Cuff (1993). Problems of Versions in Everyday Situations. University Press of America

Studies in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

No. 2

E.C. Cuff

PROBLEMS OF VERSIONS

IN

EVERYDAY SITUATIONS

1993

International Institute for Ethnomethodology and

Conversation Analysis & University Press of America

Washington, D.C.

Copyright © 1994 by the International Institute for Ethnomethodology

and Conversation Analysis

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and Conversation Analysis

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cuff, B.C. Problems of versions in everyday situations I B.C. Cuff.

p. em. - (Studies in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis ; no. 2)

Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Conversation. 2. Ethnomethodology. 3. Discourse analysis

Social aspects. I. Title. II. Series. P95.45.C84 1993 302.3'46---dc20 · 93-27025 CIP

ISBN 0-8191-9149-3 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 0-8191-9292-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of §TM American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence

of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Studies in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

is co-published by

The International Institute for Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

and University Press of America, Inc.

Editorial Board

George Psathas, Chairman • Boston University

Jorg R. Bergmann • Universitat Geissen

Egon Bittner • Brandeis University

Graham Button• Rank Xerox Europarc

Jeff Coulter • Boston University

Michael Lynch • Brunei University

James Heap • Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

D.R. Watson • Manchester University

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to David W. Francis, Manchester Polytechnic, for discussion of issues in Part III; and to Dr. Wes Sharrock, University of Manchester, for his constant support and advice. Needless to say, neither is in any way responsible for what I have made of their suggestions. I am also grateful to Mrs. Jean Davies for typing and checking the manuscript.

Didsbury School of Education Manchester Polytechinic Manchester, England

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Some Directions for Research

II THE PROBLEM OF VERSIONS

1. Schutz and Multiple Realities

2. Pollner and Reality Disjunctures

3. Smith: Versions and Subversions

4. Discussion of Pollner, Schutz and Smith

a. Pollner and Schutz

b. Smith

III VERSIONS AND MARRIAGE BREAKDOWN

1. Introduction

. 2. Partisanship and Moral Adequacy in Everyday Accounts

3. Moral Adequacy, Identities and the Systematic Subversion of Accounts

4. An Elaborated Machinery for Subverting Accounts

1

9

15

21

27

32

37

37

46

50

IV VERSIONS IN A RADIO DISCUSSION OF FAMILY TROUBLES

1. Introduction 57

2. Family Versions About What is Happening in the Family 60

3. 'Expert' Versions About What is Happening in the Family 71

4. Reality Disjunctures and Multiple Versions in a Naturally Occurring Setting 78

V IDENTITIES, IDENTITY PUZZLES AND SENSE ASSEMBLY METHODS: SOME CONCLUSIONS

1. Some Issues

2. Conclusion

REFERENCES

APPENDIX

Symbols used in transcriptions

C's Account of Marriage Breakdown MB/c

D's Account of Marriage Breakdown MB/d

Radio Discussion Program - Pia

85

92

95

101

103

105

109

I

INTRODUCTION

SOME DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

Don Quixote, Don Juan, an accused person in court, a theorising sociologist- all can be said to have 'problems of versions'. Yet to what extent are such 'problems' part and parcel of the way we, as ordinary members of society, go about our everyday life? What would our everyday life look like if the 'problems of versions' as set out in the work of Alfred Schutz, Melvin Pollner and Dorothy Smith were a routine feature? In exploring these questions, substantive matters of considerable interest are raised, for example, mental illness, paranoia, marriage-breakdown and family troubles. Yet the focus is not on these issues per se, but rather on the sort of 'machinery' we have for making sense of them as they are encountered in everyday and naturally occurring settings. In short, this study seeks to explore our 'sense-assembly machinery'.

Our basic materials for analysis are a transcription of a radio program in a series called "If You Think You've Got Problems." In these programs, a panel of two or three counsellors discuss problems that have been volunteered by means of a letter from members of the listening audience. Occasionally, the letter itself is discussed, but more often than not, the originator of the letter is invited into the studio to participate in the discussion, Although the number and identity of the counsellors can vary from program to program, the series tends to draw on a number of regulars, such as WG and JH in our transcription. A constant presence on all programs is the presenter, JM. Finally, we note that the program is not broadcast live, but is recorded.

The transcription makes available to us the talk produced in a naturally occurring setting of the social world: a radio program. The talk; then, is intendedly produced and designed not only for those

2 PROBLEMS OF VERSIONS

parties actually speaking on the program, but also for the radio public, the listening audience.

There are seven parties in the talk. Four of these, Lora, Martin, Susan and Jonathan, constitute a whole family made up of mother, father, daughter and son respectively. Their ostensible purpose in appearing on the program is to seek help with a problem in the family concerning the son, Jonathan. Two of the other parties in the talk are counsellors, WG and JH, whose task it is to provide expert advice and help for the problems presented in the program. The remaining party in the talk is JM whose task it is to present the program.

Our primary concern is to say something of sociological interest about these basic materials for analysis: a transcription of a radio program in which a whole family discusses its problems with two counsellors and the presenter of the program. At this point we ask the reader to examine these materials to see, without prejudice to our subsequent discussion, what issues and interests, if any, they yield for him. (See the transcription of Account Pia in the Appendix.)

We say "if any" because, for many readers, such materials would be of little or no interest in that they cannot be readily utilised as 'data' for analysis though they might serve to illustrate various known themes about families, radio programs and so on, To investigate such themes, however, they would require a 'better form' of data, which might be partially derived from processing our materials to see what important concepts and behaviours can be discerned from the standpoint of preexisting sociological theories, In this way, aspects of our materials might provide an instance of something or other which can be collated with other instances from other materials and thereby be explained by adducing a law-like generalisation.

We demur from this approach, preferring to opt for a research strategy where our materials can provide us with basic data, rather than raw materials for selection, processing and collation, For what these materials represent is a naturally occurring setting, a social occasion, constituted by the actions, particularly the talk, of the parties involved. These parties are simply members of their society who are going about their business and, in so doing, are effectively producing a 'piece of the social world.'

INTRODUCTION 3

Now, there is something odd about a sociology which, in purporting to study the social world, can only do so by refining and reducing such naturally occurring occasions in order to produce more manageable and pliable 'data'; and where such occasions do not constitute a primary focus of analysis. If we may borrow Roy Turner's analogy,l it is like an archaeologist refusing to be transported in a time machine back to the ancient civilization he has been painfully and laboriously studying, even though two days spent in the everyday life of that civilization would be worth more in terms of human knowledge than many lifetimes of normal archaeological endeavour. Similarly, we feel that the many sociologists who would look askance at considering our materials as basic data for analysis are in effect 'archaeologists by choice';2 they prefer to operate at several removes from daily life, rather than attempting to study and analyse the rich materials that surround them, viz the members of society constitute - in, by and through talk - their naturally occurring settings and, hence, their social world.

Of course, the problem is how to take advantage of these riches and to produce sociologically interesting analyses of what seems to characterise - indeed constitute - social life: naturally occurring settings. Although it is usually easy to understand what is going on in any such setting, it is abnormally difficult to use it as an object of sociological study 'in its own right' so that we are tempted to use it merely as an instance of such settings as suggested above. Consequently, sociologists are often taken up with - and taken over by - problems of counting, measurement and statistical significance. Alternatively, they may feel obliged to describe a study avowedly focussed on a single instance as only 'heuristic' or 'exploratory', i. e., as a possible prolegomenon of subsequent studies which will provide the further materials for the validation of a general law-like explanation,

The basic difficulty for this problem of studying the everyday world is that the analyst is also simultaneously, irreversibly and irrevocably a member of the society he is attempting to study To grasp what is going on, he has to employ the self-same methods and

1 Oral communication. 2 We believe that A.V. Cicourel used this expression when he was in Manchester in 1972.


procedures as any other member of his society, His problem, therefore, is how to 'get outside' the world of common sense while remaining irredeemably within it! It is the dominant methodological problem of the approach to studying the everyday world known as ethnomethodology,

In founding ethnomethodology as a sociological enterprise, Harold Garfinkel has provided us with a series of demonstrations of how this problem might be approached and how we might study everyday social structures, i.e. how members of society 'put their world together'. His work, however stimulating, exciting and exhilarating, serves to do little more than demonstrate the importance of such research and the possibility of conducting it; it does not provide us with a research program in the sense of giving instructions on how to go about it with respect to the sort of materials represented by our radio program. Moreover, any guidelines we may discern are far from being direct or unambiguous so that though we are clear about the sort of study we intend to produce, we would be extremely reluctant to make any claim to whatever prestige the label 'ethnomethodology' may give and make no claim whatsoever that we have realised Garfinkel's intentions concerning ways of studying the everyday world

The work of Garfinkel's close associate, the late Harvey Sacks, is prima facie more directly helpful in that it can be seen not only to derive from ethnomethodological orientations, but also to focus directly on conversational materials. We detect, however, some strain between the approaches of Garfinkel and Sacks to the study of everyday settings. This strain is perhaps expressed in Garfinkel's description of Sack's treatment of conversational materials as "dealing with docile texts".3 By this description, we gather that Garfinkel is criticising Sacks' desire to produce formal descriptions of conversational 'objects' on the grounds that such a desire works to the detriment of taking sufficiently into account the situation or context in which such objects not only appear but, in appearing, produce.

In other words, the sort of enterprise which Sacks has founded, namely Conversational Analysis, has separated out from the prime

3orai communication

INTRODUCTION 5

ethnomethodological concern with describing how members put together their social structures, and developed into ways of describing with great rigor how members produce conversations. In this way, conversation becomes the topic of study, to the exclusion of studying how members occasion their naturally occurring settings in, by and through their talk.

Now Sacks himself is neither leading nor advocating 'separationism'. As he says:

This work is part of a program of work undertaken several years ago to explore the possibility of achieving a naturalistic observational discipline that could deal with the details of social actions) rigorously, empirically, and formally. For a variety of reasons that need not be spelled out here, our attention has focussed on conversational materials; suffice it to say, this is not because of a special interest in language, or any theoretical primacy we accord conversation, None the less, the character of our materials as conversational has attracted our attention to the study of conversation as an activity in its own right, and thereby to the ways in which any actions accomplished in conversation require reference to the properties and organization of conversation for their understanding and analysis,both by participants and by professional investigators. (Schegloff and Sacks, 1974: 233-234)

Our aim, then, is to pursue Sac~s' original research strategy In attempting to study our materials 'in their own right', we want to do more than treat them formally ' as a conversation' per se,;. we want to analyse them for the occasion that they display, though, of course, this occasion is constituted in, by and through the talk of the parties involved, i.e. through their conversation. In pursuing this aim, therefore, we shall not simply utilise Sacks' work, but also evaluate it in terms of its utility for our wider purposes,

In attempting to analyse our materials 'in their own right', we wish to describe how members can be seen to be displaying their routine knowledge of everyday social structures in constituting an


occasion in, by and through their talk, Our concern is with what such knowledge looks like and the ways it is used for the collaborative achievement of the naturally occurring setting; a "radioprogram" where a-whole-family-talks-about-its-problems-and-isadvised-on them- by-outsiders.

Clearly, one social structure which is ubiquitously present in our materials is 'the family'. The sociological literature on the family is enormous and relates to almost every conceivable topic on or way of looking at families. We say 'almost', however, because what are self-confessedly virtually absent from this vast literature are empirical studies of 'ordinary families' in their normal, everyday settings and encounters. Our materials present us with the opportunity of studying how a whole family unit manages its public appearances and, in so doing, displays its own organisation as a family as seen not only by the analyst, but also by other parties to· the occasion. In this way, we can make available a way of studying such substantive matters as family life and family organisation in a manner which does not call for the sort of intensive measures generated by such devices as experiments, questionnaires, interviews and participant observation. For in displaying their appearances and family organisation to other parties to the occasion and to the radio audience for their practical rather than research purposes, the family also makes them available to us for our own analytical uses.

The appearances of the family are not simply displayed for analysts; they clearly provide materials for the experts to find and contrast different 'versions' of what is happening in and to the family. Our discussion focuses in particular on the problem of versions, The materials enable us to investigate this vexing and fascinating issue in the sociological literature. The problem of versions alias multiple realities alias reality disjunctures has received detailed attention, but none of it has been devoted to an extensive and detailed analysis of the materials of a naturally occurring setting. Here we explore how members manage conflicting versions of reality and see if the problems they encounter resemble the analytical presentation of the problem in the literature. For in our materials, the fact that various parties in and outside the family have different views about what is happening in the family, about who has the problem and about what are the troubles in the family, presents us

INTRODUCTION 7

with some empirical basis for investigating how 'versions' are displayed, managed and resolved in an everyday situation.

Specifically, the discussion that follows has the following shape:

In part II, we review and discuss three major views - by Schutz, Pollner and Smith - concerning the nature of the problem of versions. In part III, we begin a consideration of the problem of versions in relation to empirical materials. In the first instance, these empirical materials consist of two accounts of marriage breakdown both given by parties to the marriage involved. These additional materials are used as a bridging device to facilitate the development of concepts and arguments before embarking on the complexities entailed by the long, multi-party conversation of the radio program. In part IV, we consider the materials of the radio program and go on, in part V, to isolate and discuss some methodological issues and to suggest some conclusions which derive from our analysis.

II

THE PROBLEM OF VERSIONS

(1) SCHUTZ AND MULTIPLE REALITIES

In his article, "On Multiple Realities", Alfred Schutz promises to address the problem of versions when he states:

Our problem, however, is not what occurs to man as a psycho-physiological unit, but the attitude he adopts towards these occurrences - briefly, the subjective meaning man bestows upon certain experiences of his own spontaneous life. What appears to the observer to be objectively the same behavior may have for the behaving subject very different meanings or no meanings at all. (Schutz, 1973: 210)

The pertinency of this quotation for the materials in our transcription seems to be made more acute when we review one particular section. The presenter, JM, has been reviewing with the son, Jonathan, the formul~tion of his problem so far in terms of his attitude towards competition. His mother has produced several descriptions .of his past behavior to illustrate the way he has 'avoide<t'"competition'1 Here (8.13- 9.7), Jonathan not only asserts that 'you h~v~ to be competitive in this world', but also denies any recolleCtion of the incidents to which his mother has referred. In the interests of setting up the problem of versions, it is worth noting in full the 'conclusion' of this exchange:

9.6 JM Well it was like listening to two different people hh yourself as you see yourself Jonathan and yourself as hh your parents see you.

9.7 J Yes I don't remember any of them.


These materials seem to illustrate the problem outlined in the quotation from Schutz. There is no dispute about the 'objectively same behaviour', there is no disagreement as to what actually happened. Instead one party sees what happened to be so important as to make it memorable and usable as evidence for her son's character. He, on the other hand, suggests that these events are of so trivial a nature that he does not even remember them.

At this stage, we are not concerned with the veridicality of the son's claim not to remember these events. After all, if he admits to remembering them, he may not only be asked to explain them, but also to explain them in a way whereby he can avoid being seen to contradict himself on the subject of his attitude to competition. Moreover, he could find himself in the delicate interactional situation of contradicting his parent. It is sufficient here to note that JM can find acceptable his explanation of not remembering the incidents to the extent that she formulates what is going on in the manner of9.6. Thus she can be seen to accept the notion that there can reasonably be different meanings attributed to the same behavior, even to the extent that one party invests great significance in certain events, while another party (and not just any other party; after all, the incidents concern what J himself did) cannot even remember them. In Schutz's words, these events appear to have for Jonathan 'no meaning at all.'

Given then, that Schutz does in fact promise to address the problem of versions, we now go on to consider his detailed position and arguments.

In his article, Schutz pursues what he considers to be a crucial insight made by the philosopher, William James. He paraphrases James as follows:

there are several, probably an infinite number of various orders of realities, each with its own special and separate style of existence. (Schutz, 1973: 207)

He links this quotation with several other key points from James' thinking. First, "all propositions, whether attributive or existential are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed at the same time,

PROBLEM OF VERSIONS 11

by affirming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions."(Schutz, 1973 citing James, 1950: 290)

Secondly, the distinction between real and unreal is based on the fact that we think differently of the same and that "'we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard," (Schutz, 1973) thereby giving a 'sense of reality' to the objects of our contemplation.

Schutz goes on to explore the nature .of these 'various orders of realities'. which James calls sub-universes and he terms multiple realities'. In exploring them, Schutz is hoping further to clarify the philosophical foundations of a scientific interpretive sociology, of which he attempted to outline the main bases in his seminal work, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Schutz, 1972 [1967, orig. 1932]).

In his article, he is particularly concerned with the relationship of two 'realities': the reality of the world of everyday life and the reality of the world of scientific theory, He does, however, identify other 'realities' - namely, the worlds of dreams, of imageries, of phantasms, of art, of religious experience, of play of children and the world of the insane (Schutz, 1972: 232) - as well as the worlds of everyday life and of science.

These 'worlds' or 'realities' and others - the list is not exhaustive- can·be distinguished from one another in a number of ways, Each of them is a 'finite province of meaning', with its own cognitive style, containing internally consistent and compatible experiences and receiving a 'specific accent of reality'. The consistency and compatibility of experiences refer only to what occurs within a cognitive style. As Schutz (1973: 232) says:

By no means will that which is compatible within the province of meaning P be also compatible within the province of meaning Q. On the contrary, seen from P, supposed to be real, Q and all the experiences belonging to it would appear as merely fictitious, inconsistent and compatible and vice versa. ·

Movement between provinces of meaning necessitates some sort of a 'leap', 'transformation' or 'shock'. In the sociological


literature, the 'conversion' that Kuhn (1962) maintains is required to move from one scientific paradigm to another is perhaps an example of the sort of experience to which Schutz refers, It is, for Schutz, a "radical modification in the tension of our consciousness, founded in a different attention a Ia vie. II (Schutz, 1972: 232) Each province of meaning, i.e., 'world' or 'reality', has its own cognitive style involving "a specific tension of consciousness, a specific epoche, a prevalent form of spontaneity a prevalent form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective." Finally, "the world of working in daily life is the archetype of our experience of reality. All the other provinces of meaning may be considered as its modifications." (Schutz, 1972: 232)

It would be an interesting task to try a systematic grouping of these finite provinces of meaning according to their constitutive principle, the diminishing tension of our consciousness founded in a turning away of our attention from everyday life a typology of the different finite provinces of meaning could start from an analysis of those factors of the world of daily life from which the accent of reality has been withdrawn because they do not stand any longer within the focus of our attentional interest in life. (Schutz 1972: 233)

As we have seen, Schutz has given us the parameters of such a typology: type of tension of consciousness, type of epoche, type of spontaneity etc.

This exposition might, however, prove to be misleading in two important ways: ways which Schutz was most anxious to avoid and which he feared would arise even out of his own discursive exposition.

The first of these is to think of these 'multiple realities' in some overly separated, ontological manner. Schutz stresses that:

they are merely names for different tensions of one and the same consciousness, and it is the same life, the mundane life, unbroken from birth to death, which is attended to in different modifications my mind may pass during one single day or even hour through the whole gamut of tensions of consciousness, now living in

PROBLEM OF VERSIONS

working acts, now passing through a daydream, now plunging into the pictorial world of a painting, now indulging in theoretical contemplation. (Schutz, 1972: 258)

13

Secondly, the 'multiple realities' are not of equal status: the world of everyday life is the 'paramount reality'. It is paramount because it is the realm of working, of action, of changing the outer world; because it is shared with others; because individuals are passionately interested in the practical results of their actions; because the system of relevancies of individuals is dominated by 'the fundamental anxiety' i.e. death; because individuals have the natural attitude, i.e. they take "the world and its objects for granted until counter proof imposes itself"; because individuals suspend doubt in its existence and in their "warranted experiences" for "as long as the actions and operations performed under its guidance yield the desired results, we trust these experiences." (Schutz, 1973: 258)

Schutz argues that the paramountcy of the everyday world over the other realities can be seen in one further and major respect: ordinary language. For communication and sociality to occur, the experiences within the various 'realities' have to be reproduced in ordinary language, if they are to be made available and shared with others. In so doing, persons are then 'working' in the world of everyday life. This point underlines the argument that the 'multiple realities' are hot ontological states, but merely the names for different tensions of one and the same consciousness. (Schutz, 1973: 255-259)

Clearly, Schutz's article on 'multiple realities' deals with the problem only at the philosophical level. It is particularly aimed at clarifying the relationship between the reality of the world of everyday life and that of theoretical, scientific contemplation. (Schutz, 1973: 208) In so doing, Schutz is developing his life-long study of the interpretation of meaning in the social world by taking up a 'further problem' listed at the conclusion of his seminal work The Phenomenology of the Social World (1972: 250) concerning the problem of 'relevance'. In his own words,


This is the question of why these facts and precisely these are selected by thought from the totality of lived experience and regarded as releva,nt.

This quotation, like the earlier one formulating the problem of 'multiple realities', is an excellent focus on the problem of versions. In terms of providing ways and means, some apparatus, for actually analysing some specific occurrences in the world. However, Schutz's approach appears to be too general, Nevertheless, as we shall see, his work has greatly influenced the approach of several other social analysts, who have claimed that it provides useful guidelines for empirical research. Before we turn to their work, however, let us examine Schutz's own application of his notion about 'multiple realities' in his analysis of Cervantes' Don Quixote .This analysis is perhaps the closest Schutz gets to making an empirical investigation of the social world.

In his analysis of Don Quixote Schutz (1971) summarises his notions about 'multiple realities', again stressing his indebtedness to William James' propositions, and then demonstrates their applicability to this work of fiction. Don Quixote has given the 'accent of reality' to the world (i.e. 'reality' or 'sub-universe') of chivalry. Insofar as he acts out this world of chivalry, he is 'working' and not simply 'imagining' or 'phantasying' i.e. he is acting in the world and trying to change it. Other people, however, do not share his interpretations of objects e.g. what Don Quixote takes for a giant is taken by them for a windmill. In the resulting clash between interpretations of objects in the world, Schutz points out that there is no definitive test to 'prove' which version of the world is correct. For the world of chivalry is a complete system of understanding reality. It can explain anything. For example, everi though Don Quixote eventually comes to concede that the windmill is a windmill, it is only such because his ~ch-enemy, the magician, has changed a real giant into a real windmill at the last moment. By having recourse to explanations which posit the existence of magical forces, Don Quixote has little difficulty in preserving his view of reality. There is no way at all to defeat such a view (or to defend it) on purely logical or empirical grounds.

Schutz goes on to show how Cervantes elaborated on this theme of how we experience reality by, first, having Sancho Panza share in Quixote's sub-universe of discourse and, then, having others


pretending to share it for their amusement. For our purposes, there is no need to trace out these complicated and sophisticated developments. For we have provided sufficient materials to illustrate 'multiple realities' in what is for Schutz the nearest he comes to an 'empirical' discussion of this subject. What we find are two selfcontained and competitive ways of interpreting the world with no way of proving which one is 'correct'. We should emphasise, however, that Schutz does not labor this point. Quite clearly, he regards Don Quixote as the 'outsider' and takes the people whom Quixote encounters as representing the world of everyday life. Apart from Sancho Panza, none of these others has his hold on the reality of the everyday world shaken by Quixote's views, arguments and actions. Instead, he is viewed as a figure of fun, as a nuisance or as a madman and treated accordingly.

(2) POLLNER AND REALITY DISJUNCTURES

In his article, "The Very Coinage ofYour Brain": The Anatomy of Reality Disjunctures Melvin Pollner (1975) seems to take up and attempts to develop on some of the basic issues raised by Alfred Schutz. 4 Although he does not make use of the term 'multiple realities', his discussion of 'reality disjunctures' addresses the same basic phenomenon and problems, particularly as they are formulated in Schutz's treatment of Don Quixote.

According· to Pollner, 'reality disjunctures' appear on those occasions when members of society differ in their interpretations of the objects they encounter in the world to the extent that they dispute and challenge the correctness of one another's version. In these cases, proponents of one interpretation or version of the world regard other versions as 'faulty'. Consensus can be achieved only if 'they' - the holders of another version - care to observe the world 'properly', 'as it is'.

The fundamental equivocality here, Pollner observes, is that proponents of a version of the world can always fault proponents of another version. For example, if someone hears voices, he may not

4In fact, Pollner cites Schutz's Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (1973) on page 427, note 1.


cease to hear them simply because others assure him that they cannot hear them. After all, these others may be hard of hearing, or malevolent or whatever. If someone persists in hearing voices, then neither logic nor empirical tests can definitively settle the question of whether there are or are not voices to be heard. Similarly, Pollner quotes from Rokeach (1964: 75):

Through bilocation he could be in two places at once and through translocation he had the power to go instantaneously from one place to another, Leon also claimed to be able to perform miracles, He had once commanded a table to lift itself off the floor - and it had obeyed. When I expressed disbelief, he volunteered to repeat the miracle for me, He went into. the recreation room and picked out a massive table. He then turned his back to it and, in a loud affirmative tone, commanded it to lift itself.

- I don't see the table lifting -'Sir, that is because you do not see cosmic reality.

Here we might recall how Don Quixote maintained his view of reality; the doings of magicians and enchanters were as clearly visible to him in the appearances that the world presented as they were conversely not visible, in fact non-existent, for those whom he encountered in his travels.

Given, then, that the fundamental equivocality generated by 'reality disjunctures' (which we can now see to be virtually synonymous with 'multiple realities') cannot be consensually resolved by empirical testing, Pollner enquires as to how 'closure' of them can be achieved. He suggests that closure must involve a 'politics', a 'politics of experience.'

Like Schutz, Pollner greatly relies on the work of William James to give philosophical support to his arguments. He also quotes James regarding the necessity to choose between alternative versions of reality, i.e. alternative ways of experiencing the 'same object' given that "we cannot continue to think in two contradictory ways at once." (Rokeach 1964, citing James, 1950: 288-290) Given that neither version can be empirically proved and that there is no outside control or external agency other than men's judgments which can


possibly settle the matter, then a 'politics' is involved. Somehow one way of experiencing the world becomes a 'credentialled version' which can serve to ironicize the other version.s For example, the clinician's version can serve to display the experiences of some others as the experiences of 'patients' who are having 'hallucinations'. But if the clinician's version is challenged i.e. it is itself regarded as a 'version' of reality, then it too can be ironicized from the standpoint of those who reject the description of their experiences as 'hallucinations' and of themselves as 'patients'.

