napalm had ignited them, just asrilla units shared the woods with 100 acres of crops. The some MACV analysts had originally predicted. Though propodefoliation and burning were to be preceded by publicity nents of the fire-starting blamed the rain, subsequent experiintended to move noncombatant residents of the woods into ments proved again and again that forest fires were not asecure South Vietnamese resettlement areas. practical tool of war in the jungles of South Vietnam.3

General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. The use of Skyraiders for flak-suppression was to con-Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), asked for a tinue throughout the war, with varying success. The loiter timestaff opinion on the Soi Loi operation. Air Force Major General of the chugging A-1 was high, allowing repeated runs on aRobert R. Rowland, head of the Air Force Advisory Group in persistent target.Vietnam, hatched the fire plan. MACV analysts said the Skyraiders were employed in other unconventional optropical Soi Loi Woods would not catch fire like an American erations in Vietnam. The early Farm Gate U.S. Air Force flierspine forest would, but the chemical defoliation might in itself be sought ways to airdrop vital supplies to besieged outposts.promising. So defoliation was ordered, preceded by heavy This included airdrops from Skyraiders. At Pleiku, U.S. AirUSAF and VNAF Skyraider strikes in the Soi Loi Woods Force Colonel Eugene P. Deatrick, Jr., commanderofthe Firstbetween 18-20 January. The combined A-1 strikes dropped Air Commando Squadron, worked with Lieutenant Colonelmore than 395 tons of bombs. In addition to specific VC Eleazar Parmly IV, the U.S. Army Special Forces commander,targets, the Skyraiders engaged in area bombing. Sometimes to use the Air Commandos' Skyraiders in this supply role.the Skyraiders released bombs with delayed fuses. These Canisters were already approved for this purpose, and werebombs later exploded with a random uncertainty that made used by some VNAF Skyraider squadrons, but Deatrick andSoi Loi residents uneasy, and may have helped persuade Parmly experimented with empty napalm tanks filled withsome of them to leave. Ranch Hand Fairchild C-123 Provider supplies and rigged with a parachute. Each A-1 could carrytransports began defoliating the area on 22 January, while the eight of the 500-pound converted napalm tanks. Tactics calledSkyraiders continued to bomb and strafe. This A-1 action for twilight drops, masked by strafing runs to keep the enemywhile the spray planes were deployed accounted for an unaware of the actual purpose of the drops by making themadditional 372 tons of bombs dropped in 316 sorties, with look like air strikes. Release of the parachute canisters was at85,000 rounds of 20-millimeter cannon ammunition spent in slow speeds, at altitudes between 50 and 300 feet.the Soi Loi Woods.1 The aggressive Skyraider work was Early in November 1966, the squadron began these airunusual for this period in the Vietnam war, and no doubt drop tactics west of Pleiku, with ground forces reporting a highhelped reduce the number of ground fire hits the low and slow recovery rate of supplies dropped this way.4

Though Seventh Air Force lauded the ingenuity of theFirst Air Commando Squadron for these airdrops, furtherexperiments in this vein were turned down. The use of napalmtanks for supply drops by A-1 s was not publicized, and only afew pilots were trained in the technique. During operation

No More Kid Gloves: New Tricks for an Able Dog 91

The U.S. Air Force snapped up multi-place A·1E Skyraiders for use in Vietnam, to train south Vietnamese pilots. Rigged withdual controls, the early gray A·1 Es ostensibly were flown by Vietnamese pilots, with Americans only observing and advising,in a time when the United States was not overtly engaged in combat operations. In actuality, Americans frequently flewcombat with Vietnamese on board to legitimize the strike. Black paint obscures the exhaust smudges on the fuselages ofthese USAF A·1Es circa 1965. (Photo by Col. Ronald G. Linder, USAF Ret.)

Blackjack 31 in early 1967, the Army's Fifth Special ForcesGroup recovered all 96 containers dropped by Skyraiders.Later at Can Tho during Blackjack 41, several napalm containers filled with ammunition exploded on impact when thesupporting parachutes failed. The Skyraider delivery had adisadvantage - nine·napalm tanks were equal to one airdropbundle from a C-7 Caribou aircraft, and a single Caribou couldcarry three such bundles. It was more difficult to chase downthe numerous smaller Skyraider loads.s

But the successes enjoyed by Skyraider pilots in accuratelydelivering supplies in converted napalm bombs promptedsome Army Special Forces officers to suggest expandingthese A-1 supply missions to cover all of Vietnam. Some AirForce officers argued against diverting Skyraiders from actualairstrike missions. In August 1967, the napalm canistersreceived Air Force certification as airdrop supply containers,but the airdrop role for U.S. Air Force Skyraiders dwindledfrom a small start.6

During the months of pilot training, while droning in anairplane over a monotonous landscape, or while seated safelywith friends in the officers' club, it is human nature to ponderwhether one has the courage and judgment to wage heroic


actions in an emergency. Two U.S. Air Force Skyraider pilotswho demonstrated their heroism underfire in Vietnam earnedthe United States' highest award, the Medal of Honor.

On 10 March 1966, Major Bernard F. Fisher (alwayshailed as "Bernie" in written accounts of his actions) swunginto A-1 E number 649. The gray Skyraider was loaded with100-pound bombs and poised on the ramp at Pleiku where theFirst Air Commando Squadron set up shop. The mission wasan effort to rout 2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers who hadattacked and now occupied the south portion of the strategicSpecial Forces camp at A Shau. The importance of A Shauwas the ability of the Special Forces there to observe NorthVietnamese troop movements into South Vietnam from nearbyLaos.

The ride to A Shau covered 150 miles. Fisher and fiveother A-1 E pilots found an undercast obscuring the valley.Major Fisher spied a hole in the clouds and took the otherSkyraiders down into the valley. The gray murk opened uponly 800 feet above ground, and the valley walls rose to 1,500feet. The A Shau valley is less than one mile wide, but six mileslong, terminating in mountains at one end and Laos at theother. Attacks on the communist troop positions could only be

made one way, down the length of the A Shau valley. Antiaircraft gunners on the sides of the valley poured fire into theSkyraiders, sometimes actually aiming down on the low-flyingprop bombers. Captain Hubert King was the first casualty ofthe A Shau shooting gallery when his A-1 's canopy shatteredfrom bullet impacts which narrowly missed King. With visibilityrobbed by a crazed and shattered windscreen, King announced his predicament and poked his Skyraider back intothe clouds and limped for Pleiku.7 King had been one of fourofthe six Skyraider pilots participating in that first pass. Fisherand the other two remaining from that first pass cranked theirA-1 s around in tight turns to make another attack on theoverrun A Shau camp. The besieged defenders of A Shau,holed up in the north bunker of the camp, radioed enemypositions to the Skyraider pilots who responded with accurateattacks.

