Demography and Civilisations

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Demography: Clash orEncounter of Civilizations?

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Youssef Courbage, INED, Paris

IIASA, Laxenburg, November 13th,

2009



1. INTRODUCTION• A scientific essay. Based on statistical

data: family, demography, economy.Charts and graphs abound.

• Refutation of thesis of late Samuel

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Huntington on “clash of civilizations”.• His arguments give considerable

importance to the "populationexplosion" of Muslims in confrontationbetween Islam and Western civilization.



• 178 pages scanning 50 Moslem

countries: Arab world, Greater non-ArabMiddle East, Europe, the Caucasus andpost-communist Central Asia, the Far

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East, sub-Saharan Africa.

Groups not studied due to format:

Muslims in India and China, America andsome 10 million North African and Turkmigrants in Europe.



• Refutation of ideological premises of Huntington: arealistic vision of Muslim populations.

•The “clash of civilizations” attaches great importanceto population explosion of Muslim world in this frontalclash.

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"The resurgence of Islam has been fuelled by spectacular rates of growth", p.116.

• « Population growth in Muslim countries, expansion of the 15-24 years, provides recruitment for fundamentalism, insurgency and migration. Economic growth strengthens Asian government, demographic growth threatens Muslim governments and non-Muslim societies » (Huntington, p. 103).



• Huntington’s message well understood that

recent NATO report "Towards a GrandStrategy for an Uncertain World,", listing the 6key threats to global security puts:

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-Number 1: Demographics

•

-Number 4: The rise of the irrationality, ofreligious fundamentalism (only Moslem notJewish or Christian mentionned).



• Stream of thought animates bright intellectuals:Bernard Lewis, and less bright ones: ChristopherCaldwell, journalist of the FT, nostalgic of Enoch Powell(a sort of English Le Pen) has just produced Reflections on the Revolution in Europe – Can Europe be the same

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.

•Hence, Huntington's thesis has made tremendousdamages, like all self-fulfilling prophecy.

• It feeds islamophobia : establishing a kind of man, ahomo islamicus, different from other human species.



• Program of the presentation:

• -Demography as a measure of modernity: thegeneral pattern,

• -

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,• - girls excess child mortality in Muslim

countries,• - Iran/Turkey

• - transitional crises,• - discussion and conclusion.



2. DEMOGRAPHY AS A MEASURE OF

MODERNITY – THE GENERAL PATTERN

• Demography help dismantling myths andstereotypes.

Allows to analyze the concrete Muslimpopulations and not the imagined one.

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• Relies on objective quantitative indicators,demography and anthropology :fertility, infantmortality, literacy, endogamous marriages,

patrilinearity.



• Demographic variable sometimes considered

as an indicator -superficial- of the state of acountry.

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• nstea emograp y, power u n catormentalities, goes deeper in the order ofintimacy: union between men and women,sexuality, reproduction, death. Demography is

a psycho-analysis, a Rorschach test of thesocieties.



• Preferred indicator of demographers, the TotalFertility Rate. Varies worldwide from 8 for themost fertile populations to 1 child for less fertile.

•

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,refutation of explanations based on culturalistarguments.

• Muslim countries come all across the spectrum.From 7-8 in sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Niger) tothe low of 1.7 children in Azerbaijan andLebanon. Bosnian Muslims at 1.1, less than Serbs

and Croats or Greeks.



• France’s present fertility rate stands at 2.01

is, so to say, behind Tunisia, Lebanon andIran. Not trivial phenomenon, but mostmeaningful.

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On demographic criteria, the "Muslim world"does not exist. Its population explosion is amyth, to feed fantasies of advocates of the

"clash of civilizations".



• Demographic transition: Where mortality decline in theeighteenth century led to a potentially unbearable

population growth in relation to resources.

• Ultimately it had to be checked by reducing fertility:

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.

This adjustment occurred thanks to the rise of literacy,first among young men then young women.

• But, secularism was a prerequisite: considerer

reproduction, not as a supernatural phenomenon -God’s will- but an attribute of man’s free decision.Fertility limitation has to be within the “calculus ofconscious choice” (Ansley Coale).



• When people decide to control their fertility, thiscorresponds in changes in perception of the world, no

more the outcome of “a divine intervention”.“Disenchantment of the world", as Max Weberdescribed it, the Muslim world is living it today.

•

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Demographic transition spread over two centuries inEurope. Began late among Muslims compared toEurope, but speedier. Two centuries for Europe to passfrom 5 children to 2, two or three decades in the ArabMaghreb.

• In the Muslim world as a whole, fertility has been morethan halved in 30 years.



