UY V CA 346 SCRA 246FACTS: This is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of CA and its resolution denying reconsideration reversing that of the RTC declaring void the special proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda Jardeleza in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., with approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son-in-law, for the ostensible purpose of “financial need in the personal, business and medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband”

March 25, 1991 – Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose and incapable of motor and mental functions.

June 6, 1991 – Teodoro Jardeleza, Ernesto’s son, filed a petition for guardianship of his father. He averred that due to Ernesto’s current condition, he cannot competently administer his properties. In order to prevent the loss and wasteful expenditure of Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. He prayed that the guardianship be issued in favor of the wife and that in the meantime, no property be negotiated, mortgaged or alienated to third persons

June 13, 1991 – The wife filed a petition declaring the incapacity of the husband and assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and prayed for authorization from the court to sell a parcel of land (lot no. 4291) due pay for medical expenses of the husband

June 20, 1991 – RTC rendered a decision in favor of the wife’s petition pursuant to Art. 124 FC; that the wife is the sole administrator due to the husband’s incapacity and authorize the sale of the lot in question to pay medical bills

Son Teodoro opposed petition; assumption of sole administratorship and authority to sell conjugal properties is essentially a petition for guardianship of person and properties of Ernesto and as such it cannot be proceeded in accordance with Art. 253 FC. It should follow the rules on special proceedings set in ROC. Also, under NCC, Ernesto acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner and such rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent.

Teodoro filed motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:1. CPG has other assets to pay off financial obligations. 2. Medical bills can be offset since Ernesto can pay on installment since he has stocks in

the hospital 3. Two of his attending physicians are his own sons who are not charging him anything

While motion for reconsideration was pending, the wife sold the said property to daughter (Glenda Uy) for P 8M. July 23, 1991, the wife filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale

December 19, 1991 – RTC denied Teodoro’s motion for reconsideration and approved the wife’s motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale citing that Teodoro does not have the personality to oppose the petition since the property belongs to CPG and both spouses are still alive

December 9, 1992 – CA reversed RTC decision and ordered RTC to declare sale VOID.

ISSUE: Due to the comatose condition of the husband, can the wife assume sole powers of administration over conjugal properties and dispose of a parcel of land with the approval for the court?

HELD: CA ruled that due to the condition of the husband, the rules on summary proceedings in relation to Art. 124 FC are not applicable. What Art. 124 covers are situations where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other, or the consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. SUCH RULES DO NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE NON-CONSENTING SPOUSE IS INCAPACITATED OR

INCOMPETENT TO GIVE CONSENT. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship under Rule 93 of 1964 ROC.

Even if the rules of summary judicial proceedings under FC applied to the wife’s administrative powers, the wife who assumes the sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the ROC

A spouse who desires to sell a real property as such administrator of CPG must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95 ROC, not summary judicial proceedings under FC

In the present case, RTC did not comply with the procedures under ROC and the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under FC: it did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse and it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

SABALONES V CA 230 SCRA 79FACTS: As an ambassador petitioner Samson Sabalones was assigned to different countries and as such, he left the administration of their conjugal properties to his wife Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones

1985 – Sabalones retired as ambassador to live in the Philippines but did not return to his family. In 1989, he filed judicial authorization to sell their Greenhills property. He alleged that he was 68 yrs old, very sick and living alone with no income.

Remedies opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the Greenhills property was occupied by her and their 6 children and they were dependent on the rentals of their other properties. She also informed the court that despite Sabalones’ retirement, he did not return to his legitimate family and instead maintained a separate residence with Thelma Cumareng and their 3 children. Remedios prayed for a decree of legal separation and liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s share. Also prayed for preventing the Sabalones from disturbing the tenants in the Forbes Park property and disposing any of the conjugal properties

After trial, Judge Mariano Umali found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981 with Thelma Cumareng. The court, then, decreed the legal separation of Sabalones and Remedios , forfeiture of his share in the conjugal properties and non-entitlement to support

