Crimpro - Cases - Set 1-1

7/30/2019 Crimpro - Cases - Set 1-1

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G.R. No. 104392 February 20, 1996

RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in hiscapacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, BaguioCity, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used intransporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio CitypLoakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in

On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with apassenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road,Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudenceresulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2,1990 against petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court ofBaguio City, Branch III, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7514-R. Amonth later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by privaterespondent Boado against petitioner himself. The complaint, docketed as Civil CaseNo. 2050-R, was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him,citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court, in itsorder dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuantto the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, inaddition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case.

Petitioner took the matter on certiorariand prohibition to the Court of Appeals,maintaining that the civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal casebecause no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in thecriminal case.

On January 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition on the authorityof Garcia v. Florido,1andAbellana v. Marave,2which it held allowed a civil action fordamages to be filed i ndependently of the criminal action even though no reservationto file the same has been made. Therefore, it was held, the trial court correctly deniedpetitioner's motion to suspend the proceedings in the civil case.3

Hence this petition for review on certiorari. There is no dispute that privaterespondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring aseparate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the driver, HerminioAndaya, or against the latter's employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. Thequestion is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent maynonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the followingprovisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, therebeing fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such

fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relationbetween the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by theprovisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable notonly for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons forwhom one is responsible.

. . . .

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employeesand household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quotedprovisions is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising fromnegligence under the Revised Penal Code.

However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that acivil action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately fromthe criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved. This Rulereads:

Sec. I. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action isinstituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is i mpliedlyinstituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the

civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes thecivil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action i ncludes recovery of indemnity under the RevisedPenal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 2176 of the CivilCode of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of theaccused.

. . . .

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall bemade before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and undercircumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity tomake such reservation.

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the casesprovided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved maybe brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of thecriminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Based on these provisions, petitioner argues that the civil action against him wasimpliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employeebecause private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this action separately.(The records show that while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, thecriminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a

formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the prosecution failed toprosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioner's argument that since thecivil action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, thedismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.)

Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civilaction against Andaya's employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided inArts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, theirenforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforcethem separately. Private respondent cites in support of his position statements madeinAbellana v. Marave,4Tayag v. Alcantara,5Madeja v. Caro,6andJarantilla v. Courtof Appeals,7to the effect that the requirement to reserve the civil action is substantive

in character and, therefore, is beyond the rule making power of this Court under theConstitution.8

After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion thatthe right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved asrequired by Rule III, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed.

I.

A. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to instituteseparately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will bedeemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are notlimited to those which arise "from the offense charged," as originally provided in RuleIII before the amendment of the Rules of Court i n 1988. In other words the right of theinjured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil l iability whether arising

from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must bereserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.9

Thus Rule III, 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal actionis instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives thecivil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes thecivil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action i ncludes recovery of indemnity under the RevisedPenal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of theCivil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission ofthe accused.

B. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule III, 1 and 3 are beyondthe rule making power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A carefulexamination of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of separatecivil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civilaction had been reserved rests on considerations other than that no reservation isneeded.

In Garcia v. Florido10 the right of an injured person to bring an action for damageseven if he did not make a reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution forphysical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld on the ground that by

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bringing the civil action the injured parties had "in effect abandoned their right topress for recovery of damages in the criminal case. . . . Undoubtedly an offendedparty loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only whenhe has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but alsowhen he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions hisinterest in the criminal case has disappeared."11The statement that Rule III, 1 of the1964 Rules is "an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33, and34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation" is not the ruling of theCourt but only an aside, quoted from an observation made in the footnote of adecision in another case.12

Another case cited by private respondent in support of his contention that the civil

case need not be reserved in the criminal case isAbellana v. Marave13in which theright of persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate action for damageswas sustained despite the fact that the right to bring it separately was not reserved.But the basis of the decision in that case was the fact that the fili ng of the civil casewas equivalent to a reservation because it was made after the decision of the CityCourt convicting the accused had been appealed. Pursuant to Rule 123, 7 of the1964 Rules, this had the effect of vacating the decision in the criminal case so thattechnically, the injured parties could still reserve their right to institute a civil actionwhile the criminal case was pending in the Court of First Instance. The statement "theright of a party to sue for damages independently of the criminal action is asubstantive right which cannot be frittered away by a construction that could render itnugatory" without raising a "serious constitutional question"14was thrown in only asadditional support for the ruling of the Court.

On the other hand, in Madeja v. Caro15 the Court held that a civil action for damagescould proceed even while the criminal case for homicide through reckless

imprudence was pending and did not have to await the termination of the criminalcase precisely because the widow of the deceased had reserved her right to file aseparate civil action for damages. We do not see how this case can lend support tothe view of private respondent.

InJarantilla v. Court of Appeals16the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in thecriminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground ofreasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages even though thefiling of the latter action was not reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Codewhich provides that "when an accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt hasnot been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action f or damages for the sameact or omission may be instituted." This ruling obviously cannot apply to this casebecause the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the driver is the factthat the prosecution failed to prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formaloffer of its evidence. Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that"The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Thepurpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."

