Decisionmaking In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: The Strategic Shift of 2007

8/7/2019 Decisionmaking In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: The Strategic Shift of 2007

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Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key DecisionsMonograph Series

DECISIONMAKING IN OPERATION IRAQIFREEDOM: THE STRATEGIC SHIFT OF 2007

Steven Metz

John R. MartinExecutive Editor

May 2010

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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This monograph draws heavily on Steven Metz, Iraq and theEvolution of American Strategy(Washington, DC: Potomac Books,2008). The author would like to thank John Martin, Peter Feaver,Alexander Cochran, Kelly Howard, and Meghan OSullivan forinsightful suggestions. The monograph was much improved bytheir efforts and all shortcomings which remain are strictly thoseof the author.

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FOREWORD

In Volume 1 of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM KeyDecisions Monograph Series, Dr. Steven Metz skillfullystudied the 2003 decision to go to war in Iraq. The resultsof that decision are widely called disastrous. In thissecond volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully atthe 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice whichis generally considered to have been effective in turningthe tide of the war from potential disaster to possible

perhaps probablestrategic success. Although numerousstrategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. militaryexecutes its responsible withdrawal from Iraq, Dr.Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in thesetwo monographs, describing both the start and what mayeventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war.In this volume, he provides readers with an explanationof how a decision process that was fundamentallyunchangedwith essentially the same people shaping andmaking the decisioncould produce such a different resultin 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate thesurge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timelyand shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in onestrategic situation by copying actions successfully taken inanother where different conditions applied. Subsequent volumes of this series will analyzeintervening and subsequent decisions, but Dr. Metzs

two works have set a high standard for the succeedingmonographs. I look forward to the needed debate that thisvolume and the others will generate.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, Jr.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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PREFACE

Victory is still an option in Iraq.Dr. Frederick Kagan1

The Strategic Shift of 2007.

By the time Fred Kagan penned the comment citedabove, victory had already long been the wrong wordto describe whatever outcome was going to befall

the American adventure in Iraq. An argument can bemade that victorysuccess against military foes inwarwas an appropriate term in April 2003, whenU.S. military forces deposed Saddam Hussein, but amilitary-only victory was far out of reach by 2007. Thegoal of victory articulated by Kagan and PresidentGeorge W. Bush perhaps still had merit in galvanizing

public support of the war.2

However, the better goalparticularly by late 2006, when a virulent insurgencyand sectarian violence were raging in Iraqs citieswas some semblance of strategic success, which wouldnot come about purely by military action. That successwould necessarily include a signicant militarycomponent, but also required a broader approachthat would support Iraqs economic, political, and

societal development. Just as victory over Adolf Hitlerin World War II required the Marshall Plan to cementthe achievements of combat in Europe, the victoryof 2003 in Iraq would require by 2007 much more thanjust military force to produce conditions that wouldultimately be helpful to advancing American interestsin the Middle East.

The military component of the 2007 effort to achievea positive result in Iraq became popularly known asthe surge. In this second volume of the Strategic


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come, the task of identifying them in strategicleaders should not be so difcult. The ability

to communicate on the strategic level must beconsidered when promoting general ofcersinto the highest ranks.

Develop a rapidly-deployable surge capacityfor creating, training, and equipping localsecurity forces. The recently-concludedQuadrennial Defense Reviewdoes not appear toinclude guidance to develop a separate forcefor this purpose, although it does suggeststrengthening the ability of general purposeforces to do so.3

Maintain the Armys wartime adaptationspeed. This recommendation should probablyextend to the entire military, not just the Army,but the Army and the Marine Corps are the most-

heavily engaged forces in Iraq and are probablyadapting more rapidly than the other Services.Wartime acts as a catalyst for adaptation, so itmay be unrealistic to expect that same speedto be maintained whenever the military nallyencounters a peacetime situation.

Lead an effort within the joint communityto develop and institutionalize proceduresfor reseizing the strategic initiative. Futureconictslike Iraqmay see the United Stateslose the strategic initiative. It only makes sensenow to prepare in education and exercises forthat eventuality.

One nal recommendation from Dr. Metz is included

in the body of his report: he recommends that Congressconsider formal establishment of a strategic councilcomprised of the Service chiefs and the combatant


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commanders. Strategic advice that comes from thiscouncil should represent both the needs of any

conictprovided by the combatant commandersand the requirements for the long-term health of theindividual Servicesmore likely to originate withthe Service chiefs. Advice to the President and to theSecretary of Defense should cover both perspectives.

The Key Decisions Series.4

The rst and second volumes of the StrategicStudies Institutes Operation IRAQI FREEDOM KeyDecisions Monograph Series act as bookends for theseries. The rst covered the decision to go to war inIraq, while this volume covers the decision that mayultimately be seen as leading to the end of the war.While one of the volumes (challenges of withdrawing

from Iraq) will cover events that happened after thesurge, all the other decisions happened within thetime frame of the decision to go to war in 2003 and thedecision to surge forces in 2007. Authors in this series are asked to concentrate onthe decisions more than on the subsequent effects.The effort should focus on identifying the factorsthat inuenced the decisioneither positively ornegativelyand determining whether the factors wereidiosyncratic or systemic in nature. That determinationis key in devising solutions to problems or to reinforcingpositive factors. Authors should answer six questionsabout their analyzed decision: 1. Who were the key decision makers? 2. Who shaped or inuenced the decision?

3. What was the political and strategic context ofthe decision?


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While the decision to surge troops into Iraq in2007 is widely seen as a good choice, it still requiresthe careful examination that Dr. Metz brings to allhis work. Without such meticulous study, the wisedecision in a particular theater at a certain point intime may be misconstrued to be a solid solution forother theaters where very different conditions exist.The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that study of thegood decisionat least as judged by the emergingresultsto surge troops into Iraq in 2007 will generatejust as much debate as study of the many poor onesmade in this particular war. Better understandingofboth good and bad decisionsshould lead to betterchoices in future operating environments.

JOHN R. MARTINExecutive EditorOIF Key Decisions ProjectStrategic Studies Institute

ENDNOTES - PREFACE

1. Frederick W. Kagan, Choosing Victory: A Plan for Successin Iraq, Phase I report of the Iraq Planning Group at the AmericanEnterprise Institute, January 25, 2007, p. 1.

2. President Bush used the rhetoric of victory manytimes, doing so ofcially in National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,Washington, DC: National Security Council, November 2005.


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3. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC:U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 29.

4. A fuller explication of the OIF Key Decisions MonographSeries can be found in the preface to the rst volume of theseries. See Steven Metz, Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom:Removing Saddam Hussein By Force, OIF Key Decisions MonographSeries, Vol. 1, Colonel (Retired) John R. Martin, Executive ed.,Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,February 2010, pp. v-xvii.

5. Procedures for submitting unsolicited manuscripts are foundat the SSI website, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil. Submissions for this series should be directed to SSIsDirector of Research, who will provide them to the series executiveeditor.

6. This decision was studied in the rst volume of this series.See Metz.


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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEVEN METZ is Chairman of the Regional StrategyDepartment and Research Professor of NationalSecurity Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute(SSI). He has been with SSI since 1993, previouslyserving as Henry L. Stimson Professor of MilitaryStudies and SSIs Director of Research. Dr. Metz hasalso been on the faculty of the Air War College, theU.S. Army Command and General Staff College,and several universities. He has been an advisor topolitical campaigns and elements of the intelligencecommunity; served on national security policy taskforces; testied in both houses of Congress; and spokenon military and security issues around the world. Heis the author of more than 100 publications, includingarticles in journals such as Washington Quarterly,Joint

Force Quarterly, The National Interest, Defence Studies,and Current History. Dr. Metzs research has taken himto 30 countries, including Iraq immediately after thecollapse of the Hussein regime. He currently serveson the RAND Corporations Insurgency Board. He isthe author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategyand is working on a book entitled Strategic Shock: EightEvents That Changed American Security. Dr. Metz holdsa Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University.