Pendente lite, Remedios filed a motion for issuance of a write of preliminary injunction preventing Sabalones from interfering in the administration of their properties. Petitioner opposed motion

April 7, 1992 – CA granted the preliminary injunction Petitioner argued that the law provides of a joint administration of the conjugal properties by

the husband and wife, citing Art. 124 FC. Also the court failed to appoint an administrator pursuant to Art. 61 FC

ISSUE: Whether or not the wife, pendente lite, can enter into a contract of lease of a conjugal property without the consent of both spouses

HELD: While the law does indeed grant the spouses joint administration over conjugal properties under Art. 124 FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be applied in the instant case since the legal separation case filed by the wife is still pending.

Pending the appointment of an administrator over the conjugal assets, CA was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration pursuant to Art. 61 FC. This provision states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.

RAVINA V VILLA-ABRILLE G.R. NO 160708 OCTOBER 16, 2009FACTS: Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. In 1982, the spouses acquired lot 7 in Davao City with TCT T-88674 in their names. Said lot was adjacent to lot 8 which Pedro acquired when he was still single and was registered solely under his name (TCT T-26471)

Spouses used their conjugal funds and loan from DBP to build a house on 7 and Pedro’s lot. Consequently, they made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex

1991 – The husband got a mistress and started to neglect his family. The wife was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family.

On his own, the husband wanted to dispose of the house and two lots to the petitioners Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. The wife opposed but the husband still sold the property without the wife’s consent and signature

July 5, 1991 – While the wife and children were out, the husband and some CAFGU members transferred all their belongings from the house to an apartment. When they got home, the were prevented from entering the house. Thus, the wife filed a complaint for the annulment of sale with damages against the husband and the petitioners.

During the trial, the husband alleged that the house was built from his exclusive funds September 26, 1995 – RTC ruled in favor of the wife, declaring that the sale of lot 8 was void,

being a conjugal property while the sale of lot 7 was valid since it was the husband’s exclusive property

CA declared that: sale of lot 7 to petitioners is valid but the sale of lot 8 is null and void; that the husband is ordered to return the value of the consideration for lot 8 to petitioners; that petitioners are ordered to reconvey the house and lot to the wife

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband can sell a property which is part exclusive and part conjugal

HELD: Art. 160 NCC provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” Lot 7 is an exclusive property of the husband since it was acquired prior to his marriage with the respondent. However lot 8 was acquired in 1983 during the marriage of the spouses. There is no evidence proving that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal

nature of the property subsists in the absence of and convincing evidence to over come the presumption. A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is governed by Art. 124 FC which states that a disposition or encumbrance is void if done a. without the consent of both the husband and wife , or; b. in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s deciwision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)

Unlike in the NCC which gives the wife 10 years to annul the alienation or encumbrance, any alienation or encumbrance under the FC without the consent of both spouses is NULL AND VOID. Just like in ACP, if the husband, without the knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, the sale is void. If the sale was with knowledge the not consent of the wife, the wife has 5 years from the date of the contract to annul the sale.

In the present case, the wife filed within the prescribed period. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot which does not include lot 7 which is an exclusive property of the husband.

The petitioners cannot argue that they were buyers of good faith since they knew that at the time of the sale, Pedro was married to Mary Ann and her signature did not appear in the deed. Even if they were to argue that the property is an exclusive property of the husband, that they proceeded with the sale regardless of the wife’s contention and that the she was in actual and public possession of the house at the time of the sale, clearly indicates that they are not purchasers in good faith. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

FELIPE V HEIRS OF ALDON 120 SCRA 628FACTS: Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several pieces of land in 1948-1950. In 1960-1962, said lands were partitioned into 3 lots

1951 – the wife sold the lots to the petitioners without the consent of her husband April 26, 1976 – the heirs of Aldon (wife and children) filed a complaint against the petitioners

alleging that they had orally mortgaged the said properties to the Felipes and that an offer to redeem the properties was made but they refused