Pollner suggests that the social world is full of such potential ironies. For example, if someone looks for his pen and cannot find it, then the whole episode can be described as overlooking the pen. To do so is to ironicize the first time period in terms of the discovery of the pen made in the second. Logically, the reverse could apply so that "the latter looking might be formulated as illusory or, perhaps, as the occasion for revising idealizations of an object's constancy". (Pollner, 1975: 415-416)

Such occasions for a choice of versions are only 'potential'; they are usually "resolved at a glance". There are settings, however, where members specifically orient to the resolution of versions. Such settings are characterised by presenting conflicting representations of the same event to some party who must resolve the disjuncture by making a choice, e.g. the courts.

He goes on to stress, however, that generally members of society do not go about laden with uncertainty and equivocation concerning 'correct versions' of the world. For them, the grasp of the world is characterised by certainty and the conviction that their way of seeing the world is not simply l! way, but, rather. the way of seeing it. Such certainty is highly conducive of producing conflict between versions if proponents of two versions of reality are equally convinced of the correctness of their way of seeing the world.

Here we note that Pollner has distinguished between two kinds of 'versions'. In his example of the courts he refers to the fact that in everyday life, members of society not only encounter but recognise that in various settings there can be conflicting representations of the

5 This expression is borrowed from an earlier unpublished draft of Pollner's article.


same event. Such conflict may be settled in an institutionalised manner, e.g. by reference to the procedures of the courts. With respect, however, to those 'versions of reality' which generate what Pollner (1975: 419) calls "full-fledged reality disjunctures", their salient feature is the fact that neither set of proponents regards their own grasp of reality as merely a version which, as such, is competitive with other versions. It appears, then, that this use and sense of versions is an analyst's device. Consequently, we can distinguish between those occasions where members can be seen to be orienting to and dealing with what they recognise to be a problem of versions and those cases where analysts may be seen to be describing the world in terms which have particular usages for their own (scientific) purposes.

In Pollner's article, it is the analyst who stresses that the sort of versions which constitute 'reality disjunctures' can be viewed as having equal logical and empirical status. It is the analyst who poses the problem of the 'politics' of resolving competing versions and who, in fact, regards them as 'competing' in the sense that a choice of 'correct version' can be made. For members, this question of choice does not appear to arise. In holding fast to how they see and experience the world, members take it that any problem they might have is how to deal with anyone who cannot see the world 'properly' and 'for what it is'. 6

Pollner, however, does imply that the analyst can reasonably apply this analytical view of versions to the study of everyday life by going on to distinguish between further (analytical) types of 'reality disjunctures' and to examine various ways of resolving them. In these respects he is more concerned with what he calls 'perceptual systems' rather than with 'belief systems'. He goes on (1975: 428, note 4):

That is, we shall be primarily concerned with the selfpreservative properties of claims with inferences about worlds which from the point of view of members are the intended objects of activities such as 'looking', 'touching' and 'hearing', rather than 'belief' 'interpretation', 'inference', 'thought', etc.

6 In fact, Pollner seems to recognise this point in an earlier article, Pollner (1974): 35-44)


He suggests that with such 'reality disjunctures', persons can sometimes be persuaded to relinquish their way of experiencing the world and to take the 'existential leap' of accepting another version as the proper way of reformulating their experiences. Here the operative word is 'persuade'. In his own words:

By 'politics' we mean to indicate the activities whereby a version of reality is used as the grounds of further inference and action given the recognition that the version is rendered empirically equivocal by the counterclaims and counter experiences of the other. What do these practices consist of? They would include all the activities through which a particular version of the world is supported, reasoned from, and used as the grounds of inference and action. Thus, they would include activities such as the simple insistence that 'I saw what I saw' and the recommendation to the other that he look agaiQ.. They would include the offering of 'good reasons'-4'or how what the other claims to have experienced as in the world could not be in the world. They would include an appeal to further experiential or reasoned evidence which contradicts the possibility of the disputed experience. They would include the instantaneous recognitions of the other's error and the 'subjective' origin of his claims. They would include, as well, activities which are perhaps more readily regarded as political such as mobilizing support for one's version from relevant segments of the community such as family members and friends, psychiatrists and police. (Pollner 1975: 420-421)

Pollner implies that he is operating with an analyst's view of 'politics'. From the standpoint of members of society, the inferences they make are seen as empirically compelling and empirically warranted. For them, activities which can be seen as 'paranoid' 'hallucinating' etc are, for all practical purposes, adequately disposed of by the very fact that they can be labelled and thus 'accounted for' in this way. For members, such cases do not pose problems of 'multiple realities' or 'reality disjunctures'. Indeed, the very activities of someone seeking to represent his 'paranoia' as an alternative and 'correct' way of s(;feing the world can be used by


members for confirming that they are dealing with a 'genuine case of paranoia'. Thus the 'conspiracy' of which the 'paranoid' complains is 'quite clearly' and 'simply' and 'only' a consolation' between medical experts and other involved parties seeking to 'treat' the 'sick person'. His cries of outrage that people are talking about him and conspiring to do things to him serve to confirm the 'accuracy' of the diagnosis that he is indeed 'a paranoic'. (Pollner, 1975: 412)

In such ways, members can sustain their grasp of the workings of the social world. In Pollner's analytical view, they are sustaining their version of the world and legitimating it as the 'credentialled version', as the basis for ironicizing all other 'versions'. Thus, although members do acknowledge and refer to the existence of other versions, they do so in a manner which displays the 'faulty' nature of such other versions; such versions may be seen to be held in 'good faith', they may be seen as 'sincerely held', but they are nonetheless 'false' and highly pervious to the 'correction' of experience.

We note here that Pollner is referring to cases where members use the description 'version' as a pejorative term, It serves as a gloss or label for identifying and making innocuous certain views of others. Insofar as these views can be described as (mere) 'versions', they do not provide a challenge to a 'credentialled' version of reality. Thus Pollner presents us with three interrelated uses of the term 'version':

(a) versions as logical and empirical co-equals, which present us with an analyst's problem of 'reality disjunctures' and the analyst's problem of closure;

(b) versions as encountered in natural settings such as courts where there are institutionalised procedures for closure and resolution;

(c) versions as a pejorative term used in everyday life for putting down or discrediting other persons views.

Finally, Pollner notes that social science is not immune from problems generated by reality disjunctures. Some styles of social scientific research in effect ironicize the everyday experiences of members of the social world in favor of the definitive or privileged


version presented by researchers. The researchers' version is privileged because it effectively sets the terms for choosing between alternative versions of the world. In short, "it is precisely in assigning his own version a privileged status that the analyst engages in the politics of experience." (Pollner, 1975: 420-421) Occasionally, however, the 'discreditors are discredited' and the analyst's version is discussed by the subjects under study.?

(3) SMITH: VERSIONS AND SUBVERSIONS

Dorothy Smith (1978) has addressed herself to the problem of versions as located in transcribed materials and in concerning herself with members' methods for producing versions and subverting them, her work might be seen to have some direct applicability to the materials of the radio program.

The data for Smith's analysis consist of a written account of an interview between one of her students and a friend, Angela, who has been asked to tell about anyone she knows whom she thinks has become mentally ill. The account, amounting to some 138 lines of transcript, was written up by the student-interviewer from memory after her talk with Angela. As we can see, large parts of it consist of remembered direct quotations from Angela's original oral account.

The account concerns how one of Angela's friends, K, exhibited behavior which 'showed' her as becoming mentally ill. When Smith first heard the account being read out to her class, she unproblematically took it to be an account of someone becoming mentally ill. Later, on examining the type-script of the account, Smith found that something different might be happening; Angela and her friends could be excluding or 'freezing out' K from their social circle in the manner, she notes, classically delineated by Lemert. (1962) For Smith, the account had thus a 'figure-ground effect': when one version is seen, the alternative version is invisible; as soon as the alternative version is seen, the other one 'disappears'. These two different and contradictory interpretations or hearings or readings represent for Smith a main attraction of the transcript as data. It challenges the analyst to describe the procedures by which

7 See also Pollner, 1975: 424-425, where he cites the case of Don Juan from Castenada (1971: 37-38).


the teller's version of what was happening was originally heard as 'authorised' and then subverted.

A first such procedure or mechanism is that hearers/readers approach the account with a 'willing .suspension of disbelief (Smith, 1978: 34) because, unlike the teller, Angela, they were not witnesses to the events described. The account is further 'authorised' by the fact that hearers are initially presented with a rule or norm that K is mentally ill, which provides a frame for fitting into this rule the subsequent details of the report on K's activities. By labelling K as mentally ill ab initio, hearers are locked into Angela's version of events; they do not look for what K's version might be insofar as persons who are becoming mentally ill might not be expected to contribute to an understanding of how this process is occurring to them.

Secondly, Smith suggests that the 'objectivity' of the account can be viewed as being artfully constructed. We are informed that Angela and K are friends and that Angela slowly realises, as K produces one bizarre activity after another, that something is wrong with K. Angela's realisation of K's state is supported by the way the account introduces a gradually widening circle of other people -Angela, then Angela and a friend, then these two and Angela's mother, then these three and another friend, and so on, culminating in the introduction of a psychiatrist who also sees that something is wrong with K, K is becoming mentally ill. (Smith, 1973: 35)

In effect, Angela's account produced a solution to a puzzle before the puzzle had been presented. We are informed that K is mentally ill and then we are given descriptions of her actions which can be related and made all of a piece by the use of this solution. Hearers are thereby authorised to find K's behavior as 'anomalous' in failing to meet the 'normal' expectations of Angela and her friends. In this way, the account can be heard as a proper description of someone becoming mentally ill. (Smith, 1973: 37)

Smith goes on to argue that the fact that Angela produces both the solution and the details of the puzzle as a 'packaged' account reinforces hearers' acceptance of it. For when the package is carefully examined and each 'bizarre' action scrutinised, it is not at all difficult to find alternative explanations both for the actions of them and for the account as a whole. In making such a scrutiny, the

PROBLEM OF VERSIONS 23 ·--·

absence of K's version .of events can be seen to be an important factor in hearing the account in 'Angela's terms'. Angela can systematically account for K's behavior without challenge from K and without making available any reference to what an alternative version from K might look like. (Smith, 1973: 38)

Finally, Smith identifies a set of devices which she calls 'contrastive structures' which provide a major means of packaging the account for it to be heard as presented by Angela. For example:

(a) When asked casually to help in a friend's garden, she went at it for hours, never stopping, barely looking up. (Smith, 1973: lines 34-36 of transcript)

and (b) (i) It was obvious that she was terrified of anyone getting too near to her, especially men.

(ii) And yet she used to pretend to us (and obviously to herself too) that she had this or that guy really keen on her. (Smith, 1973: lines 43-45 of transcript)

Smith suggests that the first part of a contrastive structure indicates an instruction or rule with which hearers can review and make sense of what is reported in the second part, In example (a) above, the first part tells hearers what sort of activity was required from K - casually to help - and the second part reports that she did something which contrasts with what was required - she went at it for hours, never stopping.... Example (b) provides a similar contrast between parts (i) and (ii). In this way, 'anomalous' behavior on the part of K is produced and has to be satisfactorily explained.

Here, Smith argues that the category, 'mentally ill', provides members of our society with a way of explaining a collection of such anomalous behaviours. In the absence of. any obvious alternative, the category, 'mentally ill' can conveniently collect together and also explain these occurrences. Thus Smith displays her view of the possible nature of mental illness; as a device for collecting together a number of anomalous behaviours of someone. (Smith, 1973: 47-50) She thereby derives two further bases for subverting Angela's account:


(A) along with some other sociologists, (cf Szasz, 1973) she is dubious about the whole notion of 'mental illness';

(B) even if the notion of mental illness as a category which collects together 'anomalous' behavior is accepted, K's behavior is not really anomalous, but is presented as being so by means of the procedures she has explicated.

We shall pursue both of these points in some depth later on. Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to continue our description of Smith's article.

On this view of mental illness (i.e. in (B) above), Smith is arguing that to construct an acceptable and factual account, the teller must describe a collection of anomalous behavior produced by the 'mentally ill' person. Insofar as behavior is not anomalous per se, but rather it is anomalous in terms of the circumstances in which it is seen to occur, then the teller must 'contextualise' the behavior being reported in order to show in what way it is odd, abnormal or improper. This contextualising work is accomplished through the use of contrastive structures. "

Much of the remainder of Smith's article is taken up with descriptions and analysis of further types of contrastive structures. (Smith, 1973: 39-46) Thus another type allows the teller a procedure for showing that K cannot competently recognise and deal with social realities. For example,

When something had gone radically wrong, obviously by her doing, she would blandly deny all knowledge (Smith, 1973: lines 87-88 of transcript and discussed on pp. 44-45)

This contrastive structure works by first describing what is regarded as either a mistake or deception on K's part and then K is shown to deny all knowledge of both her actions and her responsibility for them. The use of 'obviously' in the construction serves to rule out the possibility that Angela can be heard as reporting a 'natural' or a 'genuine' mistake. The connection between K's actions and the 'radically wrong' consequences is presented as obvious not only to teller and hearers, but to K herself, unless it is


the case that there is something the matter with K. Further, if K is in fact aware of what is happening, but is trying to deceive her friends, then she is still failing to recognise the social realities which should be clear to anyone. For if what she is doing is obviously wrong, she should know that to deny either involvement or responsibility for her own actions cannot succeed in deceiving anyone.

The second aspect of this contrastive structure hinges around the use of 'radically' and 'blandly'. By denying all knowledge 'blandly', K can be seen as not recognising the seriousness of the problem. Smith proposes that the reactions of a person when something goes wrong are properly related in their intensity to the perceived seriousness of the problem. She suggests that this proposition can be stated in the form of a rule to the effect that when something goes wrong, a person should be seriously upset and vice versa when something goes mildly wrong. Thus by· 'blandly' denying all knowledge in a situation where something had gone 'radically' wrong, K displays her incompetence as a person by deviating from this rule. As Angela provides hearers with no particular explanation of this deviation, other, of course, than the general frame that K is becoming mentally ill, then K's behavior here is heard not only as anomalous, but as the kind of behavior produced by a mentally ill person.

In fact, Smith goes on to argue that this contrastive structure can be located as a part of a larger such structure, which reads in full;

When something had gone radically wrong, obviously by her doing, she would blandly deny all knowledge, but got very upset at little things, like a blown fuse. (Smith .• 1973: lines 87-89 of transcript)

The complete structure suggests to hearers that K consistently deviates from this rule and does not therefore possess the ordinary everyday competence they might expect from anyone in properly controlling emotional reactions to events.

According to Smith, the account succeeds in achieving acceptance among readers/hearers largely through the piling up of contrastive structures of various kinds over the course of the account. They serve to establish K as someone who is producing anomalous behavior consistently across a wide variety of situations.

.26 PROBLEMS OF VERSIONS

She behaves 'strangely' at the swimming pool and the beach, in a friend's garden, at Angela's house, in the flat she shares with Angela and another girl, Trudy, and whenever men are around and so on. A picture is built up of someone who cannot be relied upon to produce 'normal' behavior in any circumstances. The contrastive structures have a cumulative effect in building up this picture. If, however, each event is individually examined, Smith argues then:

... there are few if any items that stand up as immediately convincing. The teller of the tale has to do a good deal of working up in order to display K's behavior as m.i. type ... There are descriptions of K's behavior which deprived of the contextualising work would not look particularly out of the way. (Smith, 1973.: 39)

From such scrutiny of the elements of the account, Smith suggests that hearing that K is mentally ill can be seen as a version of what is happening and that another version becomes more and more visible: that K is being frozen out by her friends. Items which are conducive to this latter hearing are not at first noticeable by readers/hearers, but become more and more visible on examination of the transcript. As these items become more noticeable, so the effects of the authorisation procedures employed by the teller are undermined.

It is not possible, however, to construct from the materials in the account an alternative version which is as fully detailed as the teller's version, says Smith, because it does not contain sufficient information. She says:

.. .It is a normal feature of such accounts that they do not contain irrelevant material. Irrelevant material is material which neither (a) establishes the adequacy of the authorisation procedures used, nor (b) is made use of in the conceptual organisation. The reader/hearer cannot go back to the personnages of the original to recover material which might be relevant to an alternative construction. As a feature of the social organisation, this may be contrasted with situations such as a court of law in which witnesses may be questioned to recover material making possible .alternative accounts.

PROBLEM OF VERSIONS

Thus the construction of an alternative account in which X is not mentally ill is not possible on the basis of what is available. But I can briefly show for some parts how it might be done. It would involve finding rules or contexts forK's behavior which would properly provide for the behavior to the same effect. If the enterprise were successful it would result in a description which would lack any systematic procedure for bringing these items together. The pieces of behavior would simply be fitted back into various contexts. The present account would disintegrate. The reader/hearer would be unable to recover from them a rule under which he could see what the account "was all about". (Smith, 1973: 51. italics in the original)

27

For our purposes, we do not propose to delve deeper into the riches of Smith's article. The outline summary we have just given can serve to generate a number of important points for the analysis of versions in conversational materials that we shall shortly develop.

(4) DISCUSSION OF POLLNER, SCHUTZ AND SMITH

(a) Pollner and Schutz

Pollner's account of versions is clearly in several basic ways very similar to that of Schutz. Though Pollner does not employ the term 'multiple realities', his discussion of 'reality disjunctures' brings out the identical issue of systemic 'sub-universe' or 'versions' (in sense (a) above on p.24) of the world, as can perhaps be seen from their respective illustrations by way of Don Quixote or paranoia

There are, however, some significant differences, the explication of which can serve to point out some methodological directions for our analysis of the materials of the radio program.

First, Po liner's discussion might imply a 'more sociological approach' insofar as he eschews the language of the phenomenological philosopher. He does not employ Schutz's


philosophical frame of reference as expressed in such concepts as 'epoche', 'attention a la vie', 'tension of consciousness' and so on. Instead of focussing in this manner on the processes of the mind, Pollner prefers to talk about the interaction of members of society in the ways that he sees 'reality disjunctures' being brought to a closure by the 'politics' of persuasion. In this, he might perhaps be seen as going beyond the sort of illustration of 'multiple realities' which Schutz provided in his article on Don Quixote to provide an attempted explication of the methods which members might use to deal with such matters.

We suggest, however, that Pollner's jettisoning of Schutz's particular philosophical problem (concerning the mind) and his phenomenological language do not mean that he .has also abandoned what is basically a philosophical orientation for discussing the workings of the everyday world. For the problem that he is attempting to elucidate concerns the nature of the fundamental equivocality of 'reality disjunctures' which, for him, is explicitly an analyst's problem.

For members, neither Schutz's 'multiple realities' - dreams, phantasies, plays, madness etc. - nor Pollner's main examples of 'reality disjunctures' - hallucinations, paranoia, sorcery, neurosis -present them with a 'reality problem'. As Pollner (1974: 35-54) himself implies, members do not subscribe to the basic philosophical argument which underpins the notion of 'reality disjunctures', namely, that there is no logical or empirical method of demonstrating the superiority of one version of the world over another. We agree with Pollner that if members encounter activities which they can take to be 'hallucinatory', 'paranoic' or 'neurotic', then the very fact that they can see them that way ensures that they do not have to wrestle with the difficulties posed by 'reality disjunctures'. In short, such activities do not challenge their grasp of reality,of how they understand the world to operate.

In spite of his recognition of these points about how members operate in their social world, Pollner still pursues his concern with how they 'nevertheless' deal with the philosophical-cum-analytical problem of 'reality disjunctures' . It is ironic that Schutz, with his explicitly philosophical concerns does not end up in Pollner's incongruous position, which postulates that different versions of reality are accorded equal status regardless of how he sees members


to be operating in the everyday social world. Although Schutz recognises the point concerning the equal status of 'multiple realities' in logical and empirical terms and although he illustrates that there can be a clash of realities (as with Don Quixote), he does not develop his argument into a discussion of ways of closing 'reality disjunctures'. His treatment of Don Quixote reveals his awareness of them as an analytical product, but presumably he does not proceed to analyse them because he does not make the further assumption that they have equal status. Whatever the logical and empirical equality of status of his 'multiple realities', Schutz has no doubt about the paramountcy of the world of everyday life. 8

What emerges from this discussion is the need to distinguish between, on the one hand, what members are doing and, possibly, what they take to be problems and, on the other hand, those concerns and problems which appear to be primarily the prerogative of those analysts whose focus is more epistemological than empirical We are suggesting that the treatment of the problem of versions by both Pollner and Schutz comes off largely as a set of issues about which a philosopher-as-analyst is particularly concerned. These issues have a general and abstract concern with the nature of social reality. The thrust of the argument is epistemological and references to the social world are more in the manner of illustrations, examples and intuitive appeals to 'what anyone knows' in order to make arguments plausible and tenable. What neither author does is to make a thorough-going analysis of any particular natural setting with a view to studying in depth how members of society may and do actually deal with something they might take to be a problem of versions. In short, the two authors tend to use examples and illustrations in order to demonstrate their analysts' view of the problem of versions.

Pollner is not exempted from this criticism despite his frequent illustrations of and references to events and examples from everyday settings and despite his obvious knowledge and explicit awareness of the distinction between the analyst's and member's treatment of versions Although he discusses members' methods for making sense of their social world, he succeeds in neither explicating nor pursuing deeply such methods. He appears to be more concerned, in short, to illustrate the conceptual distinctions generated by the

8 See prior discussionof Schutz.


analytical framework of 'reality disjunctures'. He is basically illustrating what largely amounts to a philosophically rooted argument.

We say 'largely' because when Pollner examines the 'politics' engaged in by members for resolving 'reality disjunctures', he comes closer to probing what problems members might have with versions. In fact, in this section of his article, (Pollner, 1974: 420-421) he draws heavily on the work of Harold Garfinkel (1967), which he cites, for illustrating the nature of members' methods. Following Garfinkel, he shows how, in describing their social world, members simultaneously both constitute it and account for it in intersubjectively meaningful ways. For example, in his hypothetical example concerning the location of the pen, he shows how in finding it, we can simultaneously make sense of what has happened by 'seeing' that it has been 'misplaced' or 'overlooked'. So far so good. But for Pollner to go on to speculate that an equally valid version of what has happened can be, in logical and empirical terms, some sort of 'transmogrification' or 'migration' of the pen is to adopt the licence of a theorist to play around with such possibilities rather than to enquire, say, what might be the fate of someone in everyday life if he were to make such a concern a practical matter by advocating this 'version of reality' in everyday interaction with his fellow members of society.

In fact, in his seminal work, Studies in Ethnomethodology , Garfinkel explores in some depth the possible consequences of introducing into the everyday world some of the relevances or 'rationalities' of the 'scientific attitude'. (Garfinkel, 1967: chapter 8) The embarrassment, mortification, annoyance and even anger of both student-experimenters and their victims when the former tried, for example, to act as lodgers in their own homes, or tried to probe the accuracy and meanings of such greetings as 'how do you do?', (Garfinkel, 1967: chapter 2) clearly indicate the existence of takenfor-granted and seen-but-unnoticed features of everyday life. The strong social affects induced by transgressing these features serve not only to make manifest the normative nature of social interaction, but also, and more importantly for Garfinkel's purposes, to indicate what might be the nature of these very features. For Garfinkel aims to discover the methods members have for constituting and sustaining any given setting in the everyday world and through much of his book he endeavours to demonstrate what is involved in


such enquiry by means of a number of extended examples and programmatic statements deriving from them.

' In this way, Garfinkel can be seen to be taking some initial, but

crucial, steps towards operationalising in empirical terms what he takes to be Schutz's fruitful philosophical program for the social scientist. In particular, he demonstrates in interactional terms the consequences of introducing the attitude to reality required in the 'world of scientific theorising' into the 'world of everyday life'. In this way, he gives us a set of practical illustrations of Schutz's general tenet concerning the paramountcy of everyday life.

Garfinkel thus sees that the utility of Schutz's philosophical work is in providing the social scientist with clear guidelines for avoiding confusion between the relevancies entailed by the 'scientific rationalities' and the practical concerns of members in the everyday world. He says (1967: 283):

... the scientific rationalities can be employed only as ineffective ideals in the actions governed by the presuppositions of everyday life. The scientific rationalities are neither stable features nor.sanctionable ideals of daily routines, and any attempt to stabilise these properties or to enforce conformity to them in the conduct of everyday affairs will magnify the senseless character of a person's behavioural environment and multiply the disorganised features of the system of interaction.

In short, Garfinkel is arguing in favor of ways of studying the social world which would focus on how members make sense of it; how members, not analysts, use notions of 'rationality' and 'reasonableness'. He warns of the methodological danger of shaping perceptions of the everyday world with an analyst's notions of 'rationality', 'consistency' and so on Such notions form part of what he calls the 'scientific rationalities', which he demonstrates as not being features of everyday interaction.

Despite drawing extensively on Garfinkel for his access to notions of members' practices, Pollner's attempt to examine the everyday world seems to be firmly rooted in 'the world of science', in the 'scientific rationalities'. Although he recognises that members


of society go about their everyday affairs untroubled by the philosophical discovery that their grasp of what is happening may be described as merely a 'version' of reality, not susceptible to logical or empirical proof, and although he is interested in members' practices sufficient for him to show conversance with relevant literature and to cite examples, Pollner does not proceed on these lines. Instead, he opts virtually to step outside the everyday world, acting as some sort of independent arbiter of the meaning of social action. For in ironicizing any one version of the world in terms of another, he effectively ironicizes both versions from what he takes to be a 'neutral' and 'objective' standpoint, the impartial world of someone looking out from 'the world of science'.