On the second Skyraider attack, Major Dafford W. "Jump"Myers was jolted in his A-1 E as big-bore anti-aircraft roundsconnected with the moving target he presented. As Myers'Skyraider lost power it sheeted flame back past its tail. Myers'A-1 would come to earth quickly, and he guided his sudden

glider in for the only landing approach he would get on thebattle-littered A Shau landing strip. On the radio Major Fisherurged Myers to retract his Skyraider's landing gear when itbecame apparent the crippled A-1 was carrying too muchdeadstick speed to stop on the short runway with its wheelsrolling. In the rushed seconds remaining, Major Myers pulledup the gear and tried in vain to jettison the plane's centerlinefuel tank. That drop tank ruptured and exploded in flame asMyers rode the Skyraider to a halt, skidding off the right sideof the runway. Overhead, Bernie Fisher made a pylon turnabove his long-time buddy Myers. As the Skyraider burned,Myers finally emerged after doffing his personal gear. Trailingsmoke, Myers scrambled out the right wing of his ruinedSkyraider and headed for undergrowth on the side of theairstrip opposite enemy positions. The other two Skyraiders ofthe original six joined up with Bernie Fisher and his wingman,Captain Francisco "Paco" Vazquez, and the four A-1 s repeatedly strafed the enemy to aid both the Special Forces contingent and their downed fellow flier.

The airborne command post involved in the A Shauoperation said a rescue helicopter was 20 minutes away. Ten

USAF A-1 Es adopted tactical camouflage colors for the war in southeast Asia. Dark aft canopy was tinted blue, giving rise tothe nickname for the rear compartment on A-1 Es: 'The Blue Room.' (Douglas photo via Harry Gann.)


Bernie Fisher's legendary A-1 E almost didn't make it to the Air Force Museum. Number 32649 suffered a major accident inVietnam, shedding debris in the process. (Photos courtesy Dave Menard.)

A diving A-1E pilot concentrates on the onrushing ground as he makes an attack against communist positions in southeastAsia. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann.)


minutes later another radio transmission from the commandpost said the chopper was still 20 minutes distant, and askedFisher if he could meet up with the helo and guide it backthrough the hole in the clouds.

Major Fisher quickly nixed that idea. The departure ofSkyraiders from their strafing runs would likely have given thecommunists timeto reach the downed Myers and capture him.Instead, against advice from the command post, Bernie Fisherelected to land on the same airstrip and try to pick up Myers.With Paco Vazquez flying on his wing, hosing A Shau withcannon fire, Bernie Fisher shredded through a pall of smokeand touched his Skyraider's wheels on the plank steel runwaymat. Battle debris, rocket pods, oil drums and sheet metallittered the wet metal-clad airstrip. Fisher gingerly appliedrudder to dodge the garbage in his path, and came to thesinking realization his big Skyraider could not stop on the2,500-foot runway. Cobbing the power to his plane's Wright R3350 engine, Fisher clambered back into the sky. His abortedlanding no doubt had telegraphed his intentions to the persistent communist attackers. 8

Fisher wrenched his A-1 E through a demanding 180degree turn and attempted a landing from the opposite direction, sailing through heavy gunfire. Through years of piloting,Fisher had the skill needed to place seven tons of roaringwarplane down right near the beginning of the runway. Againhe missed debris, riding the plane's brakes and raising wingflaps to decrease lift, putting more weight on the wheels forbetter friction. Still, Fisher's gray Skyraider rolled off theopposite end of the wet runway. He cranked in a turn. As theA-1 E's wings passed over 55-gallon drums in the weeds at theend of the runway, the plane's tail banged into some in theturn. Quickly taxiing back down the strip to where Myers wasconcealed, Fisher stopped when he saw his buddy wavingboth arms, but the Skyraider's fast taxi run made it overshootMyers' location by about 100 feet. Fisher planted the plane'sparking brake, unbuckled from his seat, and headed to theright side of the wide cockpit to see if Myers needed helpreaching the plane. What Fisher saw next he described as"two little red beady eyes trying to crawl up the back of thewing."g It was smoky Myers, and Fisher unceremoniouslygrabbed his fellow aviator's flightsuit and hauled the manheadfirst onto the floor of the A-1.

As the rescue was taking place, the three remainingairborne A-1 Es kept bombing and strafing to occupy the NorthVietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers. When they ran out ofordnance, this trio made dry attack runs, hoping to keep thecommunists ducking. Fisher demanded power from his A-1,and scooted around the junk on the runway while the planebuilt up flying speed. He hoisted the A-1 aloft with minimalflying speed, and avoided climbing until the plane built upairspeed.

Captain Jon Lucas, in one of the other three A-1 s, registered battle damage in the fray as his plane smoked away fromA Shau. More A-1 s replaced Fisher's gaggle at A Shau thatMarch day. The bravery of these U.S. Air Force Skyraiderpilots was credited with helping to hold off the communistsuntil 13 of the 17 surviving Special Forces members could beevacuated. Bernie Fisher's special bravery also saved his

friend, Jump Myers, from capture or death. Nineteen bulletholes attested to the hell Fisher's Skyraider had gone throughto rescue Myers, in the heart of enemy-held ground.10

Major Fisher's Skyraider, itself once the victim of a damaging belly landing, was carefully rebuilt. In its May 1967issue, Air Progress magazine urged its readers to write theircongressmen, requesting that Fisher's historic Skyraider besent to the Air Force Museum for preservation. It was, andvisitors to the great museum galleries at Wright-Patterson AirForce Base, near Dayton, Ohio, can conjure Bernie Fisher'swar as they view the gray A-1 E in which he earned the Medalof Honor.

Only one other of the 12 Air Force Medal of Honorrecipients from the Vietnam war was an A-1 driver. He wasLieutenant Colonel William A. Jones III, commanding officer ofthe 602nd Special Operations Squadron based at NakhonPhanom in Thailand. The squadron operated single-seat A1H (AD-6) and A-1 J (AD-7) Skyraiders. On 1 September1968, Lieutenant Colonel Jones' Skyraider flying under thecall sign "Sandy 1", signifying the lead of a search-and-rescueflight, was his perch from which to direct the rescue of adowned F-4 Phantom aircrew. It was Jones' 98th combatmission, and ittook him into North Vietnam, northwest of DongHoi. Another flight of Phantom jets made radio contact with thedowned F-4 pilot, but they misunderstood the flier's location,and led the Sandy Skyraiders eight miles from where the pilotwas. The Skyraiders burned up nearly an hour's precioussearch time before the pilot of an F-1 00 reestablished contactwith the airman in distress, and guided the A-1 s to the rightlocation. The Super Sabre pilot warned Lieutenant ColonelJones the crashed airman was in range of a host of antiaircraftweapons up to 37-millimeter. ll

Bill Jones nosed his single-seat Skyraider down to scanthe jungle for signs of the pilot. A scraggly broken cloud layerobscured some of the higher hilltops as Jones spread a searchpattern over the rugged ground.

His wingman and other fighters called out enemy gunpositions to Jones as he dragged the jungles forthe concealedairman. A jolting explosion temporarily caused smoke to fill

To keep their out-of-production Skyraiders flying, Air ForceA-1 E mechanics stripped badly damaged Skyraider hangarqueens in a desolate boneyard circa 1965. (Photo by Col.Ronald G. Linder, USAF Ret.)