RTC ruled in favor of Felipe, declaring that they were the rightful owners of the lots in question

CA reversed the decision on the ground that the sale instituted by the wife was invalid since the properties were conjugal in nature and that the sale was done without the husband’s consent

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the properties in question was valid without the consent of the husband

HELD: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165 NCC). Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent (Art. 166 NCC). And the wife cannot bind the conjugal property without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law (Art. 172 NCC)

In the instant case, the wife’s sale is not covered by the phrase “except in cases provided by law.” THE SALE IS INVALID

Void or voidable? VOIDABLEAccording to Art. 1390 NCC, among the voidable contracts are “those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract (Par. 1). The wife had no capacity to give consent to the contract of the sale. The capacity belonged not to the husband alone but to both spouses. This is further supported by the provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction questioned (Art. 173 NCC).

The voidable contract of the wife was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. The wife, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.

The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation the wife. After the death of their father, they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father’s share in the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.

The Felipes were purchasers of bad faith as revealed in a testimony that sometime in December 1970, Vicente Felipe (son of the petitioners) attempted to have the wife (Gimena) sign a ready-made document claiming the sale of the land to them. If sale was valid, why did they need a document of sale in their favor. Because they knew the lots still did not belong to them. CA DECISION AFFIRMED. Petitioners are ordered to give an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the share from 1959.

CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul—for lack of consent on his part—the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to Estelita Padilla

December 4, 1970 – Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have been separated since February 15, 1981

June 4, 1974 – a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando Altares, conveying a parcel of land in favor of “Criselda Cheesman, married to Thomas

Cheesman.” Thomas, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax declarations for the said property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she assumed exclusive management and administration of the property

July 1, 1981 – Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledge and consent of Thomas

July 31, 1981 – Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property sold was paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good faith

During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took place during the existence of their marriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974

June 24, 1982 – RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio and ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal property

Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelita’s petition for relief and resolution of matters not subject of said petition; in declaring valid the sale to Estelita without his knowledge and consent. On January 7, 1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in question; Whether or not Cheesman, being an American citizen, can question the sale

HELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that: “save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, he was knowingly violating the Constitution. As such, the sale to him was null and void. At any rate, Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY TO QUESTION THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THE THEORY THAT IN SO DOING HE IS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF A HUSBAND IN RESPECT OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the Constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his recovering and holding the property cannot be warranted as it is against the constitution. Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good faith since she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said property. AFFIRMED

FRENZEL V CATITO G.R. NO 143958 JULY 11, 2003FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel, a German, married Teresita Santos in 1976 but the couple separated in fact without obtaining divorce in 1981. While in Australia, Frenzel met Erlinda Catito, who unknown to him, was married to another German. They fell in love and went back to the Philippines

and agreed to start a business (beauty parlor). Ederlina found a building in Manila for the parlor and used P 20,000 from Frenzel to purchase the rights over the property and P300,000 to buy equipment.

January 23, 1984 – Frenzel bought a house and lot from Victoria Binuya Steckle for $20,000 and had it named under Catito

Frenzel sold all his property in Australia and transferred them to an account under Catito’s name in Manila

July 28, 1984 – Frenzel discovered that Catito was married to another German since October 1978 . He confronted Catito who promised him that she would get a divorce. Frenzel paid for the lawyer’s services

AYUSTE V CA G.R. NO. 118784 SEPTEMBER 2, 1999FACTS: Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961. They lived in Manila but owned a business in Lucena managed by the husband.

August 26, 1982 – spouses Ayuste purcahed a lot in Lucena from spouses David. TCT was issued in the name of RAFAEL AYUSTE MARRIED TO CHRISTINA AYUSTE

February 27, 1987 – the husband executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Viena Malabonga for P40,000. Deed of sale showed the wife’s signature

After the husband’s death in October 1989, the wife discovered that the husband sold the house and lot to private respondent

March 2, 1990 – the wife filed a complaint for the annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages; she alleged that her signature was forged in the deed of sale and that the husband sold the property without her knowledge and consent

June 20, 1991 – RTC declared that: sale was void; property should be reconveyed to the wife; wife should pay Malabonga for the improvements made on the property.

