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Masters Theses Graduate School

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Die Zukunft gehoert dem Ingeniuer: HermanSoergel's Attempt to Engineer Europe's SalvationRyan Bartlett Lingerrlinger@utk.edu

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Recommended CitationLinger, Ryan Bartlett, "Die Zukunft gehoert dem Ingeniuer: Herman Soergel's Attempt to Engineer Europe's Salvation. " Master'sThesis, University of Tennessee, 2011.https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/998

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Ryan Bartlett Linger entitled "Die Zukunft gehoert demIngeniuer: Herman Soergel's Attempt to Engineer Europe's Salvation." I have examined the finalelectronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partialfulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in German.

Maria Stehle, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Stefanie Ohnesorg, Daniel H. Magilow

Accepted for the Council:Dixie L. Thompson

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

DieZukunftgehörtdemIngenieur:

HermanSörgel’sAttempttoEngineerEurope’sSalvation

AThesisPresentedfortheMasterofArtsDegree

TheUniversityofTennessee–Knoxville

RyanBartlettLinger

August2011

ii

Copyright©2011byRyanBartlettLingerAllRightsReserved

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Iwouldliketotakethisopportunitytoexpressmyheartfeltgratitudetoallof

theindividualswhohavesupportedmeduringthedifficultprocessofwritingthisthesis.

Onlywiththeirsteadfastbeliefinmedidtheformidabletaskofcompletingthiswork

seemwithinreach.Inparticular,Iwouldliketoacknowledgethefollowingpersons:

Myfriends–withoutwhomthisjourneywouldhavebeenverylonely.Thanks

particularlytoAmyHill,whowasoftenatmysidethroughlongnightsinthelibrary.

Myfamily–foralwaysbelievinginmypotential.Iamespeciallygratefultomyparents

RonnieandBethLingerandtomybrotherKevinMorris,foralwayslendinganearwhen

Ibecamefrustrated.

SpecialthanksgotoJuliaThomas,whosemasterfuldexterityinwritingprovedtobe

mosthelpful.

IamgratefultofacultyoftheGermandepartmentattheUniversityofTennessee–

Knoxvillefortakingthetimetoimparttheirconsiderableknowledgeonme.Iespecially

valuedtheguidanceandsuggestionsofDr.StefanieOhnesorgandDr.DanielMagilow.

Finally,Imustexpressmyadmirationformyadvisor,Dr.MariaStehle.Iamforever

indebtedtoherforgraciousandsteadycounsel.Withouther,thisprojectwouldhave

neverbeenpossible.

iv

ABSTRACT

HermanSörgeldevisedaplan,beginningin1927,tousherinaneweraofpeace

andprosperityforthewholeofEurope.Atlantropawashisanswertotheperceived

threatsthattheEuropeanpeoplefacedfrominternationalcompetition,overpopulation,

andlackofresources.Theplanwouldhaveresultedintheloweringofthe

MediterraneanSeaandtheultimatecreationofonecontinentcomprisedoftheformer

EuropeandAfrica.Thoughtheplanwasneverimplemented,itposesafascinating

modelthroughwhichhistoriansmayreconsiderthetimeperiodbetweentheendofthe

FirstandSecondWorldWars.

Thisthesisexaminessomehistoricalsocio‐politicalmovementsthroughthelens

ofSörgel’smegaproject.OriginalpublicationsfromHermanSörgelhimselfaswellas

thoseoftwonotableAtlantropascholars,AlexanderGallandWolfgangVoigt,explainin

greatdetailthetechnicalandsociologicalaspectsoftheplan.Additionally,theories

fromJeffreyHerf,RichardvonCoudenhove‐Kalergi,andDinaBrandtaidinthe

understandingofthemanwhoattemptedtoengineerEuropeoutofcrisis.

ThefollowinganalysisrevealsthedifficultyinplacingHermanSörgelintoanysingular

politicalorsocialmovementinhistime.Thoughheespousedsomeofthesamerhetoric

asthatoftheNationalSocialistsandpan‐Europeanmovementsalike,hefailedto

conformtoanyparticulargroup.Theunwaveringobsessionwithhisprojectconsumed

allofSörgel’senergiesuntilhisdeathin1952.Thoughall‐but‐forgotten,theproject

offersanuncommonmeansbywhichtoviewatumultuoustimeinEurope.

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TableofContents:

Chapter: Page:

Introduction 1

1.Atlantropa:TechnicalAspectsofContinent‐Creation 9

2.Sörgel’sInspiration:PreservingdasAbendland 19

2.1HermanSörgel:Modernist.Reactionary? 20

2.2OswaldSpenglerasPessimisticImpetus 23

2.3RejectionofEurope’s“Inevitable”Fate 27

3.“Supranational”Designs 30

3.1Coudenhove‐Kalergi’sPaneuropa 32

3.2ContrastingPaneuropaandAtlantropa 35

4.ImperialismandAtlantropa 39

4.1TheShort‐LivedGermanAppearanceontheColonialStage 39

4.2Atlantropa:SolidifyingEurope’sHegemonyoverAfrica 40

5.AtlantropainScienceFictionLiterature 46

5.1GeorgGüntsche’sPanropa 47

5.2J.E.Wells’ProjektAtlantropa 50

5.3DerDeutscheZukunftsroman:1918‐1945 52

Conclusions–Atlantropa:SnapshotofaDynamicTimePeriod 56

ListofReferences 62

Vita 66

vi

ListofFigures:

Figure: Page:

Figure1:TablefromAlexanderGall,notingnumberofpressarticles 3 publishedonAtlantropaintheyearsbetween1928and1954Figure2:ProposalfortheAtlantropacentralbusinessbureaufromFritzHöger, 6 1931Figure3:Sörgelathisdesk,around1932 10Figure4:ConceptionoftheGibraltarwerkwithmaindamandprotective 15 Levee:GeorgZimmerman,1932Figure5:OverviewofthevariousprojectsontheMediterraneanand 18 NeulandgainedthroughitsdammingFigure6:AgraphicdepictionofSörgel’sbasicfactorsaffectingthe 37 politico‐economicbodyofEuropeFigure7:TitlecoverofSörgel’sDieDreiGroßenA,1938 43 Figure8:TitlecoverofGüntsche’sPanropa,1930 47Figure9:ConstructionoftheGibraltarwerk;PicturebyHeinrichKley,1932 61

1

Introduction:

Classification and periodization, by which we label spans of time, guide our

understandingofhistory.Inthecourseofmankind’shistory,criteriafortheseperiods

includenamesderivedfromsimpletime‐basednumbering,rulingelitesorfigureheads,

culturaldevelopments,ortechnologicaladvancement. In formingmentalmapsofthe

humanstory,symbolismplaysanintegralrole,andagescometobeknownbysocieties’

progress, stagnation, achievements, aswell as failures. Large‐scale projects occupy a

unique position in the study of history. Grandiose plans stand as symbolic

representations of both cultural and political thought. Great undertakings provide

benchmarks for historians seeking to delineate beginnings and endings of particular

ages.AlbertSpeer’sblueprintsforthetransformationofBerlinprovideanexceptionally

ominousexampleofGroßprojekte(megaprojects)inGermany’shistory.Hitlerwasnot

thefirsttoshowenthusiasmforhischiefarchitect’sconcept–itwasanideadatingback

to1908(Voigt108).Especiallyafterindustrialization,featsofengineeringcanbeseen

assymbolicofaperiod’sculturalZeitgeist.RecentexamplesofAmericanprojectsmight

includethediggingofthePanamaCanalintheearlytwentiethcenturyorthedamming

and concurrent development of river systems in the Southeast overseen by the

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), beginning in the 1930s. The Panama Canal is

indicativeof the timeperiod,which saw theUnitedStates flexingdiplomaticmuscles,

andtheTVAhighlightsaturningpoint intheGreatDepressionfor itsrole in fostering

2

economicgrowth.Bothoftheseexampleswerehighlysuccessfulventuresthatbrought

prosperityandprestigetotheAmericanculturalstory–victoriesofasort.

WinstonChurchillsaidthathistoryiswrittenbythevictors.Takingthesewords

into account, of what importance are failed or rejected proposals to the greater

narrative of history? Without careful preservation of documents and texts, these

“defeated” ideasare likely tobe forgottenwith thepassageofenough time,but that

doesnotnecessarilydecreasetheirrelevancetoaperiodortoourunderstandingofit.

TheStrategicDefenseInitiativeproposedbyU.S.PresidentRonaldReaganisapoignant

exampleofawell‐knownabortedprogramthatmaintainsrelevance in interpretations

oftheColdWar.“StarWars,”asitcametobeknown,isnowaniconofthe1980sand

the“ReaganEra”becauseofitsinfluenceonAmericanscientificdevelopment,domestic

politics,aswellasSoviet‐Americanrelations.

Inmuchthesameway,HermanSörgel’sall‐but‐forgotten“Atlantropa”projectis

one instanceofsuchagrandioseproject,abandonedbeforeconstructioncouldbegin.

Thereexistshereagreat irony,becauseofthemediaattentionpaidtheprojectat its

onset,andperhapsmore importantly,thesheerbreadthandgrandeurofhisproposal.

The piqued interest of the international press was not lost on Sörgel, who included

extracts from well‐known newspapers inside the front cover of his Sammlung

(collection),1Mittelmeer‐Senkung;Sahara‐Bewässerung(PanropaProjekt)(Sörgel1929,

3).SaidtheNewYorkTimes;“Itisthe‘reawakeningoftheSahara’throughfructification

by the Mediterranean’s waters, that gives to the German engineer’s project its

1Inhisforeword,Sörgelexplicitlyinvitedthepresstotakenoteofhisplan

3

attractivetwist.”TheIllustratedLondonNewsconcurred,“HowtoenlargeEuropeand

Africa:TheMediterraneanofferssuchanopportunity.ModernEngineeringshowsthe

way.”(3).EvensourcesinlandssodistantasSouthAmericacommentedonAtlantropa.

TheRevistaMenendezBehetywrote,

Siexistieraunaideaquefueramáselevadaqueelactualespíritudepartidodelafamilia

internacional europea,una idea,queconayudade la téchnicadieraampliabasepara

une nueva vida de los pueblos: no se podría entonces evitar el inminente peligro de

naufragio de nuestra cultura, no se podría con ello iniciar y dejar establecido un

conjuntoculturalcompletamentenuevo?2(3).

In 1932, in the German‐speaking realm alone, the Atlantropa Institute collected one

hundredandforty‐sevennewspaperarticlesconcerningtheintriguingplan(Gall38).

Figure1:TablefromAlexanderGall,notingnumberofpressarticlespublishedonAtlantropaintheyears between1928and1953 AlexanderGall,DasAtlantropa‐Projekt:DieGeschichteEinerGescheitertenVision:HermannSörgelunddie AbsenkungdesMittelmeeres.Frankfurt:Campus,1998.38.

2Translation:IfamoreelevatedideathanthecurrentEuropeanpoliticalpartyspiritweretoexist,oneidea,withthehelpoftechnology,wouldgiveabroadbaseforanewlifeforthepeople.Then,wouldonenotbeableavoidtheimminentdangerofaculturalshipwreck,couldonenotinitiateandleaveestablishedacompletelynewculturalgroupwithit?

4

Sörgel’splandidnotcallonlyforachangeinnationalrealms–butinsteadwould

haveaccomplishedno lessthanaverydistinctchangeonthecartographic faceofour

planet by damming the Straits of Gibraltar and lowering the Mediterranean Sea.

Despite nearly a century of technological advancement, engineering on such a

gargantuan scale as Atlantropa is unparalleled and unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Curiously, Sörgel was able to amass a healthy following of enthusiasts to aid in his

efforts,includingsomeveryesteemedindividuals,especiallyinthefieldofarchitecture

(10).

ThedreamofAtlantropadeservesscrutiny,notsolelyduetothecuriousnature

of the project. A unique perspective of the Inter‐War and post World War II time

periodsmaybegainedthroughthelensofthismegaprojectandtherationalebehindits

inception.HistorianJeffreyHerfcoinedtheterm“reactionarymodernism”inhis1984

workof the samename to refer to the paradoxicalnature inwhich somepost‐World

War I German intellectuals simultaneously rejected rationalistic ideals of the

Enlightenment.Thephilosopherswere in favor ofamoreRomanticnationalismwhile

accepting technological advances born out of that sameenlightened, liberal thinking.

Irrationalist ideology combined with modern technology led to the devastating

philosophyof theNational Socialist regime (Herf1‐2), andalso contributedheavily to

Sörgel’smotives.3

3Itisdiscussedlaterthat,althoughSörgeldisagreedwiththeNationalSocialistphilosophy,oneofhisprimaryinfluenceswasanadherentofreactionaryphilosophy.

5

One proponent of this “highly technological romanticism” (2) was Oswald

Spengler, whoseworkDer Untergang des Abendlandes, cataloguing and detailing the

lifecycleofgreatcivilizations,providedanimpetusforAtlantropa.Thoughthecultural

pessimismmovedSörgelandinformedthedesperatenatureofhisproject,thecommon

threadofnationalismseemsabandoned inhisvision, infavorofamorepan‐European

ideal. Atlantropawouldnecessarily require cooperationamongstEuropeannations,a

factnotlostonSörgel,whoconsideredandplannedacentralbureauforhisprojectin

Switzerland,whichwouldoverseemuchoftheorganizationalandoperationalaspectsof

planningandbuilding(Sörgel1932,135).

6

Figure2:ProposalfortheAtlantropacentralbureaufromFritzHöger,1931 WolfgangVoigt,Atlantropa:WeltbauenamMittelmeer;EinArchitektentraumderModerne. Hamburg:2007.78.Print.

Fears of upcoming American and Asian dominance contributed to, what one

mightcall,aEuropeannationalismadvancedbySörgel.TheaftermathoftheFirstWorld

WarleftatatteredEurope,rifewithpessimism.Thatpessimismwasprevalentamongst

manyGermanintellectualsandpoliticians.Theideapervadedmanyofthesecirclesthat

theAmericaswereonaroadtowardunification,whichwouldspelleconomicdownfall

7

fortheEuropeancontinentandpeoples.Asiaoccupiedtheotherfrontier,whosemight

lay inthesheersizeof itspopulationandthewealthof resources. Sörgel fearedthat

Europe’s shortsighted political interests diverted attention away from America and

Japan,whowerewrestingthelastmarketsoftheworldoutofEuropeanhands(Sörgel

1929,38).Hesawthesolutiontobothofthesethreatsintechnologicalinnovationand

a strongallianceamongst theconstituent statesof Europeand theirAfricancolonies.

The importance of binding Africa to Europe was paramount to Atlantropa, and to

creatinganidentityforthenewcontinent.Onlythencoulditstandasawedgebetween

theimpendingdominanceoftheAsianandAmericanjuggernauts,whilesimultaneously

providingEuropewithdesperatelyneededresources(Sörgel1932,128).

The idea of Atlantropa spanned four decades. Sörgel enunciatedmost of the

technicalaspectsby1932.Hethenkeenlyadaptedtherhetoricinwhichhepresented

the megaproject to suit the shifting political situation in Europe, though the project

itself remained largely the same. This megaproject reflected cultural pessimism and

optimismintheInterbellumWeimarRepublic,thevivacityoftechnologicalprogress,as

well as imperialistic ambitions of both Germany and other European nations.

Atlantropa is an amalgamof early twentieth century history– not entirely utopian in

nature,andnotrepresentativeofanyoneparticulartrendofthought.Thepurposeof

thisstudyistoexaminesocio‐politicalideologyanddogmabetweentheFirstWorldWar

untilshortlyafterWorldWar II throughthe lensoftheAtlantropaproject. Thestudy

makes use of original publications from Herman Sörgel and the analysis of two

Atlantropa experts, Alexander Gall and Wolfgang Voigt. These works detail the

8

technical, economic, and social aspects of Atlantropa. The historical cultural

investigation of Oswald Spengler by Jeffrey Herf contributes an important historical

contexttoSörgel’sworld.Finally,DinaBrandt’sexplorationofGermansciencefictionof

the Inter‐war period further enriches our understanding of the enthusiasm of the

period.ThisaggregationofliteraturemakesrelevantHermanSörgel’sfailedvisionofa

world,grosslychangedbothphysicallyandpolitically.

9

1.Atlantropa:TechnicalAspectsofContinent‐Creation

HermanSörgelwasbornin1885toHansSörgel,aprominentbuildingauthority

representative in Bavaria, who served as an inspiration for his son. His father and

motherwereelevatedtonoblestatusintheKingdomofBavaria,butthisdistinctionwas

nothereditary. ThoughHermanfollowedhis father’s footsteps,heneverattainedthe

same levelof recognitionbestoweduponhis father (Voigt15). Adesire to reach the

samestatusofhisparentsmayhaveinformedmuchofSörgel’sthoughprocesseswith

regardtohisownproject.

Sörgel wrote in the foreword to his 1932 publicationAtlantropa that he first

decidedtomaketheprojecthislife’sworkduringChristmas1927.Withintwoyears,he

hadmadegreatstridesinrefiningwhatwas,atfirst,merelyapipedream.Thenecessity

of cooperationamongexperts fromvarying fields required toallow forany successful

developmentofhis ideawas immediatelycleartohim (Sörgel1932,V). Itwas inthis

spirit that Sörgel published a summarized collection of various articles that he had

writtenabouttheMediterraneanprojectin1929.Hedeclaredinhisforeword,

The purpose of this record, drawn up in four languages, is to gain for the project

popularity,sympathy,andco‐operationofanynaturewhatsoever.Furtherworkonthe

linesofthisprojectisonlypossibleifitbecomesanaffairofthepeople,iflittlebylittle

thewillofthepeoplerangesbehindtheideaoftheindividual. Thus,thisshortrecord

mayberegardedasaboveallaninvitationtotheentirePresstoaidasmuchaspossible

inmakingthisprojectpopular.(Sörgel1929,6).

10

With these words, Sörgel plainly stated goals that would become a decades‐long

obsession. This collection of ideas was the first of four detailed works that Sörgel

publishedbetweentheyearsof1929and1948. Ineachofthesetexts,hedefineshis

twofoldvision. Hefirstelaborateduponthetechnicalaspectsoftheproject.Next,he

rationalizedboththesocio‐politicalcostandnecessityofAtlantropa.

Figure3:Sörgelathisdesk,around1932 WolfgangVoigt,Atlantropa:WeltbauenamMittelmeer;EinArchitektentraumderModerne.Hamburg:2007. 16.Print.

11

Dr. Otto Jessen, a prolific professor of geography at the time, made two

expeditions to the Strait ofGibraltar in 1922 and 1924, and the results of his studies

inspired and lent credibility to the feasibility of damming theMediterranean. Jessen

found that, despite its size and position, theMediterranean Sea could not survive in

current form. The primary vein of nourishment, through which this sea receives its

”Blut“ (lifeblood), is the Strait ofGibraltar. Jessen added that, the ocean floor in the

strait only needed to be raised one hundredmeters in order to produce the desired

effects. The sea would then slowly shrink, leaving smaller saline lakes (Jessen 101).

EstimatesatthetimeplacedtheinflowofwaterfromtheAtlanticOceanaround88,000

cubicmeterspersecond,totalingaround2,762cubickilometersperyear.Yearlywater

flow fromtheBlackSeaamountstoaround152cubickilometers,andestimatesfrom

other tributaries range around 2,230 cubic kilometers annually. With a total

evaporationsurfaceof~2,511,000squarekilometersandanaverageyearlyevaporation

of 165 centimeters from this surface, Sörgel calculated an evaporation of 4,144 cubic

kilometersperyear.Inhiswords,“DasMittelmeeristeinVerdunstungsmeer.”4(Sörgel

1929, 8). The quantitative research of Jessen and others provided Sörgel with great

inspiration.

A dam along the Strait of Gibraltar would not only provide immense

hydroelectricprofitforbothEuropeandAfrica,butalsowouldallowfortheloweringof

theMediterraneanwater level, exposinghuge tractsof “Neuland” (reclaimed land) to

4TheMediterraneanisaseacharacterizedbyevaporation.Therateofevaporationexceedsreplenishmentfromriverrunoffandprecipitation.See:Pinet,PaulR.p.202.

12

beagriculturallycultivatedandsettled.ThisnewlandwouldprovideLebensraum,5and

in so doing prevent Europe from self‐destruction caused by rampant overpopulation

(Sörgel 1932, 9‐10). In order to developNorthernAfrica and the Sahara regions into

usable farmland, an enormous quantity of waterpower or “weiße Kohle”6 would be

required. TheGibraltar damwouldprovideelectrical power,and, byaccelerating the

sinkingof the seaviaartificial pumping, theSahara could be irrigated. Onlywith the

complementarycultivationoflanddoestheprojectbecomeeconomical,arguedSörgel

–thetwogoalsareoneandthesame(Sörgel1929,12).

Attheoutset,Sörgel’splanwastosinkthe levelof theMediterraneanbyfour

hundred to five hundred meters through a series of dams at Gibraltar, each one

hundred meters lower than the previous. Due to concerns for maritime traffic,

however, Sörgel and his colleagues decided that a lowering of one hundred to two

hundredmeterswouldbesufficient(11‐14).

The raising of a dam at Gibraltar was, without doubt, the most technically

demanding part of Sörgel’s plan, requiring themost time and effort (22). Instead of

constructingadamatthenarrowestpointintheStraitofGibraltar,adistanceofaround

fourteenkilometers,Sörgeldecidedthatamoresatisfactory location layslightlywest,

toward theAtlantic. Hereone finds the shallowestaveragedepths,with thedeepest 5Spacetolive:Inbiology,thistermisusedtorefertothehabitatofaspecies.FriedrichRatzel,whoisoftencreditedasthefounderofpoliticalgeographyandaproponentofSocialDarwinismcomparednationstoorganisms.States,likeorganismsrequiredadequatespacetolive.Inthelate19thandearly20thcenturies,thetermcameintoheavyuseintherealmofGeopolitikduetoperceivedoverpopulation.TheNationalSocialistpartyusedtheconceptofLebensraumtojustifyexpansionistpolicies.ThetermhasalsobeenadoptedintotheEnglishlanguage.Formoreinformation,seeRatzel,Friedrich.DerLebensraum:EinebiogeographischeStudie6Literally:“whitecoal.”Sörgelfrequentlyusedthistermtodescribehydroelectricpower.

13

stretch“only” three hundredmetersbelowwater leveland stretching5.2kilometers.

(Itshouldbenotedthataheightofthreehundredmeterswas,atthattime,overtwo

hundredmeterstallerthananydamtheninexistence.)Thedamwastoformaslightly

asymmetricalarchofaroundthirty‐fivekilometersbetweentwooffsetpointsnearthe

BayofTangierandtheCabezosReefs(Gall20,Sörgel1929,22).Theraisingofthedam

wastobeginsimultaneouslyatatthreepoints:atbothendsinSpainandMoroccoand

inthecenterofthestrait. Itwouldbenecessarytobeginallthreestagesatthesame

timeduetotheprevailingdeepandsurfacecurrents.Sörgelcalledforpontoonstobe

filledfromlandbyconveyers,eachcarryingupto10,000tonsofmaterial. Afterthat,

theywould beplaced in the desiredpositionand then sunkaccordingly. In theearly

phases of planning, Sörgel estimated that the dam would comprise some

10,000,000,000cubicmetersofmaterial(Sörgel1929,22).

InAtlantropa,published in1932,Sörgeloutlinedthedevelopmentoftheplans

for the Gibraltar dam in phases, though he did not elaborate on as many smaller

technicalitiesandmeasurementsasinhis1929publication. Thefirstphasedealtwith

the development of themain dam at Gibraltar, described earlier. The second phase

implementedpowerplantsandcanalsoneithersideofthedambasedondetailedmaps

of the ocean floor. Due to the mountainous nature of the banks, the third step

necessitated a stretching of these power plants over ten kilometers. In the fourth

phase, the power‐producing turbines were relocated to the European side and the

overflowcascadesmovedtotheAfricanside.BrunoSiegwarts,acolleagueofSörgel’s,

came up with the idea to bow the ends of the dam toward the east, such that the

14

AtlanticOceanwoulditselfserveasaheadracechannel.Inafifthdesignstage,many

defensivetechnicalfeatureswereaddedtothedam,foremostamongthemasecondary

leveeontheAtlanticside. FurtherstudiesofthetopographicalnatureoftheStraitof

Gibraltarallowedamorepreciseplanningoftheportsandthetraffic infrastructure in

thesixthplanningstage.Inaddition,amoreexactestimateofthematerialsneededin

construction of the damwasmade, and thewidth then estimated to be around two

kilometers, including the levee dam. In the seventh and final stage published in the

1932work,asingle,largerlockreplacedthegraduatedlocksonthenorthernsideofthe

dam– an idea introduced by Professor Peter Behrens of theWienerAkademie. Also,

Behrens suggested an “Atlantropaturm” – a tower of up to four hundred meters in

height.TheAtlantropaturmwouldserveasadefensiveanti‐aircraftstationaswellasan

aestheticallypleasingtouristdestination(Sörgel1932,15‐19).

15

Figure4:ConceptionoftheGibraltarwerkwithmaindamandprotectivelevee:GeorgZimmerman,1932WolfgangVoigt,Atlantropa:WeltbauenamMittelmeer;EinArchitektentraumderModerne.Hamburg:2007.44.Print.

16

The Black Seawas another concern that Sörgel had to address, because of its

characterization as an Überflutungsmeer,7 discharging most of its water into the

Mediterranean (27). In order to preserve the coastline of this sea, Sörgel proposed

another damatChanak (todayÇanakkale), at thenarrowestpoint in theDardanelles.

Toretainships’abilitytoreachtheAegeanandMediterraneanSeas,acanalwouldbe

dugatthenarrowestpointontheGallipoliPeninsula,creatingapassagetotheGulfof

Saros.ThedeepnatureoftheGulfofSarossimplifiedthissolution,asthetwohundred

meter drop in water level would not affect navigation in this particular area. The

hydroelectricdamwouldalsoaddtothealreadypowerfulnewelectricitynetwork(27‐

29).

Sörgel noted several other important locations for the construction of other

hydroelectricprojectsandcanals.HeenvisionedsmallerdamsontheRhoneandEbro,

aswellasacomplexsystemforthenearlydepletedAdriaticSea(34‐38).Includedinhis

estimations of powerwere other, smaller river systems, but Sörgel did not elaborate

muchonthese,simplyestimatingtheamountofpowertobegainedfromallof them

(38).

Withoutdoubt,themostcomplexproject,otherthantheGibraltarworks,wasto

be completed near Tunis andMessina. Thework on a dambetween Tunis and Sicily

couldnotbegin,however,untilthewaterleveloftheMediterraneanhadsunkatleast

7Seathatischaracterizedbyitsoverflowintoanotherbody–TheBlackSeahasapositivewaterbalance.

17

onehundredmeters.8Sörgelcalculatedthatconstructioncouldfirstbeginonthisdam

alittleoveronehundredyearsafterthecommencementofworkatGibraltar.Hesaw

littleneedtoexplainingreatdetailtheseplans,because“…in100years,thetechnology

willsurelybemoredeveloped”(32‐33). Basic ideasfortheTunisdamweregiven– it

wouldbebuiltattheshallowestpointinthenewlyformed“StraitofSicily,”anditwould

only need to be around one kilometer wide. No extra levee would be necessary

becauseofitslocationwithintheMediterranean.Thisdamwouldextendsomesixty‐six

kilometers, a facetgiven littleattentionbySörgel–most likelybecauseofhisabiding

faith in forthcoming technology. This point would serve as a third axis for travel

between Europe and Africa, allowing a direct line of traffic through Italy into central

Africa. Asecondarydamofsixkilometerswastobebuiltalongwithacanalallowing

shippassage(32‐34).

WiththeexposureofnewlandduetothesinkingoftheMediterranean,many

coastalcitieswouldbeleftcompletelylandlocked.Sörgelwaswellawareofthisissue,

andheandmanycolleaguesalsoincludedprovisionsforthefutureoftheseports.He

expectedthatcities locatedonsteeperbankswouldsimplyexpand inthedirectionof

the retreatingwaters (Sörgel1929,32). Thiswouldbe thecaseofmanycities in the

western basin, such as Marseille and Genoa (Sörgel 1932, 51‐54). Other cities like

Venicewouldrequireamorecomplexapproach.Atfirst,SörgelconsideredVeniceand

8“Tunisdamm”–Thisdam,derivingitsnamefromtheAfricancityofTunis–theAfricanterminusoftheseworks–wastodividethewesternandeasternbasinsofthesunkenMediterranean.Inadditiontoadam,Sörgelenvisionedabridgewithcapacityforautomobileaswellasrailtraffic,connectinganenlargedSicilytotheAfricancoastline.

18

Ravennaas“fitforthelethalchamber,”(Sörgel1929,32)buthelaterrecanted(dueto

publicoutcry)anddevisedanintensivesystemofcanalsanddamstopreserveVenice.

YetanotherdamwouldpreserveVenice’slagoon,farenoughoutsuchthatitwouldstill

appeartobeacityonthesea(Sörgel1932,60).Thatlagoonwouldlinktotheeastern

MediterraneanbasinviacanalsthroughtheformerAdriaticSea.

Figure5:OverviewofthevariousprojectsontheMediterraneanandNeulandgainedthroughitsdammingWolfgangVoigt,Atlantropa:WeltbauenamMittelmeer;EinArchitektentraumderModerne.Hamburg:2007.66.Print.

19

2.Sörgel’sInspiration:PreservingdasAbendland

NotonlydidHermanSörgelexpounduponthetechnicalaspectsofAtlantropa,

he also provided substantial economic and political reasoning for the project, which

servedtohighlightthedirenecessityofsuchaventure.Hegavemostdetailtothatend

inthe1932publication.Herepeatedmuchofitwithamuchmorereactionarytonein

DieDreiGroßenA(TheThreeGreatA’s)in1938.

Sörgelfirstbrieflyaddressedtheroleoftheprojectintheoverallenergybudget

of the Earth. Coal and oil undoubtedly played the most important roles in energy

productioninhistime,thoughitwasclearthatthesewerefinitesourcesofenergy.By

way of example, Sörgel estimated that reserves of coal in England would last only

anothertwohundredyears,andthoseofGermanyonlyapossiblythreehundredfifty.

America’sabundantreservescouldnotbecounteduponasasourceofenergywithout

sacrificing European autonomy (Sörgel 1932, 76). Seeking to become a world‐class

engineerlikehisfather,SörgelturnedtotheMediterraneanasthesolutiontoEurope’s

energyproblems,saying“There isnoothersufficientsourceforEurope’s futureother

than theMediterranean” (Sörgel1932, 78). Heconsideredwaterpower, the so‐called

“white coal” not only a solution, but also an absolute necessity for Europe, to be

properlydeveloped.

Newsourcesofpowerwouldbenecessary to fuel theexpansion ofagrowing

European population. In order to accommodate that population, more Lebensraum

wouldhavetobefound,conquered,orcreated.ThepacifistSörgelchosethelatter.He

20

felt that adequate space for growth was the only way to ensure a bright future for

Europe.Indeed,hefearedthattheacquisitionofLebensraumandasufficientsourceof

powerwouldbetheonlywaytoavoidEurope’sdownfall.

ThoughSörgel sawabright future forEurope in completionofAtlantropa, the

prevalentculturalpessimismofsomecontemporarythinkers,suchasOswaldSpengler,

informed his planning and reasoning. Herman Sörgel’s numerous references to the

Europeanrealmas“DasAbendland”servetohighlighthisawarenessofthepoliticaland

culturalphilosophiesoftheWeimarperiod.TheparticularinvocationofofSpenglerian

terminologyalsoaccentuatesSörgel’s familiaritywithSpengler’sworksandprocesses.

Sörgel statesearly inhis firstpublishedworkonAtlantropa that theultimate“fateof

[das abendländische Kultur] – as that of most others – will be settled on the

Mediterranean”(Sörgel1929,38).Whereothersfoundthesouloftheirnation,Sörgel

spoke of a greater, European soul. The Spenglerian reference surfaces repeatedly

throughout Sörgel’s published material on Atlantropa – making a clear connection

betweenHermanSörgelandso‐called“reactionarymodernists.”

2.1HermanSörgel:Modernist.Reactionary?

JeffreyHerfbeginshis1984bookReactionaryModernism:Technology,Culture,

and Politics in the Third Reich by asserting, “there is no such thing as modernity in

general. Thereareonlynational societies,each ofwhichbecomesmodern in itsown

fashion.” He noted that most sociological theories of European modernity are

dominatedbydichotomies–traditionormodernity,progressorreaction,communityor

21

society,rationalizationorcharisma(Herf1). WheremanytheoriesarguethatGerman

nationalismandNationalSocialismstemmedfromarejectionofscientisticmodernity,

as well as the values of the French Revolution and Industrial Revolution, Herf

reexamines this theory and reconsiders the role of technology in the post‐Weimar

period.9 He coined the term “reactionary modernism” to describe the paradoxical

cultural tradition of the time (1). In particular, Herf uses this to refer to theway in

which National Socialists married the romantic ideas of Volk10 and Land11 to the

utilitarian augmentation of technology – technologymade possible by Enlightenment

ideals.

Logically,onewouldassumethatanyrejectionoftechnologywouldaccompany

a rejectionofEnlightenment ideals, foranacceptanceof reasonwouldalsobe in line

withthemarriagebetweenEnlightenmentphilosophicalandtheperiod’stechnological

pursuits. Instead, those who Herf named reactionary modernists simultaneously

rejected Enlightenment reason while embracing technological advance (3). The

reactionarymodernistssoughttointegratethetechnologicalcomponentofWestern

9HerfisspeakingoftraditionaldichotomiesinstudiesofGermanideologyintheWeimarRepublic.Hesays,“Dichotomies–traditionormodernity,progressorreaction,communityorsociety,rationalizationorcharisma–predominateinsociologicaltheoriesofthedevelopmentofEuropeanmodernity.”Herfinsteadarguesfora“morenuancedview”oftheGermanideology(Herf1).10People,population,ornation–Herethetermisusedinanationalistsense,implyingthepeopleofaparticularnation.11Land,orcountry–Onceagain,theusehereimpliesaRomanticnotionofcountry,thehomeofacertaingroupornationality.

22

“Zivilisation” intotheGerman“Kultur”12 (1),answeringthequestionof“technologyor

culture” with the response, “technology and culture” (2). Those advocating strong

technical progress knew that, in order to avoid stagnation, they had to embrace

technology. They sought to create a stählerndeRomantik (steel‐like Romanticism) in

thewordsofJosephGoebbels(3).

TheparadoxofGermansociologicaldevelopment13had itsroots in its late,but

“thorough” industrialization as compared to England and France (5). Ralf Dahrendorf

considered industrialization a filter of sorts, through which all societies pass before

approaching themodernproblemof liberalism (Dahrendorf34). In theGermancase,

themachinationsofindustrywereveryquicklyadoptedfromtheexamplesofwestern

neighbors,butthesocietalstructureremainedlargelyunchanged(35).SaidJeffreyHerf

in his preface, “Germany’s scientific and technological advancesoccurredwithout the

benefit of a vital tradition of political liberalism” (Herf ix). This combination of the

“inherited structures of the dynastic state of Prussia”with rapid industrialization left

littlespaceforpoliticalliberalism(Dahrendorf35),butalsoaccountedforthespeedand

successwithwhichGermanybecamean industrialpower. Herein liestheparadox: a

rejectionofrationalthoughtdespitemakinguseofthefruitsbornofthatsamethough. 12Herfexplainsthat,byuseof“…acoherentandmeaningfulsetofmetaphors,familiarwords,andemotionallyladenterms…hadtheeffectofconvertingtechnologyfromacomponentofalien,WesternZivilizationintoanorganicpartofGermanKultur.”Here,particularly,thecontrastofthesetermshighlightstheconflictbetweenrationalandirrationalmindsets(Herf1).13Withtheterm“paradox,”Herfisaddressing“themannerinwhichtheGermanRightincorporatedtheEnlightenment”andhethereinsoughtto“accentuatethepositivecontributionstheEnlightenmenthasmadetomodernsociety.”Headds,“ItisnotparadoxicaltorejecttechnologyaswellasEnlightenmentreasonortoembracetechnologywhilecelebratingreason.Thesepairingsarethecustomaryoutcomesofchoosingbetweenscientismandpastoralism.”(Herfix,3).

23

Herf posited that nationalistic ideology would then argue that the Volk needed

protectionfromtheinfluencesofWesternZivilisation(Herf6).

Herfusedtheterm“reactionary”toemphasizethelinktothetraditionalpolitical

right(11).Arejectionof1789principleswastypicalofthereactionarymodernists,and

theyfoundinnationalisma“thirdforce,”whichofferedanalternativetocapitalismand

Marxism. The addition of that nationalistic third force fueled the National Socialist

movementinGermany,andinformedthewayinwhichtheydetestedcommunistsand

the“capitalistJews.”Herfthenelaboratedonhisuseoftheterm“modernist,”saying

that they were first and foremost technological modernizers, advocating the

industrializationofGermany.Secondly,thereactionarymodernists“articulatedthemes

associatedwiththemodernistvanguard”–acollectionofthinkersinthewesternworld

forming a movement not associated with the political Left or Right, but instead a

“triumph of spirit and will over reason and the subsequent fusion of this will to an

aestheticmode”(12).

2.2OswaldSpenglerasPessimisticImpetus

HerfnamedOswaldSpenglerasatypicalprototypeofareactionarymodernist

(11), and as such, Spengler warranted an entire chapter in Herf’s Reactionary

Modernism.14 Spengler’s most well known work, Der Untergang des Abendlandes15

14Herfcitesotherexamplesofthose,who“articulatedthemesofthemodernistvanguard:ErnstJüngerandGottfriendBenninGermany,GideandMalrauxinFrance,MarinettiinItaly,Yeats,Pound,andWyndhamLewisinEngland”(Herf11).15TheDeclineoftheWest:TranslationintoEnglish1926

24

espoused a highly anti‐Zivilisation rhetoric that was typical of critics of the Weimar

Republicandofthepost‐Warperiod.Herf,however,foundanother,oftenoverlooked,

undercurrent within Spengler’s text – a similar “reconciliation of romantic and

irrationalist sentiments with enthusiasm for technical advance” (49) – and, as such,

classifiedhimasatypicalreactionarymodernist,albeitonewho“straddledthefence”

between a traditional Prussian conservatism and the more revolutionary postwar

conservatives(11).

In Preußentum und Sozialismus, Spengler made clear that he disagreed with

Marxist ideas, on the basis that Marx applied conflicting societal customs onto his

theoryofclassstruggle.HelikenedtheEnglishattitudetowardworktothatofaViking

–focusednotupon“patchingthesail”butinsteadonlyuponcapturingthe“loot.”The

primary objective in wealth acquisition was the possibility of entering the ranks of

“gentlemen,”andtoescapethedifficultiesofHandarbeit(manuallabor)intotherealm

of Händlergewinn (mercantile gain).16 Spengler argued that Marx took this “purely

English” dichotomy and incorporated it into his theory of the Bourgeoisie and

Proletariat (Spengler 1920, 73). This false analogy only highlightedMarx’s erroneous

logicwithregardto labor,arguedSpengler,whofelt thatthetruehonorofhardwork

waslostonbothMarxandtheEnglish.HadMarxunderstoodthePrussianconceptof

work – a business of service to the greater society as awhole, not only in service of

oneself–hewouldhavelikelyneverwrittenhisManifesto(Spengler1920,74).

16Hereheisspeakingofthemercantileclass.

25

TherebukeofMarxistphilosophy(andmorespecificallyofMarxhimself)tookon

a highly nationalistic tone as Spengler ridiculed the latter, suggesting thatMarx had

become English, because of his desire tomove capital from the hands of the private

interestsintothehandsoftheHandarbeiter.Onlytwopartieswerefoundinplayinthis

system,much liketheEnglishparliament(Spengler1920,75). Spengler,however,put

forththeexampleofthePrussian‐socialiststateasanalternativetosuchasystem.This

state functioned as awhole,where bothworker and business are fundamentally and

equallycivilservants.Theprincipleofcivilservicetothestate“…istdieinnereFormder

politischenZivilisationdesAbendlandes…”(…istheinnerformofthecivilizedpoliticsof

the West…). Moreover, Spengler found symbolic evidence of this in the Gothic

cathedrals, where every small detail is a necessary component of a greater whole

(Spengler1920,76).

As Herf noted, Spengler’s attack on Marx in Preußentum und Sozialismus

constituted a “metamorphosis of philosophical‐political categories into nationalist

ones.” Spengler consideredhimselfmodern in comparison to the nineteenthcentury

(worker class)materialism. Marxismwas, to him, too rational and unromantic tobe

consideredmodern,andMarx’sobsessionwiththedichotomybetweencapitalistsand

the proletariat was a byproduct ofManchester liberalism and of his own Jewishness

(Herf 50). Here, Spengler revealed some reactionary tendencies, saying, “the feeling

that lifedominatesreason,…thatknowledgeofmen ismore importantthanabstract

andgeneralideas.””Knowledge”heredoesnottorefertoadvancementswonthrough

26

rational thought of the liberal Enlightenment tradition. Spengler favored Prussian

qualities,suchasfate,instinct,andtheorganic(50‐51).

Before Preußentum und Sozialismus, Spengler published his most recognized

workDerUntergangdesAbendlandes in1918,whichcontainedasortofphilosophical

reflection on world history. John Farrenkopf called this work “an unconventional,

multidisciplinary,andwide‐rangingworkonthephilosophyofworldhistory,”andnoted

thatSpenglersoughtnotonlytochroniclethephilosophicalhistoryofbothWesternand

non‐Western cultures, but also to create “a kind of unconventional textbook on the

philosophyofstatecraft.” Spenglerhopedtoadvancethecausesofneo‐conservatism

and imperialism in light of democratic and capitalist developments of the Weimar

Republic and Western Europe (Farrenkopf 20‐21). In the first volume of his work,

Spengler defined and contrasted two competitive perspectives on understanding:

Gestalt17 (form) and law. Where the latter is a method of examination akin to the

“exactdeadeningproceduresofmodernphysics,”theformer,Gestalt,“operatesinthe

realmofmovingandbecoming”(Spengler,qtd.inHerf53).Moreover,theemployment

of law inanevaluationdestroystheobjectobservedthroughthoroughdissectionand

analysis.Spengleradvocatedinsteadamoreorganicandintuitiveapproachtoanalysis

basedonGestalt(Herf53).

Der Untergang des Abendlandes, with its relative popularity in Germany,

expanded dialog with regard to historical depictions, in that it provided a non‐

17Herethetermisusedinamoremetaphoricalsense,implying“wholeness,”anditechoesSpengler’sadvocacyofamoreorganicperspective.

27

Eurocentricperspectiveontheriseandfallofcivilizations(Farrenkopf27).Insteadofa

chaoticchainofcauseandeffect,Spenglersaw inthehistoryofgreatcivilizationsand

cultures the same indicators of life as with organisms (30). Each civilization displays

ascertainable stages of “childhood, youth, manhood, and old age” (Spengler, qtd. in

Farrenkopf30).Thisideathatcivilizationshavelifecyclesnecessarilyimpliesthatthere

must also be a death, or, at thevery least, a decline into obscurity. Spengler’s great

concern for western civilization, his Abendländische Kultur, hinged upon this axis of

thought, and because of the natural and organic order of history, he saw no route

throughwhichsuchafatecouldbeavoided(SpieringandWintle191).

ThoughHerffindsSpengler’sjudgmentsabouttheimpendingdeclineofwestern

civilization “dubious,” he credits Spengler with influencing a “mood of impending

disasterandpossible salvation” in thepostwarWeimarperiod. The storydepicted in

Der Untergang des Abendlandes is constructed upon a so‐called “morphological”

perspective–aromanticnotionthatthetypicalmechanizationsofmoderncivilization

form a “shell” or outer skin of something greater within. The political and cultural

institutions,architecturalforms,andeconomicorganizationsaresimplysurfacematerial

ofaninner“soul”(Herf52).

2.3RejectionofEurope’s“Inevitable”Fate

Sörgel exemplified many modernist tendencies as well as some of the

reactionary inclinationsprevalent inWeimarGermany. His inclination to look toward

technologyasasavinggracefortheotherwisedoomedcultureplaceshimintheranks

28

ofmanyotherrightwing ideologuesthatHerfdescribes,agreatmanyofwhomwere

NationalSocialists.AlthoughmanyEuropeansdistrustedtechnologyintheaftermathof

theFirstWorldWarandthedevastationitbroughtabout,modernistsmanagedtosway

opinionintheotherdirection.Sörgeladdressedtherelationshipbetweentechnology,

economics, and politics. Hemade a case for the use of technology, saying “Nicht im

KampfegegendieMaschine,sondernnurimBundemitihrkommenwirweiter.”(Notin

fightingthemachine,but insteadonly in leaguewith it,doweadvance) (Sörgel1932,

85). The faith that Sörgel placed in Europe’s technological abilities is inherent in the

Atlantropa plan and underscored by the fact that heenvisioned a completed damat

Gibraltarinameretenyearstime(Gall,24).Contrastingthebreathtakinglybriefperiod

of time envisioned for the completion of the Gibraltarwerk,18 Sörgel proposed an

exceedinglylong‐termvisionforAtlantropa’scompletion,comingonlyafterthepassage

of two hundred fifty years (Sörgel 1932, 24). So great was his faith, that he did not

bother toaddress someof thedifficulties regarding theTunisdamm, trusting that the

technologywouldnaturallybeavailablebythat time(32‐33). Inhisowntexts,Sörgel

remained deliberately vague about important details and numbers involved in the

project,choosinginsteadtorelyuponsketchesortheexpertiseofspecialists(Gall,27).

Inthisrespect,heappearedblindtolegitimateobstacles,aswellassociopoliticalforces,

at least because of an obsession with technical and mechanical potential, and an

increasing fixation upon the looming specters of Asia and America, as will become

evidentbelow.

18ThistermreferstothedamandhydroelectricworksatGibraltar,asawhole.

29

Muchmoredifficult topinpointareSörgel’s reactionary tendencies. Hewasa

self‐proclaimed pacifist, and detested the idea of using military might to advance

culture. This alone separates him frommany of Herf’s National Socialist reactionary

modernists,butitdoesnotalterthefactthatSörgelstilladheredtomanyneo‐romantic

ideasofnation‐building,orinthecaseofAtlantropa,continent‐building.Theromantics

ofGermanyvaluedthepromotionofVolk,adiscernablecultureboundbythebordersof

anation.TracesofthisthoughtpatternarefoundintheimaginationofaEuropeanVolk

–onemadeupofthewhiteracesofdasAbendland.Thegoalofpreservingculturetook

precedence over other economic considerations. Atlantropa was not fundamentally

meanttobeamoneymakingventure,butwasmerelytoensurethestabilityofEurope

and her markets. This mindset aligns with the anti‐capitalist, culture‐focused neo‐

romantics of the Weimar period, who certainly embraced the doom‐and‐gloom

predictions of Spengler. The same prognoses of decline informed Sörgel’s verdict:

“Entweder: Untergang des Abendlandes Oder: Atlantropa alsWende und neues Ziel”

(Either:Decline ofWestern Civilization Or:Atlantropa as turning point and new goal)

(Sörgel 1932, 106). Sörgel simply saw Atlantropa as a way out of Europe’s declining

fortunes.

30

3.“Supranational”Designs

TheominousimpressionofthedeclineofEuropewasperhapsthemostobvious

influenceuponSörgel’sAtlantropaconcept,referencestoaEuropean“Untergang”and

acontrasting“Gefahr”(danger,threat)fromtheAmericasandAsiapermeatingSörgel’s

publications before the end ofWorldWar II. The Spenglerian school of thoughtwas,

however, not the only important contributor to Sörgel’s design. The popular

apprehension of Europe’s demise promulgated by Oswald Spengler and the empire

buildingofthe late19thandearly20thcenturies coalescedandgavebirth,notonlyto

Atlantropa,butalsotoanumberofconceptionsofafutureEurope.

AlexanderGall notes in his book,DasAtlantropa‐Projekt, that Europe sawnot

onlyapowerfulnewwaveofnationalismattheendoftheFirstWorldWar,butalsoan

unprecedented number of proposals for a unification of Europe (49). Indeed, the

interwarperiodwitnessedthecreationoftheLeagueofNations,ironicallychampioned

byUnitedStatesPresidentWoodrowWilson,despitehisnation’srefusaltojoin.Many

foundingmembersandthosewhojoinedlaterwouldultimatelyleavetheLeaguedueto

itsinabilitytofulfillthedictatesofitsowncharter.Thisdiscord,createdbynationalistic

ambitionsopposingaspirationsofunity,characterizedtheinterwarperiodinEurope,as

wellasaroundtheglobe.

Inthe1929publication,SörgelmadebriefmentionofhisbeliefthatEuropeand

Africamust be consolidated into one unit in a section entitled “What is the political

importanceofthisprojectfortheworld?”HeadvocatedcreatingAtlantropa,notsolely

31

as an essential political and economic fix for an ailing Europe, but additionally as a

bulwark against a “threatened external destruction between and from the hands of

AmericaandAsia”(Sörgel1929,38).Laterin1932,heelaboratedonhisperceptionof

theseexternalthreats,explainingthatAmericahadnoneedforcoloniesbecauseofits

inheritedwealth in natural resources, industrial capacity, and land inevery [climactic]

zoneof the Earth. Americawouldbeautarchic (Sörgel1932,79). Asia,on theother

hand,would be a threat todasAbendland because of the “racial antipathy” of India,

China, and Japan (Sörgel 1929, 38), and because of the Asian burgeoning Asian

population(Gall,50).

Inconsideringhisoptions,Sörgelnotablyconsultedtwoprevioussuggestionsfor

theunificationofEuropean(andother)territories, ifonlytopointouttheir flawsand

improve upon them. He first consideredWoytinsky’s proposed “Vereinigte Staaten,”

andquicklydismissed itasan improbability. Sörgel foundtheEasttoWest formatof

Woytinsky’sideaunsustainablebecauseoftheaforementionedantipathybetweenthe

“Asian and European races.” He maintained that, even if a European were to live

twenty yearswithin the Asian culture, or vice‐versa, the twowould never quite fully

understandoneanother(Sörgel1932,80).19

19AlsoseenasDieVereinigteStaatenvonEuropa–TheUnitedStatesofEurope,Woytinsky’splanisonlybrieflymentionedinSörgel’svolumes.WoytinskyenvisionedaunionwhichwouldhaveincludedtheAsianportionofRussia,whichSörgelviewedasbeingtooAsiaticaculturetofunctionwellwithinanyunionwithEurope.(Sörgel1932,80).

32

3.1Coudenhove‐Kalergi’sPaneuropa

Thesecondworld‐organizationidealSörgelconsideredwasthatofCountRichard

NikolausvonCoudenhove‐Kalergi.Coudenhove‐Kalergidocumentedthefoundationsof

his own personal crusade to assemble the separate nation states of Europe into

“Paneuropa.”20NotunlikeHermanSörgel,Coudenhove‐Kalergitooknoteoftherapidly

evolvingpoliticallandscapeofEurope(andthegreaterworld)intheperiodbetweenthe

two World Wars. He saw the Interwar period as a battle between pessimists and

optimists,betweenthosewhopromulgatednationalisticcompetitionbetweennations

and peoples and those who invested their hopes for the future in rationality and

thoughts of peace (Coudenhove‐Kalergi 56). Before the League of Nations began to

“healthewounds”oftheFirstWorldWar,itsmandatewasseverelydiminishedbythe

American Senate’s declination to join the union. Without the initial support of the

AmericansortheSoviets,theLeaguewasrenderedimpotentandcouldnolongerclaim

to speak for the majority of the world’s citizens. Some continued to support the

“amputated”union,andtheyformedoneofthreegroupsvyingforpowerinEurope,to

Coudenhove‐Kalergi’sestimation.Thenationalistsandthecommunistsconstitutedthe

othertwocamps(57).

20Meanttoinspirepan‐Europeancooperation,thistermbecamethenameofCoudenhove‐Kalergi’simaginedfederationofEuropeanstates.HermanSörgelchangedthenameofhisprojectfromPanropatoAtlantropatoavoidanylegalactionduetothesimilaritybetweenthetwonames.SeeGall,pgs.38‐39.

33

BecauseoftheabbreviatedmandateoftheLeagueofNations,manylostfaithin

theplausibilityofapeacekeepingunion inEurope. Coudenhove‐Kalergi,however, felt

that history provided ample precedent for the viability of such a conglomeration of

states. In a chapter entitled “Geschichte der Paneuropa‐Bewegung” (History of the

PaneuropaMovement),Coudenhove‐KalergibeganbycreditingtheGreeksasthefirst

tohavedividedtheirknownworldintothreeseparatewholes–Asia,Europe,andAfrica

– and created the concept of the European continent. The Roman Empire, he

continued,wasaMediterraneanempire,but laid thebasicgroundwork fora “second

Europe”–onethatwasunitedthroughacommonlanguage(Latin)andthroughreligion

(the Catholic Church). During the Crusades, the commonenemyof this newly arisen

AbendlandwasIslam,buttheeffortsoftheEuropeansfailedultimately,duetoalackof

cohesive unity among princes, states, and cities, who continued to quarrel with one

another despite the efforts in the Near East (52‐53). In light of these events, two

contrastingfigurescametodevelopsomeofthefirst,albeitdisparate,idealsofuniting

Europeintheearlyfourteenthcentury.Coudenhove‐KalergiheldthattheItalianpoet,

Dante Alighieri, and French politician Pierre Dubois with the original conception of a

“Paneuropa.” WhereDantedreamedofa renewalof theRomanEmpirebasedupon

Christianideals,DuboisencouragedafederationofEuropeanstatesundertheguidance

oftheFrenchcrown(53).DanteandDubois’ideasfailedtowinfavorwiththecrowns

orcommonersofEurope,andthedreamofunionwaslaidasidethroughthecenturies,

despite advances made by the Turks in Southeastern Europe in the fifteenth and

Napoleon’s expansionist conquests in the early nineteenth centuries. The goal was

34

made more challenging because of the Reformation and the spiritual split that

afterwardsensued(54‐55).

OnlyintheaftermathofWorldWarI,withameasureofdesperationintheface

of amost divided Europe, did Coudenhove‐Kalergimake his plea for Paneuropa. He

recountedthechronologyofhisthoughtprocessesregardingPaneuropa inhisbookof

thesamename,publishedin1923.Inasubsectionentitled,“DieHoffnung”(TheHope),

herevealedthathismuseforhiscausewastheSwissConfederation.This“europäisches

Weltwunder” (European world wonder) acquired Coudenhove‐Kalergi’s interest and

respectbecauseofthesovereigntythateachof itsKantonsretainedunderthefederal

lawwithintheSwissnation(39‐40).Healsofoundremarkabletheculturalpluralitythat

not only existed in Switzerland, but which was also advocated by the federal

government. Such cultural development is most obvious when considering the

languages spoken within Switzerland. Coudenhove‐Kalergi chose Switzerland as an

archetypewith critical awareness of the nationalismbrewing in the rest of Europe in

order to provide an exemplar that directly contradicted notions of right‐wing

nationalism(42‐43).

In“DasEuropäischeManifest,”publishedonMay1st,1924andincludedinlater

versionsofPaneuropa,Coudenhove‐Kalergilaidouta frameworkfortheconsolidation

oftheEuropean“continent.”HefirstcalledforagroupingofEuropeanstatesafterthe

designofPan‐America, ifnecessarybycallinga conferenceoftheaffectedstates. An

important second stepwould be the canceling of obligatory separation treatises and

border guarantees betweenstates, followed then by a defensive pact among allPan‐

35

Europeanstates.ThefourthandfinalstepmentionedbyCoudenhove‐Kalergiwasthe

introductionofacustomsunionandperiodiceconomicconferencesforthenewentity

(109‐110).ThesestepswereperfectlyplausiblestepstoaunifiedPaneuropa,aunionof

statesthatalreadysharedacommon“soul.”Coudenhove‐Kalergisaidofthissoul,“Die

europäische Seele ist dreidimensional: christlich die Tiefe, hellenisch die Weite,

germanisch die Höhe.” (The European soul is three dimensional: Christian the depth,

Hellenistic the breadth, and Germanic the height.) (121). That same common soul

wouldbesymbolizedbytheredcrossofChristimposeduponthegoldensunofApollo–

inCoudenhove‐Kalergi’swords,“supranationalhumanityconjoinedtothebrilliantspirit

oftheEnlightenment”(58).

3.2ContrastingPaneuropaandAtlantropa

HermanSörgelfoundmanyfacetsofCoudenhove‐Kalergi’sproposedPaneuropa

to be in linewith his own expectations of Atlantropa, going so far as to call the two

projects “brothers” and “confederates.” In order to distinguish the twopropositions,

however, Sörgel sought to differentiate them in his 1932 publication, stating that

althoughthegoalsandoutcomesofbothunionsweresimilar,theprimarydissimilarities

lie in thegenesisofeachproject. Sörgel saidof the two, “Paneuropa is the ideaofa

philosophizing politician, Atlantropa the idea of an organized technician.” Sörgel

revealed once more his pessimism in contrast to Coudenhove‐Kalergi’s perceived

optimism in his elaboration on the two proposals. The successful implementation of

Paneuropa would rely on “victorious reason” and healthy common sense within

36

European politics. Sörgel immediately answered with his typical pessimistic

dichotomization: “entweder Untergang oder Verständigung” (Either decline or

understanding). Europewould only be unitedwhen its people finally understood the

desperationoftheirsituation(Sörgel1932,82).

Sörgel wished to make another distinction between Paneuropa and his

Atlantropa poignantly clear. He considered Paneuropa an idealist notion; one that

wouldcomefromthetop(politiciansandleaders)andfilterdown(tothepeople).This

notionofmovementatthehigherlevelsofgovernmentseemedtoo“goodandnice”to

Sörgel,whofavoredhisown“bottom‐up”approach.Atlantropainsteadwouldbe“ein

Antrieb”(drive,or impulse)toignitetheEuropeanpeople’sspiritofactivityanddesire

to work. In a sense, Sörgel here justified the fantastic proportions of his project,

because of his belief that engineering and technology should lead to a unification of

Europe through the material work involved in such a project (82‐83). Political unity

would be a logical, if not necessary, consequence of the work involved in creating

Atlantropa. AnAtlantropaheadquarters inGenevawould foster thatunity:unity ina

political, economic, and technological sense, represented by the three towers of the

Atlantropahaus.

A common feature of Sörgel’s rhetoric and that of both the conservatives and

National Socialists in the early twentieth century was the use of the concept of

Lebensraumtoadvancealbeitverydifferingcampaigns.TheoverpopulationofEurope

had become a concern since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, with many

prominent thinkers such as Thomas Malthus warning of the potential dangers of

37

population to the well being of society.21 Sörgel reduced the “vitally important”

symptoms plaguing the “politico‐economic body of Europe” to three basic factors –

Lebensraum, Bevölkerung, and Energiewirtschaft (Technik). He provided a graphic

representationofthethreefactorsandtheirinteraction(seeFigure5below)(95).Inhis

estimation, theeventsof theFirstWorldWarwere thenatural consequenceof these

three factors – the “kettle” of European Lebensraum simply could notwithstand the

pressure of the boiling “water” of the Bevölkerung. The catalyst for the ensuing

explosionwasthe“fire”ofanever‐expandingTechnik(96).

Figure6:AgraphicdepictionofSörgel’sthreebasicfactorsaffectingthepolitico‐economicbodyofEuropeSörgel,Herman,Atlantropa.Zürich:Fretz&Wasmutha.g.;etc,1932.95.Print.

21Malthusfeltthatthenecessityoffoodanditslimitednaturecombinedwiththetendencyformantoprocreatewouldleadtoaworldburdenedandindeclineduetooverpopulation.SeeMalthus,T.R.andGeoffreyGilbert,pp.12‐13.

38

Therecouldbenochangetothevariablesoftechnologyandpopulation(despite

thedeathtollofthewar),sotheonlyvariablelefttochangewouldhavetobethatof

Lebensraum. Sörgelanswered theLebensraumfrage clearlyanddefinitivelyby stating

that the future home ofdas abendländische Volk existed in the landswon from the

Mediterraneanand,especiallylater,inAfrica.Sörgelwrote:

DasAtlantropaprojektzeigtsolcheEntwicklungsmöglichkeitenimadäquatenAusmaßzu

denimmerbedrohlicherwerdendenGefahren. Europa,dasmechanisiertesteLandder

Erde,mußsichdieHerrschaftüberAfrika,dasjungfräulichsteLandderErde, sichern

durchdieLänder‐undWirtschaftsbrücke,wiesiedasAtlantropaprojektschafft.

(TheAtlantropaprojectshowssuchpossibilitiesofdevelopmentinadequateproportion

to increasingly threatening dangers. Europe, themostmechanized landof the Earth,

must secure controlofAfrica, themostvirgin landof theEarth, through the landand

economicbridge,asisaccomplishedbytheAtlantropaproject.)(103).

Theenthusiasmforclaimingfar‐awaylandswashardlynewatthetimeHermanSörgel

beganplanningAtlantropa.Indeed,hisextensiveplanningfortheAfricancontinentcan

clearlybeviewedasanextrememanifestationofcolonialfantasyofthetimeperiod.

39

4.ImperialismandAtlantropa

4.1TheShort‐LivedGermanAppearanceontheColonialStage

Thoughmanyof theGermanstateshadacquired somesmall colonial holdings

prior to unification in 1871, the unified German empire needed to close an ever‐

widening gap between its own colonial program and those of the other European

nations. Compounding the issue was a seeming lack of initial interest in developing

holdings overseas in leaders such as Bismarck, despite a broad belief amongst the

population that a well‐developed colonial empire would officially signal Germany’s

arrival on theworld stage (Schinzinger 22‐23). The reach for colonieswent hand‐in‐

handwiththedesireddevelopmentofapowerfuloverseaseconomythatcouldrivalthe

British(23).

Despite the greater public interest in the prospect, Bismarck only grudgingly

gaveintothedemandsforacolonialempire,citinganeedforthedomesticeconomyin

GermanytoremaincompetitivewithrivalsBritainandFrance.Betweenthe1880sand

the outset of World War I, the empire established colonies in the Pacific (Deutsch

Neuguinea) andseveral inAfricaaswell–Togoland,Kamerun,DeutschOstafrika,and

DeutschSüdwestafrika.22

Given the frustration inGermanydue to the loss of its colonies after the First

World War, and the expansive holdings that Britain and France maintained, many

22Togoland(today,Togo),Cameroon,GermanEastAfrica(today,Tanzania),andGermanSouthwestAfrica(today,Namibia)

40

Germansmusthaverespondedpositivelytothedreamofonceagaintakingpartinthe

greatcolonialrace.Despitetheactual lossofthecoloniesearlyinWorldWarI,made

official by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, an awareness of colonial affairs continued

throughtheWeimarRepublicandWorldWar II. EvenaftertheGermandefeat inthe

latterwar,withGermanydividedamongstthevictoriousAllies,therecontinuedtobean

interestintheotherEuropeancoloniesandtheiractivitiesinthewell‐informedGerman

populace. MonikaAlbrechtnotes inheressay,“GermanDebatesonColonialismand

Decolonization in thePost‐WarEra,” that therewasno“post‐colonial amnesia,”even

aftertheSecondWorldWar.ShereferencesmanyarticlesfromDerSpiegelinthepost‐

warerathatattestedtojournalists’historicalknowledgeofGermancolonialism.Pains

were taken to make the reader aware of many colonies’ former German patronage,

sometimes going into details in footnotes and special features about these lands’

histories(PerraudinandZimmerer187‐188).

4.2Atlantropa:SolidifyingEuropeanHegemonyoverAfrica

Herman Sörgel’s vision for the African portion of Atlantropa can only be

describedasimperialistic innature. ItwouldhavesolidifiedEuropeanhegemonyover

theAfricancontinent. Therhetoricofhiscampaignfocusedheavilyonan“equitable”

exchangeofresourcesandfinishedgoodsbetweenthesouthern(African)andnorthern

(European)componentsofhisnewcontinent,respectively.Thestarkimagerybrought

about by comparing the mechanized North with the “jungfräulich” (virginal) South

(Sörgel1932,103)impliednotjustacontinuingrapeofAfricanlands,butmoreoverone

41

intensified through technical prowess. This crucial exchange would have protected

essentiallyEuropeanbusinessinterestsagainstaburgeoningNorthAmericancapitalistic

powerhouseandanever‐increasingAsianpopulation.Sörgelincludedmanyprovisions

forthedevelopmentofAfrican infrastructurethroughEuropean intervention,perhaps

themostimportantofwhichwastheirrigationoftheSaharaandtheconstructionofa

canalnetworkbetweenmanmadelakesdeepintheinteriorofthecontinent(Gall,24‐

25). While some provisions of the Atlantropa project certainly implied substantial

benefits for theAfrican continent and peoples, therewas little to nothing to suggest

that therewereanyaltruisticnotions regarding thebettermentof theAfricanpeople

and their living conditions. Any development would have been based upon purely

Europeaninterests.

Sörgel’sAtlantropadifferedfromtraditional imperialisticambitions in its,albeit

loosely defined, supranational focus. Forgoing the designation of particular national

gains in the new continent, Sörgel focused on Atlantropa’s dividends for the

AbendländischeKulturasawhole–acquisitionsforthegreaterEuropeanVolk.Despite

thelofty,nearlyutopianlanguagethatSörgelusedtodescribehisnewcontinent,there

existed no concurrent vision of a future inwhich race relationswere somehow to be

improved ormollified. The integral nature of theAfrican continent in theAtlantropa

plansurelyprovidedasenseofuneaseamongstmany,giventheprevalenceofracism

duringthattime.FearsofmiscegenationmusthavemadeitmoredifficultforSörgelto

pushhisagenda,especiallylaterinthe1930sand1940sinaNationalSocialistGermany,

and on the greater European scene. In order to combat fears of racemixing, Sörgel

42

chosehiswordscarefullywhenreferringtothepeoplesofEuropeandthose inAfrica.

Europeanswerecalledthe“weiße,nordische”(white,Nordic),orthe“technische”Rasse

(technicalrace).Inaclassicspiritofimperialism,hecategorizedAfricaas“derRahmen

ohneBild” (framewithoutapicture), andas the“jungfräulich,unbeschriebenesBlatt”

(virginal,unwrittenpage)oftheEarth(Sörgel1932,126;Sörgel1938,57).Therewould

benoproblemofmiscegenationbetweentheblackworkersandtheirwhite,European

entrepreneurial bosses (Sörgel 1938, 56). This ideology, incredibly racist in nature, is

made poignantly clear through Sörgel’s constant mention of the “yellow peril” and

simultaneousdisregard for theAfricancultures. To imperialistsandSörgel, therewas

no culture to fear in Africa, and hence no impediment to European control over the

continent.Hesummedupthispointquiteneatly,declaring:“AmerikadenAmerikanern

– Atlantropa den Europäern – Asien den Asiaten!” (America for the Americans –

AtlantropafortheEuropeans–AsiafortheAsians!)(Sörgel1932,115).

InanefforttomakehisprojectmorepalatabletotheNationalSocialistregime,

many of whom were skeptical of Atlantropa, Sörgel publishedDie Drei Großen A in

1938.SörgelhadbeengrantedpermissionbyHitler’sofficein1935topublishworkon

Atlantropaasaprivate individual, thoughhe remainedunder thewatchfuleyeof the

regime(Gall,75).InDieDreiGroßenA,herevisedsomeofhisrhetorictomatchthatof

theHitler’sregime,employingmuchmorefrequentlybuzzwordssuchas“Lebensraum”

andusingpropagandisticsketchesshowingEuropeburstingattheseamswithpeople.

Sörgelalsocalledforaworldexhibitiontopromotehisidea,andhewantedtoholdsuch

an event under themotto “Brot für Europa – durch Atlantropa” (Bread for Europe –

43

throughAtlantropa),mirroringHitler’spromisetoonceagainputbreadonthetablesof

frustratedGermans(Sörgel1938,82).Moreover,hetitledchaptersandsubheadingsin

the 1938 work in a cunning manner, likely designed to catch the eye of National

Socialists or Fascists. One chapter was subtitled “Achse Berlin‐Rom bis Kapstadt

verlängert” (Axis Berlin‐Rome extended to Cape Town), no doubt evoking a positive

reactionfrommanyland‐hungrypartymembers(76).

Figure7:TitlecoverofSörgel’sDieDreiGroßenA,1938 WolfgangVoigt,Atlantropa:WeltbauenamMittelmeer;EinArchitektentraum derModerne.Hamburg:2007.107.Print.

44

DieDreiGroßenA,moresothananyofhisotherpublishedworks,shedlighton

theconflictingideologiesatplaywithinSörgel’sownmindandinthepoliticsofEurope.

Someof theaforementionedchapter titlesand subsection titles, thoughhavingmade

clearallusionstocommonNazijargon,werethenfollowedbytextthatlackedthesame

fervor. Opening with a quote from Adolf Hitler’sMein Kampf,23 Sörgel presented

Atlantropaasaprojectchampionedbythe“pillar”ofGreaterGermanyandtheItalian

Empire,asissuggestedinthebook’ssubtitle.24ThoughquotingHitlerwasnodoubtan

overture to the men in power, Sörgel wasted no time in contradicting the National

Socialistagendainhisownintroductiontothebook,saying,

Wenn es eine Idee gäbe, die höher und stärker wäre, als der Haß und Neid in der

europäischenVölkerfamilie, eine Idee,diemitHilfederTechnik einebreiteGrundlage

zu einem neuen Leben der Völker schaffen würde: könnte man dann nicht durch

ungeheuren Ländergewinn, vor allem aber durch die noch größere Aufgabe und

gemeinsame Arbeit die Gefahr des Krieges und des Unterganges unserer Kultur

abwenden? ... Eine Friedensarbeit so groß, daß kein Krieg Energien findet, durch

dieMittel dermodernenund zukünftigen Technik, welchedieVölker naturnotwendig

undzwangsläufigverbindet!

23SörgelquotedHitler:„AufgabedesProgrammatikersistesnicht,dieverschiedenenGradederErfüllbarkeiteinerSachefestzustellen,sonderndieSachealssolcheklarzulegen,dasheißt:erhatsichwenigerumdenWegalsumdasZielzukümmern.HierbeiaberentscheidetdieprinzipielleRichtigkeiteinerIdeeundnichtdieSchwierigkeitihrerDurchführung.“InEnglish:“Thetaskoftheprogrammerisnottoascertaintheviabilityofsomething,butinsteadtodefinethattask,whichmeans:Heshouldattendtothegoalmoresothanthepath.Thoughwhiledoingthis,thedecidingfactorofanideaisitsprincipledvirtue,andnotthedifficultyofitsimplementation.”Translatedfromoriginalpublication.(Sörgel1938,8).24DieDreiGroßenA:GroßdeutschlandunditalienischesImperium,diePfeilerAtlantropas(Sörgel1938).

45

(Iftherewerean idea,whichweregreaterandstronger thanthehateandenvyinthe

Europeancultural family,an idea, thatwith theassistanceof technologywouldcreate

thefoundationtoanewlifeofthepeople:couldonenotthen,throughenormousland

gains,andaboveallthroughthelargertaskandcollectivework,avertthethreatofwar

and thedeclineofourculture?…Aworkofpeacesogreat, thatwar findsnoenergy,

through the apparatus of modern and future technology, which binds the peoples

throughnaturalnecessityandinescapability.)(8).

This sort ofpeacefulenterpriseand cooperationamongEuropean states contradicted

theNazi’sownplanstoforcefullyannexterritory(Voigt,106).Sörgelattemptedtosway

farrightelementswithachange intoneandrhetoric,butdidnotchangetheheartof

the plan,which required cooperation. Despitea concurrent desire to regain colonies

lost to the Treaty of Versailles and the opportunity offered by Sörgel, the regime

prioritizedannexingLebensraumfortheGermanpeopleintheEast.Sörgelandmanyof

his supporters ultimately remained opposed to theKriegs‐ und Ost‐orientierte Politik

(Politicsofwarandeastern‐orientedpolitics)of theNS regime,andasa result,never

gainedmuchgroundwiththefascistgovernment.

This Euro‐centric perspective mirrored the common colonial attitudes of the

timeperiodandmadeAtlantropaarguablymoreaccessibletothegeneralpublic.Given

thefrustrationinGermanyduetothelossofcoloniesaftertheFirstWorldWar,andthe

expansiveholdingsthatBritainandFrancemaintained,manyGermansmusthavebeen

drawntotheideaofonceagainbeingapartofthegreatcolonialrace.

46

5:AtlantropainScienceFictionLiterature

ThecolossalscopeandtimeframeforcompletionoftheAtlantropaprojektcould

havedestroyedSörgel’scredibilityasanengineerandarchitect. Despitethedaunting

nature of the plan, Herman Sörgel managed to amass quite a following of loyal

supporters. Most of these men and women were fellow pacifists, who favored a

peacefulsolutiontoEurope’sperceivedproblemsandfoundmutualunderstandingina

technocratic visionof the future. Thoughpersonal interest in his conceptwaxedand

waned amongst the greater populace, some of his followers actively promoted his

brainchildasifitweretheirown.Sörgelworkedwithasmallarmyofengineers,mostly

fromGermany,Austria,andSwitzerland–aswellaswithartists–mostnotablyHeinrich

Kley, who provided numerous visual representations of his unrealized dream (Sörgel

1932, VII‐VIII). Beyond the more practical development of engineering schematics,

there were creative individuals who brought Sörgel’s world to life through their

published stories. Novelsmakingmanifestaworld to comeenjoyedpopularity in the

postWorldWar I era, and several so‐called “Zukunftsromane” (science fictionnovels)

werepublisheddetailingtheconstructionofGroßprojekte,suchasAtlantropa.

47

5.1GeorgGüntsche’sPanropa

Figure8:TitlecoverofGüntsche’sPanropa,1930 WolfgangVoigt,Atlantropa:WeltbauenamMittelmeer;Ein ArchitektentraumderModerne.Hamburg:2007.80.Print.

Onesuchnovel,firstaseriesinnewspapersandin1930publishedinbookform,

wasPanropa,byGeorgGüntsche(SpieringandWintle177). Panropanearlyperfectly

mirroredHermanSörgel’sownAtlantropaplan.Indeed,thetitleisborrowedfromthe

originalnameof theproject, andSörgelhimselfwrotean introduction to thebook in

Octoberof1930.

Güntsche’s novel details the socio‐political situation of a drastically different

world intheyear1970.IntheaftermathofWorldWarI,Anglo‐Americancompetition

sparks a war between the British Empire and the United States, with the Americans

emergingvictorious.Intheaftermathofthatwar,theworldreorganizesintofourblocs

48

ofpower–Pan‐America,Asia,anAfricanUnion,andaEuropeanUnion.TheEuropean

bloc,ofwhichBritainisamember,isgiventheformofaStaatenbund(confederationof

states), similar to that advocated by Coudenhove‐Kalergi. Güntsche portrayed the

AmericanandAsiancontingentsashighlyaggressivesuperpowers,placingEuropeand

Africainmuchmoreprecariouspositions.

Hereentersahero. AGerman,Dr.Maurus,proposesamammothengineering

project – dam theMediterranean at the Strait ofGibraltar and theDardanelles, thus

loweringtheleveloftheSeabytwohundredmeters.Dr.Maurus,despitehisGerman

heritageandpridetherein,considershimselfamanofEurope.Quiteearlyoninascene

withanAmericanrepresentative,MaurusrefersnottoaGermanVaterland,butinstead

toeineuropäischesVaterland(aEuropeanFatherland)(Güntsche14).

Throughdeterminationandpatience,Maurusisabletobringaboutaconvention

oftheEuropeanpowersinGeneva,anddespitetheprotestofaBritishrepresentative,

thedelegatesofthecouncilarepersuadedtopursuehisidea.Thoughconvincedofthe

validityoftheplan,therepresentativesconcludethattheycannotraisethemoney,and

aresurprisinglyprovidedfundingbythepresidentoftheAfricanUnion.Thispresident,

namedMao‐Ssai,isdescribedintermsbefittingadictatorormonarch,andisalsovery

wealthy.Hiscontributionwouldbeintheformofmoneyandasubstantiallaborforce

for the project. It is no coincidence that Mao‐Ssai is so amenable to the idea of

cooperatingwiththeEuropeanUnion–hehimselfbeingthesonofaGermanandan

African queen. In addition, he has fallen in love with Adelgart, the daughter of a

powerfulGermanindustryleader,GeheimratVerschüren.

49

Verschüren is every bit asmuch inspired byMaurus’s idea asMaurus himself.

Hemanagestoinsurethatagreatdealoftheconstructionworkdoneonthegreatdam

willbecontractedbyGerman industrialists–ensuringGermany’sabilitytopaybacka

largedebtstillowedduetotheFirstWorldWar,decadesearlier.

With the support of theAfricanmogul, construction begins. Despite constant

attempts by American and Asian agents to sabotage construction and an incident

involving the bribery of British guards to ignore a bombing plot, the construction is

successfullyexecuted.Onlyfouryearsafterinitiation,thedamatGibraltariscompleted

in1974,andtheworldgazesinaweatthespectacleofashrinkingMediterranean.The

love story of the novel also blossoms with the marriage of Adelgart and Mao‐Ssai,

symbolizingthebondbetweentheEuropeanandAfricanUnions.Intheend,Mao‐Ssai

congratulatesDr.Maurusandhismasterpiece–Panropa,thenewstate(266).

PerhapsthegreatestandmostintriguingdiscrepancybetweenGüntsche’snovel

andSörgel’sownvisioncameintheformofracerelations.MennoSpieringdocuments

this contrast in his essay “Engineering Europe: The European Idea in Interbellum

Literature,TheCaseofPanropa.”Thoughtherecanbenoconclusivedeterminationof

how Sörgel felt about Güntsche’s end product, Spiering aptly assumes that the

“suggestion that black and white might intermarry must have dismayed Sörgel”

(Spiering and Wintle 188‐189). The African president Mao‐Ssai is presented as

essentially European, not because of blood, but instead because of acculturation.

Adelgart’s sister, Hella, is the voice of “progress” in the novel, callingMao‐Ssai “ein

weißer Neger” (a white negro), inferring that he is the equal of the European white

50

races (Güntsche 33). This progressive depiction of the future was not lost on the

NationalSocialists,whocondemnedPanropa.Theirnewspaper,VölkischerBeobachter,

condemned the novel, calling it a “Zionist ‘Völkervermischungsprojekt’” (race‐mixing

project) (Voigt 112). Though Panropa may not have been well‐received by the NS

regime,SörgelhimselfmaintainedhislinethatAfricanswerefarinferiortoEuropeans,

and as such, would simply receive the gracious European interventionwith gratitude

andappreciation.

5.2J.E.Wells’ProjektAtlantropa

J.E.WellspublishedanothernoveldetailingtherealizationofHermanSörgel’s

dream in 1956 with the title Projekt Atlantropa. J. E. Wells was the pen name of

EberhardSetz,mostlikelyhonoringthefatherofsciencefiction,H.G.Wells(Voigt,138).

ProjektAtlantropapresentsastorylinenearlyidenticaltothatsetupbyGüntsche,with

someminorchanges,mostlyduetothelater,postWorldWarIIpublicationdate.

In Well’s account, the “yellow” peril is replaced with the “red” peril – giving

credence to the rise of the Soviet Bloc and their influence to Europe’s east.

Furthermore,manyoftheresidentsalongtheMediterraneancoastprotestwhatwould

ultimatelybethedestructionoftheirhomes.Thedifficultiesovercomingtheobjections

of this population gave a nod to someofHerman Sörgel’s owndifficulties convincing

somecountries–mostnotably Italy–tocomeonboardwithhisplan. Onceagain,a

Germanengineer,KaiManner,spearheadsthepushforAtlantropa.Theprimarydriving

force behind the project is to create desperately needed Lebensraum for the United

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StatesofEurope.InWell’saccount,theburgeoningpopulationisswellingduetoahuge

influxofrefugeesfleeingtheSovietUnion.LikeGüntsche’sstory,Well’snarrativeends

positively for the proponents of Atlantropa. The novel ends with an all‐too‐familiar

rallying cry first envisioned by Herman Sörgel: “Zwei Erdteile haben einen dritten

geboren”(Twocontinentshavebornathird)(Wells270).

Spieringnotesthattheimplementationofsuchamega‐projectdidnotseemas

foreign in the period after the SecondWorldWar because of a heightened sense of

optimism,contrastingthemoodaftertheFirstWorldWar. Inaddition,theadventof

nucleartechnologyandtheincrediblepowerbehinditmadethefeasibilityofsuchgreat

projectmorebelievable.Thisapparentfeasibilitywaslentcredibilitybytheproposalof

the Dawvydow Canal system in the Soviet Union, whichwould have seen a series of

canals built with the aid of nuclear detonations through the U.S.S.R. (Spiering and

Wintle196).Ironically,thisverysamevalidationlentbythedawningoftheatomicage

alsospelleddoomforthepracticalityofdammingtheMediterranean,andhydroelectric

poweringeneral(Gall166).

Georg Güntsche’s Panropa and J. E. Wells’ Projekt Atlantropa both fictionally

chroniclethefulfillmentofHermanSörgel’spersonalquesttooverseethe loweringof

theMediterraneanthroughdamming.Theengineersinbothnovelssocloselyresemble

the actual Herman Sörgel that one can refer to Maurus, Manner, or Sörgel

interchangeablyinthediscourseonAtlantropa.Bothnovelspresentthisnarrativeinan

extremely similar manner, involving many literary motifs common to science fiction

novelsofthetime.

52

5.3:DerDeutscheZukunftsroman1918‐1945

DinaBrandtexploresmanyprevailingmotifsinGermansciencefictionliterature

intheyearsbetweentheendsofthetwoWorldWarsinherdissertationDerDeutsche

Zukunftsroman1918‐1945:GattungstypologieundsozialgeschichtlicheVerortung. One

can draw many conclusions about Sörgel and his personal perspective through her

analysisofthesefictionalworks.Inherwork,Brandtfirstdelineatesthecharacteristics

constitutingaZukunftsromanassuch:

Die erzählte Handlung in einem Zukunftsroman kann zwar zu dem Zeitpunkt (oder

früher),zudemdasBucherschienenist,beginnen,siemußaber

– technischeoder/und

– politischeoder/und

– sozialeElemente/Konstellationenaufweisen,diezudiesemZeitpunktnoch

nichtmöglich,aberfürdieZukunftdenkbarsind.

(Thenarratedplotinasciencefictionnovelmayactuallybeginatthetime(orearlier)at

which it was published. The plot must however present: technical and/or political

and/or social elements that are not possible at that specific point in time, but are

conceivableinthefuture.)(Brandt81‐82).

Withoutquestion,bothofthesenovels(andSörgel’sprojectitself)fulfilltheguidelines

laidoutbyBrandt.SherefersdirectlytoAtlantropawhenanalyzingthecommontheme

of autarky – especially in the sense of obtaining new resources. In particular, she

focuses on the obsessionwithLebensraum,whichwas a commonality amongstmany

worksofsciencefictioninthetime(81‐82).

53

InheranalysisofoverfourhundredZukunftsromane,Brandtfindsanextremely

high incidence of what she calls “engineering fantasies.” These Ingenieurphantasien

(engineer’s fantasies, or engineering fantasies) stand in contrast to other novels that

focus primarily on Völkerbund‐ or Weltkriegsszenarios (International alliance/league

scenariosorworldwarscenarios),inthatthesignificantdrivingforceofthenarrativeis

placed upon the project itself. Other considerations – political, social, or economic

events or repercussions – are secondary (104). The engineer has no direct personal

interestinchangingthepoliticallandscape.Hedoesnotsetouttocreateanyunionof

states. Instead, he only interested in presenting to theworld the possibilitiesmade

availabletoitbytherealizationofhisconcept.InVölkerbund‐andWeltkriegsszenarios,

there exists instead an explicit desire to affect political and social change, often as a

resultof technicalachievement. Thetechnicaldetailsarethen,however,downplayed

(105).