JOHN R. MARTIN joined SSI in mid-2009 andis the Institutes specialist in joint, interagency,intergovernmental, and multinational issues. ProfessorMartin previously served at SSI from 2000 to 2004,serving as the Chairman of the Art of War Department

and concurrently as the Institutes Deputy Director.Professor Martin was also a visiting professor atSSI in 2006 and 2007. Professor Martin served in the


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U.S. Army for over 31 years, retiring as a colonel. Heserved extensively in the Republic of Korea, primarily

in tactical Aviation, but also with the United NationsCommand Military Armistice Commission and ascommander of a liaison team with the Republicof Korea Army. He also possesses considerableexperience in Washington, DC, where he worked onArmy force structure, manning the force, the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program, and providinglanguage training. While in the Army, Professor Martinwas operationally deployed to Guam (1975: OperationNEW LIFE), Kosovo (1999: Task Force Falcon), Bosnia(1999-2000: SFOR), Afghanistan (2002: CJTF-180)and Iraq (2003: ORHA/CPA; 2005: MNSTC-I; 2007:MNF-I). Professor Martin was the Executive Editor ofHard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. Thismajor government report by the Special Inspector

General for Iraq Reconstruction was published inearly 2009 and analyzed the reconstruction of Iraqsince 2003. Professor Martin graduated with highestdistinction from the College of Naval Command andStaff at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, in 1988.He is a 1996 graduate of the National War College andholds Masters Degrees in National Security Affairsfrom both institutions. Professor Martin also holds aMasters Degree in Aeronautical Engineering from theU.S. Naval Postgraduate School and is a graduate ofthe U.S. Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, MD.He is a 1974 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy atWest Point, NY.


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DECISIONMAKING IN OPERATIONIRAQI FREEDOM:

THE STRATEGIC SHIFT OF 2007

As to whether the United States has made mistakes,of course, Im sure, we have. You cant be involvedin something as big as the liberation of a countrylike Iraq and all that has happened since, and Imsure there are things that we could have donedifferently. . . .

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice1

INTRODUCTION

When the Bush administration elected to invade

Iraq in 2003 to remove Saddam Hussein from power,no senior policymaker anticipated that there wouldbe extensive and protracted armed resistance after thedictator was gone.2The administration assumed thatthe Iraqi bureaucracy and security forcesboth mili-tary and policewould return to work once they hadnew leadership untainted by association with Hussein.But American policymakers did not understand how

fragile and precarious Iraq was after decades ofpathological rule. As Iraqi security forces disappeared,the nation collapsed into a spasm of looting and streetcrime. All administration and public order collapsed.It was Lord of the Flies on a monumental scale.Anarchy sparked public anger which gathered energywith each passing week. Personal and sectarian

hostility, which had been suppressed by Hussein,raged unfettered. Revenge haunted the streetsandit was armed. For a brief interlude, little violence wasdirected against Americans. But that did not last long.


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Trouble rst exploded in the restive city of Fallujah, 35miles west of Baghdad. The U.S. military had bypassed

the city in its assault on Baghdad, but elements of the82d Airborne Division arrived in late April. Fallujahdid not take kindly to occupation, and the 82d did nottake kindly to occupation duty. Within a few days, arally celebrating Saddam Husseins birthday led toangry denunciations of the U.S. presence and heateddemands for withdrawal. Shooting broke out, leavingat least 13 Iraqis dead.3Two more died the next dayin a second round of clashes. Attackers then tossedgrenades into a U.S. Army compound.

In early May, two American Soldiers were killed inBaghdad. A few weeks later, two more died during anighttime attack on an Army checkpoint near Fallujah.Violence spread to Baghdad and the region west andnorth of the capital known as the Sunni triangle.

The initial attacks were unsophisticated, but thissoon changed as veteran soldiers unemployed by thedisbanding of the Iraqi army joined in. Armed bandsbegan to focus on isolated checkpoints and slow-moving convoys. They made greater use of rocketsand mortars, allowing them to retreat and ght againrather than die en masse as the Saddam Fedayeenirregulars had in the March and April battles. Iraqiswho worked for the Americans or were part ofthe new government and administrative structurebecame targets. Translators were among the favorites.Insurgents sabotaged the electrical grid, water system,and oil pipelines. Like their forebears in earlierinsurgencies, Iraqi ghters seemed to understand thata countrys rulersthe Americans in this casewere

blamed for the lack of water, electricity, and fuel evenwhen the insurgents themselves were responsible. The


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greater public anger and frustration, the insurgentsknew, the better for them.

Over the summer, a group of Hussein loyalistscalling itself al-Awda (the return) made open over-tures to Islamic militants linked to al Qaeda. Therewere reports of former regime ofcials recruitingforeign ghters. U.S. forces soon encountered Syrians,Saudis, Yemenis, Algerians, Lebanese, and Chechens,indicating that the international jihadist network, bornin Afghanistan in the 1980s, was refocusing on Iraq.Insurgent leaders began paying unemployed Iraqimen with military and police training and criminalsreleased from prison earlier in the year to kill Americantroops. As early as June, some strategic analysts warnedthat the ghting constituted an organized guerrillawar. But U.S. ofcials rejected this idea. Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld attributed the violenceto the remnants of the Baath regime and Fedayeendeath squads and foreign terrorists who werebeing dealt with in an orderly and forceful fashion bycoalition forces.4As summer wore on, though, it wasincreasingly difcult to sustain that position. Finally,on July 16, General John Abizaid, commander of theU.S. Central Command, admitted that the UnitedStates faced a classical guerrilla type campaign.Its low-intensity conict in our doctrinal terms,he said, but its war, however you describe it.5Theoptimism of a month earlier, the hope of a quick andrelatively painless transition to a post-Hussein Iraq,was shattered.

Initially the United States did not develop a

comprehensive strategy for counterinsurgency sup-port in Iraq, or a national strategy which explainedthe rationale for U.S. involvement and the ultimate


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political objectives.6 These only took shape during2004 and 2005 as the insurgency grew. The strategy

stressed increasing the size and effectiveness of theIraqi Security Forces (ISF) and turning over respon-sibility to them as quickly as possible. This reecteda long-standing truth of counterinsurgency support:outsiders can inuencethe outcome, but only locals candetermine it. Ultimately the Iraqis themselves had todefeat the insurgents. In fact, some U.S. military andcivilian leaders were convinced that American militaryforces provoked hostility among the Iraqi people,and thus sought to minimize the U.S. role, keepingAmerican troops off the streets as much as possibleand limiting their contact with the population.

This did not work. Creating a new ISF provedharder than expected. With few effective Iraqi securityforces and not enough Americans to secure all of the

country around the clock, the insurgency spread andmutated. Attacks became better coordinated and moresophisticated, particularly those using improvisedexplosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle borne improvisedexplosive devices (VBIED). Foreign extremists linkedto al Qaeda, and under the leadership of the JordanianAbu Musab al-Zarqawi, began targeting Iraqi Shiites.Nineteenth century Russian revolutionaries used toassert the worse, the better, meaning that anythingthat eroded public order and trust in the governmenthelped their cause. The Iraq insurgents put this intopractice. Eventually Shiite militias began striking back.By the summer of 2006, journalist Linda Robinsonwrote, Baghdad was on re. Sectarian violence wasspilling into all-out civil war, and it swept up hundreds

of thousands of Iraqis.7 The ISF, while improving,were overwhelmed and remained weak in key areas.Some units were simply dysfunctional. Others joined


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the sectarian violence, serving the government by dayand sectarian militias by night. By the end of 2006,

the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) grimly notedthat, Attack levelsboth overall and in all specicmeasurable categorieswere the highest on recordduring this reporting period. . . .8

Then things began to turn. In January 2007,President George W. Bush announced a new approachin Iraq which increased the number of U.S. militaryforces, refocused them on population security, andredoubled reconstruction assistance and support topolitical reform. While the strategic shift experienced arocky startAmerican casualties increased during therst half of 2007Iraq eventually began to stabilize.By March 2009, the DoD reported that, violence hasdropped dramatically in the last 2 years, and normallife continues to return to the country.9Today attacks

continue, but there is precarious stability. The U.S.military is no longer involved in combat operationsand soon will have only a training and advisory force inIraq. That countrys future certainly remains unclearrenewed sectarian violence or a revived insurgency arepossible. However, Iraq at least has an opportunity. The popular perception is that the strategic shiftof 2007, which is often simply called the surge,snatched victory from imminent defeat. According tothis thinking, the United States was implementing aawed strategy but then had a burst of insight. As aresult of the surge, America won and al Qaeda, theBaathists, and the Iranians lost.10 Reality is morecomplex. The strategy which had taken shape by 2005was appropriate for that time, given both conditions

in Iraq and the wider strategic context. During 2006,though, the essential nature of the conict changed,thus requiring a strategic shift to allow the United


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States and the Iraqi government to recapture theinitiative. The strategic shift of 2007 succeeded

through a combination of good thinking, good luck,and good timing. This monograph will explore thedecisionmaking process that led to the strategic shift,drawing implications and recommendations formilitary involvement in strategy formulation.