• Revisit sayings on Muslim demography 3 decadesago. Then culturalist stereotypes were widespread.

Dudley Kirk, renowned American demographer in"Factors Affecting Moslem Natality" highlighted its“laws” :

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• (1) Islamic fertility is universally high• (2) it shows no significant decline• (3) is greater than that of neighbouring peoples

followers of other religions.

• Perception which marked next generation ofdemographers: a dogmatic unchanging Islam, reluctantto modernize and unable of demographic transition.



TFR in some Arab countries before

transition (1960-70) and in 2005

66,5

77,5

88,5

9

15

1,52

2,53

3,54

4,55

,

Lib Tun Mar Alg Liby Egy Ira Syr Jor Om A S Pal Mau Yém

60-70



3.THE EXCEPTIONS• Definitely universal story of accession to

modernity whose trigger is the move toliteracy.

•Today, varying levels of literacy explain why

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some Muslim countries are still lagging indemographic transition, while others are asadvanced as in Europe.

• There are also failed or stalling transitions,that might be superficially attributed to Islam,whereas the real reasons might be elsewhere:



3.1.POLITICAL REASONS

• Deliberate form of resistance to demographictransition in Muslim countries do exist, but hasnothing to do with the religion as such. They areessentially political under religious dress.

•

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The Middle East under the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict is an example of "war ofcradles”.

•

High fertility of Palestinians in the occupiedterritory (at least until the 2nd intifada ) despitemodernization: urbanization, literacy…



•-In Israel: The Palestinians, Israeli citizenshad on average many children, also despitetheir high levels of education and urbanization,

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• But Israeli Jews also very fertile: twice morethan Europeans or Jews of the diaspora .Demographic rivalries between Orthodox andreligious Jews and seculars fuels the game

number. Between Sephardic Jews andAshkenazi dominated the differences are alsosignificant.



“War of cradles” in the Near East, TFR by groups

in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine

4,55

5,56

6,5

77,5

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11,52

2,533,5

SYRSUN

SYRALA

SYRDRU

SYRCHR

LIBCHI

LIBSUN

LIBDRU

LIBCHR

ISRORT

ISRREL

ISRLAI

ISRPAL

PALSUN

PALCOL



• Syria considered as a Jacobin Nation-State.Yet, differences are considerable betweenthe high fertility Sunni majority, politicallydominated and the minorities holding thepower (Alawites) or close to it: (Druzes,

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w ose e og ap c e av o snow of a European pattern.

• Fertility rates in Lebanon, show rapidconvergence among Christians (maronites…)

and Muslims (Shias…).Does it pave the way topolitical convergence, contrary to what issuggested by sensationalist medias?



3.2. FAMILY SYSTEMS

• Demographic differences might derive fromfamily systems. Existed before Islam and havesurvived to it. Yet, this family system much olderthan Islam: Patrilineality prior to Islam, identifiablein Mesopotamia in the 2nd millennium BC.

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•The central Arab, Iranian, Indian system arepatrilineal, give advantage to boys, and

patrilocal - young couples live with or nearrelatives of the husband - and endogamous.•



• Decrease in patrilinearity intensity as we moves awayfrom the original Arabic kernel: Arabian Peninsula,

Fertile Crescent. Some traces of matrilocality in NorthAfrica, Iran, Turkey, in heterodox provinces in Syria.

•North Africa ado ted it but with notable exce tions:

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Sahraoui’s in Morocco matrilocality reached 21-38%in1982, against 5.5% in Morocco as a whole.

• Effect on fertility: few couples willing stop having

babies until they have at least 1 boy. Explains stallingfertility in Syria, Egypt and Jordan. With TFR of 7-8odds for remaining sonless 1%. With TFR of 2, it isclose to 25%.



Probability (%) to remain sonless

by average number of childrenProbability

35

40

45

50

23

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8



• In contrast the matrilocality of Indonesia -the largestMuslim country 240 millions, 200 millions Muslims-,

guarantees women higher status, transmission throughgirls.

•

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,

2/3 couples (peaks at 77- 91% in Aceh and for theMenangkabaus). Men and women inherit equally.Sometimes men are disinherited and eldest daughtercollects bulk of the inheritance.

• Fertility reduction undergoes no obstacles.

• Incidentally in Indonesia, Muslims less fertile than

Christians; and lower fertility than ChristianPhilippines.



TFR in Indonesia by provinces (in

red high % of Christians)

3,23,43,63,8

44,2

25

1,82

2,22,42,62,8

Yogyagarta Bali BangkaBetilung

SulawesiNord

Lampung Gorontalo Bengkulu Riau Maluku NusaTengarra

Est



• But why not in Malaysia, which has the same

family system as Indonesia?

