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Development on the Move Measuring and Optimising Migration’s Economic and Social
Impacts in Vietnam
C o u n t r y R e p o r t
By Dang Nguyen Anh, Tran Thi Bich, Nguyen Ngoc Quynh, Dao The Son
March 2010
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Foreword
This report is one of the main outputs produced by the project ‘D e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e M o v e : M e a s u r i n ga n d O p t i m i s i n g M i g r a t i o n ’ s E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l I m p a c t s ’, (DOTM). D e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e M o v e is a joint
project of the Global Development Network (GDN), an international organisation headquartered in Delhi,
India and dedicated to promoting development research; and the Institute for Public Policy Research
(ippr), one of the UK’s leading think tanks.
D e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e M o v e is a ground-breaking global research project gathering new qualitative and
quantitative data about migration’s development impacts. The project aims to comprehensively assess
how migration affects development in a number of different countries around the world, and how policy
can maximise migration’s development benefits and minimise its costs.
We believe the project is unique in terms of scope, depth and focus. We have conducted comparable
research in seven countries, each on a different continent, speaking to hundreds of thousands of people
and gathering in-depth data from almost 10,000 households. The project examines a wide range of
migration’s development impacts, thinking about how migration a s a w h o l e affects development a s aw h o l e . And it is uniquely policy focused, with policymaker inputs at various stages of the research and
fresh, workable policy ideas as one of the key project goals.
This report into migration’s development impacts in Vietnam is a comprehensive study, examining a
diverse range of migration’s development impacts. It also provides an in-depth analysis of current
policies which affect migration’s development impacts, as well as providing suggestions as to how they
might be improved to further enhance migration’s contributions. Vietnam provides an interesting case
for any study of migration’s development impacts, given its historical experiences and the very different
waves of migration that have been generated over the past decades as a result. In particular, in recent
years Vietnam has quite successfully attempted to increase the numbers of its people who have access
to work and study opportunities abroad, with development in Vietnam (while protecting the rights of
Vietnamese workers abroad) one of the goals of those increased migratory opportunities. This report
serves as a timely assessment of the development impacts of those efforts, and provides food-for-
thought for policymakers’ next steps.
All the in-depth country reports are authored by research teams primarily composed of researchers living
and working in the country of study, with this no exception. This, we hope, ensures that our research is
shaped by and references the local context, making the analysis and resulting policy recommendations as
relevant as possible. We would like to thank all the researchers who worked on this report, each of
whom was very thoughtful and collaborative. Particular thanks must go to Quynh Nguyen, who led most
of the research components on a day-to-day basis, and was an innovative thinker as well as a pleasure to
work with. We believe that this resulting report is both fresh and accessible analysis, providing many new
and important insights.
The project would also not have been possible without the generous support provided by an
international group of donors, comprising the Australian Agency for International Development, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance,
the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK
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Department for International Development. However, the views in this paper do not necessarily
represent those of any of the project funders.
If you are interested in the project more widely it has also produced a diverse range of additional outputs
including workshops, a working paper series, a short film, a number of comparative reports, a publicly
available household dataset, and the other in-depth country studies (which examine Colombia, Georgia,
Ghana, Jamaica and Macedonia). Other outputs can be obtained from GDN and ippr’s websites
www.gdnet.org and www.ippr.org.
Please contact ippr and GDN with any questions or comments you have on reading this report.
Development on the Move has been a collaborative endeavour between partners from all over the world
hoping to learn from one another while adding to the global stock of knowledge. We would be delighted
to further broaden that dialogue.
Ramona Angelescu
Laura Chappell
Alex Glennie
George Mavrotas
Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah
Project Management Team
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Table of Contents
About the authors
Acknowledgements
Executive Summary
Section 1: Introduction
Section 2: Patterns of migration in Vietnam
2.1 History and scale of international migration in Vietnam
2.2 Current trends in Vietnamese migration
2.3 Migrant characteristics
2.4 Migrant household characteristics
Section 3: Consequences of migration
3.1 Remittances
3.2 Transnational Communities
3.3 Finance and skills brought back by returned migrants
Section 4: Impact analysis of migration in Vietnam
4.1 Economic impacts
4.2 Education impacts
4.3 Health impacts
4.4 Gender impacts
4.5 Other social impacts
Section 5: Policy discussion and recommendations
5.1 Migration policies in Vietnam
5.2 Non-migration policies and their effects on international migration
5.3 Non-domestic policies
References
Appendix A: Household Survey Summary
Appendix B: Summary of stakeholder interviews
Appendix C: Endogeneity test for the error term in the saving model
Appendix D: The impact of migration and remittances on household health expenditure
Appendix E: Probability of women holding a bachelor degree
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About the authors
Professor Dang Nguyen Anh holds a PhD degree in sociology from Brown University. He is a senior
researcher at the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences and the Research Director of the Asia-Pacific
Center of Hanoi (VAPECHN), Vietnam. He is a leading expert on migration issues, both internal and
international. He participates in and coordinates a range of research activities dealing with social
development, human migration, population and labour in Vietnam and the Asian region. He has
conducted research projects and consultancies for a number of international and government agencies.
He is author of several books, academic articles and journal papers.
Tran Thi Bich, PhD, is a senior lecturer and researcher at the National Economics University of Hanoi. She
is a specialist in statistics and economic analysis. She conducts research and does consultantcy on
institutional economics and development issues in Vietnam. She is also author and co-author of a
number of journal articles and books on institutions and development.
Nguyen Ngoc Quynh1, PhD, is a specialist in development and economic issues who has participated in
and conducted various development projects and research activities in Vietnam and Australia. She is the
Research Director of the Center for Economics and Community Development (ECCO), Vietnam.
Dao The Son is an economist and a researcher who has been involved in various development research
projects and has conducted consultantcy for a number of international organizations in Vietnam. He is a
lecturer in Health Economics at Hanoi School of Public Health, Vietnam. He also delivers economics
courses at Vietnam University of Commerce and National Economics University of Hanoi.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the Statistic Offices of the six surveyed provinces in Vietnam for the
conduct of the national survey on which much of the project was based. We particularly thank Mrs
Nguyen Thuy Chinh at Hanoi Department of Statistics, the four field supervisors and the 60 interviewers
who carried out the survey. We are also grateful to PhoHien Media Company, Vietnam and their
members who are responsible for database design, data entry and editing.
We would like to express our sincere thanks to ippr and GDN for their vital contributions, their valuable
inputs and discussions. Special thanks should go to George Mavrotas, Ramona Angelescu and Loic
Sanchez from GDN, Laura Chappell and Alex Glennie from ippr, and Danny Sriskandarajah, David
McKenzie, Richard Black, Robert Lucas, Vladimir Gligorov and Michael Landesmann for helpful
discussions and support throughout the project. We would also like to thank Mr Do Nam Thang who has
given his fully support during our project. Lastly, we would like to thank team members from other
countries and participants of D e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e M o v e project’s meetings and workshops for useful
feedback and comments.
1 Corresponding author: [email protected]
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Executive Summary
Although migration to and from Vietnam has increased considerably in recent years and now attracts a
great deal of attention from both policymakers and researchers, there is still a lack of comprehensive
quantitative information on international migration and its impacts on development. Researchers have
tended to focus on internal migration and its consequences, and very few policies take into account the
profound impact of international migration. This research is therefore the first empirical study to provide
a comprehensive investigation of the social and economic impacts of international migration to and from
Vietnam and the current policies related to these issues. The report’s analysis focuses particularly on the
effects of migration on income distribution and living standards, savings and investment, labour market
participation, education, health, gender roles and other social factors.
The report has employed a wide range of methodological tools, including analysis of existing literature
and data sources, a national household survey and in-depth stakeholder interviews. The household
survey is the first nation-wide survey on international migration in Vietnam, which allows for detailed
investigation of the developmental impacts of migration and generates valuable new evidence.
Key findings from the household survey in Vietnam
Migration to and from Vietnam has increased significantly since the end of the Vietnam War. Nationally,
5 per cent of Vietnamese households contain one or more members currently living abroad (equating to
about 1 million people currently away), while 2 per cent of households have one or more members who
have previously lived overseas and have now returned to Vietnam.
1. Vietnamese migrants are concentrated in around 30 countries and territories, with 10
destination countries containing more than 80 per cent of Vietnamese migrants – both absent
and returned. The most significant of these are the United States, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia and
Russia. The period of migration is normally between one and five years. Migrants are
disproportionately drawn from the proportion of the population aged 17 and 30, which is the
age at which most Vietnamese migrants depart. The next most common bracket is the 31-45
year old age group. An increasing number of Vietnamese migrants are female.
2. Our data suggests that absent and returned migrants (particularly those from urban areas) are
more likely to achieve higher levels of education than non-migrants. For example, around 30 per
cent of returned migrants and almost 20 per cent of absent migrants from urban areas are
educated to college level or above, compared to just over 10 per cent of non-migrants from
urban areas.
3. Economic factors (particularly the opportunity to ‘earn more’, ‘save money’, or the fact that it is
perceived to be ‘easier to get a steady job’ abroad) tend to drive the decision to migrate from
Vietnam, while the main reason for return is the completion of a contract overseas.
4. Remittances to Vietnam have been increasing in recent years. Female absent migrants, especially
those from urban areas, tend to remit more frequently than male absent migrants. For example,
76 per cent of female migrants who have migrated from urban areas remit in comparison with
64 per cent of urban male migrants. Absent migrants from rural areas tend to remit every six
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months while those from urban areas send money home every year. Meanwhile, married
migrants who go abroad with their spouse and leave their children at home, remit almost double
the amount sent by unmarried migrants (the equivalent of just under US$5000, versus just over
US$2700).
5. More than 80 per cent of the study households report being in contact with their overseas
migrant members once a month or more, suggesting the existence of strong links between the
home country and the Diaspora.
6. Both descriptive statistics and econometric estimations suggest that migration and remittances
have had positive impacts on household income and living standards. There is also evidence to
suggest that migration and remittances have improved income equality in Vietnam.
7. Our survey data reveals that migrant households, especially those with currently absent
members, tend to have higher saving rates than non-migrant households. These households are
also more likely to have family businesses.
8. Although the majority of stakeholders and surveyed households believe that international
migration can reduce unemployment and do not see it as a threat to high levels of dependency,
our data shows that the unemployment rate among returned migrants remains high. This
suggests that the skills that may be acquired by migrants while they are abroad have not been
used effectively.
9. From our survey data, it seems that the impacts of migration and remittances on education and
skills are mixed. For example, while the presence of migrants in a household does not have a
statistically significant impact on the school attendance rates of children in Vietnam, the receipt
of remittances appears to have a significant negative impact on children’s school attendance.
10. The brain gain and brain drain effects of migration in Vietnam are similarly unclear, with only
around 1 in 5 returned migrants reporting having gained additional educational qualifications
while abroad. This figure seems surprisingly low, given that more than a third of all surveyed
households (both migrant and non-migrant) believe that migration allows individuals to bring
back new skills that are useful for development in Vietnam.
11. Our econometric analysis suggests that both migration and remittances may have significant
positive impacts on household health expenditure per capita. However, the data also show little
evidence of migration and remittances having an impact on standards of health in Vietnam.
12. The gender impacts of migration are ambiguous from the survey results. Although it appears
that women living in households with migrants are more likely to hold bachelor degrees than
those in households without migrants, the receipt of remittances seems, if anything, to work in
the opposite direction. Migration also does not seem to have had a significant impact on
traditional divisions of labour within the household in recent years, even though around 90 per
cent of returned migrants report that their experience of living abroad has made them more
supportive of attempts to ensure gender equity.
13. Our household data reveals that returned migrants are more likely to be separated or divorced
than non-migrants. The proportion of single parent families is also higher among returned
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migrant households. However, living away from home also seems to have made returned
migrants appreciate traditional ways of life and culture, with more than 90 per cent of returned
migrants reported that living abroad made them feel more strongly about protecting the
Vietnamese culture and ways of living.
Policy responses
There are a number of ways in which policy could optimise the development impacts of migration in
Vietnam. We recommend that policymakers should focus on:
1. Shaping consistent policies to facilitate the productive use of remittances. Government policies
have not been particularly successful in harnessing the resources which tend to be generated by
migration for development (such as remittances, or the savings that returned migrants usually
bring back with them). To address this problem, it is necessary to cooperate closely with host
countries to improve the speed and reduce the cost of formal remittances transfers through
banks and other financial sector institutions in order to compete with the informal transfer
system.
2. Supporting Vietnamese migrant workers and contract labourers in their destination countries.
The government, local authorities and community organisations should participate in raising
awareness about the opportunities and risks of migration through training and mass media, and
assist migrant workers and their households on making their right decisions about working
abroad. Credit and fund support programmes to provide loans for the poor to cover the costs of
migration should be facilitated to ensure that the poor are able to benefit fully from the
opportunities that migration offers. Furthermore, efforts should be made to equip migrants with
adequate information and training about working and living conditions abroad, as well as about
their rights and the risk of exploitation. This should help to ensure that improvements in income,
for example, are not gained at the cost of migrants’ wellbeing.
3. Encouraging skilled workers and professionals to return, and enabling them to use the
technical skills and qualifications they have gained while abroad. The government should
create incentives for the return of professionals, skilled labourers, trainees and students to
maximise the development impacts of migration in Vietnam.
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Section 1: Introduction D e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e M o v e : M e a s u r i n g a n d O p t i m i s i n g M i g r a t i o n ’ s E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l I m p a c t s ’ is a
large, innovative, policy-focused research project, run jointly by the Global Development Network (GDN)
and the London-based Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr). Recognising the growth of global
interest in the nexus between migration and development, D e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e M o v e (DOTM) aims to fill
some of the gaps in this research area by:
• Generating new, comparable data on seven case study countries through the use of a number of
tools, including national household surveys
• Providing analysis of that data and examining a wide range of migration’s economic and social
impacts
• Devising fresh, innovative and workable policy responses to maximise the developmental
benefits of migration and minimise the costs
To achieve these objectives, DOTM assesses the impacts of migration on development across six
indicators: economic, educational, health, gender, ‘other social’, and governance impacts (Chappell and
Sriskandarajah 2007). In addition to a comprehensive view of development, migration is also defined
broadly. See Box 1 below for our definition of migration.
Box 1: Definition of migration
Development on the Move uses the following definitions:
• Migrant: Someone who has spent three months or more living continuously in a
country other than that of their birth.
Within this, the project examines three different kinds of migrants:
• Immigrant: A person who was born in another country but has come to live in the
country of our study.
• Absent migrant: A person who was born in the country of our study but who, within
the last years, left to go and live in another. Absent migrants are still living abroad. We
only examine people who went to live abroad in the last 10 years in order to try to
minimise ‘recall errors’ when respondents discuss them, so anyone who left more than
10 years ago is not included in this category.
• Returned migrant: A person who was born in the country of our study and who lives
there now but who at some point has lived in another country for three months or
more.
A three month definition of migration differs from the usual definition used in official data
sources, which only includes people who moved for a year or more. We feel our definition
is more useful as it allows us to capture short-term, irregular and seasonal movement, as
well as more permanent emigration.
Although migration to and from Vietnam has increased considerably in recent years and now attracts a
great deal of attention from both policymakers and researchers, there is still a lack of comprehensive
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quantitative information on international migration in Vietnam and its impacts on development.
Consequently, researchers have focused on internal migration and its impacts, and a number of policies
have been implemented that do not take into account the profound impact of international migration.
This research is therefore the first scientific study to provide a comprehensive investigation of the socio-
economic impact of international migration in Vietnam and the current policies related to these issues.
Methodology
One of the great strengths of this project is its use of a wide range of methodological tools, including
investigation of the existing literature and data and a series of stakeholder interviews and workshops.
The literature review and the launch workshop involving key stakeholders aimed to ensure that the
research focused on critical issues for analysis of migration’s impacts on development. Most importantly,
the project has generated its own sources of data on Vietnamese migration patterns and impacts
through implementation of a new nation-wide household survey.
T h e h o u s e h o l d s u r v e yThe household survey was carried out in six provinces of Vietnam: Hanoi and Hung Yen in the north,
Nghe An and Da Nang in the centre, and Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho in the south. Initially, a sample of
1500 households was taken in 90 communes/wards (the lowest administrative units) which were evenly
distributed in selected provinces. Due to their large population size, these communes/wards were then
divided into small villages/blocks with almost equal population size, which we call the enumeration areas
(EAs). 5 EAs and the other 5 reserved were taken in each selected commune/ward. Our objective here
was to equalise the fieldwork loads per province.
To make a sample of 1500 households, approximately 250 households, which are divided equally into
three types of households - absent, returned, and non-migrant households - are sampled in each
province. The response rate in Vietnam was very high except for the case of Ho Chi Minh City. However,
due to the scarcity of returned migrant households in three provinces - Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, and
Can Tho - fieldworkers had to survey returned migrant households in reserved EAs. This made our final
sample up to 1508 households and the total number of absent and retuned migrant households
surveyed varied slightly across provinces. Appendix A presents details of our sampling technique and the
distribution of population and sample in surveyed provinces.
The household survey collected a wide range of information, including demographic, socio-economic
information and migration histories of the household members and the household itself. Household
opinions and opinions of returned migrants on migration were also gathered, providing evidence for
qualitative analysis.
T h e s t a k e h o l d e r i n t e r v i e w sThe stakeholder interviews provided an additional source of information which enriched our analysis on
the impact of migration. Opinions from key persons with different perspectives on migration
supplemented the household data where there was a lack of information, such as about unemployment.
Suggestions on as how migration policies should be shaped were also collected.
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Twenty nine high profile individuals in various sectors were interviewed in Vietnam. A third of these
stakeholders were government officials working at the National Assembly, departments and ministries,
and some government bodies which specialise in international migration such as the Overseas
Vietnamese Committee (OVC) and the Bureau of Administration on Overseas Workers (BAOW). Another
third of the interviewees were academics and researchers from universities and research institutes. The
rest were composed of key informants from international organisations, including the ILO, the IOM, UN
agencies, and local NGOs. Details of the stakeholder interviews are provided in Appendix B.
Limitations of the methodology
This report limits its analysis to the impacts of international migration on socio-economic development.
Internal migration is not included in this research. Another limitation of the data collection process is
that absent migrants were not interviewed themselves: instead, discussions were held with those left
behind in the households of absent migrants.
Structure of the report
The remainder of the report is organised as follows:
o Section 2 describes the history and current patterns of international migration in Vietnam.
o Section 3 discusses the consequences of migration with a particular focus on the role of
remittances.
o Section 4 analyses the key impacts of migration on development in Vietnam, looking specifically
at impacts on income, living standards, employment, education, health, gender and other social
issues.
o Finally, section 5 provides an overview of the migration policy framework in Vietnam, and draws
on the report’s analysis to make some key policy recommendations.
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Section 2: Patterns of migration in Vietnam
2.1 History and scale of international migration in Vietnam
International migration flows in Vietnam has been measured since April 1975, at the end of the American
war. This does not mean that there was no international migration prior to that period. For instance,
there was some movement of labourers from Vietnam to other French colonies during the French
colonial period (1858-1954) (Thompson 1968). There was also a small movement of northern
Vietnamese students to other communist countries and southern Vietnamese citizens to Western
destinations during the American war (1954-1975), although there is no data available on these outflows.
Even for movements since 1975, there is very little by way of officially accurate and reliable data on
international migration (Dang 2003). This report has thus had to rely largely on available information
from different sources. Each source documents a different type of Vietnamese emigrants.
Vietnamese international emigrants fall into four categories. The first consists of documented permanent
migrants and asylum seekers who closely associated with the US and the South Vietnamese government.
According to statistics collected by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), during
the period 1975-1995, there were 1,790,000 Vietnamese leaving the country. Of these emigrants, around
60 per cent left the country illegally by boat or overland to a nearby Southeast Asian country, before
departing and residing permanently in Western countries. The remaining 40 per cent departed directly
from Vietnam to resettlement countries exercising their right to petition for family reunification under
the Orderly Departure Program (ODP). The majority of these emigrants moved to the US (around 64 per
cent), Australia (12 per cent) and Canada (12 per cent) (UNHCR 1995). However, the above UNHCR figure
is likely too low. New estimates by Merli (1997) using Vietnamese population censuses in 1979 and 1989
suggest that as many as 2,768,000 emigrants may have fallen under this category. These refugee
movements finished in the middle of the 1990s following the closing of refugee camps in Southeast Asia
and the end of ODP.
The second type of migrant includes labour migrants who work overseas for a fixed term contract under
bilateral agreements between Vietnam and labour receiving countries. This movement was first
observed in the outflow of Vietnamese workers during 1980 to 1990, mainly to Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. During this period, Vietnam sent approximately 300,000 workers abroad. The
majority of these migrants were unskilled, although 7,000 were experts in health and education (Bureau
of Administration on Overseas Workers – The Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs [BAOW-
MOLISA]). The movement of labour then shifted to Asian countries due to the collapse of traditional
markets in Eastern Europe. Because of the difficulties in finding new markets and the inexperience of
labour export enterprises, the period 1991 to 1999 witnessed a decrease in the amount of labour export
to just over 87,000 workers, of which 40 per cent were unskilled.
From 2000 until the present day, there has been a massive expansion in labour migration from Vietnam
due to a high demand for workers in Asia and the increasing size of the labour force in the country.
Although the destinations for labour export have now expanded to the Middle East and developed
countries, the majority of Vietnamese workers are concentrated in Malaysia, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan
(see Table 1). Unskilled workers still account for a large proportion of the total migrant labour force and
work primarily in construction, mechanics, electronics, textiles, aquatic processing, shipping industry,
healthcare, education and agriculture (Dang 2008). According to the Ministry of Labour Invalids and
Social Affairs (MOLISA), there are now more than 500,000 Vietnamese labourers working in over 40
nations, and the proportion of labour female migrants has been increasing over time.