This criticism of Pollner is not intended to advocate the position that we cannot therefore have an analyst's standpoint, or that we should substitute for it something called a 'members' standpoint. What we are seeking, explicitly qua analysts, are ways of analysing how members deal with their problems of versions in a manner which might avoid the difficulties inherent in Pollner's approach. These difficulties seem to amount to the analyst attempting to match members' activities with an 'external' - perhaps 'imposed' -intellectual framework based on 'reality disjunctures'. For we do agree with Pollner when he argues that members do not operate in a manner which would suggest that 'reality disjunctures' are a constitutive part of their everyday world.

We do not seek this privilege of scientific detachment for our analysis. As we have seen, it leads to the construction of theories9 around an analytical framework rooted in the 'scientific rationalities' rather than to a thorough-going attempt to describe members' methods for making sense of their everyday world. At times, Pollner embarks on this latter strategy and has produced some telling points. The main thrust of his argument, however, is to propound an analytical framework which generates the methodological and conceptual difficulties we have been explicating.

(b) Smith

We begin our examination of Smith's work by noting the kind of materials she uses. They consist of a transcription of an ex post

9 Sec Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) for a discussion of 'constructive theorising'.


facto reconstruction of an interview between Angela and the 'student interviewer'. Part of this reconstruction involves the student interviewer's recollections of direct speech made by Angela. We can enquire, then, as to what methods are available for handling materials of this kind.

Smith ( 1978: 28) stresses that one merit of her article is that the data is reproduced in full for examination by her readers. We strongly welcome this facility for affording us the opportunity to check out in the data her detailed arguments.

Further, Smith (1978: 28) also stresses that the data is not presented as purporting to be an accurate reconstruction of 'what really happened'. Rather, it represents a selective ordering and characterisation of events as told by Angela and reported by the student interviewer, in order to give a description of someone who was becoming mentally ill. Smith's interest is in how this task is accomplished in relation to prevailing notions of mental illness.

In proceeding to deal with this data, Smith adopts as one of her methods the scrutiny of particular descriptions in the account to see if they can be alternatively explained. In finding that she can do so, she claims some warrant for proposing that we are hearing an account of how K is being frozen out rather than of K becoming mentally ill. She suggests that we hear the account in the latter manner because Angela 'authorises' her 'version' of what happened by 'packaging' her materials in a manner which produces such a hearing. Thus by critically examining the account, it can be subverted and an alternative version can emerge.

By 'alternative version', she appears to mean something like the outline or general shape of such a version insofar as she has pointed out that the teller utilises materials relevant only for her own version of what happened Yet despite the absence of such materials, Srriith is able to document rather fully what such a version might look like. Presumably she is arguing that such an alternative is made available because of the weaknesses in the account once it is broken down into parts and the artfulness of the 'contrastive structures' exposed. We shall shortly take up this issue when we argue that Smith confuses the moral adequacy and objective facticity of accounts.


A further issue which we take Smith to raise for detailed discussion is the way she treats the relationship between Angela and K and, also, between Angela and the student interviewer. She argues that the assumed relationship of 'friends' between Angela and K helps to produce the initial hearing of the account. Once we doubt this relationship (e.g. by seeing them as 'enemies' or 'rivals') then we have located a principled way of subverting the account. As for the relationship between Angela and the student interviewer, Smith pays it little or no attention. We shall argue, however, that in suggesting that Angela might be effectively 'conspiring against' K, Smith is also expecting us to assume that the student interviewer is also entering into the 'conspiracy'.

In both cases, Smith is taking for granted the 'obvious' relationships that exist between these parties and the ways, therefore, that identities and activities operate in descriptions to give us a sense of what is happening in the social world. She can be seen to use these 'obvious' relationships, therefore, as a resource for her analysis rather than as a topic for her research. to Although, as we shall argue, much of the dynamic of her discussion derives from this resource, it is largely unexplicated by Smith.

Another issue concerns how she conceives hearers/readers might be expected to approach the account. In effect, Smith asks them to approach it with a some detachment and scepticism; to have virtually a principled position of doubt. In the absence of such an approach, they can be 'taken in' by what amounts to only a version of what happened. Although Smith herself took the account 'on trust' on its initial oral presentation, once she came carefully to examine the transcript, she began to question its veridicality as a description of someone becoming mentally ill. Further, she could go on to subvert it by producing an alternative version which she found equally plausible and, possible, more convincing. Here we suggest that Smith is moving from hearing it as a member of society to examining it qua analyst of society, In Schutz's terms, she can be seen to be moving out of the world of everyday relevancies to the world of scientific theorising. We have referred to the possible consequences of so doing in our discussion of Garfinkel's work above.

10 See Cicourel (1964) especially chapter 1 for the discussion of the distinction between treating commonsense knowledge as topic or resource.


We suggest that it is hardly surprising that she did not doubt the account when it was first presented. After all, the student interviewer had been asked to report on a case of someone who was known to be becoming mentally ill and presumably hearers, including Smith, could hear that she was giving such a report in the account of her talk with Angela. Of course, there are settings in the social world where members might be expected to scrutinise what is being said from a principled position of doubt. Pollner referred to such settings, e.g. the courts, and Smith herself is aware of them when she talks about how court procedure facilitates the recovery of materials which may not be presented in any one particular account. Yet, as she has shown in her own analysis, it may be possible effectively to subvert an account even without recourse to such procedures. In the next part, we shall argue from the basis of some materials on marriage break-down, that members might be seen to be able routinely to subvert an account by systematic means and may do so if it raises for them suspicions about its 'biased' or 'partisan' nature. In general, however, we suggest, following Garfinkel, that members will take accounts 'on trust' if they can, and will not usually invite the possible interactional troubles that can arise by introducing a sceptical or 'scientific' attitude in situations where they see such an attitude to be both unwarranted and uncalled for.

Smith did not invite such possible troubles by challenging the report of her student-interviewer. Indeed, it did not occur to her to do so (Smith, 1978: 25) for at the time of its presentation she was hearing about 'what happened' rather than a 'version' of what happened. In this way, she herself manifested the taken-for-granted 'trust' to which we have been referring.

Her subsequent suspicions about the account were aroused by her ability to find an alternative account in the ways we have outlined above. This view of the account raises for us two problems.

First, it is unclear whether Smith is attempting to explicate general mechanisms for doing accounts i.e. mechanisms which


anyone must employ for producing them.ll Or whether she is suggesting that Angela made a selection from a collection of such mechanisms to 'put down' her 'friend/enemy/rival'. While it might seem clear enough from her discussion of contrastive structures that Smith is concerned with general mechanisms for doing accounts, she is also heavily involved in showing how Angela has utilised such mechanisms for damaging K. We are unclear, therefore, if Smith is arguing that Angela has made some improper use of such mechanisms, or if such mechanisms are particularly available for producing selective versions of the world, or, finally, if she is implying that there are other mechanisms available which, if employed, could serve to produce a properly 'objective' and 'factual' account of what happened. For although she claims not to be interested in 'what really happened', (Smith, 1978: 27) her great concern with the details of an alternative version and what it might indicate for the whole notion of mental illness, might serve to undermine this claim.

Secondly, we shall examine these points with particular reference to her suggestion that the 'facts' in the account do not appear to amount to showing someone as mentally ill, where Smith is employing her own strong views on the nature of mental illness. We suspect that for Smith it is not simply a question of whether these 'facts' can be seen to add up to mental illness, but whether, for her, any facts can be seen to do so.

In conclusion, we suggest that although Smith's article presents the reader with a large number of overlapping and sometimes conflicting issues, making for difficulties in grasping a coherence in her methodological and/or substantive aims, it brims with fertile ideas concerning ways of examining accounts and the possible subversion of accounts.

11 Precisely, Smith (1978: 50) says "This conclusion points to although it does not fully design a general procedure for the analysis of such accounts. It suggests ... a more general sociological relevance."

III

VERSIONS AND MARRIAGE BREAK-DOWN

(1) INTRODUCTION

In this part we begin an r.mpirical exploration of how members produce and manage versions, using conversational materials as our data. Here we begin with two short transcriptions giving accounts of marriage breakdown, before embarking on our transcription of the radio broadcast.

Although we are reluctant to introduce further materials in view of the length of our basic transcription, it is necessary to do so to prepare adequately for the complexities inherent in the radio discussion. In particular, we refer here to the multi-party nature of the talk in the program and to the fact that the parties are producing a number of differing actual versions of what is happening in the family, rather than the possible alternative versions discussed by Dorothy Smith. As we wish to build on and develop from Smith's analysis, it is helpful to take data roughly comparable to her materials in order to develop our own alternative description of members' methodic ways of subverting accounts before embarking on the more extensive and complex radio transcription.

(2) PARTISANSHIP AND MORAL ADEQUACY IN EVERYDAY ACCOUNTS

The two accounts of marriage break-down that we shall consider are labelled MB/c and MB/d.12 We primarily focus on MB/c, but draw on MB/d for certain comparative purposes, which will shortly be explained. Both accounts are part of a collection of such accounts, They were gathered by R, a student in a College, who interviewed some of her fellow students whom she knew to have

12 Both accounts are reproduced in the Appendix.


had serious troubles in their marriage. The interviews were tape recorded

We tum to account MB/c in which lines 1-15 indicate that the interviewee, C, in saying that she 'might be better off doin it meself, opts to tell the story of her marriage break-down directly into the tape-recorder rather than to R. In opting to give a 'solo performance', C reproduces for the analyst some of the methodological problems we encountered in Dorothy Smith's materials.

Unlike Smith's materials, the account MB/c is 'first-hand': the teller is both a witness and an active participant in the events she is describing. It is not therefore mediated through a third party such as Smith's student-interviewer. After line 17, however, the materials do resemble Smith's in that they cannot reasonably be described as 'conversational'; they are a one-party rather than an interactional product. They do, however, have the virtue of being directly produced by a party to the events described and do not therefore present the analyst with the methodological problem of determining the status of materials which are constructed by an 'unconnected' -or, at least, apparently 'unconnected' - third party, who constructs her account from the talk of someone who was both a witness and a party to the events described.

Thus the merit of MB/c being a first-hand account is off-set by its one-party nature. As such, it lacks that interactional quality of conversational materials which can serve to constrain the analyst's flights of imagination about what is occurring in the talk. The interactional quality of conversational materials gives the analyst some purchase on what the parties to the talk are making of the talk. Whatever we, as analysts, want to make of it, we ignore at our peril what the parties themselves seem to be making of it insofar as the materials display the ways they are mutually orienting to what each has to say as the talk is built up turn by turn. Even so, this interactional quality of conversational materials cannot eliminate equivocality- the possibility of alternative hearings. Nevertheless, to the extent that the materials do offer some display of how the parties are mutually orienting to one another in the ways their successive utterances are 'chained' or 'sequenced' or 'locked into' one another, analysts do have some warrant for suggesting what hearings the

VERSIONS AND MARRIAGE BREAKDOWNS 3 9

parties are making and thus also the possibility of warrantably constraining the range of alternative possibilities.

In Smith's materials we can only speculate that one possible basis for accepting Angela's account of K's mental illness is that the student interviewer heard it that way and thus reported it that way We can of course speculate that in the original conversation between the two of them, the student interviewer used the opportunity available to any conversationalist to query points of detail, to raise questions and to seek for some explication of, for example, K's view of the situation. The fact that such work on the part of the student interviewer is not a feature of her account of what Angela said might indicate that she, like Smith in her initial hearing of the account, took it to be an adequate and proper description of someone becoming mentally ill. In short, both of them took it for granted that what they heard was what-had-been-asked-for, namely, an account of someone becoming mentally ill. We have suggested that in the absence of some 'good reason' to listen to the account in a critical manner- where such 'good reason' could be to know that Angela is K's 'enemy' or to have a sceptical attitude to the very notion of 'mental illness'- neither the student interviewer nor any other hearer will try to do other than hear, if they can, what is being said as what has been asked for.

We can, of course, do no more than speculate about the nature of the talk between Angela and the student interviewer. In the case of account MB/c, we cannot even do that as C is producing her account 'solo', directly into the tape-recorder. We wish, therefore, briefly to examine another account from R's collection of stories about marriage break-down, namely MBJd13 in order to develop further how the interactional quality of conversation can afford the analyst some purchase on his materials.

In MB/d, the teller of the story, D, produces an account of the break-down of her marriage in lines 7-40 inclusive. If the taperecorder had been switched off at this point, she would have produced for our analysis similar materials to C's in account MB/c. In fact, the transcription continues with talk between D and R and thus we have available materials for examining how R is hearing D's story. Clearly, one aspect of these materials is the fact that in

13 Reproduced in Appendix.


'responding' or 'replying' to what D has said, R can ask for more information, obtain more details, which can serve to fill out and, perhaps, to contrast with the account as initially presented. Here, D is asked 'what did your Mum think about it' (line 42); the views of her husband about D going to college (lines 50 - 52 and 54 - 65); and the 'kind of rows' the couple had (line 78). In this way, from the interaction of D and R and from the consequent display of their mutual orientations to what is being said, the account in some ways can be heard to be 'tested' in terms of its 'acceptability' to at least one hearer.

We suggest that questions of 'testing' and 'acceptability' derive from an omnipresent feature of any account: its 'moral adequacy'. Any account can be scrutinised in such terms, i.e .. (1) how does it come off as a 'proper' description of what is happening in the social world: and (2) how does it display the teller - as 'impartial' or as 'biassed' or as 'sensitive' or as 'callous' or as 'involved' or as 'disinterested' or whatever? The teller, in producing an account of what is happening in the world, is also unavoidably producing materials which make available possible findings about his characterological and moral appearances as displayed in his talk. Alternatively put, in telling about the world, he is also inescapably telling about himself: in seeing the world 'that way', he is inescapably open to possible findings that he is 'that kind of person who sees the world that way'. As we have suggested, the analytic advantage of conversational materials is in providing us with some warrant for discussing such matters as they can be seen to arise for members in a naturally occurring setting.

We have also suggested, however, that such matters do not seem to present for members an endemic source of troubles so that they are reluctant to tell stories and to give accounts of their social world. Rather, members might routinely and matter-of-factly expect that what they have to say will be heard as morally adequate. After all, any hearer who wants to take issue with what has been said can generate for himself interactional troubles, which might include a scrutiny of the propriety of his action in taking issue with what has been said. Such action might call for some interactional delicacy if troubles are to be avoided,

We might perhaps take R's questions to D as illustrating the deployment of such delicacy in that she does not produce her 'own'

VERSIONS AND MARRIAGE BREAKDOWNS 41

hearing of D's account. Rather, she enquires about the views of D's mother and husband on what was happening in the marriage. In this way R does not express a personal opinion about D's account and elicits further information by enquiring what other persons (who not only might be expected to have views, but also might be expected to have rights to have such views) thought about what was happening, We take it that D's further talk does not, in fact, display any resentment or hostility to R's questions; but gives her the sort of information she can be heard to be asking for. This exchange between the two parties in the talk, together with the manner in which D has assembled her initial account of her marriage breakdown, can further be taken to be displaying a mutual orientation to an important feature in accounts of such events as marriage breakdown: the possibility that such accounts can be partisan or onesided.

For D is not simply reporting as a 'witness' to the break-down of a marriage: she is telling about the break-down of her marriage. She is thus describing the events which led to the break-down of a social unit, a marriage, of which she was one of its two constituent members. In describing such matters, she can be taken to be describing a 'unit event' 14 in which she, as a member of the unit, is inextricably implicated. What she has to say in her account can therefore be examined for the part she has played in bringing about the dissolution of the unit; she is morally involved in the troubles of the unit. By 'moral involvement', we are referring to the ways members can standardly and routinely deploy their social knowledge about the nature of unit troubles in order to examine the actions of each member of the unit for his responsibility for what has happened. In assessing responsibility for the troubles, members may thus simultaneously be orienting to the possibility that blame or criticism may be assigned to one or more members of the unit.

We are suggesting, then, that when a single party reports on troubles in a unit of which that party is a member, both that party and hearers have standardly available the possibility that what is being said is one-sided or partisan. Members might routinely expect that accounts of such matters will be biased in this manner, Consequently, we can expect tellers to orient to the possibility that their accounts can be heard as partisan by assembling them in a

14 For the concept of 'unit event' see Sudnow (1967: 165ff.)


manner which attends to the unit- here two-party nature of such troubles. By attending to this possible feature of such accounts, tellers can try to show their awareness of the implicativeness of these troubles for both members of the unit and thus produce an account which orients to this feature. In short, both tellers and hearers might take it that in such matters as unit troubles, there may standardly be available other versions of what has happened and that attention in the account to this possibility assists in hearing it as morally adequate.

In MB/d, we suggest that the teller can in fact be heard to be orienting to this feature insofar as she describes both her own and her husband's attitudes and actions and depicts the jointness of the decision to end the marriage:

we decided to make arrangements to split up an wi- we arranged everythin we sold the house an the furniture an just split the money - an that was it just split up, (lines 37- 40)

Moreover, R can be heard to be displaying an orientation to the 'bipartisan' nature of the troubles of a marriage insofar as her questions seek further details of the relations between the marital pair.

Thus both D and R can be heard to be orienting to the possibility that an alternative account or version of the troubles in the marriage can be given by the husband in the marriage. We suggest that such a possibility can be described as a 'determinate alternative possible account'. The key word here is 'determinate'. Although there may be a number· of alternative ways of hearing and assessing the breakdown of D's marriage on the basis of the materials she makes available in the talk, we take it that hearers might standardly monitor the talk for the views of parties who are implicated in the events and troubles being described, rather than, say, look for the views of neighbours, colleagues from work and so on. The possibility, then, that the husband has an alternative version of what is happening/has happened in the marriage is more than a reference to the fact that various hearings may be made of conversational materials. Rather, it is a determinate possibility, standardly available to members from their routine knowledge of the nature of social units like 'marriage' and 'the family'. Consequently, members can employ their common


sense knowledge of the everyday social world to find who is implicated in the troubles of such units and who can and should appropriately have a view on them.

Of course, any account of such unit troubles which is presented by only one member of the unit runs the risk of being heard as onesided or partisan. After all, the selection of the materials and the way that they are presented are in the control of the teller. As we have suggested, however, tellers can orient to the general availability of determinate alternative possible accounts in the way they assemble their account to give a morally defensible description of what has happened in the unit. For tellers to produce morally adequate accounts, what seems to be important is not so much their assembled nature, but the possibility that selection will display bias or one-sidedness. As we have seen, tellers can take care to try to avoid being heard in this way and, in so doing, be heard to produce morally adequate accounts.

We are not suggesting that the assembly of a 'morally adequate' account is synonymous with the assembly of a 'factually objective' account. Although we will develop this distinction shortly, we note at this point that perhaps Smith was demanding the latter in describing the details of Angela's account as 'weak'. By arguing that the 'facts' in the account did not seem to justify a 'verdict' of 'mental illness', Smith appears to be invoking an analyst's view of its nature. This 'analyst's view' seem to be further demonstrated by her insistence that Angela is interested in presenting a 'factually objective' account, i.e. an account which is assembled with a view to its being heard in this way and in these terms. What we are suggesting is that Angela is more likely to be concerned with assembling a morally adequate account, i.e. an account which is defensible in terms of its appropriateness, its propriety, as the description by a competent15 member of some events in the world. After all, the facts of the matter are that she is describing these events in response to the student- interviewer's request that she do so. Similarly the teller in MB/d appears to be putting forward the view that she- and her husband- had enough or sufficient 'good reasons' to decide to terminate their marriage. In assembling such an

l5 For a discussion and demonstration of how members display their 'competence' through the routine management of everyday interactions, see Garfinkel (1967) especially chapter 2.


account, where events are described, inferences made and 'good reasons' adduced, she can be heard to be seeking to justify what has happened and hence to be presenting an account which is morally defensible.

We suggest that if hearers suspect that an account is one-sided or partisan, then not only might they call into question its adequacy or defensibility as a proper description of what is happening, but also, in hearing the account this way might simultaneously make available for themselves a systematic basis for subverting the account.

We propose that one basis for systematically subverting an account might derive from the availability to members of a determinate alternative possible account, and that it might standardly be provided by their routine knowledge of the nature of 'unit troubles.' Members might trade off such knowledge to monitor such accounts for materials which make available or, at least, orient to, possible alternatives. If this is the case, then members might properly scrutinise such accounts for materials which can be heard to display the teller's own orientation to this feature and might find them morally inadequate in its absence.

We can now reformulate our criticism of Smith's work in these terms. Smith appears to suggest that we can standardly in everyday life apply a systematic principle of doubt to whatever we hear, and, in doing so herself to Angela's account, she can suggest that Angela might be K's 'enemy' rather than 'friend'. This transformation of Angela's relationship with K, this switch of identities, does much, we suggest, to subvert Angela's account. To do so takes considerable work on Smith's part. After all, we recall that she did not herself hear the account this way when it was initially presented and, furthermore, her subsequent subversion of it owes a great deal to her analyst's view of the nature of mental illness. Although 'freezing out' processes do go on in friendship groupings, as analysts and members might know, and although it is possible that Angela was collaborating in such a process, we have suggested that not only does the student-interviewer seem to be unaware in her report that 'freezing out' is going on, but also she would appear to have little motive for 'joining in the 'conspiracy' against K and concealing it in her report to a group of academics presumably socially unconnected with Angela and her friends. Finally, Smith also raises the issue of the nature of mental illness. While we may


agree that there seems very little that is 'odd' about K's activities and while we may also agree that Angela and her friends did 'gang up' on K, making K mentally ill, we cannot accept without some warrant that Angela was conscious of what she and her friends were doing to K. Without some warrant, we cannot accept that Angela was motivated to construct an account in order both to display that there was something wrong with K and also to conceal her awareness that K' s mental state was a direct product of the actions of Angela and her friends. Smith implies that Angela is deliberately hiding her responsibility for K's condition and can therefore be blamed for such behavior. Self knowledge of such behavior, can, of course, provide Angela with a strong motivation for the dissimulation Smith finds in her 'artfully constructed' account.

Even so, insofar as members and analyst alike know that others can 'drive us crazy', where the 'others' are usually our intimates -friends or family members- then if we can, in fact identify Angela as 'an enemy' we can also, along with Smith, hear the account differently and look for an alternative version of K becoming mentally ill. By alternative version, however, we are simply looking for a different sort of explanation in terms of who is responsible for K getting into this state. We would be making a fresh moral assessment of the responsibility in the matter of the parties involved and would find Angela's account morally inadequate insofar as it did not only fail to address such matters, but also sought to conceal them and thus to avoid the opprobrium which might derive from her involvement in 'freezing out' K.

As the account shows, K herself sought psychiatric help and, by so doing, might be seen to be acknowledging herself to be 'mentally ill'. It is not only her friends/enemies who see her that way. Smith cannot accept this members' judgement about K's state. Instead, she appears to advocate what amounts to a 'correspondence theory'16 of mental illness which necessitates some sort of perfect fit between correct symptoms and the label, 'mental illness'. She discounts the fact that the label is used by K, by her friends and, presumably, by the psychiatrist involved. Instead, Smith seems to criticise Angela for not ensuring that the label was correctly used and might even be taken to imply that Angela was aware of this 'fact'. We cannot

16 Kaufmann (1958) provides a seminal discussion of 'correspondence' theories of reality.


agree, therefore, with Smith's rather old-fashioned use of 'labellingas-correspondence' theory or that Angela should have operated in the everyday world with this analyst's view' of the nature of mental illness.

Nevertheless, we are grateful for Smith's suggestion that accounts might systematically be subverted, and for her discussion of the possible methods involved. In particular, her indication, albeit largely unexplicated, of a systematic method for subverting accounts through the transformation of identities will now be fully pursued.

(3) MORAL ADEQUACY, IDENTITIES AND THE SYSTEMATIC SUBVERSION OF ACCOUNTS

We now return to account MB/c and discuss how members might systematically subvert it by finding an alternative determinate possible account from materials manifestly not intended to be heard in this alternative way.

In account MB/c, we take it that the teller's story about her marriage break-down can be heard to be attributing to the husband, James, the responsibility for what has happened. Although the teller, C, was the party in the marriage who, as she reports in her story, actually took the decision to end the marriage by telling James to go, we hear that James was to blame for the breakdown because his behavior had been the source of the persistent and recurring troubles in the marriage. James' behavior - lying to his wife, gambling away the marital money, illegally endorsing his wife's cheque, refusing to work, and, when he did work, not really trying to keep his job - was such as to make a viable marriage impossible. C gave her husband chance after chance to change his unacceptable behavior, but he failed to· do so. Consequently, we hear that C was not only entitled to terminate the marriage when she did, but also fully justified in so doing.

We derive from this account, then, a clear picture of the nature of C's marriage, of the marital relationship between the parties and of the moral qualities of the parties. We can hear that the marriage is seen by C to consist of three episodes, each of which is punctuated by a 'split'. In the first episode, the marriage 'wasn't too bad' at first, even though C who had been obliged to marry James when


she was sixteen years old because she was pregnant, had 'felt nothin at all for him' on the wedding day. The m~tal troubles began after James fell ill with appendicitis, after which he could not keep a job, he sold all the furniture, they were evicted and, eventually, they split for the first time. The second episode began with the couple finding another house, but soon the troubles began again with James gambling and lying. This episode terminated with the second split after James had endorsed C's grant cheque for which he had received three year's probation. C began the third episode by deciding to give James another chance on the basis of his promises to change his behavior. These promises soon proved to be empty so C gave him a 'final chance' in the form of an ultimatum: 'he had to -- work -- clear out .. .' Even when James failed to respond to this ultimatum she can be heard to give him further chances to change his behavior insofar as she did not enforce it when she discovered he was lying to her by saying that had a job. Only when he avoided doing the job he eventually obtained by lying to her about being ill did she decide that she had had enough; she told him to go and, thus, made the third split the fmal one.