Jones' Skyraider. An enemy gunner had come too close forcomfort, but failed to seriously damage the A-1 . A trap set bythe communist gunners was to beef up any available AAdefenses around a downed American flier, using the haplessairman as bait, certain to draw rescuing aircraft into the ring offire.

Still searching for the airman, Jones' pluck was rewardedwhen the downed pilot radioed that a Skyraider had justpassed directly overhead. This pinpointed his position.

Bill Jones found himself in a situation similar to thatexperienced by Bernie Fisher, with hillside gunners on thelimestone karst firing down on his Skyraider. Jones crankedhis single-seater into a turn that lined him up for an attack onthose hillside guns. He pickled off rockets and fired his 20millimeters at the enemy guns, and rolled in for a secondattack. This time, 14.5-millimeter gunfire found his Skyraider.The rocket motor in the A-1 's Yankee extraction systemignited when hit by a round, but did not deploy. The Skyraiderwas an airborne Roman candle as the rocket motor spewedflame. Colonel Jones cleared the area and pulled the Yankeeextraction handle to initiate the pilot extraction sequence. Thecanopy blew away instantly, accompanied by a rush of air thatfanned the flames. But the torching extraction rocket no longerworked to propel Jones from his A-1. He released the Yankeesystem so he could climb from the cockpit under his ownpower. In the rapid sequence of events since his Skyraiderbegan to burn, Jones tried to radio the downed flier's position,but his transmissions went unheard as his fellow pilots usedthe frequencies to urge him to bail out ofthe flaming Skyraider.When Jones' radio failed to transmit, and the fire began 'tosubside, he assessed his predicament. If he left the crippledSkyraider now, the other rescue planes would have to run thesame gauntlet to locate the downed Phantom flier all overagain. Plus, Jones would also become the object of a search,further complicating an already complex situation.

Bill Jones was out of this fight, unable to transmit on hisradio and severe!'~ burned on his hands, arms, shoulders andhead. But he carried the downed flier's location with him as helimped 90 miles back to NKP (Nakhon Phanom). Captain PaulMeeks flew wing for Jones, and took up a lead position to easeJones' navigating tasks. Only a portion of the left side of thewind-screen remained in place on Jones' A-1, so he deliberately skidded in skewed flight, presenting that left panel to theslipstream to give his burned body some additional protectionfrom the open-air blast. Faced with an undercast at NKP,Jones managed to follow Meeks down through the cloud deckin tight formation. Jones brought his A-1 H in hot and shallowin a no-flap landing. As rescuers tried to lift him from hisscorched Skyraider cockpit, Bill Jones grabbed for his charts,refusing aid until he was convinced the positions of thePhantom flier and the enemy gunners were understood by theother aircraft in the area. He continued debriefing even whileon the NKP operating table, where his wounds were tended.Later that afternoon, the Phantom pilot was successfullyplucked from the jungle. Bill Jones' tenacity paid off.12

Asthe war progressed, U.S. Air Force use of the Skyraidertypically included the role of "Sandy", the call sign for rescueescort. The Sandys often acted as on-scene rescue commanders, and frequently escorted HH-3 rescue helicopters to


the site of a downed airman. The rescue chopper might holdseveral miles from the position of the downed flier while the A1s went in to beat up AA batteries prior to calling for thevulnerable helicopter. The courage of the Skyraider pilots wasmatched by that of the rescue helo crews who braved a hail ofenemy fire while hovering over the downed airmen, loweringa rescue sling and a para rescue specialist if the flier wasincapacitated.

In the mid summer of 1967, U.S. Air Force Staff SergeantBud Pentz was a door gunner on an HH-3 Jolly Green Giantrescue chopper paddling out of Da Nang toward a Navy flierdown in North Vietnam, about 50 miles south of Hanoi. ACrown airborne rescue command post C-130 controlled all theaircraft involved in this penetration into North Vietnam. A-1 swere tasked in their familiar ground attack and flak suppression role.

The pilot of Pentz' Jolly Green elected to land about 100yards from the injured Navy flier, since the flier's leg injuriesprevented him from climbing aboard a jungle penetratordevice which the chopper crew could wind down into theundergrowth and then hoist back up. North Vietnamese troopschallenged the rescue with small arms fire. "There was no waywe could get in position to give protective fire," Pentz said. Sohe removed his 7.62-millimeter M-60 machine gun from itsdoor mount, grabbed several ammunition containers, left theHH-3, and covered the successful extraction of the Navy pilotby a para rescue specialist from Pentz' Jolly Green. SuddenlySergeant Pentz was surrounded and cut off from his chopperby men and women wearing starred pith helmets and firingsmall arms. "Probably the smartest thing I did was take a radiowith me," Pentz later explained. Rather than keep the entireHH-3 and crew in jeopardy any longer, Sergeant Pentz urgedthem to get airborne while he held off the North Vietnamesewith his M-60. The Jolly Green radioed the Sandys and toldthem one of the rescuers had just become a rescuee in needof help. A pair of A-1 Es from NKP loitered protectively for thenext 90 minutes to two hours, as faster jets came and wentdelivering a variety of ordnance including cluster bomb unitson the North Vietnamese. "For three hours, I saw just abouteverything in the Air Force arsenal," Pentz said. The A-1 sspotted targets for the jets and used their 20 millimetercannons to surgically intervene when the North Vietnamesewere within 150 yards of Pentz. "The Sandy pilots were tellingme constantly what was going on; I never felt alone," Budremembered. The A-1 s explained over the radio what kind ofordnance was aboutto be dropped. "Iftheywere using generalpurpose bombs, they'd tell me to get low." The incessantbom bing and strafing, plus Pentz' trusty machine gun, kept thepith-helmeted attackers at bay. "I know for a fact there weremore than 100 sorties involved in keeping them off me."13

Bud took refuge in a bomb crater. The Orbiting A-1sadvised him when the enemy troops got closer, and then theSandy drivers told him the direction ofthe next Skyraiderfiringpass to afford him protection. The Skyraiders dropped whatordnance they had, made cannon passes and dry runs to keepthe communists busy. As the first pair of Skyraiders retired,two more took up station in the wake of a Navy jet attack. Pentzlooked up to see the unique blue Plexiglas covering part of theA-1 Es glint in the sun. "That was probably the best sight I could

see above me," said Pentz, whose previous combat experiences gave him a healthy respect for the durable A-1 s. Whenthe Skyraiders advised Pentz the enemy troops were tooclose to his position to allow for bombing, Bud momentarilypoked up from his crater and cut loose with 7.62-millimeterrounds. But he didn't spend most of his time trading bullets."Mostly I was hiding - not so much from them, but from theordnance."14

