Digests for Introduction Cases

8/10/2019 Digests for Introduction Cases

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Civil liberties union vs. executive secretary

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which

allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries

to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions

subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO

averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being

challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,

Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their

deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,

hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said

tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any

business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or

special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or

their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their

office.

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in thisConstitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment

in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-

President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),

Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and

Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.HELD: No, it is unconstitutional.It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks toprohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or

assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the

government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above

clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio

capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,

the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during thedebate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials

should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the

constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2),

Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting

the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant

secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2

positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows

them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express

mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,

unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESG.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on

Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of

disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the

Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.

Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.

and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the

Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was

endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen

Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee

on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being

insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet

been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of

Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June

2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House

Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was

filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.

Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,

Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-

mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was

accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least

one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one

year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political questionhas resulted in a political

crisis.


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HELD:1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the

impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial

action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.

Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,

another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period

following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the

first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on

June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,

the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,

Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003

violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment

proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a

duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called thepolitical question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,

that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political

questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of

political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly

political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the

reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On

the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can

review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Lambino Vs. ComelecG.R. No. 174153

Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for aninitiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the

COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.

Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling

what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987

constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by

adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential

form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition

due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago

Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative

petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2,

Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a

peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735

incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to

implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due

course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basicrequirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC

did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed

at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and

misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing

Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment

and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of theconstitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the

legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the

present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with

the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.


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SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELECG.R. NO. L-34150APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibitingproceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions

(Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for

residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing

with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National

Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the

amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2

with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the

constitutions in proposing amendments:

ISSUE:Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD:In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and

how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its

Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to

propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the

majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on

Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When,

therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and

Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of

such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to

amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, thecourt held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose

amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and

propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the

democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the

people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no

debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present

Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against

the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total

overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely

amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the

moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as

well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution

supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,

sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a

majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the

three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it

has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.

That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned.

Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any

amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three

months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three

resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a

constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg.

22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day

period provided by the Constitution.

IMBONG VS COMELECG.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970Ponente: Makasiar, J.

FACTS:

Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in

running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the

constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such

candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting a s a Constituent Assembly,

passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have

two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congresspassed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the

convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from

each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a

legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly

repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the

validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong

questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:


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1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set

the parameters of such convention?

2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the

constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing

details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within

the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application

with Sec. 2 of Art. XII o f the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due

process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the

Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The

challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office

in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of

Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction

contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain

substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid i nfringement of the

constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

Santiago vs. COMELEC

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the

Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The

COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.)set the time and dates for signaturegathering all over the country, b.)caused the necessary publication of the saidpetition in papers of general circulation, and c.)instructed local election registrarsto assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996,

MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin

Petition. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited

to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or thelifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes

revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative.

ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to theconstitution or does it constitute a revision.

HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revisionof, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would

involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one

that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an

isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections

and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public

service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative

which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited

to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits

provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the

philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are

Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration

of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective

proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the

common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble

vision of the 1987 Constitution.

Gonzales vs COMELEC

21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political Question vs

Justiciable Question

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to

hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided

in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general

national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by

Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was

unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people

who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather

than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when

they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this

regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act

of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a politicalquestion.

II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

HELD:I.No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amendas well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in

the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not

constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to

the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when

Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so

as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as aconstituent assembly. Such act is not a


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legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent

assembly is within constitutional limitations.

II.Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held ona special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]

Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a

general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the

Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections

merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then

obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for

ratification in general elections.

Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be

scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent consentor rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition with theamended proposition.

Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito

78 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill TheoryPetitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were

suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not

allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House

Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in

determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution

(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an

enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the

Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could

have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had

been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would

have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolutionamending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take

cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the

enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whetheror not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD:As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journalsfrom each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the

disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply

rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a

law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190

as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of

the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated

copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of

conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in

order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two,

the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy

appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say

or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater

weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies

shall be conclusive proof ofthe provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment

thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both

houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed

by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No.

2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the

proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be

provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those

bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or bycopies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That

in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when

there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of

said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the

due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill)by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevailover those of the journals.

Sanidad vs COMELEC

73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the ConstitutionOn 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16

Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things,

the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such

replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise

by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued

another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by

declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and

canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of

Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.

991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the


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questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October

16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued

opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire

to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,

providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the

people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction

seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the

Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect

Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the

Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the

Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-

Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935

and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the

constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a

consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or

legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence

the court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to theConstitution.HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a

judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency

to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally

exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973

Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the

interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory

Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active

session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of

the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution).