These materials enable us, as readers/hearers, to make assessments of the moral qualities of both James and C. We can hear that James is lazy, unreliable, dissolute, a persistent liar. Conversely, we can hear that C was as good a wife as 'any one' could be in difficult circumstances. Even though C is ostensibly concerned with describing James' behavior and seldom her own, we can hear her as continually trying to preserve the marriage by getting James to alter his unacceptable behavior. She might even be heard to continue in these efforts beyond the point where she might reasonably have given up. Her motives for continuing to try to preserve the marriage come off as 'noble' in that her efforts appear to be on behalf of the children to the marriage, rather than because of her own feelings towards James.

It could be said that in this description we have accepted C's own assessment of her marriage and its breakdown. The assessment that we have made - that C tried her hardest to preserve the marriage despite feeling nothing for her husband, that James failed both her and the children, that James was therefore to blame for the breakdown - is clearly the kind of view which C holds of these events. She does not, however, specify blame or responsibility for what happened in such terms. Instead, she relies on our ability as


members of a shared culture to make appropriate assessments of the descriptions which she provides of what happened in the marriage.

One assessment of the account that hearers might make, however, is that it is partisan. Hearers might find that the account comes over as 'the wife's view' of what happened in the marriage and, further, that it suppresses any expression of the 'husband's view'. In this case, we can describe hearers as speculating about what a determinate alternative possible account would look like, i.e. the husband might properly have his own version of what was happening in the marriage and his version - but not anyone's version - might be required for any moral assessment if what has been heard comes over as one-sided or partisan.

It might appear that C's account allows hearers little access to seeing what an alternative determinate version would look like. Insofar as it is C who has assembled the account, and not her husband, then any access to his version must derive from what she has to say about him and about their marriage. This feature of the account might be seen as a 'weakness' in that it can be heard as 'selective', as not being a 'factually objective' account. In the previous section however, we argued that this view might be to confuse factual objectivity with questions of moral adequacy. We suggest that hearers might not reasonably expect a person in C's situation to produce a 'factually objective' account, with all its connotations of 'scientific impartiality', and they might even anticipate the possibility that her account might be one-sided and partisan. If, in fact, the account does come over as partisan, then they might 'test out' the moral adequacy of the account by reviewing its materials from the stand-point of the determinate alternative possible account that they know to be standardly available for this situation; namely, the husband's version of what happened in the marriage. Just as Smith did not question the facticity of K's actions (did she really cry? did she really swim thirty lengths? etc.), hearers need not doubt the veridicality of C's descriptions of James' actions (did he really gamble, did he really spend the money that the couple had saved up for a house? etc.) in order to enquire whether the account is morally defensible as an account of someone's own marriage break-down, in the case of MB/c, or as an account of someone becoming mentally ill, in the case of Smith's materials.


We suggest that in neither case is it possible for hearers to make any sort of 'final' or 'determinate' hearing that can be warranted as definitive. This is not to say that members are indecisive, go about with perpetually 'open minds' and cannot make moral assessments of what they hear. Rather, they can and do make 'definitive' hearings. but such hearings can better be characterised as 'for all practical purposes' and as based on what they have heard, what they know and what seems reasonable, rather than as emerging from the rigours and tests of some set of scientific canons.

We take it that some hearers can find C's account to be morally adequate in displaying James as being responsible for the breakdown of the marriage; whereas other hearers might be more sceptical, find the account to be partisan and hence question it in terms of what an alternative determinate account, the husband's version, might look like. We suggest that this 'weakness' is not only an ineradicable feature of such accounts, but, further, can be seen as a systematically reproducible feature of them. The clue to this feature - or 'weakness' - is, in fact, indicated by Smith, albeit in a largely unexplicated manner, when she implies that Angela's identity might be transformed from 'friend' to 'bad friend', 'rival' or perhaps 'enemy'. (Smith, 1975: 52) We saw how, on the basis of this single proposition about identities, we could deploy our everyday knowledge about the workings of the social world in such a manner that a different version of what was happening could be produced, where we could continue to accept the facticity of the events, but could also systematically doubt and even transform the inferences and assessments made about them.

We propose that, as in the case of MB/c, the possibility of systematically subverting an account by transforming its constituent identities may be warranted by members in the everyday social world if an alternative determinate possible account can be found to be standardly and appropriately available. Alternatively put, we are proposing a systematic basis for subverting an account like MB/c which can be stated analytically as two 'steps' or propositions:-

(a) In accounts of unit troubles, hearers can properly look for determinate alternative possible accounts which other unit-members might be expected to provide;


(b) a scrutiny of such alternative possible accounts can serve to transform the constituent identities of the account and a systematic basis for hearing it 'differently' might thus be found.

We are suggesting then, that for account MB/c, members might find that C does not adequately display her own implicativeness in the 'unit troubles ' of the marriage, might find, therefore, her account to be morally inadequate in that it comes off as 'one-sided' and 'partisan' and, consequently might explore what the husband's version might look like. In so doing, they might transform the identities which they took C to be using in 'her version ' of what was happening in the marriage .

(4) AN ELABORATED MACHINERY FOR SUBVERTING ACCOUNTS

We now attempt to describe in more technical terms the sense assembly procedures which members can be seen as employing for the systematic subversion of an account. In so doing, we shall employ and attempt to extend the 'machinery' of standardised relational pairs (SRP's) which was initiated by Harvey Sacks.l7

In his major published discussion of SRP's, Sacks (1972) focuses on how they are used to find a 'locus of help' in cases of 'suicidalness', and he indicates that this specific application serves to illustrate their general availability as a way of describing some members' methods for making sense of their social world. We can therefore test this claim about the generalisability of the SRP machinery by first examining how it can be used in the analysis of how account MB/c can be subverted and, later, how it can be applied to study the problem of versions in our radio program.

Turning again to MB/c, we take it that whatever hearing members make of this account, they are employing at least two omnirelevant categories: 'husband' and 'wife'. Further, we take it that members 'know' how these categories are standardly, routinely and taken-for-grantedly related in the social unit, 'marriage'. In fact,

17 See especially Sacks (1972) and Sacks (1974).


the ways in which such knowledge can be seen to be organised around related categories is what Sacks means to indicate with his SRP machinery. Let us call this pair of related categories i.e. 'husband' and 'wife', SRP 1.

When we come to employ these categories on the materials of MB/c, however, they appear to be somewhat 'empty'; they are overgeneralised in relation to what we can hear as going on in this marriage as reported by C. Whatever hearing we make of the account, whether it is to accept what we can take to be C's view that James is to blame and is responsible for the break-down of the marriage, or whether we hear the account as partisan and look for an alternative determinate possible version, we are concomitantly 'filling out' or 'specifying" or 'qualifying' the two categories, 'husband' and 'wife'. In making either of these two possible hearings, we appear to be incorporating our assessment of what is going on into the way we identify the parties to the marriage in order to find what is going on the marriage. Alternatively put, the questions of partisanship and the moral defensibility of what we hear are not simply post hoc matters, are not questions which arise only some time after an account has been given, are not questions which we can cogitate upon at our leisure. Although we, as members or analysts can and do engage in such post hoc consideration of accounts, it appears to be the case that just as tellers can be seen simultaneously to be giving an account and making an assessment of what happened, so hearers can be seen simultaneously also to be making assessments in the very fact of making a hearing. We are suggesting that these moral assessments can be seen to be shaped up by what identities are available for hearing the talk 'this way' or 'that way' and that the identities used appear to be more specific than the 'general' categories of 'husband' and 'wife'. They appear to be more specific in that they seem to have built into them this very quality of moral assessment so that they are informative of 'what kind of a husband (or wife) this is'. Thus in identifying the parties to the marriage, both tellers and hearers seem to be operating not simply with the two categories, husband and wife, but with more specific identities which build in moral assessments of what they are like as husband and wife, i.e. these morally specified identities indicate the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the behavior of the parties 'as husband' or 'as wife' in 'this marriage'.


At this point, we must note that we are not saying that Sacks ignores or overlooks the moral import, the appropriateness of social action as seen by members. Indeed, it is centrally displayed in his definition of SRP's (Sacks, 1972: 37, para 2.2.1 ff.) which are devices which members can be seen to employ in organising and using their social knowledge about the rights and obligations that should prevail between a pair of standardly related categories concerning the locus of help.18

The main thrust of his illustrative materials, however, concerns the proper ordering and organisation of the search for help of a 'suicidal person' and how some persons can be seen as inappropriate to turn to and therefore corrrectly identified as 'noone' in terms of the propriety of turning to such a. person for help in these circumstances. Thus in his treatment, Sacks does show how the general categories of his SRPs can be related to such identities as 'suicidal person' and 'no-one', i,e. the 'stranger' in the Suicide Prevention Centre, in ways which both display and are organised around the sense of propriety of members of society. He also shows how the incumbent of a category to whom it is ostensibly proper to tum to for help may have his identity appropriately transformed into one of 'no-one to turn to' e,g, the wife whose adulterous activities are making her suicidal can be seen as appropriately not turning to the proper person for help, her husband, as located by the SRP machinery, in view of the reasons for her troubles. Nevertheless, insofar as his major concern was to initiate discussion and consideration of a novel approach to the way social knowledge can be seen to be organised and deployed by members of society, he did not in this analysis go beyond an illustration of how such general categories like 'husband' and 'wife' can be described in terms of his SRP machinery and thus did not probe deeper into the question of the moral adequacy of action being actually built into the identities used by members to repair the sense of what they are hearing.

18 By 'devices', we are referring to (and accepting) Sacks' argument that the common sense knowledge of members of society is organised around collections of 'identitities' or 'categories'. Such a collection, together with its rules for application, is a Membership Categorisation Device (MCD). Standardised Relational Pairs (SRPs) are a subset of these 'devices' or MCD's. See Sacks (1972) and (1974) for a detaiied exposition.


We are arguing, however, that for our materials- i.e. MB/c and, later, Pla- the question of moral adequacy is a central concern for tellers and hearers, as displayed by the way that moral assessments of the appropriateness of the actions of the parties involved can be seen to be built into the identifications used to make sense of what is told/heard to be happening.

We suggest, then, that if hearers accept C's version of the breakdown of the marriage- that James was wholly responsible for itthey might be employing not simply the 'general' SRP, 'husband''wife', which we have called SRP I, but, rather, a morally specified SRP like 'good wife' -'bad husband', which we call SRP II.

These morally qualified identities can serve to indicate how members assess the activities, and the display of the relationship, of the parties to the marriage. Here, we are not saying necessarily that members actually employ the adjective 'good' and 'bad', but are simply suggesting as analysts, that these adjectives provide us with useful glosses for indicating in broad terms how they might be assessing and, thereby specifying the incumbents of the general categories contained in SRP I. The adjectives 'good' and 'bad' do no more than indicate the nature of the possible moral assessment of the parties to the marriage, Hearers might employ the materials of the account to make an even more specific qualification of the general categories, 'husband' and 'wife'. Thus James might be heard as a 'dissolute' husband and C as a 'long-suffering' or 'exploited' wife. Nevertheless, we suggest that whatever further specification is used, it can be seen to preserve the moral connotation given by 'good' or 'bad' and thus can be seen to be one out of a possible range of possible specifications of the qualified identity, 'bad husband'.

We are proposing, then, that unqualified, general categories of husband and wife are inadequate for repairing the sense of what is being reported in account MB/c. Rather, hearers might require some more specific identity, such as 'bad' or 'dissolute husband' for them to find who it is who is engaging in a range of activities like gambling, lying, refusing to work and support his wife and children in this marriage. The qualified identity, 'bad husband' might then serve to collect together these various activities, which can be heard as a collection of the sort of things done not simply by 'husbands', but by 'bad' or 'dissolute husbands'. Conversely, hearers might


find from C's self-reported activities (such as she tried to make the marriage work, she kept giving her husband chances despite accumulating evidence that he was 'dissolute' and so on) that she was a 'good wife', she was 'a wife who tried to make the marriage work' etc.

It may be the case, however, that hearers find that she has 'overdone' her criticisms of James. Or they may bring to bear on the account some frame of scepticism based on misogyny, or male chauvinism, or unfortunate personal experiences of marriage, or whatever. In such a case, they might trade off the fact that C is selfreporting the marriage to find that she is giving a one-sided and biassed account which eradicates James' version of what happened in the marriage. They might trade off thei:r standard social knowledge of C's implicativeness in the marriage to suspect that she is shifting all the responsibility on to James and accepting none herself; and might even use this fact to see what C must have been like in the marriage and use it as a basis for reviewing what they are hearing/have heard to locate an alternative determinate hearing of the account, We suggest that such an alternative might be found if hearers can also find alternative ways of categorising the parties to the marriage and thereby revising the inferences that are made about the couples activities as reported by C.

Hearers might subvert C's account by using alternative related identities for the marital pair to find an alternative set of appearances for each party. Instead of utilising SRP II to see and to agree with the set of appearances hearers might take C to intend to present, they might hear the account as displaying a 'bad wife' and a 'good husband', where 'bad' might be further specified as 'nagging' or 'hypercritical' and 'good' as 'normal' or 'trying to make the marriage work'. We label this alternative set of identities, SRP III. This transformation of identities can permit a different explanation and hearing of what is happening in the marriage. Now it is not the wife who is being forced into terminating the marriage because of her husband's intolerable behavior; rather, she can be heard to be generating the troubles in the marriage and possibly 'forcing' her husband into 'escapist' activities. For just as SRP II makes available to hearers one set of standard appearances for each of the parties, so SRP III permits of an alternative set of appearances for each party. Once we 'know' that Cis a 'nagging wife', then the 'terrible things' which we hear James as doing when we employ SRP II may simply


becomes 'the things James is driven to do by a nagging wife' who, it may now be noted to her detriment, 'felt nothing at all for him' (MB/c lines 20 - 21) right from the start of the marriage. Further, hearers might trade off their social knowledge of 'nags' to suspect and look for possible exaggeration in C's account. The issue might then be taken to be not that James drinks or gambles, but does he do so to excess? And, even in the latter case, might he be found to have some justification in so doing, does his nagging wife drive him to it?

We are proposing, therefore, that the account MB/c can be seen as potentially a product of either SRP II or SRP III. Either set of paired categories can potentially generate the same set of appearances, i.e. the conduct of a 'dissolute husband' can look to a 'good wife' the same as the conduct of a 'good husband' can look to a 'nagging wife'.

Now clearly, we can see that once we have moved away from SRP I (wife/husband), the membership categories in SRP II and SRP III are not equivalent. In each set of pairs, one identity has built into it critical attributes like blame, and the other paired identity reflects a moral assessment of approval.

We take it that tellers of such accounts are not indifferent to what sort of moral assessments hearers might make of what they have to say. Rather tellers might be concerned to come off as favorably as possible in terms of the propriety of their actions. In this case, once the question of equivocality in an account is raised, then hearers might find ways of discounting the teller's claims to be a 'good wife' in that she could be seen as having to present herself as such even if she was heard to be a 'nagging wife'. Moreover, hearers might know that 'nagging wives' are not likely to see themselves in this light, but, rather, as 'good-wives-whose-husbands-give-themgood-cause-to-grumble'. If this is the case, then even the most detailed and strongly argued account which seeks to demonstrate that the husband is entirely responsible for the break-down of the marriage can be subverted by the availability of this possible alternative identification of the wife, i.e. what sort of a wife she is. Thus it may be that C, in being heard to argue 'so strenuously' for James taking the responsibility for the troubles in their marriage, might raise for hearers such equivocality and, simultaneously, make relevant an alternative possible determinate account, which, through an alternative selection of linked identities (SRPs), can permit a


different moral assessment to be made. On the other hand, in the 'two party' account of marriage break-down, i.e. MB/d, it may be the case that insofar as the teller can be heard to be 'sharing' in this responsibility and thereby displaying the implicativeness of both parties in the events that led to the break-down of the marriage, hearers might take her account to be morally adequate in that it is not taken to be obviously 'one-sided' and 'partisan'. In this case, such an account might be heard as 'morally defensible' on the grounds that D has provided 'good reasons' for the break-down of the marriage; reasons which show the teller to take account of marriage being properly seen as a 'unit' affair, a 'bipartisan' matter.

IV

VERSIONS IN A RADIO DISCUSSION OF FAMILY TROUBLES

(1) INTRODUCTION

So far we have reviewed several approaches to the study of versions and, subsequently, focussed primarily on Smith's explanation of how an account can be subverted. We particularly stressed her apparent confusion of the objective facticity and moral adequacy of accounts and showed how tellers and hearers might be seen to orient to assessments of the propriety of what is going on in the talk.

These findings derived from an analysis of two accounts of marriage break-down in which we tried to explicate our assertion that Smith implicitly trades off what appears to be a major resource for her mechanism of subversion. This resource is the way Smith switches the identity of Angela from being K's 'friend' to being K's 'enemy' or 'rival'. Our analysis aimed to make out of this resource a topic for analysis. We did so by drawing on Sacks' SRP machinery to describe how members might be seen to be deploying their knowledge of the social world, as organised around an appropriate selection and use of identities, in order to subvert an account. In so doing, we proposed some modification of this machinery in order to incorporate members' assessments of moral adequacy, which, we suggested, were integral to enable them to find what specific identities might be involved in making a hearing of this account, on this occasion, i,e, the account being heard 'there-and-then'.

In turning to the materials of the radio program, we can anticipate some modifications of our analysis to take into account some of the differing features of these materials, Thus in our analysis of the two accounts of marriage break-down, both told by parties to the troubles being related, we suggested that members might orient to the possibility that alternative determinate accounts


might be standardly available to members in hearing reports on such matters. In fact, we suggested that a feature of such accounts might be their potentially and prospectively partisan nature, Thus hearers might look to such accounts to display something of the implicativeness of the events, that led to the breakdown of the marriage for both unit members, and, if hearers are also parties to the talk, might check out the possible partisan nature of the account. We suggest that some such checking out might be found in MB/d, but it was not available in MB/c because the teller preferred to talk directly into the tape-recorder, thus not placing herself in an interactional situation.

In our transcription of the radio program, however, we have a relative abundance of interactional materials contributed by the seven parties in the talk. In the radio studio and available to contribute to the talk are all four members of the family whose problem is to be discussed. Thus any question of partisanship in the presentation of accounts of what is happening in the family by any of its members can be checked out there and then by asking other members to give their views on the matter. In this way, surmise and speculation about alternative determinate possible accounts can be supported by encouraging family members to produce their alternative actual accounts. Thus the radio program can be seen to attend to the possibility of prospectively one-sided accounts by making available for the talk the 'whole family'.

In this part, we can therefore study the various contributions of family members with a view to seeing if they can reasonably be described as 'versions' and, if so, what purchase, if any, can be derived from Pollner and Schutz and Smith for understanding how they are generated and dealt with by members in a naturally occurring setting in the social world.

On examination of these materials, we shall see that it is not simply the case that family members present their accounts of what is happening in the family, leaving it to the counsellors or 'experts' in such matters to arbitrate and determine between them. Rather, the talk takes the form of a conversation between the parties, in which there is some dispute, altercation and disagreement about the nature of the family's troubles and, even about whether what is discussed constitutes 'real problems'. In making available their hearings about what is going on in the family, the counsellors can be seen to be

VERSIONS IN RADIO DISCUSSIONS 59

involved in something like Pollner's 'politics of persuasion'; their findings are not simply moral assessments of what they are hearing, but also and simultaneously, constitute a version of what is happening in the family which is alternative and distinctive from any version provided by a family member. We can therefore examine what an 'experts' version' might look like and its possible relationship to what the members of the family have been saying.

Arising from all of these concerns, we can examine the importance of 'versions' for helping to generate the talk and thereby constitute the setting: radio-program-discussing-family-problems. In pursuing the question that if there were no 'real problems' in this family, how can a whole radio program lasting some 45 minutes be generated out of talk with such a family, we will suggest that producers of such a program can trade off members' standardly available knowledge of family life not only to anticipate the possibility that different versions of family life can be routinely derived from the self-presentation of a whole family, but also that the talk might be seen to be so organised as to maximise this possibility. In this way, the production of conflicting and/or alternative versions by family members about what is happening in their family, what is the nature of their problem(s), can be seen to provide a dynamic for generating talk, shaping and organising such talk and, consequently, shaping and organising the radio program. Thus, in showing how this naturally occurring setting is constituted by, in and through the talk of the parties in the studio, we hope to show as an integral feature of such a setting the importance as a feature of the standard and expectable availability of 'versions' of family life.

In so doing, we hope also to bring out another important factor of our materials: how they can be seen to display the interpenetration and mutual 'servicing' of two normally independent types of social organisation in our society. These two types of organisation are: the radio program; and the family. We will try to demonstrate how the organisation of the family, including members' knowledge of its organisational troubles which can generate versions of what is happening in it, can be utilised in the production of talk, which can serve to achieve the organisational purposes of the radio program. Conversely, of course, the purposes of the family unit may be achieved by means of the organisation of the radio program insofar


as family members find in the talk the help, advice, reassurance or whatever they - or some of them - were looking for.

(2) FAMILY VERSIONS ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE FAMILY

In this section, we examine the nature of the versions of what is happening in the family as produced by members of the family. We also pay some attention to our formulation of what they say as 'versions' and thus explicate our warrant for describing our materials in these terms.

Our starting point is a statement by JM:


We take it that in saying that family members have been heard as expressing two views or ways of accounting for what Jonathan is like and, consequently, what sort of troubles there are and what is happening in the family, JM is formulating a problem of versions. We note, however, that she does not go so far as to use the actual formulation 'version' in producing her hearing of the talk so far. We suggest that members might have good reasons for not making explicit formulations in their talk of what they are hearing; such formulations can lead to interactional troubles in that they might come off as 'too sharp' or 'too pointed'. The explicit formulation, 'version' can be a means for members to express their dissociation with a point of view and to seek to 'put it down' by glossing it in this manner. JM, as presenter of this program and, as such, responsible for the management of what is being said, might prefer to opt for a more elliptical formulation rather than utilise the more pejorative gloss, 'versions'.

Hearers might also take it that in this statement JM is confirming something she might have been heard alluding to right at the commencement of the program: that there may well be different versions produced by family members of what is happening in the family. She says to Jonathan:

VERSIONS IN RADIO DISCUSSIONS

1.5 JM First of all we talk to you on your own because your mother thinks uh there's a problem here do you think you've got a problem?

61

Here she can be seen both prospectively and retrospectively to be 'setting up' a problem of versions; she can be heard to suggest the possibility of disagreement and different points of view in the family in the way she formulates the invitation for Jonathan to speak. In so doing, she might be utilising knowledge about the family she has obtained in pre-program talk. She might also be trading off what 'any one known' about family organisations where there are teenage children: standardly and routinely we might expect there to be differences of viewpoint, attitudes and value between parents and their teenage - children. In fact, she seems to indicate as much in her initial utterance

1.1 JM You know we receive many many letters from parents who are worried about various aspects of their teenage children hh worried about schooling perhaps exams hh discipline - not being able to talk to each other all that sort of thing and so this did seem a wonderful opportunity to talk to a whole family as a whole ....

From the standpoint of the radio organisation, the 'wonderful' nature of this opportunity to meet/listen to a family as a whole has somehow to be realised. Perhaps an interesting program might be achieved by the self-display of the predictable and expectable differences and disagreements in a family. The achievement of such a display might require taking advantage of the fact that all members of the family are present and available to talk by ensuring that they do, in fact have opportunities to talk.l9 If the talk results in a duologue between any one family member and the panel, or parents or teenage children, then the 'wonderful opportunity', as prognosticated by JM might be lost.

Whether done by chance or design, by selecting Jonathan to be the first member of the family to give his views, JM might have improved the chances of having family members presenting different versions of what is happening in the family (thereby actualising the

19 Technical considerations of talk equalisation, speech-exchange systems etc are not pursued here. See Cuff (1977) especially part V.


possibility suggested in utterance 1.5, reproduced above). By speaking first, Jonathan can 'matter-of-factly' give his views in a manner in which he is not explicitly 'taking on' or 'contradicting' his parents. By having first turn, rather than a later turn, Jonathan might avoid, at least at this stage of the talk, the adverse characterological inferences that might be inferred from disagreeing with his parents.

Jonathan presents himself as someone who once had a problem concerning his progress at school. In this presentation, he can be heard to show proper concern and awareness of the fact that his parents might have had good reasons to worry about him insofar as they, like him, are properly concerned about his future. Happily, this problem is now a thing of the past, not only for Jonathan but also for his teachers at school, In his own words:

2.4 J Uhm - I was -- told that uh my parents- were going to see m- the teachers hh and uh when the teachers said no - there's-nothing-wrong-with-him-he'sperfectly-alright I felt more reassured then and uh since then my work's picked up because I haven't had to worry about this in the back of my mind.

We note here, following Dorothy Smith, how Jonathan can be seen to be utilising the 'authorisation procedure' of supporting his account with a report of the views of independent, knowledgeable and responsible witnesses; indeed, witnesses who might be expected to know better than his parents how he is doing at school.

In this way, Jonathan can be heard to be disclaiming any possible identification of him as a 'teenager-with-a-problem' or as a 'teenager who-is-creating-troubles-for-his-family'. Hearers might be hard pressed to find such an identification from the sort of activities and attitudes he displays on pages 1-3 of the transcription: he is concerned about his future, he likes a large range of subjects at school, he likes challenging work and he maintains his place in the top stream at school.

JM then brings the 12 year old daughter, Susan, into the talk and the nature of the troubles in the family are not directly addressed though some display of life at home and of the relationships between the sibiings and between the children and the father can be heard.


