THIRD DIVISION  

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

- versus -

SAMUEL and LORETA VANZUELA,Respondents.

G.R. No. 178266

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,Chairperson,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,NACHURA, andREYES, JJ.

Promulgated:July 21, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x   

DECISION 

NACHURA, J.:  Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner People of the Philippines (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the Order[2] dated May 18, 2007, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Surigao City, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter the criminal case for estafa filed by private complainant Veneranda S. Paler (Veneranda) against respondents Samuel Vanzuela (Samuel) and his wife, Loreta Vanzuela (Loreta) (respondents). The case ostensibly involves an agrarian dispute, hence, according to the RTC, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The antecedents are as follows: Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr.[3] who is the registered owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland, containing an area of more than four (4) hectares, situated in Barangay Mabini (Roxas), Mainit, Surigao del Norte, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5747.[4] One (1) hectare of this riceland (subject property) was cultivated by the respondents as agricultural tenants for more than ten (10) years, with an agreed lease rental of twelve and one half (12) cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest. The respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially, Veneranda brought the matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Mainit, Surigao del Norte, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondents. Consequently, respondents were charged in an Information[5] dated February 28, 2002 which reads: 

That in about and during the period from 1997 to 2001 in Brgy. Roxas, Mainit, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said spouses Samuel and Loreta Vanzuela, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, having leased and occupied the farmland of Veneranda S. Paler and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr., and having harvested and accounted for a total of 400 sacks of palay for the past 10 harvest seasons of which 25% thereof were hold (sic) in trust by them or a total value of P80,000.00, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert said sum of  P80,000.00 to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Veneranda Paler and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr. in the aforementioned sum of P80,000.00.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that the respondents had been the agricultural tenants of Veneranda for more than ten (10) years; and that the palay was harvested twice a year on the subject property. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, the respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence, [6] praying that the criminal case be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to establish the culpability of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition[7] arguing that the respondents, as agricultural tenants, were required by law to hold the lease rentals in trust for the landowner and thereafter turn over the same to the latter.

 In an Order[8] dated May 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed the criminal case ratiocinating, thus: 

From the averments of the information, the admissions of the parties and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is easily discernable (sic) that the instant case pertains to the non-payment of rentals by the accused to the private complainant, involving a lease of an agricultural land by the former from the latter. This being so, the controversy in the case at bench involves an agrarian dispute which falls under the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, x x x. 

 Citing our ruling in David v. Rivera[9] and Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,[10] the RTC opined that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the controversy had the character of an agrarian dispute. The trial court did not find it necessary to rule on the respondents Demurrer to Evidence and, in fact, no mention of it was made in the assailed Order of May 18, 2007. Hence, this petition raising the following issues: 

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 30, SURIGAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CHARGE FOR ESTAFA EVEN IF IT INVOLVES AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT; [AND]

 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SEEMING EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF AGRICULTURAL

TENANTS FOR ESTAFA WOULD CONTRAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.[11]

 Petitioner, on one hand, contends that, under Section 57 of Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) were vested with limited criminal jurisdiction,  i.e., with respect only to the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the said Act; that the only penal provision in RA 6657 is Section 73 thereof in relation to Section 74, which does not cover estafa; that no agrarian reform law confers criminal jurisdiction upon the DARAB, as only civil and administrative aspects in the implementation of the agrarian reform law have been vested in the DAR; that necessarily, a criminal case for estafa instituted against an agricultural tenant is within the jurisdiction and competence of regular courts of justice as the same is provided for by law; that the cases relied upon by the RTC do not find application in this case since the same were concerned only with the civil and administrative aspects of agrarian reform implementation; that there is no law which provides that agricultural tenants cannot be prosecuted for estafa after they have misappropriated the lease rentals due the landowners; and that to insulate agricultural tenants from criminal prosecution for estafa would, in effect, make them a class by themselves, which cannot be validly done because there is no law allowing such classification. Petitioner submits that there is no substantial distinction between an agricultural tenant who incurs criminal liability for estafa for misappropriating the lease rentals due his landowner, and a non-agricultural tenant who likewise incurs criminal liability for misappropriation.[12]

 Finally, petitioner posits that, at this point, it is premature to discuss the merits of the case because the RTC has yet to receive in full the evidence of both parties before it can render a decision on the merits. Petitioner also claims that it is pointless to delve into the merits of the case at this stage, since the sole basis of the assailed RTC Order is simply lack of jurisdiction. [13]

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that share tenancy is now automatically converted into leasehold tenancy wherein one of the obligations of an agricultural tenant is merely to pay rentals, not to deliver the landowner's share; thus, petitioner's allegation that respondents misappropriated the landowner's share of the harvest is not tenable because share tenancy has already been abolished by law for being contrary to public policy. Accordingly, respondents contend that the agricultural tenant's failure to pay his lease rentals does not give rise to criminal liability for estafa. Respondents stand by the ruling of the RTC that pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over agrarian disputes; and that respondents did not commit estafa for their alleged failure to pay their lease rentals. Respondents submit that a simple case for ejectment and collection of unpaid lease rentals, instead of a criminal case, should have been filed with the DARAB. Respondents also submit that, assuming  arguendo that they failed to pay their lease rentals, they cannot be held liable for Estafa, as defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, because the liability of an agricultural tenant is a mere monetary civil obligation; and that an agricultural tenant who fails to pay the landowner becomes merely a debtor, and, thus, cannot be held criminally liable for estafa. [14]

 Ostensibly, the main issue we must resolve is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of estafa, because the assailed

order is premised on the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, should our resolution be in the affirmative, the more crucial issue is whether an agricultural tenant, who fails to pay the rentals on the land tilled, can be successfully prosecuted for estafa.