The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National

Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President

undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendmentsthru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October

16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in

lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable

issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which

commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid,

thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the

competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new

Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en

banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional

without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the

last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the

Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the

Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the

Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has

been discharged within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the

Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient

time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

Dumlao vs COMELEC

EqualProtectionEligibility to Office after Being 65

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office

and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to

the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed

(par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed

the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was

joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues.

The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the oth er

provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length

of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run

for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary

investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao

invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case wouldnever have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have

separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd beeligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the

exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an

appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the

constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest

opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon

in order to decide the case. I n this case, only the 3rd

requisite was met. The SC ruled

however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for

public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary

investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.


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The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is

neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is

subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real

differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another

class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly

classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are

subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so

compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that

candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office,

if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification

although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be

to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On

the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good

elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable

disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees

from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to

disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local officialjust like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired

from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from

running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the

challenged provision.

J O H N H A Y P E O P L E S A L T E R N A T I V E C O A L I T I O N , M A T E O C A R IO FO UN DA TI ON IN C. , CE NT ER FO RALTERNATIVE SYSTEMSFOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINEDBY

HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINEDBY HER MOTHERMRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED ANDJOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIEG. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C.PACALSO ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,URSULA C. PEREZALIAS "BA-YAY," EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G.YARANON,D I A N E M O N D O C , p e t i t i o n e r s , v s . V I C T O R L I M , P R E SID EN T, BA SE S C ON VE RS IO N D EV EL OP ME NT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAYPORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.)CO.LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OFENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES, respondents.Facts:

The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then

President Ramos declaring a portionof Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone

(SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John HaySpecial Economic

Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court also

held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full powerto

exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to

exempt being as broad as itspower to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption

would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a lawgranting any tax exemption

must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Moreover, theclaimed

statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and

unmistakable from thelanguage of the law on which it is based. Thus, the Court

declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of taxexemption and other

privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the Constitution.

However, theentire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the

other parts thereof not being repugnant tothe law or the Constitution. The delineation and

declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as aSEZ was well within the

powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a

statute isvoid as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable

from the invalid, as inthe case at bar, may stand and be enforced.Issue:WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition

Ruling:YES

Rationale:R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation

of SEZs outof all the base areas in the country. The grant by the law on local

government units of the right of concurrence onthe bases' conversion is equivalent

to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the realinterests

that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the

interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of

Proclamation No. 420, ispersonal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain

direct injury as a result of the government actbeing chal lenged. Theirs is a material interest,an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely aninterest in the

question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in the enforcement

of ProclamationNo. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. ...

Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T.Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected

councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governanceof Baguio City and

whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether toconcur

with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then,

petitionersClarava ll and Yarano n, as city offic ials who voted agains t

the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994)supporting the


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issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring

the presentpetition

Osmea v. COMELEC (199 SCRA 750)

Posted: August 9, 2011 in Political Law

0

Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus & Injunction

Ponente: Justice Paras

Personalities: Gov. Emiliano Osmea

Gov. Roberto Pagdanganan

Rep. Pablo Garcia

Rep. Raul del Mar

Rep. Antonio Bacaltos

Rep. Wilfredo Cainglet

Rep. Romeo Guanzon

Petitioners

COMELEC

Oscar Orbos

Guillermo Carague

Rosalina Cajucom

Respondents

Solicitor General, for respondents

Manuel Siayngco, Oliviano Regalado

Jacinto Jimenez

Pablo Garcia, Winston Garcia

For petitioners

FACTS:

Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates

the Constitution:

1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of

synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;

2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing

that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond

June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected

and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the

Constitution;

3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens

the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of

November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;

4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for

Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, v iolates the provision of

Section 9, Article IX under the title Co mmission on Elections of the Constitution;

5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in

Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the

Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less,

valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of

November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all,Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to

eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort

can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its

amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this

petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack

legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory

opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the

merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative


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power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the

Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the

instant petition?

HELD: Yes.

What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to

SolGens contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And

even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the Courts

power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of

the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave

abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed

by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the challenge to

the petitioners standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have

no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered

the transcendental importance of the issue being raised herein.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of

the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local

elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of

election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of

synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used

synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent

in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common

termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which

provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until

noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials

shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall

have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris

Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature to extend the t erm of

officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and

qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the

term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,

there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even

though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution

which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials,

to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of

November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two

years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not

three years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing

the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days

before the day of election.

b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and

c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective

provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the

elections.

