Document of The World Bank française de développement (French Development Agency) AfDB African Development Bank AM Aide-Memoire CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003333

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-73510)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$60.00 MILLION

TO THE

OFFICE NATIONAL DE L’ÉLECTRICITÉ ET DE L’EAU POTABLE (ONEE) (NATIONAL ELECTRICITY AND POTABLE WATER AUTHORITY)

WITH THE GUARANTEE OF THE

KINGDOM OF MOROCCO

FOR A

RURAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROJECT

SEPTEMBER 27, 2015

Global Practice Water GWADR Country Department MNC01 MNA Region

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Senior Global Practice Director: Junaid Kamal Ahmad Country Director: Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly Practice Manager: Steven Schonberger Project Team Leader: Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne ICR Team Leader: Stephane Raphael Dahan ICR Main Author Véronique Verdeil

1

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective 02/28/2015)

Currency Unit = Moroccan Dirham (DH) DH 1.00 = US$ 0.10362 US$ 1.00 = DH 9.60225

FISCAL YEAR 2016

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFD Agence française de développement (French Development Agency) AfDB African Development Bank AM Aide-Memoire CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis CMU Country Management Unit CR communes rurales (local governments) DEP Département pour la généralisation de l’accès à l’eau potable DFI Direction Financière DGH Direction Générale de l’Hydraulique (General Department of Hydraulics) DH Moroccan Dirham DHS Demographic and Health Surveys DO Development Objective ERR Economic Rate of Return FM Financial Management GDE Gestion des Données d’Exploitation (Management of Operational Data) GEP Programme de Généralisation de l’Eau Potable (Program for Universal

Access to Potable Water Supply) GOM Government of Morocco GPOBA Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid HC House Connection IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion Report IPF Investment Project Financing ISR Implementation Status Report IT Information Technology INDH Initiative nationale pour le développement humain M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MATEE Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire, de l’Eau et de l’Environnement

2

MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTR Mid-Term Review O&M Operation and Maintenance NPV Net Present Value OBA Output-Based Aid ONEE Office National de l’Electricité et de l’Eau potable (National Electricity and

Potable Water Authority) ONEP Office National de l’Eau potable (National Potable Water Authority) OP-BP Operational Policy and Bank Procedure PforR Program for Results PAD Project Appraisal Document PAGER Programme d’Approvisionnement Groupé en Eau Potable des Populations

Rurales (Water Supply Program for Rural Populations) PAP People Affected by the Project PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit PPP Public-Private Partnership PSP Private Sector Participation QACU Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit QAG Quality Assurance Group QEA Quality at Entry Analysis RF Results Framework RWS Rural Water Supply RWSS Rural Water Supply and Sanitation SMT Social Mobilization Team SP Standpipe TA Technical Assistance TORs Terms of Reference VAT Value Added Tax WUA Water User Association

3

CONTENTS

DATA SHEET A. Basic Information vii B. Key Dates vii C. Ratings Summary vii D. Sector and Theme Codes viii E. Bank Staff viii F. Results Framework Analysis viii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs xiv H. Restructuring xv I. Disbursement Graph xv

REPORT

1.1 Context at Appraisal ................................................................................................ 15

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators .................... 16

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators .. 16

1.4 Main Beneficiaries ................................................................................................... 17

1.5 Original Components ............................................................................................... 17

1.6 Revised Components ............................................................................................... 18

1.7 Other Significant Changes ....................................................................................... 18

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ................................................ 19 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry .................................................... 19

2.2 Implementation ........................................................................................................ 21

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization ......... 24

2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance .................................................................... 25

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase ................................................................... 26

3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 27 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ............................................ 27

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives ................................................... 28

3.3 Efficiency ................................................................................................................. 30

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ................................................................. 31

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ............................................... 31

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ........ 32

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 32 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 33

4

5.1 Bank Performance .................................................................................................... 33

5.2 Borrower Performance ............................................................................................. 35

6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 36 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ............... 38 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 39 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 41 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 51 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 61 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results – Summary of selected findings ........................... 63 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 67 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 72 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 77 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 79 Figure 1 - Sustainable Provision of Rural Water Supply .................................................. 20 Figure 2 – Disbursement of loan proceeds, as appraised and at closing ........................... 41 Figure 3 – Use of loan proceeds by expenditure category, as appraised and at closing ... 42 Table 1 - Reallocations of loan proceeds during implementation .................................... 41 Table 2 - Component 1: massive infrastructure to develop village access points ............ 42 Table 3 - Component 1: standpipes to provide villages with access to potable water ...... 43 Table 4 - Project’s contribution to the increased access rate to ONEE’s water, 2004-2014........................................................................................................................................... 43 Table 5 - Component 2: situation of the house connection pilot project at project closing........................................................................................................................................... 45 Table 6 – Component 3: TA support to project implementation and capacity building (men.day) .......................................................................................................................... 47 Table 7 - Key Parameters for Ex-Post CBA ..................................................................... 52 Table 8 – Subprojects assessed ex-ante and actually implemented .................................. 53 Table 9 - Investment Costs Supported by the Project (excluding VAT and contingency) 54 Table 10 - Result of the Ex-Post Economic Cost Benefit Analysis of the Subprojects/Project ........................................................................................................... 56 Table 11 - Scenarios Affecting the ERR Ex-Ante and Ex-Post ........................................ 57 Table 12 - Investment Cost Per Capita Ex-Ante and Ex-Post (DH/US$) ......................... 59

5

D A T A S H E E T A. Basic Information

Country: Morocco Project Name: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project

Project ID: P086877 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-73510 ICR Date: 07/20/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: ONEP Original Total Commitment:

USD 60.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 57.28M

Revised Amount: USD 51.37M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Office National de l’Electricité et de l’Eau Potable (ONEE) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 02/06/2004 Effectiveness: 04/07/2006 04/07/2006

Appraisal: 09/19/2005 Restructuring(s): 09/09/2011 05/09/2013 11/25/2014

Approval: 12/15/2005 Mid-term Review: 09/30/2009 06/30/2010 Closing: 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Modest Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Unsatisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

6

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Sanitation 10 Water Supply 90 100

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Gender 16 5 Other Human Development 17 13 Participation and Civic Engagement 17 17 Pollution Management and Environmental Health 17 5 Rural Services and Infrastructure 33 60 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Christiaan J. Poortman Country Director: Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly Theodore O. Ahlers Practice Manager/Manager:

Steven N. Schonberger Narasimham Vijay Jagannathan

Project Team Leader: Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne Marie-Laure Lajaunie ICR Team Leader: Stephane Raphael Dahan ICR Primary Author: Veronique Verdeil F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project development objective is to support the Government program to increase sustainable access to potable water supply in rural areas, while promoting improved wastewater management and hygiene practices.

7

In the Loan Agreement: The objective of the Project is to assist the Borrower in supporting the Guarantor’s program in the Project Area aiming at increasing sustainable access to potable water supply in rural areas, while promoting improved wastewater management and hygiene practices. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Number of people in rural areas provided with access to Improved Water Sources under the project

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 465,000 323,600 191,754

Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 11/30/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achievement rate is 59%. Target was revised to reflect the population in IBRD-funded project areas only and Indicator was aligned with the Bank core sector indicator.

Indicator 2 : At least 90% of water supply and wastewater facilities built under the project have functioning and sustainable management structures


- 90% 90% 57%


Achievement rate is 64% (actual 57% vs 90% target). 654 standpipes well-functioning and operated by a caretaker out of 1,141 standpipes built.

Indicator 3 : At least 20% of project beneficiaries have adopted improved hygiene practices Value (quantitative or qualitative)

5% 20% 20% Not available


Due to quality of evidence, considered unreliable, this achievement cannot be measured (see Section 3.5 for more details).

Indicator 4 : Rural access rate to potable water supply in the five provinces covered by the project increased by approximately 20% of the rural population (about 465,000 additional people)


0 465,000 465,000 Dropped

Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 11/30/2014

8

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Was replaced by the Core Sector Indicator #1 and dropped after delinking with AFD operation (target value was the population in AFD and IBRD areas).

Indicator 5 : Number of people having gained access to potable water supply in rural areas in the provinces of Safi and El Jedida (project areas where facilities are funded under the IBRD loan)


0 465,000 323,600 Dropped


Was duplicating Indicator#1 above.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : % of local governments making required financial contribution Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0% 100% 100% 80%

Date achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 11/30/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achievement rate is 80%. 32 Agreements between ONEE and 40 local governments involved in the project were signed and paid for (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 2 : Breakdown: % of local governments making required financial contribution in the province of El Jedida


0% 100% 100% 100%


Achievement rate is 100%. All 19 Agreements between ONEE and local governments involved in the subprojects were signed and paid for (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 3 : Breakdown: % of local governments making required financial contribution in the province of Safi/Youssoufia


0% 100% 100% 62%


Achievement rate is 62%. 13 out of 21 Agreements between ONEE and local governments involved in the subprojects were signed and paid for (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 4 : Breakdown: % of local governments’ contributions to capital costs recovered in the province of El Jedida

Value 0% 100% 100% 100%

9

(quantitative or qualitative) Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 11/30/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achievement rate is 100%. This indicator complements Indicator 2: amounts recovered from local governments reached 100% of their expected contribution to capital costs (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 5 : Breakdown: % of local governments’ contributions to capital costs recovered in the province of Safi/Youssoufia


0% 100% 100% 82.50%


Achievement rate is 82.50%. This indicator complements Indicator 3: amounts recovered from the local governments reached 82.50% of their total expected contribution to capital costs (source: ONEE).

Indicator 6 : Villages in the project given access to house connections through the project Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 265 50 to 100 (IBRD areas) 0

Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 11/30/2014


Target not achieved (0%). No house connection was implemented; however, the project delivered detailed design studies for 11 villages meeting eligibility criteria and secured over 1,700 signed commitments from households to get house connections.

Indicator 7 : % of villages provided with house connections that have adequate mitigation measures for increased wastewater flows


0% 90% 90% 0%


Target not achieved (0%). No villages were provided with house connection; the wastewater pilots were not implemented.

Indicator 8 : % of villages contributing to capital costs for production and conveyance Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0% 95% 95% 19%


Achievement rate is 20% (= actual 19% vs. target 95%). 9,358 beneficiary households out of the 49,973 in the project areas made a financial contribution to capital costs to access a village water point (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 9 : Breakdown: % of villages contributing to capital costs for production and conveyance in the province of Safi/Youssoufia


0% 95% 95% 26%

Date achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 11/30/2014

10


Achievement rate is 28% (= actual 26% vs. target 95%). 7,638 beneficiary households out of the 28,897 in Safi/Youssoufia made a financial contribution to capital costs to access a village water point (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 10 : Breakdown: % of villages contributing to capital costs for production and conveyance in the province of El Jedida


0% 95% 95% 8%


Achievement rate is 9% (= 8% vs. target 95%). 1,720 beneficiary households out of the 21,076 in El Jedida made a financial contribution to capital costs to access a village water point (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 11 : Breakdown: % of households which contributed the amount of MAD 500 to access to potable water standpoints in the province of Safi/Youssoufia


0% 95% 95% 15%

Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 11/30/2014


Achievement rate is 16% (= actual 15% vs. target 95%). This indicator complements Indicator 9: households paid 15% of the amounts expected, or an average of DH 284 per contribution (instead of DH 500) (source: ONEE’ Completion Report)

Indicator 12 : Breakdown: % of households which contributed the amount of MAD 500 to access to potable water standpoints in the province of El Jedida


0% 95% 95% 8%


Achievement rate is 9% (= actual 8% vs. target 95%). This indicator complements Indicator 10: households paid 8% of the amounts expected, or DH 500 per contribution (source: ONEE’ Completion Report).

Indicator 13 : % of Water User Associations (WUAs) with female members Value (quantitative or qualitative)

NA 75% 75% Not applicable


Not applicable. No WUA was established under the project to manage village networks with house connections. According to the TA beneficiary survey, 6% of the standpipe caretakers in place are women.

Indicator 14 : % of households with adequate water quality in household water storage facilities


40% 80% 80% Not available


Due to quality of evidence, considered unreliable, this achievement cannot be measured (see Section 3.5 for more details).

11

Indicator 15 : People and villages given access to potable water supply (by type of service) per province


0% 100% Dropped

Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Was overlapping with Key Indicator 1 and duplicating Indicator 6.

Indicator 16 : Number of villages given access to potable water supply through house connections in the provinces of Safi and El Jedida


50 to 100 Dropped

Date Achieved 11/30/2014 11/30/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Was duplicating Indicator 6.

Indicator 17 : Cash deficit of ONEP in operating water production systems (DH million) Value (quantitative or qualitative)

- 9.65 Not available


Not monitored at project level. An annual 15% ratio of self-financing of investments (as per Legal Agreement) was monitored and used as proxy for ONEE’s financial viability.

Indicator 18 : % of project villages with functioning water systems Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0% 90% 90% 71%


Achievement rate is 79% (actual 71% vs 90% target). 830 villages out of 1,162 in the project areas have functioning standpipes (technically ready to provide water).

Indicator 19 : % of water user associations with tariff adequate for O&M and replacement costs for distribution systems and village waste water facilities


- 95% Not applicable

Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

No WUA was established under the project to manage village networks with house connections.

Indicator 20 : % of project villages with house connections that have functioning waste water facilities


0% 90% Dropped

Date Achieved 12/15/2005 12/31/2012 11/30/2014

12


Was duplicating Indicator 7

Indicator 21 : % of target population undertaking hand washing at critical times Value (quantitative or qualitative)

5% 20% Not available


Not available. Was monitored through Key Indicator #3.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 12/30/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 06/22/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.15 3 12/21/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.15 4 04/19/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.31 5 07/31/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.96 6 02/07/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.75 7 07/31/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.59 8 05/21/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.53 9 12/30/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.63

10 06/29/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.82 11 01/04/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 33.07 12 05/15/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 35.93 13 01/04/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 39.29 14 08/22/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 40.97 15 06/20/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 44.59 16 01/03/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 47.97 17 06/22/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 50.34

18 11/29/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 52.10

13

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP

09/09/2011 N MS MS 37.95

Extension of closing date (+23 months); Reallocation of proceeds; Adjustment of project areas’ names (provinces).

05/09/2013 N S S 44.03 Change of Borrower’s name.

11/25/2014 N MS MS 52.10

Reallocation of proceeds; Amendment to Loan Agreement (1 legal covenant); Delinking with AFD loan; Results framework revised.

I. Disbursement Profile

14

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Country background. In 2005, when the project was approved, Morocco was on a steady path to growth and rapid urbanization, and absolute poverty was declining. Yet more than two-thirds of the 15 percent of Moroccans (4.5 million people) living below the national poverty line were concentrated in rural areas. Their average income was half that of city dwellers, and inadequate access to basic services was the norm.

2. To address rural poverty, the Government of Morocco (GOM) adopted the 2020 Rural Development Strategy in 2003. One of its priorities was to increase access to basic infrastructure and social services. In addition, in May 2005 GOM launched an ambitious, multisector national program to enhance human development, l’Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain (INDH), aimed at reducing poverty by targeting poor rural and periurban areas and vulnerable people, including women.

3. Sector and institutional context. Morocco faced persistent urban-rural disparity in access to potable water. The average access rate in rural areas was only 14 percent in 1995, due to the limited capacities of local governments, or communes rurales (CRs), responsible for water and sanitation service provision. Access to standpipes (SPs) was limited, and house connections (HCs), rare. People relied on local resources and vendors, of unregulated quality and spent considerable time fetching water often at high costs. Access rates to sanitation were also very low and there was no institutional framework for sanitation.

4. In 1995, GOM launched a rural water supply (RWS) program known as the Programme d’Alimentation Groupé en Eau Potable des Populations Rurales (PAGER). The General Department of Hydraulics (Direction Générale de l’Hydraulique, DGH) and the National Potable Water Authority (Office National de l’Eau Potable, ONEP) shared responsibility for the implementation of PAGER. In remote rural areas, DGH developed standalone systems tapping groundwater resources, managed by water user associations (WUAs). ONEP supplied larger rural centers close to its regional water conveyance systems through SPs operated by caretakers trained by ONEP.

5. PAGER successfully raised RWS access rates from 14 percent in 1995 to 61 percent by 2004, mostly through SPs in thousands of villages. Despite such achievements, progress was unequal across provinces. First, autonomous water systems could not work in areas with scarce good-quality groundwater resources, such as along the Atlantic coast and in the Rif and Pré-Rif regions. Second, WUAs received only limited post-construction support to properly operate such systems. In 2002, GOM decided to accelerate the pace of investment in rural areas to achieve a 92 percent access rate by 2007, with a new strategy for overcoming existing constraints.

6. In 2004, GOM made ONEP responsible for a new national program for universal access to potable water supply (Programme de Généralisation de l’Eau Potable, GEP). ONEP’s experience in water production, transmission in bulk to large urban utilities, and provision of water services to secondary urban centers was key to expanding piped water in rural areas. This shift entailed huge challenges in terms of: (i) financial sustainability, as recovering the high cost of infrastructure development and operations in rural areas was an

15

issue; and (ii) capacity, as ONEP needed to develop cost-effective management models to ensure sustainable services to local communities.