Ultimately, F-4s massed for a plane-after-plane attack toparalyze the North Vietnamese troops. Another HH-3 toucheddown in coordination with the F-4 Phantoms. Pentz was downto two rounds of ammunition for his machine gun. Grabbingthe firing pin to render the weapon useless to the enemy,Pentz dived for the door of the HH-3. "There was no way Icould have ridden the tree penetrator because of the intensityof the ground fire," Bud recalled. As he was diving into thechopper, it lifted off, its hard floor catching Pentz in mid air. Hehad seen enemy soldiers as close as 15 yards, but had notbeen hit during his three-hour ordeal. The Air Force thoughtBud Pentz' actions warranted the Distinguished Flying Cross.Bud remained grateful to the aircraft which persisted in hisown rescue - especially the long-lasting cool-headed A-1Skyraider pilots.15

Jerry Boynton was an Airman First Class when the AirForce sent him to Nakhon Phanom - NKP - on 26 February1970. Because he had previous reciprocating engine experience as a Lockheed C-121 mechanic, Airman Boynton hadsettled into his A-1 training at Hurlburt earlier that year withminimal adjustment. At Hurlburt in Florida's Eglin Air ForceBase complex, Boynton learned about the Yankee extractionseat system, A-1 engine runs, fuel tank removal and otheraspects of Skyraider operations. Since his A-1 schoolinglasted four weeks, Boynton was in for on-the-job training withthe 22nd Special Operations Squadron at NKP. At NakhonPhanom, Jerry became involved in hanging ordnance underthe wings of A-1 s, including 50-pound loads of Willie Pete white phosphorous -rockets, often in the harried climate offrantic-search-and-rescue (SAR) operations. "It was an unwritten law that during a SAR no unauthorized person was onthe flightline," Boynton remembered, to avoid accidents andinjuries possible in the mix of whirling Aeroproducts props andlive ordnance. Six A-1 s were kept on alert for SAR whileBoynton was involved in Skyraider operations at NKP. Thesesix Skyraiders were paced on SAR missions. The first twowent in to the location of the subject of the rescue. Theydropped all their ordnance to suppress flak and keep enemytroops at bay, and then orbited with the Jolly Green rescuehelicopter while the second two Skyraiders layed down smokeas needed. Then the chopper's turn came; if the Jolly Greenstill found enemy fire too stiff, the last pair of A-1 s went in tosoften things up, he recalled. For protracted rescue efforts,more A-1 s could be generated to augmentthe first six Sandys.Crew chiefs whose Skyraiders had launched would go helptheir fellows prepare the other A-1 s during peak SAR activity,to get Skyraiders into the fight as expeditiously as possible.16

About the middle of 1970, the 22nd SOS sent twoSkyraiders and two Jollies on temporary duty to Pleiku for 30days. The squadron set up 90-day temporary duty at BienHoa. Skyraiders rotated back to NKP with aircrews every

three days; crew chiefs stayed behind, receiving niceties suchas mail with the arrival of new aircrews and Skyraiders. It wasduring one such temporary duty period for Boynton in the latterhalf of 1970 that the 22nd SOS became the 602nd SOS and1st SOS. By October, these two squadron designators wereconsolidated as the 1st SOS. Early in November 1970, the 1stSOS relinquished sixA-1 s-a mixed bag of Es and Hs-totheVNAF, which was expanding its Skyraider war. Some of theVietnamese who came to NKP to pick up the A-1s betrayedtheir lack offamiliarity with the big attack bombers as they triedto get acquainted with the A-1 s. Others in the VNAF contingent had only flown A-1 s equipped for Military AssistanceProgram standards. As they eyed these planes newly strickenfrom U.S. Air Force records they kept remarking "Our airplanes don't have this; our airplanes don't have that," as theyencountered equipment peculiar to USAF A-1 s, Boynton said.It was this transfer of Skyraiders to the South Vietnamesewhich prompted the consolidation of the remaining USAFplanes and crews of the 602nd and 1s~ Special OperationsSquadrons. Boynton recalled that the A-1 s given to the VNAFhad black undersurfaces, which the Vietnamese requested bepainted white. Around November 1970 this was done, including USAF A-1 s as the planes passed through periodic maintenance cycles, he saidY

Late in November 1970, some new, unknown "assistantpilots" showed up at NKP. "We didn't know where they camefrom," Jerry Boynton said. The strangers affixed panels in thecockpits of A-1 Es for guiding smart bombs, mating the mostsophisticated weapons and weapons delivery technology withthese holdover planes from World War II design philosophy,Boynton remembered. Security was tight around the entireoperation involving A-1 Es and smart bombs, but Boyntonlearned through the G.!. grapevine that these speciallyequipped A-1 Es took part in the clandestine night prison raidon Son Tay inside North Vietnam. The Skyraiders, Boyntonwas told, had flown from NKP to Da Nang, and out over theocean, turning at minimum altitude and running lean and hotfor the several hours needed to fly from Da Nang to Son Tayand recover at NKP after the mission. This lean fuel mixture"more or less cleaned out the cylinders," Boynton remembered, but he said it did no harm to the 3350s. 18

Official Air Force published history still is vague about therole ofthe A-1 s in the Son Tay prison break-in of 20 November,and the stories gleaned at that time at NKP still need morethorough documentation. But an Air Force supply officer at ajet base in Thailand where smart bombs were routinelystocked and used is reported to have remarked about anunusual shipment of these weapons going to the base at NKPabout this time, and published Air Force historical accounts ofthe Son Tay raid say the Skyraiders involved were fivemultiseat A-1 Es, consistent with Boynton's information aboutadditional pilots being used to operate smart bomb guidanceequipment.

The Son Tay prison compound was supposed to house asmany as 50 prisoners of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staffapproved planning a raid to rescue the prisoners at Son Tayback on 5 June 1970. A heavy rainy season was to foil thisscheme in a most unusual way.


This page and opposite: Skyraiders of the First Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida, reveal irregularities incamouflage. An Air Force tech order prescribed the pattern for camouflaging aircraft including Skyraiders. In actual practice,one wave of the spray gun brought about a variation in style. These single-seat A-1 Hs and multi-place A-1 Es trained manyU.S. and Vietnamese fliers in the art of Skyraider warfare. (Photos by Tom Brewer via John M. Bowdler.)

The rains brought flooding which fouled water wellsserving the prison. The Hanoi government also apparentlyperceived they would receive international praise for humaneactions if they separated the Protestants and the Catholics inSon Tay, because each group had requested to hold separatereligious services. Weighing the water problems and theerroneously-perceived propaganda value to be derived bysegregating the prisoners according to their religious preferences, the North Vietnamese moved all ofthe prisoners ofwarfrom Son Tay by 14 July, while American planning for the raidprogressed. Reconnaissance photography picked up con-


tinuing activity at Son Tay, however, because a contingent ofguards and other North Vietnamese continued to dwell there. 19

The armada massed for the November raid on Son Tayincluded "Wild Weasel" F-1 05 Thunderchiefs to thwart NorthVietnamese anti-aircraft missile batteries; five HH-53 helicopters to carry raiders in, and additionally, freed prisoners out,one more-expendable HH-3E helicopter, two pathfindingCombat Talon MC-130E unconventional warfare transports,and the five A-1 E Skyraiders. The HH-3 chopper was todeliver shock troops in the middle of the Son Tay prison yard.A tree known to be in the yard would certainly smash the rotor

blades of the HH-3 as it landed, so the rescuers planned onleaving it behind as they loaded everybody into the HH-53s.