THE DECISION

Political and Strategic Context.

Decisionmaking on national security is shaped notonly by the particulars of a given issue, but also by thewider political and strategic context. During the Bushadministration the global war on terrorism (GWOT)was the dominant contextual component or central

organizing concept of American strategy. The Iraqconict was understood and portrayed in relationshipto this. The concern was not simply Iraqs inherentimportance, but the symbolism of the conict. Thethinking was that Americas adversaries and partnerswould draw conclusions about the United States fromthe outcome in Iraq and act accordingly. An Americandefeat would embolden adversaries and frightenpartners. Victory would have the opposite effect.11

By 2006, the Bush administration dened Iraq asthe central front in the GWOT.12 A failed Iraq,President Bush stated in August 2006, would makeAmerica less secure. A failed Iraq in the heart of theMiddle East will provide safe haven for terrorists andextremists. It will embolden those who are trying to

thwart the ambitions of reformers. In this case, itwould give the terrorists and extremists an additionaltool besides safe haven, and that is revenue from oil


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sales.13 Building on this, the Bush strategy in Iraq,like all strategies, reected a series of assumptions:

The conict in Iraq was a component of theglobal struggle between Islamic moderates(dened as those friendly to the United Stateswho sought democracy) and extremistspursuing Taliban-style theocracies, in essence astruggle between freedom and its enemies;14

The objective of al Qaeda and its afliates wasthe downfall of the United States;

Al Qaeda and its afliates were interested in Iraqas a sanctuary and resource for the next stageof their offensive against America. Hence, Iraqwas important because al Qaeda considered itimportant.

Unintentionally, this perspective allowed al Qaeda

to dene the conict in Iraq. The United States wascompelled to undertake counterinsurgency supportnot because it wanted to, but because al QaedaAmericas arch-enemyhad instigated insurgency.The problem was that insurgency is a type of conictthat avoids Americas strengths and exploits itsweaknesses. Insurgency is, for instance, protractedand costly, often with ambiguous outcomes.Americans favor (and are good at) short conicts withdecisive results. Counterinsurgency lacks moral claritysince the regime which the United States supportsis, by denition, deeply awed. It may be corrupt,repressive, unrepresentative, fragmented, or simplyineffective. This makes it difcult to sustain the publicand congressional support needed for long-term

involvement. Because of this, Presidents committedto counterinsurgency support emphasize the strategicstakes, warning of the great costs and risks of defeat


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(and dening defeat as the failure to decisively defeatthe insurgents). In Vietnam, the Johnson administration

portrayed a communist victory as the beginning ofcommunist control of all of Southeast Asia. In Iraq,the Bush administration stated that insurgent successwould provide al Qaeda the type of victory that wouldmake it a much more dangerous enemy. By portrayingthe stakes as expansive and dire, the United Statesbecomes rmly committed to the regime facing aninsurgency. While necessary from the perspectiveof domestic politics, this ties a Presidents hands. Itdiminishes his inuence over the allied regime andhardens the issue, leaving little exibility in deningor adjusting ultimate objectives.

That is precisely what happened in Iraq. To bolstersupport for American involvement in the conict, theBush administration portrayed a failure to do so as

catastrophic, linking the survival of the Iraqi regimedirectly to American security. The worst mistakewould be, according to President Bush, to thinkthat if we pulled out, the terrorists would leave usalone. They will not leave us alone. They will followus. The safety of America depends on the outcome ofthe battle in the streets of Baghdad.15The security ofthe American homeland, in other words, dependedon the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. As thedebate unfolded, this took any serious reconsider-ation of strategic objectives off the table. Only theways and means of the strategy were open fordiscussion.

There was more opposition to the strategic shiftof 2007 than any of the other key decisions that

framed Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Congressionalresistance emerged early. In November 2005, thelate Congressman John Murtha (D-PA), a veteranwith a pro-military reputation, introduced House


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Joint Resolution 73 calling for the withdrawal ofAmerican troops. Murtha, according to Peter Feaver,

was advocating the wholesale abandonment ofIraq.16 A July 2006 letter to President Bush from 12leading congressional Democrats asserted that yourAdministration lacks a coherent strategy to stabilizeIraq and achieve victory and simply staying thecourse in Iraq is not working.17 In 2006, the Houseof Representatives passed a nonbinding resolutioncalling for a withdrawal deadline. But congressionalopposition was thwartedat least temporarilybyPresident Bushs success in portraying the conictas part of the struggle against al Qaeda, and inpopularizing the notion that opposition to Americaninvolvement was tantamount to being opposedto the American forces ghting the war. But thissimply bought time. Bush understood that Congress

eventually would end U.S. involvement in Iraq if theconict did not turn around. After all, it was Congressthat had forced American disengagement from anearlier counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam. Therewas, then, a closing window of opportunity. Meanwhile, the public was bitterly divided. Withthe Internet, 24-hour cable news, and talk radioinaming passions, Iraq became the most divisivepartisan issue in modern American politics, surpassingeven Vietnam.18 With Iraq a major factor, PresidentBushs approval rating plummeted.19 But as oftenhappens, the President facing an unpopular warLincoln and the Civil War, Truman and Korea, Johnsonand Vietnamcould not simply abandon it, whetherout of concern for the wider damage to American

prestige and security or with personal legacy. Like thoseearlier unpopular wars, the goal in Iraq became ndingan attainable form of success even if it did not match


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the initial lofty goals. This interplay of strategy andpolitics reected a deep tradition. Americans consis-

tently blend strategy, public opinion, and electoralconsiderations. More than most other democracies,the United States considers national security a validtopic for partisanship. Politics and strategy are notsimply linkedthey are indistinguishable. Becausethe public has a role in shaping national securitystrategy but has a very shallow understanding of it,issues are simplied, painted in stark black and white.Information profusion adds to this, making nuanceor compromise difcult, if not impossible. Politicaldiscourse and strategic debates often become a clashof opposing caricatures.

As the 2006 mid-term elections approached,Democrats recognized that Iraq was the greatestvulnerability of President Bush and, by default, Repub-

licans in general, so they made it the centerpiece of theircampaigns. Republican (Grand Old Party [GOP])candidates were in a bind: President Bushthe leaderof their partyhad staked his reputation and hislegacy on an increasingly unpopular conict. SeniorRepublican strategists said they told candidates toavoid talking about the war, and even to distancethemselves from it, and urged the White House tochange its approach, at least through November, theNew York Times reported. But that strategy wasundercut by Mr. Bush and Mr. Dick Cheney, whokept making the case for victory in forum afterforum, ensuring that the issue remained in publicview.20 That October 2006 was the deadliest monthfor American troops since 2004 made it even worse.

The November 2006 election led to a tremendousvictory for the Democrats as they won control of bothhouses of Congress. The message was clear. As Senator


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terrorism, jumped on board.30 Secretary Rumsfeldresisted, arguing that additional troops would draw

resources from the ongoing defense transformationthat he badly wanted. The real problem, he wrote,is not necessarily the size of our active and reservemilitary components, per se, but rather how forceshave been managed, and the mix of capabilities at ourdisposal.31

In 2004, the Army again extended the tours ofsome units in Iraq, returned others more quicklythan planned, and began exploring other unpleasantmeasures such as shorter leaves. At that time GeneralPeter Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, admittedthat Iraq was stressing the Army but advised thathe could support at least 3 more years at existingdeployment levels without an overall force increase.32Trouble, though, lay ahead. What keeps me awake at

night, General Richard Cody, the Army Vice Chiefof Staff, told Congress, is what will this all-volunteerforce look like in 2007.33The word hollow, whichwas used to describe the weakened, post-VietnamArmy, reappeared.34 By 2006 General Schoomakergrimly warned that the active duty Army will breakunder the strain of repeated rotations into Iraq andAfghanistan.35 In 2007, Admiral Michael Mullen, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), expressedconcern that deployments in Iraq and Afghanistanleft the Army and Marine Corps unprepared for largescale conventional warfare.36

The naland most importantcontextual com-ponent framing the strategic shift of 2007 was thedecaying security situation in Iraq itself.37Violence was

endemic and paralyzing. Large parts of the country hadminimal or no government control. The Iraqi securityforces were expanding in size and effectiveness, but


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were still far from capable of securing the nation. Therewas no indication that this was about to change.