7. Rationale for Bank intervention. The World Bank had for long been successfully involved in Morocco’s water sector, 1 and the PAGER project carried out interesting lessons.2 Improved water and sanitation to address rural poverty and enhance women’s empowerment was a priority of the 1997 and 2001 Country Assistance Strategies (CASs). The 2005 CAS enlarged the scope for Bank support to “improved water management and access to rural water supply and sanitation (RWSS) services.”3

8. With its global experience in RWSS and involvement in Morocco’s sector dialogue, the Bank was in a unique position to support the new national program by (i) advising GOM and ONEP on ways to enhance the sustainability of RWSS investments through demand-driven and participatory approaches; (ii) strengthening ONEP’s capacity in hygiene education and solutions for rural sanitation; and (iii) promoting local private operators in RWSS. In the context of the 2005 Paris declaration on aid effectiveness, the Bank was also open to working in synergy with other donors on rural water in Morocco.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 9. As per the Loan Agreement (Schedule 2), the objective of the project was to assist the borrower in supporting the guarantor’s program in the project area aiming at increasing sustainable access to potable water supply in rural areas, while promoting improved wastewater management and hygiene practices. This wording was consistent with that of the Project Appraisal Document (PAD).4 The PAD Results Framework proposed three outcome indicators to monitor the achievement of this twofold objective:

1. Access rate to potable water supply in the five provinces increased by about 18 percent of their rural population (or about 465,000 additional people);

2. At least 90 percent of the water supply and wastewater facilities built under the project have well-functioning and sustainable management structures;

3. At least 20 percent of users have adopted improved hygiene practices. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators 10. The PDO was not revised. The key indicator #1 (as listed above) was aligned in 2010 with the core sector indicator: Number of people in rural areas provided with access to

11 The Rainfed Agriculture Development and the Irrigation-based Community Development projects focused on rural development and social infrastructure; the PAGER project focused on rural water supply. 2 World Bank, 2003: Implementation Completion Report, Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project 3 World Bank, 2004: Morocco, Recent Economic Developments in Infrastructure; Water Supply and Sanitation Sector 4 The borrower, the National Potable Water Authority (Office National de l’Eau Potable, ONEP [now Office National de l’Eau potable et de l’Electricité, ONEE]), is an autonomous, profit-making public corporation subject to the sector oversight of the Ministry of Land Use Planning, Water, and Environment. The Government of Morocco (GOM) is the loan’s guarantor. The PDO in the PAD was to support GOM’s program to increase sustainable access to potable water supply in rural areas, while promoting improved wastewater management and hygiene practices.

16

improved water sources under the project. Its end-target value was reduced to the target population in IBRD-funded provinces (see paragraph 17 and section 1.7).

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 11. The project targeted about one-third of a rural population of 1.6 million without access to potable water in five provinces: El Jadida, Safi, and Essaouira on the Atlantic Coast, and Taounate and Taza in the Rif and Pré-Rif regions.5 The access rate in these provinces was 40 percent in 2004, below the national 60 percent average in rural areas.

12. The PAD also identified as target groups: (i) women, to promote their participation in project activities; and (ii) ONEP as the borrower and implementing agency. Extensive technical assistance (TA) support would strengthen its capacity to implement GEP.

1.5 Original Components Component 1. Water Production and Conveyance (US$94.35 million) 13. This component involved implementing a program of subprojects to deliver water supply to villages through the construction of lateral mains from existing or planned ONEP regional trunk lines (piquages), storage tanks, public standpipes (SPs), and, in limited cases, water production facilities (treatment stations, intake structures, pumping stations, etc.). The PAD targeted 12 to 15 subprojects taken from the GEP Provincial Master Plans. The Loan Agreement detailed eligibility criteria, including the financial contributions from local governments (15 percent) and beneficiaries (5 percent).

Component 2. Water Distribution and Wastewater Management (US$13.49 million) 14. This component included (i) the design, construction, and supervision of village distribution systems providing house connections (HCs); and (ii) the mitigation measures required to handle the resulting increased wastewater flows. The project envisioned that communities (villagers and local governments) be given the choice to opt for HCs instead of SPs, based on their willingness to pay for and operate this level of service. ONEP would offer beneficiaries a credit facility of up to DH 2,500 as an incentive to connect.

Component 3. Institutional Strengthening and Project Implementation Support (US$4.63 million) 15. Activities under this component aimed to reinforce ONEP’s capacity to implement the project and provide support to the local organizations responsible for operation and maintenance (O&M). It included: (i) implementation of an inclusive, participatory approach responsive to community demands in terms of service level and management models; (ii) training to local organizations responsible for O&M; and (iii) hygiene promotion related to water supply and wastewater. The costs covered the TA for project coordination and Social Mobilization Teams (SMTs).

16. The PAD also stated that in parallel to the project, two to three pilot public-private partnerships (PPPs) involving output-based aid (OBA) schemes were envisaged to leverage

5 The local governments or communes rurales (CRs) in these provinces were among the poorest in Morocco according to the national data (INDH) and poverty maps established in 2007.

17

private investments, especially to finance HCs and wastewater management facilities. The project planned to solicit grant financing for the proposed schemes with the Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid (GPOBA).

17. Project costs and financing. The project cost totaled US$112.47 million, including: (i) an IBRD loan of €49.5 million (US$60 million equivalent); (ii) financial contributions from ONEP, the CRs, and households; and (iii) a loan of €20 million (US$24 million equivalent) from the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD). AFD prepared and appraised the project jointly with the Bank. IBRD would support subprojects in El Jadida and Safi and AFD in Essaouira, Tanouate, and Taza, using their respective procurement rules. The TA was the only co-financed activity, with a share of 70 percent from IBRD and 30 percent from AFD.

18. Institutional setting. ONEP’s new division in charge of the national program (Département pour la généralisation de l’accès à l’eau potable, DEP) would implement the project and coordinate internally. The TA would support this division. The financial division (Direction Financière, DFI) would represent ONEP as borrower and remain IBRD’s main contact for the loan management.

1.6 Revised Components 19. The components were not revised. The costs per component and expected contributions from ONEE and local communities were not modified to reflect the delinking with AFD loan in 2014 (see section 1.7).

1.7 Other Significant Changes 20. Extension. Initially designed for a seven-year implementation period, the project was granted a 23-month extension from December 31, 2012 to November 30, 2014, through a Level 2 restructuring approved on September 9, 2011. This extension was deemed sufficient to compensate for initial delays and recurrent issues slowing down some activities (see section 2.2) and allow for the full achievement of the PDO.

21. Change in project scope. Given the slow implementation and lack of recordable progress in AFD-funded areas, ONEP and the Bank agreed in 2011 to track key indicators’ progress in IBRD-funded areas separately. After AFD announced the extension of its loan in early November 2014, a final Level 2 restructuring (approved on November 25, 2014) confirmed the delinking from the AFD-funded operation and the preparation of separate completion reports. As a result, the present ICR will assess achievements in IBRD-funded areas only, and efficiency based on a reduced total project cost (without the AFD’s US$24 million).

22. Results Framework. Following the Mid-Term Review (MTR) in June 2010, ONEP and the Bank agreed on explicit definitions for initial indicators to address difficulties in interpreting and reporting these indicators. The 2011 restructuring acknowledged the proposed changes annexed to the borrower’s request (Annex 3, paragraph 6). In particular, the key indicator #1 target value was broken down to track the population in IBRD-funded areas only, then estimated at 323,600. Other adjustments were made through the 2014 restructuring (see details in the ICR datasheet).

23. Use of funds. Reallocations of loan proceeds between disbursing categories resulted in an increased share of funding to support Component 1. See Annex 1 for details.

18

24. Definitions. The 2011 restructuring updated the definition of project areas following administrative changes.6 A restructuring dated May 9, 2013 reflected the new name of the borrower and implementing agency, ONEE. 7 In this report, we use ONEE or ONEP depending on the context, or simply “the Office”.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 25. Background analysis and alternatives. The team during preparation drew lessons from earlier operations, which are captured in the 2003 PAGER ICR (see section 1.1).8 A “PAGER II” was discarded as this model could not provide sustainable access nationwide, and an alternative—to combine rural roads and water—was considered too complex to implement. The institutional shift of engaging ONEP in rural water was a game-changer. The GEP Provincial Master Plans developed by ONEP provided relevant information to scope potential activities in rural areas with low rates of access.

26. Sustainability of access. ONEP aimed to ensure sustainable access at the village level. As illustrated in Figure 1, this involved (i) reliable supply in quantity and quality through the regional trunk lines already supplying urban centers and high-quality design9 and construction; (ii) sharing with local communities the investment costs up to the village access points, or SPs—HCs downstream would rely on communities’ investments; and (iii) developing sustainable management structures for the distribution systems to supplement ONEP’s O&M capacity. The PAD introduced an indicator on WUAs’ cost recovery, but provided limited information on tariff levels that would be both affordable to users and attractive to operators.

27. Cost recovery and financial sustainability. Given that costs to provide water in rural areas were higher than sales revenues, the model relied on ONEP’s capacity to cross-subsidize operations with revenues from urban operations. To be financially sustainable, the rural model had to develop cost-effective management models for the local systems, including through O&M delegation to local private firms. Although no supporting activity was directly funded by the project, it planned (see paragraph 16) to test OBA models in the project areas. Another pillar (see PAD, p. 9) relied on the intended adjustments to ONEP’s tariffs for bulk water. The Framework Contract between ONEP and GOM was the key instrument governing such strategic issues 10 and the overall success of the national program—and the rationale for the Bank’s engagement in the sector dialogue.

6 Safi Province was split into Safi and Youssoufia; El Jadida was split into El Jadida and Sidi Bennour. 7 ONEP was merged in 2012 with the National Electricity Utility ONE. ONEP became the so-called Water branch, and ONE the Electricity branch of ONEE.” 8 Also see Annex 9 for other reports assessing rural water at that period. 9 Systems were designed for a full domestic service based on a 50 liters/capita/day supply. 10 The Framework Contract (Contrat Programme) defines, among others, the respective share of investments between ONEE, the CRs, and the beneficiaries as well as tariff levels.

19

Figure 1 - Sustainable Provision of Rural Water Supply

Source: ICR Team.

28. Participatory approach. Community participation was a third pillar of sustainability. To foster ownership, match actual demand, and build local capacity, the TA’s tasks included awareness-raising and communication activities to mobilize beneficiaries and CRs responsible for service provision. Consultations were planned to help these stakeholders jointly determine the level of service and the management model they wished and were ready to pay for. Training sessions for operators were also planned. Indicators measuring participation included the level of CRs’ and beneficiaries’ contributions and the involvement of women in water associations.

29. Sanitation. Introducing sanitation to mitigate environmental and social risks linked to increased wastewater flows from HCs made good sense from a technical viewpoint. At appraisal however, responsibilities and funding for rural sanitation were not clear and ONEP was reluctant to engage in this area given costs and capacity limitations. The project would only fund a few pilot sewerage systems. Elsewhere, users opting for HCs would implement mitigating solutions on their own, through on-site or collective facilities. Hygiene education would be included in the participatory approach.

30. PDO and components. The PDO included two dimensions: (1) increased sustainable access to potable water supply in rural areas; and (2) improved wastewater management and hygiene practices. PDO1 mirrored ONEP’s national mandate and focused on selected provinces and poor rural areas. Achieving PDO2, in contrast, relied on progress in PDO1, in particular increased water consumption through HCs. This was rather ambitious, given the lack of a clear institutional framework for rural HCs and sanitation, even with a pilot approach proposed for Component 2. Meanwhile, HCs were crucial to reach the targeted population. In addition, issues relevant to sustainability required clearer definitions and measurable indicators. The sustainable management structures in the key indicator #2 (see section 1.2) referred mostly, in the PAD, to operators for HCs while caretakers’ ability to make a living from SPs was not really discussed. How TA support would help build ONEP’s capacity remained vague and was not captured by Component 3 indicators.

31. Risk and mitigation measures. The PAD considered the overall project risk modest. Two risks were addressed: (i) the Agreements signed with CRs mitigated the risk of not recovering their contributions; (ii) the financial covenant requesting that 15 percent of annual investments be self-financed would help monitor ONEP’s financial viability and

Sustainability of water infrastructure ONEE’s financial viability• Cost-effective investment and management of distribution systems• Appropriate tariffs to ensure operational commitments (reliable service in quantity and

quality) and debt commitments (investments)

CRCR

CR

Regional trunk line

Storage

Conveyance

Commune Rurale (CR)

Village

Standpipe

Distribution network & House connections

Investments O&M

• ONEE (80%) (through loans)

• Communities (20%) CRs: 15% Households: 5%

(DH 500 x 70% of village)

• ONEE• Caretaker

Buy at 2.5 from ONEE / Sell at 10 (DH/m3), per contractual provision

• Communities (100%) CRs: 50% Households: 50%

(DH 3,500 + sanitation)

• ONEE• Caretaker

(ONEE in-house, private or association)

20

coverage of operational deficits. Yet, in hindsight, some risks that hindered implementation and PDO achievement were underestimated. First, TA support was planned to mitigate the risk of “rushed implementation to increase the access rate, due to political pressure” (PAD), and improve project sustainability through extended support to operators. Despite several amendments to increasing its resources, TA proved insufficient to fully control those risks. Second, contrary to the PAD assumptions, beneficiary financial contributions were not easy to collect despite the high demand for water, and the HC pre-financing mechanism was not ready for implementation. The MTR noted that the interest in the SP level of service or preference for HCs would have deserved more attention during preparation, as did the feasibility of the pre-financing mechanism. Third, risks related to land acquisition had not been anticipated. ONEP had limited experience in this area at such a scale, which became a real implementation challenge.

32. Quality at Entry Analysis (QEA). The Quality Assurance Group (QAG) performed a QEA just after the project went into effect (see section 5.1).11

2.2 Implementation 33. The project was implemented over nine years between effectiveness in January 2006 and closing in November 2014. The MTR in June 2010 was important to take stock of progress and point out implementation issues. Progress toward the Development Objective (DO) was rated between satisfactory and moderately satisfactory over the nine years, suggesting a positive balance between progress and recurrent issues.

34. The project delivered on building SPs in villages but implementation delays affected results. The project maintained an overall scope of 11 subprojects covering almost 1,200 villages. A massive production and conveyance infrastructure and 1,141 SPs were constructed. Several factors, however, delayed progress, preventing many of these facilities from becoming functional: 762 were technically ready to provide water, and only 654 provided commercial service12 to villagers at completion. After initial delays preparing standard bidding document templates acceptable to the Bank, the project experienced delays in procurement, including to recruit a firm for TA services. The actual duration of works contracts took on average 2.8 times longer than planned, due to the complex packaging and sequencing of contracts, issues related to land acquisition and at times the firms’ limited capacities. Securing authorizations from other public entities to work on the public domain, notably road crossings or interconnections with power lines, also affected results (see Annex 7): at closing, over 200 SPs were not functional due to this problem.

35. Oppositions to land acquisition became a major implementation issue. Oppositions to land acquisition were a major reason for delayed implementation and actual results (see Annex 7 and ONEE’s completion report). ONEE had to acquire a large number

11 QEA8, FY2006–07, Report 44714: Panel Report dated September 9, 2007. 12 Facilities could provide commercial service only once a caretaker was selected by the communities, appointed by the local government, registered as ONEP’s subscriber and took over operations.

21

of plots (almost 2,000 representing about 100 km2) to install water infrastructure.13 In many cases, claimants did not have proper documentation (land titles, deeds for customary land rights, etc.) to inform the procedures for land acquisition and access to compensation. In the first years, ONEP moved to start the works quickly, but encountered a lot of oppositions from landowners. Though most issues were resolved quickly, some cases remained pending for years and affected work completion. Meanwhile, the level of paid compensation remained low. Following MTR recommendations, ONEP enhanced efforts to better document the list and status of plots acquired and related compensations. Due to limited resources and adequate skills, carrying out this task manually proved daunting (see section 2.4). In 2013, ONEE’s Steering Committee agreed on measures to facilitate, as per the Constitution, the implementation of landowners’ rights—such as using simplified decrees for temporary occupation of public domains and provisioning funds for compensation without jeopardizing works and service provision to the population.

36. A participatory approach was implemented, with mixed results. The project enabled ONEE to improve its level of engagement with citizens and customers. The SMTs followed a standardized protocol including several field visits. They started by identifying villages’ interest in the project and continued with conducting participatory diagnostics and facilitating the selection and appointment of a reliable caretaker. Yet, the underlying objectives of this approach—to respond to local communities and authorities’ preferences, and to address an increased demand for HCs—were not fully achieved. First, works in the initial subprojects started before the TA and SMTs were in place: in some places, consultations took place after the construction of SPs, and at times villagers did not want to pay for them. Second, this expertise was outsourced: SMTs were qualified, but temporary resources constrained by the TA budget. Overall, the time spent on each village/subproject was modest to ensure communities’ full ownership of systems.

37. Local governments. CRs played an important role in project implementation as the parties primarily responsible for service delivery. At completion all CRs had signed the co-financing agreements with ONEE and paid their share of the conveyance system costs, sometimes with delays. For ONEE’s provincial representatives and the TA, taking into account local interests, political agendas, and citizens/beneficiaries’ expectations required careful communication and continued coordination. It took time to mobilize the CR officials to facilitate land acquisition and approve the appointment of caretakers, while clarifying the constraints associated with distribution networks. These delays also contributed to the late operationalization of many SPs at project closing.

38. Beneficiaries. Compared to the CRs, the financial contributions paid by beneficiaries remained low. On average, less than 20 percent of household contributions were collected across subprojects. ICR consultations confirmed findings from participatory diagnostics and the MTR: some villages did not want SPs, either in areas with free sources of good water or when more affluent residents wanted to move directly to HCs. The messages delivered during initial consultations regarding the feasibility and timeframe to develop

13 As per agreements signed with ONEE, the CRs had to provide ONEE with the land needed to install access points and distribution networks, in a process that sometimes entailed lengthy negotiations.

22

village networks may, in retrospect, have been optimistic or misunderstood (see Annex 7). Meanwhile, the slow or inadequate progress of works affected villagers’ willingness to contribute and raised frustration in some areas. Post MTR, ONEE noted that the cost of collection exceeded the expected revenues from SP fees, and pragmatically decided that the DH 500 contribution would serve as a down payment for HCs applications.