Cruz vs DENR

Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful

deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as

minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine

embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically

enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may

include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-

encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might

even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said

law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE:Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.HELD:The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted andreached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since

there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was

sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domainsomehow against

the regalian doctrine.


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Enrile vs SET

Facts:On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate ElectoralTribunal (SET) an election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other

senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections.

On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest.

Issues having joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilotprecincts number not more than 25% of the total precints involved.

On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall

announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot

precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the

petitioners name dropped to the 15th

position in the senatorial race.

On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in

Sen. Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the

Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate comments

alleging petitioners motion is premature considering the SET has not resolved

respondents election protest.

Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to

discard the partial tabulation. The SET also denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration.

A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of

discretion the resolution that denied petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial

Results in Pimentels Protest and to conduct another Appreciation of Ballots in the

Presence of All Parties.

Issue:Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing uponmerits of said petition.

Held:The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of thecontested senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30,

1998. The case became moot considering there is no more actual controversy

between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon anymerit.

Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost,

thereby rendering the resolution of no practical use or value.

The petition is dismissed.

Alunanet al

. vs Mirasol

et al

. July 31, 1997G.R. No. 108399This is a petition for review on

certiorari

of the Decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 36,

Manila nullifying an order of the DILG, which cancelled the general elections for the

SK datedDecember 4, 1992 in the City of Manila on the ground that the elections

previously held on May 26, 1990served the purpose of the first SK under the LGC of1991 (R.A. 7160).On September 18, 1992, the DILG issued a resolution through

then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan IIIexempting the City of Manila from holding its

SK election on December 4, 1992. This was issued i n relationto the letter of Joshue

R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila. In its

resolution,the DILG stated:

[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the

legislature to exempt fromthe forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those

kabataang barangay chapters which may haveconducted their elections within the

period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 under BP 337.Manifestly the term of

office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to

coincidewith the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.

Respondents filed a petition forcertiorari

and

mandamus

in the RTC of Manila, which then issued aninjunction ordering petitioners to desist

from implementing the order of the DILG.Trial of the case ensued and a Decision

was issued holding that the (1) the DILG had no power to "exempt"the City of

Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C,

2(1) of theConstitution the power to enforce and administer "all laws and

regulations relative to the conduct of anelection, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,

and recall" is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEChad already in effect

determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for

generalelections for SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the

"exemption" of the City of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause ofthe Constitution because, according to the DILG's records, in5,000 barangays KB

elections were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the

Cityof Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no elections held

on December 4, 1992.

Petitioners sought this review on

certiorari

. They insist that the City of Manila, having already conductedelections for the KB

on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on December 4, 1992.

Insupport of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government Code


11/24

of 1991, which provides that: All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng

mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sangguniangshall be deemed vacant

until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have beenelected

and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected:

Provided

,

That, elections forthe kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg.

337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered

as the first elections provided for in thisCode

.

The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said

period shallbe extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those

elected under this Code

.Issue: Whether the case has been moot and academic.Held: The Supreme Court

held that the issue is not moot and it is necessary in fact to decide the case on

theissues raised by the parties. The case comes with the rule that courts will decide

a question otherwise moot

and academic if it is capableof repetition and yet evade review.Rejecting the contention of being moot and academic, the Supreme Court in the

Southern Pacific Terminal

case held:

The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are

usually continuing (as aremanifestly those in the case at bar), and these

considerations ought not to be, as they might be, defeated,by short-term orders,

capable of repetition, yet evading review, and at one time the government, and

atanother time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission

without a chance of redress.

Moreover in

Roa vs. Wade

, the US Supreme Court explained:

[W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significantfact the litigation, the normal 266-day

human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come toterm before the

usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot,

pregnancylitigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid.

Pregnancy provides a classic justification

for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capableof repetition, yet

evading review.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is

REVERSED andthe case filed against petitioner by private respondents

is DISMISSED.

Salonga vs Hermoso

97 SCRA 121 Political Law Right to Travel Even During Martial Law

During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a mandamus proceeding to

compel Rolando Hermoso of the Travel Processing Center to issue a certificate of

eligibility to travel to Salonga.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermosodid issue and did not deny Salongas request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.

The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights on the Right to Travel. The Philippines, even though it is

under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The

Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression

that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel couldbe subjected to inconvenience or annoyancethis is to avoid such similar cases to

face the Court which needlessly expire the Courts effort and time.

JOVITO R. SALONGA vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAOGR 59524. February 18, 1985.