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Table 1: Vietnamese workers present in major regions of destination, 2000-2007 (number of workers)
Country of destination Year Total
Female
( per cent) Malaysia Taiwan Korea Japan Others
2000 31,500 28.8 239 8,099 7,316 1,497 14,349
2001 36,168 21.3 23 7,782 3,910 3,249 21,204
2002 46,122 22.9 19,965 13,191 1,190 2,202 9,574
2003 75,000 24.2 38,227 29,069 4,336 2,256 1,112
2004 67,447 56.0 14,567 37,144 4,779 2,752 8,205
2005 70,594 34.9 24,605 22,784 12,102 2,955 8,148
2006 78,855 34.3 37,941 14,127 10,577 5,360 10,850
2007 85,020 33.3 26,704 23,640 12,187 5,517 16,972
2008 86,990 - 26,000 23,000 12,000 6,000 19,990
Note: It is noticeable from Table 1 that female migrants are over-represented in 2004. This is because of a high demand for women labourers in
domestic areas in Taiwan that year.
Source: BAOW-MOLISA
The third emigrant movement includes those who migrate for education. Overseas Vietnamese students
include those who hold governmental scholarships from Vietnam or another developed country and full-
fee paying private students (hereafter described as private students). Often, governmental scholars work
for government bodies and go abroad for graduate education or short-term studies (3-6 months) under
the commitment of coming back to work in the same department for a fixed period. Private students
tend to be younger, go for high school or undergraduate study, and have the freedom to choose their
future career.
In recent years, demand for overseas study has risen, especially among the young. The pattern of
studying overseas has also changed considerably. Previously, private students went abroad to study for
university-level degrees but now many children at the age of 15 are being sent to overseas high schools
(British Council 2008). The Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) of Vietnam estimates that there
are now 60,000 Vietnamese students studying abroad, of which the majority are private students (Nguoi
Lao Dong Online 2008). Table 2 documents the number of overseas Vietnamese students in major
destination countries from various sources.
Table 2: Overseas Vietnamese students in major receiving countries
Country Time Number of students
Australia 2009 20,000
China 2008 10,000
US 2008 8,769
France 2008 5,700
Russia 2009 5,000
UK 2006 4,000
Singapore 2005 4,000
Japan 2008 2,580
Germany 2004 2,006
New Zealand 2006 1,400
Sources: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2009; British Council 2008; Nguoi lao dong Online 2008; Academic Service
Cooperation International 2008; Dan Tri 2009b; Ling 2008; Institute of International Education 2010
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Finally, there are individuals who migrate in order to marry. Young Vietnamese women in this category
migrate mainly to Taiwan and Korea. Statistics from the Academy of Social Sciences of Ho Chi Minh City
show that by the beginning of 2003, there were around 65,000 Vietnamese brides in Taiwan, twice as
many as the number of Vietnamese labour migrants in that country. The current figure is higher, with
estimates suggesting that there are around 100,000 Vietnamese brides in Taiwan (Le e t a l 2007) and
27,000 in Korea. Vietnamese brides are drawn predominantly from poor areas in the south of the
country. For instance, among Vietnamese brides in Taiwan, 30 per cent come from Can Tho, 15 per cent
from Dong Thap and 11 per cent from Tay Ninh (Nguyen and Hugo 2005). A survey by the Vietnamese
Female Association in Ho Chi Minh City finds that 67.5 per cent of young women who marry foreigners
have economic motivations for doing so (Wang and Chang 2002).
This emigration and the permanent settlement of a number of labour, professional, and study migrants
add a small scale to Vietnamese refugees. These permanent settlers are known as overseas Vietnamese
( V i e t k i e u ). According to statistics from the Overseas Vietnamese Committee, there are now over 3
million overseas Vietnamese settled permanently in 110 countries. Of these, 1.3 million Vietnamese live
in the US, 250,000 people have settled in Australia, 250,000 are in France, 180,000 are in Canada, and
100,000 have resettled in Germany (MOFA 2008).
Our household survey uses a different definition of migration (e.g. it does not account for entire families
that may have migrated abroad, and it counts temporary short-term migrants as well as permanent
movers), therefore our data gives somewhat different estimates about the scale of Vietnamese
migration. Nationally, we find that 5 per cent of Vietnamese households contain one or more members
currently living abroad (which equates to about one million Vietnamese people living abroad) and 2 per
cent of households have one or more members who have previously lived overseas and have now
returned to Vietnam.
2.2 Current trends in Vietnamese migration D e s t i n a t i o n s a n d d u r a t i o nVietnamese migrants are dispersed across the globe. The household data from the DOTM project show
that current Vietnamese absent migrants reside in 31 destinations, while returned migrants have come
back from 38 countries. However, more than 80 per cent of Vietnamese migrants - both absent and
returned – are concentrated in 10 receiving countries and territories (with each hosting over 2 per cent
of the migrants). Figure 1 displays the top ten destination areas for absent and returned migrants.
Although the orders of countries are slightly different, the top ten destination areas for absent and
returned migrants are nearly the same, with the five most attractive destinations for both absent and
returned migrants being the US, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, and Russia. Collectively, these host over 60 per
cent of each type of migrant.
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Figure 1: Destinations of Vietnamese absent and returned migrants
The breakdown of destinations by gender shows that although men are generally over-represented
among absent and returned migrants, female migrants dominate in Taiwan and the US. This high number
of female migrants in Taiwan seems likely to be because of the increasing demand for women labourers.
In the US, the data suggests that women are more likely than men to migrate to stay with their relatives.
Another noticeable feature from Figure 1 is that Laos is among the top ten destinations for Vietnamese
returned migrants, and that reported returnees are almost entirely men. The explanation for this is that
the illegal exploitation of wood flourished in Laos some years ago, and this profitable industry attracted a
lot of Vietnamese workers, who often came from the centre of Vietnam.
Regarding the duration of stay in host countries, Table 3 below shows that Vietnamese migrants
normally go abroad for a period of 1 to 5 years. However, the pattern is slightly different for those
coming back from the US and Russia. As discussed above, returned migrants often travel to the US to
visit their relatives for a shorter period. Meanwhile, news reports suggest that Vietnamese students and
workers often overstay their visa to work in Russia.
Table 3: Duration of stay in host countries for returned migrants
Returned migrants from (%) Duration of stay
US TAIWAN KOREA MALAYSIA RUSSIA ELSEWHERE
< 6 months 18.3 5.3 1.8 2.1 0.0 9.6
6 months - < 1 year 31.0 13.2 1.8 8.3 1.7 10.3
1 - < 3 years 28.2 44.7 33.9 50.0 22.4 26.4
3 - < 5 years 5.6 26.3 33.9 36.5 25.9 21.1
5 - < 10 years 2.8 9.2 25.0 2.1 36.2 22.2
> 10 years 14.1 1.3 3.6 1.0 13.8 10.3
Overall 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2.3 Migrant characteristics A g e , g e n d e r , e d u c a t i o n , a n d m a r i t a l s t a t u s o f m i g r a n t sIt is commonly believed that Vietnamese migrants are young, strong and highly educated people, and
that their departure negatively affects the production of the country of origin. Our descriptive statistics
in Table 4 show that while the age distribution of non-migrants is roughly in line with the frequency of
16
the whole Vietnamese population, most migrants – both returned and absent – depart at a young age
(17-30 years old). These are followed by people aged 31-45 years old. However, a significant number of
returned migrants also reported having come back at these ages (which is in line with the findings above
about the duration for which returned migrants tend to stay away for).
Table 4: Age profile of non-migrants, returned and absent migrants (percentages)
The DOTM household data
Returned migrants Age groups
The Vietnamese
population† Non-migrants
At time of departure All at time of
return
Those who stay
abroad >=1 years,
at time of return
Absent migrants
at time of
departure
<=16 30.2 25 3.3 4.4 4.5 5.5
17-30 24 24.4 50.3 35.4 37.5 63.4
31-45 22.5 17.7 25.3 35.1 38.6 22.8
46-60 14.4 21.3 10.9 10.8 8.5 5.6
>60 8.9 11.6 10.2 14.2 10.9 2.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: The age distribution follows the MOLISA classification of labour age
Source: † GSO, 2007 for the whole Vietnamese population
The literature suggests that in recent years, Vietnamese females have had more opportunities to
migrate. This is partly because of the increasing demand for women labourers in domestic jobs in some
Asian countries, such as Taiwan province of China. As Table 5 shows, the proportion of women among
absent migrants is much higher than that of returned migrants, both urban and rural. This provides some
evidence for the above suggestion made in the literature.
Table 5 also reveals that while the educational level of non-migrants is roughly in line with the
distribution of the whole Vietnamese population, absent migrants tend to hold higher degrees than
those left at home. Similarly, returned migrants achieve higher educational levels than non-migrants.
This suggests that both ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain gain’ may be happening in Vietnam, which will be further
investigated in Section 4 of this report.
Table 5: Gender and education profiles (percentages)
Non-migrant Returned migrants Absent migrants
The Vietnamese
population Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
1) Gender†
Male 49.1 46.5 47.2 76.7 57.1 51.5 37
Female 50.9 53.5 52.8 23.3 42.9 48.5 63
2) Educational level††
Non 32.3 27.9 24.7 6.2 11.4 6.2 8.7
Primary 26.1 22.7 18.8 13.2 15 15.2 14.8
Secondary 22.1 29.6 17.9 39.3 16.3 30.1 17
High school 9.4 13.2 16.4 29.6 15 30.7 33
Professional and technical 6.7 4.1 9.3 8.2 11.6 11.5 8.1
College and above 3.4 2.5 12.8 3.5 30.7 6.2 18.3
Source: † Statistics on gender for the whole Vietnamese population come from GSO, 2007
†† The educational level for the Vietnamese population is calculated from the VHLSS, 2006.
Figure 2 displays the marital status of return migrants and non-migrants. As shown in this Figure,
although the divorce rate is low for both groups, returnees are more likely to divorce than non-migrants.
17
Similarly, the separation rate of returned migrants is 2.5 times greater than that of non-migrants.
Regarding the marital status of absent migrants, statistics from the household data show that 61.3 per
cent of absent migrants are married and 38.5 per cent are single. Among married absent migrants, the
majority live with their spouse in the same country, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 2: Marital status of return migrants and non-migrants
Figure 3: Marital status of absent migrants aged 18 and older
Note: Here ‘another country’ refers to a country which is neither Vietnam nor the country in which the absent migrant themselves is living.
R e a s o n s f o r d e p a r t u r eThe household data allows us to investigate the reasons driving Vietnamese people to migrate and
return. As displayed in Figure 4 below, the opportunity to ‘earn more’, ‘save money’, or the fact that it is
perceived to be ‘easier to get a steady job’ are the main reasons given for the departure of absent and
returned migrants.
Figure 4: Reasons for departure for absent and returned migrants
18
26.8%
10.6%
3.5%
9.3%
47.1%
41.2%
0.3%
0.8%
2.2%
1.9%
9.1%
2.9%
22.1%
24.7%
16.7%
6.6%
7.4%
36.4%
33.5%
0.5%
0.3%
0.6%
8.3%
23.2%
11.2%
4.8%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Easier to get a steady job
Study and get qualifications
Learn to speak another language
Learn other useful new skills
Earn more money
Save money and send it back
Didn’t feel safe living in this country
Have more freedom to do what wanted
Left with other family members
Left to get married
Went to live with family members abroad
Hoped to find a better job after come back
Other
Returned migrants Absent migrants
The largest share of returned migrants (27 per cent) reported that they came back home because their
particular contract overseas finished, while 16.8 per cent of them stated that they come back with their
family and 15 per cent come back because they felt bonded to do so.
Figure 5: Returned migrants - reasons for return
E m p l o y m e n t s t a t u s b e f o r e d e p a r t i n gReasons for departure are sometimes also related to the economic activities of migrants before they
migrate. Table 6 documents the employment status of non-migrants and absent migrants before
departing. The economic activities of returned migrants were also reported for before their departure
and after their return. In this table, we only consider people of working age, from 16 to 60. As can be
seen from Table 6, non-migrants mainly work, either for an employer (33.7 per cent) or themselves (38.7
per cent). This is followed by people who are in school or other training.
19
Migrants mainly work before migrating. The results may imply that higher salary in receiving countries
(rather than a lack of work in Vietnam) is one driver of the outflows of Vietnamese workers. Table 6 also
reveals a high percentage of absent migrants in school before departing (27 per cent). This may support
suggestions from the literature that there are an increasing number of younger people going abroad to
study. Examining the current situation of returned migrants, the majority are currently working, broadly
in line with the trend for non-migrants. We can also see that the share of returned migrants in education
is smaller after returning as compared to before they leave.
Table 6: Employment status of working aged non-migrants, absent and returned migrants (percentages)
Employment status Non-migrants Returned migrants Absent migrants
Current status Status before
departure Current status
Status before
departure
Attending school or other education/training 13.6 14.7 2.7 27
Doing paid work for an employer 33.7 42.4 39.8 36.8
Working for themselves 38.7 32.4 38.3 24.5
Unemployed and trying to find work 1.7 3 6.6 4.2
Unemployed and not looking for paid work 1.5 0.4 1 1.1
Doing unpaid work for the family or household 2.1 1.5 0.8 3.5
Retired/no longer able to work 2 0.4 3.1 0
Other 6.7 5.1 7.7 2.9
Total 100 100 100 100
2.4 Migrant household characteristics
Table 7 documents the distribution of living standards (measured by consumption per capita) of migrant
and non-migrant households. As shown in this table, non-migrant households are over-represented in
the first two quintiles of the consumption per capita distribution. Most returned migrant households in
rural areas are also located in the lower quintile groups, raising doubt about the lasting impact of
migration on rural areas. However, absent migrant households, returned migrant households in urban
areas, and mixed households lie in the highest two quintile groups of the consumption per capita
distribution. The results suggest that migration can improve the living standards of households which
have members currently living abroad as well as returned migrant households in urban areas, although
migrants may of course have been richer than non migrants before departing.
Table 7: Living standards measured by consumption per capita by household types (percentages)
Quintile Non-migrant hh† Absent hh Returned hh Mixed hh
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
1 43.8 14.2 23.9 3.9 38.5 8.6 15.2 5.9
2 21 21.5 19.7 16.5 28.5 16.7 18.2 13.2
3 19.5 24.8 20.1 21.1 15.5 18.1 18.2 16.2
4 6.2 24.5 15.8 26.9 12.5 28.6 21.2 26.5
5 9.5 15 20.5 31.5 5 28.1 27.3 38.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: † hh: household (consumption per capita is measured by household total expenditure)
The pattern of household expenditure is demonstrated in Table 8 below. As expected, savings are higher
in migrant household groups except for returned migrant households in rural areas. Table 8 also shows
20
that the investment in education of absent migrant households is much higher than that of non-migrant
households, especially those in urban areas. On average, an absent migrant household in urban areas
spends 143,820 Vietnamese Dong (VND) - the equivalent of US$ 8.50 - monthly per capita on education
while a non-migrant household invests VND 55,780 or US$ 3.30 equivalent for this item.2 Statistics in
Table 8 also support findings from the literature that remittances can help absent migrant households to
pay debts which are generated by high departure costs. Furthermore, a considerable amount of money
earned abroad is spent on housing improvements. This is demonstrated in Figure 6, which shows that the
houses of absent and returned migrant families tend to be larger than those of non-migrant households.
The extent to which these patterns of income and expenditure for migrant households are the result of
migration is explored further in section 4.
Figure 6: Housing conditions (percentages of migrants in different groups)
2 Unless otherwise noted, the exchange rate used in this paper is US$ 1 = VND 17,000 (exchange rate at the time of the survey).
21
Table 8: Monthly consumption per capita by household types
Non-migrant household Absent migrant household Returned migrant household Mixed household
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
I n T ho u s a n d V N D
1. Daily need 669.8 994.5 653.2 1,381.1 552.8 960.2 729.6 1,289.7
2. Entertainment 12.6 49.7 18.6 71.4 9.6 55.0 12.4 151.3
3. Health 48.1 50.9 59.8 77.3 25.0 46.7 67.3 77.0
4. Education 27.4 55.8 28.1 143.8 22.3 61.9 21.3 69.7
5. Saving 144.2 141.3 477.7 379 134.9 344.5 711.7 1,313.4
6. Pay debt 35.3 24.6 191.5 72.2 50.4 16.8 184.6 14.0
7. Religious consumption 95.4 134.4 99.3 164.8 72.2 158.1 125.4 222.0
8. Purchase and repair vehicle 74.1 98.3 66.3 118.3 79.2 138.3 49.7 198.3
9. Durable asset and large hh items 47.0 46.5 47.7 66.3 34.7 58.8 36 72.4
10. Home repair/ improvement 152.9 462.1 296.3 1,756 202.6 385.9 333.3 722.3
I n U S $
1. Daily need 39.4 58.5 38.4 81.2 32.5 56.5 42.9 75.9
2. Entertainment 0.7 2.9 1.1 4.2 0.6 3.2 0.7 8.9
3. Health 2.8 3.0 3.5 4.5 1.5 2.7 4.0 4.5
4. Education 1.6 3.3 1.7 8.5 1.3 3.6 1.3 4.1
5. Saving 8.5 8.3 28.1 22.3 7.9 20.3 41.9 77.3
6. Pay debt 2.1 1.4 11.3 4.2 3.0 1.0 10.9 0.8
7. Religious consumption 5.6 7.9 5.8 9.7 4.2 9.3 7.4 13.1
8. Purchase and repair vehicle 4.4 5.8 3.9 7.0 4.7 8.1 2.9 11.7
9. Durable asset and large hh items 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.9 2.0 3.5 2.1 4.3
10. Home repair/ improvement 9.0 27.2 17.4 103.3 11.9 22.7 19.6 42.5
22
Section 3: Consequences of migration
This section investigates the consequences of Vietnamese migration that have the potential to affect
development, focusing particularly on remittances, transnational communities, and the transfer of
skills from the destination country to Vietnam.
3.1 Remittances C u r r e n t s c a l e o f r e m i t t a n c e s i n V i e t n a mRemittances are an important source of external funds for the Vietnamese economy. As the result of
revised policies towards remittances and the growth of the private sector (which is thought to attract
resources from family members overseas), the volume of remittances transferred to Vietnam has
increased significantly over time. As can be seen in Figure 7, the share of remittances in GDP has
increased from around 0.5 per cent in 1991 to more than 5 per cent in 2000, and reached around 9
per cent in 2008 – a very striking increase.
Figure 7: Remittances as a share of GDP (1991-2008)
Source: (i) Remittances: OVC and various sources
(ii) GDP: World Bank 2008
Figure 8 indicates the importance of remittances as a source of finance for the Vietnamese economy
compared to implemented ODA and FDI during the period 1991-2008. Since the second phase of
post-war economic reforms in Vietnam, which started in 2000, remittances from overseas have been
higher than implemented ODA and have even passed the level of implemented FDI in some years.
Figure 8: Remittances, implemented ODA and FDI (in US$ billions)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Remittances Implemented ODA Implemented FDI
Source: (i) ODA: MOF and various sources
(ii) FDI: GSO 2008
23
The above statistics on remittances relate to the money sent through formal channels. The real
inflow of remittances to Vietnam is much higher, given the existence of a large informal remittance
market. Information from the household survey reveals that nearly half of absent migrants remit
using informal services such as unlicensed agents or through friends and relatives (Figure 9)
Figure 9: Remittance services used by absent migrants
Interes
tingly,
absent
migran
ts who
migrat
e from
rural
areas
are
more
likely
to use
formal
chann
els such as banks (51.7 per cent) and licensed money transfer agencies (13.6 per cent). In contrast,
absent migrants from urban places prefer informal services. 22.5 per cent of urban absent migrants
remit through friends or relatives, while 16.9 per cent of them use unlicensed agents. Similarly, other
remitters who were not members of the household before departing (hereafter non-member
remitters) prefer informal service providers. 33.8 per cent of this group transfer money through
friends or relatives. Only 23.1 per cent and 15 per cent use banks and licensed money transfer
agencies, respectively (see Figure 10 below).
The results imply the availability of informal remittance channels in urban areas, and the preference
and habit of remitters towards these types of services in remittance markets in Vietnam. This
preference might be explained by the distrust of remitters towards formal channels and the faster
transfer speed and lower costs of informal remittance services. For example, one study of the
Canada-Vietnam remittance corridor reveals that while a transfer through banks takes 2-5 days with
a cost of between 2 and 10 per cent of the transferred amount, informal services take only 24 hours
with a price of 1-2 per cent (Hernandez-Coss 2005). Although this is a case study, its statistics may be
typical of other corridors.
Figure 10: Remittance services used by non-member remitters
13.6%
51.7%
10.2%
5.7%
16.6%
2.3%
12.9%
38.2%
16.9%
8.0%
22.5%
1.6%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Licensed money transfer agencies
Banks
Unlicensed agents
By Post
With a friend or relative
Other
Urban
Rural
24
T h e p r o f i l e o f r e m i t t e r sThe household survey allows us to investigate the profile of remitters, the value of remittances sent
(including cash and non-monetary transfers), and the frequency with which absent and non-member
remitters transfer money home. Table 9 below shows that female absent migrants, especially those
in urban areas, tend to remit more than their male counterparts - both in the likelihood that they
remit and the average value remitted. For instance, 75.6 per cent of female migrants from urban
areas remit while only 63.7 per cent of urban male migrants send money home. These findings may
reflect high levels of economic responsibility within the family of Vietnamese women. However,
differentials in the frequency of remitting are generated by differences in geographical locations, not
by gender. Absent migrants in rural areas remit every six months while those in urban places send
money home every year.