39. Progress on HCs service delivery has prepared the ground for results. The extended implementation period was not sufficient to remove the structural obstacles affecting Component 2 activities (see section 2.1). Facing staff and revenues limitations, ONEE initially focused on its primary contractual objective: extending access through SPs. Yet it maintained the objective to develop HCs. First, in June 2011 a restructuring request pointed out progress made in the rural HC cost-sharing arrangement, which was boosted during the preparation of the Bank-funded Regional Potable Water Supply Systems Project (P100397). 14 The project needed (i) additional time to fine-tune communication and implementation mechanisms, and (ii) a reduced target below the initial 265 targeted villages (240 in IBRD areas) for distribution networks and HCs. A 23-month extension was granted, and the target revised to a range of 50–100 pilot villages. Scoping studies to identify eligible villages started soon. Second, although too late to be used in this project, ONEE and the Bank clarified fiduciary procedures to operationalize the pre-financing mechanism for subsidized connections (see section 2.4). Lastly, with Bank support, ONEE streamlined its sustainable management models through pilot projects and evaluation studies. 15 Standard bidding procedures and documents for private sector participation operations were prepared, evolving from traditional works contracts into properly delegated management contracts (see section 2.5).

40. Sanitation. Throughout implementation, ONEE reiterated its reluctance to invest its own funds in sanitation facilities without a clear mandate and financing options. It put the sanitation pilots under Component 2 on a definite hold in mid-2012, as GOM announced the launch of its National Rural Sanitation Strategy. This was acknowledged in subsequent supervision reports, but did not trigger a restructuring request. ONEE limited activities on sanitation/wastewater to the environmental assessments under the HC scoping studies.

41. Changes in the Moroccan political economy. Stakeholders during ICR consultations stressed that since 2011—the Arab Spring triggered social turmoil in Morocco and a new Constitution reaffirmed the country’s dedication to human rights

14 To adjust to more realistic distribution costs and reduce the risk of insufficiently covered investments, in 2009 the Ministry of Interior agreed to change the level of contributions required from the CRs (from 30 to 50 percent of distribution costs) and beneficiary households (from DH 2,500 to DH 3,500 for at least 70 percent of villagers, to cover the other 50 percent of the costs). 15 In 2011, ONEE launched a pilot PPP operation developed with GPOBA grant support in Sidi Kacem province in northwest Morocco. A 10-year lease contract using output-based performance subsidies has been successfully implemented since then. In 2012, with Bank support under the Regional Potable Water Supply Systems Project (P100397), ONEE performed a comprehensive evaluation of private sector participation models including individual operators or small local firms (“micro-entreprise”), with or without transfer of risk (“sous-traitance” or “sous-délégation”). An important finding was that only 30 percent of the WUAs managing distribution systems were able to operate after a couple of years; conversely, a PPP was the most efficient management model in terms of cost and benefit.

23

principles, inclusion and social participation, and transparency and accountability of political power—, citizens and project beneficiaries had higher expectations for modern public service provision, land rights, and compensation for land use.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 42. M&E design. In the PAD, ONEP’s M&E unit was to have overall responsibility to monitor data that would be collected (i) at the village level, by SMTs and beneficiary surveys, and (ii) internally, by DEP in coordination with other relevant units. Tools to collect operational data at the subproject level were to be developed after effectiveness, as per the Loan Agreement (Article 4, Financial Covenants, section 4.04). Indicators were uneven: some were quite specific (e.g. measuring O&M recovery through tariffs applied only to WUAs), while others were rather unclear (e.g. on sustainable management structures or on ONEP’s operational deficit). How the M&E system would inform decision making was not explicit in the PAD.

43. M&E implementation. The TA, once in place, developed simple tools like Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to monitor implementation progress in the various subprojects. It actively coordinated with construction firms and provincial units to aggregate data on civil works, SPs, and financial contributions and submitted detailed quarterly reports. In support of the participatory approach, M&E was discussed at kick-off in 2006, and the household surveys were included in the TA’s TORs. The first survey was carried out to inform the MTR in 2010 (year 4 of implementation), a second survey took place in 2012, and the final one before closing, when several subprojects started to operate. The sample focused on villages supplied by operational SPs for at least one year. Data collection included both qualitative (observations, focus groups) and quantitative approaches.

44. M&E utilization. The MTR stressed that several indicators of the Results Framework were confusing and should be reviewed. Changes agreed upon between ONEE and the Bank were limited, though: indicators remained largely focused on local counterparts’ contributions and included no clear measure of sustainability.16 Also, existing information systems,17 informed by local units and consolidated centrally, do not provide information at subproject level (i.e. project or donor specific), and are sometimes limited by ONEE’s local capacity to input data. As a result, though substantive data are available, it is difficult to aggregate or disaggregate them according to needs. Reconciling information could have helped articulate progress or bottlenecks and provided the rationale for a more comprehensive restructuring. The beneficiary surveys, on the other hand, were useful in assessing beneficiaries’ perceptions, but provided limited quantified data needed to inform the RF (e.g. hygiene practices) or the economic benefits induced by the project (e.g. on time saved by using SPs). Also, the sampling method did not include a control group, undermining any assessment of the project’s effective role in observed changes.18

16 The Results Framework in the ISRs did not fully reflect the PAD indicators. 17 ONEE’s existing digitized platforms include operational data management (gestion des données d’exploitation), the commercial system, the accounting system, and so on. 18 Without a counterfactual scenario, one cannot conclude if (cause) and to what extent (attribution) the project triggered some changes. For instance, the survey would help determine whether people using

24

2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance Safeguards 45. The project was approved as a Category B, with limited adverse environmental and social impacts linked to civil works and increased wastewater flows from HCs. The PAD did not foresee resettlements, only expropriations and temporary use of land. Operational Policy and Bank Procedure (OP-BP) 4.01 and OP-BP 4.12 were triggered.

46. Compliance with OP-BP 4.01. An Environmental Management Framework was published in 2005 and further implemented, although sometimes with delays. ONEE performed required environmental screenings for each subproject and monitored contractors to ensure security compliance at the construction sites. It also conducted environmental screenings required for Component 2 together with other technical studies and social mobilization to select villages eligible for HCs.

47. Non-compliance with OP-BP 4.12. A Resettlement Policy Framework was published in 2005, but its implementation proved difficult. The Loan Agreement explicitly stated (Schedule 5, section 4) that land acquisition measures should be carried out and their application monitored in years 3 and 5. These evaluations were not found in the project files. The MTR urged ONEE to document activities undertaken to comply with Moroccan law and OP-BP 4.12, and to reduce delays in compensating affected people. Thereafter, supervision missions systematically recalled the mitigation measures discussed with the teams of the Regional Safeguards Advisor and Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit (QACU). These measures were as follows: all potentially affected landowners should be informed about the acquisition process, including procedures and timelines for assessing and accessing compensation; a judicial procedure (expropriation) is foreseen in an amicable settlement is not reached; and works should be authorized only when adequate provision for compensation is secured.

48. The safeguards performance was rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory until mid-2013. Bank reports noted progress toward the better documentation of acquisition and compensation processes, and ONEE submitted a land acquisition monitoring report before closing. Yet, at the end of 2014, only around 10 percent of expected compensations had been paid in El Jadida subprojects and none in those of Safi and Youssoufia. 19 This represented a major deviation from both Moroccan legislation and Bank requirements. ONEE will have to perform an audit on land acquisition processes and regularize all pending procedures. It is fair to stress that obstacles to the swift completion of land acquisitions in accordance with OP-BP 4.12 provisions are beyond ONEE’s sole control. The institutional framework governing land acquisition and compensation is complex, and the widespread absence of official land titles remains an overarching obstacle to the claiming and receipt of compensation.

standpipes washed their hands more after the project compared to “the average rural population”, or those who did not get access during the project. 19 Source: ONEE’s Completion Report

25

Fiduciary Compliance 49. Procurement. No major procurement issue was raised during implementation, except for some delays in the awarding of contracts: ONEE performed procurement in accordance with Bank standards and successfully handled more than 40 different contractors, including several contract amendments, to adjust to implementation constraints and actual needs.

50. Financial management (FM). FM performance was rated satisfactory until 2012, as there were no major deviations from the FM policy, and audit reports did not contain any qualified opinions. However, the performance was downgraded to moderately satisfactory in the last four ISRs. Recent interim unaudited FM reports and annual audit reports were submitted late, and did not include the level of detail requested (such as of cumulated disbursements by loan and by component). Despite a Loan Agreement’s covenant to upgrade the existing accounting system, the contract to implement a module able to process this information automatically was terminated in 2013, and ONEE did not set up an alternative plan. The audit report and internal control letter for 2013 and 2014 were also submitted after some delay.20 Conversely, ONEE complied with the financial covenant21 to meet an annual 15 percent self-financing ratio of its investment program, a key indicator of its ability to support deficits in rural operations.

51. Disbursement. As of November 30, 2014 at project closing, disbursements reached a total of US$52.07 million, or 87 percent of the US$60 million Bank loan. They increased to 57.27 million, or 95 percent, when the loan closed on June 5, 2015 after a six-month grace period. Procedures for the submission of disbursement requests were revised during the project to speed up disbursements, which were sometimes delayed by incomplete documentation. Reallocations of funds allowed ONEE to incorporate a new subproject in 2011, to be financed with initially unallocated funds (2011), and lately (2014) to use the undisbursed pre-financing category to partially finance with project funds some works initiated with ONEE’s own funds and consistent with the PDO (see section 2.5 and Annex 2). This contributed to increasing the final disbursement ratio. It was clarified in end 2012 that disbursing funds earmarked for the pre-financing mechanism needed a revised Disbursement Letter to authorize advances through a designated account and had to be justified by actual subsidized connections. The amendment request could not be implemented since HCs pilots could not be physically installed before project closing.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 52. ONEE’s post-completion plan includes resources and institutional arrangements for each subproject. Section 4 provides more details on the structures and mechanisms in place or those ready to be developed to maintain the systems built and ensure cost recovery.

20 The agreement during Negotiations was that audits were to be approved by ONEP’s Board before being submitted to the Bank; however, ONEE’s Board did not meet on a regular basis during the project. 21 This covenant was aligned, through the final restructuring in November 2014, with the calculation formula applied in other IBRD projects after ONEP became ONEE.

26

Incomplete activities will continue with ONEE’s or other funds. TA support will continue on a partial basis to follow up on pending activities in the IBRD areas.22

53. In addition, the Bank remains involved through other ongoing projects with ONEE, in particular the Regional Potable Water Supply Project and the Rural Water Supply Project (P100397 and P145529), which partially intervene in the same or adjacent CRs. For instance, the Lanouaate subproject benefited from funds from this project and will be completed under P100397, while other areas under P145529 will take advantage of the now-ready pre-financing mechanism to enable the shift to HCs.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance of Objectives: Substantial 54. The project objective has remained relevant throughout implementation given the lagging rates of access to water and sanitation services in Morocco’s poor rural areas. It is aligned with the Government’s ongoing (i) National Initiative for Human Development to reduce poverty, (ii) National Program to Generalize Access to Water Supply in Rural Areas, which achieved a 93 percent access rate in 2013 (up from 61 percent in 2004), and (iii) National Program for Rural Sanitation, which addresses the implications of climate change and pollution on scarce water resources and people’s health. The project objective also supports Result Area 3 of the CPS FY14-17 (strengthening governance and institutions for improved service delivery to all citizens) and its Strategic Outcome 3.4 (expanding access to basic services), which support the Bank’s corporate goals to ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity while ensuring sustainability.

Relevance of Design and Implementation: Modest 55. The project design, reflecting a national policy shift that gives ONEP a mandate to improve access to water supply in rural areas, attempted to balance infrastructure development and institutional strengthening. The approach was bold and supported by good principles of participation, cost recovery, and sustainability—both at the village level and at ONEP’s level. However, as discussed in section 2.1, some risks were underestimated or not anticipated, including rural residents’ willingness to pay for or acceptance of the service level provided, which was the backbone of the project design. Developing HCs together with appropriate sanitation measures to mitigate potential adverse impact was a sound strategy. Yet the lack of a clear institutional framework and financial incentives was a limiting factor and this pilot component weighed a lot on the achievement of the two-fold PDO—20 percent of the initial target population were expected to access HCs and have adequate sanitation solutions in place.

56. The PDO and components were not restructured to adjust to the evolving situation, even when ONEE confirmed that this project would not finance the sanitation pilots or

22 From December 1, 2014 to June 2016, AFD is financing 100% of the TA’s contract (Amendment 5). It was agreed that some time could be spent in IBRD areas.

27

when the risk of not implementing the HC pilot (due to delays in scoping studies and difficulties in establishing the pre-financing mechanism) was acknowledged in 2013. Given the TA/SMTs’ limited resources, and their focus on more pressing issues such as the selection of caretakers and negotiations with CRs, hygiene promotion and behavior change did not get the attention and time needed to achieve substantial outcomes.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives PDO1: Increase Sustainable Access to Potable Water in Rural Areas: Modest 57. The target of 323,600 people provided with access to Improved Water Sources under the IBRD loan was achieved at a rate of 59 percent. At project completion, the project provided 191,754 people access to potable water through SPs. Comparatively, in the AFD-funded areas, major difficulties prevented any single SP from becoming operational during the same duration. This additional population contributed to the steady increase in access rates in the provinces supported by the project between 2004 and 2014 (see table below). There is a reasonable likelihood that the project would provide access to water to up to 237,000 people (73 percent of target population) in the near future, with over 100 additional SPs already technically functioning at completion becoming commercially operated.

Provinces Access Rate 2004 Access Rate 2014 Increase 2004–14 Project’s contribution

El Jedida 34% 99% +65% 26% Safi 29% 82% +53% 42% Youssoufia 34% 94% +60% 58% Source: Access rates are provided by ONEE. The project contributions to the increased rates are estimated based on populations actually benefiting from operational SPs.

58. The target of 90% of the water supply and wastewater facilities built under the project with well-functioning and sustainable management structures was achieved at 64%. At closing, out of the 1,141 SPs built, 654 (57 percent, or 64 percent of the 90 percent target) were well-functioning (with water running) and in commercial use, managed by a caretaker with a subscription policy with ONEE. ONEE made important efforts to resolve pending technical issues and get caretakers ready to operate the SPs; yet at completion, three of the 11 systems (27 percent) had SPs built but not functioning.

59. It is fair to mention the production and conveyance infrastructure developed: though it is not accounted for by the project indicators, such infrastructure will help serve more beneficiaries in the medium and long term. The 11 subprojects cover 1,162 villages and come with a total of 2,474 km of new pipe networks installed (86 percent for distribution); 45 new storage tanks providing a capacity of 12,525 cubic meters (m3); 20 pumping and booster stations; three remote monitoring systems, and 11 power lines.

60. The project achieved mixed results in collecting financial contributions from local counterparts. The target of 100 percent of local governments paying the requested share was fully achieved in El Jadida and by 80 percent in the Safi and Youssoufia provinces. In contrast, the target of 95 percent of beneficiaries paying their share of the investment cost was not achieved: 8 percent of households contributed in El Jadida and 28 percent in Safi/Youssoufia, and amounts collected in Safi/Youssoufia were 16 percent of those expected. ICR consultations confirmed that the issue was not affordability: in most cases,

28

beneficiaries’ unwillingness to pay for SPs increased together with demand for HCs. ONEE decided to pay with its own funds that missing part of the financing plan to avoid blocking other investments to extend access. But it reflected limited achievement of the principles of participation and demand-responsiveness.

61. As discussed earlier, conditions to deliver HCs in villages were not met during the project. Nonetheless, the project clearly supported the implementation of the National Program to Generalize Access to Water Supply in Rural Areas, and it provided ONEE and GOM with guidance to address constraints in an evolving context. First, ONEE made important progress over the project implementation period, in articulating a solid HC service delivery policy. The Guidebook for House Connections, published 23 in 2014, summarizes all the criteria and procedures to apply (see Annex 2). Bank support has been instrumental in strengthening ONEE’s operational knowledge on a range of management models for village networks, including using performance-based incentives for small PPP operators. Second, at the project level, ONEE maintained the momentum toward HCs. At closing, design studies were available for 11 villages meeting the eligibility criteria, and over 1,700 households had signed commitments to apply for HCs in the project areas. These and other households will be able to benefit from the pre-financing mechanism now in place under the Rural Water Supply Project (P145529).

PDO2: Promote Improved Wastewater Management and Hygiene Practices: Negligible 62. As discussed earlier, conditions were not met during the project to deliver wastewater pilots and to enhance on-site or off-site facilities for managing wastewater. Regarding hygiene practices, the PAD (p. 24–25) proposed two standardized24 indicators to assess progress of the hygiene education activity under Component 3: (i) undertaking hand washing at critical times (20 percent of the target population) and (ii) safe water storage at home (80 percent of households with adequate water quality). How these two might be combined to measure the key indicator for PDO2—at least 20 percent of users have adopted improved hygiene practices—was unclear. Awareness-raising activities on water and hygiene took place once the SPs became operational and people started to use them. These included practices related to environmental hygiene (cleanliness around the facility, gray water disposal practices, etc.) and personal hygiene (hand washing and adequate storage to preserve water quality). But the limited evidence could not confirm that the project improved hygiene practices.

63. The TA’s beneficiary survey in 2012 reported that 98 percent of the respondents washed their hands with soap after using the toilet (only 10 percent did not have one). From then on, monitoring reports used this figure as a significant achievement of the project; however, the actual explanation in the report (p. 40) provides a different perspective. First, the figure of 98 percent does not come from the quantitative survey but from focus groups: while it reflects a consensus among participants; it is doubtful that people would publicly

23 The Guide was supported by the Belgian Cooperation. 24 They are used in national health surveys such as the UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and the USAID’s Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).