The Combat Talon C-130s were to aid the five Skyraidersin navigating to and from Son Tay in the dead of night.

Planners also intended for the C-130s to drop a palletloaded with napalm bombs to create a flaming beacon forother aircraft in the operation. The A-1 Es also were fitted withnapalm in case the C-130s were unable to drop theirs.Primarily, the A-1 Es were tasked to bomb a bridge in an effortto slow any enemy reinforcements. (Accurately bombing abridge at night near a P.O.W. camp lends further credibility tothe stories that the Skyraiders were equipped with precisionsmart bombs which could be maneuvered to a target.) Ifenemy troops prevailed after this, the A-1 Es were to strafewith their 20-millimeter cannons. The planners also blocked

the periods from 21-25 October and 21-25 November as thebestfor likely having clear weather, and just enough moonlightto complement night-viewing optics without silhouetting theaircraft or troops. In actuality, typhoon Patsy was forecast tomake the Gulf of Tonkin too rough for the Navy carriers tolaunch their diversionary strikes by 21 N(~)Vember.

The October dates had been lost due to peace negotiations which Dr. Henry Kissinger, a special assistant to thePresident of the United States, feared would be hurt by anAmerican incursion of 150 men into North Vietnam. So on thenight of 20 November the Son Tay raiders launched.20

While Navy A-6s and-7s purposely alerted North Vietnamese and Chinese radar to confuse the issue, the mainforce pressed on for Son Tay. The first C-130 dropped itsnapalm marker; a minute later the second C-130 delivered the


five multi-place Skyraiders overhead. Once the A-1 Es movedout on their own, the second C-130 dropped its napalm pallet.The Skyraiders went to work on the bridge and then orbitedabove the napalm marker.

The expendable HH-3 inadvertently landed in a militarysapper training school instead of the Son Tay prison yard.Fortunately no tree existed in the sapper schoolyard to cripplethe chopper, and it quickly lifted off for the prison. TheAmericans achieved their objective of penetrating the prison,killing North Vietnamese as they raced through the compoundin a futile search for the P.O.W.s who weren't there anymore.The raiders demolished their HH-3 with an explosive charge,and left Son Tay aboard the HH-53s. Surface-to-air (SAM)missiles damaged two of the F-1 05s; one was abandoned andits crew rescued at dawn in Laos.21

The Son Tay raid received mixed reviews. Critics marveled at launching such a sophisticated attack, and not havingup-to-date intelligence information on the location of theprisoners. Those more sympathetic said the raid worked well,and proved what a coordinated armada could do. Dismalfailure or tactical milestone, the Son Tay raid called upon theability of the capacious A-1 E Skyraider once more.

(Son Tay postscript: Colonel Benjamin Kraljev, Jr. was anunconventional warfare action officer involved in the Son Tayplanning. In the winter 1984 issue of Airlift: The Journal of theAirlift Operations School, Colonel Kraljev said the A-1 E leftseaters were hand-picked for longevity in the type. He said theright-seaters were returned from southeast Asia "under theguise of participating in a night recovery system Rescue wasdeveloping. We now had a stick and rudder pilot who washighly experienced in the airplane with a pilot who knew whatwas going on currently in southeast Asia." Colonel Kraljevdoes not mention the use of smart bombs. He further says thebridge at Son Tay was neutralized by an Army demolitioncharge. But he is quick in his defense of the suitability of theSkyraider for the raid: "We decided we also needed somefighter support, something that could fly low and slow. Theobvious answer was A-1.")22


Notes1. William A. Buckingham, Jr., Operation Ranch Hand - The Air Force andHerbicides in SoutheastAsia, 1961-1971, Office of Air Force History, Washington D.C. 1982, pp.109-112.2. Ibid.

3.lbid.4. Ray L. Bowers, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia -TacticalAirlift, Office of Air Force History, Washington. D.C. 1983, p.424.5. Ibid.6. Ibid.7. Major Donald Schneider, Air Force Heroes in Vietnam (USAF SoutheastAsia Monograph Series Vol. VII, Monograph 9) Air War College, MaxwellAFB, Alabama, 1979. pp. 3-11, 72, and 75.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Ibid.13. Interview, Frederick A. Johnsen with Bud Pentz, July 1982.14. Ibid.15. Ibid.16. Interview, Frederick A. Johnsen with Jerry Boynton.17. Ibid.18. Ibid.19. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975,Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C. 1980, pp. 103-112.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. Benjamin Kraljev, Jr., Colonel, USAF, "The Son Tay Raid", Airlift: TheJournal of the Airlift Operations School, Winter 1984, Military Airlift Command.

CHAPTER IXWind-Down in Asia

''There has never been a protracted campaign from which a country has benefitted." Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C., Art of War

Inthe wintry months of January and February 1969, whilethe Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held antiwar rallies on American college campuses, Second Lieu

tenant Gary Cave buzzed over the foliage of South Vietnamin his gray USAF-emblazoned Cessna 0-1 E.

The single-engine Cessna 0-1 was a derivative of theIightplanes that company was famous for. Laden with "WilliePete" - white phosphorous rockets used for target-markingthe 0-1 served as bird dog for the bomb-haulers. Gary Cavewas a FAC (Forward Air Controller), who guided Americanand South Vietnamese attack aircraft to specific targets. Hewas assigned to the 22nd Tactical Air Support Squadron atSinh Thuy.

Thus it was on a wintry 1969 day that Lieutenant Cave wascoordinating between U.S. Army intelligence advisors andSouth Vietnamese army troops, requesting an air strike againsta concrete bunker over which cut boughs were regularlyreplenished by the enemy. The network for fielding suchrequests through American and Vietnamese channels wascapricious. As Cave orbited in his noisy Cessna, he wasprepared for a wait of between five minutes and two hours forapproval of this bomb strike.

With approval came a flight of VNAF A-1 sJo do the job.These were not the novice "sandbag" Vietnamese that earlyUSAF pilots had ridiculed - the complexion of the war hadchanged enough that Lieutenant Cave had at his disposal

A 1st Special Operations Squadron (1 50S) Skyraider - probably a G-model- used sandbags for wheel chocks in its revetment in Southeast Asia.

Wind·Down in Asia 101

against the particular target at hand. As Lieutenant Caveswitched channels on his 0-1 's comm radios to contactground units and the VNAF A-1 drivers, he missed hearingonly the first ordnance hard point on the A-1 leader's plane.Cave copied the rest of the ordnance load: Some 250pounders, rockets, CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units), and the heavy20-millimeter ammunition.