It is interesting to look at the relationship between marital status of migrants and remittances. Table
9 reveals that 100 per cent of migrants who live with their spouse abroad and leave children in
Vietnam remit with the average amount sent almost double that sent by unmarried migrants (VND
84,434,340 compared to VND 46,212,340). Surprisingly, figures in Table 9 show that 91.4 per cent of
migrants who migrate with the whole nuclear family (i.e. with their spouse and children) send money
home. However, they remit the smallest amount compared to other types of migrants and these
remittances may be sent to their parents living in the home country. This may reflect a Vietnamese
tradition of parents relying on their children when getting older.
25
Table 9: Remittances from absent migrants
Percentage remitting Mean amount if remitted Frequency (mode)
VND (thousand) US$ G e n d e rMale
Rural 88 63,824.2 3,754.4 Every 6 months
Urban 63.7 36,469.6 2,145.3 Every year
Female
Rural 90.4 67,014.5 3,942 Every 6 months
Urban 75.6 36,602.2 2,153.1 Every year M a r i t a l s t a t u s a n d m i g r a t i o n
Single 63.7 46,212.3 2,718.4 Every 2 and 6 months
Married and go alone 81.3 52,575.5 3,092.7 Every 6 months
Go with spouse and leave children at home 100 84,434.3 4,966.7 Every year
Go with the whole nuclear family 91.4 43,326.2 2,548.6 Every year E d u c a t i o n p r i o r d e p a r t u r e
None 78.7 32,306 1,900.4 Every 6 months
Primary 88.1 41,128.9 2,419.3 Every year
Secondary 82.4 47,528.2 2,795.8 Every 6 months
High school 73 56,646.8 3,332.2 Every year
Professional and technical 86.5 57,342.2 3,373.1 Every 6 months and every year
College and above 69.2 56,620.7 3,330.6 Every year D u r a t i o n o f a b s e n c e
< 6 months 67 45,164.4 2,656.7 Every 2 months
6 months - < 1 year - - - -
1 - < 3 years 83.9 47,982.6 2,822.5 Every 6 months
3 - < 5 years 71.5 51,308.5 3,018.1 Every year
5 - < 10 years 82.8 55,863 3,286.1 Every year
> 10 years 86.2 40,133.6 2,360.8 Every year H o s t c o u n t r y
US 78.4 35,657.5 2,097.5 Every year
Taiwan 95.7 60,104.7 3,535.6 Every 2 months
Malaysia 87.5 31,841.1 1,873 Every 6 months
Korea 94.2 73,843.1 4,343.7 Every 6 months
Russia 74 80,681.1 4,745.9 Every year
Elsewhere 65.6 48,274.2 2,839.7 Every year
As expected, migrants who have been away for long periods remit less. Table 9 shows that migrants
who have been away from the country between 1 to 3 years remit more frequently (every 6 months)
while the greatest average amount remitted is sent by those who have been away from 5 to 10 years.
During the period 1980-1990, many Vietnamese workers and students migrated to Russia, with a
number of them overstaying their visa and settling there. Most of them have become successful
businessmen and have helped their relatives in Vietnam to migrate. This might account for the fact
that migrants in Russia tend to earn more, and thus remit a larger amount than migrants in other
countries. It is interesting that although the average salary of Vietnamese workers in Taiwan is less
than in other countries (as shown in previous studies), these migrants remit relatively high amounts.
A possible explanation for this is that the majority of Vietnamese workers in Taiwan are women
working in domestic areas. The result may reflect the economic responsibility within family of
Vietnamese women. Because Vietnamese workers in Korea can earn 5 times more than those in
Malaysia (Dang 2008), they remit more.
26
The household survey does not reveal much information on the profile of non-member remitters.
Table 10 classifies these remitters in the descending order of prevalence in host countries. The
distribution of non-member remitters in destination countries is roughly in line with the frequency of
overseas Vietnamese (see Section 2). Among non-member remitters, those in the US are over-
represented, and this is followed by people in Canada, Australia, and Germany. Table 10 also
indicates that the majority of non-member remitters have a close relationship with recipients. They,
therefore, remit a larger amount than other relative and friends who only send money on special
occasions.
Table 10: Remittances from non-member remitters
Percentage of senders Mean amount remitted (thousand VND) Frequency (mode)
Top 5 destination countries
United States 55.6 18,778.81 Every year
Canada 8.8 19,760 Every year
Australia 7 27,883.33 Every year
Germany 7 23,725 Every year
Czech Republic 4 8,700 Every year
Elsewhere 17.5 76,877.83 Every year
100
Relationship of remitter to recipient
Close relative 91.8 29,878.48 Every year
Other relative and friend 8.2 26,857.14 On special occasions
100 T h e p r o f i l e o f r e c i p i e n t sOne of our concerns is which types of households are most likely to receive remittances and whether
these remittances affect levels of economic inequality. The household data reveals that 76.5 per cent
of households with absent members receive remittances from those migrants, while 9.3 per cent of
households report that they receive remittances from non-member remitters.
To investigate the effect of this on inequality, we classify the households in the sample into quintiles
using household total expenditure per capita, with the percentage of households in each quintile
receiving remittances calculated. Table 11 displays the percentage of households that receive
remittances in each quintile using total expenditure excluding net remittances per capita while Table
12 demonstrates the household distribution by expenditure including net remittances per capita.
A noticeable feature from Table 11 is that poor families are more likely to receive remittances, with
the greatest amounts being sent by absent migrants, both urban and rural. For instance, 60 per cent
and 70.7 per cent of the poorest households in rural and urban areas, respectively, receive
remittances from their overseas members.
On average, an absent migrant household in a rural area receives VND 58,804,100 or US$ 3,459 per
year, which is almost double the amount that an absent migrant household in an urban area receives
(VND 32,925,600 or US$ 1,936).
27
Table 11: Household distribution by expenditure before remittances and mean amount of remittances received
3
Percentage of household receiving remittances from
Absent migrants Non-member remitters Quintile
Rural Urban Rural Urban
1 60 70.7 3.2 20.7
2 22.7 36 2.3 9.6
3 23.2 26.7 3.2 11.9
4 14.6 21.5 7.3 16.1
5 36.7 15.8 3.3 13.3
Total 35 28 3.5 13.9
Mean amount of remittances sent (thousand VND) from Mean amount of remittances (US$) from
Absent migrants Non-member remitters Absent migrants Non-member remitters Quintile
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
1 79,957.1 76,772.4 23,992.9 44,379.4 4,703.4 4,516 1,411.3 2,610.6
2 23,812 25,699.6 15,625 9,605.8 1,400.7 1,511.7 919.1 565
3 39,696.6 20,844.7 3,737.5 11,393.5 2,335.1 1,226.2 219.9 670.2
4 47,907.1 22,250 30,735.7 8,325.6 2,818.1 1,308.8 1,808 489.7
5 27,629.6 1,862.4 3,700 32,608.6 1,625.3 109.6 217.6 1,918.2
Total 58,804.1 32,925.6 19,497.9 21,106.1 3,459.1 1,936.8 1,146.9 1,241.5
The household distribution and mean amount of remittances received from non-member remitters
do not follow any pattern. This is understandable because these remittances depend on the
relationship between remitters and recipients as well as the nature of special occasions.
Nevertheless, it can be seen from Table 11 that urban households receive more than their
counterparts in rural areas, on average (VND 21,106,100 / US$ 1,241 versus VND 19,497,900 / US$
1,147).
Table 12 (which shows household incomes when remittances are included) shows a significant
increase in the proportion of households who receive remittances from absent migrants in the
middle and upper two quintile groups. Specifically, 44.6 per cent and 59.8 per cent of households in
the upper two quintiles in rural areas receive money from their overseas member(s), with an average
amount of VND 93,722,200 and VND 79,747.1, respectively, being sent. Our survey also indicates that
remittances from non-members appear to lead to an increase in the expenditure of households,
especially in urban areas. These results suggest that poor households are more likely to receive
remittances and these seem to lead to an increase in their consumption. The impacts of migration on
expenditure and inequality are explored in greater depth in section 4.
3 The analysis presented here and in table 12 is unweighted. This is why, for example, proportions of all households
receiving remittances from absent migrants appears so high – it is the proportion of all households in the sample receiving
remittances from this source (and absent migrants are oversampled, vis-à-vis the population as a whole).
28
Table 12: Household distribution by expenditure after remittances and mean amount of remittances received
Percentage of household receiving remittances from:
Absent migrants Non-member remitters Quintile
Rural Urban Rural Urban
1 22.6 18.1 1.3 5.6
2 31.4 31.8 2.6 8.1
3 38.7 28.2 3.2 13
4 44.6 28.9 7.2 18.8
5 59.8 27.6 8 16.4
Total 35 28 3.5 13.9
Mean amount of remittances
(thousand VND) Mean amount of remittances (US$)
Absent migrants Non-member remitters Absent migrants Non-member remitters Quintile
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
1 28,752.7 28,492.3 6,966.7 13,400 1,691.3 1,676 409.8 788.2
2 42,823.1 39,285.5 11,362.5 10,847.5 2,519 2,310.9 668.4 638.1
3 57,736.5 29,472 10,000 11,383.5 3,396.3 1,733.6 588.2 669.6
4 93,722.2 33,128.6 27,416.7 19,279.2 5,513.1 1,948.7 1,612.7 1,134.1
5 79,747.1 31,546.3 28,157.1 34,033.3 4,691 1,855.7 1,656.3 2,002
Total 58,804.1 32,925.6 19,497.9 21,106.1 3,459.1 1,936.8 1,146.9 1,241.5
U s e s o f r e m i t t a n c e sOur data suggests that remittances may be spent differently to “regular” income. The consumption
break-down displayed in Table 13 shows a somewhat similar consumption pattern for expenditure on
basic needs between receiving and non-receiving remittance households. However, spending on
health, entertainment, saving, religious outgoings, and housing improvement differs between the
two groups, in both urban and rural areas. Remittances also seem to increase expenditure on durable
assets in receiving households in rural places. Moreover, a proportion of remittances are spent on
debts, which may be caused by migrant departure fees.
The figures in Table 13 reveal few differences in education expenditure between households that do
receive remittances and those that do not. These results may suggest that households invest in
education in order to migrate rather than the other way around.
29
Table 13: Uses of remittances
Receiving remittance
HH
Not receiving
remittance HH
Receiving
remittance HH
Not receiving
remittance HH
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Expenditure category
Thousand VND US$
Food (bought) 387 650.6 358.6 615.7 22.8 38.3 21.1 36.2
Food (bought and self produced) 534.3 807.9 481.8 632.7 31.4 47.5 28.3 37.2
Travel expenses 60.6 109 59.4 126.8 3.6 6.4 3.5 7.5
Water 3.1 15.8 2.8 14.4 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.8
Electricity 29.4 75.9 23.9 64.4 1.7 4.5 1.4 3.8
Gas 19.2 38.9 13.9 37.6 1.1 2.3 0.8 2.2
Telephone/mobile phone 25.6 61.2 23.2 65.1 1.5 3.6 1.4 3.8
Internet 1.5 10.6 1 12.4 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.7
Fuel 2.8 1.8 2.5 2.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Rent/mortgage payments 10.8 1.1 6.7 11.8 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.7
House supplies 13 20.1 12.1 20 0.8 1.2 0.7 1.2
Personal services 4.5 11.2 7.2 13.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.8
Clothes and shoes, and materials to make
clothes? 25.7 47.6 22.9 46.6 1.5 2.8 1.3 2.7
Toiletries/cosmetics 11.2 17.4 10.4 19.9 0.7 1 0.6 1.2
Light bulbs, electric wire, plugs, fuses 3.4 2.8 2 2.8 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Medicines and health services 64.2 74 35.7 52.8 3.8 4.4 2.1 3.1
Education 21.3 88.3 28.7 87.8 1.3 5.2 1.7 5.2
Entertainment 17.1 62.9 7.6 54.8 1 3.7 0.4 3.2
Saving 518.8 405.6 146.1 343.1 30.5 23.9 8.6 20.2
Payment of debts 197.8 47.6 43.8 31.8 11.6 2.8 2.6 1.9
Religious consumption 104.6 155.2 82.4 138.8 6.2 9.1 4.8 8.2
Hiring domestic services 0.7 8 1.2 14.9 0 0.5 0.1 0.9
Purchase and repair vehicle 15.4 19.6 13.1 21.2 0.9 1.2 0.8 1.2
Durable assets 2532.7 2422.4 2057 2596.7 149 142.5 121 152.7
Home repairs/improvements 247.3 670.5 134.1 399.4 14.5 39.4 7.9 23.5
3.2 Transnational Communities
While remittances are the most significant consequence of migration, there are other consequences
that are also important but less frequently investigated, such as ‘transnational communities’ created
by communication between absent migrants and their families. These links may create a corridor for
the transfer of remittances and other non-financial assets including technologies and working styles.
In turn, this can have an effect on development. Furthermore, the existence of transnational
communities can act as an incentive for governments in migrant-sending countries to improve
infrastructure.
Figure 11 examines the frequency of contact between migrants and their families. Often, Vietnamese
families communicate with their overseas members monthly (19.8 per cent) or more than once a
month (23 per cent). In addition, 16.9 per cent of households report that they communicate with
their members abroad weekly or more than once a week. These findings may reflect a Vietnamese
30
tradition of close family relationships and may also be the result of an improvement in
communication infrastructures such as telephone and internet, especially in rural areas.
Figure 11: Frequency of contact between absent migrants and their families
3.3 Finance and skills brought back by returned migrants
As discussed in the previous section, finance and skills brought back by returned migrants can
promote development through investment and innovation channels. Our household data reveal that
60.8 per cent of returned migrants bring money back when they return. Regarding the skills they
acquire when abroad, only 17.3 per cent of returnees state that they obtain some educational
qualifications while they are overseas. Of the group that do obtain additional qualifications, 23.4 per
cent achieve Bachelor degrees and 19.1 per cent achieve Masters degrees (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Educational achievements of returned migrants while overseas
A positive impact for the Vietnamese economy is that the majority of returned migrants bring with
them improved working skills and styles. These returnees often learn the language and understand
the culture of the destination country (Figure 13). As a result, they are more efficient human
resources for both Vietnamese businesses and foreign companies operating in Vietnam.
31
Figure 13: Skills gained by returned migrants aged 18 or older
32
Section 4: Impact analysis of migration in Vietnam
Previous sections have looked at general trends of migration and remittances in Vietnam. The
purpose of this report is also to measure the impacts of migration on various aspects of
development. This section gives an overview of some of the economic, educational, health, gender
and other social impacts of migration identified in our survey. The analysis has been carried out at
individual, household and community levels.
4.1 Economic impacts
The literature suggests that international migration has contributed to poverty reduction in
developing countries. Adam and Page (2005) report that both international migration and
remittances significantly reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in the developing world. In
Vietnam, poverty reduction has been the core aim of various development policies. We therefore
intend to assess whether international migration has contributed to achieving this goal in Vietnam.
Here, we are particularly interested in how migration contributes to the improvement of household
income and living standards. I m p a c t s o f m i g r a t i o n o n h o u s e h o l d i n c o m eOur household survey shows that one of the main reasons driving Vietnamese to migrate is the need
to improve their income and their family’s income. Statistics on remittances from the Vietnam
household survey show that international migrants’ remittances are by no mean negligible. Even
though a household with an absent migrant may lose their potential income from that migrant
member in the home country, the difference might be narrowed or overcome by remittances from
abroad instead.
For the purpose of comparative descriptive statistics, households in our survey are grouped into
returned migrant households, absent migrant households and non-migrant households. Returned
migrant households and absent migrant households are partially overlapping due to the fact that
some households have both returned and absent migrant members. An alternative grouping is
households with remittances from abroad and households with no remittances.
Table 14 provides descriptive statistics of the average per capita income of households which report
a positive income. On average, per capita income of migrant households is higher than that of non-
migrant households. Households that receive remittances have higher average per capita income
than households that do not. Households with absent migrants tend to have a much higher per
capita income than that of other households, which might be the result the remittances they receive
from abroad.
Table 14: Average per capita income (1,000VND/year) S a m p l e : H o u s e h o l d w i t h p o s i t i v e i n c o m e
Group Obs Mean Std. Err.
Households have no migrants 461 13,595.7 610.4
Households have migrants 980 21,765.3 977.3 H o u s e h o l d s h a v e r e t u r n e d m i g r a n t s o n l y396 15,068.1 685.5 H o u s e h o l d s h a v e a b s e n t m i g r a n t s o n l y494 25,849.4 1,674.5 H o u s e h o l d s h a v e b o t h a b s e n t a n d r e t u r n e d m i g r a n t s90 28,816.4 4,020.5
Households received no remittances 880 14,743.5 514.5
Households received remittances 561 26,066.7 1,563.1
All households 1,441
33
To investigate the effect of migration on household income, we have developed an econometric
model to estimate the impact of remittances on household income. Table 15 reports our analysis
results. The dependent variable is the natural log of household income per capita over that last 12
months.
Fixed effect estimation controlling for unobserved province factors provides significant results
suggesting that households with migrant member(s) experienced an income per capita 39 per cent
higher than non-migrant households. Table 15 also reports interesting significant findings that
households with absent migrant(s) have an income per capita that is 59 per cent higher than that of
non-migrant households. The income of households with returned migrants was 8 per cent higher in
comparison with non-migrant households, though the level of significance is not very strong.
In general, migrant families have a much higher per capita income than non-migrant families.
However, the regressions with migrant factors do not clearly indicate whether it is migration that
causes this increase in income or whether it is because households with higher income have a higher
probability of sending their member abroad.
Regressions with remittance variables report significant results suggesting that remittances have led
to a considerable improvement in household income per capita. Households that receive remittances
also experienced an income per capita 59 per cent higher than households which do not receive
remittances. Remittances therefore seem to be a large source of family income for households that
receive them.
The coefficients for household characteristics are as expected. Age and education increase income.
Households in which the head of the household holds a bachelor degree or higher are estimated to
have an income per capita of 28 per cent higher than households in which the head does not have a
university education. One year of schooling also contributes to an increase of 2.3 per cent in income.
Urban households appear to have a higher income than rural households (although this difference is
not significant in fixed effect estimation). Coefficients for the gender of head of household are
insignificant.
These findings are in line with the assessment of our stakeholders that one of the biggest impacts of
migration in Vietnam is the significant improvement in household income through remittances,
which in turn has a positive effect on poverty reduction. The findings are also consistent with a
substantial number of international studies that find that migration and remittances have a positive
impact on household income.
34
Table 15: Impacts of migration and remittances on per capita income
Dependent variable Log of per capita income over last 12 months
Sample Household with positive income
With Migration dummy With Remittance dummy
Independent variable OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
If there are migrant(s) in the household 0.402** 0.399**
( 0 4 2 ) ( 0 4 3 )If there are absent migrant(s) 0.586** 0.596**
( 0 4 4 ) ( 0 4 3 )If there are returned migrant(s) 0 94* 0 80+
( 0 4 3 ) ( 0 4 3 )If the household received remittances 0.585** 0.598**
( 0 4 2 ) ( 0 4 1 )
No. of working adults in household 0 82** 0 73** 0.106** 0 99** 0.108** 0.103**
( 0 1 9 ) ( 0 1 7 ) ( 0 1 8 ) ( 0 1 7 ) ( 0 1 8 ) ( 0 1 7 )
No. of children in household -0.179** -0.167** -0.177** -0.165** -0.176** -0.165**
( 0 2 2 ) ( 0 2 3 ) ( 0 2 1 ) ( 0 2 2 ) ( 0 2 1 ) ( 0 2 2 )
Urban 0.175** 0 70 0.161** 0 65 0.145** 0 56
( 0 4 5 ) ( 0 4 9 ) ( 0 4 3 ) ( 0 4 7 ) ( 0 4 3 ) ( 0 4 7 )
Household head characteristics A g e0 01 0 00 -0 12 -0 13 -0 09 -0 10 ( 0 1 1 ) ( 0 1 1 ) ( 0 1 1 ) ( 0 1 0 ) ( 0 1 1 ) ( 0 1 0 ) A g e s q u a r e d0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) M a l e
-0 75 -0 32 -0 49 0 00 -0 68 -0 17
( 0 5 0 ) ( 0 4 9 ) ( 0 4 9 ) ( 0 4 8 ) ( 0 4 8 ) ( 0 4 7 ) I f m a r r i e d-0 47 -0 37 -0 71 -0 63 -0 54 -0 47 ( 0 6 7 ) ( 0 6 4 ) ( 0 6 6 ) ( 0 6 2 ) ( 0 6 5 ) ( 0 6 2 ) S c h o o l g r a d e0 21** 0 23** 0 27** 0 27** 0 26** 0 24** ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 0 7 ) I f h o l d b a c h e l o r d e g r e e
0.375** 0.285** 0.382** 0.276** 0.485** 0.367**
( 0 7 5 ) ( 0 8 0 ) ( 0 7 4 ) ( 0 7 7 ) ( 0 7 6 ) ( 0 7 7 )
Constant 9 84** 9.169** 9.379** 9.476** 9.340** 9.449**
( 0 . 2 9 5 ) ( 0 . 2 8 8 ) ( 0 . 2 7 8 ) ( 0 . 2 7 7 ) ( 0 . 2 8 4 ) 0.275
# of observation 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440
F-stat 24.90 20 5 31.64 29.66 35.11 33.62
R-squared 0.1455 0.1377 0.2001 0.1916 0.2054 0.1964 N o t e: + p <.10; * p < 5; * * p < 1
I n c o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d r e m i t t a n c e s i n V i e t n a mEven though migration and remittances have significantly improved household incomes in Vietnam,
their impact on income distribution is less clear. The impact of remittances on income distribution is
found to be different in different countries around the world. Various studies have shown that
migration tends to increase income inequality (Carlos 2002, Torres-Zorrilla 2008), while others have
reported an improvement in income distribution (Ahlburg 1996, Rodriguez 1998).