29

declare they did not wash their hands.25 Second, the report states that “this performance is not related to the project because these practices were ordinary practices for adults before the project.” Third, the final survey, at completion, noted that around 90 percent of toilets were equipped with soap but that only 50 percent of the respondents26 “used soap” after using the toilet (p. 57), which contradicted the previous statement. Water storage at home was not included. No other data27 could be found to understand how the initial baseline (5 percent) and target (20 percent) were established, or corroborate the reported results. Certainly, health indicators have increased in Morocco over the past decade and access to ONEE’s water, compliant with safe drinking water standards, has contributed to it. Despite the efforts made under the project, the quality of evidence strongly undermines the results reported and the rating of this PDO2.

3.3 Efficiency Rating: Modest 64. Economic rates of return (ERRs) were estimated ex-ante and ex-post. An ex-ante cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was carried out for a sample of 13 RWS subprojects, and for the project as a whole (see section 1.5 and Annex 3 for details). The conservatively estimated benefits stemmed from time saved on fetching water and health benefits. The main costs used in calculating the ERR on investments were: (i) the costs of construction, feasibility studies, and works supervision; and (ii) costs associated with project management, implementation, and O&M of water supply and wastewater systems. For the entire project, including both IBRD and AFD loans,28 the ex-ante ERR was estimated at 13 percent, with a positive net present value (NPV) of DH 229 million (equivalent to about US$ 25 million) at a 10 percent opportunity cost of capital and benefiting 526,672 people. ERRs of the 13 proposed subprojects (in El Jadida, Safi, Essaouira, Taza, and Taounate provinces) ranged from 6 to 34 percent. The ERRs of the subprojects proposed for the IBRD financing ranged from 10 to 34 percent. Sensitivity analysis was undertaken that confirmed the robustness of the model to deviations from the base case assumptions.

65. The ex-post economic analysis used the analytical framework established by the ex-ante model and updated the CBA with current values based on the actual implementation scope of the project, reflecting significant changes in subprojects eventually implemented, and important variations of ERRs across subprojects (see section 1.7 and Annex 3). The project supported by IBRD implemented a total of 11 subprojects (five in El Jadida and six in the Safi and Youssoufia), whose ex-post ERRs ranged from 2 to 23 percent, with an overall project ERR of 12 percent and a positive NPV of DH 49 million (US$4.5 million)

25 The ICR did not have access to the surveys’ TORs and the questionnaire tool. 26 The report does not say if this figure resulted from the quantitative survey or focus group discussions. 27 Neither the last DHS available for Morocco (2003–04) nor the last MICS (2006–07) reported any specific result on hand washing or water storage at home. The recent National Survey on Population and Family Health (2011) and statistics of the Ministry of Health are also silent on these issues. 28 Since the project followed a framework approach, in which actual subprojects were not known in advance, the economic analysis considered a sample of subprojects based of the financial envelope to be provided by IBRD and AFD. No specific ERR and NPV were calculated for IBRD-financed subprojects.

30

at a 10 percent opportunity cost of capital and benefiting 191,754 people. The ex-post ERR is only slightly lower than the ex-ante value despite a significantly lower number of beneficiaries since: (i) overall project cost was reduced in the ex-post analysis to reflect the delinking from the AFD-financed project, and (ii) the subprojects assigned to receive AFD financing (Taza and Taounate provinces) had ex-ante ERRs significantly lower than the average of other subprojects, and their exclusion had a positive impact on the ex-post ERR. For the subprojects included both ex-ante and ex-post, the ERR is in most cases lower ex-post, due to late operationalization of SPs and the absence of benefits associated with HCs.

66. The ex-post assessment confirmed that project investments per capita exceeded the cost-effective limit of DH 2,371 (US$247) set at inception, as many systems were mostly implemented but could not be put in operation before project closing. The ex-post cost per capita was DH 2,834 (US$295) for the overall project, DH 2,985 (US$310) for El Jadida subprojects, and DH 2,725 (US$284) for Safi/Youssoufia subprojects. International benchmarks for rural water schemes (at an average of US$50/capita) usually refer to simpler systems without all the conveyance infrastructure of the Moroccan design, making any comparison difficult.

67. The methodology used in both ex-ante and ex-post analyses gives the lower bound of the benefits of rural water investments due to the conservative nature of the assessment. Yet, only 57 percent of the SPs built were fully operational at completion and accounted for in the analysis. The overall ERR over 10 percent shows that investments were justified to increase rural access to potable water supply in three provinces of Morocco, but benefited fewer beneficiaries and hence were not as cost-effective as expected.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 68. The rating is Unsatisfactory. It results from an “averaging split sub-ratings assessment” of the various dimensions impacting the overall outcome, lowered by modest design and efficacy. First, the relevance of objectives is substantial. Relevance of design, in contrast, is modest as weaknesses in the risks assessment and the Results Framework affected implementation and performance assessment, and adjustments were too limited to turn around implementation progress. Second, the project accomplished less than expected and its efficiency is modest, even if the ERR shows that the investments were justified. Third, the overall efficacy of the project is modest, despite ONEE’s progress over the decade to generalize access to potable water in rural areas. The core part of the PDO, which aimed to increase the sustainable access to potable water in rural areas, achieved limited success in terms of sustainability and number of beneficiaries, and mixed performance on participation and demand-responsiveness. While the project contributed to increased access rates in the project areas, infrastructure able to serve more people in the future, and consolidation of the HCs service delivery model, these results were not captured in the Results Framework. Achievement of the second part of the PDO is negligible, with no physical output on sanitation and limited evidence on hygiene practices. In total, both parts of the PDO were not fully achieved, and several indicators had low achievement rates.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

31

69. The project targeted some of the most underserved areas in the poorest provinces and CRs in Morocco, and contributed to increased access rates there. But no evidence links progress in access to water supply through this project to reduction in overall poverty. Improved access to electricity and changes in agricultural activities and revenues also triggered economic and social changes, including improvements in housing materials and household appliances, as noted in the beneficiary survey.

70. The project achieved mixed results in engaging women in water management. Only one-third of the SMT members and 6 percent of the caretakers were women. Although an indirect outcome, during the project ONEE signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the ministries in charge of health and education to extend water connections to health centers and schools in rural areas, enhancing the potential for human development in the beneficiary communities.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 71. In 2005 ONEP was the most credible candidate to push forward the rural water agenda and took up that challenge over the years of the project. Evolving from an urban water utility with recognized experience in water production, transmission in bulk to large urban utilities, and provision of water services to secondary urban centers to one also embracing rural water supply using a decentralized approach was by no means an easy transition in mindset. Yet the implementing agency expanded its customer base and its capacity to work in various geographic and social contexts. This is an important institutional achievement for ONEE and the country.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) N.A.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 72. Beneficiary Survey. As discussed above, the final beneficiary survey planned under the TA contract was performed at completion; therefore no separate survey was carried out for this ICR. Despite flaws in the methodology, findings are consistent with previous surveys and field visits conducted during the ICR missions. On average, people using SPs were satisfied with the improved convenience and water quality, and fair rates. Despite low individual consumption levels, people progressively seemed to rely more and more on this improved source of water (see Annex 5 for details).

73. Stakeholder Workshops. Stakeholder consultations were held during the second ICR mission, at the provincial level and at ONEE’s headquarters. The key takeaways that emerged include the satisfaction of people benefiting from SPs and also the frustration of years of delays and high expectations for HCs; constrained implementation capacity at the local level, and heavy internal procedures from the project and program centralized supervision; the overarching issue of land acquisition and compensation; and difficulties in dealing with an ambitious national program and multiple projects’ monitoring, safeguards, and fiduciary requirements (see Annex 6 for details).

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Modest

32

74. Structures in place are flexible enough to limit adverse effects on the outcomes. Existing Agreements signed with CRs for each subproject remain in place, mandating ONEE to develop infrastructure and provide sustainable access to water at an agreed level of service and cost. For SP service delivery, caretakers are appointed by the CR based on villagers’ proposal. They purchase bulk water from ONEE at a subsidized rate of DH 2.5/cubic meter, and sell to villagers at a maximum price of DH 10/cubic meter. Caretaker does not earn much, and the job is not a full-time position, as is made clear in the “job description.”29 This might encourage the turnover of caretakers. In the medium run, the development of HCs may lead more professional operators to take over the systems. But in scattered villages, the SP will remain the only option for some time.

75. To reduce its O&M costs in project areas, ONEE has already set up small PPPs under classic subcontracting arrangements in Ouled Frej (2011), and Sidi Smail, Sidi Abed, and Mouley Abdellah (2014). Two other contracts for Chemaia/Youssoufia and Mazagan will be procured in mid-2015. Replicating the successful GPOBA pilot in Sidi Kacem (see section 2.2), sub-delegations (with risk transferred to the private operator and incentives based on performance) under a 10-year lease should be tendered in 2015 for Safi Sud and Safi Nord-Saadla.30 Ultimately, the sustainability of project outcomes will largely depend on ONEE’s capacity to scale up viable models for domestic service delivery models. Key policy features to support a progressive shift toward this level of service were confirmed in the 2014–17 Framework Program between ONEE and GOM. These include measures to (i) recover debts from local governments and value added tax (VAT) refunds from GOM, and (ii) to increase tariffs. Their implementation will be critical to allow ONEE to pursue its mandates without threatening its financial viability.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory 76. The project was prepared over FY04 to FY06, mobilizing 82 staff weeks and $540,000 to perform due diligence in the context of a new rural water program. Building on ONEP’s Provincial Master Plans, criteria to support the PDO achievement (poor underserved provinces, areas with no good quality groundwater resources) were relevant to equitably select project areas. Promoting sustainability, users’ participation and a demand-responsive approach was an overall bold and innovative approach.

77. In retrospect however, the QEA rating of highly satisfactory appears over-optimistic given the design shortcomings that affected implementation and results: (i) the underestimated risks of land acquisition and compensation issues, and strong reliance on the TA for major project features while its recruitment was not ready; (ii) compared to

29 From a sample of standpipes in Safi (ONEE), the average margin was found to be around DH 700 monthly, from which the caretaker has to pay for routine maintenance and small repairs (ONEE covers more important repairs). 30 Tenders are pending confirmation of African Development Bank (AfDB) financing.

33

similar Bank projects appraised at the same period, an insufficient level of effort in the cost estimate to implement a demand-responsive approach; (iii) the lack of sound institutional framework to develop HCs and promote wastewater solutions; and (iv) the loose M&E and Results Framework that undermined the assessment of crucial aspects of the project, including sustainability.

(b) Quality of Supervision: Unsatisfactory 78. Over the nine years of implementation, the Bank undertook regular supervision missions, prepared aide-memoires with the client, and produced 18 implementation support status reports. The MTR in 2010 was a critical milestone to document issues faced and to enhance implementation support. The Bank was also actively engaged in the sector dialogue on sustainable management models, the enabling environment needed to develop HCs, as well as the implementation of the Framework Contract. The sheer contrast in terms of project achievements between IBRD- and AFD-funded subprojects (which had not delivered any operational SP by November 30, 2014) largely reflects the amount of implementation support provided to ONEE. A strong sector presence in the field, materialized after the MTR by the relocation to Morocco of the project Task Team Leader, was critical to help ONEE deal with complex implementation challenges. However, severe shortcomings affect the Bank supervision rating.

79. The Bank’s enforcement of the Operational Policy 4.12 requirements has not been consistent throughout implementation, putting both the Bank and the Client in a difficult situation of non-compliance. Though oppositions delayed works throughout the project period, the issue of land acquisition and compensation only surfaced in ISRs in 2009, when the CMU requested that a safeguards specialist join the team for the MTR. Post MTR, the issue was thoroughly dealt with and systematically raised in each supervision report, with advice from the Regional Safeguards Advisor and QACU. Yet, proposed measures were insufficient to reverse the situation before project closing.

80. Positive ratings of the PDO over the nine years of implementation contrast strongly with the ICR assessment of the project outcomes: in hindsight, these ratings did not shed enough light on the risks to PDO achievement and on the need for a stronger shift in the project approach. The DO was rated satisfactory for most of the implementation period, except in the time from MTR to the 2011 restructuring approval and in the last year of implementation when it was rated moderately satisfactory. While this was consistent with the continuous progress in the disbursement ratio and progressive construction of water infrastructure, it did not reflect the recurrent issues that were reported (nonpayment of users’ contributions, oppositions to land acquisition, delays in Component 2 activities after 2010, financial reporting issues after 2012) and affected DO achievement. Implementation progress was downgraded to moderately unsatisfactory only in the final ISR. Component 2 was rated moderately unsatisfactory after the MTR and in the last two ISRs, and Safeguards got this rating in the last four.

81. Stronger proactivity measures were needed to make up design weaknesses and address implementation issues. The decision to extend the project was justified to overcome implementation delays and adjust to the progress of the household connection delivery model. However, there was room for a more substantial restructuring of the loan. Reallocations of proceeds increased the disbursement rate. Yet, revising the components’

34

consistency or even the PDO could have resulted in refocusing available time and resources on more realistic or better measurable outputs and outcomes. Despite some changes along the road, the Results Framework at completion does not properly capture the level of commitment by both the Bank and ONEE, and some of the project’s achievements.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 82. The Bank performance is considered Unsatisfactory based on the combined dimensions of quality at entry and quality of implementation.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory 83. The Government of Morocco, as loan’s guarantor, was not directly involved in implementation. Yet, GOM mandated ONEP to implement an ambitious rural water program, which needed an environment conducive to successful outcomes of the different projects and partners supporting this program. While a key pillar of sustainability for this project was for ONEP to fulfill its operational and debt commitments, the implementation of the successive framework contracts fell short of the adjustments to the water tariff structure and other types of financial support from GOM that were envisioned at appraisal. This affected ONEE’s financial situation and capacity to hire staff to address increased needs. Similarly, improved coordination mechanisms among public agencies and the implementation of fast-track procedures related to works in the public domain could, in some cases, have smoothed implementation progress.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory 84. This project supported ONEE’s first steps as implementing agency of the national program to generalize access to water supply in rural areas. Given the challenges faced since 2005, its continuous commitment to progress toward the objectives is commendable. Indeed ONEE implemented the project in an environment that could have been more conducive to its success and deployed significant efforts to address issues under its control. More flexibility on tariff setting could have helped ONEE increase its sales revenues and diversify staff and skills for O&M of rural water systems. Clearer institutional and financing policies slowed down the implementation of sanitation pilots under the project.

85. ONEE’s Completion Report also candidly acknowledges achievements below expectations, and the difficulties faced and areas of improvement, from procurement and project management, at the core of its business, to participatory and social safeguards issues that arose as new challenges for the organization. First, ONEE needs to continue strengthening its planning and monitoring tools to better manage data at the project level: a smooth plan for land acquisition and better sequencing between participation and works would have enhanced implementation progress, and a dynamic dashboard could have eased the monitoring of tasks. Second, ONEE relied a lot on the TA provided by the project; however, some activities should remain the implementing agency’s responsibility, and some tasks need to continue once the project is over. Building more internal capacity and strengthened coordination within ONEE’s units could have streamlined supervision and enhanced results. Third, after the merger of the water and electricity branches, measures to optimize synergies could have avoided lengthy discussions and sped up the water systems’

35

operationalization. Fourth, streamlined procedures would have expedited disbursements and helped perform financial management reporting requirements more timely.

86. Finally, ONEP then and ONEE now, did not comply with national regulations on land acquisition and compensation to affected people. Applying the provisions set forth in the safeguard framework documents (including documenting processes, informing affected parties, and paying or at least provisioning funds for compensation before starting work) and reporting on such activities remain critical areas. Efforts undertaken under the other Bank projects (P100397 and P145529) and the land acquisition audit that ONEE will perform on this project are positive sign in this regard.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 87. The overall borrower performance is considered Moderately Unsatisfactory, which reflects the combined performance of the Government and the implementing agency.

6. Lessons Learned 88. Understanding the institutional sector context and country’s political economy is key to design and implement transformative projects with sustainable impacts for the sector, and to support implementation agencies, especially in a context of sector reform. While such elements are usually present in project appraisal documents, they may be strengthened to better capture (i) the overall sector strategy, the maturity of institutional and regulatory frameworks of the different policy areas included in the project design, the robustness of associated financial strategies to support them, as well as (ii) who the main stakeholders are, and what their interests and incentives are. This, in particular, allows to assess the risk to project implementation and achievement if the framework in place at appraisal does not evolve as expected.

89. Indeed, Investment Project Financings alone may not provide sufficient leverage on the institutional and regulatory environment to ensure that sustainability conditions envisioned at appraisal materialize during project implementation, especially when the service delivery model depends to a large extent on upgraded sector financing mechanisms. Some policy areas, such as sanitation in Morocco, may need clear and agreed prerequisites for utilities to engage in, and some time before they are conducive to implementation and can deliver results. Strong engagement in policy dialogue is needed to foster tariff, institutional and regulatory reforms. In such contexts, a combination of infrastructure financing and technical assistance on sector policy reforms is critical to help effectively trigger sector-level measures and tighten the implementation of Government commitments.

90. A stakeholder assessment at preparation is also recommended to understand the various stakeholders’ potential opposition or support to the project. Such as ONEE, utilities may face issues with many stakeholders (local officials, contractors, decentralized agencies, other public agencies, and final beneficiaries): their support is often taken for granted since the project would bring water and sanitation. Although the overall development objective may be fully relevant and attractive, projects have to deal with local socio-economic situations; political agendas and changing counterparts, other agencies’ own priorities, constraints, and timeframes.