A VNAF A·1 H sits poised for battle, on the ramp at Tan Son Nhut, 14 December 1970. (Photo by Norman E. Taylor, via DennisPeltier.)

some high-time Skyraider fliers. Some could boast more than6,000 flying hours, most of it in combat in their homeland.

The leader of the four VNAF A-1 s sent to demolish thebunker spoke English, and addressed Lieutenant Cave, bythe FACs' traditional call sign: "'David', Ihave four A-1 s." It wastraditional for the inbound attack aircraft to list their ordnanceto "David" - the FAC - so he could orchestrate the attack

A VNAF A-1 H securely ensconced in a steel and earth-fill revetment at Pleiku, circa 1972-73. Modern revetments affordedprotection, but communist ground attacks nonetheless destroyed VNAF Skyraiders here. Small South Vietnamese flag flapsfrom the corner of the revetment, its yellow and red colors reproduced on the rudder of the A-1. (Photo by Col. Ronald G.Linder, USAF Ret.)


Near Pleiku,the gutted, burned hulk of an 'A-1 E lies neglectedin the weeds. Though the VNAF employed Skyraiders afterthe United States retired them from combat, anti-aircraftaccuracy and equipment were threatening an end to theenvironment the Skyraiderhad been built to fight in. (Photoby Col. Ronald G. Linder, USAF, Ret.)

Flying about 1,500 feet above ground level, perhaps 600feet to one side of the mysterious bunker, Cave called in allfour Skyraiders to bomb in trail, following the leader. When theleader loosed his first store, Gary Cave watched, momentarilyperplexed, because the plummeting object looked like theplane's centerline fuel tank. "It was huge," Cave remembered,obviously unlike any mere 250-pound bomb. This was the onepiece of ordnance Cave had not copied in the radio transmission with the Vietnamese flight leader - a 2,000-pound bomb.The resulting blast "demolished one bunker and a lot of treesand everything else around it," Cave said. With scant time toreact, Cave found his light 0-1 rocked into a 25-to 30-degreebank by the huge blast's concussion, which shook the plexiglaswindows in the Cessna. Cave vouched that his fear instinctswere, at that moment, as good as the next man's.

The Skyraiders rumbled away from the smoky, chokingrubble, toting most of their ordnance unexpended. 1

Increasingly, the VNAF shouldered responsibility in itsSkyraiders. In contrast to early operations, when inexperienced VNAF A-1 pilots had been grounded after the sun wentdown, by 1967 two VNAF A-1 's flew nocturnal cover over Bien

Hoa, ready to strike at infiltrators in the dark. Yet, the quickreaction afforded by this airborne umbrella all too frequentlywas retarded by maddening delays in obtaining Vietnameseapproval to hit targets.2 Pairs of night-riding VNAF Skyraiderssimilarly patrolled over Binh Thuy after that base was jolted byfive stand-off ground attacks between December 1966 andMay 1967. Nha Trang also employed two Vietnamese A-1s.All of these base protection sorties were in concert with othermass-firepower planes including AC-47 gunships and UH-1helicopter gunship variants.

The 1968 Tet offensive appears to have been engineeredby Hanoi as a media show as much as it was a militarycampaign. Sensing the anti-war value to be derived from abloody campaign, the North Vietnamese orchestrated largelyViet Cong attacks on most of the major cities of SouthVietnam. American media scholars and critics have arguedthat, while the United States and ARVN forces actually thwartedNorth Vietnam's 1968 Tet offensive militarily, the increasedlevels of bloody combat relayed home on American newsbroadcasts implied theAmericans were mired and losing. Thisimplication contributed to the growing weariness in Americawith the dragging war, and probably hastened America'sdeparture from South Vietnam thereafter.

Between January 30 and February 25, 1968, the VNAFflew 4,648 close air support sorties and 1,535 interdictionsorties, working their A-1 Skyraiders hard, along with the restof their aircraft inventory.3 This was a large-scale campaignaffecting all four South Vietnamese regional corps areas. TheVNAF Skyraiders performed well, but their performance limitations kept the A-1 s tethered to the particular corps in whichthe squadrons were based. It was not feasible to amassSkyraiders for attacks in other corps as long as they werephysically located in a distant corps. This pointed up anongoing dilemma of VNAF Skyraider operations. Early in thewar, USAF advisors criticized the practice of ARVN corpscommanders to conserve the A-1 s based in their corps areas,keeping them for duties in their own corps instead of crossingcorps boundaries if greater needs were in other regions.

VNAF A-1Hs at Tan Son Nhut, 13 November 1970, fitted with high-speed, low-drag bombs. (Photo by Norman E. Taylor, viaDennis Peltier)

Wind·Down in Asia 103

A train of 500-pound bombs on trailers services Vietnamese A·1 Hs at Tan Son Nhut, 13 November 1970. (Norman E. Taylorphoto via Dennis Peltier)

During Tet, it seemed, the rapidly-changing needs for airstrikeswere beyond the timely response capabilities of the slow A-1 swhen requested by another geographic corps.

On March 30, 1972, 40,000 North Vietnamese soldiers,equipped with Soviet long-range artillery, tanks, and newhand-held SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, launched a new offensive. The concentrations of North Vietnamese tanks wereunusual. The attack appeared designed to cut off SouthVietnam's northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.Only the massive application of airpower prevented the fall ofthese provinces. In the central highlands of South Vietnam,communist objectives appeared to be the capture of the citiesof Kontum and Pleiku. Airlift saved besieged defenders andairstrikes broke North Vietnamese attacks, but not withouthigh cost. By April 30, Dong Ha and Quang Tri were lost to theNorth Vietnamese. For the first time U.S. and VNAF planeswere downed by the SA-7 missiles. The air environment wasnot permissive; the new Soviet antiaircraft weapons signaleda new and deadly era for air operations in Vietnamese skies.One VNAF A-1 H was bagged by an SA-7 on 1 May; the nextday, two more Skyraiders were lost. The hostile AA firepowermade air operations costly below 10,000 feet and 450 knots,spelling trouble for the Skyraiders.4

By this time, the South Vietnamese were putting jet A-37sinto battle, as well as their old Skyraiders. U.S. airpower wasa major factor in the 1972 counteroffensive, and a centralizeddirection of airpower was used to advantage, as aircraftshifted quickly from Military Region I, (the new term for theformer corps regions) to MRII, to MRIII. If total daily sortiesaveraged 207, 45 of these were generated by the pluckyVNAF. This was just about "the maximum they (the VNAF)


could generate considering the limited range of their aircraftand number of sorties that had to be flown in support of theother military regions," U.S. Air Force historians concluded.s

Pleiku-based VNAF Skyraiders joined the jet A-37s intank-busting duties during the battle for Kontum. Cloud coverdictated low attacks, and the slow Skyraiders took numeroushits. Nine A-1 s were lost to enemy action during the battle forKontum. By late May, parts of Kontum were in North Vietnamese hands. Though ultimately staved off by airpower, someNorth Vietnamese resistance was felt northwest of the city aslate as July, long after Kontum was resecured by the SouthVietnamese. The old VNAF bugaboo of pilots who were onlyqualified for daylight visual operations reappeared during theKontum fighting. The Vietnamese Skyraiders could not jointhe A-37s when these conditions ofvisibility were not present.s

Ultimately, the offensive was broken by airpower and theonset of the rainy season. Observers noted that VNAF airsupport was more intense than during the 1968 Tet offensive.But the slow-movers -especially the Skyraiders - were ingrave danger from the new levels of communist anti-aircraftfirepower. When possible, the VNAF did attempt to centralizeits airpower during the 1972 counter-offensive, although stilllimited by the performance of its Skyraiders andA-37s.