To the same effect are the holdings in Tayag, Sr. v.Alcantara,17Bonitev.Zosa18 and Diong Bi Chu v. Court of Appeals.19Since Art. 29 of the Civil Codeauthorizes the bringing of a separate civil action in case of acquittal on reasonabledoubt and under the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure such action is not requiredto be reserved, it is plain that the statement in these cases that to require areservation to be made would be to sanction an unauthorized amendment of the CivilCode provisions is a mere dictum. As already noted in connection with the caseof Garcia v. Florido, that statement was not the ruling of the Court but only anobservation borrowed from another case.20

The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the propositionherein made that, on the basis of Rule III, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civilliability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only(1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is t he subject ofthe criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3)such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has notbeen reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, theacquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal isbased on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not existbecause of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of the

civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been regarded a matterof procedure and, since the rule making power has been conferred by theConstitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this Court. Thus the subject wasprovided for by G.O. No. 58, the first Rules of Criminal Procedure under theAmerican rule. Sec. 107 of these Orders provided:

The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injuredby the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of theoffense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason ofthe same shall not be held to be abridged by the provisions of this order;but such person may appear and shall be heard either individually or byattorney at all stages of the case, and the court upon conviction of theaccused may enter judgment against him for the damages occasionedby his wrongful act. It shall, however, be the duty of the promotor fiscalto direct the prosecution, subject to the right of t he person injured toappeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right.

This was superseded by the 1940 Rules of Court, Rule 106 of which provided:

Sec. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. - Unlessthe offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved theright to institute it after the termination of the criminal case, and subjectto the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or byattorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

This Rule was amended thrice, in 1964, in 1985 and lastly in 1988. Through all theshifts or changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act or omissionfor which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change has beeneffected by this Court. Whatever contrary impression may have been createdby Garcia v.Florido21 and its progeny22must therefore be deemed to have beenclarified and settled by the new rules which require reservation of the right to recoverthe civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the

criminal action.

Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separatecivil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeatsubstantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderlyprocedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter theRevised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is alsocivilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet noone has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may bebrought separately.

Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Codeseparately must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent character ofsuch actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil actionsto proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before theymay be institutedat all, a reservation to bring them separately must be made. Put inanother way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution throughthe filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome ofthe criminal case.

C. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civilaction under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing ofmore than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any

award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liabilityunder Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 ofthe Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused.23

In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver.Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have beenheld subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action(whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be nopossibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there wouldbe no pronouncement as to the civil liability of t he accused. In such a case theinstitution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would notresult in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rulerequiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against doublerecovery for the same act or omission.24As held in Barredo v. Garcia,25the injuredparty must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have

elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such acase his cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of thelatter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

II.

Nor does it matter that t he action is against the employer to enforce his vicariousliability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminalcase, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute aseparate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is notreserved.26The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding andconclusive upon the employer "not only with regard to its civil liability but also withregard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated butfollows that of his employee"27is true not only with respect to the civil liability arisingfrom crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Sincewhatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from

the employee, the policy against double recovery requires that only one action bemaintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against theemployee or against his employer. Thus in Dulay v.Court of Appeals28this Court heldthat an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and that the right tobring the action did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted beforethe criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against theemployer constituted an express reservation of the right t o institute it separately.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint againstpetitioner is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 119771 April 24, 1998

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE andSURETY CORPORATION,respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being drivenby its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San IldefonsoLines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of JuliaVargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totallywrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in theprocess.

A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig onSeptember 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier,with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physicalinjuries.

About four (4) months l ater, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondentPioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as i nsurer of the van andsubrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional TrialCourt of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motorvehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00(P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 asappearance fees.) 1

With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the petitioners' answer to thecomplaint for damages and after submission by the parties of their respective pre-trialbriefs, petitioners filed on September 18, 1992 a Manifestation and Motion toSuspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case againstpetitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make areservation to file a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied bythe Manila Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 21, 1993, 2ruling thus:

Answering the first question thus posed, the court holdsthat plaintiff may legally institute the present civil actioneven in the absence of a reservation in the criminal action.This is so because it falls among the very exceptions to therule cited by the movant.

It is true that the general rule is that once a criminal actionhas been instituted, then civil action based thereon isdeemed instituted together with the criminal action, suchthat if the offended party did not reserve the filing of thecivil action when the criminal action was filed, then suchfiling of the civil action is therefore barred; on the otherhand, if there was such reservation, still the civil actioncannot be instituted until final judgment has been renderedin the criminal action;

But, this rule (Section 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court)is subject to exemptions, the same being those providedfor in Section 3 of the same rule which states:

Sec. 3. When civil action mayproceed independently. Inthe cases provided for inArticles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 ofthe Civil Code of the Philippines,the independent civil actionwhich was been reserved maybe brought by the offended

party, shall proceedindependently of the criminalaction, and shall require only apreponderance of evidence.

Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of t heformer Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be areservation in the criminal case of the right to institute anindependent civil action has been declared as not inaccordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorizedamendment to our substantive law, i.e., the Civil Codewhich does not require such reservation. In fact, thereservation of the right to file an independent civil actionhas been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with thedecisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a

reservation as ineffective. (Bonite vs. Zosa, 162 SCRA180).

Further, the Court rules that a subrogee-plaintiff mayinstitute and prosecute the civil action, it being allowed byArticle 2207 of the Civil Code.

After their motion for reconsideration of said July 21, 1993 Order was denied,petitioners elevated the matter to this Court via petition for certiorariwhich was,however, referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. On February24, 1995, a decision adverse to petitioners once again was rendered by respondentcourt, upholding the assailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order in this wise:

A separate civil action lies against the offender in acriminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted andfound guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party

is not allowed (if t he tortfeasor is actually charged alsocriminally), to recover damages on both scores, and wouldbe entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award ofthe two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the saidarticles to the result of the criminal prosecution whetherit be conviction or acquittal would render meaninglessthe independent character of the civil action and the clearinjunction in Art. 31, that this action may proceed

independently of the criminal proceedings and regardlessof the result of the l atter.

In Yakult Phil. vs. CA, the Supreme Court said:

Even if there was no reservationin the criminal case and that thecivil action was not filed beforethe filing of the criminal actionbut before the prosecutionpresented evidence in the

criminal action, and the judgehandling the criminal case wasinformed thereof, then the actualfiling of the civil action is evenfar better than a compliancewith the requirement of anexpress reservation that shouldbe made by the offended partybefore the prosecutionpresented its evidence.

The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to preventthe offended party from recovering damages twice for thesame act or omission.

Substantial compliance with the reservation requirement

may, therefore, be made by making a manifestation in thecriminal case that the private respondent has instituted aseparate and independent civil action for damages.

Oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not placeundue importance on technicalities when by so doingsubstantial justice is sacrificed. While the rules ofprocedure require adherence, it must be remembered thatsaid rules of procedure are intended to promote, notdefeat, substantial justice, and therefore, they should notbe applied in a very rigid and technical sense.

Hence, this petition for review after a motion f or reconsideration of saidrespondent court judgment was denied.

The two (2) crucial issues to be resolved, as posited by petitioners, are:

1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delictunder Article 2176 of the Civil Code be fil ed if no reservation was made in thesaid criminal case?

2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an i ndependent civil action duringthe pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to fil e anindependent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that theprivate complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in theaforementioned criminal case?

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We rule for petitioners.

On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules ofCourt which reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the casesprovided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved maybe brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of thecriminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.There is no dispute that these so-called "independent civil actions"based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions tothe primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set forth in

Section 2 of Rule 111. 3However, it is easily deducible from the presentwording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988 amendments to theRules on Criminal Procedure particularly the phrase ". . . which hasbeen reserved" that the "independent" character of these civil actionsdoes not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words, priorreservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independentcivil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuousdetermination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. Thatthis should now be the controlling procedural rule is confirmed by noless than retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and amember of the committee which drafted the 1988 amendments, whoselearned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by petitioners,to wit:The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which hisdeemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived,reserved or previously instituted. . . .Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action i ncludes not

only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damagesunder Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but alsodamages under Article 2176 of the said code. . . .Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However,in view of Article 2177 of the said code which provides that the offendedparty may not recover twice for the same act or omission of theaccused, and in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, theseobjections were overruled. In any event, the offended party is notprecluded from filing a civil action to recover damages arisingfrom quasi-delictbefore the institution of the criminal action, or fromreserving his right to file such a separate civil action, just as he is notprecluded from filing a civil action for damages under Articles 32, 33 and34 before the institution of the criminal action, or f rom reserving his rightto file such a separate civil action. It is only in those cases where theoffended party has not previously filed a civil action or has not reservedhis right to file a separate civil action that his civil action is deemed

impliedly instituted with the criminal action.It should be noted that while it was ruled inAbella vs. Marave (57 SCRA106) that a reservation of the right to fi le an independent civil action isnot necessary, such a reservation is necessary under the amendedrule. Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted.(Emphasis ours, Justice Jose Y. Feria [Ret.], 1988 Amendments to the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a pamphlet, published by CentralLawbook Publishing Co., Inc., Philippine Legal Studies, Series No. 3, 5-6). 4

Sharing the same view on the indispensability of a prior reservation is Mr. JusticeFlorenz D. Regalado, whose analysis of the historical changes in Rule 111 since the1964 Rules of Court is equally illuminating. Thus,