35
In Vietnam, Nguyen e t a l (2008) reported that migration increases the Gini coefficient of per capita
household expenditures considerably. However, a recent study by Nguyen e t a l (2009) using the
Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey has shown that migration reduces income inequality in
Vietnam. In this report, we therefore hope to identify more clearly whether remittances sent by
migrants improve income distribution in Vietnam.
Table 16: Household income distribution
Quintile Income without remittances Income with remittances
Number of households Income share (percentage) Number of households Income share (percentage)
1 293 3.3 289 4.4
2 284 8.6 291 9.4
3 293 14.2 295 14.6
4 284 21.4 279 20.4
5 287 52.5 287 51.2
To show the pattern of income distribution, we rank households by their income. Table 16 represents
income shares of households when they are ranked by their pre-remittance income (calculated as
total household income minus remittances from migrants) and when they are ranked by income
including remittances. The income shares of the 2 lowest quintiles increase from 11.9 per cent to
13.8 per cent when remittances are included. This shows that when adding remittances to income,
the share of total income received by poorer households increases, implying a slight reduction in
income inequality.
Table 17: Number of households moving across quintiles
Income with remittances
Group 1 2 3 4 5
M= R= M= R= M= R= M= R= M= R=
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 40 0 40 0 24 0 24 0 31 0 31 0 18 0 18
2 54 54 103 5 0 24 0 24 0 26 0 26 0 13 0 13
3 0 1 1 0 68 69 123 14 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 17
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 52 124 9 0 31 0 31
Inco
me
wit
ho
ut
rem
itta
nce
s
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 5 2 19 52 57 14 N o t e : M = H o u s e h o l d s w i t h m i g r a n t s ; R = H o u s e h o l d s w i t h r e m i t t a n c e s
To better illustrate how remittances improve income equality in Vietnam, we calculate the number of
households that move across quintiles when remittances are added. Table 17 shows that all
households who move up across quintiles are those that have migrants and that receive remittances.
There are 224 households moving up across quintiles. Among households who move down across
quintiles, there are 44 households who receive remittances.
36
Figure 14: Distribution of remittances and their effect on income distribution
0.2
.4.6
.81
0.2
.4.6
.81
Cum
ulat
ive
Inco
me/
Rem
ittan
ces
Sha
re o
f P
oore
st 1
00p%
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Cumulative population share, p
Lorenz of Income w/out Remittances Concentration of Remittances
Concentration of Income with Remittances Lorenz of Income with Remittances
Perfect Equality Line
Distribution of Remittances and Their Effect on Income Distribution
A graphic representation of the cumulative distribution of households is provided in Figure 14. This is
explained below and in Box 2 on the following page.
The Lorenz curve depicting the cumulative distribution of households by pre-remittance income is
used as a base line. The concentration of remittances by pre-remittance income, which lies above the
perfect equality line, shows that a large share of remittances is received by poorer households.
The curve which represents the concentration of income with remittances (i.e. the incomes
households have including remittances, ordered on the graph on the basis of their non-remittances
incomes) moves up, closer to the prefect equality line, implying that international remittances indeed
improve income distribution in Vietnam. An alternative measure on income inequality, the Lorenz
curve included remittances (i.e. the incomes households have including remittances, ordered on the
graph on the basis of their post-remittance incomes) also suggests that income inequality falls as a
result of remittances. Considering the government’s strategies towards facilitating labour migration
from poor provinces, this suggests that policy may be having a positive influence on the impact of
migration. However, the impact is small. The Gini coefficient of the Lorenz of income when including
remittances is 0.461, only a little lower than the Gini coefficient calculated without remittances
which is 0.466. This implies that it may be worthwhile exploring if additional efforts can be made in
order to maximise the positive impact of migration on income equality.
37
L i v i n g s t a n d a r d sIt was noted in previous sections that migrant households and households that receive remittances
tend to have a higher income than households that do not have these characteristics. But how does
this affect living standard?
Using the household survey to look at household consumption in more detail, Table 18 provides a
summary of household per capita consumption on various expenditure items. On average, migrant
households have a higher per capita consumption level than non-migrant households. It is interesting
that migrant households’ per capita expenditure on paying debts and savings is much higher than
that of non-migrant households. Our household survey does not collect information on the nature of
the debt borrowed by migrant households. However, the figures on migrant households’ debt
payment suggest that these households possibly have to pay a large amount of their remittances on
debt borrowing in order to migrate.
Migrant households spend less on fuel, but more on durable goods including kitchen items. That
suggests that migrant households may have money to buy more expensive and more fuel economy
items. Looking at leisure activities, although migrant households’ per capita expenditure on leisure
items is 15 per cent less than that of non-migrant households, they spend much more on holidays (89
Box 2: Understanding the effect of remittances on inequality
There are two ways of thinking about the effect remittances have on inequality. We present both, and it is
important to distinguish between them.
The first way of thinking about the effect that remittances have on inequality is to consider the incomes
households would have if they didn’t have remittances - which we calculate simply by removing the amount of
remittances each household receives from their household budgets, Once we have all households’ non-
remittance incomes we can look at the distribution of remittances on top of this. If more remittances are sent
to households who are in the bottom half of the income distribution without remittances than to those in the
top half, then we can say that remittances reduce inequality.
The other way of thinking about remittances and inequality is to examine the extent of inequality in a society,
and see whether remittances diminish or add to this level of inequality. So for example, it is possible that, as in
the example set out above, more remittances are sent to households who without remittance income would be
found towards the bottom of the income spectrum. In one sense this reduces inequality. However, if these
households then move up the income spectrum, toward the middle or even the top, the poor households who
don’t receive any remittances at all are left behind. Therefore, looking at the overall level of inequality, the
differences between all households in the income spectrum, it is possible that while some poorer people gain
through remittances, overall inequality rises.
Both kinds of inequality can be demonstrated graphically and, through the Gini coefficient. Curves such as the
Lorenz curve show graphically how far a particular income distribution is from being equal. The curve charts a
country’s population from poorest to richest on one axis, and national income on the other. If income were
distributed equally across a country, the Lorenz curve would be diagonal – because 20% of the population gains
20% of the nation’s income, 80% gains 80% and so on. The further a country is from having an equal
distribution of income, the further the graph of income distribution will be from the diagonal line. The Gini
coefficient is simply a mathematical expression of how far the actual distribution of income is from a
completely equitable distribution.
The distinction between these two kinds of inequality is found in how we set them out graphically. We measure
the effect of remittances on the first kind of inequality by maintaining the original ordering of the households
(from the poorest to the richest, excluding remittance income) when we add remittances to their non-
remittance income and calculate the Gini coefficient. We measure the second after re-ordering the households,
to reflect their new positions on the income spectrum, including remittances.
38
per cent). In terms of spending on long term items, per capita expenditures made by migrant
households are significantly larger than those of non migrant households.
To see whether migration and remittances contribute to the improvement of migrant household’s
living standards, we estimate their effect on household consumption. The number of migrants in the
households is used as a proxy for the impact of migration, and remittances per capita are used to
capture the effect of remittances. We follow Deaton (1997) in computing aggregate household
consumption as a measure of living standards. In particular, we leave out rent/mortgage payment
because it is difficult to estimate the housing consumption of households who have their own house.
We also do not include savings, debt payment or the purchase of gold, silver, gemstones and foreign
exchange, as those items do not always contribute to the current living standards of households.
Finally, we exclude the transfer of money to other households, including gifts given to other
households, wedding gifts and assistance in the case of funerals, because those items are considered
to improve living standards of other (receiving) households (Deaton and Zaidi 2002).
39
Table18. Average annual household consumption per equivalent adult break-down (thousand VND) S a m p l e : H o u s e h o l d w i t h p o s i t i v e i n c o m e
Non-migrant HH Migrant HH % difference
Food 6,571.3 11,902.3 81.13%
House supplies and other stuffs 200.9 287.0 42.83%
House supplies 175.6 245.0 39.50%
Light bulbs, electric wire, plugs, fuse? 25.3 42.0 65.96%
Clothing & wearing 499.6 787.0 57.52%
Clothes and shoes, and materials to make clothes? 359.7 572.8 59.25%
Toiletries/cosmetics 139.9 214.2 53.09%
Personal services 90.5 146.6 62.03%
Utilities 1,373.0 2122.3 54.57%
Water 113.2 134.3 18.58%
Electricity 448.8 748.2 66.73%
Gas 272.6 416.6 52.83%
Fuel 34.6 34.1 -1.35%
Telephone/mobile phone 439.9 685.4 55.83%
Internet 64.0 103.6 61.96%
Hiring domestic services? 58.9 105.7 79.48%
Entertainment 242.1 464.5 91.91%
Leisure items? 78.4 66.6 -15.11%
Leisure activities 30.1 57.1 89.89%
Holidays? 133.6 340.9 155.21%
Items of worship, donation to a church, temple..? 157.6 245.0 55.47%
HH member's wedding, funeral and death, entertainment? 504.6 734.8 45.60%
Travel and vehicles 1,806.1 2566.1 42.08%
Travel expenses 1,165.6 1,590.8 36.47%
Repair for vehicles? 97.5 97.9 0.43%
Purchase vehicles? 543.0 877.4 61.59%
Health 494.3 819.6 65.82%
Education 543.4 749.8 37.99%
Durable assets and large items
Kitchen items 31.4 51.4 63.61%
Furniture and large HH items 166.9 245.6 47.14%
Durable assets 206.8 279.9 35.32%
Housing 2,282.2 4985.8 118.47%
Rent/mortgage payments 80.3 135.2 68.50%
Purchase and repairs/improvements of housing, production workshop? 2,201.9 4,850.6 120.29%
Saving and investment 1,498.6 4650.3 210.31%
Put into savings? 1,078.0 3,685.1 241.83%
Buying gold, silver, gemstone, forex? 420.5 965.2 129.51%
Payment of debts, reimbursement, advance payment? 357.9 1,137.8 217.86%
Transfers
Given to other HHs, wedding gift, funeral support? 510.6 730.7 43.10%
Note: All consumption items have been annualised
40
Table 19 displays the regression results of the impact of migration and remittances on household
consumption. It shows that each migrant in a household improves household per capita consumption
by nearly 8 per cent. Similarly, households that receive remittances have a per capita consumption of
approximately 6 to 9 per cent higher than households that do not receive remittances. Table 19: Impacts of migration and remittances on per capita consumption
D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e : L o g o f p e r c a p i t a c o n s u m p t i o n o v e r l a s t 1 2 m o n t h sS a m p l e : H o u s e h o l d w i t h p o s i t i v e i n c o m eIndependent variables OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
Coeff. ( S E ) Coeff. ( S E ) Coeff. ( S E ) Coeff. ( S E )
Household pre-remittance income per capita last 12
months [log] 0.318 ** 0.241 ** 0.247 ** 0.181 **
( 0 2 1 ) ( 0 1 8 ) ( 0 3 7 ) ( 0 2 8 )No. of migrant(s) in the household 0 77 ** 0 78 **
( 0 1 5 ) ( 0 1 5 )Received remittances per capita 0 63 ** 0 91 **
( 0 1 6 ) ( 0 1 6 )Urban 0.422 ** 0.318 ** 0.521 ** 0.394 **
( 0 2 9 ) ( 0 3 1 ) ( 0 5 1 ) ( 0 5 4 )Household head characteristics A g e
-0 02 -0 03 0 04 0 00 ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 1 2 ) ( 0 1 0 )A g e s q u a r e d0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 )M a l e
-0 98 -0 47 -0 60 -0 16
( 0 3 2 ) ( 0 3 1 ) ( 0 5 9 ) ( 0 5 0 )I f m a r r i e d-0 29 -0 23 0 03 0 22 ( 0 4 6 ) ( 0 4 1 ) ( 0 7 6 ) ( 0 6 4 )S c h o o l g r a d e0 28 ** 0 31 ** 0 18 * 0 29 ** ( 0 0 5 ) ( 0 0 5 ) ( 0 0 7 ) ( 0 0 7 )I f h o l d b a c h e l o r d e g r e e
0.244 ** 0.172 ** 0.381 ** 0.257 * ( 0 4 7 ) ( 0 5 2 ) ( 0 . 1 1 8 ) ( 0 . 1 0 9 )Constant 5.548 ** 6.354 ** 5.592 ** 6 69 **
( 0 . 2 5 5 ) ( 0 . 2 2 9 ) ( 0 . 4 8 5 ) ( 0 . 3 7 5 )# of observation 1381 1381 490 490
F-stat 118.39 63.40 32.23 24.30 **
R-squared 0.4473 0.4522 0.4134 0.3807 N o t e: + p <.10; * p < 5; * * p < 1
I m p a c t o f m i g r a t i o n a n d r e m i t t a n c e s o n s a v i n g sThe literature suggests that temporary income, such as remittances, may increase the level of saving
and investment. Our review of the literature on the impact of international migration in Vietnam
reveals that a proportion of remittances are spent on savings, which can be used for investment
purposes in the future (Le 2009). Information from the household survey supports the findings from
the literature. Among absent migrant households that report using remittances differently to regular
sources of income, 21.5 per cent of household heads claim that remittances sent by absent migrants
are used for savings. In addition, 6 per cent of households (including both migrant and non-migrant
households) say that remittances sent by non-member remitters are spent on savings. Figure 15
shows the mean savings per capita during the last twelve months by migrant and non-migrant
households. As shown in this figure, migrant families that have a member currently living abroad
(absent migrant and mixed households) save more than other types of households.
41
Figure 15: Savings per capita by household types during the last twelve months
To establish whether it is the fact of having an absent migrant that makes a difference to household
savings levels, a multivariate model is estimated using the OLS method (Table 20). Results from the
econometric model support the descriptive statistics suggesting that households that have a member
currently living overseas save more than their counterparts (excluded as a base). Among variables
reflecting the characteristics of household head, only health is found to be positively significant.
The results also show that there is no differential in saving levels among households where the
head’s marital status, working situation and age are different. It is surprising that the number of
working adults in each household does not affect the level of saving per capita. However, the
numbers of members which are currently in school diminish the saving level of the household. This
implies that education investment decreases the share of remittances for savings. It should be noted
that although the F - s t a t i s t i c s
is highly significant, the R - s q u a r e d of the model is only equal to 0 2.
However, the endogeneity test for the error term shows that OLS is the proper method (see
Appendix C). Table 20: Determinants of savings
Dependent variable: mean of saving per capita
Coefficient Std. Err.
Number of observations 1507 H e a d o f h o u s e h o l d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sMale -883.1 1296
Married 3996.3 3445.1
Widow 1293.7 3820.1
Divorced† -1372.1 4886.9
Health (in good condition) 1873.3* 1113
Working 2179 1959.1
Retired 1718.4 1928.6
Age 340.7 272.7
Age squared -3.1 2.5 H o u s e h o l d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
Proportion of working adults -853.3 2740.2
No. members in school -1382.1** 617.8
Urban 1250.2 1114.4 M i g r a t i o n f a c t o r s
Having absent migrants 4198.4*** 1090.1
Intercept -11132.5 7373.8 F - s t a t i s t i c s 2 . 7 7R - s q u a r e d 0 2Note:
† Persons who are separate are included in this group
‘***’; ‘**’, ‘*’ are significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.
42
I m p a c t o n i n v e s t m e n tMigration affects business investment in home countries through two channels. First, an absent
migrant, through remittances or the promise of remitting is a guarantee for the family to face
economic risk and invest more (Taylor 2006). Second, returnees that bring back financial assets and
other skills tend to move from agriculture to commercial production. An investigation of the
literature reveals that the lasting impact of migration on investment is, however, questionable (Dang e t a l 2003). The summary from our stakeholder interviews shows that just under a quarter of
interviewees believe that international migration has impacts on the expansion of production. This
section starts with any analysis of migration’s impact on investment in households that receive
remittances and absent migrant households. It then investigates the probability of return migrants
opening family businesses. Returned migrants are examined separately because there is considerable
policy interest in this group in particular as potential entrepreneurs.
Table 21 displays the relationship between receiving remittances and opening businesses or being
self-employed (hereafter family businesses). Though no simple patterns can be drawn from this
analysis, two noticeable features can be observed. First, absent migrant households that do not
receive remittances tend to invest more compared to other types of households. This finding implies
that having a member abroad may stimulate households to invest more at home, regardless of
whether this member remits. Second, a high percentage of households that receive remittances from
non-member remitters invest in entrepreneurial activities. This supports qualitative findings from the
literature that a proportion of remittances sent by the Vietnamese diaspora are invested in small
businesses which are run by their relatives in Vietnam.
Table 21: Remittances and percentage of households having family businesses (percentages)
HH receiving remittances from HH not receiving
remittances Absent migrants Non-member remitters
Non-migrant household 39.4 52
Absent migrant household 49.5 33.7 61.5
Returned migrant household 32 53.7
Mixed household 25 23.2 40
To take a more detailed look at the impact of migration on investment, we summarise some
characteristics relating to the relationship between migration and family businesses by household
groups in Table 22. Interestingly, the statistics reveal that non-migrant households are most likely to
own family businesses than migrant households, and that businesses with only family employees are
found more commonly in this group. Table 22 also reveals that the average number of workers
(including family workers and waged employees) is slightly higher among enterprises of migrant
households compared to those of non-migrant household businesses.
Table 22: Family businesses and international migration
Non-migrant
HH
Absent migrant
HH
Returned migrant
HH
Mixed
HH
Total number of households 469 496 400 100
Percentage of household having businesses during the last 12
months 38.2 34.9 33.3 24
Percentage of households having businesses with only family
employees 76 71.7 73.7 58.3
Business closed down
� per cent of households having business closed down 7 11.1 6 8
� Mean number of years in business 7 9.4 9 11.9
Scale of businesses
� Mean number of businesses 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
� Mean number of employees 2.2 2.5 2.6 3.9
� Mean number of waged employees if using paid
employees 2.8 3.8 4.3 5.8
43
The fact that it is not too expensive to be self-employed in Vietnam may explain for the high
percentage of small family businesses among non-migrant households and absent migrant
households which do not receive remittances. Moreover, statistics from Table 11 show that poor
families are more likely to receive remittances, and poorer households are more likely to spend
money on household daily needs. Therefore, remittances in these households seem unlikely to lead
to an expansion in production. The results also imply that a number of households do not need
external sources of capital from overseas members to set up their family businesses. Nevertheless,
migration appears to matter when taking into account the scale of businesses.
R e t u r n m i g r a n t s a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l i s mReturn migrants can affect the economic development of their countries of origin through
accumulated savings and skills gained while overseas. These allow them to change their business
activity, for example, from agricultural to commercial production. However, the probability of
establishing enterprises, the likelihood that these businesses are successful, and the scale of
businesses, in turn, depends on the business environment in the home country.
Figure 16 indicates some of the answers given by return migrant entrepreneurs when asked why they
chose to open a business after returning to Vietnam (the survey allowed respondents to choose
multiple answers). As shown, 36.5 per cent of returnees report that the savings accumulated while
overseas allow them to open businesses, while skills and knowledge gained abroad come second (27
per cent). Only 9.5 per cent state that a favourable economic environment in Vietnam encourages
them to start economic ventures.
Figure 16: Reason for opening business upon return
To determine what factors influence the probability that a returned migrant opens a business,
multivariate models are estimated using the probit method. Because the impact of migration on
entrepreneurship is clearer when excluding family businesses (which are often small mobile sellers,
as shown in our previous descriptive statistics), we restrict our focus to businesses which employ two
workers or more (including family and waged workers). Two cases are considered. The first includes
all returned migrants, while the second one takes into account only returnees who stayed abroad for
a year or more. The reason for excluding those who stayed abroad less than a year is that these
people were either individuals visiting their overseas relatives or government officials going abroad
to study for a short-term with a commitment of coming back to their office upon return and would
therefore be unlikely to be returning to start a business.
The determinants of having a family business are divided into four groups. The first group contains
personal characteristics such as gender, education and work experience before going abroad, and the
urban/rural origin of returnees. The second group reflects the experience of returned migrants, such
as the total amount of time spent abroad, or the education and work experience gained in the
44
destination country. The third group includes the age of returnees and the time when they returned.4
Migration factors are gathered in the fourth group, which includes dummy variables such as whether
a return migrant sent money home while abroad or brought it back when they returned5, as well as
reasons for returning. The number of returnees in each returned migrant household is also added in
this group.
Marginal effects which measure the impact of different factors on the likelihood of having a family
business of returnees are reported in Table 23. Factors of interest are the variables in the fourth
group. It is interesting that sending money home while abroad has a positive impact on the
probability of investing an enterprise. Similarly, money brought back when a migrant returned
increases the probability of investing in business activities. The number of returnees in each
household has a positive impact on the likelihood of having a family business only when all return
migrants are considered (and not just those that have been away for a year or more).
In terms of the personal characteristics and experience gained abroad, gender, the level of education
prior to departure and the place of origin affect the likelihood of investment. As would be expected,
compared to those who have no or very low levels of education (primary school education excluded
as a base), people with higher education are more likely to set up a family business. Return migrants
who come back to urban areas are more likely to invest in entrepreneurial activities. This is not
surprising given more favourable economic conditions in urban areas in Vietnam.