By 1972, in-country Skyraider operations were the province of VNAF A-1 s, except for penetrations by Thai-basedUSAF Skyraiders on SAR (Search And Rescue) escort missions. Ronald G. Linder had flown USAF Skyraiders in Vietnam back in 1964 and 1965 as a flight instructor with the FirstAir Commando Squadron. He returned to Skyraider duty in1972 and 1973. "I was requalified in the A-1E at HurlburtField ...Florida" in August-October 1972, Linder, who retired

A·1E, 132514, at Tan Son Nhut in December 1970 with oil-swirled centerline tank. Two prop blades appear to be replacements,possibly indicating a belly flop in this Skyraider's past. (Norman E. Taylor photo via Dennis Peltier)

as a USAF colonel, recalled. "It was the last 'Express' classand had only three or four members. One day in late October1972we were on the gunnery range when halfway through themission we were recalled." The impending U.S. withdrawalfrom Vietnam prompted the U.S. Air Force to turn over itsremaining Skyraiders to the VNAF, Linder was told. "We hadsearch and rescue A-1 s in Thailand, a training section atHurlburt Field, and one A-1 , at Hill AFB, Utah, which was usedfor ordnance testing."?

The following month, Ronald Linder was assigned aschief USAF advisor to the VNAF Sixth Air Division, headquartered at Pleiku. Here, the VNAF's 530th squadron operated acollection of A-1 Es, Gs, Hs, and Js.

In the fall of 1972, up to the 27 January 1973 ceasefire,Pleiku was subjected to a number of rocket attacks. VNAFSkyraiders, some fully armed and in revetments, were destroyed in these attacks.

"I flew 20 combat missions in December 1972 and January 1973 with the Black Cat Squadron (530th Fighter Squadron, VNAF) at Pleiku," recalled Colonel Linder. "(I) believe thatI flew the very last A-1 combat mission flown by an Americanin Vietnam on 22 January 1973 just six days before theceasefire," he added.8

Linder recalled VNAF Skyraiders flew during the ceasefire.9

The South Vietnamese air force continued to prosecutethe war until South Vietnam fell with the surrender of Saigonon 30 April 1975. Before this time, according to official U.S. AirForce historical accounts, the VNAF Skyraiders had been putin storage to streamline VNAF maintenance chores in theabsence of an American presence. But with the takeover ofSouth Vietnam by North Vietnamese forces in April 1975,

scores of South Vietnamese fliers evacuated their homeland,taking airworthy VNAF-planes including Skyraiders to theU.S. base at U-Tapao, Thailand.

To downed airmen and harried helicopter rescue crews,the Southeast Asia Skyraider sagawill forever conjure imagesof loitering USAF A-1 s keeping the enemy from reachingdowned Americans. Answering to the radio call sign "Sandy",these rescue A-1 s were a latter-day Twentieth Century reincarnation of the cavalry, often arriving in the nick of time andmaking the difference between a successful save, or anaddition to Hanoi's cold POW/MIA (Prisoner-of-War/Missingin Action) list.

In the 1960s, when the U.S. Navy still operated A-1s incombat, their carrier-launched Skyraiders also participated inrescue plots. But the camouflaged Sandys of the U.S. AirForce will forever be the archetypal avenging angels ofthe warin Southeast Asia. By 1967, the Skyraider posted the highestloss rate of any USAF plane in Southeast Asia, due at least inpart to the heroic and dangerous low-level loitering whichdetermined search-and-rescue pilots adopted in defense oftheir downed fellows. During 1967, Skyraider loss rates were6.2 per 1,000 sorties over North Vietnam; 2.3 over Laos; and1.0 over South Vietnam. Twenty-five Air Force Skyraidersdowned over North Vietnam between June 1966 and June1967 included seven performing rescue missions.10

All too frequently, enemy gunners used downed fliers asbait to lure rescue planes within range of hastily-deployedanti-aircraft weapons. Although the U.S. Navy set air-to-aircombat tacticians buzzing when Navy Skyraiders shot downtwo North Vietnamese MiG jet fighters, the Air Force paid theprice with two confirmed A-1 losses to enemy MiGs during

Wind-Down in Asia 105

Grey USAF A-1E takes on high-drag iron bombs with box fins of World War II design. Skyraiders in Southeast Asia hauled allkinds of ordnance; may have even carried smart bombs. (USAF photo)

rescue operations. The HH-3 rescue helicopter crews knewand respected the Sandy A-1 fliers who escorted them. DaveFeigert, then an Air Force lieutenant flying right seat in "JollyGreen" rescue choppers, remembered backto 1966and 1967when "Sandy"crews and "Jolly Green" crews stood up for eachother in barroom brawls a bit less glamorous than thosestaged in Hollywood. Feigert's collection of A-1 anecdotes fitthe classic parameters of war stories - they are fantasticenough to be true.

Like the time Sandy pilot Dave Lester, flying on temporaryduty (TDY) status out of Udorn, Thailand, had his A-1 shot outfrom under him. Lester, an accomplished skydiver, was overLaos in the fall of 1966 when he had to abandon his crippledSkyraider near Tchepone Pass. Lester had rehearsed thiscontingency mentally. He free-fell after leaving the A-1, topresent a smaller, speedier target to the enemy gunners onthe ground. Close to the jungle he popped his chute, nestlinginto the top boughs of dense trees some 200 feet above thejungle floor. He could hear the communists below him as heorchestrated his own rescue just as if he were still chargingaround in his Skyraider, vectoring help for another downed


flier. Dave Feigert was aboard the HH-3 that located Lester.The only hitch in the operation was the intense rotor downwashfrom the large HH-3. "We damn near blew him out ofthe trees,and down to the hostile jungle floor so far below," Feigert said.Lester braced himself with his parachute harness for therough rotor wash, and grabbed the jungle penetrator winchedto him from the helicopter. As he scrambled onto the penetratoramid a flurry of leaves, the Jolly Green hoisted him to safetyfrom the treetops.l1

The spacious A-1 Es featured a large aft cabin onceintended to carry as many as 10 passengers in addition to theflight crew of two up front. But for SEA USAF operations, A1Es usually were flown solo. The glazing over the aft cabinwas tinted blue and crews going aft would report "I'm going tothe Blue Room," as if they were wandering the halls of amansion. During a two-ship formation out of Thailand, withonly one man per A-1 E, the leader's wingman noticed theunmistakably bulky form of the formation leader movingaround in the Blue Room. Nobody, obviously, was flying theairplane.