1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civilliability arising from the offense charged was impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action, unless such civil actionwas expressly waived or reserved. The offended party wasauthorized to bring an independent civil action in the casesprovided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the CivilCode provided such right was reserved.In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same Rule111 thereof reiterated said provision on the civil liabilityarising from the offense charged. The independent civilactions, however, were limited to the cases provided for inArticles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, obviously becausethe actions contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177 of saidCode are not liabilities ex-delicto. Furthermore, noreservation was required in order the civil actions in saidArticles 32, 33 and 34 may be pursued separately.2. The present amendments introduced by the SupremeCourt have the following notable features on this particularprocedural aspect, viz:a. The civil action which is impliedly instituted with thecriminal action, barring a waiver, reservation or priorinstitution thereof, need not arise from the offensecharged, as the phrase "arising from t he offense charged"which creates that nexus has been specifically eliminated.b. The independent civil actions contemplated in thepresent Rule 111 include the quasi-delictsprovided for inArt. 2176 of the Civil Code, in addition to the cases

provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 34 thereof. It is necessary,however, that the civil liability under all the said articlesarise "from the same act or omission of theaccused." Furthermore, a reservation of the right toinstitute these separate civil actions is again requiredotherwise, said civil actions are impliedly instituted with thecriminal action, unless the former are waived or filedahead of the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied.) 5

In fact, a deeper reading of the "Yakult Phils. vs. CA" case 6relied upon byrespondent court reveals an acknowledgment of the reservation requirement. Afterrecognizing that the civil case i nstituted by private respondent therein Roy Camaso(represented by his father David Camaso) against petitioner Yakult Phils. (the ownerof the motorcycle that sideswiped Roy Camaso, only five years old at the time of theaccident) and Larry Salvado (the driver of the motorcycle) during the pendency of thecriminal case against Salvado for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physicalinjuries, as one based on tort, this Court said:

The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission ofthe accused in this case is a quasi-delictas defined underArticle 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:

xxx xxx xxxThe aforecited rule [referring to the amended Section l,Rule 111] requiring, such previous reservation also coversquasi-delictas defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Codearising from the same act or omission of the accused(emphasis supplied).

But what prompted the Court to validate the institution and non-suspension of the civil case involved in "Yakult" was the peculiar factsattendant therein. Thus,

Although the separate civil action filed in this case waswithout previous reservation in the criminal case,neverthelesssince it was instituted before the prosecutionpresented evidence in the criminal action, and the judgehandling the criminal case was informed thereof, then theactual filing of the civil action is even far better than acompliance with the requirement of an express reservationthat should be made by the offended party before the

prosecution presents its evidence.

The distinct factual scenario in "Yakult" simply does not obtain in this case. Nosatisfactory proof exists to show that private respondent PISC's damage suit wasinstituted before the prosecution presented its evidence in the criminal case pendingin the Pasig Regional Trial Court. Neither is there any indication that the judgepresiding over the criminal action has been made aware of the civil case. It is in thislight that reliance on the "Yakult" case is i ndeed misplaced.

Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern theinstitution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules ofCourt, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an"unauthorized amendment" to substantive law i.e., the Civil Code, should nolonger be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honoreddictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends ofsubstantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has

mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights withthe end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedydisposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantiverights. 7Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is,to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta": 8

. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard againstoppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clearcongested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; inshort, the attainment of justice with the least expense andvexation to the parties-litigants.

Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the CivilCode, 9is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damagessuit based on quasi-delictarising from the same act or ommission of petitioner Javiercomplained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into

the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound toobserve the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herselfinstituted the civil case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appealsdated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motionfor reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed bypetitioners is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113032 August 21, 1997

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WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., HOMERO L. VILLASIS, DIMASENRIQUEZ, PRESTON F. VILLASIS & REGINALD F. VILLASIS, petitioner,vs.RICARDO T. SALAS, SALVADOR T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALAS-TUBILLEJA,ANTONIO S. SALAS, RICHARD S. SALAS & HON. J UDGE PORFIRIOPARIAN, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Up for review on certiorariare: (1) the Decision dated September 6, 1993 and (2) theOrder dated November 23, 1993 of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Il oilo City

in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 for estafa and falsification of a publicdocument, respectively. The judgment acquitted the private respondents of bothcharges, but petitioners seek to hold them civilly liable.

Private respondents Ricardo T. Salas, Salvador T. Salas, Soledad Salas-Tubilleja,Antonio S. Salas, and Richard S. Salas, belonging to the same family, are themajority and controlling members of the Board of Trustees of Western Institute ofTechnology, Inc. (WIT, for short), a stock corporation engaged in the operation,among others, of an educational institution. According to petitioners, the minoritystockholders of WIT, sometime on June 1, 1986 in the principal office of WIT at LaPaz, Iloilo City, a Special Board Meeting was held. In attendance were othermembers of the Board including one of the petitioners Reginald Villasis. Prior toaforesaid Special Board Meeting, copies of notice thereof, dated May 24, 1986, weredistributed to all Board Members. The notice allegedly indicated that the meeting tobe held on June 1, 1986 included Item No. 6 which states:

Possible implementation of Art. III, Sec. 6 of the Amended By-Laws ofWestern Institute of Technology, Inc. on compensation of all officers ofthe corporation. 1

In said meeting, the Board of Trustees passed Resolution No. 48, s. 1986, grantingmonthly compensation to the private respondents as corporate officers retroactiveJune 1, 1985, viz

.:

Resolution No. 48 s. 1986

On the motion of Mr. Richard Salas (accused), duly seconded by Mrs.Soledad Tubilleja (accused), it was unanimously resolved that:

The Officers of the Corporation be grantedmonthly compensation for services rendered

as follows: Chairman P9,000.00/month,Vice Chairman P3,500.00/month,Corporate Treasurer P3,500.00/month andCorporate Secretary P3,500.00/month,retroactive June 1, 1985 and the ten percentum of the net profits shall be distributedequally among the ten members of the Boardof Trustees. This shall amend and superceed(sic) any previous resolution.