Similar to the case of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in the study by Black and Castaldo (2009), we find that
the duration of stay in host countries does not affect the probability that a returnee sets up a family
business. It would appear that the achievement of some educational qualifications while overseas
reduces the probability that a returnee opens a business. One possible explanation for this is that
migrants who go abroad to study often work for government bodies and have to come back to their
previous jobs. 6 Another possible explanation is that the business environment in Vietnam is still not
attractive to those who acquire some educational qualifications abroad, and who are able to choose
from a broader range of careers.
4 The time of return is broken out in 2002 because after the period of economic stagnation at the end of the 1990s
following the Asian financial crisis, the Vietnamese government carried out a second phase of economic reforms. A series of
policies which favoured the formation and growth of small private enterprises were issued in 2000 and 2001. Therefore, we
take 2002 as a cutting-point, taking into account the lag in the enforcement of legal documents. The variable ‘returning
after 2002’ is, hence, used as a proxy for government policies towards the business environment in Vietnam. 5 Since the survey allows returnees to report the money that they brought back when returned in its original currency, it is
very difficult to convert many currencies at different times into one common unit. Therefore, instead of calculating the
amount of money, we introduce the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent reports bringing money back
and 0 otherwise. 6 Unlike government scholars, private scholars often stay abroad upon their graduation.
45
Table 23: Marginal effects for the determinants of the likelihood of running businesses with two workers or more
1: including all returned
migrants
2: only returnees who stayed
abroad >=1 years
Variable
Estimate Std-er Estimate Std-er
Dependent variable Running a business having workers >=2
Number of obs 416 345 R e t u r n e e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sMale 0.086* 0.041 0.084* 0.045
Education prior departure
� secondary and highschool 0.111* 0.058 0.141** 0.066
� professional and technical 0.283*** 0.106 0.353*** 0.123
� college and above 0.088 0.091 0.229** 0.127
Working before going abroad 0.005 0.050 0.008 0.056
Urban location 0.146*** 0.047 0.152*** 0.053 E x p e r i e n c e w h i l e a b r o a dTime spent abroad (in months) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Working while abroad -0.126** 0.064 -0.095 0.072
Achieved some educational qualification while abroad -0.124* 0.054 -0.138** 0.058 P o i n t o f r e t u r nAge at return 0.003 0.008 -0.005 0.010
Age at return squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Returning after 2002 -0.044 0.054 -0.046 0.061 M i g r a t i o n f a c t o r sSending home remittances while abroad 0.102** 0.049 0.121** 0.050
Bringing money back when returning 0.080* 0.041 0.103** 0.045
Reasons for return
� Earned a certain amount of money, then came back home 0.113 0.094 0.123 0.098
� Finished study, then came back home 0.030 0.105 0.001 0.108
Number of returnees 0.093** 0.041 0.050 0.045
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.105 N o t e : ‘ * * * ’ ; ‘ * * ’ , ‘ * ’ a r e s i g n i f i c a n t a t 1 p e r c e n t , 5 p e r c e n t a n d 1 0 p e r c e n t l e v e l s , r e s p e c t i v e l y .
It seems that government policies, as proxied by ‘Returning after 2002’, do not have a significant
impact on the investment of returnees. The results suggest that reforms may not have gone far
enough to promote the formation and development of the private sector in Vietnam. This hypothesis
is supported by return migrants’ points of view when asked how the government should stimulate
the operation of enterprises. Their opinions are summarised in Figure 17. As can be seen, the
majority of returned migrants state that providing more business information (58.4 per cent) and
simplifying the policy environment (57.6 per cent) are critical for the survival and growth of
enterprises. This is in line with findings from other surveys in Vietnam (Tran e t a l 2009).
Figure 17: Return migrants suggestions for government policies
46
M u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t sOne of the criticisms of studies about migration is that many of them look for the impact of migration
in the wrong places, i.e. in only migrant and/or remittance-receiving households. Taylor (2006)
illustrates the impact of remittances on non-receiving remittance households by using the multiplier
theory. He states that remittances spent by migrant households can stimulate the investment and
production of non-migrant households. Therefore, migration can promote local production thanks to
income and investment multiplier effects. In this report, we look at the multiplier effects of migration
by summarising the total number of family businesses created in each commune across migrant and
non-migrant households.7
Figure 18: Number of family businesses created by migrant households in rural and urban areas
In Figure 18, the number of family businesses created by migrant households is plotted in the
ascending order across communes. As can be seen in the graph relating to urban communes, a slight
upward trend is observed in the total number of enterprises established by non-migrant households,
despite large fluctuations. This may reflect a positive relationship between the number of enterprises
created by migrant and non-migrant households in urban areas (though it may also be that some
areas are more popular in which to establish businesses, to both migrant and non-migrant
households. Further exploration of the data would be needed to see to what extent these theories
explain this result). The implication is, however, that the impact of international migration may not
be limited to migrant households alone. It can also have a spill-over effect on the expansion of
production in urban areas of Vietnam.
It should be noted that there is no such pattern in rural Vietnam. This, coupled with findings from
Section 2 that most rural returned migrant households are among poor families, raises doubts about
7 A multivariate model which analyses the multiplier effects of migration will be developed in our upcoming working paper.
47
the lasting impact of migration in rural areas of Vietnam. To achieve sustainable development, we
suggest easier access to credit and favourable economic environment must be created, especially in
rural areas. We will return to this in our section on policy. M i g r a t i o n a n d u n e m p l o y m e n tInternational migration can help relieve labour surplus and population pressures in developing
countries. Studying the impact of migration on unemployment needs macro level data. However, due
to the lack of such data, we limit our analysis to a qualitative investigation.
The literature on the impact of migration finds that labour migration, by creating a significant
number of jobs annually, reduces unemployment rates in Vietnam. Similarly, the majority of
interviewed stakeholders (just over 60 per cent) state that international migration has eased
unemployment pressures, especially in rural areas of Vietnam. Our household survey reveals that
around 40 per cent of surveyed households believe that migration can reduce unemployment (Figure
19).
Figure 19: Household opinions on positive impacts of migration
As discussed in Section 2, most Vietnamese migrants have a job before migrating. Only a small
proportion of them are unemployed. The results may imply that migration can help to reduce
unemployment in the sense of preventing the likelihood that a migrant falls into unemployment or
by creating job vacancies for those left behind.
I m p a c t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i g r a t i o n o n l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o nSome of the literature suggests that migration can cause dependency and make people in sending
countries lazier (see Sriskandarajah 2005), which could inhibit development in migrant sending
countries over the long term. Here we investigate whether international migration might be having
this effect in Vietnam.
Our stakeholder interview shows that dependency is not a significant phenomenon in Vietnam. Some
stakeholders state that remittances sent by absent migrants are not large enough to enable
recipients to stop working. Only one interviewee mentioned that impact and pointed out an example
of the ethnic minority living in the south of Vietnam. In line with stakeholders’ opinions, 32.3 per cent
of survey households disagree with the statement that receiving remittances can diminish the
probability of household members participating in the labour force. This is followed by 23.2 per cent
of households which somewhat disagree with the statement, while 16.6 per cent express a neutral
opinion, meaning that the majority of households support the point of view of stakeholders (shown
in figure 20) that this is probably not a problematic issue in Vietnam . Figure 20: Household opinions on whether receiving remittances makes people lazier
48
Contrary to findings from the qualitative analysis, descriptive statistics from the household survey
show that the percentage of unemployed - whether or not these individuals are looking for a job - is
higher in migrant and remittance receiving households, while the proportion of working people is
higher in non-migrant and non remittance receiving households (Table 24). Although the differential
is not very large, the result suggests that remittances might undermine recipients’ incentives to work,
given the unobserved factors.
Table 24: Labour force participation by household residents
Non-migrant hh Migrant hh
Male Female Male Female
Total No of people of working age† 681 649 1404 1378
Percentage of
� Paid employed 45.67 30.82 40.88 28.23
� Self-employed 39 6 42.22 37.96 43.54
� Unemployed looking for a job 1.76 1.69 3.13 2.47
� Unemployed, not looking for a job 0.88 0.62 1.28 2.32
Not receiving remittance hh Receiving remittance hh
Male Female Male Female
Total no. people of working age 1338 1263 747 764
Percentage of
� Paid employed 43.95 30 1 39.76 27.49
� Self-employed 39 1 42.83 37 8 43.59
� Unemployed looking for a job 1.79 2.14 4.28 2.36
� Unemployed, not looking for a job 0.97 1.50 1.47 2.23 N o t e : † T h e V i e t n a m e s e l a b o u r c o d e s t i p u l a t e s t h a t w o r k i n g a g e i s f r o m 1 6 t o 5 5 a n d f r o m 1 6 t o 6 0 f o r f e m a l e a n d m a l e , r e s p e c t i v e l y .
One of our concerns is the unemployment rate of returnees. The media in Vietnam often emphasises
the government’s failure to make use of the skills of returned migrants. Dang (2008) states that the
unemployment rate of returned worker migrants is high. However, he also mentions that this
statement lacks proof in terms of quantitative statistics. Table 25 compares unemployment figures
between non-migrants and returnees. As shown in this table, the overall percentage of those who
are unemployed and looking for a job is much higher among returnees than non-migrants (6.6 per
cent compared to 1.7 per cent). However, the proportion of return migrants who are unemployed
and not looking for a job is fairly similar – and indeed slightly lower - compared to non-migrants.
Table 25: Labour force participation of non-migrants and returnees
Non-migrants Returnees
Male Female Overall Male Female Overall
1. Total No of people of working age 1749 1880 3629 336 147 483
2. Percentage of
� Paid employed 39.97 27.87 33.70 44.35 29.25 39.75
� Self-employed 34.53 42.55 38.69 40.77 32.65 38.30
� Unemployed looking for a job 2.6 1.38 1.71 4.76 10.88 6.63
� Unemployed, not looking for a job 1.32 1.70 1.52 0.30 2.72 1.4
The above analysis reveals converse findings from earlier qualitative and quantitative studies. To
provide more scientific evidence for the impact of migration on labour market participation, a
49
multivariate model is estimated, reflecting an approach suggested by Sasin and McKenzie (2007). We
estimate two specifications. One measures the impact of receiving remittances on the probability of
household residents being in work. The other determines whether being members of an absent
migrant household diminishes the likelihood of working.
The sample for the model includes household residents of working age, which is from 16 to 55 for
females and from 16 to 60 for males. The dependent variable of the model is the employment status
of household members, which takes the value 1 if the member is working during the last twelve
months and 0 otherwise. The probability of participating in the labour force of each household
member is determined by a vector of individual characteristics and a migration factor measured at
the household level. Given the suggestion from qualitative study and descriptive statistics from the
household survey that the unemployment rate of returnees is high, we introduce a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if a member is returned migrant and 0 otherwise to control for differences in
labour market participation between non-migrants and returnees. Results of the estimation are
provided in Table 26.
Table 26: Marginal effects of the likelihood of being in work
Impact of receiving remittance
on labour force participation
Impact of having members
abroad on labour force
participation
Estimate Std-er Estimate Std-er D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e : w o r k i n g o r n o t w o r k i n g d u r i n g t h e l a s t 1 2 m o n t h sE s t i m a t i o n m e t h o d : b i n o m i a l p r o b i tS a m p l e : H H r e s i d e n t s i n t h e w o r k i n g a g e : 1 6 - 5 5 f o r f e m a l e ; 1 6 - 6 0 f o r m a l eNo. observations 4112 4112 I n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sMale 0.108*** 0 14 0.108*** 0 14
Married 0.183*** 0 22 0.184*** 0 22
Widow 0 68 0 46 0 68 0 46
Divorced† 0 89** 0 33 0 90** 0 33
Health (in good conditions) 0 50*** 0 14 0 49*** 0 14
Age 0 92*** 0 04 0 92*** 0 04
Age squared -0 01*** 0 00 -0 01*** 0 00
No. dependents -0 05 0 07 -0 05 0 07
Urban -0 96*** 0 13 -0 95*** 0 13 M i g r a t i o n f a c t o r s
Returned migrants -0 88*** 0 25 -0 90*** 0 26
Residents of receiving remittance HH -0 25* 0 14
Residents of absent migrant HH -0 24* 0 14 P s e u d o R2 0 . 2 6 5 0 . 2 6 5N o t e : † P e r s o n s w h o a r e s e p a r a t e a r e i n c l u d e d i n t h i s g r o u p‘ * * * ’ ; ‘ * * ’ , ‘ * ’ a r e s i g n i f i c a n t a t 1 p e r c e n t , 5 p e r c e n t a n d 1 0 p e r c e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y .
As Table 26 shows, the results are somewhat similar between the two specifications. As expected,
returned migrants are less likely to work than non-migrants and this result is strongly significant. This
could either be because return migrants could not find a job or they become more selective about
jobs upon return. Furthermore, being residents of either remittance receiving or absent migrant
households reduces the probability of working. However, the effect is neither large nor very
statistically significant.
Interestingly, among factors reflecting individual characteristics, the number of dependants does not
affect the probability that an individual participates in the labour force. This accurately reflects the
labour market in Vietnam. That is, participating in the labour force is shaped by the ‘supply’ side, not
by the ‘demand’ side. The signs of other coefficients of individual characteristics are as expected.
50
Married and divorced people are more likely to work than single people (who are excluded as a
reference). This is because single people in our sample are often below 23 years old, which tends to
be the age of enrolling in education programs. Table 26 also reveals that people in good health are
more likely to work than their counterparts, holding other factors constant.
It is worth investigating those who are unemployed and not looking for job in more detail, as this is
the group who are not simply lacking work, but who have also stopped looking for it – people who
have exited the labour force. The profile of unemployed/not looking for a job is documented in Table
27. As can be seen, women are over-represented in this group compared to the ‘unemployed/looking
for a job’ and ‘working’ groups. Table 27 also shows that the ‘unemployed/not looking for a job’
group contains more vulnerable people with lower levels of education and higher divorce and
widowed rates.
Table 27: Profile of unemployed, not looking for job
Unemployed, not looking for job Unemployed, looking for job Working N u m b e r o f o b s e r v a t i o n s60 94 3084
Age (mean) 36.1 27 37
Gender
Female 60 44.7 47.4
Male 40 55.3 52.6
Education
None 20 5.3 9.1
Primary 26.7 18.1 19.4
Secondary 26.7 31.9 27.8
High school 21.7 23.4 18.3
Professional and technical 5 10.6 11.1
College & above 0 10.6 14.3
Marital status
Single 46.7 67 22.1
Married 45 29.8 74.5
Separate & divorce 5 2.1 2.2
Widowed 3.3 1.1 1.2
The model where the dependent variable is ‘unemployed/not looking for job’ is also estimated.
Independent variables remain the same as in the model above about participating in employment.
Marginal effects are reported in Table 28. As can be seen, receiving remittances has no effect on the
probability of not working, while having a member currently living abroad increases the probability of
not looking for a job by 0.07 percentage points for remained household members. It should be noted
though that the P s e u d o R2 of the model is very small.
Table 28: The probability of being unemployed/not looking for job
Impact of receiving remittance
on prob. of being
unemployed/not looking for
job
Impact of having members
abroad on prob. of being
unemployed/not looking for
job
Estimate Std-er Estimate Std-er D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e : u n e m p l o y e d / n o t l o o k i n g f o r j o b d u r i n g t h e l a s t 1 2 m o n t h sE s t i m a t i o n m e t h o d : b i n o m i a l p r o b i tS a m p l e : H H r e s i d e n t s i n t h e w o r k i n g a g e : 1 6 - 5 5 f o r f e m a l e ; 1 6 - 6 0 f o r m a l eNo. observations 4112 4112 I n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sMale -0 06* 0 03 -0 06* 0 03
Married -0 16*** 0 06 -0 16*** 0 06
Widow 0 02 0 13 0 02 0 13
Divorced† 0 01 0 09 0 01 0 09
Health (in good conditions) 0 02 0 03 0 03 0 03
Age 0 01 0 01 0 01 0 01
Age squared 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
No. dependents -0 03 0 02 -0 03 0 02
51
Urban 0 07** 0 03 0 07** 0 03 M i g r a t i o n f a c t o r s
Returned migrants -0 03 0 05 -0 03 0 05
Residents of receiving remittance HH 0 05 0 04
Residents of absent migrant HH 0 07** 0 04 P s e u d o R2 0 5 0 5N o t e : † P e r s o n s w h o a r e s e p a r a t e a r e i n c l u d e d i n t h i s g r o u p‘ * * * ’ ; ‘ * * ’ , ‘ * ’ a r e s i g n i f i c a n t a t 1 p e r c e n t , 5 p e r c e n t a n d 1 0 p e r c e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y .
In conclusion, the descriptive statistics show a lower probability of working among members of
migrant/remittance receiving households and this is confirmed by estimated models. However, the
effect is not very large or significant. Furthermore, an in-depth look into the characteristics of those
who are unemployed and not looking for a job reveals that these people seem to be unable to find a
job rather than being unwilling to work. Nevertheless, migration seems to diminish the incentive to
work to some extent. In addition, high unemployment rate among returnees is evident and this
matter must be brought into the government agenda to optimise the impact of international
migration.
4.2 Education impacts
Various studies suggested that international migration affects education through different channels.
It may have an impact on the level of education of both migrants and those left behind by affecting
the opportunities of migrants to participate in education either physically or financially, or by
influencing households’ abilities or incentives to invest in education. It may also affect the quality of
education in the home country by improving the standard of teaching or by contributing to processes
of brain drain or brain gain.
I m p a c t o n t h e e d u c a t i o n o f h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r sStatistics from the household survey on households’ use of remittances show that 5 per cent of
households who receive remittances from absent migrant members report spending a portion of
these on the education of other household members.
Figure 20 displays answers given by survey respondents to the question of whether seeing skilled
educated people migrate makes people keener to study in the hopes that they may migrate
themselves one day. Given that more than 50 per cent of surveyed households either somewhat or
strongly agreed with this statement, it is therefore interesting to look at whether and how migration
affects current levels of school attendance.
Figure 20: Survey respondent views on the statement ‘Because people see skilled people migrating, they are keener on
studying, because they think getting educated will help them to migrate’
52
Table 18 suggested that migrant households spend more on education than non-migrant households
(22 per cent higher). To investigate in detail the relationship between migration and the education of
household members, the probability of attending school of children at school age (6 to 18 years old)
in migrant households and non-migrant households is estimated using probit regression.
Table 29: School attendance of children D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e C u r r e n t l y a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l o r n o tE s t i m a t i o n m e t h o d B i n o m i a l P r o b i t – M a r g i n a l E f f e c tS a m p l e C h i l d r e n a g e d 6 t o 1 8Independent Variables Coef. Std. Err.
If having migrant (absent and/or returned) in the household 0 3 0.15
Total remittance received per household member -1.14 0.63
If urban area 0.21 0.13
If parent is absent 0.52* 0.24
Male -0 6 0.12
Constant 1.46 0.14
Number of observation 1,002
Pseudo R2 0 2
Table 29 provides marginal probit estimation results on the probability of attending school. There is
no significant difference in the attendance level of children in migrant households (either absent
and/or return migrants) and in households who do not. The impact of remittances on school
attendance is also insignificant. However, while insignificant, it is interesting to note that remittance
inflows seem to have a negative association with school attendance. This may reflect the fact that
remittances are mainly used to pay off debt or are spent on other consumption items, which is
consistent with the statistical findings on household consumption that migrant households spend a
large amount of their remittances on paying debt.
Another interesting finding is that children with one absent parent are more likely to attend school
than those with both parents present. As remittance inflows don’t seem to have a significant impact
on school attendance, this finding suggests a possibility of self selection, in that households whose
members have higher standards of education or invest more in their children’s education are also
more likely to send members abroad. This would support the opinion often expressed by interviewed
households that people consider education as an important means of facilitating the migration of
household members. However, it is hard to draw clear lines of causality here. It may also be that
some children with absent parents feel grateful for their sacrifices and are particularly committed to
education (UNICEF 2008).
Overall, children in urban areas are more likely to attend school than those in rural areas. There is no
significant evidence on the school attendance difference of boys and girls.
B r a i n d r a i n a n d b r a i n g a i nThe impact of migration on human resources is attracting a great deal of interest from academics and
policymakers. Our survey asked households for their opinions on the impact of migration on
Vietnam, and allowed them to choose all the answers they found appropriate. Figure 21 exhibits
opinions specifically relating to brain gain and drain.
53
Figure 21: Household opinion on brain drain and brain gain
Household opinions show strong support for the idea that migration is having a brain gain impact in
Vietnam, as indicated by the responses to statements about the skills and knowledge obtained by
Vietnamese migrants abroad as well as the new skills and ideas brought to Vietnam by foreigners.
More than one third of the surveyed households, both migrant and non-migrant, think that migrants
can gain skills and resources which are helpful to the country when they return. It is interesting to
take a more detailed look at the opinion of different groups. The percentage of non-migrant
households and absent migrant households who chose this answer is relatively low, at 35.5 per cent
and 33.5 per cent respectively. This may be because non-migrants and those left behind in absent
migrant households do not have enough information on how absent migrants are doing abroad and
how they could actually contribute to human resources in Vietnam.
However, the percentage of households who chose this answer in returned migrant households and
households who have both returned migrant and absent migrant members are significantly higher, at
40.5 per cent and 51.5 per cent respectively. This may suggest that returned migrants bring home
evidence of skills and resources gained while abroad. The high percentage of households with both
absent and returned migrants might have many implication.
Our stakeholder interviews also reveal that policymakers and other stakeholders think Vietnamese
migrants are able to gain valuable skills and knowledge while abroad. However, most of them also
expressed concern about whether the skills gained abroad could be used effectively when brought
back to Vietnam.
Regarding the brain gain impact of immigration to Vietnam, more than half of households in every
group support the opinion that immigrants bring new and different ways of doing things. Households
in different groups seem very close in their opinions toward the skills gained from immigrants.
Our household suvery also asked households for their opinion on skills deficits that might be caused
by migration. Only a small proportion (around 5 per cent or less in each case) of households think
that international migration leads to a serious skills deficit, or that the country is worse off as a result
of having to pay to educate people who then leave.
54
A comparison of the percentage of households who support the idea that migration is having a brain
gain impact to that of who think that brain drain is occuring suggests that households appear to think
the brain gain impact of international migration outweighs the brain drain impact. This opinion is
consistent with our stakeholders’ assessment that the brain drain impact in Vietnam is insignificant
because most Vietnamese labour migrants are low skilled.
E d u c a t i o n a l l e v e l o f m i g r a n t s a n d n o n - m i g r a n t sStakeholders and households believe that Vietnam can gain from international migration through the
skills and knowledge that migrants obtain abroad and bring back to the country. To provide more
concrete evidence on the brain gain/drain impact of international migration, Table 30 displays the
educational levels of Vietnamese migrants and non-migrants in the labor force.8
Table 30: The educational level of migrants and non-migrants S a m p l e : i n l a b o u r f o r c e ( 1 6 - 5 5 f o r f e m a l e , 1 6 - 6 0 f o r m a l e )
Absent migrants Non-migrant
Returned migrants
(Education at return) Before departure Abroad Degree
No. Per. Cum. No. Per. Cum. No. Per. Cum. No. Per. Cum.
0-None 341 9.1 9.1 21 4.3 4.3 38 5.2 5.2 33 4.5 4.5
1-Primary school 665 17.7 26.8 67 13.8 18.2 101 13.9 19.1 86 11.8 16.4
2-Lower Secondary School 1165 31 57.9 142 29.3 47.5 172 23.6 42.7 148 20.3 36.7
3-Upper Secondary School 805 21.5 79.3 117 24.2 71.7 245 33.7 76.4 223 30.6 67.3
4-Short-term technical worker 124 3.3 82.6 20 4.1 75.8 26 3.6 80 64 8.8 76.1
5-Long-term technical worker 35 0.9 83.5 14 2.9 78.7 14 1.9 81.9 24 3.3 79.4
6-Prof. secondary school 191 5.1 88.6 24 5 83.7 32 4.4 86.3 29 4 83.4
7-Junior college diploma 63 1.7 90.3 5 1 84.7 18 2.5 88.7 19 2.6 86
8-Bachelor 345 9.2 99.5 50 10.3 95 74 10.2 98.9 71 9.8 95.7
9-Master 16 0.4 99.9 19 3.9 99 7 1 99.9 27 3.7 99.5
10-Doctor 3 0.1 100 5 1 100 1 0.1 100 4 0.6 100
Comparing the educational level of returned migrants at the time of return, and of absent migrants
before departure with that of non-migrants shows that both are higher than that of non-migrants.
The percentage of people with no education among non-migrants is higher than that among returned
migrants (9.1 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively). The percentage of people with higher levels of
education (upper secondary school or more) among returned migrants and absent migrants are also
higher than among non-migrants (except for professional secondary school and junior college
diploma).
Even though the percentage of returned migrants with higher levels of education at the time of
return are higher than that of non-migrants, the rates are not dramatically different, suggesting that
any brain gain resulting from migration is not very signficant, which does not support policymakers’
opinion that migration appears to have strong brain gain impact. This conclusion is strengtened by
comparng absent migrants’ educational levels before departure are compared with return migrants’
education - which is the comparison which may give the most accurate picture of the effect of
migration.
8 This does not take into account the difference between qualifications obtained abroad and in Vietnam
55
E d u c a t i o n a n d e x p e r i e n c e g a i n e d a b r o a dAnother measure of possible brain gain involves examining directly the education and experience
acquired by returned migrants abroad. Only 18 per cent of returned migrants in our survey sample
report having obtained qualifications abroad. This is a modest figure, we would have expected a
higher proportion of migrants from developing countries to have qualification while living in other
countries.
Table 31 shows the qualifications obtained by returned migrants in the labour force. Among returned
migrants who obtained qualifications abroad, the highest proportions gained bachelors and masters
degrees (29 per cent and 25.6 per cent respectively). In total, the percentage of migrants who
obtained bachelors, masters or doctorate degrees is 53.6 per cent. The percentage of migrants who
obtained short term or long term technical and professional secondary school certificates is 29 per
cent.
Table 31: Qualifications obtained abroad S a m p l e : R e t u r n e d m i g r a n t s i n l a b o u r f o r c e Frequency Per cent
1-Primary school 1 1.2
4-Short-term technical worker 10 12.2
5-Long-term technical worker 11 13.4
6-Prof. secondary school 3 3.7
7-Junior college diploma 2 2.4
8-Bachelor 21 25.6
9-Master 18 21.9
10-Doctor 5 6.1
11-Other 11 13.4
Total 82 100
Meanwhile, however, 54 per cent of returned migrants believe that they gained new ideas or skills
that have been useful to them when they are back in Vietnam. It is interesting to see that while only
18 per cent of returned migrants obtained qualifications abroad, a much higher number of returned
migrants think they have acquired useful skills and knowledge.
Returned migrants interviewed in our survey were asked to specify the new ideas and skills they
gained while abroad. Mulitple answers were allowed for all applicable cases. Table 32 shows in
details the new ideas and skills that the returned migrants think they have gained. Only 32.5 per cent
of them reported that they learned a new language. This rather low percentage suggests two
possibilities. Firstly, a large part of Vietnamese migrants are low skilled labors, they went to work in
factories with limited language training and social interaction with local people. Secondly, even
among those migrants who went abroad for further education, many Vietnamese students were shy
and did not socialize enough to learne or improve their foreign language skills.
Table 32: New ideas and skills gained abroad S a m p l e : R e t u r n e d m i g r a n t s a g e d 1 8 a n d o v e r ( 5 8 2 p e o p l e ) Frequency Percentage
New language 178 30.6
Professional skill or trade 132 22.7
Life skills 67 11.5
Learned about new social issues 86 14.8
Working skills and style 178 30.6
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Vision/knowledge on culture and society 175 30
Other 4 0.5
There are 11.6 per cent of Vietnamese returned migrants learned or improved their life skills. Just
over 20 per cent of returned migrants reported that they learned or improved a professional skill or
trade. This figure is rather low, given that more than 80 per cent of returned migrants also did not
report obtaining any educational qualifications abroad. This implies that there is a large number of
Vietnamese returned migrants that did not acquire any qualifications or professional skills while
abroad. However, around 30 per cent of returned migrants do report that they learned or improved
their working skills and working styles. Finaly, just under 15 per cent of returned migrants learned
about new social issues and around 30 per cent learned or improved their knowledge about culture
and society.
The statistics suggest that some kind of intervention is needed on the part of government or other
authorities to enable returned migrants to better develop skills while abroad and make better use of
the skills and knowledge do develop through migration.
4.3 Health impacts I m p a c t o n h e a l t h s t a t u sThis section examines the impact of migration and remittances on the health status of members of
migrant /remittance receiving households.
The impact of migration on the health of returned migrants could occur in a number of ways. Living
abroad for some time in a country with higher living standards could improve migrants’ general
health permanently, although this will of course depend on living and working conditions in the
destination country. It may be too that working and living conditions abroad are so poor for some
Vietnamese migrants that their health is permanently harmed. Alternatively, once migrants return to
Vietnam, their health may return to a ‘normal’ level, regardless of their experiences as a migrant. We
investigate this first by looking at the self-reported health status of non-migrants and returned
migrants.
Table 33: Self-reported health status S a m p l e : n o n m i g r a n t s a n d r e t u r n e d m i g r a n t s ( a l l a g e s )Health Status Non-migrant Returned migrant
No. Percentage No. Percentage
1-Excellent 1,151 19.6 122 19.7
2-Good 2,000 34.1 207 33.5
3-Fair 2,255 38.5 234 37.9
4-Poor 145 2.5 18 2.9
5-Very poor 311 5.3 37 6
Total 5,862 618
Table 33 shows a very similar distribution of health status between non-migrants and returned-
migrants, suggesting that there is no strong evidence that migration has an impact on the health of
returned migrants. There may be several explanations for this. Firstly, there may be problems with
the self-reported health variable, since people with similar health conditions may report differently.
Secondly, as mentioned above, migrants may have seen changes to their health abroad, but their
health might have become “normal” again after returning to Vietnam.
57
H e a l t h s t a t u s o f t h o s e l e f t b e h i n dTables 34 and 35 compares the health status of those left behind in different types of households,
with the former looking at the impact of migration and the latter looking at the impact of
remittances. Table 34: Health status of household members left behind (by migration status)
Health Status Non-migrant HH Returned-migrant HH Absent-migrant HH Mixed-migrant HH
No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage
1-Excellent 418 20.9 303 21.99 377 18 3 53 16.99
2-Good 731 35.1 418 30.33 742 35.5 109 34.94
3-Fair 791 38.1 570 41.36 767 36.7 127 40.71
4-Poor 45 2.2 40 2.90 52 2.5 8 2.56
5-Very poor 96 4.6 47 3.41 153 7.3 15 4.81
Total 2081 100 1378 100 2091 100 312 100
Similar to our findings when comparing the health of non-migrants and returned migrants, the above
table shows little evidence that migration has a significant impact on the health of household
members left behind. The only notable difference between non-migrant and migrant households is
that there seems to be a slightly higher percentage of those reporting to be in ’very poor’ health in
the group of households with absent migrants. A possible explanation for this could be the fact that
members living away from each other might have a negative psychological impact on household
members’ statements regarding health status. Those left behind in absent migrant households may
also receive less intensive care than people in other households do.
Similarly, remittances do not seem to have much of an impact on the health of left behind household
members. The only notable difference may be in the group reporting very poor health conditions. 6.2
per cent of those left behind in households with no remittances are in very poor health, while the
figure for households with remittances is only 4.7. However, if we omit people aged 66 and above,
then the reported percentages of people with very poor health condition are very close between the
two groups of households.
Table 35: Health status of households that do and do not receive remittances S a m p l e : N o n m i g r a n t s ( a l l a g e s )Health Status HH received REM HH not received REM
No. Percentage No. Percentage
1-Excellent 699 19.3 452 20.1
2-Good 1,185 32.8 815 36.3
3-Fair 1,468 40.6 787 35.7
4-Poor 95 2.6 50 2.2
5-Very poor 171 4.7 140 6.2
Total 3,618 100 2244 100 I m p a c t o f m i g r a t i o n a n d r e m i t t a n c e s o n h e a l t h e x p e n d i t u r eTo estimate the impact of migration and remittances on household expenditure on health, we use a
log of household expenditure per capita as the dependent variable. The independent variables are
the number of migrants in a household, the log of household income per capita (or pre-remittance
income per capita if remittances per capita are included as an independent variable), the log of
received remittance per capita, and other household characteristics variables. Appendix D shows the
58
summary of estimated results (OLS and Fixed Effect). The findings suggest that both migration and
remittances have a statistically significant impact on household health expenditure per capita.
Specifically, if a household has one (or more) migrant, the household health expenditure per capita
will, on average, be higher by 11.7 - 12.6 per cent, holding other variables constant. One reason for
this might be that having migrants in the household may improve its members’ awareness about
health issues, which in turn might increase households’ spending on health.
If received remittances per capita increase by 1 per cent, household health expenditure is higher by
approximately 0.1 per cent, holding other variables constant. This small positive impact on health
expenditure may be due to households being able to spend more on health as a result of the increase
in their income through receiving remittances, or it could be because migrants are sending
remittances back to help pay for the treatment of a sick household member.
4.4 Gender impacts
It is reported in various studies that migration may contribute to change in gender roles in sending
countries. The migration of people as well as technology and ideas could have a significant impact on
both migrants and non-migrants’ attitudes towards gender issues. This section aims to look at how
migration affects attitude towards gender and gender roles in Vietnam.
I m p a c t o n w o m e n ’ s e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e sStatistics on the educational levels of women are presented in Tables 36 and 37. Table 36 show
statistics on school grades achieved by women in migrant and non-migrant households, and in
households that have and have not received remittances over the last 12 months. The percentages of
women with higher grades in migrant households and households that receive remittances are
higher than in non-migrant households and households that do not receive remittances. This
suggests that migration and remittances may have a positive impact on educational opportunities for
Vietnamese women, though it may of course to be the effect of other factors – such as household
income which is higher for households with migrants and that receive remittances, and which may
allow greater investment in education.
Table 36: School grades achieved by women in surveyed households
Grade Non-migrant HH Migrant HH Non-remittance HH Remittance HH
No. Per. Cum. No. Per. Cum. No. Per. Cum. No. Per. Cum.
None 124 11.7 11.7 268 12 12 241 11.7 11.7 151 11.9 11.9
1 23 2.2 13.9 43 2 14 43 2.1 13.8 23 1.8 13.71
2 30 2.8 16.7 61 3 16 56 2.7 16.5 35 2.8 16.47
3 50 4.7 21.5 102 4 21 80 3.9 20.4 72 5.7 22.14
4 40 3.8 25.2 92 4 25 70 3.4 23.8 62 4.9 27 3
5 69 6.5 31.8 161 7 32 137 6.7 30.4 93 7.3 34.36
Primary 336 31.8 31.8 727 32 32 627 30.4 30.4 436 34.4 34.4
6 61 5.8 37.5 116 5 37 109 5.3 35.7 68 5.4 39.72
7 66 6.2 43.8 130 6 43 125 6.1 41.8 71 5.6 45.31
8 40 3.8 47.5 98 4 47 73 3.5 45.3 65 5.1 50.43
9 169 16 63.5 414 18 65 358 17.4 62.7 225 17.7 68.16
Lower Secondary 336 31.8 63.5 758 33.4 65.4 665 32.3 62.7 429 33.8 68.2
10 36 3.4 66.9 86 4 69 67 3.3 66 55 4.3 72.5
11 30 2.8 69.8 69 3 72 61 3 68.9 38 3 75.49
12 320 30.3 100 631 28 100 640 31.1 100 311 24.5 100
Higher Secondary 386 36.5 100 786 34.6 100 768 37.3 100 404 31.8 100
Total 1730 163.5 3756 165 3352 162.7 2134 168.2
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Table 37 gives descriptive statistics on the educational degrees obtained by women in migrant and
non-migrant households, as well as households with and without remittances. There are higher
percentages of women with college diplomas and tertiary education in migrant households than that
in non-migrant households. However, the percentages are lower in households with remittances
compared to households without remittances.
Table 37: Highest educational qualification obtained by women
Highest degree obtained Non-migrant HH Migrant HH Do not receive
remittances Receive remittance
Numbe
r
Percentag
e
Numbe
r
Percentag
e Number Percentage
Numbe
r
Percentag
e
0-None 284 26.8 584 25.7 514 24.9 354 27.9
1-Primary school 223 21.1 467 20.6 413 20.1 277 21.8
2-Lower Secondary School 218 20.6 548 24.1 457 22.2 309 24.3
3-Upper Secondary School 172 16.3 330 14.5 311 15.1 191 15.1
4-Short-term technical
school 19 1.8 40 1.8 39 1.9 20 1.6
5-Long-term technical school 3 0.3 13 0.6 13 0.6 3 0.2
6-Prof. secondary school 59 5.6 91 4 108 5.2 42 3.3
7-Junior college diploma 11 1 30 1.3 26 1.3 15 1.2
8-Bachelor & higher 67 6.3 165 7.3 176 8.5 56 4.4
Total 1,056 100 2,268 100 2,057 100 1,267 100
To provide more concrete evidence on the impact of migration on the educational achievements of
women, a multivariate model is estimated to examine whether women in migrant households or
households that receive remittances are more likely to be better educated (see Appendix E). The
results suggest that having a migrant in the household increases the possibility of a woman holding a
bachelor degree by 0.24 percentage points. Meanwhile, receiving remittances reduces the possibility
of women being more highly educated by 0.36 percentage points. However, this is consistent with
findings from previous sections that a large part of remittances are used to pay debt. Also, the small
marginal effect of the variables may suggest that there is not enough evidence to confirm the clear
effect of migration and remittances on women’s education.
Looking at the impact of other variables, it is interesting to see that male household heads are less
likely to invest in education for their female household members (by 0.2 per cent). The number is
statistically significant but small, showing a very slight discrimination against women here.
For better gender comparison, another multivariate model is also estimated to examine the
probability of being educated for a man in a migrant household or household with remittance (also
presented in Appendix E). The results suggest that having a migrant in the household increases the
probability of a man holding a bachelor degree by 0.033 percentage points. Similar to women,
receiving remittances reduces the possibility for men to hold a bachelor degree by 0.53 percentage
points. The marginal effect of migration on men’s education is slightly greater than that for women’s
education. This suggests that the effect of migration and remittance, if there is, on women’s
education is less than on men’s education.
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V i e w s o n g e n d e r e q u a l i t yThe Vietnamese survey data show a large number of returned migrants reporting that their
experience of living abroad changes their views about gender equality. Around 90 per cent of
returned migrants stated that their experience of living abroad made them think that more efforts to
ensure gender equality were needed in Vietnam. Also, 72 per cent of our surveyed households
reported that they think returned migrants care more about gender equality. This result would
suggest that returned migrants might change their behaviour regarding gender issues.
There is also a slight difference between men and women. Around 6 per cent of female returned
migrants and 3 per cent of male returned migrants reported that they do not think more efforts to
improve gender equality are needed. A greater number of men reported that their views were not
changed by their migration experience, though the difference between sexes is not statistically
significant.
Figure 22: Returned migrants’ views on whether they support more efforts to improve gender equality in Vietnam, given
their experience of living abroad
G e n d e r r o l e s i n t h e h o u s e h o l dOne way to test the impact of changed attitudes towards gender that result from migration is to
examine gender roles within the household. The Vietnamese survey data contains information on
household tasks each household member spends most of their time, both currently and 5 years ago.
This allows us to see if there has been a change in the sexual division of labour in the household as a
result of migration. The comparison of household activities carried out by women and men in non-
migrant households and returned migrant households enables us to see whether migration is leading
to behavioural change by returned migrants as well as others towards gender equality by shaping the
distribution of tasks within the households.
In Vietnam, women are traditionally expected to take care of most of the housework, while men are
expected to work outside the home for income and spend most of their time at home resting or
engaged in recreational activities. Results from our survey data shows that in 2008, more than 60 per
cent of women reported cooking as an activity that takes up a great deal of their time, while less than
20 per cent of men reported doing such activities. At the same time, around 40 per cent of men
reported resting/recreation as their most time-absorbing activities, while only 16 per cent of women
mentioned these activities.
To better understand whether migration is affecting gender roles in the households, we compared
the proportion of women doing gender-specific household tasks in non-migrant households and
households with returned migrants. Figures 23 and 24 represent the percentage of women reporting
61
cooking, cleaning and resting/recreation as the main use of their time in 2008 and 2003 for non-
migrant households and households with returned migrants respectively. The figures show no
significant difference between the two groups of households. The percentage of women reporting
the traditional tasks of cooking and cleaning as their main activities reduces only slightly over time
and varies little between the two groups. Meanwhile, the proportion of women reporting
resting/recreation as their main activities increases by a small amount over time and stays almost the
same across groups. This suggests that behaviour towards gender roles has changed slowly over
time, but not necessarily as a result of migration.
Figure 23: Proportion of women in non-migrant households doing certain household tasks
Figure 24: Proportion of women in households with returned migrants doing certain household tasks
4.5 Other social impacts
It is believed that migration may have a strong impact on an individual’s way of life and their views
on particular social issues. In Vietnam, migration has been blamed for the loss of the country’s
traditional culture and for a ‘negative’ change in the younger generation’s views and behaviours. In
this section, we aim to look at how migration affects family values, and traditional culture and norms.
Figures 25 and 26 represent the percentage of returned migrants and non-migrants by marital status,
and the proportion of family types across household groups, respectively. Traditional families in
Vietnam may consist of several generations. The traditional society usually has negative views
towards single parent families and people who are divorced or separated. Even though the number is
small, Figure 25 still shows that the proportion of returned migrants who are separated or divorced is
three times higher than that of non-migrants. Our findings also show a higher percentage of women
who were divorced or separated. The numbers in Figure 26 shows that the percentage of single
62
parent families among returned migrant households is 1.5 times higher than that of non-migrant
households.
These results might indicate the impact of migration on family structure and family life in Vietnam.
Having experience living in Western countries may alter returned migrant’s views toward family life
and family structure, which in turn could make returned migrants more likely to get divorced or
separated. Given that a majority of Vietnamese migrants move without their family, another reason
for the higher incidence of divorce could be due to long separations with their spouse. Almost 50 per
cent of our surveyed households reported that they think when people migrate without their family;
it is easier for family relationship to be broken. However, causality it quite difficult to determine here
- it should also be noted that individuals may migrate because their marital relationships are weak in
the first place.
Figure 25: Effect of migration on marital status of individuals aged 13 or older
Figure 26: Effect of migration on family structure
Our survey also asked whether living abroad influences returned migrants’ views toward traditional
ways of life and traditional culture of the country. More than 90 per cent of returned migrants
responded that living abroad made them felt more strongly about protecting Vietnamese culture and
ways of living. These results suggest that migration could significantly contribute to the preservation
of traditional culture and norms in Vietnam. However, further research is needed to investigate the
actual extent to which migration affects people’s behaviour in this way.