36

91. Obstacles to handling land acquisition in accordance with national regulations and safeguards provisions are often beyond the implementing agency’s control and can jeopardize infrastructure development programs. In many countries, land ownership is extremely fragmented, especially in rural areas where customary rights apply, and the widespread absence of official land titles remains an overarching obstacle for affected people to claim and access due compensation. It is recommended that: (i) project preparation assesses in detail the potential scope of land acquisitions; the borrower’s capacity to manage and monitor land acquisition and compensations to PAPs; and the bottlenecks stemming from land regulations that could affect the implementation of safeguards instruments; (ii) when appropriate, digitized monitoring tools—customized to needs—be implemented from the beginning to carry out related tasks and help better review the project sequencing and implementation; and (iii) land issues be addressed at the country portfolio level as they cut across sectors and project teams’ mandates.

92. Besides the important focus on sector context and political economy during project design, it is crucial to ensure readiness of implementation and fiduciary arrangements to avoid delays at kick-off. Standard bidding documents should be prepared and agreed upon with the Bank before effectiveness, the TA procurement be initiated, and the implementation unit be in place and fully staffed. A plan to develop project management tools to address specific monitoring and reporting requirements may be developed as needed, as well as a clear mapping of responsibilities between the implementing unit, the overall structure hosting it and the proposed TA. Such as the overall context and sector constraints, resources and tools for project management should be reviewed periodically to allow for mitigation measures to be proposed to prevent the project from delaying its development objectives.

93. A project-specific TA is instrumental for efficient and effective project implementation, and for building capacity within the implementing agency if strategically used. Even in utilities with recognized experience like ONEE, a shift in scope and mandate requires strengthened capacities to perform and sustain progress. A TA team needs to bring specialized skills, and has to work from the very start of project implementation. Despite staff limitations, it should not become a substitute for internal coordination or staff. Instead, TA is an instrument to improve project coordination and to develop new skills, methods, and dashboard and steering tools—and translate “on the job” operational knowledge into streamlined approaches to address business needs.

94. Recommendations regarding TA and capacity building are that: (i) project design specify how TA activities contribute to project implementation and to the supported entity’s increased capacities, with specific results or outputs; (ii) depending on the scope of work and roles for coordination, M&E and reporting, having the TA in place could also be a condition for effectiveness; (iii) for national programs supported by several donors and projects, digitized tools (able to reconcile data collection, processing, and use between decentralized and centralized levels) and project dashboards (able to provide disaggregated information to address stringent reporting requirements from donors) would simplify both project and program management and monitoring while freeing staff and TA’s time for other purposes; (iv) to address specific recurring tasks (social mobilization, local intermediation, land surveying in acquisition processes, etc.) even once projects are completed and the tenure of TAs ended, appropriate procurement mechanisms could speed

37

the mobilization of short-term expertise (for instance, through a roster of trained and certified social mobilization consultants or land survey technicians) avoiding the delays and transaction costs linked to specific project resources.

95. Identifying and highlighting issues and obstacles in project monitoring reports is important to address them in a clear and constructive way with the Client. Achieving successful outcomes is the common objective of the Client and the Bank. Difficulties that may arise during implementation should be addressed as soon as possible. ISR ratings need to objectively reflect progress on key output indicators, rather than incremental improvements in implementation overall. As specified in the Bank’s ISR guidelines, significant under performance on any important output indicator should trigger at least an MU rating which can drive more determined actions by Bank, including on the country-level issues such as safeguards which require determined and effective CMU and Regional attention as well as sectoral support. Overall, candid statements on project ratings should be considered an opportunity to revisit project design or foster implementation support, and to learn from implementation, both within the Bank and between the Bank and the Client. These are essential principles in order to maintain good quality portfolios and to prepare the ground for other operations in the same country or in similar contexts. 96. Decentralized management models involving the local private sector are effective to reduce O&M costs of rural water systems. Addressing the aspiration toward a HC level of service calls for a long-term engagement, clear institutional settings and financial strategies, and consistent messages on options available to beneficiaries. Recent experiences in Haiti, Benin, and Senegal show that, as in pilots developed in Morocco, innovative arrangements to incentivize operators’ performance help transitioning to higher standards of service delivery and scale up access to water services in rural areas.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing Agencies See Annex 7 (b) Cofinanciers See Annex 8 (c) Other Partners and Stakeholders

38

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Project costs Appraisal Estimate

(US$ million)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$ million)

Percentage of Appraisal

Component 1 – Production and conveyance 94.3 78.9 84%

Component 2 – Water Distribution and Wastewater Management

13.6 0.0 0%

Component 3 – Institutional Strengthening / Project Implementation Support

4.6 5.3 115%

Total Financing Required 112.5 84.2 75%

(b) Financing (in US$ million equivalent)

Source of Funds Type of Co-financing

Appraisal Estimate (1)

(US$ million)

Actual/Latest Estimate (2) (US$ million)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 5.8 13.7 (3) 238% Local Communities 22.7 13.2 (4) 58%

AFD Partial 24.0 -- -- IBRD 60.0 57.3 95%

Total 112.5 84.2 75% Sources: ONEE data files (May 2015); ONEE’s Completion report (Feb. 2015); Interim Financial Report S2 2014 (Dec. 2014); World Bank Client Connection Notes: (1) The project cost estimate at appraisal included a US$24 million co-financing from AFD. The final project cost does not take into account AFD’s disbursements as the project was de-linked before closing. In addition, the Borrower’s and Local Communities’ expected contributions were not modified when the AFD loan was delinked from this operation, even though part of their contributions were planned to cover investment or tax costs for AFD-financed activities and areas. This complicated the estimate of the final project cost.

(2) The latest project cost estimate is based on original data received from the Borrower in DH; the US$ amount equivalent is based on the exchange rates for the years each payment was made. Exchange rates variations over the project duration were important.

(3) ONEE’s contribution is higher than appraised; several factors must be taken into account:

39

- ONEE bore most costs than anticipated, in particular as it covered the households’ contributions that could not be collected;

- ONEE’s financial input to the project includes an estimate 85% of taxes (VAT). ONEE had to support the imbalance between the 7% VAT billed to Local Governments and the 20% VAT due on many of its investments for works, goods and services for consultants. Delays in recovering VAT refund has affected ONEE’s cash flow and financial forecasts during the project period, as reported in some ISRs and in ONEE’s latest financial audit. Existing data at project level do not allow to fully assess ONEE’s “net” contribution to the project, i.e. the taxes that were paid but not (yet) refunded; such uncertainty in the timing of tax refund was not taken into account at appraisal.

(4) The local communities’ actual contributions are below what was planned at appraisal; however, these contributions only reflect local contributions collected in project areas supported by IBRD, while the appraisal estimates also included project areas supported by AFD. The amounts collected from communities under this project represent 17% of the investments in Component 1, instead of the expected 20%.

40

Annex 2. Outputs by Component This section provides (a) an overview of the use of funds during implementation; and (b to d) data and information on the outputs for each of the three components of the project. (a) Overall use of funds: Figure 2 – Disbursement of loan proceeds, as appraised and at closing

Table 1 - Reallocations of loan proceeds during implementation Loan Agreement Original

Jan-06 Restructuring

Sep-11 Restructuring

Nov-14 IBRD73510 (EUR) 49,500,000 49,500,000 49,500,000 Works 36,376,250 40,876,250 45,576,250 Goods 1,000,000 0 0 Consultants Services (TA) 3,000,000 3,500,000 3,500,000 Prefinancing Mechanism 5,000,000 5,000,000 300,000 Unallocated 4,000,000 0 0 Front-end Fee 123,750 123,750 123,750

41

Figure 3 – Use of loan proceeds by expenditure category, as appraised and at closing

(b) Component 1: Development of a massive water system to increase rural access to water supply Table 2 - Component 1: massive infrastructure to develop village access points

New pipe networks (km) New storage

tanks

Pumping stations/ boosters

Remote monitoring

systems

Power lines

Provinces Subprojects Conveyance Distribution Total # Capacity m3 # # #

El Jadida Mazagan 23 286 309 3 1,325 2 1 2

Moulay Abdellah 14 108 121 0 0 0

O. Frej 23 120 143 4 520 3 1

Sidi Abed 35 77 112 3 1,070 1 1

Sidi Smail 62 179 240 4 1,500 2 1

Total EJ 5 157 769 925 14 4,415 8 1 5

Safi Safi North x 3 (*) 27 546 573 8 3,650 5 1 3

Safi Sud 33 249 281 3 1,100 1 1 1

Youssoufia Chémaia 75 405 480 12 2,330 5 1

Youssoufia 45 170 215 8 1,030 1 1

Total S./Y. 6 179 1,370 1,549 31 8,110 12 2 6

Total 11 336 2,138 2,474 45 12,525 20 3 11 (*) Safi North comprises 3 subprojects: Saadla, Hrara, Moulbergui – Source: ONEE Completion Report

42

Table 3 - Component 1: standpipes to provide villages with access to potable water

Provinces Subprojects Planned (*) Built % /

planned Well-

functioning % /

built With

caretakers (**) % /

built

El Jadida Mazagan 151 137 94% 93 68% 52 38%

Moulay Abdellah 82 81 100% 75 93% 58 72%

O. Frej 59 62 100% 42 68% 36 58%

Sidi Abed 60 51 100% 51 100% 39 76%

Sidi Smail 101 60 65% 57 95% 25 42%

Total EJ 5 453 391 90% 318 81% 210 54%

Safi Safi N - Saadla 150 139 100% 139 100% 139 100%

Safi N - Hrara 132 120 91% 0 0% 0 0%

Safi N -Moulbergui 84 78 93% 0 0% 0 0%

Safi Sud 131 144 100% 144 100% 144 100%

Youssoufia Chémaia 163 184 100% 161 88% 161 88%

Youssoufia 119 85 72% 0 0% 0 0%

Total S./Y. 6 779 750 94% 444 59% 444 59%

Total 11 1232 1141 92% 762 67% 654 57%

(*) based on contracted engineering studies; (**) with subscription policy signed with ONEE, selling water to villagers – Source: ONEE Completion Report

Table 4 - Project’s contribution to the increased access rate to ONEE’s water, 2004-2014

Source: ONEE for the access rates; the project’s contribution is estimated based on population that gained access to rural water (ONEE and Census) and the beneficiary population in project areas in the selected provinces

PROVINCEAccess rates -

2004Access rates -

2014Increase

2004-2014 Main contributing financingsProject's

contribution

EL JADIDA 34% 99% 65% World Bank, local financings 26%SIDI BENNOUR 44% 70% 26% World Bank, local financingsSAFI 29% 82% 53% World Bank, local financings, JICA, KFW 42%YOUSSOUFIA 34% 94% 60% World Bank, local financings 58%TAOUNATE 56% 86% 30% AFD, JICA, local financings

MOROCCO 61% 94.5% 34%

43

44

(c) Component 2: Progress toward a rural house connection delivery model

Due to a late start of Component 2 activities, including due to the time to mature the financing plan and procedures to enhance the implementation of house connections in rural areas, the expected targets set for the project could not be reached.

However, since 2012, the project has initiated several studies (financed under the Bank-funded Regional Water Supply Systems Project) and campaigns (undertaken by the TA) to progress toward the development of distribution networks and house connections in the project areas.

Table 5 - Component 2: situation of the house connection pilot project at project closing

Actions Safi and Youssoufia El Jedida Total Initial screening of eligible villages (SMTs)

110 villages 75 villages 185 villages identified

Second screening of eligible villages (SMTs and technicians)

80 villages NA 80 villagers

Consultant services Detailed technical studies and preparation of bidding documents (3 lots)

Social, technical and environmental screening; preparation of bidding documents for 1 lot (14 villages)

65 villages covered by technical studies

Situation as of Nov. 30, 2014

Works contract awarded for lot 1, will start after collection of households’ down payment (DH 500)

Bid tendered Works ready to start in 13 villages in Safi

SMTs’ campaigns

654 households signed commitment to contribute; 4 CRs planned to formally endorse the project

530 households signed commitment to contribute; 1 CR (M. Abdellah) planned to formally endorse the project

1,154 households (*) signed up for house connections and 5 formal endorsements expected from related CRs

To be completed post-project

Collection of household contributions; Speed up resolutions by local governments

Award works contract; Collection of household contributions; Speed up resolutions by local governments

Source: ONEE Completion Report; (*) figure was revised to over 1,700 households

The overall process experienced under the project was progressively clarified and standardized in a Guidebook for house connections, published in 2014 with support from the Belgian Cooperation.

45

The Guidebook is disseminated to Rural Local Governments and interested households. Users can refer to Frequently Asked Questions on technical prerequisites, expected financial contributions, management options, etc. (left) and to the detailed procedure from initial village screening to formal decisions endorsed by local governments (below).

46

(d) Component 3: TA for institutional strengthening and project implementation support

The TA provided by the project under Component 3 was recruited on the following timeframe:

• Nov. 2005: expression of interest and international tender for short-listed Consultants

• Oct. 2007: contract awarded

• Feb. 2008: initial contract approved

• April 2008: contract effective, activities launched

• March 2010: Amendment 1 (initial coordinator replaced after 8 months vacancy)

• Aug. 2012: Amendment 2 (additional funding)

• Dec. 2012: Amendment 3 (additional funding)

• April 2014: Amendment 4 (additional funding)

• Nov. 2014: Amendment 5 (after closing, TA 100% financed by AFD)

Table 6 – Component 3: TA support to project implementation and capacity building (men.day)

Function Per initial contract

Per amended contract

Actually spent

% amended /initial

% spent /initial Assignment

1 Coordinator 940 1280 1273 36% 35% Full time - Overall supervision of works, studies, monitoring and reporting

1 Sociologist 380 490 518 29% 36%

Upon demand - Coordinated household surveys and sensitive field visits with potential conflicts with populations. Overrun will be covered under Amendment 5

1 Sanitation expert 130 98 84 -25% -35% Upon demand - mostly involved in sanitation-related studies for house connections

1 Electromechanical Technician

65 91 46 40% -29% Depending on needs

2 Social Mobilization Leads 1862 2064 1838 11% -1% Planned SMT activities, supervised SM

Specialists, led field visits Social Mobilization Specialists 6000 7729 7421 29% 24% Depending on needs for participatory

activities

Technicians 4200 9525 9955 127% 137%

7 technicians initially, then 5 - additional supervision of works due to delays in Safi Nord and Youssoufia subprojects; 1 technician to support land acquisition procedure. Overrun will be covered under Amendment 5

Source: ONEE Completion Report and ICR interviews. In total the TA contracts was extended from 66 months initially to 80 months and cost over 40% of the planned amount (excluding Amendment 5)

47

Source and pictures: ONEE Technical Assistance

Example - Youssoufia project Participatory Diagnostic, Oct.-Dec. 2012 Through awareness and social mobilization activities, the TA collected information on socioeconomic activities; current practices to get and use water; willingness to get ONEE’s water to the village. The diagnostic highlighted the existence of - free standpipes and water from trucks provided by the neighboring Factory OCP (Office des Phosphates et de Pétrole);

- standpipes supplied by private water systems developed by community associations – mostly no more in operation, sometimes transitioning to house connections.

At completion, 85 standpipes were built in Youssoufia but none was functioning yet.

From 2009 to the project closing in November 2014, social mobilization teams conducted a total of 59 campaigns to support the project on social matters:

• Communication on the project to mobilize communities around the project’s options (standpipes/house connections) and associated constraints, and their willingness to financially contribute;

• Participatory diagnostics to collect socio-economic data on the communities and their environment, draw ‘social maps’ including existing water sources;

• Facilitating community decisions regarding the selection of the caretaker;

48

• Focus groups during the beneficiary surveys to assess uptake of the project and use of existing, operational standpipes, changes in the communities and household practices regarding water uses, satisfaction of service provided, etc.

Example – Village ‘social map’ in Mouley Abdellah, El Jedida (2008) Initial consultations with villagers help map the existing sources of water and discuss the location of the standpipe(s) proposed under the project. In El Jedida, social activities started after the initial technical studies; in some villages, consultations aimed to confirm the location proposed by contractors.

Source: ONEE Technical Assistance In total and in addition to the household surveys (see Annex 5):

• 11 participatory diagnostics (one per system) were conducted, even though some in El Jedida subprojects were held only once the TA was in place and works were already well advanced in some villages;

• 7 campaigns (in Safi/Youssoufia) focused on supporting standpipes implementation;

• 7 focused mainly on supporting ONEE in household contributions;

• 18 focused on supporting the selection of caretakers and/or his/her appointment by the CRs;

• 6 were directly related to the ongoing studies to identify villages eligible to house connections, including diagnostics on sanitation;

• 24 of the 59 campaigns (field visits) included issues with oppositions to land acquisition issues, sometimes to facilitate discussions in cases of reported conflict;

The TA also provided:

• 25 quarterly progress reports;

• Several specific reports: household surveys (4); Methodology notes for social mobilization; Reports on eligible villages for house connections; Reports on existing sanitation facilities in villages requesting house connections and proposed solutions for onsite and semi-collective facilities;

• 35 reports from the mobilization teams.

49

50

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (a) Scope and Methodology. A Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) was undertaken ex-ante, at appraisal and ex-post, during the ICR preparation for the following three project components:

Component 1. Water Production and Conveyance—mainly standpipes (ex-ante: El Jadida, Safi, Essaouira, Taza and Taounate; ex-post: El-Jadida and Safi/Youssoufia)

Component 2. Water Distribution—including household connections and small wastewater and collection system (ex-ante: planned; ex-post: not undertaken); and

Component 3. Project Implementation Support and Institutional Strengthening (ex-ante and ex-post: Technical Assistance provided)

The analytical frameworks used for calculating returns on investment ex-ante and ex-post are similar to allow for necessary comparison. A list of the key parameters used in the ex-post CBA exercise is given in Table 7 below, along with the data sources and estimation approach (followed by details in the next sections).