There were no other business.

The Chairman declared the meeting adjourned at 5:11 P.M.

This is to certify that the foregoing minutes of the regular meeting of theBoard of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. held onMarch 30, 1986 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge andbelief.

A few years later, that is, on March 13, 1991, petitioners Homero Villasis, PrestodVillasis, Reginald Villasis and Di mas Enriquez filed an affidavit-complaint againstprivate respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo, as a result ofwhich two (2) separate criminal informations, one for falsification of a publicdocument under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and the other for estafaunder Article 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, were filed before Branch 33 of the RegionalTrial Court of Iloilo City. The charge for falsification of public document was anchoredon the private respondents' submission of WIT's income statement for the fiscal year1985-1986 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reflecting thereinthe disbursement of corporate funds for the compensation of private respondentsbased on Resolution No. 4, series of 1986, making it appear that the same waspassed by the board on March 30, 1986, when in truth, the same was actuallypassed on June 1, 1986, a date not covered by the corporation's fiscal year 1985-1986 (beginning May 1, 1985 and ending April 30, 1986). The Information forfalsification of a public document states:

The undersigned City Prosecutor accuses RICARDO T. SALAS,

SALVADOR T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALAS-TUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S.SALAS and RICHARD S. SALAS (whose dates and places of birthcannot be ascertained) of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLICDOCUMENT, Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed asfollows:

That on or about the 10th day of June, 1986,in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused, being then theChairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer,Secretary, and Trustee (who later becameSecretary), respectively, of the board oftrustees of the Western Institute ofTechnology, Inc., a corporation dulyorganized and existing under the laws of theRepublic of the Philippines, conspiring and

confederating together and mutually helpingone another, to better realized (sic) theirpurpose, did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and criminally prepare and executeand subsequently cause to be submitted tothe Securities and Exchange Commission anincome statement of the corporation for thefiscal year 1985-1986, the same beingrequired to be submitted every end of thecorporation fiscal year by the aforesaidCommission, and therefore, a publicdocument, including therein the disbursement

of the retroactive compensation of accusedcorporate officers in the amount ofP186,470.70, by then and there making itappear that the basis thereof Resolution No.4, Series of 1986 was passed by the board oftrustees on March 30, 1986, a date coveredby the corporation's fiscal year 1985-1986(i

.e., from May 1, 1985 to April 30, 1986),when in truth and in fact, as said accusedwell knew, no such Resolution No. 48, Seriesof 1986 was passed on March 30, 1986.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Iloilo City, Philippines, November 22, 1991. 3 [Emphasis ours].

The Information, on the other hand, for estafa reads:

The undersigned City Prosecutor accuses RICARDO SALAS,SALVADOR T. SALAS, SOLEDAD SALAS-TUBILLEJA, ANTONIO S.SALAS, RICHARD S. SALAS (whose dates and places of birth cannotbe ascertained) of the crime of ESTAFA, Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of theRevised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1986, inthe City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused, being then theChairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer,Secretary, and Trustee (who later becameSecretary), respectively; of the Board ofTrustees of Western Institute of Technology,Inc., a corporation duly organized andexisting under the laws of the Republic of thePhilippines, conspiring and confederatingtogether and mutually helping one another tobetter realize their purpose, did then andthere wilfully, unlawfully and feloniouslydefraud the said corporation (and itsstockholders) in the following manner, to wit:herein accused, knowing fully well that theyhave no sufficient, lawful authority to disburse let alone violation of applicable laws andjurisprudence, disbursed the funds of the

corporation by effecting payment of theirretroactive salaries in the amount ofP186,470.00 and subsequently payingthemselves every 15th and 30th of the monthstarting June 15, 1986 until the present, inthe amount of P19,500.00 per month, as ifthe same were their own, and when hereinaccused were informed of the illegality ofthese disbursements by the minoritystockholders by way of objections made in anannual stockholders' meeting held on June14, 1986 and every year thereafter, they

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refused, and still refuse, to rectify the same tothe damage and prejudice of the corporation(and its stockholders) in the total sum ofP1,453,970.79 as of November 15, 1991.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Iloilo City, Philippines, November 22, 1991. 4 [Emphasis ours]

Thereafter, trial for the two criminal cases, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 37097and 37098, was consolidated. After a full-blown hearing, Judge Porfirio Parianhanded down a verdict of acquittal on both counts 5 dated September 6, 1993 withoutimposing any civil liability against the accused therein.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 of the civil aspect of the RTC Decisionwhich was, however, denied in an Order dated November 23, 1993. 7

Hence, the instant petition.