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Section 5: Policy discussion and recommendations
Migration has long been considered a means of development and poverty reduction by the
Vietnamese government. Policymakers have been trying hard to develop policies and regulations to
manage migration in a way that will promote development. Over time, migration in Vietnam has also
evolved beyond, and human trafficking is now a significant issue. As such, it is important that
government policies should not only focus on maximising the development impacts of migration, but
also try to minimise its costs.
5. 1 Migration policies in Vietnam G o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i g r a t i o n 1 9 8 0 - 2 0 0 0The Vietnamese government has traditionally considered overseas migration to be an important way
of supporting the development of the country. Exporting labour has been facilitated in order to
accelerate the inflow of foreign capital, as well as to reduce the stress of unemployment in the
country.
As we have established earlier in the report, the main motives for international migration from
Vietnam are economic, and relate particularly to the wide gap between wage and income levels in
Vietnam and the developed world. Average wages in Vietnam were about US$ 800 per year in 2006
(VHLSS 2006), about 2 per cent of those in the US and Japan. Unemployment is another factor.
Despite recently high growth rates, unemployment in Vietnam has been increasing every year.
Between 1.3-1.5 million new workers enter the market every year. However, high levels of job
shedding in the state sector, agricultural modernisation, reduction of agricultural land, and the global
financial crisis have combined to lead to high levels of unemployment in Vietnam.
In this context, the Vietnamese government has actively promoted overseas migration. Since the
year 2000, the government has announced that sending labourers to work abroad is one of Vietnam's
major efforts to resolve issues of employment. Recently, the government has issued legal documents
to support poor districts in promoting labour export for sustainable poverty elimination. Along with
recently improved policies toward Vietnamese diaspora groups, this shows the government’s
commitment toward boosting international migration as a means of improving living standards in
Vietnam.
Government policies towards the export of labour have had a clear impact, not only on the number
of people who migrate, but also in terms of the way in which migration has impacted on the country.
Between 1980 and 1990, sending Vietnamese labour to work in other countries was centrally
managed and organised directly by the government. In the early 1980s, the Vietnamese government
had initially signed bilateral agreements with some former communist countries, including the
former Eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and the former Soviet Union to send young
Vietnamese to these countries for education and vocational on-the-job training.
In the late 1980s, these destination countries had expanded to include other Eastern European
countries and some Northern African countries and Middle East countries. At this point, as Vietnam
had just recovered from the war, overseas migration was a government strategy to create jobs for
young Vietnamese, to enable migrants to learn about new technologies and skills, and to build
domestic capacity. Around 250,000 people migrated in this period. All of them were selected
centrally by the government and were secured a job in Vietnam after finishing their contract and
returning to Vietnam.
64
The impacts of this wave of migration in Vietnam included an improvement of consumer goods and
living standards after the war. It is also notable that in this period, a large number of people went to
Eastern Europe, particularly to the Soviet Union, for education. This had a considerable effect on the
structures and processes of government in Vietnam, as migrants brought back new ideas about
political organisation from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.
After the collapse of the communist bloc and the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991-92, many
Vietnamese migrants had to return, which created significant pressure in the domestic labour
market. The government at that time allowed state-owned companies with operating licenses to
send workers to other countries, based on bilateral labour contracts. Under this new policy, state-
owned companies were permitted to recruit labour, and sent workers directly to foreign enterprises.
In the period from 1991 to 1999, around 400,000 workers were sent to work overseas. In 1999, the
government approved a new policy on overseas employment (Decree No.152/1999/ND-CP) which
specifies procedures and mechanisms to facilitate the overseas employment of workers from the
state and non-state/private sectors. It also enables local labour export agencies and placement
agencies to expand to meet the needs of their foreign partners more effectively. Individual workers
can accept employment overseas if they are offered jobs. Private enterprises can send their workers
abroad if they have contracts with a foreign company. Hence since 1999, around 70,000 to 80,000
workers have been sent abroad each year.
C u r r e n t l a b o u r e x p o r t p o l i c i e s i n V i e t n a mSince 2002-2003, migration from Vietnam has increased significantly and has had a range of
important impacts on the development of the country as shown in section 4. Government policies
and regulation on international migration have been added as well as amended to cover various
issues in migration.
Findings from our household survey as well as the opinions of interviewed stakeholders have
confirmed that migration has had a significant impact on poverty reduction and employment.
Receiving remittances from abroad has increased household income and contributed to the
diversification of income in reducing risk. Furthermore, going abroad to work has been a survival
strategy for people in rural areas in terms of responding to high levels of unemployment, especially
under the pressure of agricultural land reduction.
Government policies to encourage poor people to migrate as contract labourers seems to have had a
positive impact in improving household income and living standards, as well as reducing income
inequality. However, poor management of migration movements and other related issues could
cause serious damage, putting Vietnamese people in more vulnerable situations. Many stakeholders
have expressed their concerns about the current management of international migration in Vietnam.
Although there is little hard evidence, they have also warned about the potential for human
trafficking networks to exploit labour export programs.
With the government’s encouragement of labour emigration, the number of labour placement
companies has increased significantly. There are now around 150 legal labour export enterprises
(Nguyen Nga 2008). However, due to ineffective monitoring on the part of the government and
differences in implementation of government regulations at the level of local government, a
significant number of illegal labour export agents and brokering networks exist. Labour export agents
already charge quite a high fee, in comparison with average income levels in Vietnam, but illegal
agents typically charge a much higher fee, or even cheat so that many potential emigrants fall into
debt but are unable to migrate. Potential migrants are also frequently cheated from the beginning of
the migration process, paying fees which are much higher – and often two or three times as much -
65
than the fee frame stated in the government’s regulation number 59/2006 on labour placement fees
in labour export (Dan Tri 2009a, Tuoi tre 2009). Ineffective management of migration movements
may therefore limit (or in some cases, turn negative) the impact that migration can have on poverty
reduction in Vietnam.
For these reasons, and in order to maximise the positive impact of migration on poverty, labour and
economic growth, the government should pay more attention and strengthen its supervision of
labour placement agencies and labour export programs. Labour migrants need to be protected
before, during and after migration. Currently, Vietnamese labourers abroad face many dangerous
challenges (VNExpress 2009) and have not been fully protected by existing legal frameworks.
The management and operation of labour export activities are governed by the Law on Vietnamese
Labour Working Abroad under Labour Contract, which has been in force since 2003, and amended
several times. The current version of this Law gives details on the legal responsibilities of all actors
involved, including managing ministries, local authorities, labour placement companies and
labourers, in order to send more labour abroad, and increase the benefits of migration. Various
regulations have also been issued to provide guidelines on banking deposit requirements for labour
placement companies, on the implementation of financial regulations for labour and labour
placement companies, and on vocational training and language training for contract labourers.
However, these have not put a strong enough emphasis on rights and protection for Vietnamese
labourers abroad.
The government’s bilateral agreements on sending Vietnamese labour to work overseas provide a
general framework for exporting Vietnamese labour only, but do not give clear instructions to foreign
employers about working conditions abroad. Regulation No. 01/2005/TTLT-BCA-BLĐTBXH (dated
18/01/2005), which provides guidelines on the prevention of illegal activities in the export of labour
has not been updated to deal with current situations.
For instance, it is stated in the regulation that labour placement companies only have to have a
representative present to support and protect Vietnamese labourers in areas where they send
Vietnamese labourers if the number of labourers sent by the company in that area exceeds 100
people. The practice in Vietnam is that each approved labour placement company is given a quota to
determine the number of labourers they can send abroad each year. In many cases, the company
does not have enough workers to meet these quotas, so they transfer parts of them to different
labour export agents. These agents are normally smaller companies and they usually send fewer than
100 people abroad, meaning that they do not have to place representatives in the receiving area. For
approved labour placement companies, even though the documented number of workers sent
abroad exceeds 100 people, they are not involved in managing, supporting and protecting labourers
sent by their labour export sub-contractors. As a result, Vietnamese labourers abroad, who mainly
working in “3D” jobs (‘dirty, dangerous, and difficult’), do not have enough support and protection,
and can be at high risk of being abused.
Our data analysis shows that a large part of remittances sent from abroad are used to pay debts,
which are frequently loans to cover the cost of migration. Again, this limits the other potentially
positive impacts of migration and remittances. The government is aware of this issue and in recent
years have been implementing some credit programs to allow potential migrants to borrow in order
to cover the costs of migration. There are also provisions on compensation for labourers who have
been hurt by illegal activities. However, the implementation of these programs is not effective and
has many problems. In the end, Vietnamese labourers still have to bear risks when working as
contract labourers abroad. Recently, a Fund for Supporting Labour Export and Helping Labourers at
Risks was established, but again, the implementation has not been effective and so far no money has
66
been disbursed by the Fund. Thus, it is necessary to facilitate the implementation of these programs
to support poor populations in the process of migration.
Another issue that emerged from the household survey relates to the brain gain impact of migration.
Our analysis reveals that little formal brain gain occurs as a result of migration in Vietnam as the
number of Vietnamese migrants who gain qualifications or work skills abroad is modest. The majority
of Vietnamese contract labourers work in unskilled and low-skilled sectors with low salaries, which as
well as meaning they often face various difficulties, and have a limited ability to remit home, also
implies that the skills and knowledge they could gain from working in these jobs are limited.
Therefore, the potential impact of remittances, technology and knowledge transfer is not currently
being optimised.
Helping Vietnamese contract labourers to obtain better jobs with decent salaries and working
conditions must become a priority for policymakers. In order to do this, Vietnamese migrants should
be equipped with good qualifications, skills and vocational training before departure. However,
vocational and language training for contract labourers offered by labour placement agencies have
not been paid enough attention in the past. Normally, the training courses do not provide enough
skills and information, and are of poor quality.
Current problems in managing and regulating migration suggest the necessity for better policies and
programs to maximise the beneficial impacts of migration and minimise the costs. The legal
framework on migration should be improved, and the government should improve its management
and supervision of these laws to ensure that there is appropriate oversight of labour placement
companies that send workers abroad and to protect labourers in every stage of the migration
process. Closer cooperation between Vietnam and migrant destination countries is also needed.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s :
o The government needs to establish institutions specialising in dealing with migration in order
to provide information and knowledge to migrant workers;
o The Vietnamese government should develop bilateral and multilateral agreements with the
governments of receiving countries to protect and regulate the rights and safety of
Vietnamese citizens. Appropriate and transparent measures, institutions and regulations and
close coordination of implementation should be ensured in order to effectively and equitably
manage international labour migration;
o Law enforcement must be strengthened to prevent negative impacts of migration, including
closer supervision and stronger fines for illegal activities related to labour migration, and
synchronisation of legal documents in every stage of the migration process;
o The activities of companies and agencies engaging labour export should be strictly
monitored;
o Government, local authorities and civil society organisations should participate in raising
awareness and helping migrant workers to make the right decisions on working abroad
through training and media;
o The government should facilitate the implementation of credit and fund support programs to
provide loans for poor people to cover the costs of migration;
o Information and knowledge exchanges on international labour migration trends, the
conditions experienced by migrant workers, and measures to protect their rights should be
strengthened to prevent human trafficking during migration process;
o Labour placement agencies should work with destination countries to help provide
appropriate training courses for migrants. The courses need to provide not only professional
skills and knowledge, but also information on the culture and legal systems of destination
countries;
67
o Labour placement agencies should cooperate with high quality vocational training schools to
equip labourers with useful qualifications and skills.
o Living and working conditions of Vietnamese workers in receiving countries should also be
monitored by Union and the Vietnamese diplomatic representative agencies in those
countries. International and local NGOs in Vietnam could also cooperate with local NGOs in
receiving countries to establish ‘support and protect’ centres to help Vietnamese workers
abroad and protect victims of trafficking.
R e m i t t a n c e p o l i c i e sOur descriptive statistics reveal that remittances transferred to Vietnam have increased significantly
over time. We find that remittances help to reduce poverty and increase living standards of migrant
households. Furthermore, remittances can enhance savings and increase investment in education,
which are potential sources for future production. Results from the report also show that
remittances have an impact on production expansion and this impact seems likely to go beyond
migrant households and spill over to non-migrant households in urban areas.
Our findings also reveal that around half of absent migrants use informal channels to transfer money.
Similarly, non-household member remitters often use informal remittance services. This diminishes
the multiplier effects of remittances, especially in rural areas. The formalisation of remittance flows
can stimulate the development of microfinance institutions that can help to link commercial banks to
retail clients in rural areas. Low-income families then have more opportunities to access a broader
range of financial services, thereby allowing them to improve earnings and the management of their
financial risks.
A key issue for policymakers is therefore not only determining how to increase remittance inflows
but also promoting the development of the formal remittance market and shifting remitters away
from informal channels.
The development of remittance policies in Vietnam can be divided into four periods. The first period
was from 1980 to 1990. The Vietnamese economy during this period was characterised by the
centrally planned mechanism which set out the framework for government policies including
remittance regulations. The skeleton for remittance policies during this period was Decree No.102/CP
(passed in 1963) which required all organisations and individuals to sell their remittances to the
government. The government was the sole entity which was allowed to hold and allocate foreign
currencies.
During the second period, 1991-94, Vietnam moved from a centrally planned to a market economy.
Remittance policies in this period were developed by Decree No.161/HDBT (18/10/1988). This
Decree encouraged overseas Vietnamese to remit and allowed recipients to receive remittances in
cash. However, the procedure to receive money was complicated and thus not effective in
stimulating remittance inflows. In addition, granting permission to receive foreign currencies caused
difficulties in managing remittances, which in turn caused the fixed Vietnamese exchange rate to
become unstable. This problem undermined the benefits of remittance inflows, generating changes
in policies in the following period from 1995 to 1998.
The period 1995-98 witnessed the issuance of Decree No.48/QD-NHNN on 23/2/1995 and the
Circular No.27/TC-TCT on 20/1/1995. These legal documents stipulated that recipients were allowed
to receive money only in VND and that they had to pay irregular income tax. Moreover, the transfer
fee was very high. These measures created distrust among senders, especially among overseas
Vietnamese, and shifted them away from the formal remittance transfer system.
68
The fourth period was from 1999 to the present day. Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997,
which led to the outflow of foreign capital from Vietnam, the Vietnamese government became aware
of the critical role of external funds from remittances for the economy. Consequently, remittance
regulations were adjusted with the issuance of Decree No.63/1998/ND-CP in August 1998 which set
out the framework for current remittance policies. This Decree allowed recipients to receive
remittances in cash and abolished tax revenue. More importantly, it diversified remittance service
providers and stipulated remitting fees clearly. As a result, the cross-border transfer of funds has
increased significantly.
However, little has been done by the government in terms of cooperating with the host countries or
remitters to formalise the remittance market or to make the new remittance policies well-known to
overseas senders. Moreover, the formal system is still less competitive in terms of transfer speed and
prices than informal channels. The fixed exchange rate policy of the Vietnamese government also
generated gaps between the official exchange rate and the one set up by the informal market. This
stimulated incentives to use the informal transfer system, which led to dollar speculation, triggering
to the dollarisation of the Vietnamese economy and undermining the impacts of the monetary
policies (Chu 2002).
Difficulties in managing remittances and stabilising the exchange rate resulted in the issuance of the
Ordinance on Remittances in 2005. Generally, the Ordinance follows the principles of Decree
No.63/1998/ND-CP. However, it also allows the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) to apply secure
measures such as requiring organisations to sell remittances to SBV or restricting the amount
transferred by individuals when necessary.
To conclude, it can be seen from the above discussion that remittance policies in Vietnam have been
not consistent, and this has pushed senders towards informal remittance services. Overseas
Vietnamese pay careful attention to the government’s remittance regulations and are still sceptical
about formal remittance services. This explains why around 50 per cent of remitters in our household
data choose informal transfer channels.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s :
o Government investment is needed to upgrade advanced technologies in banking and
financial institutions to improve the speed and reduce the cost of transfers in order to
compete with the informal transfer system.
o The Vietnamese government should cooperate with remitters hosting countries in
formalising the remittance market.
o The government should improve its efforts to make the current remittance policies well-
known to overseas Vietnamese and to keep these policies consistent
o Secure measures should be applied when necessary to achieve the macro-economic stability
of Vietnam. However, they should consider the benefit of both senders and recipients to
draw them to the formal services.
These recommendations would require a considerable level of investment, but will create substantial
benefits in the long term once remitters become used to sending remittances through the formal
transfer system.
P o l i c i e s t o w a r d s t h e u s e o f h i g h l y s k i l l e d h u m a n r e s o u r c e sThe effectiveness of policies towards the Vietnamese diaspora such as the Law on Housing
Ownership in 2005, Regulation No.90/2006/ND-CP giving building ownership to overseas
Vietnamese, the visa exemption for Vietnamese residents overseas, and the elimination of residence
69
registration for Vietnamese diasporas recently, have been seen as the number of overseas
Vietnamese experts and intellectuals has increased. These initiatives are big changes, expressing the
government’s desire to encourage Vietnamese diaspora groups to come back and invest in Vietnam.
However, the procedures to implement these policies are still cumbersome, meaning that many V i e t k i e u find it troublesome settling in Vietnam. It seems that these policies need to be allowed a bit
more time to become more effective.
In contrast to the government’s effort to attract V i e t k i e u
to come back and settle in Vietnam, the use
of returned migrants, including both labour and study migrants, has not been addressed and is
problematic. Findings from this report show a high unemployment rate among returnees. The results
also suggest that government policies are ineffective in encouraging returnees to change their jobs
upon return. Given the skills that many returnees bring back with them, the benefits of migration
cannot be optimised unless policies in this area are developed. Regarding overseas Vietnamese
students, the Ministry of Education and Training has mentioned the need to encourage them to
return in some recent discussions, but has not issued any policy to manage this process.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s :
The gap in government policies towards returnees should be addressed. It is important for the
government to create attractive conditions for the return of professionals, skilled labourers, trainees
and students to maximise the impact of migration through significantly contribution to the
development of human resources in Vietnam. Specific recommendations are as follows:
o The Vietnamese government needs to enhance its efforts to improve working conditions. In
the near future, Vietnam should upgrade its internet system to speed up online transfers and
set up conference facilities of international standards to attract overseas Vietnamese
intellectuals and experts.
o The government should create a good working environment by adapting western working
styles to the Vietnamese context, implementing a system of performance appraisals for staff,
including returnees, and promoting them if they are deserving.
o The government should also set up centres to circulate information about return migrants
and opportunities in the labour market.
5.2 Non-migration policies and their effects on international migration
Although various non-migration policies affect the impact of migration on development in Vietnam, it
is difficult to distinguish their influence since they apply to both migrants and non-migrants. This
section will therefore focus on non-migration policies that have the most visible impact on
international migration. I n v e s t m e n t p o l i c i e sFindings from our report show that the use of remittances in businesses is modest. Furthermore,
there seems to be no significant difference in self-employment levels between migrant and non-
migrant households. International migration does matter, but apparently only at a larger scale of
businesses that require more capital and secure flows of remittances. The report also reveals the
ineffectiveness of government policies in stimulating returnees and migrant households in
establishing new enterprises.
The limited impact of migration on the expansion of production in Vietnam is possibly the result of
the failure of economic reforms to go far enough. The property rights of individuals and private
70
ownership were first recognised at the beginning of the 1990s following the issuance of the Land Law
(1988), the Company Law (1991), the Law on Private Enterprises (1991), Decree No.66/HDBT (1992)
and the Constitution (1992). Since then, a series of legal documents have been issued to stimulate
the formation and development of the private sector. However, the business environment in
Vietnam has only been significantly improved since the second phase of economic reforms which
started in 2000. Following the issuance of a number of legal documents - such as the Enterprise Law
(1999), Decree No.90/2001/CP-ND in support of the development of small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), Decision No.94/2002/QD-TTG to reform the mechanisms and policies to stimulate the
development of the non-state sector and the Land Law (2003) - constraints on company entry have
been released, leading to a fast growth of the private sector in Vietnam.
Nevertheless, obstacles towards companies’ operations have remained. For instance, it has been very
difficult for small firms to access land, credit and business information. The issuance of the New
Enterprise Law in 2005 that created a fair competitive environment for all types of business has not
improved weaknesses in the judiciary system to enforce contract implementation and resolve
disputes. Moreover, the discretion of local authorities in implementing the central government
policies weakens the effectiveness of reform measures (see Tran 2008 for more details). This explains
why return migrants do not consider the Vietnamese business environment to be conducive to
setting up an enterprise, and accounts for their desire for the government to pass stronger economic
reforms.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n:
o Further economic reforms are required to secure private property rights and ensure the
availability of business information. Moreover, the judiciary and administration systems need
to be strengthened by suitable reforms.
G e n d e r l i n k e d p o l i c i e sAnalysis from our household survey shows that the number of woman migrants is increasing.
However, the impact of migration on gender roles is not clear, given that there does not seem to
have been a significant change in gender roles over the past five years. Nonetheless, various studies
(see for example Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Hondagneu-Sotelu 1994 and Zentgraf 2002) have
suggested that migration can provide new opportunities to improve the lives of Vietnamese women
and change oppressive gender relations. Migration can provide a vital source of income for migrant
women and their families, and might earn them greater autonomy, self-confidence and social status.
Women may feel empowered by participating in the labour market in a new country, by gaining new
skills with increased employment prospects on return, and from the expectation of improving their
status due to the remittances they are able to send back home. However, at the same time, women
migrants can face stigma and discrimination at every stage of the migration cycle. In fact, gender
discrimination, poverty and violence, can provide the motivation for women to migrate or enable
women to be trafficked in the first place.
Little is known so far on how migration and gender issues in Vietnam are related. Further, current
migration policies in Vietnam pay very little attention to gender and rarely link gender equality
concerns with migration issues.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n:
o Gender issues should be included in migration programs, activities and policies and
considered key for development. There should be more information and intervention
support for woman migrants in order to maximise opportunities for gender equalisation and
71
empowerment. The involvement of the Women Union and international and local NGOs in
designing these policies should be encouraged.
O t h e r p o l i c i e s w h i c h m i g h t a f f e c t m i g r a t i o n i n c e n t i v e s a n d o u t c o m e s :Government policies and programs on poverty reduction aim to improve people’s living standards,
create better opportunities and increase options for domestic workers. An improvement in these
policies might make potential migrants think more carefully about their decision to migrate, and
reduce the risks that workers may face if they move without much planning.
The current Law on Civil Servants also affects the decision to migrate of people who work in the
public sector and state-owned enterprises. The Law requires that civil servants have to come back to
work in their previous position after completing their short-term migration to work or study abroad.
Education policies promoting international education programs, including the government’s Program
322 to send Vietnamese students abroad to study, also have a big impact on migration decisions and
patterns. The consequences of these programs in the future are expected to be massive in terms of
ideas and knowledge.
5.3 Non-domestic policies
The global financial crisis is currently having a major impact on various development indicators
internationally. Many countries and industries have to reduce the numbers of foreign labourers they
employ, and many of those laid will return back to their home countries. To date, Vietnam has
received more than 10,000 returned migrants due to the global financial crisis.
The decrease in the demand for contract labourers, especially in newly industrialised countries such
as Malaysia, has had a massive impact on migration in Vietnam. The Malaysian Ministry of Human
Resources announced in March 2009 that the Malaysian government would temporarily stop
receiving export labourers in various industries, including the electricity, garment and textile and
some service industries. This is because Malaysia has had to close their job market to ensure
employment opportunities for their domestic workers. Currently, Malaysia is the biggest market for
the export of Vietnamese labour, receiving around 30,000 Vietnamese workers every year. The
closure of this market will therefore have a significant impact on migration in Vietnam, at least in the
short term.
The return of guest workers may significantly affect sending households, particularly poor ones.
Some have fallen into debt, or are slipping further into poverty as a consequence of migration costs
and their migrant workers returning home empty handed. Some poor households may be losing the
opportunity to escape poverty. This in turn might create a potential barrier for the government’s
plans and strategies to promote labour export from the country’s poorest districts.
This is a challenge not only for Vietnam, but also for all other countries who export labour on a large
scale.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s:
o The government and related authorities should improve the monitoring and database system
of labour and remittance flows to allow for early detection and quick response to unexpected
circumstances such as the financial crisis;
72
o Assistance to households with migrant workers should be provided through community-
based social safety nets to help households cope with adverse shocks in income;
o The role of business and corporation associations, such as the Vietnam Association of
Manpower Supply, should be strengthened in providing timely information and helping
member businesses to make strategic decisions regarding labour placement;
o Labour placement companies should keep close track of job market opportunities in
destination countries in order to make appropriate decisions regarding recruitment of labour,
and to provide necessary vocational education and information on policies and laws to their
labourers;
o Investment in local infrastructure and business development policies toward the
diversification of industries and job generation should be prioritised to reduce the pressure
of unemployment in Vietnam due to the return of labour migrants.
73
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76
Appendix A: Household survey summary
Sample design
Multistage cluster and probability sampling principles were applied to take a target sample of 1500
households divided equally into three types: absent migrant, returned migrant and non-migrant
households in Vietnam. See Box 3 for our definitions of each type of household.
Box 3: Migrant household definition
Absent migrant household: the household that contains one or more absent migrants
Retuned migrant household: the household that contains one or more returned migrants
Mixed migrant household: the household that has both absent and returned migrants
Non-migrant household: the household that does not have any migrant member.
The household sample was drawn in four stages. In the first stage, provinces in each region - north,
centre, and south of Vietnam - were stratified into metropolitan and non-metropolitan strata. Six
provinces were selected, one in each stratum, out of 64 provinces with the probability proportional
to their migration density (PPS). The selected provinces were Hanoi and Hung Yen in the north, Nghe
An and Da Nang in the centre, and Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho in the south. The migrant density at
this stage was the aggregate information of absent migrant density, returned migrant density and
labour migrants of each province. See Box 4 on how the migration density was calculated.
Box 4: Migration density
Absent migrant density. The proportion of households which receive overseas remittances is used
as a proxy for the absent migrant density. This information is calculated using the Vietnam
household living standard surveys (VHLSS) in 2002 and 2004. The absent migrant density is
computed at the commune/ward level. The limitation is that VHLSS is also a sample survey, thus
not all communes have this information.
Returned migrant density. This information is calculated using the latest Vietnamese population
census in 1999. The returned migrant density is also computed at the commune/ward level. This
information is too old compared to the rapid global integration of Vietnam and the growth rate of
Vietnamese migrants overseas during the last 10 years. However, this is the only type of
information on returned migrants in Vietnam.
Labour migrants. Labour migrants are an important source for international migration of Vietnam
at the moment. Nevertheless, this information is available at province level and thus only used in
selecting provinces.
In the second stage, communes/wards (the lowest administrative unit), were stratified into rural and
urban strata and selected as the primary sampling units (PSUs). Numbers to be selected in each
stratum were based on the ratio of rural over urban communes in each province. Because migration
probabilities of communes concentrated into two poles: high and low migrant densities, each
stratum of urban and rural was then categorised into strata of high and low migration probability.
Our objective was to select both communes with high and low migration probability into the sample.
The number to be selected in each high and low migration probability stratum was based on the
proportion of average probability of high probability stratum versus low probability stratum. 15 PSUs
were selected using the same PPS method in each province making the total number of 90
77
communes for the sample. The migration probability at this stage is a weighted average of absent
and retuned migrant densities (4 for absent and 1 for returned migrant density).9
On average, each commune in Vietnam contains 3,000 households. This makes listing all households
in PSUs impossible given the budget. Therefore, communes/wards were divided into small
villages/blocks that we named enumeration areas (EAs). These EAs had almost equal population size
and were used in VHLSS in 2002 and 2004. In six surveyed provinces in Vietnam, each EA contained
approximately 100 households on average. However, the range varied from around 50 up to 250
households in urban and rural EAs, respectively. Fieldworkers were asked to list all EAs in each
selected PSU and work out with local person (head of commune) to classify EAs into four categories:
EAs with high, medium, low, and non-zero density of migrants. We then gave scores to EAs: 5, 2, and
1 to high, medium and low migrant frequency EAs, respectively. Using the PPS method, 5 EAs were
selected in each PSU. The same method was applied to select 5 spare EAs in each PSU as reserve for
circumstances when we couldn’t survey enough number of migrant households.
The last stage involved choosing households. This stage was separated into the listing phase and the
sampling phase:
(i) Listing phase: Fieldworkers were asked to enumerate and list all households in 5 EAs of
each selected PSU. Households were stratified into absent, returned, mix of absent and
returned and non-migrant strata.
(ii) Sampling phase: Our objective was to equalise the fieldwork loads per province. Thus, to
make a sample of 1500 households, 250 households that were divided equally into
absent, returned, and non-migrant households were sampled in each province using the
systematic sampling techniques. Based on the list of households made by fieldworkers,
unequally sample across EAs and so as PSUs was applied. More precisely, we gave a
quota of 5 non-migrant households for each PSU, equivalent to 1 in each EA. For migrant
household group, we tried to keep the target of 5 to 7 absent and returned migrant
households. However, in EAs where there were more either absent or returned migrant
households, these households were then sampled more. In EAs with few migrant
households, we sampled less there. Households with both absent and returned migrants
were randomly assigned to the absent migrant household group in some EAs, and to the
returned migrant household groups in the others.
Implementation
As discussed above, unequal sampling across EAs and PSUs was applied. In practice, the number of
non-migrant households varied from 4 to 6 across PSUs. In three provinces including Da Nang, Ho Chi
Minh City, and Can Tho, due to the scarcity of returned migrant households, almost all listed
returned migrant households were interviewed. Fieldworkers were then asked to go to the reserved
EAs in each PSU in these 3 provinces to survey additional returned migrant households until they met
the targeted number.
The survey of additional retuned migrant was implemented as follows. Fieldworkers were asked to go
to the first reserved EA and survey all returned migrant households in that EA. If the targeted number
of returned migrant households for the PSU has been reached yet, they continued to scan the next
reserved EA for returned migrant households and so on until meeting up with the required amount.
Generally, we tried to control the number of surveyed households in each PSU around from 15 to 17.
9 The weight is calculated based on the estimated average of absent and returned migrant density of 6 selected provinces,
not the average migrant density of communes.
78
Nevertheless, in practice, the total number of surveyed households varied from 10 to 25 across PSUs.
In some cases, fieldworkers surveyed more than the target number of migrant households, making
our sample up to 1508 households. The distribution of households in surveyed provinces is provided
in Table 38. In our final sample, absent migrant households accounted for 35 per cent and returned
migrant households comprised 27 per cent. Among migrant households, mixed-migrant households
accounted for 9 per cent of total surveyed households.
The refusal rate in Vietnam was quite small. It was, however, a bit higher in the south than in the
north. Nevertheless, we did not record this information during the fieldwork.
Table 38: Distribution of population and sample in surveyed provinces
Population structure Sample structure
Province
Non-
migrant HH
Absent
migrant HH
Returned
migrant HH Mix-HH Total
Non-
migrant HH
Absent
migrant HH
Returned
migrant HH Mix-HH Total N o r t h 2 9 8 1 1 1 2 0 6 6 7 6 1 0 6 3 1 7 9 9 1 5 9 1 4 7 1 6 2 3 6 5 0 4Hanoi 6420 612 350 84 7466 77 67 84 26 254
Hung Yen 23391 594 326 22 24333 82 80 78 10 250 C e n t r e 1 6 5 6 7 2 0 2 1 4 6 8 1 3 8 1 9 1 9 4 1 6 5 1 8 6 1 2 4 3 0 5 0 5Nghe An 8411 1646 376 121 10554 82 78 77 16 253
Da Nang 8156 375 92 17 8640 83 108 47 14 252 S o u t h 2 1 6 1 5 7 5 5 1 4 3 3 7 2 2 5 5 0 1 6 0 1 8 0 1 2 4 3 5 4 9 9Ho Chi Minh
City 5996 167 86 21 6270 80 82 68 19 249
Can Tho 15619 588 57 16 16280 80 98 56 16 250
Total 67993 3982 1287 281 73543 484 513 410 101 1508
Implementation organisations and questionnaire
The household survey was carried out by Department Statistics Offices (DSO) of provinces where the
household survey was conducted.
The English questionnaire and show cards from GDN were adapted in accordance with the
Vietnamese context and translated into Vietnamese. Some new questions were also added in order
to capture information which was particularly useful for analysis in Vietnam. To test the
questionnaire, we conducted three pilot interviews in Hanoi. Issues discovered during the pilot
interview such as Vietnamese wordings, the questionnaire format, and additional choices for
questions on opinions were corrected and incorporated into the questionnaire.
The Vietnamese questionnaire was then translated back into English to check its original content. We
hired a professional interpreter who was not familiar with the project to do the Vietnamese to
English translating to make sure that the Vietnamese questions maintained the same content and
meaning as the English ones. The pilot interviews were filmed and used as materials in training
courses. Survey manuals were created and distributed to interviewers and supervisors of the DSOs.
Data entry and information correction
A double-data checking process was applied for data entry. Firstly, we checked questionnaires
manually. Those missing and illogical information detected were sent back to DSOs for mistake
corrections. At the second stage, logic rules were applied to detect incorrect and missing information
that were not discovered during the first stage. The errors happened in the fieldwork were sent back
to DSOs to check and get additional information. After corrections were made, the process was
repeated. The data was then standardised and translated into English where possible.
79
Appendix B: Summary of stakeholder interviews
The stakeholder interview provides an additional source of information which enriches our analysis
on the impact of migration. Opinions from key people with different perspectives on migration acted
as a supplement to the household data where there was a lack of information, such as about
unemployment. Suggestions as to how migration policies should be shaped were also collected.
Twenty eight high profile individuals in various sectors in Vietnam were interviewed. A third of these
stakeholders were government officials working at the National Assembly, ministries, and some
government bodies which specialise in international migration such as the Overseas Vietnamese
Committee (OVC) and the Bureau of Administration on Overseas Workers (BAOW). Another third of
the interviewees included academics and researchers from universities and government institutes.
The rest were key individuals from international NGOs including the ILO, IOM, and UN agencies, and
local NGOs.
Stakeholders mentioned the following main benefits of international migration:
• Economic benefits
o International migration helps reduce unemployment pressures. This is especially
helpful for labourers in agriculture and rural areas as most migrant workers are not
required to have high skills.
o International migration helps reduce poverty when migrant workers can obtain
higher salaries than they can when working domestically.
o Remittances can be an important source of income. Remittances are not only used
for purchasing household goods but also for education and investment. Remittances
can also improve communities where there are many migrants.
• Cultural benefits: Learning from migration experience, many people have changed their
perceptions and behaviours. For example, some treat their family better.
Stakeholders also pointed out many problems related to international migration:
• High costs of migration: Migration costs a lot of money and can put a burden of debt on the
migrants themselves or on their families. There are also many migration agencies that exploit
migrant workers.
• Many migrant workers have a difficult time abroad. They do not often receive adequate
training before leaving, and tend to have little or no protection when working abroad.
• Returned migrant workers have problems re-entering the domestic labour market,
particularly since few of them gained significantly in terms of skills. For those who returned
with skills, it is difficult for them to find suitable jobs that match their skills.
• Remittances are not used properly. In many families, remittances are used for gambling. In
other families, remittances are used for investment in securities markets.
• Negative social impacts:
o Migration can lead to family breakdown.
o Children left behind often do not have proper care and education.
o Left-behind children or family members can get involved in gambling or criminal
activities.
• Human trafficking has become a big issue.
Most of the stakeholders believed that the economic impact of migration is considerable, and
outweighs the negative impacts of migration.
On the domestic policies influencing the impacts of migration:
80
• Most of the stakeholders mentioned policies on labour exporting. On the one hand,
Vietnam’s policy on promoting labour export is a good policy to reduce unemployment
pressure and poverty. But on the other hand, regulation is not adequate, leaving holes that
export agencies can easily take advantage of.
• Stakeholders also mentioned the importance of domestic policies such as family planning and
population, education and training.
On the international policies influencing migration:
• Stakeholders mentioned the importance of global and regional migration integration policies.
• They also mentioned the migrant labour policies of developed countries. There can be
barriers for labour export if a developed country does not want to attract migrant labourer or
does not sign a bilateral agreement with Vietnam.
Stakeholders have given out many recommendations to maximise the impacts of international
migration in Vietnam:
• The government should improve regulation, management, and supervision of labour export
agencies to prevent unscrupulous behaviour.
• The government should carry out or commission research on how to best utilise the skills and
assets of returned migrants and support them in re-integrating into the domestic labour
market.
• The government should seek to develop bilateral agreements on labour export with
developed countries to remove barriers to labour export.
• The government should also enter international treaties and bilateral agreements on
protecting migrants and their families when they are working and living abroad.
81
Appendix C: Endogeneity test for the error term in the saving model
This test can be carried out by running a regression of Y on X’s vector and the residual taken from the
original model. The results are shown below:
Coef. Std. Er
Dependent variable: mean of saving per capita
Number of observations 1507 H e a d o f h o u s e h o l d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sMale -335.9 1379.1
Married 9268 5703.8
Widow 5690.7 5382.2
Divorced† -2016.1 4917.8
Health (in good condition) 1883.3* 1112.9
Working 3106.2 2115.8
Retired 1696.4 1928.5
Age 529.3* 317.5
Age squared -4.9* 2.9 H o u s e h o l d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
Proportion of working adults -746.3 2741.4
No. members in school -1419.8** 618.6
Urban 1305.4 1115.3 M i g r a t i o n f a c t o r s
Having absent migrants 3971.2*** 1107.4
Residual 2.8 2.4
Intercept -26790.6 15384.8 F - s t a t i s t i c s 2 . 6 7R - s q u a r e d 0 2
The insignificance of the residual confirms the appropriateness of the OLS method.
82
Appendix D: The impact of migration and remittances on household
health expenditure
Columns 1 and 2 are the results of the estimated impact of migration (number of migrants in
household) on household health expenditure per capita (log) using OLS and Fixed Effect. In these
estimations, we also include household income per capita (log) and household characteristics as
independent variables. The number of migrants in the household has a statistically significant (at 5
per cent level in OLS, and 1 per cent level in Fixed Effect Estimation) positive impact on household
health expenditure capita.
Columns 3 and 4 are the results of the estimated impact of remittance (household remittance per
capita –log) on household health expenditure per capita (log), using OLS and Fixed Effect. In these
estimations, we do not include household income per capita but use household pre-remittance
income per capita (log) and other household characteristics as independent variables. The household
received remittance per capita does have statistically significant (at 1 per cent level in OLS, 5 per cent
in Fixed Effect) positive impact on household health expenditure per capita.
In both cases, it should be noted that the coefficient of pre-remittance income is negative and
insignificant, while the coefficient of remittances is positive and significant. This suggests that
remittances and migration appear to have a positive effect on household’s health expenditure and
health care.
Household health expenditure D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e L o g o f h o u s e h o l d h e a l t h e x p e n d i t u r e p e r c a p i t a o v e r l a s t 1 2 m o n t h sS a m p l e
Household with positive income / positive remittance ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )Independent variable OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
Coeff.
( S E )
Household income per capita last 12 months [log] 0 91 + 0 89 +
( 0 4 8 ) ( 0 4 8 )
Household pre-remittance income per capita last 12
months [log] -0.139 -0.113
( 0 . 1 0 1 ) ( 0 9 1 )No. of migrant(s) in the household (absent and/or
returned) 0.117 * 0.126 **
( 0 4 8 ) ( 0 4 3 )
Received remittance per capita [log] 0.122 ** 0.117 *
( 0 4 5 ) ( 0 5 1 )Urban 0.307 ** 0.333 ** 0.300 * 0.160
( 0 8 2 ) ( 0 8 9 ) ( 0 . 1 4 8 ) ( 0 . 1 6 6 )No of children in the household -0 64 -0 82 * -0 92 -0.104
( 0 4 1 ) ( 0 4 1 ) ( 0 7 1 ) ( 0 7 1 )No of elder people (>=65) in the household 0.238 ** 0.191 * 0.403 ** 0.366 **
( 0 8 5 ) ( 0 7 8 ) ( 0 . 1 3 2 ) ( 0 . 1 2 5 )Household head characteristics A g e
0 01 0 04 0 18 0 20 ( 0 2 3 ) ( 0 2 1 ) ( 0 3 7 ) ( 0 3 5 )A g e s q u a r e d0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 )M a l e
-0.235 * -0.152 + -0.279 + -0.247
( 0 9 2 ) ( 0 9 2 ) ( 0 . 1 6 6 ) ( 0 . 1 6 2 )I f m a r r i e d-0 19 -0 94 -0.376 * -0.370 + ( 0 . 1 2 8 ) ( 0 . 1 2 2 ) ( 0 . 2 1 2 ) ( 0 . 2 1 0 )I f i n g o o d h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n
-0.987 ** -0.943 ** -1.262 ** -1.151 ** ( 0 . 1 3 9 ) ( 0 . 1 1 7 ) ( 0 . 2 1 9 ) ( 0 . 1 8 3 )I f h o l d b a c h e l o r d e g r e e0.575 ** 0.500 ** 0.977 ** 0.930 **
83
( 0 . 1 4 5 ) ( 0 . 1 4 6 ) ( 0 . 3 3 7 ) ( 0 . 3 3 4 )Constant 4.962 ** 4.875 ** 6.622 ** 6.277
( 0 . 7 5 0 ) ( 0 . 7 2 9 ) ( 1 . 4 0 1 ) ( 1 . 3 2 4 )Number of observations 1363 1363 470 470
F-stat 14.88 14.63 8.14 7.85
R-squared 0.1218 0.1205 0.1821 0.1800 N o t e : + p < . 1 0 ; * p < 5 ; * * p < 1
84
Appendix E: Probability of women holding a bachelor degree D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e I f h o l d b a c h e l o r d e g r e eE s t i m a t i o n m e t h o d B i n o m i a l P r o b i t - M a r g i n a l e f f e c t e s t i m a t e sS a m p l e W o m e n a g e d 2 2 a n d u pVariable Marginal Effect z-stat
If having migrant in the household (absent and/or returned) 0 24 **
2.72
If receive remittance over the last 12 months -0 36 **
-3.91
Household income per capita -6.66E-10 -0 2
If urban area 0 81 **
7.92
Household size -0 05 * -2.33
If head of household is in good health condition -0 22 * -2.56
If head of household is male -0 21 * -2.29
School grade of head of household 0 16 **
9.74
Number of observations 2321
Pseudo R-squared 0.1926 N o t e: + p <.10; * p < 5; * * p < 1
D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e I f h o l d b a c h e l o r d e g r e eE s t i m a t i o n m e t h o d B i n o m i a l P r o b i t - M a r g i n a l e f f e c t e s t i m a t e sS a m p l e M e n a g e d 2 2 a n d u pVariable Marginal Effect z-stat
If having migrant in the household 0 33 * 2.59
If receive remittance over the last 12 months -0 53 **
-4.14
Household income per capita -1.71E-09 -0 5
If urban area 0.132 **
9.44
Household size -0 03 -1.14
If head of household is in good health condition -0 44 **
-3.69
If head of household is male -0 28 * -2 6
School grade of head of household 0 22 **
10.24
Number of observations 2235
Pseudo R-squared 0.1982
N o t e : + p < . 1 0 ; * p < 5 ; * * p < 1