Decisionmakers.

Because President Bush saw the GWOT as thepreeminent task of his administration and Iraq as itscentral battleeld, he made the key strategic decisionshimself. This reects the long-standing tradition ofAmerican Presidents: the more important an issue, themore they directly make key decisions. To the extentthat President Bush delegated responsibility for Iraqstrategy, the most inuential ofcials were SecretaryRumsfeld; General John Abizaid, commander of theU.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and GeneralGeorge Casey, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). President Bush consulted regularly

with his eld commanders, but the focus appears tohave been on operational level questions rather thanbroad strategic issues. He did regularly ask them ifthe United States should be doing things differently inIraq. But there is no record of the President consultinguniformed leaders on whether the counterinsurgencyeffort or the commitment to the Iraqi government wasappropriate.

Bushs claims that he always deferred to militaryadvice was not wholly accurate if the reports ofjournalists are correct. Bob Woodward, for instance,describes a simmering private battle betweenPresident Bush and General Casey that had emergedby 2006, stemming largely from the Presidents focuson insurgent casualties (which smacked of the body

count mentality in Vietnam.)38 By necessity, contactbetween the President and his military commanderswas regularparticularly compared to those in the


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Clinton administrationbut not daily. With theexception of general ofcers who served as National

Security Adviser (Brent Scowcroft and Colin Powell),it is always difcult for those in uniform to form andsustain a close personal relationship with the President.

The Process.

Until the second half of 2006, President Bushdeferred to Rumsfelds insistence that a rapid transitionto Iraqi security forces and a shift of the Americanrole to support and training was most viable. Bushset the broad, overarching objectives and then taskedothers to nd ways to attain them. The issueandit is a persistent one in American strategywas theextent of presidential involvement in strategy. Bothmicromanagement and detachment from strategy

making by a President create problems. The key isnding the appropriate balance. Until 2006, though,President Bush leaned toward detachment anddelegation. Bing Westnever one to mince wordscontends that, Bush had recused himself from strategyas well as tactics. . . .39The result was a dissonancebetween Secretary Rumsfelds approach to Iraq andPresident Bushs stated objective which persisted forseveral years. This led to confusing strategic guidancefor the military commanders. As journalists DavidCloud and Greg Jaffe explain:

Bush had told himself he would not micromanage hisgenerals, the way Lyndon Johnson had done. Just assome parts of the Army had vowed never to reghtVietnam, so too had the president. But Bush took his

own maxim to the extreme, leaving his commanderswithout any real instructions except for the advicethey got from Rumsfeld. While the president was


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insisting that the United States was in a life-or-deathstruggle to change the Middle East, Rumsfeld wasessentially telling his top commander [Casey] that heshouldnt try too hard.40

This dissonance became starker as the securitysituation in Iraq eroded. Three major combinedU.S.-Iraq operations to stabilize Baghdad in 2006Operations SCALES OF JUSTICE, TOGETHERFORWARD, and TOGETHER FORWARD IIcould

not stem the violence.41

When U.S. forces moved into aneighborhood, violence dropped, but always resumedwhen they moved out. The ISF were simply unable orunwilling to hold the cleared areas, much less buildsustained security. It was clear by the summer of 2006that the United States was not on track for victory asPresident Bush described it. When the United States undertakes protracted

counterinsurgency, stabilization, or peacekeepingoperations, it must tailor its strategy both to attainnational objectives and sustain support for the effort.The American public has a limited tolerance for U.S.casualties when it questions the importance of aconict.42 The problem for the Bush administrationwas that its primary rationale for involvement in

Iraqthat al Qaeda had deemed it important, and thatghting extremists there meant that we did not have toght them heresimply did not take full root outsidethe political right. To preserve the increasingly fragilepublic and congressional support for involvement, theBush administration needed a strategy which wouldminimize American casualties. But this detracted frommission effectiveness. As historian Kimberly Kagan

describes it:


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In 2006, the overwhelming majority of Americancombat forces had been concentrated on FOBs(forward operating bases), from which theyreinforced Iraqi Security Forces and conductedpatrols in violent areas. U.S. military operationstended to be reactive rather than proactive, episodicrather than sustained. The insufciently trained andequipped Iraqi Security Forces had been pushedprematurely into the ght. Rather than conductingcounterinsurgency operations they often relied onineffective checkpoints. As a result, security ebbedand owed throughout neighborhoods and townsbut was rarely lasting, and the presence of CoalitionForces provided little sense of security for Iraqicivilians.43

As always, American strategy unfolded in a politically-charged environment with what Carl von Clausewitz,

the esteemed theorist of war, considered the rationaldimensionusing force to attain political endsintermixed with the emotions of public opinion, muchof it based on limited information and understanding.

History demonstrates that when an outsidepower undertakes counterinsurgency support, theeffectiveness of the partner government rather than

the strategy of the outsider is the ultimate determinantof success. But in Iraq, there were deep questionsabout the willingness and ability of the inexperiencedIraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his keyadvisers to control the sectarian violence which had,by 2006, surpassed the insurgency in intensity anddestructiveness. General Casey and U.S. AmbassadorZalmay Khalilzad devoted extensive time to helping

Maliki understand the role of a national leader in theface of an insurgency. But after a visit to Iraq, NationalSecurity Adviser Stephen Hadley noted that Maliki


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offered reassuring words, but was either secretlyempowering an aggressive push to consolidate Shia

power and inuence or was ignorant of what wasgoing on.44Testimony by Air Force General MichaelHayden, Director of the CIA, to the Iraq StudyGroupa blue ribbon commission created by Con-gress as a source of fresh ideaspainted a depres-singly bleak picture.45 It was increasingly clear thatwithout signicant change, the Democrats would usetheir control of Congress to force disengagement. Although Bush knew the strategy in Iraq was introuble, Bing West wrote, he didnt know what to doabout it.46In a June 2006 Camp David strategy session,Rumsfeld, who still dominated strategy making at thatpoint, continued to advocate a more rapid transitionto the ISF.47He alone among the administrations keygures had an overarching theory of American global

military strategy. The problem was that it was basedon quick, decisive applications of high-tech militarypower, and the Iraq insurgency did not t within it.Participating by video conference, General Caseyadvised President Bush that he had adequate forces totrain the Iraqis and put them in the lead, but not tohold the cities.48He continued to advocate acceleratedtransition from U.S. to Iraqi military operations. Themeeting thus left President Bush where he beganwith key advisers advocating continuity in the face oferoding security. No one could explain why continuingto do the same thing would lead to different results.

Following the Camp David meeting, the search fornew ideas intensied. On the Presidents instructions,General Peter Pace, Chairman of the JCS, began a

review, relying on a team of veteran colonels. TheNational Security Council (NSC) instigated its owninternal assessment led by Meghan OSullivan. Stephen


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Hadley had begun to believe that an increase inAmerican troops might be the only way to synchronize

the strategy with the Presidents objectives, but he alsoknew that Rumsfeld and the uniformed military leadersopposed the idea. Hence he instructed William Lutiof the NSC staffa former Navy ofcer with a Ph.D.from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacytoassess the feasibility of a troop buildup, but to do sowithout DoD involvement.49

The Democratic victory in the November electionadded urgency to the search for a new strategy whilethe resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld immediatelyafterwards removed one of the obstacles to majorchange. Altering the Iraq strategy was both imperativeand possible. In November and December, the NSClaunched a formal interagency strategy review led byDeputy National Security Adviser J. D. Crouch. By

December it was clear that the President was leaningtoward a troop increase and a shift in mission, but hehad not made his nal decision. On December 13, 2006,President Bush and Vice President Cheney met the JCSto solicit their input. While the service chiefs were notenthusiastic about a troop increase, Bush assuaged theconcerns of General Schoomaker, the Army Chief ofStaff, and General James Conway, the Marine CorpsCommandant, by supporting an increase in the size ofthe land forces (which Rumsfeld had opposed).50

The questions then were, what should the size ofthe troop increase be, and what to do with them. Paceand Casey recommended a surge of two Army brigadecombat teams and two Marine battalions, with most ofthe new forces dedicated to training and advising the

Iraqis.51 But President Bush approved the maximumincrease that the Pentagon said it could supportvebrigadesand, importantly, using them for popula-


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tion security rather than simply training and advising.In a January 10, 2007, press conference, he explained:

It is clear we need to change our strategy in Iraq.. . . Ive committed more than 20,000 additionalAmerican troops to Iraq. The vast majority ofthemve brigadeswill be deployed to Baghdad.These troops will work alongside Iraqi units andbe embedded in their formations. Our troops willhave a well-dened mission: to help Iraqis clear andsecure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local

population, and to help ensure the Iraqi forces leftbehind are capable of providing the security thatBaghdad needs.52

Thus was born what became popularly known as thesurge.