Significantly on December 8, 1994, a Motion for Intervention, dated December 2,1994, was filed before this Court by Western Institute of Technology, Inc., supposedlyone of the petitioners herein, disowning its inclusion in the petition and submitting thatAtty. Tranquilino R. Gale, counsel for the other petitioners, had no authoritywhatsoever to represent the corporation in filing the petition. Intervenor likewiseprayed for the dismissal of the petition for being utterly without merit. The Motion forIntervention was granted on January 16, 1995. 8

Petitioners would like us to hold private respondents civilly liable despite theiracquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098. They base their claim on thealleged illegal issuance by private respondents of Resolution No. 48, series of 1986ordering the disbursement of corporate funds in the amount of P186,470.70representing retroactive compensation as of June 1, 1985 in f avor of privaterespondents, board members of WIT, plus P1,453,970.79 for the subsequentcollective salaries of private respondents every 15th and 30th of the month until thefiling of the criminal complaints against them on March 1991. Petitioners maintainthat this grant of compensation to private respondents is proscribed under Section 30of the Corporation Code. Thus, private respondents are obliged to return theseamounts to the corporation with i nterest.

We cannot sustain the petitioners. The pertinent section of the Corporation Codeprovides:

Sec. 30. Compensation of directors In the absence of any provisionin the by-laws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not receiveany compensation, as such directors, except for reasonable perdiems: Provided, however, That any such compensation (other than perdiems) may be granted to directors by the vote of the stockholdersrepresenting at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock at aregular or special stockholders' meeting. In no case shall t he total yearlycompensation of directors, as such directors, exceed ten (10%) percentof the net income before income tax of the corporation during thepreceding year. [Emphasis ours]

There is no argument that directors or trustees, as the case may be, are not entitledto salary or other compensation when they perform nothing more than the usual andordinary duties of their office. This rule is founded upon a presumption thatdirectors/trustees render service gratuitously, and that the return upon their sharesadequately furnishes the motives for service, without compensation. 9 Under theforegoing section, there are only two (2) ways by which members of the board can begranted compensation apart from reasonable per diems: (1) when there is a provisionin the by-laws fixing their compensation; and (2) when the stockholders representinga majority of the outstanding capital stock at a regular or special stockholders'meeting agree to give it to them.

This proscription, however, against granting compensation to directors/trustees of a

corporation is not a sweeping rule. Worthy of note is the clear phraseology of Section30 which states: ". . . [T]he directors shall not receive any compensation, as suchdirectors, . . . ." The phrase as such directors is not without significance for it delimitsthe scope of the prohibition to compensation given to them for services performedpurely in their capacity as directors or trustees. The unambiguous implication is thatmembers of the board may receive compensation, in addition to reasonable perdiems, when they render services to the corporation in a capacity other than asdirectors/trustees.10 In the case at bench, Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 granted monthlycompensation to private respondents not i n their capacity as members of the board,but rather as officers of the corporation, more particularly as Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary of Western Institute of Technology. We quoteonce more Resolution No. 48, s. 1986 for easy reference, viz

.:

Resolution No. 48 s. 1986

On the motion of Mr. Richard Salas (accused), duly seconded by Mrs.

Soledad Tubilleja (accused), it was unanimously resolved that:

The Officers of the Corporation be grantedmonthly compensation for services renderedas follows: Chairman P9,000.00/month,Vice Chairman P3,500.00/month,Corporate Treasurer P3,500.00/month andCorporate Secretary P3,500.00/month,retroactive June 1, 1985 and the ten percentum of the net profits shall be distributedequally among the ten members of the Boardof Trustees. This shall amend and superceed(sic

) any previous resolution.

There were no other business.

The Chairman declared the meeting adjourned at 5:11 P.M.

This is to certify that the foregoing minutes of the regular meeting of theBoard of Trustees of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. held onMarch 30, 1986 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge andbelief.

(Sgd) ANTONIO S. SALASCorporate Secretary 11 [Emphasis ours]

Clearly, therefore, the prohibition with respect to granting compensation to corporatedirectors/trusteesas suchunder Section 30 is not violated in this particular case.Consequently, the last sentence of Section 30 which provides:

. . . . . . . In no case shall the total yearly compensation of directors, assuch directors, exceed ten (10%) percent of the net income beforeincome taxof the corporation during the preceding year. (Emphasisours]

does not likewise find application in this case since the compensation is being givento private respondents in their capacity as officers of WIT and not as board members.

Petitioners assert that the instant case is a derivative suit brought by them as minorityshareholders of WIT for and on behalf of the corporation to annul Resolution No. 48,s. 1986 which is prejudicial to the corporation.