The pilot had trimmed his big dive bomber for level flight,and then moved aft for reasons of his own. But when the doorto the flight deck jammed shut, the aviator became a prisonerin his own plane. He contemplated using his service .38caliber revolver to destroy the door latch, but succeeded inmanually wrestling it open. All the while, in the back of his mindlurked the possibility the big A-1 E would slip out of trim andhead earthward with the pilot still locked in the Blue Room. Theincident became a source of much laughter thereafter whenthe Sandy drivers and air rescue crews got together for abeer. 12

There was a grim aspect of the Skyraider's war thatinvolved anti-personnel attacks. In a reversal of the "shakeand-bake" tactics, one USAF A-1 would drop napalm tanks toflush communist troops out of jungle hiding. The next A-1would arrive overhead as the troops were running in clearground. This Skyraider dispensed CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units)which were deadly anti-personnel shrapnel-producing explosives.13

Notes1. Interview, Frederick A. Johnsen with Maj. Gary Cave, USAF, August 1984.2. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam - 1961-1973, Office of AirForce History, USAF, Washington, D.C. 1979, pp.130-131.3. The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951-1975, An Analysis of its Role in Combat,USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Volume 3, 1975, pp. 33-34.4. Ibid, p. 45.5. Ibid, p. 46.6. Airpowerand the 1972 Spring Invasion, USAF Southeast Asia MonographSeries, Volume 2, p. 75.7. Letter by Col Ronald G. Linder, USAF (Ret.), 9 Sep. 82.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. The United States Air Force Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, EarlH. Tilford, Jr., Office of Air Force History, USAF, Washington, D.C. 1980, pp.72-73.11. Interview, FrederickA. Johnsen with Maj. Dave Feigert, USAF, November1984.12. Ibid.13. Ibid.

Wind-Down in Asia 107

In the 1970s, Atlantan Dave Forrest restored his AD-4, BuAer number 123827, in the glossy blue colors and markings it woreat NAS Atlanta in the 1950s. Here carrying civil registration number N23827, Forrest's Skyraider cruises at 12,500 feet overcentral Georgia in concert with a restored Hawker Sea Fury, left, and P·51 Mustang, right. (U.S. Navy photo via Dave Forrest.)


CHAPTER XSkyraiders for the Future

"...all times, when old, are good." Byron, The Age of Bronze

A s this is written, more than 50 Skyraiders worldwide are in the hands of collectors, museums, orother organizations in a position to make them

available for preservation or public viewing. Recent U.S. civilregistration records show more than 20 Skyraiders havereceived civil registration numbers in this country, althoughthe assignment of an N-number to a Skyraider does not signifythe aircraft is currently flightworthy.

Georgia resident Dave Forrest deserves credit for hispioneering efforts to get an early AD-4 flying on the warbirdcircuit. The late Jack Spanich boosted the American civilianSkyraider population when he brought several ex-French AD-

4s back, beginning in the late 1970s. David Tallichet addedseveral late-model singleseaters and A-IEs to his warbirdstable in the early 1980s.

One of the most remarkable civil-owned Skyraider restorations is the AD-4 rebuilt over a 10-year period by DaveForrest ofAtlanta, Georgia. This Skyraider, BuAer No. 123827,toured with VA-55 aboard the U.S.S. Valley Forge during partof 1949, through March 1951. It ended its Navy career as agate guardian at the old NAS Atlanta, Georgia, before Forrestacquired the plane. Its subsequent meticulous restoration toflying status included repainting the plane in the markings itwore in 1956, plus civil registration number N-23827.

In January 1966, the long-neglected AD-4later acquired in Atlanta, Georgia, by Dave Forrest was missing cowl panels,windscreen, canopy Plexiglas and much dignity.

Skyraiders for the Future 109

.I

Before and after views of Dave Forrest's AD-4, derelict on the ground in Atlanta, and back in the air in vintage glossy blue withan orange Naval Reserve fuselage band. Plane's BuAer number is 123827. (Dave Forrest collection)


The boom in civil Skyraiders has exacted a toll on thewarbird community. Jack Spanich and Florida warbird operator Harry Doan each died in Skyraider accidents.

France's burgeoning warbird movement embraced aboutseven surplus ex-French AD-4s in the 1980s so that it is nowpossible to see Able Dogs flying on two continents.

The U.S. Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air ForceBase, Dayton, Ohio, displays the A-1 E in which Bernie Fisherearned his Medal of Honor for his harrowing A Shau Valleyrescue during the war in Southeast Asia. It is refreshing thatthe Air Force had foresight to save Fisher's actual aircraftbecause of its significance; all too often, museums paintnondescript examples of aircraft to masquerade as significantcombat aircraft that were scrapped.

The list of Skyraiders in preservation and in privateownership fluctuates like the commodities market. Some ofthe more stable Skyraiders on display, and likely to remain so,include:

Bradley Air Museum, Windsor Locks, Connecticut: AD4N BuAer No. 125739.Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovilton, UK: AD-4W AEW.1,BuAer No. 124121, and AD-4W, BuAer No. 124086.

Musee de L'Air, Paris, France: AD-4NA, BuAer No.126979.Pima Air Museum, Tucson, Arizona: EA-1 F, BuAerNO.135018.United States Marine Corps Museum, Quantico, Virginia:AD-4B BuAer No. 132261 (may be at nearby CampBarrett).United States Naval Aviation Museum, Pensacola, Florida:EA-1 F, BuAer No. 132532, and A-1 H, BuAer No. 135300.United States Navy, Naval Air Station Lemoore, California: A-1 H.United States Air Force, Hurlburt Field, Florida: A-1 G,BuAer No. 132598.United States Air Force Museum, Dayton, Ohio: A-1 E,BuAer No. 132649.United States Air Force, McClellan Air Force Base, California: A-1 E, BuAer No. 132463.Royal Thai Air Force Museum, Bangkok, Thailand: A-1 H,BuAer No. 134472.

Additionally, flying examples will continue to create excitement at air shows around the United States and in Europe,while others go on display in museums.

--

MCDONNELL

Two of Dave Tallichet's ex-SEA Skyraiders, an A-1 H and a multi-place A-1 E, in storage adjacent to the Douglas plant at LongBeach, California in July 1982. (Photo by Frederick A. Johnsen.)

Skyraiders for the Future 111

With amazing fidelity to markings details, Jack Spanich recreated VA-176's MiG-killing A-1H using this ex-French AD-4NA hepurchased abroad. Telltale marks of an AD-4NA - fuselage door and dorsal air scoop - belie the markings in this photo takenat the 1978 Experimental Aircraft Association Fly-In Convention at Oshkosh, Wisconsin. (Photo by Frederick A. Johnsen.)

A variety of high-speed bombs decorates "AnitaMichelle", a slngle-seat A-1 of the 56th SpecialOperations Wing. (Merrlt/Holmberg/Morgan ...........).collections) h

'-- '

Documents

Douglas a-1 Skyraider