• Return to politics. The Malay Muslims excess

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ert ty s exp a ne y t e war o num ers,the competition with the Chinese andIndians.

• Same phenomenon elsewhere:, Palestinians inIsrael or in occupied territories, Kosovo, Uigursin China etc.. akin to reflex of defence ofminority.



Ethnic/religious TFR in Malaysia

5,25

5,75

6,25

6,75

7,25

7,75

Malais

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1,75

2,25

2,75

3,25

3,75

4,25

4,75

1957 1965 1973 1981 1989 1997 2005

no s

Indiens



3.3. OPENESS AND GLOBALIZATION

• Differences in pace of fertility transitions might bedue to the contrasting effects of globalization of

the opening to the outside world.

• International migration, depending on the country

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o es na on, ac a es a more or ess rapdemographic modernity.

• Hence large differences between Maghreb and

Near East. History, geography, languages in use,especially destination of migrants : Europe in thefirst case, Arabian peninsula in the second, plays asignificant role.



The demographic advance of

Morocco on Egypt and Syria

5,75

6,25

6,757,25

7,75

MAROC

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2,25

2,75

3,25

3,75

4,25

4,75

5,25

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Egypte

Syrie



4. ISLAM AND GIRLS EXCESS

MORTALITY

• Islam often associated to discriminatory treatment ofwomen. The idea deserves to be dug, using an index of

excess U5 mortality (Hill and Upchurch).

• Girls mortality is naturally lower than boys one. In-

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century), index equal to 1, higher than 1 girlsdiscrimination.

•Muslims are not the most sexist in the world: China,

North India, are much worst.•Sexism more widespread among non-Arab Muslims:Kosovo, Albania, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, thanamong Arabs: Morocco, Lebanon, even Saudi Arabia,Yemen, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan.

•



Index of Girls discrimination, girls

U5 excess death-ratePundjab 1,98 Nigeria 1,10

Chine 1,84 Bangladesh 1,08

Haryana 1,77 Koweit* 1,08

Uttar Pradesh 1,43 Mauritanie 1,08

Rajasthan 1,40 Algérie 1,08

Bihar 1,35 Kirghistan 1,07

Kosovo 1,31 Sénégal 1,06

Turquie 1,21 Palestine 1,06

Jordanie 1,21 Yémen 1,06

Azerbaidjan 1,20 Arabie saoudite* 1,06

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Iran 1,19 Liban 1,05

Pakistan 1,19 Djibouti 1,05

Oman* 1,18 Gambie 1,05

Bahrain* 1,17 Somalie 1,04

Libye 1,16 Malaysia 1,03

Niger 1,15 Bosnie 1,02

Burkina Faso 1,15 Maroc 1,02

Qatar* 1,15 Guinée Bissau 1,01

Albanie 1,14 Comores 1,00

Ouzbékistan 1,13 Guinée 1,00

Egypte 1,13 Irak 0,99

Afghanistan 1,13 Mali 0,97

Tunisie 1,13 Emirats Arabes Unis* 0,95

Syrie 1,12 Tadjikistan 0,95

Arménie 1,11Kazakhstan 0,93

Indonésie 1,11 Turkménistan 0,91

Tchad 1,10 Sierra Leone 0,90

Soudan 1,10



• The explanation has to do with endogamy. Plays aprotective role of girls and women.

• Unlike exogamous patrilineal systems, which rely oninfanticide of baby girls.

• In the Arab family, girls do not leave the family but

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, ,

authority of the uncle.• Sometimes there are distortions, as in the case of

high fertility decline (Tunisia).• Hence the effect of modernity in demography can

sometimes be devastating: foeticide of girls(ultrasound and amniocentesis) or after birth: deliberateneglect of girls deprived of food, care, affection.



5.IRAN/TURKEY

• Paradoxically, according to demographic

parameters, Iran appears more modern thanTurkey – a country willing to join the EU.

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• Iran is closer to a real Nation-State thanTurkey. The Kurds in Iran have the samefertility behavior than other Iranians, which is

not the case of those of Turkey, who still havea fertility thrice higher than in Istanbul.



More advanced demographic

transition in Iran than in Turkey

5 255,5

5,756

6,256,5

6,7577,25

7,57,75

8

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1,752

2,252,5

2,753

3,253,5

3,754

4,254,54,75

5

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Iran



6. CRISIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC

TRANSITIONS

• Demographic transition might be destabilizingfor social order. Modernization has not only its

positive side.