We are unpersuaded. A derivative suit is an action brought by minority shareholdersin the name of the corporation to redress wrongs committed against it, for which thedirectors refuse to sue. 12 It is a remedy designed by equity and has been theprincipal defense of the minority shareholders against abuses by the majority. 13 Here,however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil aspectof Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa andfalsification of public document. Among the basic requirements for a derivative suit toprosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of thecorporation must allege in his complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on aderivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other shareholderssimilarly situated who wish to join. 14 This is necessary to vest jurisdiction upon the

tribunal in line with the rule that it is the allegations in the complaint that vestsjurisdiction upon the court or quasi-judicial body concerned over the subject matterand nature of the action.15 This was not complied with by the petitioners either in theircomplaint before the court

a quo nor in the instant petition which, in part, merelystates that "this is a petition for review on certiorarion pure questions of law to setaside a portion of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and37098" 16 since the trial court's judgment of acquittal failed to impose any civil liabilityagainst the private respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at alldeserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as aderivative suit.

Granting, for purposes of discussion, that this is a derivative suit as insisted bypetitioners, which it is not, the same is outrightly dismissible for having beenwrongfully filed in the regular court devoid of any jurisdiction to entertain thecomplaint. The ease should have been filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission (SEC) which exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over derivativesuits, they being intra-corporate disputes, per Section 5 (b) of P.D. No. 902-A:

In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securitiesand Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and otherforms of associations registered with it as expressly granted underexisting laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusivejurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

xxx xxx xxx

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b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporateor partnership relations,between and among stockholders, members, or associates; betweenany or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association ofwhich they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; andbetween such corporation, partnership or association and the Stateinsofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as suchentity;

xxx xxx xxx

[Emphasis ours]

Once the case is decided by the SEC, the losing party may file a petition for reviewbefore the Court of Appeals raising questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions offact and law. 17 It is only after the case has ran this course, and not earlier, can it bebrought to us via a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 raising only purequestions of law. 18 Petitioners, in pleading that we treat the instant petition as aderivative suit, are trying to short-circuit the entire process which we cannot heresanction.

As an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 forfalsification of public document and estafa, which this petition truly is, we have todeny the petition just the same. It will be well to quote the respondent court'sratiocinations acquitting the private respondents on both counts:

The prosecution wants this Court to believe and agree that there isfalsification of public document because, as claimed by the prosecution,Resolution No. 48, Series of 1986 (Exh. "1-E-1") was not taken up andpassed during the Regular Meeting of the Board of Trustees of theWestern Institute of Technology (WIT), Inc. on March 30, 1986, but onJune 1, 1986 special meeting of the same board of trustees.

This Court is reluctant to accept this claim of falsification. Theprosecution omitted to submit the complete minutes of the regularmeeting of the Board of Trustees on March 30, 1986. It only presentedin evidence Exh. "C", which is page 5 or the last page of the saidminutes. Had the complete minutes (Exh. "1") consisting of five (5)pages, been submitted, it can be readily seen and understood thatResolution No. 48, Series of 1986 (Exh. "1-E-1") giving compensation tocorporate officers, was indeed included in Other Business, No. 6 of theAgenda, and was taken up and passed on March 30, 1986. The merefact of existence of Exh. "C" also proves that it was passed on March30, 1986 for Exh. "C" is part and parcel of the whole minutes of the

Board of Trustees Regular Meeting on March 30, 1986. No better andmore credible proof can be considered other than the Minutes (Exh. "1")itself of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Trustees on March 30,1986. The imputation that said Resolution No. 48 was neither taken upnor passed on March 30, 1986 because the matter regardingcompensation was not specifically stated or written in the Agenda

andthat the words "possible implementation of said Resolution No. 48, wasexpressly written in the Agenda for the Special Meeting of the Board onJune 1, 1986, is simply an implication. This evidence by implication tothe mind of the court cannot prevail over the Minutes (Exh. "1") andcannot ripen into proof beyond reasonable doubt which is demanded inall criminal prosecutions.

This Court finds that under the Eleventh Article (Exh. "3-D-1") of theArticles of Incorporation (Exh. "3-B") of the Panay EducationalInstitution, Inc., now the Western Institute of Technology, Inc., theofficers of the corporation shall receive such compensation as the Boardof Directors may provide. These Articles of Incorporation was adoptedon May 17, 1957 (Exh. "3-E"). The Officers of the corporation and theircorresponding duties are enumerated and stated i n Sections 1, 2, 3 and4 of Art. III of the Amended By-Laws of the Corporation (Exh. "4-A")which was adopted on May 31, 1957. According to Sec. 6, Art. III of thesame By-Laws, all officers shall receive such compensation as may befixed by the Board of Directors.