In summary:

The main costs included in the CBA were:

1. Costs of feasibility studies, works, and supervision of works linked to the construction of water production, conveyance and distribution infrastructure and wastewater management measures for villages served by HCs.

2. Costs of O&M and replacement of the infrastructure mentioned above.

3. Costs of project management including social mobilization, hygiene education, formation and training of management structures for village water distribution systems and wastewater management systems.

The main benefits accounted for in the CBA were:

1. Time savings arising from reduced time spent collecting water, especially among women and girls. They are likely to translate into increased time allocation to productive activities and hence increased household incomes. For children, especially girls, this will enable an increase in time spent attending school.

2. Increased household water consumption, together with improved drinking water quality and improved hygiene practices, resulting in decreased morbidity and mortality rates, especially among children under 5. This is expected to result in reduced medical expenditures and improved labor productivity.

3. Increased sustainability of RWS services through the adoption of a participatory approach, focusing on what people want and are willing to pay and prolonged support to operators managing the water systems.

51

Table 7 - Key Parameters for Ex-Post CBA

Variable Source Key Assumptions Investment costs (supported by the project)

ONEE (Implementing

Agency)

Data excludes 10% contingency provided by year with and without and VAT (for investments in 2005-2015, 14%-20% VAT applies, TA VAT is 20%)

O&M costs/Recurrent costs

PAD, ONEE Ex-ante share allocations (% of investment costs) were retained, all 2005 values have been converted to 2015 current value

Total costs Data from ONEE Investment costs + recurrent costs

Population PAD, Census Census data was available for1994, 2004, 2014. Population # for intervening years was interpolated, population for 2015 was extrapolated

Beneficiary Population ONEE

Based on technically completed (or functioning) standpipes, including standpipes operational at completion and standpipes built but will become operational post project completion.

Per capita consumption PAD, ONEE

10 liters per capita per day (lpcd) used for stand pipes in the ex-ante analysis. Sensitivity was checked for 20-liters/capita/per day. ONEE data confirmed the average actual 10 lpcd for consumptions at standpipes

Agricultural Wage Rate PAD, IMF WEO The agricultural wage rate (in DH) of 2005 is made current to

2015 using IMF WEO CPI Index. Sensitivity was also checked. Distance of water point from households and time spent collecting water

PAD, Field Notes The ex-ante data has been used based project preparation studies

Health costs of water related diseases

PAD, IMF WEO The ex-ante data on health cost associated with water related diseases has been used, updated the cost inputs where needed to current 2015 DH using IMF WEO CPI

Foreign Exchange Rate ONADA, PAD For 2005-15, average exchange rate data from BNR. Estimates

for 2013-onwards, based on projections in PAD

Inflation Rate IMF, PAD For 2005-15, CPI projections from IMF WEO. For 2018-25, assumed 2% inflation rate as given in the PAD

The water investments supported by the project may also have a number of other important positive externality benefits, which have not been quantified at inception due to lack of data and/or complexity of modeling these effects. These benefits include: (i) other socioeconomic benefits such as psycho-physical stress while fetching water, higher school attendance, increase household level of education etc.; and (ii) non-quantifiable positive externalities of having access to water resulting in overall well-being of individual and family.

Therefore, the CBA methodology used in both ex-ante and ex-post analyses gives the lower-bound of the benefits of the water and wastewater investments made by the project. In addition, several sensitivity tests were performed in the ex-post CBA exercise assuming different scenarios (for e.g. investment costs increases, further decrease in accrued benefits, benefits delayed due to project implementation delays and reduction in the household size etc.) to assess the robustness of the returns on investment under these different assumptions.

52

Scope of work. The ex-ante analysis is based on scope of work which changed somewhat during implementation, which included:

1. Household connections (HCs) and mitigation measures to handle resulting increase in wastewater flows planned under Component 2 did not materialize under the project;

2. AFD financing in the amount of US$24 million was delinked from the project, resulting in a reduced project total cost and a revised geographic targeting scope.

The geographic targeting scope was modified as follows:

• Five provinces were targeted during appraisal based on a list of subprojects identified from the GEP, Priority Program (13 subprojects in three provinces were assessed as part of the project’s economic and financial analysis);

• AFD-funded interventions targeting Taza and Taounate were delinked from the IBRD operation; and

• IBRD-funded interventions took place in El Jadida and Safi, the latter split with the new Youssoufia province, and subprojects identified in Essaouira were found not eligible.

Table 8 – Subprojects assessed ex-ante and actually implemented 13 subprojects

assessed ex-ante 11 subprojects implemented

in IBRD-funded areas Notes

El Jadida 1 + 6 (DJA + DJ) El Jadida 3 - Ouled Frej

El Jadida 2 (DJB) Undertaken by IBRD under the ongoing Rural Water Supply Project - Sidi Bennour

El Jadida 4 (Maz Eh) El Jadida 1 – Mazagan

El Jadida 5 (Maz EB) El Jadida 7 (DJH) El Jadida 5 - Sidi Smail El Jadida 8 (DJI EB) El Jadida 2 - Moulay Abdellah El Jadida 9 (DJI EH) El Jadida 4 - Sidi Abed El Jadida 10 (SD) Undertaken by AFD - Chtouka

Safi 2 (Chemaia) Youssoufia 1 – Chemaia

Safi 3 (Beddouza) Undertaken by IBRD under the ongoing Rural Water Supply Project - Beddouza

Safi 1, 2, & 3 - Safi North - Saadla/Hrara/Moulbergui

Safi 4 - Safi Sud

Youssoufia 2 – Youssoufia Selection approved in 2011

Essaouira 1 (add. Meskala) Not eligible Essaouira 2 (add. Tanamar) Not eligible

Tanouate (barr. Al Wahda) Undertaken by AFD Source: PAD, p. 44-45: Appendices 4-A (list of subprojects identified in the five priority provinces) and 4-B (13 subprojects out the priority list, which were selected for the ex-ante economic and financial analysis)

53

(b) Ex-post economic analysis

The ex-post economic analysis was carried out based on actual 11 water supply schemes or subprojects (5 in El-Jadida and 6 in Safi/Youssoufia provinces) and for the project as a whole. Main assumptions used were the same as proposed by the PAD (p. 58) for ex-ante model.

Costs. Two types of costs are included in the CBA: investment costs (without VAT and contingency) for water production and conveyance (including civil works, equipment, pipes and special parts) and O&M/recurrent costs.

1. Project costs: The project costs were provided in local currency (DH) by the client, covering every year payment for each category of investment with and without taxes. Contingency allocation in ex-post model was omitted. Component 2 investment costs were assumed to be zero based on actual. Component 3 project implementation support costs were also based on actuals provided by ONEE.

2. Exchange rate variation: The ex-ante and ex-post CBA use local currency (DH) based on actual utilization. Actual average exchange rate for DH to US$ conversion was used in the ex-post assessment for each year to accommodate exchange rate movement.

3. Real value adjustment: Investment costs in the ex-ante CBA are expressed in 2005 currency, while in the ex-post CBA, they are expressed in actual for each year provided in 2015. Since the consumer price index in Morocco increased by 19 percent between 2006 and 2015 (assuming the base year to be 2005), investment costs at completion would seem smaller if expressed in 2005 terms.

4. Economic Cost Factor: A conversion factor ranging between 0.83 and 0.9 (14-20 percent for VAT and 17 percent for average import taxes) was applied to calculate economic costs of equipment, goods, and infrastructure. This is in line with what was used in the ex-ante CBA as well as in the ongoing Rural Water Supply Project in Morocco implemented since 2014.31 The project investments are already netted from taxes for use in the ex-post analysis. Table 9 - Investment Costs Supported by the Project (excluding VAT and contingency)

Ex-ante CBA (in 2006 terms) (DH / US$, million)

Ex-post CBA (in 2015 terms) (DH / US$, million)

El-Jadida DH 442 US$ 88 DH 202 US$ 21

Safi/Youssoufia DH 170 US$ 34 DH 289 US$ 30

Total DH 612 US$ 122 DH 491 US$ 51 Source: project preparation files and team calculations Note: The ex-ante costs (as per the project files) refer to the subprojects that were assessed initially in the respective provinces – not all were subsequently selected for implementation – see Table 8.

31 See PAD, Table A6.2 and IMF Morocco Article IV (2013)

54

Benefits. The benefits of these investments are:

1. Conservative assumptions were made on future water consumption: In particular, no population growth has been taken into account and average consumption was estimated conservatively at 10 liters/capita/day (lpcd) for standpipes (SPs), and tested sensitivity at 20 lpcd.32

2. Time savings. The ex-post analysis maintained the assumptions used ex-ante. Two types of information were used at that time: the average distance between household and the water source and the average time spent fetching water every day, both derived from household surveys. In the “with project” scenario, it was considered that in the case of HCs, the time spent fetching water was zero, and in the case of SPs, the distance would be reduced to 500 meters. This was consistent with the information collected from field visits during ICR preparation. The time spent fetching water was valued at 80 percent of the minimum wage for farm workers to take into account the unemployment in rural areas. The ex-post analysis updated the ex-ante minimum wage to current value (ex-ante: DH 50/capita/day; ex-post: DH 59/capita/day) and it tested sensitivity based on current wage rate used in the recent project.33

3. Health benefits. The ex-post analysis built on the ex-ante assumptions. The approach to value health benefits used a variant of the cost of illness approach and values current health expenditures on waterborne diseases as well as the loss of output due to related morbidity and premature death among the population. Morbidity and mortality rates as well as direct health expenditures of households on waterborne diseases were estimated on the basis of provincial statistics assembled by the Ministry of Health and estimates from WHO. Output lost as a result of morbidity is calculated on the basis of the number of days lost valued at the minimum agricultural wage. The value of statistical life (VSL) approach was used for the valuation of mortality risks. Due to lack of specific studies in Morocco, the economic value of one year of life lost was estimated on the basis of studies conducted in the European Union, corrected by the ratio of GDP (purchasing power parity) between Morocco and the EU. One case of mortality was considered as equivalent to 10 years of life (and corresponding value-added) lost. Ex-post, the cost of value of life was converted to 2015 current DH and all other necessary adjustments to populations were made.

32 CBA for the ongoing Rural Water Supply Project (approved in 2014) used 20 lpcd. 33 CBA for the ongoing Rural Water Supply Project used DH 67/capita/day (PAD, Table A6.5, p. 76)

55

Table 10 - Result of the Ex-Post Economic Cost Benefit Analysis of the Subprojects/Project

Subprojects Ex-Ante1 Ex-Post

NPV 10% ERR Population NPV

10% ERR Population

El Jadida 1 + 6 (DJA + DJ) / El Jadida 3 - Ouled Frej -0.56 10% 17,758 -0.27 10% 10,759

El Jadida 4 (Maz Eh) / El Jadida 1 – Mazagan 10.47 13% 26,336

-10.41

7%

17,522 El Jadida 5 (Maz EB) / El Jadida 1 – Mazagan 34.61 34% 24,000

El Jadida 7 (DJH) / El Jadida 5 - Sidi Smail 11.60 12% 50,260 -28.03 2% 14,441

El Jadida 8 (DJI EB) / El Jadida 2 - Moulay Abdellah 43.38 24% 41,012 16.76 16% 24,427

El Jadida 9 (DJI EH) / El Jadida 4 - Sidi Abed 17.40 15% 29,515 2.19 11% 12,830

Total El Jadida1 209.90 17% 280,068 -19.76 8% 79,979

Safi 1, 2, & 3 - Safi Nord - Saadla/Hrara/Moulbergui2 8.39 8.39 12%

Safi 4 - Safi Sud2 50.95 23% 30,940

Safi 2 (Chemaia) / Youssoufia 1 – Chemaia 65.98 17% 56,513 58.76 20% 49,228

Youssoufia 2 – Youssoufia3 -18.35 NA 0

Total Safi/Youssoufia1 82.48 18% 64,356 99.75 16% 111,775

Total project1 229.24 13% 526,672 49.49 12% 191,754

Sources: project preparation files and team calculations Notes: 1 Ex-ante aggregated results (NPV, ERR, population):

- The ex-ante total project summary includes all water supply systems or subprojects that were assessed ex-ante (see Table 8);

- The ex-ante summary of El Jadida includes all the 8 subprojects assessed ex-ante, though individually they are not reported above. The ex-post includes the 5 subprojects implemented;

- The ex-ante summary of Safi includes the 2 proposed water supply schemes or subprojects, though individually they are not reported above. The ex-post includes the 6 subprojects implemented in Safi/Youssoufia.

2 A subproject covering rural areas around the city of Safi was identified in the GEP Priority Program, but not included in the subprojects that were assessed ex-ante. During implementation, this large subproject was divided into four different ones, namely Safi Sud and Safi Nord, the latter including 3 systems: Saadla, Hrara and Moulbergui. 3 The Youssoufia subproject, identified in GEP, Priority Program was incorporated through the 2011 restructuring.

Beneficiary Population. The ERR is assessed based on the actual population for the 654 standpipes commercially operational, benefitting 191,754. An additional 108 technically were completed or “functional” (as worded in the Results Framework) at project completion, and have already been cleared for operational use by ONEE. In all likelihood they would benefit an additional 45,200 people in the near future or a total of 236,955

56

people. The sensitivity analysis provided later in this annex discusses the implications of considering these additional standpipes on the economic analysis.

Economic Rate of Return. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) calculated ex-ante and ex-post is given in Table 10 above. The ERR for most of the subprojects is lower ex-post (2-23 percent) than ex-ante (10-34 percent), due to late operationalization of SPs and the absence of benefits associated with HCs. The ERR for the overall project is lower ex-post (12 percent) than ex-ante (13 percent).

The ERR presented here is an underestimation due to conservative calculation of benefits, as whole universe of benefits (all possible environmental, public health, and social) of these investments have not been quantified, owing to lack of data and the complexity in measuring some of such benefits.

Sensitivity Analysis.

The ex-ante CBA exercise incorporated robustness checks, which confirmed that the ERR was fairly robust to deviations from the base case assumptions at appraisal. Ex-post, the sensitivity was re-run based on actuals to affirm the robustness of the model. The results confirm that the calculated ERR is still fairly robust for actual implementation as base scenario. Ex-ante and ex-post, ERR was estimated under different scenarios - a few high and mostly low-case scenarios – to assess whether the ERR would remain positive under even the most conservative scenarios. As seen in Table 11 below, the ERR was positive in all these scenarios (but lower than the 10% discount rate in some cases). Table 11 - Scenarios Affecting the ERR Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Ex-Ante Ex-Post

Scenarios NPV @10% (DH million) ERR (%) NPV @10%

(DH million) ERR (%)

Whole Project 229 13% 49 12% Investment Costs +10% 148 12% 14 10% Investment Costs +20% 66 12% -22 9% Benefits -10% 115 11% 5 10% Benefits -20% -0.04 10% -39 9% Benefits delayed 1 year 117 12% 4 10% Benefits delayed 2 year 14 10% -37 9%

Sources: project preparation files and team calculations

Some of these alternative scenarios tested include:

1. Investment costs: An assumption was made to increase investment costs by 10% and 20%, respectively, while all other variables remained constant. This may account for any misjudgment call on investment at ex-ante and misreporting investment for actuals at ex-post. Under both these scenarios the ex-post model performed well (ERR 10%/9%).

2. Benefits: An assumption was made to decrease benefits by 10% or 20%, respectively, while other variables remained constant. This was to check for over inflation of benefits and calibrate it to a lower level at both ex-ante and ex-post. Under both these scenarios the ex-post model performed well (ERR 10%/9%).

57

3. Benefits time delayed: An assumption was made at ex-ante for one-year, or two-year delay (e.g. due to construction delays) in accruing project benefits. In reality this did materialize, but was countered as the timeline of the project also got extended (2011 versus 2014). At ex-post this assumption was used to check how delayed operationalization of standpipes built would affect benefit to the beneficiaries. Under both these scenarios the ex-post model performed well (ERR 10%/9%).

4. Household size: Sensitivity tests also checked household size, which was an assumption at appraisal as the model used a number of households as targets, while indicators and actual data were the total population. 34 Tests were run for increasing or decreasing household size from 5.6 to 8 in rural areas in Morocco. The model showed that the project would remain feasible for up to household size of 7, at which point it would equal the cost of capital. The ERR and NPV would improve for households of less than 6 people. ERR at a lower household size of 5.5 improves to 13% and decreases to 11% for a household of 6.4.35

5. Per capita consumption. The ex-ante model used 10 lpcd as consumption for standpipes and ONEE’s data confirmed this level was still valid. The economic assessment for the ongoing Rural Water Supply project (see PAD 2014) used 20 lpcd consumption for standpipes. Sensitivity of the model was also checked for this adjustment, and overall project ERR decreased to 11% with NPV decreasing to DH 38 million.

6. Minimum agricultural wage rate. The ex-post analysis uses the wage rate used ex-ante model (DH 5.9 per capita per day) to the current 2015 value. The CBA for the ongoing Rural Water Supply project PAD used DH 6.7 per capita per day. Sensitivity of the model was also checked for this adjustment. The increase in minimum wage rate has positive effect on the ERR (goes up to 13%).

7. Beneficiary population. The model was also checked for its robustness for variations in beneficiary population. Taking into account the standpipes technically completed or “functional” at completion on the premises that they would likely benefit an additional 45,200 people in the near future (for a total of 236,955 project beneficiaries) gave a positive ERR of 14 percent and NPV of DH 129 million. Furthermore, as all planned investments under the project have been made (all assets (standpipes) have been procured and installed), the model also checked the assumption that 100 percent of standpipes built under the project were technically functional and in commercial use, operated by a caretaker. In this highest bound scenario, investments would benefit 345,210 people and gave a positive ERR of 18 percent with NPV of DH 268 million.

