De Roll Out Briefing FINAL

7/27/2019 De Roll Out Briefing FINAL

1/15


2/15

Why CSBA conducted th

assessment

Power projection: towa

operational stalemate?

Promising directed enerconcepts

Major findings and

recommendations


3/15

Asymmetric challenges to the U.S. militarys ability to proj

Proliferation of PGMs, advanced air defense threats, mariti

capabilities, state- and non-state-actors equipped with G-R

A need for new capabilities that will help the U.S. military

freedom of action in operating environments that are becoincreasingly non-permissive

A defense program of record that continues to procure wesystems with declining cost-benefit ratios

Potential to leverage existing and emerging technologies tA2/AD threats and possibly reduce requirements for expenexpendable systems


4/15

1. Forces postured overseassupport initial response to an

emerging crisis2. Rapidly deploy land- and

sea-based air forces to spoil orhalt an enemy offensive

3. Roll-back enemy air and

maritime threats

4. Build up overwhelmingcombat power in theater

5. Launch decisivecounteroffensive operations

Sufficient secure proximity to an elarge, high-signat

formations

Secure lines of cosupport force depsustain forward o

A superior precisireconnaissance-sconsisting of sensguided weapons,networks

Secure networks and control, suppprovide precision

timing

HIGHLYDEPENDENTON


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Defending against ballistic and cruise missilesalvos with kinetic interceptors that costmillions each may not be sustainable

Defending against swarms of UAVs, fastattack craft, and ASCMs could rapidly

deplete ship-based kinetic defenses

Defeating advanced IADS may require newinvestments in counter-countermeasures,stealthy platforms, and EA capabilities

Countering enemy campaigns to blind U.S.networks that underpin our precision

reconnaissance-strike complex

Sustaining stocks of expendable munitionsover extended logistics line communication

may become a U.S. center of gravity

Missile Defense

vs.

Missile Attack

Air Superiority

vs.

Air DefenseBa

Cou

Sustainment

vs.

Counter-Sustainment


8/15

When it comes tfor the better pathe trend has go

numbers as techmade each syste

In recent years, thave grown everhave become evetaking longer to being fielded in e

quantities.

Given that resouunlimited, the dyexchanging numis perhaps reachdiminishing retu


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Create Favorable Cost-Ex Prevail in the missile offe

competition

Reduce the home vs. awafor U.S. forces Reduce sustainment requ

Create Advantages in Time Time to engage missiles not driven

by flight time of an interceptor

Improve ability to counter salvos Create effects before enemy deploys

countermeasures

Create Advantages in M Increase mission duratio

manned and unmanned Increase time on station

Increase potential for plaother mission packages

Create a Wide Range of Effects New applications that span the

find, fix, track, target, attacktargeting chain Tailorable, selectable effects Lethal and non-lethal effects

New DE weapon systems could complicate an enemys planning

them to question the effectiveness of their offensive and defensive


10/15

Potential to reducerequirements forkinetic weapons

Free capacity tosupport othermissions

DE and kineticsystems arecomplementary,not competing


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12/15

Electric lasers for small aircraft such as fighters and

Ship-based Free Electron Laser for air and missile d

Strategic relay mirror system


13/15

The proliferation of precision weapons and other asymmetric chas already changed the game for U.S. power-projection opera

There is a significant potential for future DE (and cyber, electrowarfare) capabilities to create new operational advantages

Unlikely that buying more of the same will be sufficient to countthreats, especially in a time of decreasing defense budgets

The U.S. military has the opportunity to buy-back its freedom oshift the cost imposition calculus in its favor

Greatly complicate an enemys offensive and defensive planning

DE weapons will not completely replace kinetic capabDE and kinetic weapons will be complementary and syn


14/15

Leverage DE capabilities to enable new operational concepts such a

Support the Navy as a first adopter for weaponizing a high-powerbased defense against UAVs, fast attack craft, and possibly cruise m

Army and Air Force leverage mature technologies to field deployablaser modules to defend critical bases in the Western Pacific and SW

Support the Air Force and Navy as lead services for developing HPMcruise missiles and UAVs

Transition promising non-lethal DE capabilities (e.g., ADS) to the pr

Additional testing is needed to determine lethality against a range o

Develop a defense acquisition plan that is focused on transitiopromising DE concepts to operational capabilities over the ne


15/15

There are still some technologicalchallenges that must be overcomebefore high-power DE capabilities

become reality

Today, however, institutionalresistance and lack of funding, nottech maturity, may be the mostsignificant barriers to transition

An education effort is needed tobetter acquaint commanders withthe potential of new DE applications

Will it take a catalytic event, such as a

technology breakout by an enemy,

before the U.S. military realizes DEs

full potential?

FY2011 Funding ($M) for Kinetic MisPrograms and DE Technolog

Documents

De Roll Out Briefing FINAL