The mother, Lora, is then introduced into the talk by JM who informs hearers that it was Lora who was 'the one who wrote - the letter' (Pla 4.21) and also that "at the time you sounded as if you had a very big problem" (Pia 4.23). Thus Lora is identified as the 'complainant' in the family and, as such, is invited to show the 'very big problem' about which she has written. Insofar as hearers have found no problem in the family from the talk so far, they can anticipate that in presenting such a problem concerning Jonathan, Lora will produce an alternative account or version of what he is like and what he is doing and, in so doing, subvert his account in some way. After all, hearers can reasonably expect that a mother who takes the step of involving the whole family in a public discussion of the problems of her son has good reasons for so doing,

She begins by identifying Jonathan as a person who 'seems to will himself to fail even though we expect him to have a high chance of succeeding and a very low chance of failing - it seems that he engineers failure ... ' (pia 5.1) and, in a long utterance, produces two stories about him when JM asks her for examples of what she means:

(1) Well he was a he is a very good swimmer - quite recently he entered for a race and he was doing very well and he just stopped because the girl in the next lane gave up the race so he stood and watched - and uh threw away the race altogether

(2) and then he was asked to repeat it another time so he instead of counting the number of lengths he should be swimming - he went on and on and on and was disqualified on time

and concludes,

both occasions this seemed to be a very silly sort of mistake to make - I'm sure he would have done it if he hadn't been tested at the time. (Pia 5.3)

Clearly, these stories might illustrate what Lora means by 'a will to fail', but they do not address the nature of the problem as


originally presented and discussed in Jonathan's turns to speak, concerning his progress at school. JM intimates as much when she restates the problem in these terms (pla 5.6) and 'checks out' Jonathan's account by asking:

.... he felt now that he was reassured and that he'd conquered this - but you don't feel so reassured you feel it's still going on? (Pia 5.6)

At this point, Lora produces a further story which does concern Jonathan at school:

(3) Well oddly enough he - was told in at the end at the end of the Summer term that he would be continuing in the A-stream because he had done quite well - and it seemed that now he is told fine-you're-getting-alongnicely he decided right I'll slack and do nothing at all - so he behaved so badly for half a term that really it looked as if he might then be relegated to a lower stream he was allowed to go more or less his own way because they were re-reasonably happy with him at school - and - then he managed to annoy one of the staff so much that she -really lost her temper with him and we we heard from his house tutor - that his work was unsatisfactory his behavior was unsatisfactory so - I had to see the house tutor and I blew him up - and from th- the rest rest for the rest of the II term M Blew up Jonathan not the house tutor//hehhhh

? Hehhhh I blew up Jonathan and for the rest of the term Jonathan's uhm work seemed to be very good- but it seems every so often one must have a showdown with him

(Pia 5.7- 5.9 & 6.1)

She then appends another story about Jonathan which again displays his 'failure' in the swimming pool:

(4) He's good at swimming at one time he was very good at diving - he went on a diving course and managed

VERSIONS IN RADIO DISCUSSIONS

to bang his head twice on perfectly ridiculous ridiculously easy dives and he hasn't dived since.(Pla 6.1)

65

We take it that Lora's production of these four stories are not successful in persuading hearers either that there is a 'big problem' in the family or that Jonathan can be properly identified as a 'teenager-causing-big-problems'. Moreover, any puzzle generated by the failure to produce such a problem and identity during Jonathan's turns to speak may be intensified by what can be heard as the 'cemfusing' or 'confused' nature of Lora's materials. For three of her stories concern; her allegation that her son has a 'will to fail', but none of these focus on the putative problem area of schooling; and while the one story concerning schooling does appear to cast some doubt on Jonathan's own presentation of what he is like at school regarding 'slacking' and 'disciplinary' relations with school staff, it might not come over as an illustration of a 'will to fail'.

We suggest that the emergence of such puzzles, whose confusing materials can give some promise of disagreements, controversy and argument are not only a welcome feature for organisers of a radio program of this kind, but may also be regarded as an intended feature.20 By making available for the discussion all members of the family, by managing the talk so that they all have a good opportunity· to contribute, the radio organisers can hope to generate a 'lively' and 'interesting' program from the predictably divergent views of teenagers and their parents when, as here, the parents are complaining about their teenage son.

Certainly, by the time Lora has produced her fourth story, we can with some warrant suggest that the materials of the discussion so far do at least reveal two incipient versions of what is going on in this family. This warrant derives not only from our own hearing, but also from the contributions of the two counsellors: one (JH) puts a 'positive construction' on Jonathan's activities ('being his own man', Pia 6.12); and the other (WG) can be seen to be 'opening up the family front' by beginning to explore the implicativeness of the parents in Jonathan's problem when she suggests that Lora might be

20 Discussed further in Cuff (1977) and (1978b).


'building failure' into him (Pla 6.16). They can then be heard to 'counter' Martin's reassertion of the problem as Jonathan's 'will to fail' - and also his view on what he considers to be the proper role of the counsellors (Pla 7.1)- by themselves reasserting that 'I don't find his behavior as described so far at all abnormal or any reason to be uh seriously anxious hh' (Pla 7.8) and by exploring the implicativeness of Martin's 'overhigh expectations' for the problem (WG in Pla 7.11, 7.13, 8.1, 8.3, 8.5).

We have, then, a situation where Jonathan and his parents can be heard to be displaying two views of what he is like and, consequently, of what is happening in the family. The counsellors not only appear to side with Jonathan, they also seek to explicate what his parents have been doing to him and why his parents see him that way. Further, for the parents the discussion does not simply concern the question of which version happens to be 'correct'; the acceptability of one or the other version can determine findings about their moral adequacy. Presumably, if the counsellors agree with Jonathan's version of what is happening in the family, the parents can find themselves in the invidious position of not only having a version that can be faulted by outsiders, but also one in which their teenage son seems to know better than his parents what is happening in the family. Insofar as we, and they, might standardly expect that it is parents and not children who are responsible for the management of family life, we can also expect that the parents will attempt to demonstrate the correctness of their version. In so doing, they are also addressing their display of the propriety of their management of family affairs and the moral adequacy of their actions as parents.

In fact, Martin can be seen to defend the parental version of what is happening in the family by producing another story about Jonathan:

(5) I don't think we're pressuring him that way hh the very first race he ever ran at a little gymkhana there was a -race for the under sixes and he was way out in front -within sight of the tape - he slowed down turned round and watched the field waiting for them to come up - and he was too slow that time in his reaction to give away the race (Pla 8.6)


ill's method of responding to this story can also be of relevance to the question of moral adequacy in that he can be seen to be displaying his sensitivity to the interactionally delicate task of proposing a criticism of the way a parent brings up his children. Instead of simply asserting; his view in the manner generally adopted by the counsellors throughout the talk, he takes the unusual step21 - unusual, that is to say, for this particular discussion - of producing a story as a major part of his reply:

ill Yes now Martin you're assuming that the competitive thing is a valid fundamentally sound uh way of going on - now this may not be so - you see that uh uh cooperation is awfully important as well as competi//on M //Yes JH And I knew a case when three friends after a mile race in a school they were one behind the other and they though how silly hh r- racing for the tape in order that one of us shall get - there past first so they - linked arms and passed the tape together - and half the staff were furious because they were thinking all the time in terms of hh competition and these thr//ee

M //Yes ill said we w- won't compete against one another -now this this I'm just wondering whether the whole competitive th:ing is temperame:ntally uh distasteful to Jonathan. (Pia 8.7 - 8.11)

We take it that here ill is both explicating and criticising what he sees to be one of Martin's basic attitudes: the positive value he places on successful competition. At the beginning and end of this extract, he expresses this view en clair, but he also takes the trouble to present a story to illustrate another way of looking at things, i.e. in terms of co-operation.

2l Another possible instance of a 'story' produced by a counsellor in our materials might be in utterances 3.15- 3.18 where WG talks about helping her children with homework.


We can draw on more of Sacks' work to suggest that here JH is producing a 'second story'. As Sacks (n.d. and 1970; 1971; 1972) suggests, 'second stories' are not so termed simply because one story follows a previous story, Rather, a story can be analytically described as a 'second story' if it has this characteristic and also displays how the talk is being heard and understood. Thus 'second stories' have further features such as:-

i) the second story is produced in close juxtaposition to the first;

ii) it is told to the teller of the first story; iii) it is told by the recipient of the first story; iv) there are similarities between the two stories.

The sort of interactional work that can be done by the production of 'second stories' is, in part, displaying agreement or disagreement with what has been heard. Further, in so doing, 'second stories' can display that what has been said has been properly listened to by the hearer. The nature of a story as a 'second' is that it orients to a 'first' by displaying achieved similarities in the second with the first. Paradoxically, these achieved similarities can be used to display differences and to register disagreements.

Thus in JH's 'second story', he utilises similar co-descriptors to Martin- his references to racing and winning- but these serve only to show the large constructional and inferential differences between the two stories. Whereas Martin is telling about his son in a race which he probably saw for himself, JH is merely reporting on something he heard - ' a case' - where some 'friends', not connected with him, participated and took some action which JH wishes to draw to Martin's attention. Thus the two stories are only weakly related in terms of the respective tellers' position and relationships to the events and parties described.

Nevertheless, we suggest that JH's 'second story' can be seen to do some useful interactional work for him. Instead of possibly being heard as producing a 'straight criticism' of Martin as a parent, as the first part of the extract might imply, the use of the story can serve to express J's disagreement with- and, possibly, disapproval of - Martin's attitude to competition in several ways. First, by producing this talk, JH distances Martin's next turn to speak from the previous turn in which Martin's story was produced. Martin thus

VERSIONS IN RADIO DISCUSSIONS 6 9

is given time to think out and possibly to moderate his response. Secondly, JH refrains from giving Martin a 'direct contradiction.' Instead he reproduces 'another piece of the social world' to be considered and displays that he is not simply giving his own, possibly idiosyncratic view on competition; there are other people in the world who not only see things his way, but who are also prepared to take positive action based on this way of seeing things. Finally, JH can use the materials of his story to probe into the relationship of father and son in an 'oblique' rather than a 'direct' manner by 'wondering whether the whole competitive thi:ing is temperame:ntally uh distasteful to Jonathan'. (Pla 8.11). Here, he can be heard to be probing into further delicate interactional territory: the possibility that Martin is trying to force his son into uncongenial activities.

In his reply, Martin can be heard to maintain his defense of his parental actions and also his view of the nature of the problem of the family, i.e. the parental version of what is happening in the family:

Hhh it's not ye:s i- i- you may be right but it's not just com~itive because I think uhm just --achieving a certain standard securing a certain hhh standard uh is not really to my mind competitive especially when his level of ability is well above that standard. (Pia 8.12)

We can thus hear Martin as arguing for the moral defensibility of the parental actions. It is at this point in the talk that JM reintroduces Jonathan and, in a short exchange with him (Pla 8.13- 9.7), she can be heard to 'firm up' the problem of versions by contrasting (a) Jonathan's professed sharing of his father's values on competition with (b) his mother's argument and illustrations of his alleged 'will to fail'. She concludes:

Well it was like listening to two different people hh yourself as you see yourself Jonathan and yourself as hh your parents see you. (Pia 9.6)

Here we note how she effectively discounts the professed agreement between father and son and focusses on the 'disjuncture' between the views of mother and son. In presenting the issue not as father and son versus mother, but as parents versus teenager, she


preserves the terms of her original presentation of the program In so doing, she reasserts an 'ultra-rich' topic22 - rich in the materials it has already generated, and rich in the promise of the materials to come when, in the unfolding course of the talk, these versions of what is happening in the family are further examined, explicated and explained. For the purposes of the program, such a topic is invaluable; after something like 20 minutes of talk, the question of what exactly is the problem in the family, who is doing what to whom in the family, can be seen to be still unclear and unresolved and the richness and abundance of the materials so far produced might indicate a variety of alternative ways the talk can develop. There seems little likelihood of the talk 'drying up'.23

The parental response might serve to confirm the accuracy of JM's summing up. First, Martin, referring to his son's inability to remember the occasions about which his mother has been complaining, says:

That is probably the crux of the problem hh the fact that we are conscious of a certain thing - of which he is not conscious - if he were he could probably do something about it (II) (Pia 9.8)

He is clearly siding with his wife in continuing to assert that Jonathan has a problem, though he might also be heard to remove any adverse characterological implication for Jonathan by his reference to the subconscious.

His utterance is cut into by his wife, who displays her continuing adherence to this parental version of what Jonathan is

22 See Sacks (unpublished MS, Chapter 3, para 2.3.3) for a discussion of 'ultrarich' topics as illustrated by a discussion of teenage American youths talking about 'hotrod' cars. 23 The possibility that in such programmes, the talk can 'dry up', can 'never get off the ground' and other such nightmares from the point of view of the radio organisation is illustrated by transcription P6a, which is part of our collection of materials. P6a is a transcription of part of another programme in this series. In it, the two 'clients' on the programme, a mother and daughter are so laconic and parsimonious in their contributions to the talk that the bulk of the talk consists of a dialogue between the two counsellors present.


li'ke by producing another (sixth) story about his 'problem behavior':

(6) May I give a- a- an- another tchah example of something that was not competitive at all hh he borrowed my oil paints and painted a very good picture on one occasion and we said that's fine Jonathan we'd like to hang that on the wall hh so then he went down the next day and painted over the top and spoilt it. (Pia 9.9)

Thus by something like the half-way stage in the program, the talk produces two versions of what is happening in the family: Jonathan says that he no longer has a problem; his parents say that he has. As for the counsellors, they are apparently siding with Jonathan, and also seeking to explore the implicativeness of the parents in whatever is happening in the family. In so doing, counsellors go on, as we will see, to produce their own version of what is happening in this family.

(3) "EXPERT" VERSIONS ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE FAMILY

We have suggested in the previous section that the two counsellors can be heard as siding with Jonathan in respect of the two versions of what is happening in the family. We now further suggest that they are not only siding with Jonathan's version, but can also be seen to be doing some work to produce it.

We saw how, in seeking to show what Jonathan is like and thereby the nature of his problem, his parents produced six stories about his activities to illustrate their diagnosis of the problem in the family. Jonathan, on the other hand, told only one story about his progress at school (Pia 2.4) and answered a number of questions about various matters concerning his school-work and attitudes to it and to his future. As we have seen, apart from his professed agreement with his father's values on competition in his reintroduction into the talk, he adds little or no fresh materials to the discussion. All explicit inferences about what he is like as a person are therefore produced either by his parents or by the counsellors.


Gradually a picture is built up, mainly by JH, which described Jonathan initially as trying to be his own man (Pia 6,12), being a normal young man who is giving no cause for serious anxiety (Pia 7 .8), being someone whose values reasonably differ from his fathers concerning competition (Pia 8 passim) and, finally, in a very long and 'eulogistic' utterance, JH summarises much of the preceding materials and concludes:

--- so don't discount this dilettante breadth which you've been describing - because a boy who is reasonably good at science and can paint a good picture and is reasonably good at games- you're describing a very able- broadflexible kind of young man - I agree that he. would want a lot of encouragement and uh a certain amount of steering - and a certain amount of firmness but uhhh as as a potential success in the long term uh I would have thought that he had gre:at prospects. (Pla 10.3 part)

In this way, JH can be heard to utilise much of the materials produced not only by Jonathan, but mainly by his parents in their stories about him. They fill out what could only be heard as a candidate version of Jonathan from his own contribution to the talk. In corroborating and filling out this version of Jonathan, JH can be heard to be challenging the parental version. 24

As we have seen, this challenge does not simply take the form of presenting a different picture of what Jonathan is like. The incipient subversion of the parental version also incorporates an attempted display of the implicativeness of the parents in what is happening to him. Thus Lora has been portrayed as possibly 'building failure' into him (WG in Pia 6.16); Martin's 'over-high' and 'premature' expectations of Jonathan have been examined (Pia 7.8 by JH; 7.13 by WG; 9.10 ff. by JH); and Martin's attitude to competition has been scrutinised. Thus, Jopathan's claim to no longer have a problem has been filled out by the counsellors. They not only give a favorable display of his character and abilities, but also show that

24 Of course, JH can properly make such inferences about Jonathan, whereas, 'in all modesty', Jonathan can do no more than proffer the 'facts' on which JH's inferences are based.


any 'negative' behavior can be seen to derive from the way his parents are putting too much pressure on him. Hence, one of the alternative versions of Jonathan can be seen to be largely a construct of the counsellors.

As we noted in the previous section, this production of versions might be very useful for the purposes of the radio organisation for generating sufficient and relevant talk to take up the time of a whole program. From the juxtaposition, comparison and even clash of versions, the radio organisers might anticipate a 'lively' or 'interesting' program, as an outcome, Such a result might seem hardly likely if the counsellors had accepted the parental version at face value; from the view-point of the radio organisers, the counsellors might be seen as serving them well in countering it with a 'strengthened' counter-version, such as Jonathan's version has become.25

Yet it might appear that any controversy generated by the two versions will disappear when, after JH's very long 'eulogy' and 'summing up' of much of the materials in the discussion so far, Lora appears to accept his view when she replies, "Well that's very reassuring", (Pia 10.4). After all, Lora is the person who wrote the letter complaining of her problems and, presumably, if she can be heard to be satisfied with the advice given in the program, it would be reasonable to terminate the discussion.

This view would appear to be supported on reading how an outside observer, Joan Bakewell, regards what this sort of program is about:

People as nosy as I am about other people's lives will welcome the return of lfyou think You've got Problems on Sunday (6.15 Radio 4). It has been going as a series for 5 years. Initially I was put off by its facetious title. Then I found it made an engrossing and far from

25 We are not here suggesting that the counsellors are aiming to produce a 'lively' programme 'come what may'. They are hardly likely to compromise their 'professional reputation' for such an interest. We suggest below, however, that in 'being professional', the counsellors are likely to serve the interests of the radio organisers (by displaying their expertise they are also 'doing disagreements')


frivolous attempt to help people. I asked Dr Wendy Greengross, one of two stalwart counsellors, whether she minded such prurient interest as my own. 'No, not at all. There are two things that matter: if you have a problem you think is too awful to talk about - it can help to hear it talked of and accepted. And second, you may not be able to take advice because you're too bound up inside your own problem. We don't cure or solve problems - but we do try to indicate how to make them easier to cope with.' What listeners hear is only a part of a long, intensive conversation in which what matters most is not the program value but that the person who has come forward is helped and doesn't get hurt.26

Bakewell's view of the kind of program produced in the series, If you think You've got Problems can serve to raise a number of issues for the particular program in this series which we are examining. For our current purposes, however, we focus on the point that Lora, as the person who has 'come forward can be heard to have been helped insofar as she has been reassured about her son whose 'problematic activities' have not only been diagnosed as 'normal' by the counsellors, but have also been seen by them to display 'great potential' for the future. Thus Lora's expression of reassurance could serve as a possible closing point for the discussion and a new case introduced into the program. In fact, the usual pattern or format of the program is to examine two or three cases in the time allotted.

We suggest, however, that for this particular program, the radio organisers might have anticipated that a single case would be sufficient, in view of the fact that it involves the presence of all four members of the family in the studio. In this circumstance, no supply of 'back-up' or 'reserve' cases might be available to 'fill up' the time allocated to the program, in which case and 'somehow', the required amount of 'relevant' talk must be derived from the resources available i.e. from this family. Although Bakewell can claim that the 'program value' is subordinate to 'helping the person who has come forward', we suggest that these objectives might not be so easily

26 From 'Preview' in Radio Times for week 3-9 April 1976,


separated and ranked in this manner. It may be the case, for our materials, that the program has to go on.

Whatever the organisational facts underlying the production of this particular program, it is certainly the case that the discussion does continue. It continues with WG further exploring the nature of the father-son relationship with reference to competition and then JM takes the opportunity to circumvent what can be heard as 'sharpening criticism' of Martin as father by reintroducing Lora and the children into the talk to discuss competition between the siblings, (Pla pp 10 - 11 ). It is from this point that WG can be heard to rejuvenate the discussion by transforming the nature of the problems in the family and thereby simultaneously helping to produce a further and alternative and expert's version of what is happening in the family.

For Lora can be heard to accept an identity of 'the most depressed member of this family' (Pla 12.1, 12.2), to agree that she could be displacing her frustrations on to Jonathan (Pia 13. 14), and to accept that she is a 'relatively deprived' member of the family in terms of her lack of opportunities for self-development (Pla 15.1ff & 16.1ff passim). In this way, the troubles in the family are displayed in terms of deriving from 'Lora's problem' rather than, as initially presented, from 'Jonathan's problem'.

But the experts' version of what is happening in this family goes even further than transforming 'Jonathan's problem' into 'Lora's problem'. For the experts' version can be heard to culminate in a display of the 'whole family', where a cluster of problems might be seen to be generated from the way its constituent relationships are organised and managed. This version of problems as a produce of the way the family is organised might be heard in the following (abbreviated) extracts:-

(a) .. .i:if there could be some sort of reorganisation hhh not necessarily in a better way or a worse way but just in a slightly different way - hh then I think probably uh Jonathan's problems would be solved hh and perhaps

( 1.00)


some of your other problems that aren't quite so evident at the moment may hh uhm surface up and be solved just as easily. (Pia 17.11 part)

(b) You see this is a problem - of a family living together and coping together hh and taking one person out of it and saying hh you go away and we'll try and cope uh without you and you cope by yourself isn't solving the family problem - it may solve other problems but uhm I think the real problems that are going on hhh the word problem I this is too strong all the same but the real sort of hhh feelings that are going on have got to be sorted out between the four of you tog~ther hhh and taking him away:y in the hope that he's going to do well academically isn't going to solve the other sort of emotional problems in the feelings that are going on underneath,

(Pla 18.9) (c) .. .I you've spoken extremely highly of him- you you've said what a what a nice chap he is and hh uh what a a broadly based character he is hhh uh you have got - trust and confidence but you've not only to talk about it but you've got to show him hh and I think -you show him this by hh if you like taking the pressure off him tch realising that hh once family tch - reorganises itself hh uh he will work along and- probably do quite adequately - he may not do brilliantly because - his -standards may be very similar hh to yours which are -not to go into the rat race but to sort of find a personal fulfillment uh in working hh with other people uh - and I think that hh once you begin to accept this hh uh a very difficult part of the job of being a parent then I think life will be a lot easier - for you all in relationship - to each other. (Pla 20.1 part)

These extracts, all by WG , can be heard to preserve many of the features of both of the earlier versions of what is happening in the family - Jonathan has not got a problem, that is to say a 'real' problem, but he can still be spoken about as having one in terms of what his parents expect of him - and to incorporate materials about


Lora's depressed condition vis-a-vis other members of the family. Thus WG blends and integrates many of the previous materials in the talk to provide not only an 'overall' view of the organisation of the family, but also possibly to give an 'expert's' view or version of it.

We can examine this version of what is happening in the organisation of the family as a basis for speculating on what 'expertise' can look like and how it can be seen to come off in the naturally occurring social setting of this radio program. From these materials, we suggest that persons might be seen to be displaying their identities as 'experts' by 'doing disagreement'.

'Doing disagreement' involves more than simply disagreeing. When Lora produces her fourth story about Jonathan (how he banged his head while diving), JM might be heard to be disagreeing with the inference that this story illustrates his 'will to fail' when she says, 'Do you think it's easy doing backward dives" (Pla 6.2), to which Lora replies, "Well he enjoyed doing them he said he enjoyed it." (Pla 6.3) In terms of the emerging version of what is happening in the family, JM might be heard to be taking sides with Jonathan insofar as she disagrees with Lora's inferences.

As we have argued above, however, the counsellors might be doing more than expressing a disagreement and taking sides in the discussion. Especially in the earlier stages of the talk, they can be seen to be constructing the bulk of one of the two versions and expressing their disagreement with the parental version of the problem, In so doing, they might be regarded as doing what any member can do i,e. recovering and presenting an alternative determinate account made available by employing standardised knowledge of typical relationships between 'parents' and their 'teenage children'.

The differences they find, and, consequently, the display of expertise they can be seen to be giving, goes beyond disagreeing with one family version and filling out and supporting another family version These differences result in producing disagreement with both versions insofar as their 'own versions' in presenting an overall view of his family organisation, is 'something else again' compared to the two family versions of what is happening.


This is not to say that the picture of the family they present in their own version is necessarily esoteric. Presumably it lies within the competence of many members to be able to review a family 'as a whole' when looking at it from the 'outside', whereas such a view might be inaccessible for members of the family whose motivated standpoints can make them too partisan to be able to see what is happening to the family 'as a whole'.

If, then, experts have to show that they 'are there' and have to show that they are 'doing something', then an obvious method for 'doing expertise', 'doing being an expert', can be to produce differences by means of doing articulated disagreements. Such a method permits of a technique which might be employed almost regardless of the nature of the materials initially ,presented by the 'clients' on such programs. In this way, we can suggest that we might predictably expect, irrespective of what the 'clients' are doing, the production of versions in such settings.

(4) REALITY DISJUNCTURES AND MULTIPLE VERSIONS IN A NATURALLY OCCURRING SETTING

In the previous two sections, we have attempted to show how our materials can warrantably be described in terms of members producing and using different versions of what is happening in the family. Further, we hope to have shown how one of these emergent versions, namely, the experts' version, can be heard as a product of their commonsensical knowledge of the social world, as a product of the materials displayed and solicited from family members, and also as a product of the work experts must do if they are to be heard 'as experts', We have also indicated how the radio organisers might be seen, in part at least, to be achieving the organisational goal of producing an 'interesting' and 'lively' program by utilising standardly available knowledge about the organisation of families and by deploying such knowledge in the management of the prospective availability of versions about what is happening in the family, given the co-presence of all members of the family.

We can now reconsider Pollner's treatment in relation to our analysis of the 'multiple' versions we have described in the naturally


occurring setting, the radio program. We noted that Pollner used the concept 'versions' in three ways.27 We examine each of these usages in tum.

First, Pollner noted that members in everyday life can use the gloss, 'version' in a pejorative way, as a way of 'putting down' the view of.someone with which disagreement is being strongly expressed. As stated earlier, we largely accept this description of how members can use the gloss, 'version' and we have suggested that JM might be seen as possibly avoiding this formulation of what she is hearing for this reason.