It is the perception of this Court that the grant of compensation or salaryto the accused in their capacity as officers of the corporation, throughResolution No. 48, enacted on March 30, 1986 by the Board ofTrustees, is authorized by both the Articles of Incorporation and the By-Laws of the corporation. To state otherwise is to depart from the clearterms of the said articles and by-laws. In their defense the accusedhave properly and rightly asserted that the grant of salary is not fordirectors, but for their being officers of the corporation who oversee theday to day activities and operations of the school.

xxx xxx xxx

. . .[ O]n the question of whether or not the accused can be held liable forestafa under Sec. 1 (b) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, it isperceived by this Court that the receipt and the holding of the money bythe accused as salary on basis of the authority granted by the Articles

and By-Laws of the corporation are not tainted with abuse ofconfidence. The money they received belongs to them and cannot besaid to have been converted and/or misappropriated by them.

xxx xxx xxx 19

[Emphasis ours]

From the foregoing factual findings, which we find to be amply substantiated by therecords, it is evident that there is simply no basis to hold the accused, privaterespondents herein, civilly liable. Section 2(b) of Rule 111 on the New Rules onCriminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil action.xxx xxx xxx

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the

civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a finaljudgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.[Emphasis ours]

Likewise, the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 reads:Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment.

xxx xxx xxxIn case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act fromwhich the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall makea finding on the civil l iability of the accused in favor of the offendedparty. [Emphasis ours]

The acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 is not merely based onreasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-private respondents did notcommit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settledjurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal actionbars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that theaccused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. 20

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED with costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005

MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,vs.DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR.,J.:

At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also abouteleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw

respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainageculvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside thedrainage culvert.1Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, heopted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of thedrainage system.2

Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson,entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meterhigh and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.3After a while, respondentPacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left4withoutsaying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emergedagain, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid theboys lifeless body down in the grassy area.5Shocked at the sudden turn of events,Garcia fled from the scene.6For his part, respondent Andres went to the house ofpetitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and i nformed her that her son had died.Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.7

The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having beenconducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaintagainst the respondents for Wilsons death.

Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia andpetitioner Quinto.8Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to thedrainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declaredthat he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system whileriding on his carabao.

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On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda ofthe NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsyreport containing the followingpostmortem findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white longsleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.

Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.

Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.

Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy particleswith bloody path.

Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloodyfroth.

Brain autolyzed and liquefied.

Stomach partly autolyzed.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.9

The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres andPacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause forhomicide by dolo against the two.

An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac,charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:

That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in t he Municipality ofTarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the said accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy,conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there willfully,unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvertwhere the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testifiedon direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims head and theabrasion on the latters left forearm could have been caused by a strong force comingfrom a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicatedthat the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on thelumina of the larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda stated that suchinjury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or byforce.11On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalpwas caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a

blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that theoccipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.

Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsonshead could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body ofwater, the boy could have died by drowning.

In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have also beencaused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a roughsurface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no

sign of strangulation.

12

After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admittedthe pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof,13theprosecution rested its case.

The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on theground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also heldthat it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence ofpreponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death.

The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civilaspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND I N RULING THAT

NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS T O HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEESCIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.14

The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21,2001. It ruled as follows:

The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on afinding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of.Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action exdelicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arisingtherefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit thecriminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15

The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY,LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLDRESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.16

The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises andspeculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his headhitting the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) hemight have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin,causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lostconsciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also allegesthat the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive onthe part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondentAndres even informed her of Wilsons death.

The petitioner posits that the trial court i gnored the testimony of the Medico-LegalExpert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the

victim which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists thatthe behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt,considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres tobring out Wilsons cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainagesystem only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friendWilson to come out.

The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show thateither or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointlyand severally liable therefor.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecutionfailed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide andcaused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the lattersdeath.

The petition has no merit.

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17The civil liability ofsuch person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Codeincludes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification forconsequential damages.18When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for therecovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed institutedwith the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves theright to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminalaction.19With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the twoactions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal actionpredominating the civil.20

The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deterhim and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from

society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21

Thesole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of theprivate offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictualor felonious act of the accused.22While the prosecution must prove the guilt of theaccused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove thecause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/orrestitution.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civilaction. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if thereis a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from wherethe civil liability may arise does not exist.23

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Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural andlogical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be differentfrom that which he intended.24 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinarycourse of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rationalconnection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. Thefelony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximatecause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by anefficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result wouldnot have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing theinjury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting anatural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection withits i mmediate predecessor.25

There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act ofthe offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The"cause and effect" relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existingconditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condicionespatologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposiciondel ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party ( la constitucion fisica delherido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or faultof the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditionssupervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.26

The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:

(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and theresulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from thefelonious act of the accused; or

(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life injeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alterits nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated inproducing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victimif his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.28 Adifferent doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from humanlife a salutary and essential safeguard.29This Court has emphasized that:

Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant uponthe treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases ofhomicide to raise a doubt as to the i mmediate cause of death, and thereby to open awide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and

punishment. 30

In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:

The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similarto the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequencesof his act and i n this case, the physical condition and temperament of the offendedparty nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by theviolence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as thewound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which

determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident thatthe act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32

In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. InPeoplev. Delim,33the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of theaccused for homicide or murder:

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delictiwhichconsists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in thecommission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delictiincludes two things: first, theobjective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in

murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the partyalleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some otherthan the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and(c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminallyresponsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide ormurder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or ci rcumstantial, that thevictim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill.Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, thenature, location and number of wounds sustained

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