Decision Shapers.

All strategic decisions have shapers bothinside the government and outside it. Two types ofoutsiders were important for the strategic shift of2007: counterinsurgency experts and policy analysts.The community of experts, although small, played animportant role because the U.S. military, the intelli-gence community, and other government agencies hadlargely abandoned and forgotten counterinsurgencyafter the end of the Cold War. The experts, most in theprofessional military educational system and variousWashington research institutes, drew on history tospark the relearning process. For instance, Dr. KalevSepp, a former U.S. Army Special Forces ofcer andveteran of the counterinsurgency campaign in El

Salvador who was serving on the faculty of the NavalPostgraduate School, became an adviser to GeneralCasey and penned an article on counterinsurgency


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best practices which helped shape thinking acrossthe Army.53Bruce Hoffman and his colleagues at the

RAND Corporation reminded political leaders andstrategists of counterinsurgencys historical lessons.54Experts who had cut their teeth during the Cold Warwere joined by younger thinkers inside the military.Most important were Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl,whose book on counterinsurgency in Malaya andVietnam was widely touted within the U.S. military;and Australian Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen,who advised General David Petraeus, Caseysreplacement as the U.S. commander in Iraq, and whowrote widely on counterinsurgency.55

One of the most important contributions from thecommunity of experts was a 2005 article in ForeignAffairs by Andrew Krepinevich, president of theCenter for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis.56

Krepinevich, a Ph.D. and former U.S. Army ofcer,was one of the original conceptualizers of therevolution in military affairs during the 1990s andthus understood Secretary Rumsfelds notion ofdefense transformationa phrase Krepinevich helpedcoin while serving on the National Defense Panel.57But having written an inuential book on the U.S.Armys performance in Vietnam, he also understoodcounterinsurgency.58 His article argued that simplykilling insurgents did not reect the principles ofcounterinsurgency warfare. Instead, Krepinevichwrote, the U.S. military should concentrate onproviding security and opportunity to the Iraqi people,thereby denying insurgents the popular support theyneed.59

The emphasis on population security reectedthe long-standing notion in counterinsurgencystrategyderived primarily from the British andFrench experience ghting communist and nationalist


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insurgencies in the 20th centurythat separating theinsurgents from the population is crucial. Insurgents

require at least the acquiescence of the population andprefer active support in terms of information, sanc-tuary, recruits, and funds. In many insurgencies,the rebels force the population to provide these.This position, in other words, assumes that little ofthe population willingly supports the insurgents,but is compelled to do so. If security forces protectthe population from the insurgents, the supportdries up. In fact, the population will actively beginto support the government, most importantly byproviding information about the insurgents. From thisperspective, population security is not an alternativeto offensive operations against the insurgents, but is avital part of them.

As Krepinevich and other counterinsurgency

experts explained, the primary method for protectingthe population was what French counterinsurgencyexperts during the Cold War called the oil spottechnique in which selected areas were rst clearedof insurgents and fully secured, then expanded. Thiswas the inspiration for the hold component of theclear/hold/build approach which President Busheventually adopted. The wider community of policy analysts,commentators, and pundits helped shape the decisionenvironment by providing intellectual ammunitionboth for the Bush administration and its critics. Thoseon the political left contended that the Bush strategywas fatally awed and thus advocated either imme-diate or rapid withdrawal from Iraq. The most impor

tant of these were former Pentagon ofcial LawrenceKorb, a senior fellow at the Center for AmericanProgress; and Steven Simon of the Council on ForeignRelations.60 A few realist thinkers like Zbigniew


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Brzeziski, President Jimmy Carters National SecurityAdviser; and retired Lieutenant General William

Odom, director of the National Security Agencyduring the Reagan administration, also advocateddisengagement, basing their arguments on the contention that the strategic costs of continued involvementoutweighed the expected strategic benets.61

Because of its senior participants and bipartisancomposition, the Iraq Study Group attracted the mostattention among the outside groups.62 Opponentsof U.S. involvement in Iraq hoped the Study Groupwould win over some of the Bush administrationsless committed supporters to their position. Theadministration itself initially believed the Study Groupwould bolster its position but eventually recognizedthat this would not happen. The groups nal reportreleased in December 2006advocated withdrawal

with the minimum strategic damage rather thandecisive victory. While President Bush indicated thathe would seriously consider the study groups advice,he did not adopt its major recommendations suchas a diplomatic initiative to engage Iran and Syria,and linking the Israeli-Palestinian conict to the onein Iraq.63 Still, the study groups criticism of existingstrategy must have inuenced Bushs thinking. It wasone thing when the political left criticized the war; thatcriticism the administration could disregard. It wassomething altogether different when esteemed expertsand experienced leaders from across the politicalspectrum did so. This probably made President Bushmore amenable to high risk options since increasingthe U.S. troop presence soon would be politically

infeasible. In strategy, negative trends often increasethe risk tolerance of decisionmakers.


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warbut would also reshufe the priorities amongexisting missions. The key was population security.

While experts long argued that this was the centerpieceof counterinsurgency, and U.S. military doctrinecodied the idea, American strategy in Iraq did notreect it. Instead, it delegated population securityto the ISF, which were unable or unwilling to do it.67Thus, the AEI group concluded, U.S. strategy was atvariance with U.S. doctrine. It went on to suggest bothhow additional troops should be employed and howthe military might make them available. While the AEIreport did not lead President Bush in new directions,it made him aware of the feasibility of a surge, despiteless enthusiasm from the Pentagon or CENTCOM(both of which were convinced that a troop increasewould have a tactical effect but not a strategic onewithout a parallel effort to translate improved security

into political gains). As with the initial developmentof American nuclear strategy in the 1940s and 1950sand the creation of counterinsurgency strategy inthe 1960s, the community of nongovernment expertswas an important source of ideas unconstrainedby bureaucratic or organizational imperatives.Traditionally, much of the creativity in Americanstrategy comes from outside the formal system. As debate raged and the various assessmentsmoved forward, dissatisfaction grew in Congress. MostDemocrats favored an immediate or quick withdrawalfrom Iraq, contending that the cause was lost. A fewlegislatorsmost importantly Senator John McCain(R-AZ) favored an increased U.S. military presence.Like Hadley and Keane, McCain believed that the

existing strategy did not reect President Bushsobjectives. But he was in the minority, increasinglyeven within his own party. By 2006, a number of


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moderate Republicans like Lindsay Graham (R-SC),George Allen (R-VA), Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-

TX), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Lincoln Chafee (R-RI), andOlympia Snowe (R-ME) expressed dissatisfaction withthe conduct of the war.68Like the Iraq Study Group,this showed President Bush that time was running outon his existing strategy, leaving him with little hopethat he could sustain support for it in the absence ofclear progress.

The discipline of the Bush White House makes itdifcult to assess who among the Presidents senioradvisers had the greatest inuence on Iraq strategy.Hadley was extremely important, working closelywith General Pace to navigate the tricky civil-militaryaspects of the shift. Vice President Cheney likely playeda major role. Following the September 11, 2001 (9/11)attacks, he had been the leader of the administrations

hard liners, pushing for armed intervention to removeSaddam Hussein and most actively portraying Iraqas the front line in the conict with al Qaeda.69 Itis difcult, though, to know exactly how Cheneyshaped the Presidents thinking on the strategicshift of 2007.70 Their consultations were private, andCheney was the ultimate loyalist who would neverindicate any divergence with the President even if itexisted. Publicly, his role was to rally support for theadministration.

Both as National Security Adviser and, later, asSecretary of State, Condoleezza Rice was clearly a closecondant of the President and undoubtedly shapedhis thinking on Iraq. In the initial period of the Iraqinsurgency, though, Rice did not appear to be a major

player (although, of course, it is impossible to knowat this point what her role was behind the scenes). AsBob Woodward put it, Rice and Hadley, her deputy


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at the time, had worked on Iraq nonstop, and yet theynever got control over the policy making. They were

no match for Rumsfeld.71

The only public instancewhere Rice staked out a position that clearly propelledthe administrations thinking was in a November 2005Senate testimony when she described existing policyas a clear/hold/build approach.72Woodward con-tends that Secretary Rice had not discussed this withGenerals Abizaid or Casey, or with Secretary Rumsfeld, and that it ran counter to their support for adiminution of U.S. involvement in holding securedareas and handing them over Iraqi forces.73 ButPresident Bush quickly picked up on the phrase, thusmaking it part of U.S. strategy. There is little indication that the Chairmen of theJCSAir Force General Richard Myers, and later,Marine General Peter Pacehad signicant inuence

on broad strategic decisions. Despite the fact that,by law, the Chairman serves as the primary militaryadviser to the President, Secretary Rumsfeld insisted onserving as the conduit for military advice and assuredthat he and the Chairman spoke with one voice. Theother Service chiefswho again have statutory roles asadvisers to the Presidenthad very little direct accessto President Bush and appeared to play a minimal rolein shaping U.S. strategy in Iraq.74

Decision Criteria and Dynamics.

The dominant decision criteria in the strategic shiftof 2007 were identifying clear, unambiguous victory asthe overarching objective (thus ruling out a negotiated

settlement, which often happens in counterinsur-gency), and the priority accorded to Iraq within thebroader scope of American strategy. The denition ofvictory had not changed since its articulation in the


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Bush administrations 2005 National Strategy for Victoryin Iraq:

Victory in Iraq is Dened in Stages Short term: Iraq is making steady progress

in ghting terrorists, meeting political mile-stones, building democratic institutions, andstanding up security forces.

Medium term: Iraq is in the lead defeatingterrorists and providing its own security, witha fully constitutional government in place,and on its way to achieving its economicpotential.

Longer term: Iraq is peaceful, united,stable, and secure, well integrated into theinternational community, and a full partnerin the global war on terrorism.

Victory in Iraq is a Vital U.S. Interest

Iraq is the central front in the global war onterror. Failure in Iraq will embolden terroristsand expand their reach; success in Iraq willdeal them a decisive and crippling blow.

The fate of the greater Middle Eastwhichwill have a profound and lasting impact onAmerican securityhangs in the balance.

Failure is Not an Option Iraq would become a safe haven from which

terrorists could plan attacks against America,American interests abroad, and our allies.

Middle East reformers would never againfully trust American assurances of supportfor democracy and human rights in theregiona historic opportunity lost.

The resultant tribal and sectarian chaoswould have major consequences for Amer-ican security and interests in the region.75


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But while the end state remained constant, the timehorizon changed. President Bush recognized that the

existing approach was not leading toward victoryrapidly enough given eroding support for Americaninvolvement in Iraq. This left two options: accept thepressure for withdrawal with the foreknowledge thatthis was unlikely to lead to victory as dened in the2005 strategy; or pursue a game changer that mightshift the dynamics of the conict. But, Bush knew,the window of opportunity for a game changer wasclosing. This increased his willingness to acceptincreased short-term risk in order to preserve thechance of long-term success.

President Bushs overall decisionmaking stylewas similar to that of Ronald Reagan: he set broadstrategic objectives, gave general guidance, and thenlet advisers develop the details. He was less involved

in the specics than some of his predecessors, likeClinton. Such a method is effective ifthe president isgiven a full range of options and an assessment of thestrengths, weaknesses, costs, and risks of each. Reaganhad a diverse group of assertive senior advisers whoprovided this. No single adviser dominated. Until2006, this was less evident in the Bush administration.Secretary Rumsfeld, with the support of Vice PresidentCheney, dominated strategy making. The uniformedmilitary, including the two JCS chairmen, did notprovide an independent perspective. Other gureswho might have played a major roleSecretary ofState Powell until his resignation in 2005 and Condo-leezza Rice in her role as National Security Adviser andthen Secretary of Statecould not counter Rumsfeld

and Cheney (who were backed by the uniformedmilitary). As the security situation in Iraq eroded, Rumsfeldsinuence declined. From 2003 to 2006, Iraq was Mr.


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Rumsfelds war. With Rumsfeld fading, PresidentBush became more directive. Initially, he was hesitant

to overrule advice from uniformed military leaders.But Bush opted for the maximum troop increase andshift in mission priority to population security eventhough the Service chiefs, Pace, Abizaid, and Caseywere, at best, unenthusiastic. As Bing West put it:

It was Hadley and the NSC staff . . . who hadorchestrated the surge by quietly gathering a

consensus among insiders, especially [then-Lieutenant General Raymond] Odierno, Pace, andPetraeus, and outsiders. . . . while Keane added thestature of a four-star general and Kagan contributedconcrete specics.76

Options Considered.

As the Bush administration developed and assessedstrategic options in the second half of 2006, it grappledwith three important unknowns. The rst was whetherMaliki could or would control his fellow Shiites,particularly the Jaish al Mahdi forces of Muqtada al-Sadr, and other sectarian militias involved in violenceagainst Sunni Arabs. As West put it, the core problemwas the feckless performance by Maliki and his

government.77 This involved two interrelatedquestionswhether Maliki was capable of exertingcontrol over the Shiite militias given his limitedexperience at high level political leadership, andwhether he was interested in doing so. This was simplythe latest manifestation of an enduring problem theUnited States faces in counterinsurgency support:

nding a partner who is effective and committedto resolving the root causes of the conict. WhenWashington was able to do thisNapoleon Duarte in


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El Salvador or Ramn Magsaysay in the Philippinesit met with some success. When Americas partner

was ineffective or more committed to retaining powerand rewarding clients than addressing the deepproblems that fueled the insurgency (such as NgoDinh Diem, Nguyen Van Thieu, or any of SouthVietnams other despots), the counterinsurgency effortfailed. In 2006, it was not clear whether Maliki was aDuarte/Magsaysay or a Diem/Thieu. Despite concernfrom senior ofcials like Rice and Hadley, PresidentBush remained convinced that Maliki was capable ofand dedicated to controlling the Shiite militias, andbased his decisions on this assumption.78

A second important unknown was whether theSunni Arabs recognized that they could not regaindomination of Iraq by violence and would acceptAmerican protection. If they did, assigning U.S. forces

to population security was viable. If not, it wouldfail. Since there was no way to accurately gaugethis, President Bush and his advisers had to rely onassumptions. As it turned out, the assumption thatthe Sunni Arab community was willing to accept anincreased American military presence was correct. Instrategy, doing the right thing at the wrong time is asmuch a recipe for failure as doing the wrong thing.Committing U.S. military forces to population securityprior to 2006 would not have worked because neitherthe Sunni Arabs nor the Shiites wanted it. Both seemedto believe that they could attain national dominance.By 2006, though, the two communities, particularlythe Sunni Arabs, seemed to have reached a level offear, desperation and exhaustion that made them

amenable to having the American military in theirneighborhoods. That had become a lesser evil than thepresence of al Qaeda extremists and Shiite militias.


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The third important unknown was whether therewas enough remaining support among the American

public and Congress to sustain an increase in trooplevels and spike in casualties, particularly since thiswould take some time before producing results. Pollnumbers suggested otherwise but President Bushbelieved that he could mobilize and sustain backingfor a troop surge. Moreover, Bush had often made clearthat he would disregard polls when he was convincedof the rightness of an unpopular action. Over the summer, the NSC informal policy reviewdeveloped a range of options: Adjust on the margins (i.e., continue with the

current approach on the assumption that theISF would reach a point where they couldconduct the counterinsurgency campaignwith limited U.S. help before support from the

American people and Congress collapsed); Target efforts (i.e., continue to attack al Qaeda

in Iraq but stay out of the sectarian conict); Double down (i.e., increase troop levels and

assistance and attempt to broker the ragingsectarian conict); or

Bet on Maliki (i.e., write off the Sunni Arabcommunity and simply strengthen the Malikigovernment to the point that it could crushresistance).79

The double down option had led National SecurityAdviser Hadley to ask William Luti if this was feasiblegiven the strains on the military. The NSC did not wantto debate options that could not be implemented.


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Later, General Paces JCS study also focused onfour options:

1. Go Big (i.e., an increase in U.S. forces); 2. Go Home (disengagement and withdrawal); 3. Go Long (a smaller U.S. military footprintand increased emphasis on the advisory and trainingmission); and, 4. A hybrid which combined components of theother options.

However, the Service chiefs remained skeptical ofa troop increase since it was not clear to them howthis would be linked to the attainment of politicalobjectives. As a result, General Paces study wentforward with only one of the options which had beendeveloped by the Council of Colonels who builtthe assessment: continuing the existing approach

with its emphasis on training and advicebut on anaccelerated schedule.

According to a former NSC staff member, eventhough General Pace was sympathetic toward the ideaof a troop increase and more direct U.S. involvementin population security, he did not feel that he couldoverrule his eld commanders and the Service chiefsby recommending an option they did not support.80This reects an enduring conundrum for the Chairmanof the JCS: he has both an individualrole as an adviserto the President and an institutionalrole as the seniormember of the uniformed military. Senior civilianofcials with dual roles, such as the Secretary ofState or Secretary of Defense, always emphasize theirindividual role as presidential advisers rather than

their institutional role as the leader of an organization.There is no question that loyalty to the President takespriority over their responsibility to their institution.


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For the Chairman, things are not so clear. Only ColinPowell, while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,

overtly leaned toward his individual rather than hisinstitutional role. This duality inherently limits theinuence of the Chairman with the President. At an even broader level, the limited impact ofthe Chairmans Iraq study demonstrated one of thedeepest shortcomings of the American system forstrategy development: the lack of an adequate methodto integrate political and military planning. The NSCdeconicts, but does not integrate. The militarys vastplanning apparatus was not optimized for politicalplanning. To the extent it was able to do this, it didso because of the political understanding of individualplannerssomething that may or may not be availablewhen needed. On the other hand, the State Departmentand NSC were better equipped for political planning,

but their military expertise was coincidental ratherthan institutional or ingrained. Eventually this short-coming was overcome because some inuentialmilitary leaders like General David Petraeus developedan astute sense of the political component of strategymaking, and some individuals on the policy side likeWilliam Luti understood military planning. But again,this was due more to serendipity and luck than tosystemic design. In this case, the system worked butthere is no assurance it will in the future short of amajor redesign which effectively integrates politicaland military planning. During the formal NSC strategy assessment inNovember and December, the DoD representatives(Stephen Cambone and Peter Rodman), although more

open to a troop increase with Secretary Rumsfeld gone,continued to push an accelerated transition to the ISF.This was inspired by the strain that the Iraq conictcontinued to place on the militarys ability to sustain


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other U.S. security commitments.81 The Departmentof State worried that Maliki would not or could not

control the Shiite militias.82

One of the enduringdilemmas of counterinsurgency support is that thegreater the American commitment to a particularleader or regime, the less leverage Washington has.The State Department was searching for the sweetspot which would compel Maliki to rein in the Shiiteextremists without making him believe that the UnitedStates was about to abandon him (which might haveencouraged him to cut a deal with extremists, orconversely to attempt a crackdown on the Sunni Arabcommunity). Secretary Rice was also concerned thatfocusing so much of Americas attention and resourceson Iraq had adverse effects elsewhere in the world. Shefavored a broad shift in American strategy to make itless Iraq-centric. The State Department representative

in the strategic assessment promoted this idea. FinallyJohn Hannah, Vice President Cheneys representativeat the NSC review, was skeptical of Shiite-Sunnireconciliation and advocated clearly backing theShiites.83He did, however, support the idea of a troopincrease.

Ultimately President Bush rejected major shiftsin the political component of his administrationsapproach to Iraq and continued full support for theMaliki government, while encouraging it to reconcilewith the Sunni Arab community and expand economicdevelopment. The heart of the strategic shift was amilitary decision based on two separate but linkedcomponents: troop levels and mission priorities.One position held that more U.S. forces were needed

whether the mission was population security ortraining and advice. Another was that many Iraqis sawU.S. military forces as alien occupiers, and thus the


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fewer of them the better. In addition, U.S. forces werea crutch for the Iraqi government and security forces,

allowing them to postpone or avoid difcult decisionsand actions.84 Diminishing the size of the Americanpresence, according to this argument, would compelthe Iraqis to do what they needed to do. These two components combined to form fourdiscrete strategic options (see Figure 1):

Figure 1.The Four Strategic Options.

To some extent, the two elements of the decision weresequential: The administration rst had to decide whatit intended to do with American forces before it couldassess the number needed to perform the mission. Excluding those who favored immediate disen-gagement (primarily on the political left), blocks A

and D had the most support. For instance, Abizaidand Casey favored block A: training and advice witha troop level that diminished as Iraqi capabilities


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increased.85 The Iraq Study Group also fell withinblock A, advocating an increase in the number of U.S.

military advisers and trainers but an overall decreasein American troop numbers.86 A few commentatorsand military leaders favored block B. Nevertheless,President Bush opted for block D, concluding that itwas feasible and optimized the chances for victory ashe dened it.

ANALYSIS

Following President Bushs announcement ofthe strategic shift, General Casey and AmbassadorKhalilzad began preparation for the shift to includesteps to ensure that Iraqi security forces wouldsuccessfully fulll their role in sustaining securityin areas cleared by the American military. Full

implementation of the revised strategy began justas General Petraeus replaced General Casey as theoverall American military commander in Iraq. Thistransition in leadership of the Iraq effort had beenplanned for months (although its exact timing wasleft open) and was not itself part of the strategicshift, but did facilitate it. It was a new face for whatwas being portrayed and seen as a new strategy.87Petraeus created a Joint Strategic Assessment Teamand in July 2007 formally adopted a Joint CampaignPlan which assigned most of the newly arrived troopsto population security.88 General Petraeus and U.S.Ambassador Ryan Crocker developed cease reswith key Iraqi individuals and organizations.89 Themilitary component of the planmade possible by

the arrival of the ve surge brigadeswas combinedwith governance, development, and improved infrastructure protection. Under then-Lieutenant General


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them out of fear.93 Hence the solution is protectingthe population from the insurgents, preferably using

local security forces. In reality, populations sometimesprefer the insurgents over the government eventhough the government can provide more resources,at least in the short term. In Iraq, many or most SunniArabs initially supported the insurgents or at leastwere passively sympathetic to them. But they grewdisillusioned. As West put it, By November of 2006,the will of the peoplethat essential ingredient indefeating an insurgencyhad turned the war in favorof the coalition. . . . The change in attitude of the Sunni[Arab] population and the momentum in a dozen citieshad come from the bottom up, from the tribes andbattalions.94Only with the shift in attitude did usingU.S. troops for population security become feasible.The schism between Iraqi tribes and the extremists

further fueled the loss of faith in the insurgency.The decision by Muqtada al-Sadr to order the forces

loyal to him to avoid confrontation with Americantroops as the surge began, and later, his August 2007declaration of a truce were vital. While al Qaeda inIraqlike Cold War communist insurgentssoughtdecisive victory and control of the state, Sadrs Shiitemilitias (and some of the local Sunni Arab insurgentgroups) were more akin to Hezbollah, using violenceto force their way into the political system rather thanattempting to replace it. By 2007, Sadr seemed to haverecognized that with the increased size and effective-ness of the American military in Iraq, improvementsin the Iraqi security forces, and the growing compe-tence of the Maliki government, he had gotten as far

as he could with violence. Malikis assertiveness, inturn, may have come from his reading of the Ameri-can political situation. With the Democratic electoral