FACTS:

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,

September and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr.,

a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killedhimself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a

small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's

possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime

in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the

latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were

among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other

guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was

brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna

Hospital)where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P.

Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National


12/24


13/24

all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of

the Constitution.

Issue:1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.

2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to

a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring

that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution,

they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the

Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of

necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last

paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and

vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it

into effect.

2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of

the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. T he setup embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of

electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When theSupreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential electioncontest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The COMELEC, HRET and SETare not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election

contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the

explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX -C (for the

COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)

of the Constitution.

OPOSA vs.FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.

FACTS:The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the

respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License

Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,

processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive

commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further

asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet

unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs further assert that the

adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so

capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a

matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to

present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence

in the course of the trial.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

HELD:The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act

or to be heard.Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that:

The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners,

minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet

unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of

their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their

personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the

concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers

the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its

entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious

disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys

forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural

resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be

equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say,

every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and

harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little

differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,

at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection ofthat right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class

suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general

interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO Case DigestAgan Jr. Vs. PIATCO

402 SCRA 612


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G.R. No. 155001

May 5, 2003

Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investingin the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp.

They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl.

Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project.

Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was

chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still

the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil.

Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a

concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for

21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition

of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development of facilities and

proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged

with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract

with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibitionclaiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed

a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition

assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar

petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO

contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.

Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with itsamendments for being contrary to the constitution.

Held:The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy.The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different

agreement from the contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms

and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the

altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that

such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and

supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.

The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement

as their livelihood is to be taken away from them.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

EqualProtectionOil Deregulation LawConsidering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the

government has always been findingways to alleviate the oil industry. The

government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One

such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law

allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil

and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and

operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or

use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the

Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,

among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil

and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause.

Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil

refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil

industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined

petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products

and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens

oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our

downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign

oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in

the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant

players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities.

The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this isonly one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the

heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New

players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by

building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will

not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of

increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The

argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce

prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first

need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them


15/24

with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron,

Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against

the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis --vis

the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already

being observed by the latter.

BLAS F. OPLEv.

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERTBARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOFTHE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking

of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of

rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative

Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two

important constitutional grounds,

viz

:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly

intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights

sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was

published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.

On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary

Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency

Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we

issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue:WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling:

YESRationale:As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to

sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that

petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be

promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished

member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising

the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

4

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also

impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O.

No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the

implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as

invalid

per se

and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its

fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308

without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.

Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and

the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the

respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe

formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that

wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an

importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right

Chavez vs PEA

Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to

undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling

functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to bereclaimed foreshore lands

are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34

hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of

submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to betransferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the

constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land

of the public domain.The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands

comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of

PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged

areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being

contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich prohibits private

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of

290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for


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being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the

alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGOvs.THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x----------- -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.

DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET

AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the

primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level

public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories

during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations

to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an

investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,

arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties.

All it can do is gather, co llect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and makerecommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite

people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body,

it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing

of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC

from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the

Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of

1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President

to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity

and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office

which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the

Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,

those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and

the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for

investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration

as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other

administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued

that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress b ecause the Presidents

executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to

conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any

event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as

amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to

create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because

there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by

Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of theOmbudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial

body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it

was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.

No. 1;


17/24

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the

powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies

and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an

actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person

challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject

act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest

in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the

case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body

to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are

impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right

to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and

privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are

allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes

on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E.

O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In

private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It providesthat every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in

interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured

by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who

asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a

representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek

judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the

public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct

injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the

petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of

jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which

deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight

as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully

executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers

under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted

pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc

committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if

laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating

bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to

know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his

duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing

funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of

the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the

amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever

funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very

source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the

PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules a nd regulations so there is no

impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective

powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement

those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing

of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and

the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that itcan advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the

execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1

in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in

Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) o f the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be

treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires

public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar


18/24

manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person

within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,

whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution

through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four

requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to

the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It

applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not

similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as v iolative of the equal protection

clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the

truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous

administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,

patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past

administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations

similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause

cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label

the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial

differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,

have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which allother laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights

determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the

Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the

Constitution.

GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]

Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target

zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional.They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no

search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their

civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were

rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses.

The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men

were ordered to strip down to their br

Documents

Digests for Introduction Cases