Though Brandt categorizes Herman Sörgel’s Atlantropaprojekt and the novels

fictionalizing its construction as Ingenieurphantasien (81), there is an argument to be

made that theycombinebothengineer’s fantasieswiththe“union” literature. Sörgel

presentedAtlantropaastheengineer’ssolutiontothedeclineofEuropeancultureand

distancedhimselffrom“politicallymotivated”solutionslikethatofCoudenhove‐Kalergi,

buthe reliedupon thenecessaryamalgamationofEuropeannation states inorder to

accomplishhisgoal.Itgoeswithoutsaying(andisassumed)thatafusionofsomesort

musttakeplaceamongstEuropeanstates.Hiswastheengineer’ssolutiontounitingdie

AbendländischenVölker. OnecanthenreasonthatGüntscheandWell’sworks,which

54

merelyaddcharacterstoSörgel’svision,mustthenbeamalgamsofIngenieurphantasie

andVölkerbundszenario.

Another commonality of the Zukunftsroman is the presence of a technocratic

hero. This figure, according to Brandt, is simultaneously secretive and ingenious,

suddenlycomingtotheforefrontofsocietytopresentanew“superweapon”tocombat

theailsofthenation.Inthepursuitofhisgoal,heisautocraticandvirtuallydictatorial–

showing a nearly “Hitler‐like mentality” – in his actions. She notes also that the

engineer hero desires no political power or capital, beyondwhat is necessary for the

completion of his project (236). The fervor that Brandt describes here is certainly

befittingSörgelandhisfictionalcounterpartsMaurusandManner.

Our“hero”Sörgeldifferentiateshimself,however,fromBrandt’sdepictioninhis

relationshipwiththepublicandtheinclinationtopropagandizeAtlantropa.Shewrites

thattheIngenieurhelddoesnotmovetoinformthepublicmorethanisnecessaryabout

the project – the effects and results of the Großprojekt alone stand as reason and

propagandaenough(236).Sörgel,bycontrast,openlysoughttoinformthepublicabout

his plan from the onset. He published his first volume describing Atlantropa in four

languageswiththeintentionofreachingandconvincingasmanyintheEuropeanpublic

aspossible.WhereBrandt’sheroesmightonlyopenlyadvertisetheirprojectsinorder

to gain financial support, Sörgel and his fictional incarnations, Maurus and Manner,

werequiteopentothepublic,seizinganyopportunityfordiscussion.

BrandtdirectlyaddressesAtlantropaandGeorgGüntsche’sPanropainherwork

as archetypal ofGerman Zukunftsromane. Though the project and its fictionalization

55

bothsharemanyofthemotifsthatarecommontothesenovels,thereisastrongcase

for their uniqueness. Indeed, the fact that Sörgel and his alter egos contradict the

typicalheroinheranalysis–evenifonlyslightly–lendscredencetotheatypicalnature

oftheAtlantropawithinthehistoricalnarrative.

56

Conclusions–Atlantropa:SnapshotofaDynamicTimePeriod

HermanSörgel’sAtlantropaproject,despite its breathtakingexpanse, is nearly

forgotten. It remains littlemorethanaflashpoint insomeofWesternsociety’smost

sordidyears. Though it isnotalone inthis regard, itcertainlywasunique intermsof

scale.Atlantropabelongedtoanotherera–anerainwhichtechnocraticGroßprojekte

weretheanswertodesperatetribulationsintheformofwarsandsocialstrife.Despite

somebriefmention in several science fictionbooksand stories in theearly twentieth

century, Atlantropa or other similar incarnations have not since garnered much

attentioninrecentsciencefiction.Today,HermanSörgel’sdreamand life’sworklives

oninthemindsofahandfulofhistoriansandadocumentaryfilm25focusingmostlyon

thetechnicalaspectsandludicrousnatureoftheproposal.

Onemustthenquestiontherelevanceofoneman’scompulsivequestto,quite

literally,buildanewcontinent,especiallyaquest thatnever cameanywhereclose to

commencement,much less fruition. Atsurface level,Atlantropaholds little relevance

for our world today as a solution to the energy, environmental, social, and political

problems that we (still) face. It goes without saying that the environmental

consequencesoffundamentallyalteringthefaceofourplanetwouldbenothingshort

of devastating – though such environmental balances were not fully understood in

Sörgel’s time. In cases where those consequences were apparent, they might have

25Morales,MichelHaraldRauser,andChrisHof.Atlantropa–DerTraumvomneuenContinent–DVD

57

simply been ignored. Beyond thismost obvious environmental issue lie questions of

feasibility based upon the sheer proportions of his dams and infrastructure. Sörgel

himselfavoidedansweringsomeofthesequestionsonmanylevels,placinghisfaithin

forthcomingadvancementsintechnologyandthepowerfulwillof“dasAbendländische

Volk.”Anengineeringprojectrifewithimpracticalitiesandonsuchamonolithicscale–

thatithasnotbeenattemptednearlyacenturylater–isperhapsbestsuitedtoastudy

of“whatnottodo”intheengineeringworld.

Whatattentiondoesthensucha ludicrousproposaldeserveinthenarrativeof

Westernhistory?ArgumentsmaybemadeagainstAtlantropa’ssignificancebecauseof

the general failure of the project to ever get off the ground, despite any brief

excitement of the public about the proposal. Although numerous megaproject

proposalsfilledthepagesofnewspapersandtheliteratureofthepost‐WorldWarItime

period around theworld, very fewwere brought to fruition. Prominent examples of

megaprojects actually realized might be the Panama Canal, the Tennessee Valley

Authority, or the Channel Tunnel. Nonetheless, these projects very obviously pale in

comparisontosomethingofthemagnitudethatHermanSörgelproposed–alteringthe

very physical composition and appearance of the Earth. Perhaps Atlantropamerits

closerexaminationbasedsolelyonitscuriousnatureasamonumentalundertaking.

A closer inspection of Atlantropa and its designer quickly brings to light

justificationforitsplaceinthehistorybooks.Bothprojectanddesigner,inparticular,

exemplifynotjustone,butindeedmanydifferentsocio‐politicalmovementsinWeimar

andNationalSocialistGermanyandofEuropeasawhole.OnecannotclassifySörgelas

58

amemberofanysingularmovementorofanypoliticalmindset.Thoughcontrarytoa

natural tendency to “label” historical figures, Atlantropa begs closer, more thorough

inspectionofdifferingmindsets.

Could one consider Herman Sörgel a reactionary modernist? Sörgel certainly

embraced the cultural pessimism that engulfed Europe in the aftermath of the First

WorldWar.Awell‐readman,SörgeladoptedSpenglerianterminologyandpromulgated

the notion that Western civilization, das Abendland, stood on the precipice of a

devastatingdecline.Sörgelalsoexhibitedmanytendenciesresemblingnationalism–he

simplydidsoonasupranationallevel,speakingofaEuropeanpeople.Thiscontradicted

theneo‐romanticfocusonaparticularnationalVolk.Bethatasitmay,Sörgelrejected

the Spenglerian notion that nothing could be done to deter the fate of a declining

civilization.Heturnedtotechnologyforsalvationfromthisfate.

Was Sörgel an imperialist? Though popular sentiment encouraged the

reacquisitionofcolonieslostwiththeTreatyofVersailles,theNationalSocialistregime

didrelatively littletoreviveaGermancolonialempire, insteadfocusingenergyonthe

EasternEuropeanfronttoattainnewLebensraum.Sörgel,bycontrast,sawtheworldas

developing into three enormous superpowers, with Europe and Africa necessarily

comingtogethertopreventdominationfromAmericanandAsianaggressors. Though

thesethreeblocswerenotimperialisticinatraditionalsense,hisplanforEuropeansto

colonize Africa was certainly reminiscent of the way in which the imperial powers

settled “virgin lands.” Moreover, Sörgel’s obvious racism targeted against African

peoples–dieschwarzen(theblacks)–epitomizedyearsofcolonialoppression.

59

Evenwithinsciencefictionnovels,representationsofSörgelprovedthemselves

difficult topinpoint. Dr.OttoMaurusandKaiManner,main characters in twonovels

depicting the successful implementation of Atlantropa‐like projects, exhibit nearly all

qualitiestypicalofheroesofthegenre. Theirmulti‐facetednaturesandwillinguseof

propaganda (reflecting that of Sörgel) contradict still the normal mode of most

Ingenieurhelden. Moreover,Sörgel’s introductiontoGüntsche’sbooksuggeststhathe

hadahandinsteeringanyoffshootsofhisidea.Thoughnotaboisterousperson,Sörgel

displayed both a “fast scheuen Innigkeit” (almost shy intensity) as well as “eiserner

Entschlossenheit” (iron determination) in interviews with the press (Münchener

Staatszeitung qtd. in Voigt 15). Indeed, the depiction of the project and its

straightforwardandnecessarypoliticalimplicationsdefythenotionthatengineerskept

ahands‐offattitude towardpolitics. Atlantropa’s championsexplicitly soughtpolitical

union.

Thepoliticalunion thatSörgel sought isembodied somewhatby theEuropean

Uniontoday,albeitonamuchsmallerscale.Helivedandworkedduringatimeinwhich

manyadvocatedthepeacefulcooperationofEuropeannations.Thatsametimeperiod

borewitnesstotwoofthemostdestructiveconflictsinhistory.TheFirstWorldWarleft

theEuropeancontinentintattersandforceditspeopletosearchforapurposefulpath

forward. In that effort, a myriad of social and political movements emerged, each

featuring ideological dogmas. Oswald Spengler’s pessimism served as inspiration for

manyof the tacticsusedby fascist regimes. WithHitlerand theNazi regime’s rise to

power, the impact of pacifist proposals for union in Europewere heavily diminished.

60

Still, the events of the SecondWorldWar do not lessen the historical significance of

proposalsandcampaigns that counteracted reactionary policy. The legacyofRichard

von Coudenhove‐Kalergi’s drive to create a Staatenbund in Europe lives on today in

formoftheEuropeanUnion.

Atlantropawasamegaprojectdevisedinthismosttumultuousoftimeperiods.

ItprovidesusarareperspectiveonInterbellumculturalphenomena.Thatperspective

offersculturalhistoriansanenrichedspatialimaginationofwell‐knownevents.Herman

Sörgel and his beloved Atlantropa manifested qualities belonging to many differing

politicalideologies.Sörgelwasaracistpacifistseekingtobuildanempire‐likeunionof

nations in order to overcome the nearly inevitable impending decline of Western

civilization through technologicalprowess. HermanSörgelpromoted theconstruction

ofthesinglelargestprojecteverconceived.Hedidsoearnestlyandwithoutanydoubt

inhiscauseor inman’stechnological capabilities. HermanSörgel taskedhimselfwith

engineering society. He failed. Today, Atlantropa exists as a blip on the radar of

Westernhistory. The impetusandmotivationbehind thisproject,however, inspirea

mostintriguingglimpseofanalreadyfascinatingtimeinhistory.

61

Figure9:ConstructionoftheGibraltarwerk;PicturebyHeinrichKley,1932WolfgangVoigt,Atlantropa:WeltbauenamMittelmeer;EinArchitektentraumderModerne.Hamburg:2007.119.Print.

62

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VITA

RyanBartlettLingerwasborninEastPoint,GeorgiaandmovedtoColumbia,

Tennesseeatagefive.HegraduatedfromColumbiaCentralHighSchoolin2003.He

attendedtheUniversityofTennesseeinKnoxville,Tennessee,double‐majoringin

GeographyandGerman.Intheacademicyear2006‐2007,RyanstudiedinGermanyat

theRheinischeFriedrichWilhelmsUniversitätBonn.HegraduatedwithhisBachelor’s

DegreeinMay2008andbeganaMasterofArtsprograminGermanattheUniversityof

Tennessee–Knoxville.IncoordinationwiththestateofBaden‐Württemberg,he

studiedinGermanyforasecondtimeattheEberhard‐Karls‐UniversitätinTübingen.

RyancompletedtheMasterofArtsprograminthesummerof2011.