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victory in November 2006, and the leaking of Hadleysmemo, Maliki must have known that he had to control

extremists in his government or risk losing Americansupport.95Luckily for him, global increases in oil pricesleft his government ush with money, allowing it tobuy support or acquiescence from key organizations,groups, and constituencies. One of the most important enablers of the strategicshift of 2007 was the tremendous improvement thatthe American military and intelligence communityhad undergone during the 4 years of the conict. Fromenlisted Soldiers and Marines to general ofcers, therewas deeper experience; better equipment and train-ing; better cultural and situational awareness; betterdoctrine; and better tactics, techniques, and proced-ures. This meant that the force of 2007 was able to dothingslike population security through permanent

presence and effective high value targetingthatthe force of 2003-05 could not. The strategic shift notonly involved more troops, but also betterones. In alllikelihood, the 2005 American force could not haveimplemented the 2007 strategy even if it had tried. From 2004 to 2006, the Iraq conict changedfrom a predominantly anti-American insurgency toone dominated by a sectarian war stoked by out-side extremists. When the conict was purely ananti-American insurgency, a strategy focused onstrengthening Iraqi security forces and minimizing theAmerican role was correct. But by 2006, the insurgentshad seized the strategic initiative and changed thenature of the conict. Thus the strategy of 2004-05 wasno longer appropriate. Counterinsurgency support

works best with the smallest possible footprint forforeign forces, and that was exactly what the UnitedStates attempted up to 2006. But peacekeepingwhich


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is the appropriate response to a sectarian or ethniccivil wardemands a signicant presence of outside

forces to play the role of mediator. That was a crucialpart of the strategic shift of 2007: the U.S. militarychanged from pure counterinsurgency support tocounterinsurgency supportpluspeacekeeping.

Recognition of this was slow because the insurgencypersisted even while the sectarian war exploded. Thecounterinsurgency mission was not replaced by apeacekeeping mission, but a peacekeeping missionjoined the counterinsurgency mission. In reality, boththe insurgency and sectarian conict had been presentin Iraq from the time Saddam Hussein was removedfrom power. What had changed by 2006 was the relativepriority of the two as sectarian conict became the moreimportant. This created political problems for the Bushadministration. Sustaining public and congressional

support for counterinsurgency is inherently difcult,but at least the involvement of al Qaeda and thebarbarism of insurgents like Zarqawi gave the admin-istration some political ammunition. Selling theAmerican public and Congress on peacekeeping orpeace enforcement is even harderwitness the fragilityof support for intervention in Somalia, Rwanda,Congo, or the Balkans during the 1990s. PresidentBush himself had expressed his opposition to usingthe U.S. military for peacekeeping during the 2000campaign. This meant the administration had to por-tray the strategic shift as a more effective methodof counterinsurgency. It could not use the wordpeacekeeping, even though that was exactly whatit was doing. Ultimately, it was a close call. Had the

strategic shift not come at precisely the right time togenerate quick resultsif not for the perfect stormof conditionsthe administration would not have


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been able to sustain adequate public and congressionalsupport. Congress probably would have mandated

disengagement in late 2007, or early 2008, even withouta demonstrable decline in violence. In any case, the evidence does not support thecontention that the United States pursued an ineffec-tive strategy until 2007, then suddenly discoveredan effective one. The approach implemented in 2007would not have worked even a year earlier because allof the necessary conditions were not in place. And itprobably would not have had the same results had itbeen undertaken a year later.96In strategy, nations mustnot only do the right thing, but must do the right thingat the right time. This is certainly true of the strategicshift of 2007. It capitalized on a temporary and volatilecombination of trends and conditions. It was the rightapproach at the right time. While experts argue over

whether it is better to be good or lucky in strategy, theUnited States was both reasonably good andlucky inIraq.

IMPLICATIONS

The strategic shift of 2007 offers important insightinto the dynamics of American strategy formulation,particularly the dynamics of civil-military relationsand the role of the uniformed military in strategymaking. To be truly effective, strategy requires inti-mate presidential involvement. Yet nothing assuresthat the President will have expertise in national secur-ity or even a talent for it. If anything, an interest inforeign affairs is an electoral liability (at least since the

end of the Cold War). Some Presidents grow into therole of strategist-in-chief, but nothing in the Americanpolitical system assures this. Historically, a few Pres-


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idents developed strategic talent and personally dom-inated strategy making. Lincoln during the Civil

War and Franklin Roosevelt during World War IIare examples. Others never developed great strategicskill but nonetheless insisted on dominating strategyformulation. Johnson, Carter, and Clinton fall into thiscategory. A few Presidents subcontract strategy to asingle adviser (Nixon and Ford with Kissinger). Othersrely on multiple advisers in a collective strategy-makingprocess. This would include Reagan, George H. W.Bush, and, until the summer of 2006 when Rumsfeld'sand Cheneys inuence declined, George W. Bush.Like Lincoln or Roosevelt, George W. Bush assumedgreater personal control of strategy making as theconict he directed continued. In general, Presidentsbecome more intimately involved in strategy makingover the course of their administration. Obviously,

two-term Presidents will have more time to assumethis role than those who serve a single term.

With rare exceptions, signicant strategic shiftsare only possible when a President has deferred to anadviser or coterie of advisers. This is because it is verydifcult for a President to admit that his earlier posi-tions were awed. Doing so can be politically disas-trous, as when Carter admitted he had been wrongabout the Soviets following the 1979 invasion ofAfghanistan. An open mea culpa would erode theeffectiveness of even a President not facing reelection.But if a failed or ineffective strategy can be attributedto an adviser or group of advisers who are thenreplaced, the President can forge a new path with lesspolitical damage. That is exactly what happened in

2006 when Cheney moved to the background andRumsfeld resigned, allowing President Bush to adjusthis strategy without having to admit that his


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previous one was misguided. Bushs admirers talkdisparagingly of the Rumsfeld strategy or the

Rumsfeld-Abizaid-Casey strategy before 2007 ratherthan the Bush strategy. Bushs problem, for the Bushadmirers, was only that he trusted Rumsfeld and themilitary commanders too much, not that he failed tounderstand Iraq and its conict. This is an alibi, not anexplanation. The strategic shift of 2007 suggested that militaryleaders often have a more expansive strategic and timeperspective than Presidents. This can be a source ofdissonance or tension. American Presidents think in4-year periods with an eye on their own legacy. Seniormilitary leaders, most of whom have spent 30 years ormore in an institution which cultivates and sustainsintense loyalty, are more prone to consider how theiractions will affect the nation, the military, and the

long-term future of their Service. One simple indicatorof this divergent perspective is the fact that the DoDand the Services have programs to assess the strategicenvironment and armed conict years or decadesinto the future. No President devotes much time toAmerican strategy 10 or 20 years hence. To put it inmilitary jargon, Presidents are focused on the strategicclose battle while the military simultaneouslyconsiders both the close and deep battles. Becausemilitary leaders see themselves as the embodiment oftheir Service and the military in general, rather thansimply individuals, and because the Services existedbefore them and will exist after them, they are lessconsumed with leaving their personal mark on historythan on being the steward of their Service. The result is

a persistent asymmetry in risk tolerance. This was clearin American strategy toward Iraq: Bush and Rumsfeldwere more risk tolerant than most of the senior militaryleaders. The debates leading to the strategic shift of 2007


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demonstrated this. The outcome in Iraq was clearly anddominantly President Bushs top priority. History will

judge him by it. The military, particularly the Servicechiefs, were certainly committed to the Presidentsobjectives in Iraq but were also concerned with the long-term health of their organizations and the broader spanof Americas global commitments. They sought successin Iraq but not at the expense of wrecking their Services.They were, in a sense, more tolerant of risk in Iraq, ifaccepting it lowered the long-term risk to the healthof their Services. Presidents and defense secretariesrecognize the competing pressures on Service chiefsand take this into account when receiving their advice.This is a major reason that the collective JCS had aminimal role in the initial decision to intervene in Iraqand in the strategic shift of 2007. Certainly PresidentBush considered them important stakeholders and,

during the strategic review, expended great effort togain their backing for the shift. But as is always thecase when the uniformed militarys perspective differsfrom the Presidents, the President wins. The JCS knewthis and acceded to the strategic shift in Iraq once itbecame clear that President Bush was committed to it.

In any case, military advice is only effectivewhen the President and Secretary of Defense wantit to be. If civilian leaders are condent that they cancraft strategy with limited military input, they c

Documents

Decisionmaking In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: The Strategic Shift of 2007