 For the guidance of the bench and bar, we find it appropriate to reiterate the doctrines laid down by this Court relative to the

respective jurisdictions of the RTC and the DARAB. 

The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire criminal jurisdiction are (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[15]

 First. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law. It is determined by the material allegations of the complaint or information and the law at the time the action was commenced. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action, cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. Thus, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be

made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. [16]

 

In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa. In Arnado v. Buban,[17] we held that: 

Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided x x x shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for its additional P10,000.00 x x x." Prision mayor in its minimum period, ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. Under the law, the jurisdiction of municipal trial courts is confined to offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of the fine. 

Hence, jurisdiction over the criminal cases against the [respondents] pertains to the regional trial court. x x x The allegations in the Information are clear -- Criminal Case No. 6087 involves alleged misappropriation of the amount of P80,000.00. 

Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. [18]

 Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information filed, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely an agrarian dispute.  The cases relied upon by the RTC, namely, David v. Rivera[19] and Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,[20] are of different factual settings. They hinged on the subject matter of Ejectment and Annulment of Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), respectively. It is true that in  Machete v. Court of Appeals[21]this Court held that RTCs have no jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals filed against agricultural tenants by their landowners. In that case, however, what the landowner filed before the RTC was a collection suit against his alleged tenants. These three cases show that trial courts were declared to have no jurisdiction over civil cases which were initially filed with them but were later on characterized as agrarian disputes and thus, within DARAB's jurisdiction. No such declaration has been made by this Court with respect to criminal cases. Instead, we have Monsanto v. Zerna,[22] where we upheld the RTCs jurisdiction to try the private respondents, who claimed to be tenants, for the crime of qualified theft. However, we stressed therein that the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its competence.Accordingly, the RTC had to confine itself to the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of the crime. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction and, correlatively, within DARAB's exclusive domain. In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged before it is a criminal case for estafa involving an alleged misappropriated amount of P80,000.00 -- a subject matter over which the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena,[23]we outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to wit:

 For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision reads: 

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.

 x x x x x x x x x

 

 Subsequently, in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A [24] was issued; it created the DARAB to assume the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR. Pertinent provisions of Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure read: 

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. The Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases: 

1.1. The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related agrarian laws;

 x x x x x x x x x

 1.4. Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders;

 x x x x x x x x x. 

 Section 3(d) of RA 6657, or the CARL, defines an agrarian dispute over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as:

  

(d) . . . refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements including any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.[25]

 Clearly, the law and the DARAB Rules are deafeningly silent on the conferment of any criminal jurisdiction in favor of the DARAB. It is worth stressing that even the jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offenses in violation of RA 6657 per se is lodged with the SACs and not with the DARAB.[26] While indeed, the parties admit that there is an agricultural tenancy relationship in this case, and that under the circumstances, Veneranda as landowner could have simply filed a case before the DARAB for collection of lease rentals and/or dispossession of respondents as tenants due to their failure to pay said lease rentals, there is no law which prohibits landowners from instituting a criminal case for estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, against their tenants. Succinctly put, though the matter before us apparently presents an agrarian dispute, the RTC cannot shirk from its duty to adjudicate on the merits a criminal case initially filed before it, based on the law and evidence presented, in order to determine whether an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

However, we must reiterate our ruling in Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,[27] that while we do not begrudge a party's prerogative to initiate a case against those who, in his opinion, may have wronged him, we now remind landowners  that such prerogative of instituting a criminal case against their tenants, on matters related to an agrarian dispute, must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. Thus, even as we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the instant criminal case, we still deny the petition. Herein respondents were charged with the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to fraud committed 

By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. 

We viewed the cases invoked by the petitioner, namely, People v. Carulasdulasan and Becarel[28] and Embuscado v. People[29] where this Court affirmed the conviction for estafa of the accused therein who were also agricultural tenants. In People v. Carulasdulasan and Becarel,[30]this Court held that -

 From the facts alleged, it is clear that the accused received from the sale of the abaca harvested by them a sum of money which did not all belong to them because one-half of it corresponds to the landlord's share of the abaca under the tenancy agreement. This half the accused were under obligation to deliver to the landlord. They therefore held it in trust for him. But instead of turning it over to him, they appropriated it to their own use and refused to give it to him notwithstanding repeated demands. In other words, the accused are charged with having committed fraud by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money received by them in trust or under circumstances which made it their duty to deliver it to its owner. Obviously, this is a form of fraud specially covered by the penal provision above cited. 

In Embuscado v. People,[31] the accused appealed to this Court his conviction for the crime of theft by the Court of First Instance even as the information charged him with Estafa and of which he was convicted by the City Court. This Court ruled that the accused was denied due process when the Court of First Instance convicted him of a crime not charged in the information, and then reinstated with modification the ruling of the City Court convicting him of estafa. 