(c) Cost Effectiveness. The cost effectiveness criterion set for selection of subprojects at appraisal stated (PAD, p. 12 and p. 38) that the investment cost per capita for eligible subprojects should not

34 Based on 2004 Census data 35 The CBA of the ongoing Rural Water project approved in 2014 used a 5.5 household size and noted: “Household members were estimated to drop from 5.5 to 4.0 over the 2015-2034 periods.”

58

exceed DH 2,000 (in 2005). Across subprojects and provinces, this baseline varied due to several factors, including the kind of village settlement prevailing in the different areas (grouped or scattered), the nature of soil, on so on. The proposed DH 2,000 limit was converted to current 2015 value, amounting to DH 2,371 (US$247) for ex-post comparison.

The ex-post analysis showed that the per capita investment made under the project overall, and for the different subprojects implemented under the project was above the DH 2,371 limit (see Table 12) and therefore was less cost-effective than calculated ex-ante.

Table 12 - Investment Cost Per Capita Ex-Ante and Ex-Post (DH/US$)

Ex-Ante (2005) Ex-Ante (2015) Ex-Post (2015)

DH US$ DH US$ DH US$

Planned Investment cost per habitant to not exceed 2,000 222 2,371 247

Overall Project (weighted by population) 1,776 197 2,104 219 2,834 $295

El Jadida subprojects 1,577 175 1,869 164 2,985 $311

Safi/Youssoufia subprojects 2,639 293 3,128 326 2,725 $284 Sources: project preparation files and team calculations Notes: as in other tables above, calculations ex-ante were based on the 13 subprojects that were assessed, including 8 were in El Jedida province and 2 were in Safi province; the ex-post results are based on the 5 subprojects implemented in El Jedida and the 6 implemented in Safi and Youssoufia. (d) Financial analysis.

Ex-ante, the PAD included (i) a presentation of ONEP’s overall financial situation, including assumptions for forecasted tariff increases that would help maintain its operational revenues and service its debts, and (ii) financial and cost recovery projections based on planned implementation of both standpipes and house connections service delivery, and loan repayment of both IBRD and AFD loans. Ex-post, due to the delinking with AFD operation and lack of adequate data at subproject level, it was not possible to perform a meaningful financial analysis.

(e) Overall efficiency.

Based on the discussion in preceding sections, a comparison overall projects ERRs is complicated by the difference in the scope of subprojects between the ex-ante and ex-post analyses. The project overall ex-post ERR is at 12 percent, which is only slightly less that the overall ex-ante ERR of 13 percent, despite that fact that the project only reached 59% of the expected number of beneficiaries. This stems largely from the fact that three subprojects with lower ERR (11 percent in Essaouira province and 8 percent in Taza and Taounate) were part of the ex-ante economic analysis, but eventually funded by AFD and therefore excluded from the ex-post analysis.

Subprojects both foreseen at appraisal and later implemented generally show lower ex-post ERR and NPV. This decrease in economic efficiency at subproject level stems from two

59

main reasons: (i) in several subprojects, all standpipes were not operational at project completion; and (ii) due to project implementation delays, benefits accrued later than planned at appraisal.

As mentioned before, the methodology uses the lower-bound of the benefits of the rural water access investments. Some benefits may not have been quantified - owing to the lack of data and complexity of modeling these effects.

To conclude, the ex-post ERR, despite a slightly lower value than ex-ante, confirms the viability of the undertaken investments. However, the project accomplished less than expected and the investment per capita was less cost-effective than calculated ex-ante. This justifies an overall rating of modest for the efficiency dimension of the project.

60

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending Arbi Ben Achour Consultant GSURR Meryem Benchemsi Financial Management Specialist MNADE Hocine Chalal Lead Environmental Specialist GENDR Safeguards Antonio J. Cittati Consultant GEEDR Marie-Laure Lajaunie Sr Water Resources Specialist. GWADR TTL Edouard Henri Motte Consultant EASCS - HIS Johanngeorg H. Renkewitz Consultant MNSIF - HIS Mohammed Bekhechi Senior Advisor QACU Land acquisition

Supervision

Wendy E. Wakeman Lead Social Development Specialist MNSSU - HIS TTL (2005-

2010)

Anas Abou El Mikias Sr Financial Management Specialist

MNAFM - HIS

Khalid Anouar HQ Consultant ST GWADR

Siaka Bakayoko Lead Financial Management Specialist GGODR

Zineb Benider Consultant FM MNSED - HIS Franck Bousquet Senior Regional Adviser MNAVP

Hocine Chalal Lead Environmental Specialist, Regional Safeguards Advisor GENDR Safeguards

Mohammed Bekhechi Consultant Land acquisition Xavier Chauvot De Beauchene Sr Water & Sanitation Specialist GWADR TTL (2011-

2014) Abdoulaye Keita Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Hassan Lamrani Consultant MNCMA

Moez Makhlouf HQ Consultant ST MNAFM - HIS

Pierre Prosper Messali Senior Public Sector Specialist GGODR Alaleh Motamedi Senior Procurement Specialist OPSOR ICR Stephane Raphael Dahan Sr Water & Sanitation Specialist GWADR TTL Veronique Verdeil Water & Sanitation Specialist GWADR Main author Roohi Abdullah Consultant GWADR

61

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY04 15.4 127.67 FY05 29.4 186.48 FY06 37.4 226.12

Total: 82.24 540.36 Supervision/ICR

FY06 0.65 1.83 FY07 19.4 85.56 FY08 18.03 70.63 FY09 10.05 69.48 FY10 11.16 77.16 FY11 15.64 84.68 FY12 7.56 78.49 FY13 10.92 70.72 FY14 5.65 41.04 FY15 9.78 88.97

Total: 108.84 668.55

62

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results – Summary of selected findings

Preambule and objectives. The final Beneficiary Survey undertaken by the project’s TA, as per contractual provisions, was performed at the end of the project’s implementation period to assess the initial impacts of increased access to water supply through standpipes on beneficiaries and collect their views on this service. The global objectives of the survey was to assess the project’s achievements and its main effects and impacts at completion. The specific objectives were to assess household satisfaction once standpipes became operational; and to identify the difficulties encountered to develop access in the project areas.

Methodology. The baseline survey was performed in 2010 when the first standpipes built under the project became operational (“before the project” in the results below means before 2010). While this initial survey covered all stakeholders (technical units, contractors, associations, local governments, populations), the second survey (July 2012) and the final one (November 2014) focused strictly on populations, especially households who got access to standpipes and used them for at least one year. The number of villages included was higher in the final survey to reflect the growing number of subprojects and standpipes that had become operational: it reached 90 villages (51 in the initial survey) for a total of 880 households randomly selected. The questionnaire used was the same across the surveys and villages. In addition, the surveys reflected on focus groups held with villagers and qualitative information on operation and management of standpipes (water uses, tariff, users’ perceptions of service quality parameters, etc.). The 6 subprojects covered by the survey include: Safi Sud in Safi province, Chemaia in Youssoufia province (formerly included in Safi province) and Mazagan, Mouley Abdellah, Ouled Frej and Sidi Abed in El Jedida province.

Background about the survey areas.

El Jedida: the project areas are located along the Oum Rabiâa River and canal, which enables irrigation of agricultural activities and market gardening as sources of income. Near towns, building construction and industrial activities also provide revenues for rural households. The area benefitted from many water projects in the past; those still in operation provide water for free or monthly expenses around DH 30 per households.

Safi Sud: the main economic activity is fishing in the coastal areas and livestock farming in inland areas where soil fertility is limited. People in this area are relatively poor, but limited water resources increase their participation to the project. The area benefitted from standpipes from other projects in the past, still partly operational and accessible for a tariff of DH 7 per cubic meter.

Chemaia: populations in this area are very poor. Recent years of drought have negatively impacted agriculture and livestock, their main source of revenues. Water resources are scarce in this area.

63

Main findings regarding access to water, the use of standpipes and beneficiaries’ perceptions about the service provided:

Before the project, 35% of the households used existing standpipes and 49% relied on wells. After the project, 93% used standpipes for drinking purposes. Standpipes are primarily used for domestic purposes (drinking, cooking), and use is increasing when people cannot rely on alternative sources such as wells and boreholes (El Jedida and Chemaia) developed for irrigation purposes, or “matfia”, traditional system to collect and store rainwater underground (Safi Sud). Both can dry up during hot season while the standpipe provides water in all seasons. In many areas, water from the wells is brackish and once people have started using the standpipe, they usually consider that water from the pipe is of better quality. In some areas, people also use the standpipe to water livestock when the wells dry up – and have reported positive impact of the livestock health.

El Jedida: situations differ according to the subsystems and local governments, but on average, the uptake of standpipes built by the project (mostly in its early phase) is mixed. Some villages don’t want to use the existing standpipes because they can rely on private wells of good quality and want to have house connections. In some others, not all standpipes are operational because no caretaker was appointed yet/anymore. Sometimes, people are not using them because they prefer other water systems that pre-existed or have developed in parallel to the project, for instance house connections implemented by a village association or by the local government – and in such cases, at a cost lower than the standpipe.

Safi Sud: in the villages surveyed, all standpipes are operational (with a caretaker in place) and are the main sources of water for drinking and cooking. They complement the matfia that 80% of households use for other purposes until they dry up. Sometimes, they fill the matfia with water from the standpipe with plastic hoses, but they don’t use the matfia anymore for drinking purposes. People from other villages without standpipes come there to fetch water.

Chemaia: people in these villages rely on the standpipes provided by the project as other resources (and matfia) are scarce and of poor quality. People use carts with 100 or 200-liter containers and fetch water once or twice a day. Standpipes are also used by people from other villages.

The project reduced time to fetch water and changed storage practices. Before the project, 4% of the respondents spent more than two hours, and 16% spent between one and two hours a day fetching water. After the project, only 10% spent between one and two hours a day fetching water and 90% (+10%) spent less an hour a day. Meanwhile, more people (61% after vs 46% before) went to fetch water “upon demand” and did not have to store anymore because it was close and convenient to go to the standpipe, while those storing water for more than two days increased from 3% to 11% - representing those households farther away from the water point. In total, 87% of the respondents were satisfied with the distance/time to get water after the project (65% before). The same proportion was satisfied with opening hours or the waiting time at the

64

standpipes, considering the efforts made by many caretakers to respond to requests from users.

The project introduced a standardized rate to access to standpipes. The tariff for water at the standpipes, agreed between ONEE, the CR and caretakers, is in principle capped at DH 10 per cubic meter (20 cents per cubic). The disparity of responses across the surveys and areas show that people used to pay different tariffs, due to different systems in place from vendors at costs above DH 100/m3 to free standpipes from other projects or industrial complexes. On average, the selling price suggested by ONEE has played an important role in “averaging” the access price to water: 84% of respondents declared they paid between DH 5 and 10/m3 after the project for 47% before the project. Those paying more than DH 10/m3 after the project dropped from 29% before to 9% after the project while the 24% paying less than DH 5/m3 before the project were only 7% after the project. Now implemented by most caretakers, the average rate of DH 10/m3 is considered fair by 90% of the respondents, especially when caretakers accept to give water for free to poorer families that may still have difficulties to pay.

The service provided under the project is considered satisfactory.

In the survey, 100% of respondents (survey) declared that water quality was good, much higher than the 65% at the beginning of the project. Results in the focus groups were a bit more nuanced with a 91% satisfaction on water quality thanks to the project, with lower rates in El Jedida areas. Supply at the standpipe is considered sustainable by 80% of the respondents, especially when compared with wells and matfia drying up during hot seasons or droughts (61% before the project). Some areas experienced shortages – with identifiable technical reasons according to ONEE’s technical units. Vandalism of works/standpipes, occasionally, also resulted in service interruptions, usually for limited periods.

Water consumption at the standpipes remains low, around 10 liters per capita per day. The survey, based on standpipes’ water meters, points out water consumption levels that vary between 8 and 50 liters per capita per day (lpcd) in the surveyed areas, arguing that livestock consumption could explain the higher levels noticed in Chemaia and Safi Sud. By contrast, data provided by ONEE for a sample of standpipes funded under the project in Safi province show a quite consistent individual consumption of 8.2 lpcd - from 2 to 13 lpcd depending on standpipes and areas. This is consistent with data in the PAD that noted the low level of domestic consumption and other date found in the project files. The infrastructure is designed for an average consumption of 50 lpcd for house connections – knowing that consumption at standpipes would average 20 lpcd.

65

Main conclusions and recommendations: On the service provided under the project:

• Using standpipes means using good water quality water: even if consumption remains low because it is mostly used for drinking purposed, this is a great achievement;

• Standpipe development was constrained by existing alternative sources of water, including standpipes from previous projects; at the same time it has helped phase out some unsustainable local sources;

• Locations chosen for some standpipes did not respond to the populations’ expectations in very scattered villages;

• Reflecting the overall socioeconomic progress in rural areas and difficult to attribute to the project’s effects, improvements in housing materials, settings and equipment support the increased demand for house connections in many areas, especially when villages are grouped and people can afford this level of service ;

On the implementation of the project and its social component:

• Land acquisition issues should be resolved before works contractors start work in the field, to avoid delays and expropriation conflicts;

• To better integrated target populations’ needs and requests in the project design, especially in terms of service level and location of access points, the technical and social teams should coordinate very closely; the participatory approach is deemed to better empower beneficiaries and local governments and get their buy-in;

• Standpipe locations need to be proposed by the populations and then cleared by other stakeholders;

• Water projects need to take into account settlement features, topography, evolving socioeconomic conditions, populations’ and CRs’ own agendas, etc.): projects need more social background analyzes and a continuous support, adjusted to very local situations;

• The TA needs to be better involved in the communication with local governments and “crisis management” with local stakeholders;

• The baseline situation has to be established as soon as populations agree with the project and before works start to better monitor results and have more time to measure impacts;

• Design and indicators for a given project or program have to reflect the results/deliverables expected.

66

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Field visits were conducted during the first ICR mission (November 2014) just before project closing, and completed by interviews with ONEE’s coordination and TA, including the social mobilization’s coordinator. Stakeholder consultations were held during the second ICR mission (May 2015), at decentralized level, including representatives of standpipe caretakers, local authorities and ONEE agents at local level in the project areas, as well as at ONEE’s Headquarters. They were complemented by interviews with the social mobilization team leaders and additional data collection from ONEE.

The objectives were to collect feedback on the project and the context in which it was implemented, issues faced, roles and relations of various stakeholders, results achieved and potential lessons learned that would all further inform the Bank’s completion report. The first consultation took place in El Jedida on May 27, 2015, the second one in Safi on May 28 (limited to a meeting with ONEE’s representatives). The third consultation took place at ONEE’s Headquarters in Rabat on June 1st, 2015.

The key messages that emerged of these consultations include: the satisfaction of the people benefitting from standpipes but the frustration of years of delays and high expectations for house connections; constrained daily implementation at local level, in a context of tight human and financial resources and heavy internal procedures from the project and program centralized supervision; the overarching issue of oppositions to land acquisition; difficulties to deal with an ambitious national program and multiple projects’ monitoring, safeguards and fiduciary procedures and requirements.

Main topics of discussion: The caretakers and standpipes: a community management Caretakers from El Jedida, who have held these positions for several years (first systems that became operational), related similar stories about their role and relations with communities. They accepted the assignment and managed the standpipes in full trust, for the good of the communities. They live near the standpipe, know all the families around. They usually don’t impose strict opening hours so that people can come and fetch water as they need, and can unlock it and accommodate people even at night. They also know which families are really poor and cannot afford to pay the yet modicum amount they should to fill their buckets or drums with water. In such cases, they would give them water for free and pay from their own pockets. Other families, on the contrary, would pay more than their due, and sometimes in advance.

All know that the caretaker cannot default on paying his bill, which would affect everybody should the standpipe be cut off. ONEE agents confirmed that bills were paid regularly by caretakers. They only reported limited claims, usually related to the fixed fee added to the amount of water billed and that caretakers sometimes did not understand. The case of an important water shortage that affected on of the systems a couple of years ago demonstrated caretakers’ dedication to their job: technical agents were under pressure to fix it because

67

they got many calls from the caretakers until the system and related standpipes could be operational again.

Such a case remained an exception, and on average, continuity of water supply is greatly appreciated. Caretakers also mentioned the positive changes for people, who progressively let their private wells to turn to the standpipe and use it for all domestic purposes – and in areas with wells only far from the village, drastically reduced time spent fetching water, even if they still have to walk to one of the standpipes built under the project. Quality of water also reduced diseases – in some places, better health of donkeys or horses was also noticed and this was attributed to water from the standpipe.

Most of the caretakers don’t have another full time job or regular, in any other job revenues. Earnings from selling water at the standpipe depend on the season (consumption increases in summer) and on the number of families using the standpipe – which varied between 25 and 40 in the cases mentioned in the consultation, a figure converging with findings from field visits and translating into a ratio varying from 150 to 300 people per standpipe. Small maintenance costs appear to be limited – they have to change the taps on average once a year and repaint the stand post every now and then. For other maintenance issues such as dysfunctional meter (which happened when ONEE encountered problems with the systems’ reservoirs upstream), they call ONEE and technicians will come and fix the problems. For caretakers, they consider this job as a contribution to the community, which could not be enough to maintain a living without family and community support. That is a reason why, in some cases, it may have taken some time to select the person “qualified” for the job, who would at the same time be trusted by the population and accept the responsibilities and limited associated income.