Secondly, Pollner refers to those settings, such as courts, where there are institutionalised procedures for adjudicating between conflicting versions of the world and settling upon a 'correct' version. Prima facie, it might appear that our materials have something in common with settings that can be characterised in this way in that the family, in seeking help for its problem from the radio organisation, might be seen to be submitting itself to some sort of arbitration on its affairs by the 'expert' counsellors they know will be available for the discussion. It appears, however, that the family does not freely 'open up' its own affairs for all to see. Rather, it can be seen to be attempting to control and delimit what shall be discussed and, thereby, the nature of the display of the family's organisation. For example, we can see how Martin seems to attempt to head off the counsellors from exploring the implicativeness of the parents in Jonathan's problem and to remind them of what their proper task on the program should be (see Pla 7.1 ff).

Even in the later stages of the program, when we can hear that the family organisation has indeed been opened up, it might still not be the case that all family members are now submitting to the 'arbitration' of the counsellors.

Perhaps the most graphic illustration of this point occurs when Martin suggests that a possible solution to 'Jonathan's problem' might be to send him to a boarding school (Pia page 18 ff). In what can be regarded as a 'triple subversion' of what the talk has produced so far, Martin can be heard to be attempting to reformulate the problem as originally presented and, in so doing, to express his

27 See above Part II section 2.


disagreement or dissociation with the way it has been transformed into something else, i.e. a product of the family organisation. In this way he can be heard to subvert the previous display of 'minimal disunity' in the family by producing an open disagreement - a split -between himself and his son; to subvert the development of the program in raising an issue that should have been appropriately raised at an earlier stage; and, finally - and most relevantly for our current argument - he can be heard to be 'challenging' or 'trying to subvert' the 'expert view' of the family's problems that has been built up over the course of the discussion.

Similarly, we note that Martin might be observed to express his 'dissociation' with· the proceedings in another way. For, once his argument about boarding out Jonathan is 'dealt with', he does not again re-enter the discussion. In like manner, during the discussion of boarding out Jonathan, his wife does not express any view, thereby neither supporting her husband not the experts' version of what is happening in the family) although she does not refrain from expressing her agreement with the practical solution offered, namely, that she should devote more time to her personal affairs and less to the family (Pia especially page 21). Throughout this final phase of the talk, the silence of her husband might be regarded as a 'noticeable absence' of comment on his part. After all, the experts can be heard to have produced a diagnosis of the troubles in the family which display them as a product of the way it is organised 'as a whole' and have proferred a solution for the whole organisation, This solution might be accurately summarised as calling for more 'mutual appreciation' between family members in order that Jonathan's merits may be seen in their 'true light' and Lora's 'relative deprivation' in terms of opportunities vis a vis other members of the family recognised and rectified. To this emergent solution, Martin offers neither assent nor any form of practical cooperation.

Thus our materials might not adequately be described as illustrating the sense of version as in e.g. court settings, if this sense requires that the parties concerned will all necessarily submit to the procedures and arbitration of third parties. Here, Martin might be seen to 'reserve his position in a way not open to someone who actively participates in a setting where conflicting representations are made to some third party who must choose the correct one. Our materials might be adequately described in this way, however, if


we, along with Pollner, stress that the predominant feature of such occasions is not determining 'what really happened' or 'what really is the correct version', but, rather, seeing how members collaborate in producing an outcome 'for all practical purposes'.

In the sociological literature, we owe this insight to Schutz, who, in demonstrating the distinctive concerns of the 'worlds' of everyday life and of scientific theorising and in stressing the paramountcy of everyday life, effectively lays down the philosophical groundwork for the study of practical reasoning in the naturally occurring settings of the social world; In pursuing his third - and primary - usage of 'versions', i.e. versions of the world as a basis for 'reality disjunctures', Pollner ignores this insight and blurs and confuses this distinction. Instead of attempting to examine members' practical reasoning in naturally occurring situations, he appears to be using our knowledge as members of our society of such situations to provide ostensive demonstrations of a philosophical problem concerning the nature of reality.

We are now in a position where we can attempt to support this criticism on the basis of our examination of the radio program.

First, we can see that our materials display how members are engaging in a practical enquiry into what is happening in this family. It is a practical enquiry which has a prospectively practical outcome in terms of advice and help being produced for the problems under discussion, We can hear that family members commence the program by giving their own candidate diagnosis of the problems in the family, where the 'candidate' nature of these diagnoses is displayed by the fact that they do not agree on a single diagnosis. Further, the counsellors can be heard to trade off these discrepancies in their explications and in their own further diagnoses. These diagnoses can be seen both to constitute and to generate a display of different versions of what is happening in the family.

Secondly, these versions are not presented and made available from the outset as full-blown versions of what is happening in the family. Although we might anticipate that parties to the talk, given such differences as age, or sex or expertise, will in fact produce different versions, what the talk actually reveals is something that will only unfold over time.


Thirdly, we suggest that tellers of versions may be very aware of the possible appearances they may be giving in contributing to the talk; they are aware, that is, of the moral and characterological inferences that may be made on the basis of their contributions to the discussion. This awareness can be seen in the way that the parties do not rigidly stick to their version, come what may, so that something like a 'transcendental conversion' would be required for anyone to switch from one version to another. Indeed, the various parties in the talk can be seen to be displaying their own awareness that they are sharing in and thereby constituting their intersubjectively common social world by the collaborative and interactional nature of their talk. There is no stark antinomy of versions such that parties can see what is happening in the family either one way or another. Rather, there are a .variety of different versions, each one being built out of or sequentially linked back into the preceding talk in a manner that displays how the parties are attending sensitively to what has been said. Even Martin, who can be heard to be trying to reformulate the problem in the terms it was originally presented, i.e. as 'Jonathan's problem', incorporates in the proposal about boarding out Jonathan materials which show attentiveness to what the counsellors have been suggesting. Thus boarding out is recommended as a possible solution not simply to the early question of Jonathan's academic progress (Pla 1.8 ft), but also as a solution to the later emergent problem of scapegoating him (Pia 18.1), Similarly, as we have seen, the experts' version can be heard to incorporate materials which to some extent preserve both Jonathan's version and his parents' version of what is happening in the family, Here we can distinguish between the perhaps necessary polemical intent of stimulating the production of different versions from the family in the early stages of the program from the later objective of producing a practical outcome in terms of advice for the whole family.

From these three points, we hope to have drawn attention to some possible features of 'versions' as they can be seen to occur in a naturally occurring setting, From our materials, we are suggesting that they can be seen to be contingent, embryonic, overlapping and interdependent, and emergent over time. In contrast, the 'versions' which produce Pollner's 'reality disjunctures' are at once and oncefor-all presented as 'full-blown', 'completely, 'independent', 'irreconcilable' and 'out-of-time'. In treating ideational objects of this kind, he does not address himself to the question of how


versions are occasioned and managed by members in a naturally occurring setting, but rather, deals with hypothetical clashes of abstract appositionals. Thus he can ask questions like 'Who is really mad, the paranoiac or his doctor,' and, by postulating the logical and empirical equality of their two versions of reality, can suggest how a 'politics of persuasion' is required to close such a 'reality disjuncture'. We hope to have shown, however, both here and in our earlier discussion of Pollner, that such issues are more the concern of the 'world of scientific theorising' than part of the practical concerns and projects of members of society in their everyday interactions.

v

IDENTITIES, IDENTITY PUZZLES AND SENSE ASSEMBLY METHODS: SOME CONCLUSIONS

(1) SOME ISSUES

We conclude by exploring some of the methodological issues raised in our discussion of the problem of versions.

We can character our materials as generating a series of 'identity' puzzles'. By this term, we mean that hearers might not be clear who is doing what to whom in the family, i.e. what is happening in the family. We propose that these identity puzzles do not derive from any equivocality about the veridicality of the accounts contained in the materials: they are not puzzles deriving from doubts about the facticity of the events described by the various members of the family. Rather, it appears to be a question of determining solutions for puzzles where the 'factual nature' of the events described can be accepted, but what they 'mean', what they 'add up to' and, consequently, 'what sort of a person is doing them' are the prevalent issues for members. These issues appear to concern the 'adequacy' of the inferences made from 'the facts' rather than the 'correctness' of 'the facts' themselves.

We are here making a distinction arrived at earlier in our discussion, when we suggested that Dorothy Smith could be seen to be confusing the facticity of accounts with the moral adequacy of accounts. For insofar as 'inferential adequacy' involves for members questions concerning the 'appropriateness' or 'propriety' of descriptions which propose a 'fit' between identities and activities, such that identities may be properly inferred from activities and vice versa, then we are clearly referring to the possibility of descriptions [accounts] in terms of their moral adequacy rather than their factual correctness, In focussing on the possibility of descriptions or accounts, our concern is therefore with their conditions for intelligibility for members, rather than their


conditions for 'factual' correctness, Hence Smith's apparent confusion of facticity and moral adequacy can he seen to be further compounded by not making sufficiently clear whether her analytic interest is directed to how members produce 'possible descriptions' or to how they produce 'factually accurate' accounts.

We are concerned, however, with 'possible descriptions' and are explicitly enquiring into conditions for their intelligibility as such. In this respect, we are suggesting that intelligibility appears to be a matter of propriety; for members, 'possible descriptions' are 'morally adequate' in that they can be heard to present the social world in a 'proper way'. We are further suggesting that an important consideration for hearing 'possible descriptions', for hearing descriptions as 'proper' or 'appropriate', is the way members find a relationship or fit between activities and identities. Difficulties in so doing can generate the 'identity puzzles' which, we are suggesting, can be seen to characterise our materials.

For example, we take it that JM, in her introduction to the talk, is proposing two 'relevant' identities for hearing the subsequent contributions from the family: 'worrying parents' and 'a-teenagerwith-a-problem-'. If hearers cannot recover from Jonathan's initial contribution activities which can be heard as consonant with the candidate identity proposed by JM, they might doubt the adequacy of the descriptions until more materials have been produced. It may be that, 'so far', Jonathan has either been 'improperly' identified or the 'appropriate' activities which indicate that he has a problem 'worth bringing to the program' have yet to be adduced. In this way, hearers might find that the talk has generated for them an 'identity puzzle' which concerns not only what Jonathan 'is like', but also what his mother 'is like.' For, if the early materials indicate that he has no problem, then Lora's candidate identity as a 'worrying parent' might be similarly reviewed.

Again, hearers might find the materials of Lora's initial contribution 'inadequate' for displaying her son as generating a problem in the terms specified by her, viz: his 'will to fail', as displayed in the first four stories about him. Hearers might find that the three stories about Jonathan's swimming activities do not adequately document someone identified as having a will to fail ; while the story about him at school might be heard to relate to his own earlier account of his 'former' problem, but possibly not to

IDENTITIES AND IDENTITY PUZZLES 8 7

either a 'will to fail' or to the other three stories. Thus the production of more materials might serve only to compound or generate further identity puzzles for hearers, :rather than to produce solutions for them.

Of course, the production of these identity puzzles is assisted by the candidate findings of the counsellors in the ongoing course of the discussion. In suggesting that Jonathan's behavior should not occasion 'serious anxiety', that Lora might be 'building failure' into him and that Martin has 'overhigh expectations', they can be heard to be proposing an alternative allocation of identities for family members, i.e. an alternative allocation which would more adequately fit - and thus make intelligible - the activities described. Insofar as the facticity of these activities is not questioned, identity puzzles generate issues of moral adequacy rather than factual correctness.

As we have seen, Martin and Lora can be heard to resist attempts on the part of the counsellors to explore the implicativeness of the parents in the troubles of the family and to try to sustain their own version of what is happening in the family: viz: there is a problem with Jonathan who is giving them good cause to worry. For them to accede to alternative identifications - at least, the sort of identities that might be inferred from what the counsellors are saying - might require not simply that they accept that their account is inappropriate, but also that they accept that the way they see themselves as parents is inappropriate. What can be at stake in specifying appropriate identities for the parents is not simply the adequacy of their version, but also their adequacy as parents; the descriptions and 'the kind of persons' involved in and/or doing those descriptions are 'reflexive', (Garfinkel, 1967: chapter 1), i.e. in hearing one, the other is made simultaneously available. Thus in producing their version of what is happening in the family, the parents can be heard simultaneously to be both specifying the identities of family members - what they are like - and to be addressing themselves to issues of blame, responsibility or criticism. In short, they can be heard to be displaying their description as 'morally defensible'. Thus possible solutions for identity puzzles can be of great import for the parties involved in that such solutions may, in selecting alternative identities display them in 'unwelcome' or unfavorable ways. Hence tellers might be seen to have strong motivations to defend their own descriptions and versions, for, in so doing, they can also be


defending their own moral appearances as displayed in, by, and through their talk.

Thus hearers might, along with JH, find nothing abnormal in Jonathan's behavior from the materials of both his and his mother's accounts, thus creating the identity puzzle: what sort of a mother is Lora to present the whole family for a public display of her son's problem when, in fact, no such problem meriting this sort of attention can be heard to be displayed in the talk? In this way, hearers may look for a more appropriate way of identifying Lora than the one they might have derived from JM's introduction i.e. 'worrying mother'.

We can illustrate these matters with the sort. of SRP machinery we discussed at length in connection with the accounts of marriage break-down. If JM's original presentation of identities can be characterised as SRPa = worried parent/teenager-with-problem, then a possible alternative, once mother and son have contributed, might be SRPb = overanxious mother/ normal son.

Of course, these two SRPs do not exhaust the range of possible alternatives. And when we consider how the talk develops we might find still more SRPs as the materials cumulate over time. For example, we might hear SRPc = frustrated mother/scapegoated son; SRPd = demanding father/pressurised son; and, possibly, an amalgam of SRPc and SRPd to give something like SRPe = problem parents/victim or persecuted children.

Clearly, this bald enumeration of possibilities is far from being exhaustive. Nevertheless, we have probably produced enough to be able to make a number of points concerning members' senseassembly machinery.

First, in talking about 'identities', we are referring to specific identifications of persons in a naturally occurring situation, For hearers of and parties to the talk of our radio program, the identity puzzles that might be posed by these materials cannot be resolved merely by reference to and the utilisation of 'general identities' like 'mother', 'son', 'father' etc. To make intelligible what is happening in this family, it appears that such identities have to be further specified. By specifying the kind of father or mother or son, hearers might produce a 'fit' between such identities and activities described

IDENTITIES AND IDENTITY PUZZLES 89

in the talk to find, for example, that the sort of things Jonathan has been doing can appropriately be attributed to a 'normal' son; or that a mother who complains about such a son is 'overanxious' or 'frustrated'.

Secondly, this specification of general identities can be seen to build in a moral assessment both of what has been heard also of the tellers and/or parties involved in what has been heard. Moreover, tellers and hearers are aware of such possibilities. In this respect, our examination of the materials of the radio program should have amply illustrated these possibilities. By way of a further example, we cite the counsellors' 'resolution' of the cumulating identity puzzles throughout the talk when they present their version of what is happening in the family as a whole (Pia 17.8 and, after Martin's interjection on boarding our Jonathan, Pia 19.14 and 20.1). We suggest that this culminating version of, what is happening in the family as a whole not only provides a solution to the previously generated identity puzzles, but also does so in such a way that the counsellors can be seen to be orienting to the nature of possibly adverse moral assessment made by them in proposing earlier candidate solutions to identity puzzles concerning particular family members. In this 'final solution', the counsellors might be heard to be attempting to 'defuse' earlier judgments about the parents and to be here attempting to present a version where all members of the family are 'doing well after all' and only 'marginal adjustments' in the organisation of the family need to be made. In short, hearers might find that something like the depiction of a 'normal family' with 'normal problems' is being made.

Thirdly, we suggest that this 'final solution' is neither definitive nor inevitable from the preceding materials. Just as there might be seen to be a range of possible specified identities which could be found for the previous identity puzzles, so might there be alternative comprehensive solutions. This solution might be regarded as a 'forall-practical-purposes' solution insofar as it can be seen to be constructed from some of the materials and from some of the alternative identifications made available in the preceding talk. It can be seen to be constructed then-and-there and 'as required' for the practical purpose of achieving a 'proper ending' to the 'development' of the radio program.


These three points may perhaps serve to illustrate some of the difficulties and complexities of 'applying' Sacks' sense-assembly machinery to our materials, In comparison to studying how members can be seen to be achieving in, by and through their talk a naturally occurring setting where a practical enquiry is conducted and a practical outcome produced, the examination of a single fragment of talk, i.e. "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up", (Sacks, 1974) is clearly a somewhat abstract demonstration of members' methods for making 'possible descriptions'. Even in his study of 'No-one to turn to' (Sacks, 1972)28 for cases of suicidalness which employs a large body of conversational and other materials, Sacks is focussing on the possibility that there can be unique solutions for category selection rather than on any particular setting per se. In both exercises, his object is, of course, to explicate and describe members' sense-assembly machinery, which he suggests may be highly generalisable. We are suggesting, however, that considerable work has to be done by the analyst to 'apply' his machinery to other materials.

The nature and extent of this analytical work required to 'apply' Sacks' machinery might be clearly seen in our efforts to examine the radio program. In this multi-party setting, it is not 'simply' a question of studying how one party makes determinations about another, but rather of studying how these parties can be seen to be interacting collaboratively for their practical purposes in the production of an outcome of the program and of the talk itself. As we have· seen, in the course of the talk, a number of candidate determinations of the specific identities of family members are available and, as we have suggested, they might be characterised as helping to generate a series of identity puzzles for hearers of the talk. Their resolution, 'for-all-practical-purposes', seems to require something like Pollner's 'politics of persuasion' - though not a 'politics' that brings up epistemological issues of reality of the kind he invokes for the sort of 'versions' giving rise to his 'reality disjunctures' In our materials, the various parties orient to and use one another's talk in order simultaneously to display their hearing/understanding of what is going on and to present alternative determinations about one another.

28 An earlier version was entitled "The Search for Help: No One to Turn To" in Schneidman, (1967).

IDENTITIES AND IDENTITY PUZZLES 91

It would appear that these processes involve argument and disagreement about what is happening in the family, who is doing what to whom, whose version is to be accepted and can occur because members do not have available unique solutions for determining the proper assignment of categories for these issues in this setting.29 Our materials clearly display the work that may be involved for members in determining appropriate specific identities for enumerated activities and, conversely, for 'fitting' such activities into a proposed candidate identity.

As a final illustrative example, let us examine the following utterance by JH:

7.8 JH =Urn may I just make a point that the number of parents of fourteen year old boys who say we just don't know how to make him work I'm getting it all the time he's at he's at an age particularly in the young male when they do as little as they can get away with quite often -now I think there are other factors here because I think he he probably picks up your expectations for him Martin and this may make the sense of failure rather more acute in his life - but a- an awful lot of fourteen year old bo- able fourteen year olds sto:oge along until the examination objective gets a bit nearer and then if they are interested in subjects and keen ultimately to make a success of their lives they'll suddenly knuckle to:o but uh I don't find his behavior as described so far at all abnormal or any reason to be uh seriously anxious hh.

In the previous talk in the program, we know that Lora, Martin, Jonathan and JH have inferred alternative and even conflicting or antithetical candidate specific identities for Jonathan. Although they all display the knowledge of the fact that he can be generally identified as 'teenage son', it appears that such knowledge is not enough to make intelligible what is going on in the family and a more specific identification of him is required to show what sort of a teenage son he is. For if the 'standardised knowledge' made available by the general identification were sufficient, then the

29 Sacks (1972) is particularly concerned with achieving such unique solutions for making identifications in everyday life.


obvious work going on in the talk to sort out his specific identity would not be required. Yet it is clearly required for although parties in the talk do not question the descriptions of Jonathan's activities, they are far from agreeing what these activities mean in terms of what sort of a person, what sort of a teenage son, these activities display.

In his utterance, JH can be heard to make a further attempt to show persuasively the sort of person Jonathan is, The operative word here is 'persuasively' for it appears that the parties cannot intersubjectively agree on a determination of this kind simply from the enumeration of his activities. And here, although JH is referring generally to such categories as 'young males' and 'fourteen year old boys' and even 'able fourteen year old boys', he .can do no more than suggest that Jonathan is like 'an awful lot' of them in his behavior. It appears that he is attempting to 'normalise', on the basis of his 'expert knowledge and experience' the kinds of behavior of Jonathan that have been displayed in the talk. Thus we look in vain for the tight link between identities and activities that Sacks (1974) has suggested with his concept of category-bound activities. Although we might standardly expect babies to cry and thus be able to find the category 'baby' from the activity 'crying' and vice versa, we might not perhaps, so closely link 'slacking' or 'idling' with the category 'young male' or 'able fourteen year old'. Although JH can unproblematically claim that some members of these categories do indulge in this activity, such a claim is very far removed from one which might be made relying on assistance from 'category-bound activities' to determine appropriate identities for members in occasioning the naturally occurring settings of their everyday lives.

(2) CONCLUSION

Quite clearly, we do not agree that either Schutz or Pollner- at least, in the main thrust of their argument - have satisfactorily proposed or formulated a problem of versions with any direct relevance to what members of society recognise, experience or do in their everyday encounters. From our examination of empirical materials, we cannot find that members either recognise or grapple with 'multiple realities' or 'reality disjunctures'; no question of their

IDENTITIES AND IDENTITY PUZZLES 9 3

grasp of 'reality' is raised by the persons involved in the materials we have examined.

This is not to say, however, that no problem of versions can be raised for treatment by empirical methods. As we have seen, Smith raises such a problem for her materials; and so have we both for the two accounts of marriage break-down and for the radio program. The problem of versions that we have examined, however, is somewhat differently formulated from that of Pollner and Schutz. We raise this problem not as a philosophical issue, but as a phenomenon that members standardly encounter and routinely deal with. Our concern, therefore has been to describe members' methods for dealing with a mundane, taken-for-granted contingency of everyday life.

In this respect, we consider that Dorothy Smith's analysis goes some way to meeting this reformulation of the problem of versions in empirical terms, but that her descriptions of members' methods could be improved. Consequently, we propose an alternative description which drew upon and modified some of Harvey Sacks' work on identities.

Thus we showed how, with modifications, his machinery could be applied to describe the systematic subversion of our two accounts of marriage break-down and, also, to Dorothy Smith's own materials. Similarly, we showed how this same machinery might be applied to the radio program to some extent - the extent being more limited in view of the fact that here we are not dealing simple with a version and a single alternative determinate possible account, but with a number of sometimes antithetical, sometimes converging factual accounts, which, as candidate diagnoses of what is happening in the family, can be seen to generate a series of identity puzzles. As we have seen, these identity puzzles in turn generate greater complexities than those encountered in the materials on marriage break-down in the determination of specific identities and thus in the production by members of 'possible', i.e. morally adequate or appropriate, accounts or versions of who was doing what to whom in the family of what was happening in the family.

We suggest that the difficulties we have encountered in seeking to apply Sacks' work on members' sense-assembly machinery to our materials does, however, have possible serious implications for


its generalisability and hence for Sacks' (1974) suggestion that though this machinery might have seemed 'overbuilt' for the materials he himself analysed, it might be found to be widely applicable. The sort of work which we, as analysts, engaged in to modify this apparatus for application to our materials might be seen to impugn this suggestion because our work was consistently directed towards 'contextualising' it. Thus we were obliged to specify Sacks' general categories in our attempt to describe how members were making sense of that talk in that situation, Similarly, our sense of the occasioned nature of this naturally occurring setting, the radio-program-discussing-problems-of-this-family was ornnirelevant in discussing our materials.

REFERENCES

Atkinson, J.M. and Heritage J. (1987) Structures of Social Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Castenada, C. (1971) A Separate Reality, New York: Simon and Schuster

CuffE C (1977) "Some Aspects of the Social Organisation of the Family", Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Manchester

Cuff E C (1978a) "Some Features of 'Invited Stories' about Marriage Breakdown", International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Vol18

CuffE C (1978b)"Some Features of Production Accounting in the Analysis of 'Conversational Materials'", Analytical Sociology, Vol 1, No4

Cicourel A V (1964) Method and Measurement in Sociology, New York: Free Press

Coulter J (1976) "Harvey Sacks: A Preliminary Appreciation", Sociology, Vol 10, pp 507-512

Garfinkel H (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall

Garfinkel H and Sacks H (1970) "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions", in J C McKinney and E A Tiryakian (eds), Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments, New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts

James W (1950) The Principles of Psychology, Vol 2 New York: Dover Publications

Kaufmann F (1958) Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York, Humanities Press

Kuhn T S (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

95


Lemert E M (1962) "Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion", Sociometry, 24: 2-20.

Pollner M (1974) "Mundane Reasoning" Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol4, pp 35-36

Pollner M (1975) "'The Very Coinage of Your Brain': The Anatomy of Reality Disjunctures", Philosophy of the Social Sciences .. Vol 5, pp 411-430

Rokeach, M. (1964) The Three Christs of Ypsilanti, New York: Alfred A. Knopf

Sacks H (1964-72) Unpublished Lectures, Mimeo, University of California, Los Angeles

Sacks H (n.d. and 1971) "Aspects of the Sequential Organization of Conversation", Unpublished MS in 4 Chapters

Sacks H (1972) "An Initial Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology", in D Sudnow (ed.) cited below. An earlier version of this work is "The Search for Help: No One to Tum To" in E Schneidman, Essays in Self Destruction, New York: Science House, 1967.

Sacks H (1974) "On the Analyzability of Stories by Children" in Turner R (ed) (1974) Ethnomethodology .. Harmondsworth: Penguin Education

Schegloff E A and Sacks H (1974) "Opening Up Closings", in R Turner (ed) Ethnomethodology, Harmondsworth: Penguin Education

Schenkein J (ed.) (1978) Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction, New York: Academic Press

Schutz A (1972; orig 1932) The Phenomenology of the Social World, Heinemann

Schutz A (1973) Collected Papers I, The Problem of Social Reality, M Natanson (ed.) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff

REFERENCES 97

Schutz A (1971) Collected Papers II, Studies in Social Theory, M Broderson (ed.) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff

Schutz A (1971) "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality" in Collected Papers II, Studies in Social Theory, M Broderson (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff

Smith D (1978) "A Sub-Version of Mental Illness", Unpublished paper, May 1969; slightly revised as "'K is Mentally Ill': The Anatomy of a Factual Account", 1971, and published as "K 1st Geisteskrank, Die Anatomie Eines Tatsach enberichtes", in E Weingarten, F Sack and J Schenkein (eds.) cited below, and in Sociology Vol 12, No 1, 1978 pp 23-53.