Unfortunately for the petitioner, these cited cases are inapplicable. People v. Carulasdulasan and Becare[32] involved a relationship of agricultural share tenancy between the landowner and the accused. In such relationship, it was incumbent upon the tenant to hold in trust and, eventually, account for the share in the harvest appertaining to the landowner, failing which the tenant could be held liable for misappropriation. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary to public policy as early as 1963, with the passage of R.A. 3844. [33] What prevails today, under R.A. 6657, is agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship, and all instances of share tenancy have been automatically converted into leasehold tenancy. In such a relationship, the tenant’s obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to deliver the landowners share. Given this dispensation, the petitioner’s allegation that the respondents misappropriated the landowner’s share of the harvest as contained in the information is untenable. Accordingly, the respondents cannot be held liable under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. It is also worth mentioning that in Embuscado v. People,[34] this Court merely dwelt on the issue of whether the accused charged with estafa could be convicted of the crime of theft. Issues of tenancy vis-a-vis issues of criminal liability of tenants were not addressed. Thus, the dissenting opinion of then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in the said case is worth mentioning when he opined that: 

It is also my opinion that the petitioner cannot be found guilty of estafa because the mangoes allegedly misappropriated by him were not given to him in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, as provided for in Art. 315, par. 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. What was entrusted to him for cultivation was a landholding planted with coconut and mango trees and the mangoes, allegedly misappropriated by him, were the fruits of the trees planted on the land. Consequently, the action, if any, should have been for accounting and delivery of the landlord's share in the mangoes sold by the petitioner.[35]

 In fine, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject

matter. However, we find no necessity to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, as it would only further delay the resolution of this case. We have opted to rule on the merits of the parties contentions, and hereby declare that respondents cannot be held liable for estafa for their failure to pay the rental on the agricultural land subject of the leasehold.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice

  

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice

 RUBEN T. REYESAssociate Justice 

 A T T E S T A T I O N

 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. 

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division  

C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

 

* In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 508 dated June 25, 2008.[1] Dated June 5, 2007; rollo, pp. 3-11.[2] Particularly docketed as Criminal Case No. 6087; id. at 13-16.[3] Also referred to as Dionesio Paler, Sr. in other documents and pleadings.[4] Rollo, p. 37.[5] Id. at 33-34.[6] Dated December 4, 2006; id. at 17-29.[7] Dated January 20, 2007; id. at 30-32.[8] Supra note 2, id at 14.[9] 464 Phil. 1006 (2004).[10] G.R. No. 132561, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 336.[11] Rollo pp. 4-5.[12] Id. at 5-8.[13] Petitioner's Reply dated January 14, 2008; id. at 45-51.[14] Respondents' Comment dated September 17, 2007; id. at 43-47.[15] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 641, 654 (2002), citing Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume IV, 1992 Edition, p. 3.[16] Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 168.[17] A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, May 31, 2004, 430 SCRA 382, 387, citing Republic Act No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."[18] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.[19] Supra note 9.[20] Supra note 10.[21] 320 Phil. 227, 235 (1995).[22] 423 Phil. 150, 164 (2001).[23] G.R. No. 152564, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 259, 262-263. (Citations omitted).[24] "Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes." Approved on July 26, 1987.[25] As cited in Sindico v. Diaz, G.R. No. 147444, October 1, 2004, 440 SCRA 50, 53-54.[26] Regional Trial Courts have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. 56 of RA 6657 confers jurisdiction on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are RTCs designated by this Court to act as such at least one branch within each province. Under 57, these special agrarian courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.[27] A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008.[28] 95 Phil. 8 (1954).[29] G.R. No. 38984, November 24, 1989, 179 SCRA 589.[30] Supra note 28 at 9-10 (Emphasis supplied).[31] Supra note 29.[32] Supra note 28.[33] Also known as The Agricultural Land Reform Code, approved on August 8, 1963.[34] Supra note 29.[35] Id. at 592.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.

 FELICIANO, J.:

On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.

The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.

Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course.

After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.

At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court could impose.

The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.

In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. In People v. Purisima, 2 the Court stressed that:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation

charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial(People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial  (People v. Co Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330) 5 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court.

In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor  in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period).

Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Footnotes1 People v. Pegarum 58 Phil. 715 [1933]; People v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 [1952]; People v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172 [1952]; Lee v. Presiding Judge, 145 SCRA 408 [1986]; Dela Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 838 [1988].2 69 SCRA 341 (1976).3 69 SCRA at 347.4 105 SCRA 547 (1981).5 105 SCRA at 552-553.6 Supra.7 105 SCRA at 551-552.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaFIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 170609-13               January 30, 2009

BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Petitioner vs.

HON. VIRGILIO M. PATAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, VICENTE C. ARAGONA, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O NCORONA, J.:This is a special civil action for certiorari1 assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated August 25, 20052 and September 19, 20053 in Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 captioned People of the Philippines versus Bernie Miaque, et al.

On January 31, 2000, five Informations for libel4 were filed in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 26, against petitioner Bernie G. Miaque and three others.5 In an order dated February 17, 2005,6 these Informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Specifically, said Informations failed to allege either that private respondent (therein private complainant) Vicente Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offenses or that the alleged libelous remarks were printed or first published in Iloilo City.7

On June 22, 2005, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jerry Marañon issued a resolution recommending the filing of Informations for libel against petitioner and his co-accused. Accordingly, five new Informations for libel docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were filed against petitioner and his co-accused in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33, presided by respondent Judge Virgilio M. Patag.

The new Informations were similarly worded as those previously quashed but with these added allegations: (1) Aragona, Regional State Prosecutor VI of the Department of Justice, held office at the Hall of Justice, Iloilo City or (2) the alleged libelous remarks were written, printed and published in Iloilo City (on the pertinent dates thereof). Said Informations were likewise signed and filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marañon.

In view of the filing of the new Informations, petitioner filed his motions (dated August 8, 2005) not to issue warrants of arrest and, if already issued, to recall them and remand the Informations to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office for preliminary investigation. 8 In an order dated August 25, 2005, respondent judge denied petitioner’s motions on the ground that petitioner was beyond the court’s jurisdiction as he was not under the custody of the court.9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated September 19, 2005. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner challenges the August 25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 orders of respondent judge for being contrary to law and for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. He contends that the Informations were filed without the mandatory preliminary investigation. Moreover, the new Informations were filed by one who had no authority to do so because these were filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office and not the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. Jurisdiction over the subject matter supposedly belonged to the latter. Petitioner likewise assails the refusal of respondent judge to recall the warrants of arrest issued against him.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of the Philippines, contends that the quashed Informations were merely amended to include the allegations that Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offenses or that the libelous remarks were printed and first published in Iloilo City. A new preliminary investigation was therefore unnecessary. On the warrant of arrest, the OSG alleges that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner in view of the filing of his August 8, 2005 motions. The filing of the motions supposedly was tantamount to voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the court.

Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is incorrect for it violates the hierarchy of courts. 10 A regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.11 This rule, however, may be relaxed when pure questions of law12 are raised as in this case.

We grant the petition. The Informations must be quashed.One of the issues raised in the petition is the authority of the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office to file and sign the new Informations against petitioner. The offenses charged in each of the new Informations were alleged to have been committed in Iloilo City but said Informations were filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office.Sections 9 and 11 of Presidential Decree No. 127513 provide:SEC. 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals’ Staffing. -- There shall be in each province and each subprovince; one provincial fiscal and such number of assistant provincial fiscals as may hereinafter be provided for.There shall be in each city one city fiscals and such number of assistant city fiscals as may hereinafter be provided.xxxSEC. 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and Functions. – The provincial fiscal or the city fiscal shall:a) xxxb) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. xxx (emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that the alleged acts of libel were committed in Iloilo City. Who then had the authority to file and sign the new informations against petitioner and his co-accused? The Charter of the City of Iloilo provides:14

[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and in the Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the necessary informations or complaints prepared against the persons accused. xxx15

The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was clearly bereft of authority to file the new Informations against petitioner. An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.16 The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information. We held in People v. Hon. Garfin:17

It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. xxx Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.The foregoing considered, the Informations corresponding to Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were fatally defective. The common infirmity in the Informations constituted a jurisdictional defect that could not be cured.18 There was no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.19

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated August 25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 areDISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of new Informations by an authorized officer. The warrants of arrest issued are likewise QUASHED.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIOActing Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ**

Associate JusticeCONCHITA CARPIO MORALES**

Associate JusticeTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.ANTONIO T. CARPIOActing Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGActing Chief Justice

Footnotes* Per Special Order No. 552-A dated January 15, 2009.** Per Special Order No. 553 dated January 15, 2009.1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition was accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which was denied for lack of merit by the Court in a resolution dated December 6, 2006. Rollo, pp. 3-18.2 Penned by public respondent Judge Virgilio M. Patag. Id., p. 19.3 Id., p. 20.4 Id., pp. 32-51.5 Petitioner’s co-accused were Tony Mauricio, Noel Cabobos and Rodolfo Divinagracia.6 Rollo, pp. 61-66.7 Id., p. 58.8 Id., pp. 21-26.9 Id., p. 19. The relevant portion of the order read:"The records indicate that the aforenamed accused are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court because they are not in custodia legis and/or under the custody of this Court. By reason of the fact that We do not possess jurisdiction over the three aforenamed accused, We are likewise without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant motion.Based on the foregoing, We hereby deny the aforecited motion for lack of merit.SO ORDERED."

10 Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September 2007, 534 SCRA 338, 346.11 Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 285 citing People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002, 384 SCRA 152.12 A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Morales v. Skills International Company, G.R. No. 149285, 30 August 2006, 500 SCRA 186, 194 citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 13 September 2004, 438 SCRA 224.13 Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincialand City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service. This took effect on April 11, 1978. Provincial and City Fiscals are now known as Provincial and City Prosecutors by virtue of Section 9, Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provides:"SEC. 9. Provincial/City Prosecution Offices. – The Provincial and City Fiscal’s Office established in each of the provinces and cities pursuant to law, is retained and renamed Provincial/City Prosecution Service. It shall be headed by a Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor, as the case may be, assisted by such number of Assistant Provincial/City Prosecutors as fixed and/or authorized by law. The position titles of Provincial and City Fiscal and Assistant Provincial and City Fiscal are hereby abolished. xxx"14 Commonwealth Act No. 57, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Form of Government for the City of Iloilo." Section 1 thereof states: "SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as the Charter of the City of Iloilo."15 Commonwealth Act No. 57 (1936), Sec. 58.16 People v. Hon. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, 29 March 2004, 426 SCRA 393, 398.17 Id.18 Id.19 Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 712, 723 (2003).

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

ManilaSECOND DIVISION

 HECTOR TREAS,Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.

G. R. No. 195002

Present:

CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,PEREZ,SERENO,REYES, andPERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.

Promulgated:

January 25, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 

D E C I S I O N SERENO, J.: 

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.[1]

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 2010[2] and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.  

Statement of the Facts and of the Case The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred: P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.[3]

 On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

 During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of Not Guilty. Allegedly due to old

age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case. 

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of  Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid. SO ORDERED.[6]

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name Treas, under which he was accused in the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [7] which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.[8]

 On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. [9] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.

32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision [10] affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.[11]

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari [12] before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment of errors:

1.                  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;

 2.                  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON

OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;[13]

 On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱150,000

was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of  estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus, the latters demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioners.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its

Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of no valid demand was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health. 

The Courts Ruling 

The Petition is impressed with merit. Review of Factual Findings 

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:

 (1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

impossible;(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are

contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a

different conclusion;(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are

contradicted by the evidence on record.[14]

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was committed: 

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax. As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.[15]

 In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere what ifs. x x x Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati

City the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.[16]

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in this wise:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.

 Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been

overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.[17]

 The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.Jurisdiction of the Trial Court The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,[18] this Court explained: 

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the

accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

 In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of

Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x

 The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati . However, aside from

the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.

 x x x

 

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]

 Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of

Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex B,

  5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid

property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex C,

 6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREAS  issued to me a check for refund of the sum

given to him less the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x 

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.[22]

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution [23] that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened next?A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to and she will work for the Deed of Sale.Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?A Yes, sir.Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR

THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?A Yes, sir.Q Did he issue a receipt?A Yes, sir.Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to

identify it?

A Yes, sir.Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit B. This appears

to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened

next?A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.[24]

 Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not

an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.[25]Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.[26]

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. [27] Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that [s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.[28] This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. [29]

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioners conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:

 Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others

kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. [30] If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31]

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. [32] His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. [33] It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[34]

In Cuizon v. Macalino,[35] this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount of ₱130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate JusticeWE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate JusticeChairperson

  

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYESAssociate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEAssociate Justice

 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Courts Division.

 ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate JusticeChairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions

in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

 

* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012.[1] Fukuzume v. People, G.R. No. 143647, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 570, citing Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51 (1999).[2] Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ricardo R. Rosario.[3] Rollo, p. 33; original citations omitted.[4] Id. at 40.[5] Id. at 52-58.[6] Id. at 58.[7] Id. at 59-66.[8] Id. at 67-72.[9] Id. at 73-74.[10] Id. at 31-38.[11] Id. at 39-40.[12] Id. at 3-6.[13] Id. at 14.[14] Salcedo v. People, G.R. No. 137143, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 499.[15] Rollo, pp. 55-56.[16] Id. at 71.[17] Id. at 36-37.[18] G.R. No. 170298, 26 June 2007, 525 SCRA 735.[19] Supre note 1.[20] Rollo, p. 40.[21] Id. at 41-42.[22] Salazar v. People of the Philippines, 480 Phil. 444 (2004).[23] Records, pp. 260-262.[24] Records, pp. 352-353.[25] Supra; see also RULES OF COURT, Rule 118, Sec. 9 in relation to Sec. 3(b).[26] Id.[27] Buaya v. Polo, 251 Phil. 422 (1989); Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 324.[28] Campanano v. Datuin, G.R. No. 172142, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA 471.[29] See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119000, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 367.[30] Belleza v. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, 23 July 2009, 593 SCRA 549.[31] Id.[32] Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.03; Barnachea v. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925, 11March 2003, 399 SCRA 1.[33] Pentecostes v. Ibaez, 363 Phil. 624 (1999).[34] Supra note 30.[35] A.C. No. 4334, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 484.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila     

                         SECOND DIVISION

  

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

-versus-

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA,Respondents.

G.R. No. 169004

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,VELASCO, JR.,*

PERALTA,BERSAMIN,* and

ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x                         

                                                 DECISION

PERALTA, J.: 

For this Court's resolution is a petition [1] dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

 The facts follow. Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case,

with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:

 That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province

of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

 CONTRARY TO LAW.  

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss [3] dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order[4] dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition[5] to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution[6] on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

 SO ORDERED. 

Thus, the present petition. Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees

enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,[7] claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

 In his Comment[8] dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as

amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.

 In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of

the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante[9] is a case with

uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).

  

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[10] as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus: 

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.[11]

 P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D.

No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[12]

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995,  which was again amended

on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case, 

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.[13] The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states: 

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A.    Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.[14]

 

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception.  Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on  March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:

 Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: 

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

 (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

 (b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and

higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers

of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and

prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials

and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. 

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.  

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus: 

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and

higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[15]

  Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a

member of theSangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

 Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding[16] case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4

(a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of  People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[17] that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:

 x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

 b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in

subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.  A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials

enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office.  This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.[18] Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,[19] where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

 The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,

provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[20] where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:

 x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,

petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. 

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

 According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend

the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:

 In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and

reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that

 x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective

offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x[21]

 Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification

as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[22] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[23] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics supplied.)[24]

 With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[25] the issue as to the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity. WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third

Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

 SO ORDERED. 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice  WE CONCUR: 

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

ChairpersonPRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

 ATTESTATION

 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.  

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION  

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

 

* Designated additional members in lieu of Associate Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and Jose Catral Mendoza, who are on official leave per Special Order Nos. 883 and 886, respectively, both dated September 1, 2010.[1] Rollo, pp. 28-55.[2] Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, ret. (Chairperson), with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez (members), (concurring), id. at 13-25.[3] Rollo, pp. 74-76.[4] Id. at 78.[5] Id. at 80-85.[6] Id. at 13-25.[7] 478 Phil. 506 (2004).[8] Rollo, pp. 91-98.[9] G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 49.[10] G. R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 238-240.[11] Id., citing Presidential Decree No. 1486.[12] Id., citing Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts.In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within the concurrentjurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent jurisdiction.Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the armed forces in the active service. [13] People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, citing Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 379. (1996).[14] Emphasis supplied.[15] People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, at 59-60. (Emphasis supplied.)[16] Supra note 7.[17] Supra note 9.[18] Rodriguez, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 468 Phil. 374, 387 (2004), citing People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 (1960).[19] G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298.[20] G.R. No. 136806, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 498.[21] Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88.[22] Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 287 (2004), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430, 448 (1996).[23] PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 94374, August 27, 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.[24] People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, supra note 9, at 62-65, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al., supra note 22, citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 443 (2001).

[25] Supra note 9.Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 169823-24               September 11, 2013

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, vs.

THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. Nos. 174764-65

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN, J.:The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

The CasePetitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Antecedents

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).

The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 28001That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of P100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Criminal Case No. 28002

That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business, transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated

amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.

As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the motion to quash.8

Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution.10

Issues

Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11

Ruling

The petition for certiorari has no merit.1.Preliminary ConsiderationsTo properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,14 as follows:

4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.

x x x x

13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:

x x x x

(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15

Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:

In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.

Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x

Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:

x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x18

x x x x

The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)

It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,20

with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.2.Sandiganbayan has exclusive andoriginal jurisdiction over the offenses chargedDisini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.

We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

x x x x

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

x x x x

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x

It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.

Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.

Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922

applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:

x x x x

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)

x x x x

Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.

3. The offenses charged in the informations have not yet prescribed.

In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.23

The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption of public officials.24

The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.

As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, 28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .

For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.

The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto 30 is also enlightening, viz:

Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.

Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc

Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31

Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official functions.32

Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.

We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton:36

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before" investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.

The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.

The informations were sufficient in form and substanceIt is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.37Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered.38

The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.

The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.

The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.39

The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.

The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government;3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.

The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate JusticeBIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

Footnotes* In lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, who took part in the Sandiganbayan, per the raffle of October 3, 2011.1 Rollo, pp. 51-55; penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a Member of the Court), and concurred in by Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (now a Member of the Court) and Associate Justice Efren N. De la Cruz.2 Id. at 57-73; penned by Associate Justice Peralta, and still joined by Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro and Associate Justice De la Cruz.3 Id. at 104-105.

4 Id. at 108-109.5 Id. at 111-116.6 Id. at 117-128.7 Id. at 129-130.8 Supra note 1.9 Rollo, pp. 74-103.10 Supra note 2.11 Rollo, pp. 10-11.12 G.R. No. 175730, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 354.13 Id. at 358.14 Id. at 359.15 Id. at 359-360.16 Sandiganbayan, rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 164-165.17 G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1991, 190 SCRA 226.18 Id. at 254-255.19 Id. at 256-257.20 G.R. No. 132120, February 10, 2003, 397 SCRA 171.21 See the Section 1(A), Rules and Regulations of the PCGG, to wit:

Section 1.Definition. – (A) "Ill-gotten wealth" is hereby defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of Executive Orders 1 and 2, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, or misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;(2) Through the receipt, directly or indirectly, of any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by the reason of the office or position of the official concerned;(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations;(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking;(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and(6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit. (Bold emphasis supplied)

22 In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."

23 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130817, August22, 2001, 363 SCRA 489, 493.24 Supra, Note 3.25 Article 212. Corruption of public officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises or given gifts or presents described in the preceding articles."

26 Article 210. Direct bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift.If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not less than three times the value of such gift.In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties.27 Article 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusionte mporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.28 G.R. No. 139405, March 13, 2001, 354 SCRA 310, 318.29 An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances And to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.30 G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 586.31 Id. at 596-597.32 Section 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court .33 Records, Vol. 1, p. 164.34 Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.35 G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 549.36 Id. at 560-561.37 Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, February 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 145, 150.38 People v. Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 565, 573.39 The elements of direct bribery are:1. The offender is a public officer;2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;3. That such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and 4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties (Magno v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002,390 SCRA 495, 499).

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 168539               March 25, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

IWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

IIWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

IIIWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010

The Court finds the petition meritorious.Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:(1) that the accused is a public officer;(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.

However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.

x x x x

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and

executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation 26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27

Thus, it has been held that:When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

x x x x

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:

No part, former counsel in related casesMARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief JusticeANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate JusticePRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate JusticeTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate JusticeARTURO D. BRION

Associate JusticeLUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice(No part)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate JusticeROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate JusticeMARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate JusticeJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate JusticeJOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYESAssociate Justice

On leaveESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*

Associate Justice

On leaveMARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

Footnotes* On leave.1 Annex "A" to petition, rollo, p. 59.2 Composed of Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi as Chairman, with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez (now deceased), as members.3 G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547and 155661, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612.4 Annex "B" to petition, rollo, pp. 61-62.5 Annex "C" to petition, id. at 64.6 See Annex "F" to petition, id. at 74-82.7 Annex "G" to petition, id. at 84-88.8 Annex "H" to petition, id. at 90-101.9 Annex "A" to petition, id. at 59.10 Rollo, p. 27.11 Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783, 799 (2007).12 Gregorio Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013; Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 164; Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra; Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 514 Phil. 536 (2005); Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203; Luciano v. Estrella, G.R. No. L-31622, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769.13 See Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra note 11.14 Records, vol. 1, p. 106.15 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 82, p. 1115.16 §14 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 134-135.17 Id.18 §19 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 137-138.19 Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 87186, 87281, 87466 snd 87524, April 24, 1992, 208 SCRA 283, 297-298, citing U.S. v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918). (Emphasis supplied)20 See R.A. 3019, Sec. 1.21 G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759.22 Id. at 771-777. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)23 People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 409, 432; Heirs of the late Nestor Tria v. Obias, G.R. No. 175887, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 91, 116.24 Rollo, pp. 176-180.25 Id. at 186-192.26 Annex "J" to petition, id. at 112.27 Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 918 (2006), citing Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 643; Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 360 Phil. 559, 581 (1998); Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 757, 770 (1995).28 Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 582-583. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129904. March 16, 2000]DIRECTOR GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division; HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his official capacity as Ombudsman; HONORABLE FRANCISCO A. VILLA, in his capacity as Overall Deputy Ombudsman; and LEONARDO P. TAMAYO, in his official capacity as Deputy Special Prosecutor & concurrent Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Special Prosecutor; respondents. Francis

D E C I S I O N

BUENA, J.:Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to nullify and set aside the Order[1] of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman, dated November 29, 1995, in Criminal Case No. 20574 (OMB-AFP-CRIM-93-0047), as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:On February and May 1994, four (4) separate informations[2] were filed against petitioner and several others before the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Crim. Case No. 20185 (OMB Case No. AFP-CRIM-93-0026), Crim. Case No. 20191 (OMB Case No. AFP-CRIM-93-0049, OMB-4-93-1476), Crim. Case No. 20192 (OMB Case No. 93-0050, OMB-4-93-1476) and Crim. Case No. 20576 (OMB-CRIM-AFP-93-0048).[3]

In May 1994, an additional information was filed against petitioner and several others before the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Crim. Case No. 20574 (OMB-AFP-CRIM-93-0047). [4] The said case allegedly arose from a complaint filed on May 11, 1993 against certain officials of the Philippine National Police (PNP), including petitioner, "due to the discovery of a chain of irregularities within the PNP Commands in CY 1992, ranging from the irregular issuance of Advices of Sub-Allotments, ghost purchases/deliveries, forged payrolls up to false issuances of the combat, clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) to the uniformed personnel of the PNP valued at P83,600,000.00 ."[5] Petitioner was included as an accused in Crim. Case No. 20574 on account of his approval for the Chief, PNP, as then Director of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership (ODC), of the release of Advice of Allotment (ASAs) Nos. 4363 and 4400 in the amount of P5 million and P15 million, respectively. The said ASAs were actually signed by his co-accused Superintendent Van Luspo, with authority from petitioner.[6]

On May 12, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for consolidation before the First Division of the Sandiganbayan seeking the consolidation of Crim. Case No. 20574 (OMB-AFP-CRIM-93-0047) with Crim. Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192 and 20576, all pending before the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.[7]

On May 17, 1994, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan issued two (2) Orders, the first, ordering the prosecution, through prosecutor Erdulfo Q. Querubin, "to demonstrate the probable complicity of the three (3) accused herein [referring to General Cesar Nazareno, General Joven Domondon and Senior Superintendent Van Luspo] in the transaction described in the Information resulting in a violation of [the] Anti-graft Law under Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019;"[8] considering its uncertainty as to the probable cause against the aforementioned accused,[9] and the second Order, deferring action on the motion for consolidation "[c]onsidering the uncertainty of this Court to even proceeding (sic) with this case at this time and considering further that the motion for consolidation is (sic) filed by only one of the fifteen (15) accused, and considering finally the statement of Prosecutor Erdulfo Q. Querubin that this case can stand independently of the proceeding in the other casesuntil at least two (2) of the observations of this Court above on this matter shall have been responded to."[10]

On June 8, 1994, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan cancelled the scheduled arraignment in Crim. Case No. 20574 until further advice from the prosecution.[11]

On November 8, 1994, Erdulfo Q. Querubin, Special Prosecution Officer III of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman, issued an Order, approved by [then] Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, [12] recommending that the information in Crim. Case No. 20574 be amended to exclude six (6) accused (not including the petitioner), and that the prosecution against the other remaining accused (including the petitioner) be continued.[13]

On May 17, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order with prayer for the consolidation of Crim. Case No. 20574 with Crim. Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098, [14] which are allegedly pending reinvestigation by the Office of the Ombudsman.[15]

On November 29, 1995, Joselito R. Ferrer, Special Prosecutor I of the Office of the Special Prosecutor / Ombudsman, issued an Order recommending that the Order of Special Prosecution Officer Erdulfo Q. Querubin, dated November 8, 1994, be modified to exclude petitioner from the information in Crim. Case No. 20574; and denying the prayer for consolidation. [16] However, the foregoing Order was disapproved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on February 19, 1997, on the basis of the recommendation of Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa.[17] In his memorandum dated September 2, 1996 and addressed to the Ombudsman, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa proposed the setting of the arraignment and pre-trial conference in Crim. Case No. 20574.[18] Accordingly, a Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 26, 1997. [19]The amended information excluded some of the accused but included petitioner among others as they were recommended for further prosecution by the Ombudsman.[20]

Hence, this petition. The following issues are raised: noveroA. WHETHER THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE RESPONDENTS VILLA AND DESIERTO DENIED THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;

B. WHETHER THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE RESPONDENTS VILLA, DESIERTO, AND TAMAYO DENIED THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION;C. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT FIRST DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE HEARING AND OTHER INCIDENTS OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 20574 AGAINST THE PETITIONER DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PETITION.

Petitioner contends that respondents Villa and Desierto acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration, arguing that there is no probable cause against him and that the said respondents disregarded the evidence he adduced.

Petitioner also alleges that respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for consolidation, claiming that since all of the pertinent cases have been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has revested" in the latter and "it is grave abuse of discretion to refuse to perform the duty of consolidating these cases."[21]

The contentions are untenable.As this Court stated in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman:[22]

"Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances:(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;(2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;(3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;(7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance;(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been

denied; ella(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of

petitioners."

Corollary to the foregoing rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.[23] However, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsmans action when there is an abuse of discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[24]

Thus, we proceed to determine whether the respondents Ombudsman Desierto and Overall Deputy Ombudsman Villa acted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [25] Such arbitrariness or despotism does not obtain here. Petitioner has not shown that respondents Desierto and Villa committed grave abuse of discretion in their determination to proceed with petitioners prosecution in Crim. Case No. 20574. On the basis of their reinvestigation, respondents found sufficient probable cause to include petitioner in the indictment. As thoroughly discussed by respondents in the Comment and Rejoinder filed before this Court, petitioners "complicity in the commission of the crime is clearly revealed by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case." [26] At this point we reiterate that "xxx [t]his is an exercise of the Ombudsmans powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts will be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant."[27]

With regard to respondents denial of petitioners motion for consolidation of Crim. Case No. 20574 with Crim. Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098, we find the same to be well-founded. While the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed, or in the instant case, may not be consolidated with other pending cases, without the approval of the said court.[28]

Incidentally, petitioner filed a Manifestation[29] dated June 30, 1999 before this Court, stating that on June 11, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order[30] excluding petitioner from the information in Crim. Case No. 20185. In the said Manifestation, petitioner claims that "the subject of the above-entitled petition includes Criminal Case No. 20185 as well as Criminal Cases Nos. 20574, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098."[31] Petitioner further claims that "a perusal of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 20574, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098 would show that the alleged complicity and participation of the petitioner is (sic) the same as in Criminal Case No.

20185; and concludes that "with respect to petitioner, Criminal Cases Nos. 20574, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098 should be treated in the same manner as Criminal Case No. 20185."[32]

The exclusion of petitioner from the information as one of the accused in Crim. Case No. 20185 would not affect the outcome of this petition for the reason that we cannot, at this time, determine with certainty whether indeed the alleged complicity and participation of petitioner in Crim. Case No. 20185 are the same as in Crim. Case Nos. 20574, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098. Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, this petition concerns only Crim. Case No. 20574 insofar as it involves the propriety of the Ombudsmans action in proceeding with the said case. And as we have stated at the outset, this Court will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on his part. Criminal Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098 have come to the attention of this Court merely because petitioner has sought a review of the Ombudsmans denial of his motion for consolidation. If indeed the said cases have "common factual antecedents" and petitioners "complicity and participation" in all of these cases are the same to warrant his exclusion from the other pertinent cases, petitioners recourse is with the Sandiganbayan where the said cases are already pending.

In view of the foregoing, we do not find it necessary to address the other matters originally raised by petitioner in a motion [33] dated January 6, 2000, in which he informed this Court that the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan has issued an Order dated November 25, 1999, setting the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 20191.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. brando

[1] Rollo, pp. 21-26.[2] Criminal Case Nos. 20191, 20192 and 20576 were for violation of section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," as amended.[3] Rollo, pp. 32-49.[4] Ibid. at pp. 50-53.[5] Ibid. at pp. 104-105.[6] Ibid. at p. 105.[7] Ibid. at pp. 58-60.[8] Ibid. at p. 61.[9] Ibid.[10] Ibid. at p. 62.[11] Ibid. at p. 64.[12] The said Order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on April 27, 1995 and received by petitioner on May 12, 1995.[13] Rollo, pp. 66-73.[14] The Court notes that petitioner has added Crim. Case No. 22098 to the four (4) original cases pending before the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.[15] Rollo, pp. 74-83.[16] Ibid. at pp. 21-26.[17] Ibid. at pp. 26-31.[18] Ibid. at p. 27.[19] Ibid. at p. 108.[20] Ibid.[21] Ibid. at pp. 16-17.[22] 225 SCRA 725, 729 (1993).[23] Ocampo, IV. vs. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725, 729-730 (1993).[24] Garcia-Rueda vs. Pascasio, 278 SCRA 769, 776 (1997).[25] Cuison vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159, 171 (1998).[26] Rollo, p. 110.[27] Ocampo, IV. vs. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725, 730 (1993).[28] Ocampo, IV. vs. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725, 730 (1993).[29] Rollo, pp. 195-196.[30] Ibid. at pp. 198-200.[31] Ibid. at p. 195.[32] Ibid. at p. 196.[33] Ibid. at pp. 216-219.