• -

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Muslim countries- the risks of destabilizationare high.

• Concretely, in a society which becomes moreand more literate, the son toleratesincreasingly less the power of an illiteratefather.

•



• The questioning of authority throughout the

family will reflect on the global society.

•

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practicing contraception, undermine thepredominance of male, brother or father.

• and arouse suspicion because of the

likelihood of illicit sexual relations.(Shalimar the Clown, Salman Rushdie).



• This mental disorientation helps explaining theunrest in Muslim countries.

• It is not peculiar to Moslem countries, but isrelevant to this phase of transition.

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•• In sub-Saharan Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya,Nigeria, in Asia : Sri Lanka the crisis of transitionare present.

• In 2nd phase, reached by advanced Muslimcountries: Morocco, TFR 2.2, major risks nowwell behind.



• Thus, the collapse of the Islamist PJD party in theelections of September 2007 (which was credited with

47% of the vote in some polling institutes, and hadreceived less than half) is to correlate with theprogress of demographic transition, which bears theseeds of democratic transition.

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• Strong contrast with Pakistan, which hit the headlines.Here accumulated political risks:• the borders of Afghanistan• Taliban movement.

• Atomic bomb• And another destabilizing factor: the "demographicbomb". Pakistan’s TFR twice higher than Morocco: 4.6.



Muslims and Hindus in the Indian sub-continent :

India, pakistan, Bangladesh, 2000 and 2050

800

1000

1200

1400

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0

200

400

600

2000 2050

usu mans

Hindous et autres



7. DISCUSSION• 1) To use demography to explain the modernization

of the Muslim world: The approach of social reality is

complex and has multiple levels of explanation.• Demographic indicators are able to encapsulate an

infinite number of individual and collective behaviours,henomena of mentalit .

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• Are more objective than other indicators.•

2) Eurocentrism : Modernity does not imply mereacceptance of the European patterns. In the MiddleAges, the Abbasid Empire and Andalusia led the way tomodernity.

• Since the siege of Baghdad by Mongols in the XIIIthcentury, Muslim world irremediably declined. Science,knowledge moved elsewhere to China then Europe.



• Thus, from the nineteenth century on, all reformmovements in the South, have looked to Europe, with

failures for the Arabs, success story for Japan.•

Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pasha in Egypt and Syria

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ca e t e a nt- mon ens to e p mo ern ze gypt.

•

• Beys in Tunis, did not request Europeans but adresseda Lebanese Francophile Ahmed F. Chidiac (a

Christian convert to Islam) to help them reform theschool system, the key to modernization.

•



• Same for Hassan I king of Morocco, who sent amission to Japan under the Meiji era to benefit

indirectly from European experience.

• The Young Turks, most of whom were westernized-

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,

modernize the Ottoman Empire.

• For a demographer, in any case, the path to modernityhas gone from Europe. The demographic revolution

started in the Paris basin middle of the eighteenthcentury, then spread to Europe and the whole worldin successive waves.



• For important matters in life, men are verysimilar. If an innovation is successful –like

fertility control- , at any point on the planet, it isunlikely that it does not spread elsewhere.

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• 3) The contradiction between secularizationand religious practice:• Muslims are going through simultaneous

movement of secularization, a secular space

that becomes pervasive in their lives and asignificant resurgence of religious practices:ramadan, mosque attendance, daily prayer,pilgrimage to Mecca, Umrah, Zakka ...



• This contrasts with the generation of the 1960s,marked by Nasser in the Arab countries and

comparable forms of secular nationalism elsewhere(Iran, Turkey, Indonesia ...).

• The individuals ractice ambivalence: a kind of secular

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doubt and bursts of religiosity.

This has been confirmed in a field survey in Morocco,that showed that Moroccan society is secularizingmore than expected.

• In two key areas, politics: 71% believe that religionshould not guide it and economics: 66% arefavorable to bank credit.

• 40% do not give particular importance to fast of

Ramadan.



8. CONCLUSION• 1) Nothing such as “Islamic demography”, contrary to

claims of some demographers. Range of indices of

fertility rates from about 8 children to 1.

• 2) Unavoidably, transitions produce crisis, triggered

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, ,

change of gender relations. Violence can accompanytransitions. This was the case in Europe (Cromwell,French Revolution, Russian Revolution).

• 3) Universality of fertility decrease, invalidates theconcept of an unbridgeable gap between West andIslam. Invalidates idea of intangible religious roots ofdemographic behaviour and radically opposedmentalities. The world is in a logic of convergence.

•

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Demography and Civilisations