Sudnow D (1967) Passing On: The Social Organization of Dying, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

Sudnow D (ed) (1972) Studies in Social Interaction .. New York: Free Press.

Szasz T S The Manufacture of Madness, Paladin 1973

Turner R (ed.) (1974) Ethnomethodology .. Baltimore: Penguin Education

Weingarten E, Sack F and Schenkein J (1976) Ethnomethodology, Beitrage Zu Einer Sozio-logie Des Alltagshandelns, Berlin: Suhrkamp

APPENDIX

SYMBOLS USED IN TRANSCRIPTIONS

1. as in: J Yes.

2. as in: Thi:s one

3. as in: Yes

4. - as in: It's no tr-

5. - as in 1-say-that

6. as in 1-- say-- that

7. (n) as in: Well (2:00) 1..

8. = as in: I said= =Did you

9. (hh) as in: Wh(hh)en

10. () as in: He ( ) that

11. (Yes) as in: He (said) that

12. II as in: He said// that

13. ( as in: (I think ( (Did you

14. ? as in: Did you?

Completed utterance.

Preceding syllable prolonged.

Emphasis.

Word not completed.

Quick pace of talk.

Slow pace of talk; slow-ness shown by number of - - used.

Pause of 'n' seconds.

Next utterance follows on 'immediately'.

Interjectionof laughter.

Area within brackets cannot be transcribed.

Material in brackets contains' doubtful', possible transcription.

Next speaker begins after the//

Two speakers begin simultaneously.

Questioning intonation.

Note: Most of these symbols are now matters of convention in Conversational Analysis and are simply entitled "Transcription Symbols" (See Atkinson and

Heritage, 1987)

101

Account MB/c

1 C ( ) might be better off doin it meself 2 R Hmh/ 3 C A think a might be better off doin it meself 4 ( ( pause C.A. 2.00 ) ) 5 ( ( tape-recorder is switched off for 2 seconds) ) 6 ( ( pause C.A. 5.00 ) ) 7 C (is it going) 8 R Yeah -- dya want me to leave you on your own 9 C Yeah can I take it wi me 10 R erm -- you - sit down a go an sit over there 11 C Yeah 12M ( ) 13 R Ya best sit over there Mike so ya won't disturb her 14 ( (pause C.A. 2.00)) 15 M Shall a go away? 16 R No ( ) 17 C Is it workin? 18 ((pause C.A. 12.00 )) 19 C Got married at sixteen yea:rs --because I was pre:gnant --20 James was nineteen the day we got married I felt nothing 21 at all for him-- or for anybody else-- tch at fir:st 22 -- life wasn' t too ba:d -- James had a good .job we had a nice 23 house-- an then things started to happen-- first James came 24 down -- with appendici: tus -- an from that day o: n -- he ' s 25 never managed to keep a job --- er we were evicted from the 26 hou: se --James sold all the furniture bef- without me

knowing 27 it -- etcetera -- an by that time I was pregnant again -- we 28 did split up for about a wee:k -- bu then I went back to him 29 --don't know why hhh -a:nd we found another house --then 30 things started to happen again--James promises were goin all 31 down the drain - he's a hell of a li:ar -- a natural charmer 32 --we supposed to be buyin a house-- James had gambled all

the 33 money on horses an do:gs --- he'd also gambled a lot of his 34 fir:m's: money -- e:r we split up again -- a -- the beginning 35 of the first year in college -- due to this --James had 36 endorsed a grant cheque of mi:ne an got in trouble for it for 37 three years probation -- he came back on January the twenty 38 s: ixth -- seventy two: -- there were lot of promises again

103


39 decided to give im another chance -- after three months of 40 James not working I decided it was going the same way as

before 41 an nothing was going to happen so: I gave im an ultimatum

--he 42 had to -- wo:rk -- clear out -- he didn't work so finally -- he 43 was lying to me again -- said he was at work when I found

out 44 he wasn ' t -- when he did get a job it lasted two: days

because 45 ee came- ee was ill again -- thas wha ee said the doctor said 46 there was nothin wrong with im -- an so: -- a told i:n to go: 47 but the marriage has been very shaky from the star: t ""-as a 48 said a felt nothin at the very beginnin --an. a don't feel 49 anything no:w --- ees turned to~ again -- since ees been 50 gone --- an to quite honest --- a: don't think -- it'll 51 last more than a month -- the way he is now he asked me

back' a few times but --- feel nothin at all for him --52 he's never paid a penny towards the -- maintenance of the 53 children --- in fact he hasn't seen them for six months ---54 he's been in Strangeways prison --- because - ee had to 55 pay restitutional order on the grant cheque he endorsed

which 56 he didn't pay an got ninety days suspended -sentence--57 ee didn't pay it still so ee had ninety days in prison ---58 which he will go down for again - if he doesn't pay

somethin to it 59. an will go down for not paying -maintenance to 60 me at the moment -- his present state of mind is that 61 he's going to commit suicide-- as I have said a definite 62 no:o he's offerin to give me a divorce -- if he's not dead 63 before that ti:me --- tch hhh personality wise -- ees very 64 insecure --- ee believes his own- is o:wn li:es -65 anything he says he believes is true he's quite a charmer 66 most people usually like him at first till they find out what 67 he's like--- very easy goin --but very nervous- he admits 68 to having used me as a crutch --- a support if you like --69 but - this one - doesn't intend to be used as a -- support 70 anymore -- -ee ca- ee can work without me but ee can't with 71 me - an yet ee says ee loves me.

((tape-recorder is switched off))

Account MB/d

1 ((General background noises off)) 2 R Righ 3 ((pause C.A. 3.00)) ((General background noises off)) 4 D U:m what (dya want me 5 R (Right you know just from when ya were at school 6 you know ow you let im 7 D Yeah we 11 a met im when a was fifteen - tch and e:r -- a 8 started goin out with im an a went out with im--just im from 9 then on--up until a was eighteen when we got married-- er:m 10 when we got married I was working at the Inland Revenue -

which 11 is the job a got on leaving school you know --er:m-- tch and 12 -- wi had a house being built before we got married but it

wasn't 13 ready in time -- we had a flat at first and then we moved 14 into the house-- and e:r wi had more or less everythin we 15 wanted. 16 ((pause C.A. 3.00)) ((General background noises off)) 17 D Er:m we had a car an a house an a- all the furniture an every-18 thing that we wanted but -- thes -- there still seemed to be 19 somethin missing you know a still wasn't entirely happy--

with 20 -- how things were - and he thought a should be he couldn't 21 see-- why a wasn't happy-- and so a decided-- er:m to see if 22 a could get into college- a didn't really know why at the time 23 a wanted to a just knew that a wanted to do somethin -- you

know 24 --tch so er:m I applied for college and a got in -- so a gave up 25 rna job at the Inland Revenue and just got a temporary job

until a 26 came to college and then when a did come to college -- we:ll 27 things just went -- at first they were alri:ght except he didn't 28 co-operate very much -- tch with er:m -- tch you know what

a was . 29 doing really - and then did things just gradually went further 30 and further downhill -- tch wi just-- seemed to drift more and 31 more apart he pursued his own interests and I-- pursued

mine-- · 32 an then -- during the Summer holidays -- I went away on my

105


33 own -- without him and a think it was then that a realised that 34 e:r -- things weren't right because a didn't miss im at a:ll an 35 didn't want to come home -- 'n when a did get home a- you

know 36 a told im that --just couldn't go on like that a mean it was 37 just stupid-- so e:r-- tch we decided to make arrangements to 38 split Yn an wi -- we arranged everythin we sold the house an

the 39 furniture an just split the money an - that was it -- just 40 split up. 41 ((pause C.A. 3.00))((General Background noises oft)) 42 R What did your Mum think about it/ . 43 D Ooh well sh- she went up the wa:ll-- an mi dad went up the 44 wall a mean they were of the opinion that.erm -- if ya get 45 married ya should stay married -- you know -- and of course

they · 46 couldn't see what was wrong because to everybody else -- it 47 was just perfect ya know -- bu I just kne:w tha a a could 48 never bi happy with him -- even though a though so befo:re 49 ((pause C.A. 6.00)) ((General background noises oft)) 50 R Did ee er -- eve::r -- dya think ee was bothered about you: 51 doin this -- on your own tha it was somethin that you'd got 52 did ee understand it or did ee think you were goin above im 53 goin to college or -54 ((pause C.A. 2.00)) ((General background noises oft)) 55 D He though a was goin above im -- ee couldn't understand

why: 56 a wanted to do it -- because he thought a should be just

happy 57 enough by bein married an -- havin children -- you know --58 more or less straight away he: wanted them -- but I didn't 59 because of -- you know -- a felt too young to be restricted 60 really by children like that --- he he- he resented the fact 61 that a wanted to come to college an of course when a did ge 62 here-- he just wasn't co-operative at all really. 63 ((pause C.A. 3.00)) ((General background noises oft) 64 R Did ee a any time give ya the ultimatum of leaving college 65 or -- your marriage or - you know -- tha type of thing. 66 D No: ee never gave mi that ultimatum but ee said when wi 67 had decided to split up-- you know a wish you'd never -one 68 to that bloody college that (sort of-69 R (Yeah.

ACCOUNT MB/D 107

70 D - thing you know but -- ee never- ee never asked me to make 71 a choice because a think ee knew tha -- what the choice 72 would be anyway -- so ee never asked me to make it you

know. 73 ((pause C.A. 7.00)) ((General background noises oft)) 74 ? (Tha enough) 75 D (No) 76 R (Anything else you want to say) 77 D (No I can't think of anything) 78 R What kind of rows did you ave (with im)/ 79 ((pause C.A. 2.00)) ((General background noises oft)) 80 D Was i- we didn't really have-- very many big ro: ws --you 81 know it was just sort of erm -- we never used to -- ge in

really bad 82 temper with each other an really sort of-- su:lk

or anythin it was just tha-- we just couldn't could never 84 see eye to eye on this point - an it was just - it just 85 seemed to be no- th- no point in 1!Yin.g --and the more a 86 realised that er - you know college was more important to mi 87 the more a realised that a jus musn't love im an- an probably 88 ever did --just somethin we drifted into -- you see -- a was 89 probably more- in love with the glamour of gettin married an 90 havin my own house -- an everythin a wanted bein

independent 91 than a was with him- a think tha- tha was it really. 92 R What dya think about gettin married agai:n/ 93 D Oh a probably wou:ld ((laughs)) a definitely(hh) would(hh) 94 anyway (hh) -- but i- but ad want things to be as different 95 --as they possibly could be next time-- you know. 96 R Are ya frightened/ 97 ((pause C. A. 2.00)) ((General background noises oft)) 98 D Ve:ry yeah -- frightened of makin the wrong decision again-99 but a still don't think that would -- put me off ya know 100 in the e:nd a probably will make the decision cos-- a don't 101 know -- am not that frightened hu hu. 102 R Wha about -- wha ya said about bein sociably acceptable to 103 make one mistake 104 ((pause ca .. 2.00)) ((General background noises oft)) 105 D a think tha -- y- ya know perhaps society will accept ya 106 making one mistake but ya know ya could -- separate once 107 an this- a- they would accept tha you'd just made a mistake 108 an it was no: reflection on you rea:lly -- but you couldn't

108

109 110 111 112 D

PROBLEMS OF VERSIONS

do it again a mean - next time its got to be -- the right(hh) decision(hh) ya know(hh) or else (((laughs))

(Yeah. Yud just be a reject a think(hh) hu.

((Tape-recorder is switched off))

Recording of B.B.C. Radio 4 program in the series 'If vou think you've got problems ....• ' broadcast on 4th

May 1974.

Transcript Pia

1.1 JM You know we receive many many letters from parents who are worried about various aspects of their teenage children hh worried about schooling perhaps exams hh discipline - not being able to talk to each other all that sort of thing and so this did seem a wonderful opportunity to talk to a whole family as a whole hhh in this case it's going to be mother and father son and daughter andhere first of all is son Jonathan who is fourteen.

1.2 J Hello.

1.3 JM Hehhh hello Jonathan thank you very much for coming today.

1.4 J (That's alright).

1.5 JM First of all we talk to you on your own because - your mother thinks uh there's a problem here- do you think you've got a problem?

1.6 J I thought I had one some time ago but now- I don't think I've got ore cos I'm reassured now.

1.7 JM What was the problem you thought you had some time ago?

1.8 J I didn't think I was pro-gre:ssing in the way I should 'n that the class were getting on in front of me and I didn't want to go into a lower stream in a in our school.

1.9 JM It really was a big problem in the family was it--

1.10 J Yes I think it was I think it was concerning my mother and father hh because -- I think they want me to have a - decent future.

1.11 JM What do you think of as a decent future then-

109


1.12 J Urn a safe job and uh- not something where I'm doing just doing nothing.

1.13 J-1 And this you felt really was a problem recently was it?

1.14 J Yes it was because I thought I wasn't- doing at all well- and I thought I was a bit of a failure as you might say - and uh after some of today's failures what I mean is today's people

1.15 JM Mmm

1.16 J You know on the whole- I didn't want to become a them one of them.

2.1 JM en you say - you were a failure though you obviously feel you've overcome it now.

2.2 J Yes I have now.

2.3 JM What happened:

2.4 J Uhm - I was -- told that uh my parents were going to see mthe teachers hh and uh when the teachers said no-there's-nothingwrong-with-him-he's-perfectly-alright I felt more reasured then and uh since then my work's picked up because I haven't had to worry about this in the back of my mind.

2.5 WG Jonathan you said something about you don't want to be one of today's failures- w-what do you s- mean by that exactly?

2.6 J Uh - I don't want to be -- regarded as a nobody I want to be someone not particularly very famous but urn- not so down and out that urn - they just look over the top of my head.

2.7 JH) (//) )

2.8 JM) What do you like best at school? What subjects do you like best?

RADIO DISCUSSION Pia 111

2.9 J English - Maths - Art - Games - and Science subjects I like - a lot- I like Games and Art I think the best because uh -- it's more actually to do yourself in them than - with the teachers.

2.10 WG Do you find that uh t- the work is easy or do you I mean do you actually enjoy working?

2.11? Mmm.

2.12 J I enjoy w-working mainly because it's a challenge- and uh I I've got to do something otherwise hh I'm awfully bo:red - I get bored quite easily so I do try and work - and get my mind to do something.

2.13 JM Is your school streamed according to ability?

2.14 J It is-) in third year upwards(/!) )

2.15 JH ) Yes

2.16 JH I see and wh- y- wh- you're in the top stream are you?

2.17 J Yes

2.18 JH and have you always been in the top stream?

2.19 J Yes.

3.1 WG Do you get restreamed every year - hh or once you're in the-

3.2 J -no i-it's actually very hard to get downstreamed rather than upstreamed because you have to be bad in nearly all the subjects -ther- I found that a few went up this year -- and none went down.

3.3 JM You go on thinking for a minute Jonathan because yoursister - Susan has been sitting here - she must have been biting her tongue off because she's a talkative girl is Susan isn't she?

3.4 J Very


3.5 JM Hehhh very he said with a heartfelt sigh and Susan you're twelve aren't you?

3.6 S Yes.

3.7 JM What do you do when you're at home together? Your mother said you fight like Kilkenny cats earlier on - do you//really?

3.8 S Hehhhh we do sometimes but not always -- ifwe're in a good mood about something then we don't but some quite often we do.

3.9 JH What sort of things do you fight about? .

3.10 S W-w-well all sorts of things-- we fight about who's had their pocket money and who hasn't hh 'n who's do(hhh)ne a jo(hh)b to get extra money and who hasn't hh and all sorts of things.

3.11 WG If you're a normal brother and sister you probably fight about everything don't you? It doesn't really matter what it is it's just the fighting.

3.12 S Y-hehhh-e-(hh)s.

3.13 ? Hehhh

3.14 S Yes.

3.15 WG Does Jonathan help you with your homework at all?

3.16 S W:ell-- no hehhh.

3.17 ? Hehhh

3.18 WG Cos m-my children's teachers can never understand why it is my daughter does homework so well hh and does so badly in her exa(hh)ms and the answer is she gets help at home from her brothers and sisters II


Hehhhh 4.1 s

4.2WG I wondered if the same thing happened to you.

4.3 S Well I get- help from daddy.

4.4 JH Ahh- and who helps Jonathan?

4.5 S Daddy.

4.6 J Father as well.

4.7 JH I see II yeah.

4.8? hehhh.

4.9 JM He sounds as if he has quite a lot to do when he gets home from work.

4.10 S Yes

4.11 J More than us.

4.12? Hmhh.

4.13 JM You think so do you(//)

4.14 WG

4.15 S) Yes )

Does he work very hard?

4.16 J ) Yes he does - he hardly ever relaxes =

4.17 S =Yes

4.18 J 'Nit's very hard to get him into an armchair for the evening he's always got to do something even if it's our homework or

4.19? Hehhh

4.2C S Even if it's building my rabbit hutch hhhh.


4.21 JM I think at this point really Jonathan and Susan have had a jolly good crack on their own and we really ought to talk to mother and father- now Lora uh you as mother were the one who wrotethe letter.

4.22 L Yes.

4.23 JM And at the time you sounded as if you had a very big problem.

5.1 L I was very worried at the time because I was beginning to feel hopeless because the problem had recurred so many times --the problem is whenever Jonathan comes to any kind.of test he seems to will himself to fail even though we expect him to have a high chance of succeeding and a very low chance of failing - it seems that he engineers failure rather than risk a very small chance of failing - he prefers to fail himself rather than be failed by outside sources.

5.2 JM Can you give us some examples of what you mean?

5.3 L Well he was a he is a very good swimmer- quite recently he entered for a race and he was doing very well and he just stopped because the girl in the next lane gave up the race so he stood and watched - and uh threw away the race altogether and then he was asked to repeat it another time so he instead of counting the number of lengths he should be swimming - he went on and on and on and was disqualified on time - both occasions this seemed to be a very silly sort of mistake to make - I'm sure he would have done it if if he hadn't been tested at the time.

5.4 JM And this was quite recently was it?

5.5 L This was w- about a year ago.

5.6 JM Well Jonathan had the impression that he certainly agreed that he did have a problem hhh in that he was afraid of slipping down from his A-stream at school- this seemed to be the hhh what he saw as the crystallization of his situation that he might slip from an A-stream into a lower stream and he felt now that he was reassured and that he'd conquered this - but you don't feel so reassured you feel it's still going on?


5.7 L Well oddly enough he- was told in at the end at the end of the Summer term that he would be continuing in the A-stream because he had done quite well - and it seemed that now he is told fineyou're-getting-along-nicely he decided right I'll slack and do pothing at all- so he behaved so badly for half a term that really it looked as if he might then be relegated to a lower stream - he was allowed to go more or less his own way because they were rereasonably happy with him at school and - then he managed to annoy one of the staff so much that she- really lost her temper with him and we we heard from his house tutor - that his work was unsatisfactory his behavior was unsatisfactory so - I had to see the house tutor and I blew him up - and from th- the rest rest for the rest of the II term

5.8M Blew up Jonathan not the house tutor hehhh//hehhh

6.1 L I blew up Jonathan and for the refit of the term- Jonathan's uhm work. seemed to be very good - but it seems e:very so often one must have a showdown with him - he's good at swimming at one time he was very good at diving - he went on a diving course and managed to bang his head twice on perfectly ridiculous ridiculously easy dives and he hasn't dived since.

(2.00)

6.2 JM Do you think it's easy doing backward dives?

6.3 L Well he enjoyed doing them he said he enjoyed it.

6.4 JH Yes well I think that uh it's quite common for uh young people i- in this sort of situation to as Lora has uh described it rather well I forget how you said it Lora uh he takes out a guarantee

6.5 L Yes

6.6 JH Against being exposed

6.7 L Yes

6.8 JH To failure


6.9 L Yes

6.10 J H By making sure that he fails- uh i-i-i r- i- it's as though he said I cannot bear to lose face by failing

6.11 L Yes

6.12 JH Uh in terms of something else - and therefore I will organise my own failure and be my own man and then I shan't be put in this intolerable p- p- position of perhaps being forced to fail.

6.13 L Yes.

6.14 WG But then to follow this up a little bit further uh you in some way are uh showing the same sort of behavior as he is because right at the beginning you said I am beginning to feel hopeless now. =

6.15 L =Yes=

6.16 WG = Somehow to feel hopeless about a kid of fourteen uh you kn- there is so much potential there is so much ti: :me - in some ways you are also in in a way saying at this stage it is going to be a failure you're building failure into him in some ways in the same way as you feel that he is building failure into himself.

6.17 M (Hhh yes (

6.18 L ( Well I try not to let him feel that I I've do lose faith in him at all.

7.1 M I think you're being too accurate here I think the word was perhaps unfortunately chosen hh what we really uhh were hoping for is some outside help hhh this is in fact why we're here.

7.2?Mmmm.

7.3 M (its)- we have got to the limit of what we can do otherwise we should do something about it hhh uh th- there is a problem and


we've tried to (dealt) with it as far as we are concerned it's beyond our capabilities at the moment hhh.

7.4 WG But II (you know)

7.5 M It's this this permanent going forward stepping II

7.6L Yes.

7.7 M back going forward stepping back - we can't really see quite - how long it willla:st and how to ea:se ('im) out of that hhh=

7.8 JH =Urn may I just make a point that the number of parents of fourteen year old boys who say we just don't know how to make him work I'm getting it all the time he's at he's at an age particularly in the young male when they do as little as they can get away with quite often - now I think there are other factors here because I think he he probably picks up your expectations for him Martin and this may make the sense of failure rather more acute in his life - but a- an awful lot of fourteen year old bo- able fourteen year olds sto:oge along tmtil the examination objective gets a bit nearer and then if they are interested in subjects and keen ultimately to make a success of their lives they'll suddenly knuckle to:o but uh I don't find his behavior as described so far at all abnormal or any reason to be uh seriously anxious hh.

7.9 L But can he be left to go along like this? I wonder whether I'm doing the wrong thing in pulling him up sharply occasionally as wwe've had to or whether he should be just left to go at his own pace - I feel that if this happens he may drop to a level where he fr instance can take very few 0-levels - and then perhaps find that whatever - he wants to do he's already hm put himself out of the running for.

7.10 M You cannot rely on him working at the right time- uh I'm not saying he's unreliable i- it's this built-in fail-safe mechanism which appa:lls(/1)

7.11 WG Would you say he's been like this what for the last four six years?


7.12 M Oh at least.

7.13 WG So uhh perhaps uh were your expectations of him too high even at a very early age II

7.14M

8.1 WG I mean if at the age of six or eight you expected him to hh think about wor-hh-king and do we:ll=

8.2M

8.3WG

8.4M

8.5WG

=No III

He may have been under some sort of pressure II

No no I don't II think w-

for a considerable length of time.

8.6 M I don't think we're pressuring him that way hh the very first race he ever ran at a little gymkhana there was a - race for the under sixes and he was way out in front - within sight of the tape - he slowed down turned round - and watched the field waiting for them to come up - and he was too slow that time in his reaction to give away the race.

8.7 JH Yes now Martin you're assuming that the competitive thing is a valid fundamentally sound uh way of going on - now this may not be so - you see that that uh uh co-operation is awfully important as well as competition

8.8M Yes

8.9 JH And I knew a case when three friends after a mile race in a school they were one behind the other and they thought how silly hh r- racing for the tape in order that one of us shall get -there past first so they - linked arms and passed the tape together - and half the staff were furious because they were thinking all the time in terms of hh competition and these thrllee

8.9 M yes


8.11 J said we w- won't compete against one another - now this this I'm just wondering whether the whole competitive thi:ing is temperame:ntally uh distasteful to Jonathan.

8.12 M Hhh it's not ye:s i- i- you may be right but it's not just com~itive because I think uhm just -- achieving a certain standard securing a certain hhh standard uh is not really to my mind competitive especially when his level of ability is well above that standard.

8.13 JM Hhhh I'd like to know w what Jonathan's uh ideas are on this on this business of being competitive hhh.

8.14 J I think you have to be competitive in this world now to get anywhere because so many people want urn all the top jobs that it's really fight for yourself now.

8.15 JM But you say that but you see hh your mother says that you deliberately avoid being competitive - and you didn't mention that when I talked to you.

9.1 J Well I haven't myself you know when I've bee- avoiding being competitive.

9.2 JM Do you remember the occasions that she was talking about?

9.3 J No I don't actually.

9.4 JM They just didn't register with you?

9.5 J No-- not at all.


9.7 J Yes I don't remember any of them.


9.8 M That is probably the crux of the problem hh the fact that we are conscious of a certain thing - of which he is not conscious - if he were he could probably do something about it(//)

9.9 L May I give a- a- an- another tchah example of something that was not competitive at all hh he borrowed my oilpaints and painted a very good picture in one occasion and we said that's fine Jonathan we'd like to hang that on the wall hh so then he went down the next day and painted over the top and spoilt it.

9.10 JH Do you know what that i- that is saying-- I think that is saying you're putting too much pressure on me and I'll show you .

( 1 .00)

9.11 L Yes.

9.12 JH I think that//

9.13 L

9.14 JH

Yes

that is what that the message of that.

9.15 LIt's very difficult not to put on pressure.

9.16 JH I know y- you can't not put on pressure you've got to agot to put on some pressure- but it's the pressure of relationship//

9.17 L Yes.

9.18 JHthe pre- pressure of in- interest and not just the pressure of pressure I know this is very subtle II

9.19 L Hehhh

10.1 JH and very difficult uh but if h's up against Martin's very uh high standards=

10.2 L =(Yes).


10.3 JH And this feeling of of pressure and this search for his own identity and his right to be himself then he may be driven at times to to behavior of this kind - stopping running the race - painting over the painting you see just to say - take account of me:e - I have my own feelings and I'm not just your thi:ng to use - I'm a person in my own right hhh uh added to this the bre:adth of this boy is terrific and one of the things that pays off in modem society after you've got your bits of paper and I agree with Martin you need your bits of paper- having got your bits of paper what pays off is breadth -people who can think for themselves people who have got personality and those are the ones who get th- the choice both in the top jobs in industry and in the uhh m- most most desirable universities in terms of what the uh the uh applicant uh wants - so don't discount this dilettante breadth which you've been describing -because a boy who is reasonably good at science and can paint a good picture and is reasonably good at games - you're describing a very able - broad flexible kind of young man - I agree that he would want a lot of encouragement and uh a certain amount of steering -and a certain amount of firmness - but uhhh as as a potential success in the long term uh I would have thought that he had gre:at prospects.

10.4 L Well that's very reassuring.

10.5 WG Can we talk about competition in a slightly different way because I can see it hh uh from a slightly different angle II

10.6? Hhhhh

10.7 WG to James and that is uhm (1.5) Martin you're good at - apparently everything - you know you're a very competent father and you're a very hh uhm competent cha:p altogether- uh from Jonathan's point of view uh you must seem to be uhm much better than him in most fields hhh now we do know that in every family situation there is rivalry between a son - and his father -this is a perfectly natural and normal part of growing up hhh and I wondered whether the competition that Jonathan is afraid of isn't the competition with you - and that possibly one way of coping with it might be that hh if you weren't so good at everything - Jonathan could be a little better.


10.8 M Well we have tried uhh in various thi- not to compete quite deliberately hh otherwise I'm i'fact - a perfectionist for myself but I would say extremely tolerant II

10.9? ( )

11.1 M I try to understand other people other people's failings and be tolerant of them rather than uhh reject people for not achieving what either I might wish to achieve or could achieve myself.

11.2 WG Hhh but somehow you're even even your use of the word achieving and failing - hh are uhm emotive words - that are very much uhm tch -- giving feelings and giving impressions - uh even if you don't mean to.

(2.00)

11.3 M Yes this is possible.

11.4 JM Lora w- we haven't heard from you very much w- with the young things here hhh I wonder - uh we've talked about the -possible competition between father and son hh but what about- a son who has a - a very bright sparky younger sister - is there not competition there in the family?

11.5 L Well yes I think he probably does feel that his sister is treading on his heels - and in fact I think she has always done this for almost from babyhood.

11.6 JM Do you chase your brother Susan?

11.7 S Yes sometimes hehh.

11.8 J I'm quite jealous of my sister getting anywhere ne:ar me really so - you know in the sense I keep on telling myself I have to go hh otherwise I've had it.

11.9 JH Mm (//)

11.10 L II It's very difficult - one can't very well discourage Susan - from going ahead - even though sometimes she is catching


up - on Jonathan hh - one - one must let her have her head of co//urse

11.11 m Of course.

11.12 L I'm fairly anxious that she- shouldn't- be treated- just as a girl and - less be expected of her.

11.13 WG Do you think that thi:is is what happened to you - I mean that//

Yes. 11.14 L

11.15WG you came with yes -- yes=

11.16 L =I think it's still happening I I st- believe that girls are still expected to achieve less than boys.

12.1 WG Hm but one of the things - that I'm uh conscious of uh meeting you all uh and this is really only the first time we've met so I've only seen one facet of you as a family - and that is that I would say that Lora you are in some ways the most depressed member of this family at the moment hhh uh this I suppose in a way is natural because uh it is your problem you- hehhh you hmm II

12.2 L Yes.

12.3 WG No I'm sorry I don't mean this is your problem but you odge- originally wrote

12.4 L Yes.

12. 5 WG So I make the assumption that perhaps you felt it - very strongly at the time -- and what I'm wondering is - how much -re:ally you are perhaps - depressed - and perhaps slightly miserable hh and possibly have cottoned on to Jonathan's //

12.6 L

12.7 WG

Mm.

not


coming up to expectations hh uh and given this as the reason for your depression.

(2.00)

12.8 L Oh that's very interesting (1.5) I think probably I should worry less about Jonathan - as I achieve more myself.

12.9 M ) I think )

12.10 WG) Can can you can you enlarge on that a little more?

12.11 L Well I sometimes feel- very frustrated living in the country and I feel at le- at least the children must get out - if I can't manage it myself at least they must.

12.12 WG So to a certain extent uh two things are happening one is that there is this sort of feeling of - your own personal depression hh and in another way you are trying to hh really uhm tch force I suppose the children - into a way of life you're not able to - enjoy yourself.

(2.5)

12.13 L Y- yes I don't know about force I II

12.14 WG I I I //

12.15 L Yes

12.16 L thou//ght carefully I used

1 2.17 M Wi : ish perhaps you know wish

13.1 WG I used the word force because you are in some way trying to persuade them uh not from words but through what you are doing and they are slightly reluctant to fit in and this is why I used the word force hh but I don't me:hhh:an that you're sort of whipping or f-//


13.2L No

13.3 WG or forcing them uh pressurising them to do it in so many words.

13.4 JH D'you do you feel do you feel that as a personality Lora you are as it were unused in terms of your your potentialities?

13.5 L Yes I'm trying very hard to hh uhm achieve more.

13.6 JH Yes.

13.7 L But I do feel- very often frustrated myself.

13.8 JH And now now that the children are getting older you can perhaps open some opportunities for developing you your own popotentialities and your own interests.

13.9 L Yes I've reached the stage where I can look back and think all the things I might have been able to do when I was twenty or something an and was not allowed to do and not encouraged to do hhh and- hope it's not too late for me to do some of them now.

13.10 rn It's never too late- start from now.

13.11 L Ri:hhght he//hhh.

13.12 JH hhh/ /hehhhh

13.13 WG Do you think do you think it might be possible that i:f you were given the opportunity to be able to do some of these things hh uh a lot of your anxiety about Jonathan would vanish?

13.14 L I think it probably would to a large extent yes.

13.15 WG So this is really in a way free floating anxiety that hhh happens to have lit upon Jonathan do you think hh because it's obviously I I don't think it's uh uh quite as easy as this because

( 1 . 00) it has- uhm --been put on to Jonathan because obviously- urnMartin has got anxieties about Jonathan and therefore this is an area


in which you feel hh you can pull together and understand each other -- uh because you can talk about the same thing which is both -uh both feeling that hhh uh Jonathan - perhaps isn't - re:aching the standards you would like him to reach hhh uh is it as easy for you to talk about- your own frustration as it is to talk about - uh Jonathan's problems?

14.1 L No I think I think I talk about them quite a lot quite explosively.

14.2? Ma-//

14.3? (D//id)

14.4 M (I must) chip in on this II

14.5? Mm

14.6 M because I think the analysis is brilliant i- it is partially Lora's own - mainly intellectual uh under -employment.

14.7 ? Mm

14.8 JH Mm

14.9 MIt is possibly also uh- a sense of frustration that because of a - considerable tolerance on my part I haven't perhaps achieved the worldly things I should have achieved hhh I've worked very hard to - qualify I've uhh worked uh very hard in many other fields uh in fact uh qualified- in other fields quite reasonably not only the one in which I'm working and I'm not using - this i- in the direct material and profitable sense and perhaps by changing jobs (first of all) I could uh uhh join the rat race - to much to much better purpose financially - and I think this may be part of the effect.

14.10 JH ()what do you say to that Lora is tha- do you go along with that?

14.11 L I'm amazed he said it but I think it's quite true.


14.12 JH Ah hah.

14.13 LIt's the first time he's ever said anything of the kind.

14.14 JH Hm mm.

14.15 L I feel that- if I had his energy and intelligence- I would have broken out before now.

14.16 JH But- but y- you Martin find the ratrace as it at present exists somewhat distasteful you would rather uh do a job on the uh k-kitchen at home when it's falling apart here and there as kitchens do uhh you'd rather d- direct your energies there than in Wting on in the meritocracy uh struggle.

15.1 M Hhh it's not so much - a kitchen thing I think I I'm really much more interested in people I'm interested particularly in young people and - I - did have taken - quite a lot of pleasure and have spent a lot of time teaching children to swim.

15.2 JH Hehh//hh

15.3 M and this has been entirely unpaid in fact it's cost me a little to get the//

15.4 J Mm

15.5 M swimming qualification.

15.6 JH Mm.

15.7 M But I've enjoyed it uh i- if on the other hand I managed to employ my ability as a swimming teacher profitably I could probably earn quite a lot of money.

(2.00)

15.8 WG I- it seems to me in some ways- Lora that what you're saying is that - everyone else in the family is having the opportunity to find out - how good they are to be able to test themselves out to go in for the competitions if you like hh//


15.9 rn Find out what they are I would//

15.10 WG Yes.

15.11 rn Say.

15.12 WG And this uh you feel in some ways is being denied to you?

15.13 L Yes.

15.14 WG Uhm- if you had the opportunity to join hh I'll say the rat race- but- I'm I don't quite mean that but I mean the competitive society - hh would you then feel happier?

15.15 L Well I think it would certainly give me something else to worry about instead of worrying about what they were achieving I would be thinking about my own problems mo- more often.

15.16 WG I- is there any reason why uh you haven't done something about it up till now is it that you really haven't had the opportunities urn and chances to be able to even start at things or are you one of the sort of people who

(2.00) somehow always say uhm if only but really even with opportunities never seem to grasp them.

16.1 L No I don't honestly think I'm that kind of person - I think I. lack - energy - I haven't nearly as much energy as the other members of the family - in order to get any qualification at any rate I would have to travel twenty miles i- i- in one direction twenty miles back besides putting in - a a day's -study and I just feel I cannot do that hh which means that I have to - work at something at home -now I am beginning to do this now - and it's taking up more of my time and energy - and I hope that perhaps it will uh to some extent - distract me from the children.

16.2 WG But distracting you from the children isn't what you want because I I sense in your voice a great deal of resentment hhhh that you're not having -- the opportunities - that you feel that you ought to I don't think you're blaming uh just your family for this I think


you're blaming hh society and life and what happened to you when you were at school there were a lot of things obviously that were to blame.

16.3 L Well in fact I've begun writing now which- has had some success - and I can do that - at home - when I mean working at home I mean doing - some other job other than housework but working in the house - this is the only outlet I Gan find I've been struggling for an outlet for - well - twelve years at any rate since the children were very small - I had felt very - shut in.

16.4 WG But it isn't only an outlet you're looking for you're looking for a challenge because this is the word that hh keeps on coming up in the family - and because it keeps on coming up in the family I believe that it's a word that's extremely important to you.

16.5 L Yes I feel that I ought to achieve something- I would like to be able to say - this time is mine I am professionally engaged in doing something or other for two hours for instance and I I'm not to be interrupted by trivialities such as where is the biro or washing up orwh//

16.6 JH quite a lot of women feel like this they they feel that they haven't got any ti:me for themselves alo:ne and for what they want and for what they are and I think you should carve out sacred ti:me for yourself to get on with your own - uh interest - all this family must accept that Mum has the right to her own time.

16.7 L (Can I (

16.8 JM (I I want to but in here for a second because- Jonathan and Susan have been sitting si:lently all the time listening to this I want to ask them if thev would like - mother to have this fulfilling ss- special time when she can be somebody other than your mother -Susan what do you think- can you make it possible for her? Would you hhh keep out of her way for a couple of hours a day while she's working on something?

17.1 S Yes I think I would.

17.2 1M And what about Jonathan would you//


17.3 J Yes I think she ought to have - some sacred time because she's - doing enough and uhh seeing the other three of the family is so active I think she ought to have - some involvement - in something she likes doing some time of the day hh and seeing - the other three are doing so much I think we ought to be fair to her and let her get on and just le:ave her alone even if it's we've lost our heads.

17.4 ? ( Hehhhh hehhhh

17.5? ( Heh. hhhh (

17.6 ? ( Hehhhh hehhhh

17.7 JH Nicely put II Jonathan hehhh.

17.8 WG Can I come back to a completely different tack uhm re:ally what is happening in - your your family as a family hh is that - the attention of the family is being focussed on Jonathan - and it's because of this that he doesn't manage to give of his best because he feels the focus of attention=

17.9 JH =The anxiety becomes too great.

17.10? Hm mm=

17.11 WG =Now I feel that the reason that he has become the focus of attention is quite fortuitous - it is it's quite by chance in some ways hh that his - academic progress has become the focus which you as a family are all looking at hhh it may be that some of the problems that are going on in the family are very painful hh and it may be that it's much less painful to be able to hh I suppose in a way almost scapegoat Jonathan and look at his problems than to look at some of the other things that are going on - certainly we ha:ve - today hh seen - one or two other things I think - that uh are happening hhh and I f- myself feel that i:if there could be some sort of reorganisation hhh some redistribution of anxiety and of feelings - among the four of you as a family hhh not necessarily in a better way or a worse way but just in a slightly different way - hh then I think probably uh Jonathan's problems would be solved hh and perhaps


( 1 . 00) some of your other problems that aren't quite so evident at the moment may hh uhm surface up and be solved just as easily.

18.1 M Yes one uh question that I would like to ask might be relevant here

(1.5) could we - tackle this problem of scapegoating one person by --a physical separation hhh for example would it be - advisable perhaps to send him to a boarding school where- possibly there might be- a more enlivening standard of achievement of the other boys hh uhm a - possibly a higher academic level - which he will - try to emulate without any - great effort of his own - and also the fact that we are not there to supervise him from day to day hh so that he would feel freeer uh one could --ideally choose a school- (a) to suit him and (b) to to - suit the distance so that he could be a weekly boarder until he gets used to it - and perhaps boarder after that - or would you say ii- it would be best for him and for us hh uh to let him plunge in -straightaway into - full boarding hh do you think this - could possibly solve Jona//than's problem

18.2 JH Jonathan won't//

18.3 M I know he himself - would say straightaway he doesn't want it but ( ) your opinion about it.

18.4 JH Well my opinion would be with Jonathan.

18.5 WG I I don't think that he ought to- uh be sent awa:y from the family because I think that this will intensify the position.

18.6 JH Yes

18.7 J I don't really want to go away to boarding school because- I I think that uhm - everybody would be wondering more as they said before - what I'm doing and how I'm getting on and that would -automatically make me more worried in case I wasn't doing it.

18.8 JH Hmmm.

18.9 WG You see this is a problem- of a family living together and coping together hh and taking one person out of it and saying hh


you go away and we'll - try and cope uh without you and you cope by yourself isn't solving the family problem - it may solve other problems but uhm I think the real problems that are going on hhh the word problem I think is too strong all the same but the real sort of hhh feelings that are going on have got to be sorted out between the four of you together hhh and taking him awa:y in the hope that he's going to do well academically isn't going to solve the other sort of emotional problems in the feelings that are going on underneath.

19.1 M Yes- I don't regard boarding as a- a separation from the fafamily - I've (they) regard uh - the fact of boarding hh really as a prolo:nged study daily study - prolonged over a few weeks - but -the home life -.should if anything be strengthened by this

19.2 WG But Jonathan has already s- said himself// that he feels (this)

19.3? that he has answered the question=

19.4 WG =Yes I I- don't want you to get the impression that rivalry in the family is ba:d or wrong I mean it's perfectly nor//mal

19.5M Yes

19.6 WG part of growing up - and you're helping him to cope with it and live through it//

19.7 Thank you

19.8 and come to terms with it and understand it- is really part of the growing up and learning process.

19.9 M Yes I didn't want to avoid the rivalry=

19.10 WG =Yes

19.11 M What I was uh wondering is whether in your opinion it would help him hh to develop if he could sidestep the rivalry for a time and develop without it for a term or so then come back and hh


resume our- relationship family relationship On slightly better terms after uh uhhh say a few weeks separation=

19.12 JH =It wouldn't- work out=

19.13 M =which he could develop on it it wouldn't?

19.14 JH No I'm afraid it wouldn't work out that way uh Jonathan very naturally and I would feel just the same i- in the same situation hh will feel excluded from from the family - there is Susan at home -with family he's excluded and away hh and this is not I think the answer to Jonathan's problem I think Jonathan is saying hh uh take account of me:e - here I am a person with my own values my own ideals hhh uhm I want my values to be taken into account I want me to be taken into account hh I don't want .iust to live up to other people's expectations about me - let me be myself- you see and he can't do this by taking awa.y from the family - circle he can't work through that and you all can't work through it - to allow each -- so far as the others are concerned - to allow each to be him or herself.

20.1 WG You see I think being a parent is a very difficult thi:ng because - we have to - trust our children - and allow them to make -their own mistakes hhh and and - have enough - faith and confidence in him - and trust to - let him get on with the job of learning by himself oh! I mean - I'm - not - suggesting - you -don't-give-him-any-help hhh uh and I I think you must- continue to do what James said that is to take an interest in him - but I think you've got to - trust hi:m that he feels that it is important that he should get certain academic qualifications hh and I think that left alo:ne and not pressurized hhh uh he will attain these - in the same way at a certain stage you had to allow him to travel to school by himself hhh to cross the road by himself these are all hazards uh and they are hazards that you came to terms hh uh although you realise that there are inherent dangers now in the same way you've got to hh have sufficient confidence in him - I you've spoken extremely highly of him - you you've said what a what a nice chap he is and hh uh what a a broadly based character he is hhh uh you have got -trust and confidence but you've - not only to talk about it but you've got to show him hh and I think - you show him this by hh if you like taking the pressure off him tch realising that hh once family tch reorganises itself hh uh he will - work along and - probably do quite adequately - he may not do brilliantly because - his standards may be


very similar hh to yours which are - not to go into the rat race but to sort of find a personal fulfillment uhm in working hh with other people uh - and I think that hh once you begin to accept this hh uh a very difficult part of the job of being a parent then I think life will be a lot easier - for you all in relationship - to each other.

20.2 JM Lora you - clearly as as the core of the whole family you have got to find some time for yourself hhh let's start giving some rules - whe:n - do you think that - time would be most productive fulfilling for you?

20.3 L Between - nine and eleven in the morning- definitely that is my - best time for writing.

20.4 JM And what normally happens then that stops you writing?

20.5 L Well of course all through the holidays and weeke:nds- there are interruptions - people want something or a sock is missing and so forth - and then of course in the week things quite often happen in the mornings which I feel I ought to do instead perhaps or the washing- uhm perhaps I'm over conscientious- I feel I ought to put the family first-- this causes a certain amount of stress- I don't know which which to put first myself- or the family's needs-- I think it was yesterday I only - I'd just settled down to write and immediately - there was an interruption because the paper hadn't come and what-had-happened-to-it and where-wa.s-it and I was very cross because I couldn't get back to writing again hh I feel I ought to lock the door or something they sign up for things they have something organised hh I can't very well say I have writing organised

20.6WG Mm

21.1 L for certain hours hh - they say I. have signed on for this course that course may-we-have-lunch-early-I-shall-behome-late-we-shall-be-coming-home-at-different-hours and so forth- and I feel that- I'm always W!Shed to the wall- against the pressure of their activities because they have so much more energy than I have- and they always seem to get their - organisation done -first.


21.2 WG I think this is exactly where you're wro:ng - because I think you're allowing yourself to be pushed around by the family hh there's no reason at a:ll why you shouldn't say between nine and eleven you just couldn't pretend that I'm not here and get on without me hhh I think this has happened in two ways I think that one because you feel yourself undervalued in other spheres hh you have more - tch uhm tch -- more commitment if you like you have more to lose and more to gain by being a good mother and being a good wife and therefore I think in some ways you're making yourself more necessary hh than you need to be by huh being there to take them around it's very ni:ce uh for you to hh take them down to the bus and give them meals early but equally - at this stage these sort of things they ought to be able to do themselves - it won't do them any harm at all=

21.3 JH =It will do them good.

21.4 L Yes.

21.5 WG And the second point is I think as long as you sacrifice yourself to your family and allo:w this to happen hh you are not doing the best thing for your family hh//

21.6 L (//)

21.7 WG the best possible thing you can say is that I must find myself as a person because once I do that I will be a much better mother and a much better wife. ·

21.8 J I think we can help- by planning what we're going to do bein those - two hours and if we want lunch early hh by arrang-ing what we're going to have and checking beforehand that it's alright to have that hh and then - Lora can go and do her writing and we can get on with what we're doing.

21.9 JH It'll be a struggle- Lora

21.10 L Mm

21.11 JH until you get this thing set up but- keep at it and when you have got it set up you'll find that you have got more energy


because there'll be less frustration and there's nothing saps energy like frustration.

21.12 L Oh yes.

22.1? Mm.

22.2 JM Lora I hope - you're glad you wrote that letter to us anyway

22.3? Mm

22.4 JM short stories or not I'm glad you wrote the letter because you've allowed us to meet you as a family and .get to know you -and you've been very tolerant with all the - very personal questions we've been asking thank you all hh thank you especially Sue - and Jonathan.

22.5 L Thank you all very much I'm sure that your advice - will be - very useful to me - I certainly intend to pursue it.

-0-0-0-0-

account(s), 36, 38, 39, 40, 44,48,49,57, 85, 86, 88, 93 accounts, moral adequacy of

43,57 alternative determinate account, 54, 57,77 alternative determinate possible account, 46, 49, 50, 58,93 alternative determinate version, 48 attention ala vie, 12, 27 authorisation procedure, 62

Bakewell, J., 73, 74 bipartisan, 42 break-down of marriage, 41,

53,56,58 categorising, 54 category-bound activities, 92 Cervantes, 14 contrastive structure 23, 24,

25, 33, 35 conversational analysis, 4 conversational materials, 38,

42 correctness, 85 correspondence theory, 45 court settings~ 80 courts, 17

description,27, 34,44,87 determinate alternative

possible account, 42, 43, 44,48

disagreeing, 77 disagreement, 77, 80 disjuncture, 69

INDEX

137

docile texts, 4 Don Juan, 1

Don Quixote, 1, 14, 15, 16, 27,28

epoche, 12,27 ethnomethodology, 4 experiments, 6 expert, 58, 59, 71, 75, 77,

78, 79, 80,81,82

facticity, 49, 85, 86 factual correctness, 87 factual account, 36 factually objective account 48 factually objective account. 43 family 1, 2, 6, 43, 75, 58,

60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 81, 85, 87,89,90,93

family organisation, 77,79 family problems, 59 finite province of meaning, 11 freezing out, 21, 44, 45

Garfinkel 4, 30, 31, 34, 35, 87

glosses, 53 Greengross, W., 74

identification, 55, 62 identity(ies), 46, 49, 50, 51,

53, 54, 56,-57, 65, 75, 77, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91,93

identity puzzle, 85, 86, 87, 88,89,90


implicativeness, 54, 56, 58, 65, 71, 72, 79

interactional troubles, 60 interviews, 6 ironicized, 17 ironicizing, 20, 32 ironies, 17

James, W., 10, 11, 14, 16

Kuhn, T., 12

label, 46 labelling-as-correspondence,

46 Lemert, E., 21

male chauvinism, 54 marital troubles, 47 marriage 41, 43, 47, 50, 51,

53,54 marriage break-down, 1, 7,

35, 37,46,47,93 membership categories, 55 mental illness, 1, 23, 24, 33,

36, 39,43,44,45,46 mentally ill, 22, 23, 26, 33,

34,35,39,48 misogyny, 54 moral adequacy, 33, 37, 40,

42, 48, 52, 66, 85, 86, 87,93

moral assessment 45, 48, 49, 51, 53, 56, 89

moral defensibility, 69 moral involvement, 41 multiple realities, 6, 9, 11,

12, 13, 14, 15, 1~ 28, 29,92

naturally occurring setting, 1, 3, 58, 59,78,83,90

naturally occurring situation, 81, 88

noticeable absence, 80

objective, 36 objective facticity, 33, 57 objectivity, 22 organisation of family, 77, 78

paranoia, 1, 19, 27, 28 participant observation, 6 partisan, 41, 42, 48, 50, 51,

56,58 partisanship, 37, 51 politics, 16, 19, 30 politics of persuasion, 59, 83,

90 Pollner, M., 1, 7, 15, 16,

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28,29, 30, 32, 35, 58, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83,90, 92,93

possible descriptions, 86 pre-program talk, 61 problem of relevance, 13 program, 61, 73, 79 puzzle, 22, 65 puzzles, 65

questionnaires, 6

radio organisation, 61 radio program, 1, 4, 7, 50,

57,59,65, 78, 81, 88, 89,90,93

reality disjuncture, 6, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 27, 78, 81, 82,83,90,92

relevances, 30 Rokeach, M., 16

Sacks, H., 4, 5, 50, 51, 52, 67,90,93,94

Sancho Panza, 15 Schegloff, E.A., 5 Schutz, A., 1, 7, 9, 10, 11,

12, 13, 15, 27, 28, 29, 31,58, 81,92,93

scientific attitude, 30 scientific rationalities, 31, 32 scientific theorising, 31 second story(ies), 67, 68 sense-assembly, 1, 50, 88,

90,93 Smith, D., 1, 7, 21, 22, 23,

24,26, 27, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,43,44, 45,48,49, 57, 58, 62, 85,86,93

social unit, 51 sociological theories, 2 standardised relational pairs,

(SRP), 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,55,57, 88

INDEX

story(ies), 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 87

subversion, 93 subvert, 34,35,54,57 subverting accounts, 44, 46,

50 suicidal, 52 Szasz, T., 23

talk, 82, 89 troubles, 59 Turner, R., 3

ultra-rich topic, 70 unit event, 41 unit troubles, 42, 43, 44, 49 unit affair, 56

veridicality, 10, 34, 85

139

Documents

Cuff (1993). Problems of Versions in Everyday Situations. University Press of America