From standpipes to house connections: waiting for the next stage Beside the positive experience in villages with standpipes already operational for some years, consultations highlighted underlying issues that affected stakeholders, project implementation and intended beneficiaries. The main one is the long-lasting expectation for a higher level of service, namely house connections.

Representatives from local governments insisted that the country situation had evolved over the last ten years, especially since the new Constitution in 2011 that guarantees people’s rights, including the right to a “modern” (sic) level of service. Standpipe delivery service does not alleviate people’s burden of fetching water and is not sufficient to really support local development. House connections should not be considered a luxurious asset, but a solution to health problems.

ONEE’s representatives reminded the various prerequisites needed to consider developing a village distribution systems and house connections, including financial contributions from both end users and the Local Government. The overall strategy in rural areas was clearly to move forward house connections, but also to ensure equity, i.e. that all villages in the country should be able to access water supply. That is why this project, as others supporting ONEE implementing its mandate throughout the country started with building the conveyance systems needed to supply water to villages and offered the standpipes as the first level of improvement, while house connections would follow.

68

A common view from local stakeholders was that transition should have been handled with more care, as it had generated a lot of expectations first, then frustrations with villagers and local governments. Some claimed they were not fully involved in initial discussions on the level of service to be implemented and had had limited contacts with social mobilization teams in the early stages. In some areas, participatory diagnostics were clear on the population’s call for house connections rather than standpipes. People were asked to pay their contribution even before they could see effective progress in works, and were discouraged to pay once they received standpipes and were told they would have to wait more time and contribute more for house connections.

The role of social mobilization teams, in this regard, was questioned. Local stakeholders noted they all in all did not spend much time with each project/communities. Local agents noted that sometimes, there was confusion between people visiting the villages to collect contributions and social mobilization teams. In hindsight, that messages to the population and local governments regarding the financing plan and phasing of works did not fully get through, and delays in implementing works did not help manage expectations in the field. This contributed to delays in getting the Agreements with local governments signed and important backlogs in household contributions for the “access” part (DH 500 per household), not to mention the contributions for house connections (another DH 3,000 since 2009).

On ONEE side, in addition to low consumption level at standpipes, this was a major issue that further delayed consideration for distribution networks. While the expectations regarding house connections was fully legitimate, and also in line with ONEE’s competence and experience in water systems’ operations, the issue of financing was critical and initial conditions, when the project started, were not fully in place. They are now much clearer, due to all experience gathered, including through the difficulties in this particular project. Technical, financial but also environmental criteria have been clarified and summarized in the House Connections Guidebook, which is now a key instrument to communicate with local stakeholders. The latter have to understand that ONEE is facing a major challenge to serve water to more than 40,000 villages and deal with over 1,200 local governments that all want house connections. Equal access to water supply at country level goes with difficult choices at local level and the need for a pragmatic and sustainable approach. That is ONEE’s mandate and proud to work towards achieving this vision and contribute to social development.

Decentralized management faced with capacity constraints Another issue related to the project implementation was ONEE local units’ capacity to deal with internal procedures and “negotiations” with local counterparts, in a context of stretched human resources. Technicians provided by the Technical Assistance under the project was welcome to support project-related issues. However, it could not replace additional staff that would have been needed to better perform. For instance some units were short in staff tasked to distribute and collect bills; sometimes even unit managers had to help in this matter. They could not afford to collect financial contributions from prospective project beneficiaries in addition.

69

Similarly, they were in direct relations with local governments and project areas’ beneficiaries, but not always able to take immediate action due to lengthy procedures and back and forth exchanges with Headquarters and the project coordination. In the discussions around distribution networks and house connections, some claimed that these internal delays were as much a problem as the financial issue. The procedure established to select eligible villages, for instance, was criticized for its delays and complexity. In some places, studies started more than five years ago.

Managing land acquisition was another time-consuming issue, for which local units were not rightly skilled; it is only late in the project some could get support from land survey technicians for a task that should have been done even before works started – procurement for works was processed centrally and local units had to engage with local governments, owners or people living on affected land and firms to solve potential conflicts only once they appeared. The process of compensations was beyond their direct leverage and they did not have the monitoring tools and trained staff to ensure proper monitoring.

ONEE as implementing agency and as borrower Consultations with ONEE’s central units pointed out bottlenecks in project implementation that were already developed in its Completion Report (see Annex 7), in particular procurement and difficulties with contractors; relations with other public agencies to get needed authorizations to work on the public domain – especially administrations in charge of Public Works, Transportation and Electricity (ONEE water branch); and the overarching issue of land acquisition and compensations.

This one particularly affected implementation and the project results. While ONEE acknowledged some responsibilities, it also stressed (i) the complex regulatory framework and lengthy procedures related to compensations that were way beyond its control; (ii) the pressure to move forward in works to comply with the national program’s objectives and political expectations at highest level to increase access to water supply; (iii) the lack of clear requirements from the Bank in the early stages of the project regarding land acquisition and payment of compensations, followed by more guidance at mid-term to at least provision compensation funds before starting works, but too limited support to implement adequate mitigation measures. The ongoing Rural Water Supply Project has benefited from this experience, as a Land Acquisition Report was prepared and approved by the Bank. Strict monitoring of its implementation will also help overcome some of the problems faced during this operation.

Another important lesson to reduce delays pertains to project planning and sequencing: social mobilization should come first and without delay, planning should better involve various units to ensure all needed tasks are thought through in advance (requesting authorizations, surveying land, etc.) and procurement of works is well prepared and contracted firms well equipped to deliver. Discussions also stressed that part of implementation success also relied on local government partners (parts of the oppositions to land acquisition actually involved plots under CRs’ responsibility) and on a trustful relation with populations. ONEE made progress to provide more articulate messages and information to them, but this took time and resources that lacked in the last years, both centrally and at local level.

70

More broadly, consultations touched upon ONEE’s internal structure and multiple mandates country-wide, including the rural water program to generalize access to water supply. While the various divisions cover all needed functions corporate-wide, challenges remain huge to coordinate a specific program, especially when it is more contributing to global operational deficit than generating revenues in an organization deemed to be profit-making. The program’s coordinating unit may not have sufficient leverage internally to get the support needed and relies much on the various projects’ technical assistance teams, when provided.

Another issue discussed during consultations related to the monitoring requirements for this and other projects supporting the rural water program, which some participants considered time-consuming and sometimes cumbersome. While the Bank was probably the most involved in its projects’ supervision, its requirements were also more constraining than those from other external donors. In addition, donors needed information at detailed, subproject level, which was not easy to provide due to the decentralized implementation of projects at business unit levels. Some participants also noted that loan restructurings were mostly focused on reallocations of proceeds, which may not lead to significant changes in the projects’ approaches.

71

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

ONEE’s Completion Report was submitted to the Bank in February 2015. The document was coordinated by the Directorate (Direction de la Généralisation de l’Eau Potable, DEP) in charge of the national rural water program implementation and overall coordination of projects contributing to this project (Division of Development and Coordination), with inputs from the whole TA Team.

The Report includes a Chapter (i) presenting the project, contextual background, internal consistency, geographical scope and financing, as well as the various changes introduced during implementation; and a Chapter (ii) on project implementation. This chapter (over 50 pages) reports in detail activities procured and implemented, physical outputs, social mobilization campaigns, issues with operationalization of works and related delays, as well as costs and committed amounts and other information relevant to the project.

This Annex presents a summary of ONEE’s Completion Report concluding sections, including (i) a recap of challenges faced during implementation; and (ii) lessons learned and recommendations for future operations.

Oppositions to land acquisition; working with Local Governments and other public entities; procurement and issues with contractors:

• Uneven implementation readiness and delays in preparing Standard Bidding Document templates for works, goods and consultant services acceptable to the Bank, drafting clear TORs to hire the TA as soon as possible and enough resources to implement its objectives;

• Oppositions to land acquisition (or temporary occupation) by populations living on plots that ONEE/technical studies planned to acquire for production and conveyance pipes and facilities (works contractors cannot intervene, works are stopped36);

• Oppositions from landowners who accepted to sell their plot but won’t accept any works to be started as long as they don’t get their due compensation, or at least any information on the process (amount, timeline); in some cases, such oppositions take place on plots for which the Local Government is responsible 37 for paying compensations, but they may take time to consider the issues even if it can be detrimental to the project;

36 The ‘SPA’ Pumping Station in Ouled Frej (El Jadida) is a case in point. An opposition pending since 2008 resulted in full stop of the then-ongoing works. The distribution system including 28 SPs downstream of the station could not be completed. The case was finally solved in 2014, prompting the contractor to repair the damaged infrastructure built before 2008. 37 As per agreements signed with ONEE, the CRs have to provide ONEE with land needed to install the access points and distribution networks.

72

• Difficulties to secure authorizations on time to work on, or cross the public domain (roads, water channels, railroads, etc.) from other public entities – Public Works provincial offices, Water Basin agencies, National Railroad office, etc.); visa procedures are long and bureaucratic: sometimes works contractors have to stop working for weeks or months;

• Similarly, delays in securing key infrastructure interconnections with power lines, even within the sister company ONEE Electricity branch;

• Reluctance of some larger urban centers to authorize works on surrounding access roads; same for industrial complexes;

• Unexpected difficulties in excavating works due to more rocky soils than anticipated;

• Contracted firms unable to deliver in due time when they are awarded several contracts at the same time and have to split resources between various contracts and construction sites;

• Issues of procurement sequencing and lot packaging: completion of civil works may depend on progress in other contracts (e.g. lying of pipes) or delayed/ongoing procurement processes;

• ONEE’s delayed payments to contractors: may impact their sometimes weak financial capacities (low cash flow, increased bank fees, etc.);

• After completion of civil works, standpipes must be technically tested and be cleared for operationalization in the best possible delays, otherwise it may (i) generate maintenance issues; (ii) raise anger from surrounding populations and lead to acts of vandalism; (iii) in all cases, this is a risk of additional cost for the contractors;

• Delays in operationalization of standpipes may stem from (i) ‘technical’ reasons: delay or problem with interconnection of the supplying system to electricity, availability of lab staff to perform the water quality tests, available stock in water meters, etc.; and from (ii) ‘social’ reasons: time needed for a consensual decision to select caretakers in the community, delays in securing his/her appointment letter from the Local Government and signature of his/her subscription policy with ONEE.

Main mitigation measures implemented

• Stronger involvement of TA through (i) more time (technicians) allocated to supervision of works, possibly to facilitate discussions with the populations; (ii) more interventions from the SMTs in “conflict management” to facilitate difficult discussions between ONEE and the populations (due to temporary occupation of land, expropriation or delayed payment of compensations); and (iii) more time dedicated to involve the various representatives of local governments and better work with them;

• TA’s additional support through the recruitment of an specialist in land acquisition procedure to provide expertise and support to topographical and land related tasks

73

in the different regional units (expert based at HQ within the Division in charge of Sanitation);

• Technical meetings and high level discussions proposed by ONEE water branch to other public entities to suggest streamline procedures for infrastructure works on the public domain;

• Improved procurement planning and contract management to anticipate authorizations needed and prepare documentation and paperwork for visa with sufficient time before the expected works (support from TA technicians at provincial level);

• Increased consultations between ONEE electricity and water branches to discuss methods and solutions to reduce delays and simplify procedures to connect electric lines and water systems soon after the completion of civil works.

Notes on project achievements:

• Too many standpipes could not be operationalized (after being built and declared functional) – for technical reasons mentioned above, and limitations in a real convergence between the technical and the “social” approaches: (i) existence of alternative water resources and strong demand for house connections can be real issues to get the population’s buy-in; (ii) in scattered areas with very low densities, it is difficult to attract standpipe caretakers because revenues (following consumptions) are too low; (iii) delays between the caretaker selection and his/her taking over may be very long due to procedures with both ONEE and the local government, and a factor discouraging candidate caretakers;

• It was not possible to start works for distribution networks and implement the house connection pilot project;

• The TA scope of work was very broad and team members intervened in 3 different provinces for IBRD areas (and another for AFD), which complicated supervision of works and other activities, and affected the overall quality of project coordination, monitoring and reporting;

• Despite the amendments to its initial contract, the TA did not involve engineers who could have played a motor role if directly based at local level to strengthen ONEE’s local units and direct supervision of activities in the different subprojects;

• 5 project indicators could not be monitored (lack of financial data at subproject level for instance) or became obsolete (indicators related to water users associations); 6 indicators did not achieve the expected targets, despite the loan extension;

• At completion, signed contracts represented 95% of amounts allocated to the works and TA disbursing categories, respectively; remaining funds will be returned to IBRD.

74

Lessons and Recommendations The present project was a pioneer in the implementation of the national rural water project. Some lessons learned in this project have already be implemented in other operations, including the two other IBRD projects supporting the same program; some may need more time to become actionable but are shared here to be further considered in suitable contexts:

• All studies should be completed before effectiveness and build on both the technical and “social” components (people’s actual practices and constraints to get water, preferences grounded in good information of available options and capacity to pay for the such options) to suggest standpipe locations; bidding documents for works should also be ready or well advanced to really start the project at effectiveness;

• Project areas should be selected considering supervision costs and coordination constraints when sites are dispersed and implementation requires strong engagement with local counterparts;

• Project/Technical assistance teams would benefit from additional expertise such as engineers to be directly responsible for local coordination and works supervision at subproject level; and specific expertise to address specific needs, for instance in land surveying tasks and legal expertise for land and safeguards issues;

• Works should not start before temporary uses of land or expropriations be clearly identified and addressed in compliance with national regulations and Bank procedures; funds for compensations must be at least secured in case actual payments to affected people are delayed;

• Establish framework agreements with other public agencies and entities from which authorizations to work on the public domain will be sought, to ensure streamlined, pragmatic procedures and easier planning and updating during implementation; consultations even before implementation to discuss the big picture, project areas and works options may help screen potential problem spots;

• Social mobilization teams should work closely with decentralized units and get more resources to ensure a continuous, long term engagement with beneficiary populations and local governments.

75

Summary of the comments on the draft ICR As set of comments on the draft ICR was received from ONEE on September 30, 2015. Below is a summary of the main comments:

- In ONEE’s opinion, the project was satisfactory. Indeed, almost all planned water systems were implemented by project closing date, and according to ONEE, putting all SPs in operation will only depend on actions and procedures that are sometimes time-consuming but always succeed eventually.

- With regards to Component 2, ONEE wished to nuance some of the ICR’s assessments. Even though the entire scope of grey water management activities may not have been carried out as planned, the Technical Assistance did conduct through its social mobilization activities information awareness campaigns in beneficiary villages. Preparatory studies for the implementation of HCs have been carried out and ONEE was ready to launch the bidding procedures. However the Bank clarified late during project implementation that these HCs would not be eligible for pre-financing as they would not be completed before project closing date.

- Also, in view of certain divergences with the ICR conclusions on the effectiveness of social mobilization activities and on the assessment of project outcomes, ONEE recommends the organization of a workshop to further discuss these points with the Bank. It will also be useful to further discuss the cases of delayed or lengthy procurement processes, and to identify jointly recommendations for future operations.

- Finally, ONEE provided some clarifications on the timing of submission of past financial audits.

The Bank has agreed to the organization of a post-ICR discussion workshop, to be held at ONEE end-2015 and inform the design and management of other projects in the rural water sector.

76

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

77

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Project documents: ONEP/ONEE, 2009 to 2014: TA quarterly reports; Beneficiary Surveys (July 2012; Nov. 2014)

ONEE, 2015: Rapport d’achèvement du « Programme d’alimentation en eau potable et d’assainissement des populations rurales » (prêt 7351, dit « BIRD 1 »), ONEE branche eau, DEP-DDC, février 2015

World Bank, 2005: Project Appraisal Document, Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P086877 - Report 33881-MOR) and related Approval Package, including Safeguards documents (ISDS, EMF, RPF) as published online

World Bank, 2011: Restructuring Paper (Report 63490-MA)

World Bank, 2013: Restructuring Paper (Report 75046-MA)

World Bank, 2014: Restructuring Paper (Report RES16586)

World Bank, 2005 to 2014: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P086877): Implementation Semi-Annual Status Reports (18 sequences); Aide-Memoires; Project files

Other supporting documents: FAO, 2005 : Etude de diagnostic de l’AEP du monde rural au Maroc ; rapport de synthèse (online)

GPOBA, 2009: Output-Based Aid in Morocco (Part 2): Expanding Water Supply Service in Rural Areas; OBApproaches note 26

Khanfar M., 2005 : Vision du service de l’eau potable en milieu rural : octroi des branchements individuels entre nécessité et enjeux, ESSEC-ISCAE (online)

Kingdom of Morocco and World Bank: Country Assistance Strategy (1997-2000; 2011- 2004; 2005-2009)

Kingdom of Morocco, 2003: 2020 Strategy for Rural Development

ONEP-Banque Mondiale, 2005 : Guide pour l'assainissement liquide des douars marocains,

Royaume du Maroc, 2008: Mécanismes et Flux de Financement du Secteur de l’Eau (Rapport 36475-MA, 2 vol.)

World Bank, 2004: Morocco, Recent Economic Developments in Infrastructure; Water Supply and Sanitation Sector

World Bank, 2003: Implementation Completion Report, Kingdom of Morocco’s Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Report 25917, SCL-42540; SCL-42541)

World Bank, 2007: IBRD Program Document, Kingdom of Morocco’s Water Sector Development Policy Loan (Report 37442-MA)

79

World Bank, 2010: Project Appraisal Document, Oum Er Rbia Sanitation Project (P098459 - Report 49332-MA)

World Bank, 2010: Project Appraisal Document, Regional Potable Water Supply Systems Project (P100397 - Report 47593-MA)

World Bank, 2014: Project Appraisal Document, ONEP’s Rural Water Supply Project (P145529 - Report PAD694)

80