January 23, 1995 – CA reversed RTC decision by holding that the wife’s right to bring an action for the annulment is barred by laches due to her failure to file it during the existence of the marriage pursuant to Art. 173 NCC. 1

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale made by the husband without the wife’s consent is void; Whether or not the wife’s petition for the annulment of sale is barred by prescription

HELD: Under the NCC, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wife’s consent, subject only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose of conjugal property without her consent is stated in Art. 173 NCC.

A sale of property of CPG made by the husband without the consent of his wife is VOIDABLE. The action for annulment must be brought DURING THE MARRIAGE and WITHIN 10 YEARS FROM THE QUESTIONED TRANSACTION by the wife.

In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. The husband died on October 13. 1989. But the wife only filed her complaint on March 2, 1990. Although her action was filed with 1 Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (n)

the prescribed period, IT WAS NOT BROUGHT DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE which was dissolved upon the death of the husband. Hence, the action for annulment filed by the wife was barred for not having been filed on time.

Registration of sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole world. Since the deed of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, the wife is presumed to have constructive notice of the sale form such date. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

VILLARANDA V SPOUSES VILLARANDA G.R. NO 153447 FEBRUARY 23, 2004FACTS: This controversy revolves around a Deed of Exchange executed by and between two brothers, petitioner Vincente Villaranda and respondent Honorio Villaranda

A 471sqm lot was inherited by the two brothers from their parents. Estate administrator Bebiano Luminarias leased 124 sqm to Honorio from May 1, 1976 to May 31, 1986. Vicente inherited 64.22sqm of the property that had not been leased to Honorio

July 6, 1976 – brothers executed Deed of Exchange, agreeing that Vicente will convey his 64.22sqm portion to Honorio in exchange for the share in the 500sqm property in Macasandig covered by TCT 2138. Honorio took posession of the 64.22sqm lot after and constructed improvements

April 6, 1992 – subdivision plan for lot 448-B was completed. Vicente’s 64.22sqm lot was designated as lot 448-B-7. Other heirs were issued their own TCTs for their respective shares

Spouses Villaranda brought an action for specific performance before RTC to compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange, alleging that they could not fully use or dispose of the Macasindig property because Vicente has not yet identified his portion in the 500sqm property. They also asked to Vincente to lot 448-B-7 to them in compliance with his obligations under the deed

During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally sold the lot 448-B-7 to Colorhouse Laboratories Inc

Vicente did not deny that he entered into a deed of exchange with his brother but contended that he was not bound to it since the property had not been delivered so the deed has not been consummated. Also, the deed was revoked by both parties. According to him, he and the other co-heirs requested Honorio to rescind the agreement since it was unfair. Honorio agreed provided that certain conditions were met, which Vicente claimed to have complied.

Vicente argues that the deed of exchange is void since the signature of Honorio’s wife is missing in the instrument. Honorio argues that this does not make the deed of exchange void, but MERELY VOIDABLE.

CA held that the provisions of NCC were applicable to the present case since the deed of exchange has been entered into prior to the enactment of FC. Thus, the absence of the wife’s signature on the deed made it only voidable not void. Also the wife had 10 years to seek for annulment of sale but brought no action; her omission or refusal to rescind it. The spouses’ cause of action had accrued not form the date of the execution of the deed but only from the moment Vicente refused to cause the transfer of his title to Honorio, 2 months prior to filing of the present case

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of exchange entered into by the husband without the wife’s consent is voidHELD: Since the deed was entered into on July 6, 1976 prior to the effectivity of FC, NCC provisions are applicable. The Macasindig lot was part of Honorio and Ana’s conjugal properties.

Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. x x x

Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

According to Art 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the CPG without the wife’s consent. This provision must be read in conjunction with Art. 173. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction questioned. THE LACK OF CONSENT ON HER PART WILL NOT MAKE THE HUSBAND’S ALIENATION OR ENCUMBRANCE OF REAL PROPERTY OF CPG VOID BUT MERELY VOIDABLE. Hence, the deed is valid until and unless annulled.

There is evidence that any action to annul the transfer made by Honorio was ever brought by his wife within 10 years from the transaction questioned. Her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract has prescribed.

In Papa v Montenegro, the SC explained that the legal prohibition against the disposition of the conjugal property by the spouse without the consent of the other has been established NOT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS BUT ONLY OF THE OTHER SPOUSE for whom the law desires to save the conjugal partnership from damages that might be caused. Vicente, not being the proper party, cannot avail himself of the remedy prescribed by Art. 173. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

AINZA V CA G.R. NO 165420 JUNE 30, 2005FACTS: Concepcion alleged that spouses Padua owned a lot with unfinished building in QC; sometime in 1987, she bought ½ of the lot from the spouses for P100,000

No deed of sale was executed but cash payment was received by spouses Padua and ownership was transferred to Ainza. Ainza authorized her daughter (Natividad) and husband (Ceferino) to occupy the premises and make improvements on the unfinished building

Thereafter, Padua had the lot partitioned into 3 and registered it under their names Respondent Antonio Padua claimed that he bought the lot in 1980 and introduced the

improvements thereon. Between 1989 and 1990, spouses Padua allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises temporarily. In 1994, they caused the subdivision of the property and 3 separate titles were issued

Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the premises but the latter refused and claimed that Concepcion owned the property. Antonio filed an ejectment suit on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, through Natividad, filed a civil case for partition of real property and annulment of titles and damages on May 4, 1999

Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that Concepcion offered to buy one third (1/3) of the property who gave her small amounts over several years which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a receipt.

January 1, 2001 – RTC rendered judgment in favor of Concepcion cancelling TCTs and ordered the subdivision of the property into 2 lots and awarded ½ to Concepcion citing that the sale was consummated when both contracting parties complied with their respective obligations

CA reversed RTC decision applying Art 124 FC that since the property is conjugal, the written consent of the husband must be obtained for the sale to be valid

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale between Concepcion and Eugenia is valid without the written consent of Antonio

HELD: The verbal contract of sale did not violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds that a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing abs subscribed by the party charged or his agent. When the verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds. Where one party has performed his obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement. The oral contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia and Antonio’s testimony that she sold the property to Concepcion.

It is clear that the subject property is conjugal and sold by the wife (Eugenia) in April 1987 prior to the effectivity of FC, in which Art. 254 repealed Title V Book I NCC on property relations between husband and wife. However, Art. 256 limited its retroactive effect only to cases where it would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with NCC or other laws. In the present case, the vested rights of Concepcion will be impaired or prejudiced by the application of the FC; hence, the provisions o f the NCC will be applied.

The consent of both husband and wife is necessary for the sale of the conjugal property to be valid. The husband’s consent cannot be presumed. Except in the testimony of Natividad, there is no clear evidence that the husband participated or consented to the sale of the conjugal property. The wife alone is incapable of giving consent to the contract. Therefore, in the absence of the husband’s consent, the disposition made by the wife is VOIDABLE.

The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral contract, the action to annul the same must be commenced within 6 years from the time the right of action accrued. Since the wife sold the property in April 1987, the husband should have asked the courts to annul the sale on or before April 1993. No action was made by the husband to annul the same, hence his right to seek its annulment was extinguished by prescription.

Even if we were to apply the 10-year prescriptive period under Art. 173, the husband is still barred from instituting an action to annul the same because since April 1987, more than 10 years had already lapsed without any such action being filed.

The sale of the conjugal property by the wife without the consent of the husband is VOIDABLE. It is binding unless annulled. The husband failed to exercise his right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred from questioning the validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion.