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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004
BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioner’s conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.
The facts are briefly restated as follows:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986. On petition for review, we rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on January 12, 2004.1 Petitioner then filed an "Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration"2 with attached "Motion for Reconsideration,"3 wherein he makes the following submissions:
1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;
4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE.4
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration.5
The prosecution was required to comment on petitioner’s second Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-taken.6
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.7
The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties.
Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. On the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus:
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram?
a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we saw a boat being constructed there so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod (sic).
q And you arrived at 5:00 o’clock?
a Yes sir.
q And you left at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2?
a Yes sir.
q And you ate dinner between 5:00 o’clock to 2:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2, is that correct?
a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.
q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?
a Yes sir.
q And of course you also partook of wine?
a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ NARIO:
q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 o’clock Mayor Astorga was with you having dinner?
a Yes Your Honor.
q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters, the complainants here?
a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ PALATTAO:
q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this laughter?
a Probably they were talking of something humorous.9
The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q It was raining at that time, is that correct?
a Yes sir it was raining.
q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time that you were in Lucoblucob, Daram?
a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.
q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in Lucoblucob?
a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at that time.
q But it was raining the whole day?
a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.
q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 o’clock in the morning is that correct?
a A little bit hard I don’t know when the rain stopped, sir.
q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2?
a I don’t remember sir.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ PALATTAO:
q Were you told not to go away from the place?
a No Your Honor.
q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go somewhere?
a They did not say anything sir.
q Where did you go after that?
a Just down until it rained.
q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, was there somebody prevented you to go to another place?
a I don’t know Your Honor.
q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent you to go somewhere else?
a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to leave the barangay.
q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not supposed to leave that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?
a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.
q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in your impression you cannot leave the barangay. How about the other companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the place?
a No Your Honor.
q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case of those I have enumerated they cannot, why?
a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10
Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand on August 16, 2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack of material time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not touch on the circumstances of the alleged detention.11
On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent part:
xxx xxx xxx;
6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation aggravated by the exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores of the small islands of Samar for several days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also been confronted with the same predicament, hence our confrontation resulted to a heated argument and the eventual misunderstanding;
7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram, Samar our respect for him prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with him and other local residents thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was misinterpreted by us;
8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team and the group of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually allowed to leave Daram, Samar;
9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the incident to our supervisors who required us to submit our affidavit;
10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both parties had already express apologies and are personally no longer interested to pursue the case against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of desistance;
xxx xxx xxx.12
Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to testify. This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian’s testimony negate the element of detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.13 Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.14 As such, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private offended parties herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.15 He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.16
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.17 Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption
of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.18
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.The appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993
FERNANDO CAYAO, complainant, vs.JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL MUNDO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Fernando R. Cayao with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo, MTC, Indang Cavite with abuse of authority.
Acting on said complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator directed Judge Enrique M. Almario, Regional trial Court Branch XV, Naic, Cavite, to conduct an investigation and to submit his report and recommendation thereon.
Based on the records as well as the report submitted by the investigating Judge, it appears that on or about October 22, 1992 at 9:25 a.m., while traversing the stretch of Mataas na Lupa, Alulod, Indang, Cavite, complainant, as driver of Donny's Transit Bus with Plate No. DWB 315, overtook a Sto. Niño Liner with Body No. 5282 driven by one Arnel Ranes Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the bus driven by complainant almost collided head-on with an oncoming owner-type jeepney with Plate No. PJT 752. It turned out later that the jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Del Mundo who, at the time of the incident, was one of the passengers therein along with his sons Rommel and June and one Edward Rommen. Respondent's son Rommel was behind the wheel.
At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before complainant could properly park his bus, he was picked up by policemen of the Philippine National Police Station of Indang, Cavite at the Indang Public Plaza and was immediately brought before the sala of respondent judge. There, complainant was confronted by respondent judge and accused by the latter of nearly causing an accident that morning. Without giving complainant any opportunity to explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant be punished for the incident. Whereupon, complainant was compelled by respondent judge to choose from three (3) alternative punishments none of which is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to be put in jail for three (3) days. Of the three choices, complainant chose the third, i.e., confinement for three (3) days, as a consequence of which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention" by respondent judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen to the municipal jail. Though not actually incarcerated complainant remained in the premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days, from October 22 up to October 25, 1992, by way of serving his "sentence". On the third day,
complainant was released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody of Geronimo Cayao, complainant's co-driver and cousin.
The fact of detention of complainant in the premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days was confirmed and corroborated by the testimony of the jail warden of Indang, Cavite, SP04 Adelaida Nova. The fact of complainant's release therefrom after three (3) days detention was testified to by SPO1 Manolo Dilig who prepared the corresponding document of release. For his defense, respondent judge merely made general denials.
The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute abuse of authority. To begin with, respondent's verbal order for the arrest of complainant at the Indang Public Plaza without the requisite complaint having been filed and the corresponding warrant of arrest having been issued in order that complainant may be brought to his sala is characteristic of personal vengeance and the abusive attitude of respondent. Being a judge, respondent above all, should be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow (Ompoc vs. Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]). Instead, respondent judge opted to avail of his judicial authority in excess of what is allowed by law to gratify his vindictive purposes.
If respondent honestly believes that complainant committed violations of traffic rules and regulations which nearly caused the accident involving their respective vehicles, respondent judge should have caused the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against complainant and left it at that. On the contrary, respondent is not one to let the law run its own course. This is a classic case where respondent took it upon himself to be the accuser, prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same time to condemn complainant for his alleged wrongdoing without the benefit of due process. Without even an opportunity to air his side, complainant was unceremoniously made to choose his own penalty. Left with no other choice but to face his predicament and overpowered by the imposing authority of respondent, complainant picked the lesser evil of the three alternatives given to him. Complainant can hardly be blamed for so doing. A perusal of the two (2) other choices presented to him will illustrate why.
The first choice given to complainant was to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide. To threaten complainant with a criminal case for multiple attempted homicide is indicative of respondent's gross ignorance of the law. As a judge, he should know very well that such at charge will not hold water in any court of law considering that no accident per se ever occurred and hence, no life threatening injury was even sustained. To a mere bus driver who is not at all familiar with the intricacies of the law, such a threat spelled not only the possibility of long-term imprisonment and all the hardship it entails but also the onus and shame that will forever attach to his name. Surely, to his mind, a threat of prosecution coming from a municipal trial court judge is alarming enough.
The second alternative punishment offered to complainant to choose from involves his very means of livelihood — revocation of his driver's license. This is tantamount to economic death penalty and just as repulsive as the first alternative.
Faced with these grim prospects complainant voluntarily submitted himself to the jail warden of the Indang Municipal Jail for detention after executing his "waiver of detention," complainant felt that he had no other choice but to serve out the "penalty" forcibly and arbitrarily imposed upon him by respondent.
While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as respondent had intended, however, complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270
[1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds (Article 124, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Battallones 23 Phil. 46 [1912]). In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge (Section 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Such being the case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no less than the testimony of the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was indeed deprived of his liberty for three (3) days:
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, did you or did you not in fact detain Fernando Cayao on that premises? On the ground of that premises?
WITNESS (jail warden):
A I did not put him inside the jail, your Honor, but he was inside the police station.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, as a police officer, I ask you again, did you or did you not detain Fernando Cayao based on the premises that you said under oath before this Court?
A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.
Q Does it mean that he could not have gone freely of his own volition outside the police station without your authority or permission?
A He can move freely.
COURT:
Q When you said that, you meant he could have gone home, he could have gone eating in restaurant, he could have gone to a theatre or in any public place. Is that what you mean?
WITNESS:
A No, your Honor. Only inside the police station.
Q Why only in the police station? Inside? What is your order? What did you tell him?
A Because he voluntarily went to the police station to be detained.
Q Alright, so, had he told you that he would have gone to other places, you will have no objection? You will have no interpolation or you would not feel that you have a right to have him under your custody. Is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A I will still prevent him.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, pp. 9-10)
Of equal importance is the perception of complainant himself as to whether his liberty, was actually restricted or not:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the municipal jail of the station of Indang, Cavite?
A Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police station from the time that I was detained.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, p. 16)
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is not alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the fact that complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional rights.
As previously mentioned, complainant was condemned by his own accuser without the benefit of due process. Complainant was not even accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. When respondent insisted on punishing hire without a chance to air his side, complainant was deprived of the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial. Moreover, complainant was made to execute a waiver of detention without the assistance of counsel. Worse, the aforesaid waiver was even subscribed by complainant before the very same judge who was his accuser. Certainly, such intentional and blatant violations of one's constitutional rights committed by respondent cannot be tolerated by this Court.
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law (De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 (1975)). If judges, who swore to obey and uphold the constitution, would conduct themselves in the way that respondent did in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of complainant, then the people, especially those with whom they come in direct contact, would lose all their respect and high regard for the institution of the judiciary itself, not to mention, cause the breakdown of the moral fiber on which the judiciary is founded.
Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent judge represent the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and severely corrodes the respect for law and the courts without
which the government cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity (Ompoc vs. Judge Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]).
Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent judge in the case at bar exposed his total disregard of, or indifference to, or even ignorance of the procedure prescribed by law. His act of intentionally violating the law and disregarding well-known legal procedures can be characterized as gross misconduct, nay a criminal misconduct on his part (Babatio vs. Tan, 157 SCRA 277 [1988]). He used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the complainant as well as the members of the Indang police force into submitting to his excesses. Likewise, he closed his eyes to the mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct to always conduct himself as to be beyond reproach and suspicion not only in the performance of his duties but also outside his sala and as a private individual. (Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr. 199 SCRA 75 [1991]).
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his oppressive and vindictive actuations, has committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He has unequivocably demonstrated his unfitness to continue as a member of the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court of Indang, Cavite is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ,petitioners, vs.ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.(Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONAAssistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when the former made this finding in the questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain;6 (2) That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7(3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had nothing
to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution.31
lawphi1
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 126252 August 30, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
For review is the conviction of accused-appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for illegal possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana for which he was initially sentenced to death. The Information1 against him reads:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control five (5) kilos of compressed marijuana dried leaves, without the authority of law to do so, in violation of the abovecited provision of the law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pled not guilty.
The prosecutions case hinges on the testimony of Senior Inspector OLIVER ENMODIAS. He recounted that on November 28, 1994, he and SPO3 JOSE PANGANIBAN boarded a passenger jeepney from their office in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, en route to Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while SPO3 Panganiban sat opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When the jeepney reached Km. 4 or 5, accused JESUS GARCIA boarded the jeepney carrying a plastic bag. He occupied the front seat, beside the driver and placed the plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of minutes, the policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from accused's bag. To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow accused when he gets off the jeepney.2
The accused alighted at the Baguio city hall and the police officers trailed him. The accused proceeded to Rizal Park and sat by the monument. Half a meter away, the police officers saw the accused retrieve a green travelling bag from the back pocket of his pants. He then transferred five (5) packages wrapped in newspaper from the plastic bag to the green bag. As the newspaper wrapper of one of the packages was partially torn, the police officers saw the content of the package. It appeared to be marijuana.3 Forthwith, the policemen approached the accused and identified themselves. The accused appeared to be nervous and did not immediately respond. The policemen then asked the accused if they could inspect his travelling bag. The accused surrendered his bag and the inspection revealed that it contained five (5) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. The police officers then arrested the accused and seized his bag. The accused was turned over to the CIS office at the Baguio Water District Compound for further investigation. He was appraised of his custodial rights. At about 5 p.m., the arresting officers left for the crime laboratory at
Camp Dangwa, Benguet, for chemical analysis of the items seized from the accused. The next day, the policemen executed their joint affidavit of arrest and transferred the accused to the Baguio city jail. Verification by the arresting officers of the records at the Narcotics Command revealed that the accused's name was in the list of drug dealers.4 The result of the chemical analysis of the five (5) items seized from the accused confirmed that they were dried marijuana fruiting tops, weighing a total of five (5) kilos.5
For his part, the accused admitted being at the locus criminis but denied possessing marijuana or carrying any bag on November 28, 1994. He alleged that on said day, at about 8:00 a.m., he left his residence in Angeles City to visit his brother, NICK GARCIA, whom he had not seen for ten (10) years. He arrived in Baguio City at 12:30 p.m. Before proceeding to his brother's house, he took a stroll at the Rizal Park. At about 2:00 p.m., two (2) men accosted him at the park. They did not identify themselves as police officers. They held his hands and ordered him to go with them. Despite his protestations, he was forcibly taken to a waiting car6 and brought to a safehouse. There, he was asked about the source of his supply of illicit drugs. When he denied knowledge of the crime imputed to him, he was brought to a dark room where his hands were tied, his feet bound to a chair, his mouth covered by tape and his eyes blindfolded. They started mauling him. Initially, he claimed he was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs. When asked further whether he suffered bruises and broken ribs, he answered in the negative. Thereafter, he explained that there were no visible signs of physical abuse on his body as he was only punched, not kicked. Notwithstanding the maltreatment he suffered, the accused claimed he stood firm on his denial that he was dealing with illicit drugs.7
To corroborate accused's testimony, the defense presented MANUEL DE GUZMAN, a resident of Baguio City and a neighbor of accused's brother Nick Garcia. He came to know the accused in 1994 when accused visited his brother Nick, a few months before accused was arrested in November that same year. He recounted that in the afternoon of November 28, 1994, while he was walking along Rizal Park, he noticed two (2) men holding the accused's hands and forcing him to a car. He was then about 8-10 meters away. He did not see the accused or any of the two men carrying a bag.8
In a Decision, dated January 29, 1996, RTC Judge Pastor de Guzman, Jr.9 found the accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and sentenced him to suffer the maximum penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Jesus Garcia y Manabat guilty of the violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659, involving possession of marijuana weighing 5 kilograms, beyond reasonable doubt.
The penalty for the possession of marijuana weighing 5 kilograms as provided under R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 is Death. The Court has no recourse but to sentence the accused Jesus Garcia y Manabat to suffer the death penalty. The law is harsh but it must be followed and obeyed, "dura lex sed lex."
SO ORDERED.
The decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996.
On February 26, 1996, the accused moved for reconsideration.10 He reiterated his position that the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Inspector Enmodias was insufficient to establish his guilt. He further contended that he should only be punished with reclusion perpetua.
On April 12, 1996, Judge de Guzman, Jr. filed an application for disability retirement. This Court, in its en bancResolution,11 dated June 18, 1996, approved his application. The effectivity of his retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996.
On August 6, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Eulogio Juan R. Bautista issued an Order12 granting in part accused's Motion for Reconsideration. For lack of aggravating circumstance, the accused's penalty for illegal possession of marijuana was reduced from death to reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, appellant impugns his conviction on the following grounds: (a) the decision convicting him of the crime charged was not validly promulgated as the promulgation was made four (4) days after the retirement of the judge who penned the decision; (b) the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Senior Inspector Enmodias is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, we shall thresh out the procedural matter raised by appellant.
In his Motion for Clarification,13 appellant contends that since the decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, four (4) days after the approved retirement of Judge de Guzman, Jr., his decision is void and has no binding effect.14
We reject this contention. Undisputably, a decision promulgated after the retirement of the judge who signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure,15 a decision is valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. To be precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally appointed, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de facto.16 A judge de jure is one who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully invested with all the powers and functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de facto is one who exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time.17
In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated. Although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s disability retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said office and act as judge thereof until his application for retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his duties as a de factojudge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file his application for disability retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the principle that where the term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, his subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the expiration of his term are void.18 However, in the present case, as Judge de Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his office at the time the decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said decision is legal and has a valid and binding effect on appellant.19
On the merits, we likewise affirm appellant's conviction.
In his Memorandum20 before the trial court, appellant insisted that the prosecution was unable to discharge its onus of establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He maintained that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution's main witness, Senior Inspector Enmodias, is incredible and unreliable. Firstly, appellant pointed out that if the police officers indeed smell and the marijuana he was allegedly carrying while they were all on board the jeepney, they should have
immediately arrested him instead of waiting for him to alight and stroll at the Rizal Park. Secondly, appellant faulted the procedure adopted by the arresting officers who, after the arrest, took him to the CIS office at the Baguio Water District Compound for investigation instead of bringing him to the nearest police station, as mandated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Finally, appellant theorized that the prosecution's omission or failure to present the other arresting officer, SPO3 Panganiban, to corroborate the testimony of its witness Senior Inspector Enmodias was fatal to the prosecution's case as the lone testimony of Enmodias failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
These contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The prosecution was able to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is nothing irregular in the manner appellant was apprehended by the police authorities. On the contrary, we find that, without compromising their sworn duty to enforce the law, the police officers exercised reasonable prudence and caution in desisting to apprehend appellant inside the jeepney when they initially suspected he was in possession of marijuana. They sought to verify further their suspicion and decided to trail appellant when the latter alighted from the jeepney. It was only after they saw that one of the packages with the torn wrapper contained what looked like marijuana fruiting tops did they accost appellant and make the arrest. At that precise time, they had obtained personal knowledge of circumstances indicating that appellant had illicit drugs in his possession. They had reasonable ground upon which to base a lawful arrest without a warrant.1âwphi1.nêt
Neither do we find anything irregular with the turn over of appellant to the CIS Office. At the trial, it was sufficiently clarified that this has been the practice of the arresting officers as their office had previously arranged with the CIS for assistance with respect to investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office being more specialized in the area of investigation.21 Neither can the police officers be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable by afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the record bears that appellant was arrested for possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana on November 28, 1994 at 2 p.m., a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. He was detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting officers to the court in the afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law, i.e., 36 hours from the time of his arrest.
Coming now to appellant's defense, we find that his simplistic version of what transpired that fateful day utterly failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. His testimony is not worthy of credence.Firstly, appellant insists he did not bring any travelling bag or personal items with him.22 However, we find it baffling that one would visit a relative in a distant province and fail to bring clothes and other personal belongings for the duration of his stay. Secondly, while appellant repeatedly emphasized that he went to Baguio City to visit his brother whom he had not seen for ten years,23 his corroborating witness, de Guzman, adamantly insisted that the first time he met appellant was only months before the arrest.24 Thirdly, we find it altogether disturbing that appellant, without compunction, acknowledged in open court that he lied when he initially claimed he was kicked by the police officers while under their custody. After testifying that he was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs, appellant unwittingly declared that he suffered no broken ribs or internal injury as a result of the alleged mauling. Realizing the improbability of his claim of maltreatment, he promptly altered his previous testimony. He sought to explain the lack of visible signs of physical abuse on his body by clarifying that he was only punched, not kicked, by the police authorities.25 Lastly, it runs counter to common experience that an innocent person, wrongly accused of a crime and subjected to alleged physical abuse by the authorities would keep mum about his plight. Yet, appellant, through all the sufferings he supposedly underwent, would have us believe that he has not confided to anyone, not even to his brother, his version of the incident, not to mention the maltreatment he
supposedly endured in the hands of the police authorities.26 In sum, appellant's defense lacks the ring of truth.
Neither did the testimony of appellant's corroborating witness aid the defense as it is equally flawed. De Guzman testified that he saw appellant being held by two men and being forced into a car, yet he never revealed what he saw to appellant's brother Nick. No explanation was offered for this omission. Although De Guzman thought that the two men harbored ill intentions in abducting appellant, he never reported the incident to the police nor told Nick, appellant's brother, about what he witnessed. In fact, it was when Nick told him that appellant was in jail that de Guzman allegedly mentioned to Nick what he saw days earlier.27
Treated separately, the incongruent details in the defense theory may appear innocuous at first blush. However, the inconsistencies eventually add up, striking at the very core of appellant's defense — the real purpose of his presence at the crime scene. The contradictions become disturbing as they remain unsatisfactorily explained by the defense and unrebutted on record.
In sum, we find the testimony of Senior Inspector Enmodias credible to sustain a judgment of conviction. We reiterate the familiar rule that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is enough to convict an accused. For indeed, criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses presented against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even one witness.28 It bears stress that it is the quality, not the quantity, of testimony that counts.29 To be sure, a corroborative testimony is not necessary where the details of the crime have been testified to with sufficient clarity.30 As there was nothing to indicate in this case that police officer Enmodias was inspired by ill-motive to testify mendaciously against appellant, the trial court had every reason to accord full faith and credit to his testimony.31
On a final note: The death sentence originally imposed on appellant was correctly modified by the trial court and reduced to reclusion perpetua as there was no aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime. However, both the Decision and Order of the trial court omitted to impose the penalty of fine.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Order, dated August 6, 1996, affirming the conviction of appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, but reducing his penalty toreclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the additional penalty of fine in the amount of ten million (P10,000,000.00) pesos is likewise imposed on him. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military dated 19 January 1998 1 which recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by petitioner against herein private respondents for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for delay in the delivery of detained persons, and the Order of April 13, 1998 2 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of Children Against Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." 3 The following day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle 4. The complaint, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:
That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy. Catarman, Liloan, Metro Cebu, Philippines and within the Preliminary Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping with one another, while accused JASPER AGBAY manipulating to finger the vagina of GAYLE FATIMA AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his companion block the sight of the Private Complainant, Mrs. JOAN A. GICAYARA, while on board a tricycle going their destinations. Upon initial investigation of the Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman, accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT was released and accused JASPER AGBAY is presently detain Liloan Police Station Jail. Medical Certificate issued from Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, Cebu City is hereto attached.
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997." 5 Private respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner. 6
On September 12; 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued an order, denominated as "Detention During the Pendency of the Case", committing petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu City. 7 Five (5) days later, or on September 17, 1997, petitioner was ordered released by the said court after he had posted bond. 8
On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. 9
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution containing the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for the crime in Violation of Republic Act 7610, it is hereby recommended that an INFORMATION be filed against the two aforenamed accused.
Forward the record of this case to the Provincial Fiscal's Office for appropriate action. 10
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, dated 10 October 1995 of the Office of the Ombudsman, 11 the case for delay in delivery filed by petitioner against herein private respondents before the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint, now denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and which issued the questioned Resolution dated January 19, 1998 recommending its dismissal against herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but this motion was denied in an Order dated April 13, 1998.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The grounds relied upon in the present petition 12 are as follows:
I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RELYING ON MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 14, SERIES OF 1995, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1995, OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS COMPETENCE TO ACT ON THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE BEFORE IT, THE SAID CIRCULAR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL, HENCE, NULL AND VOID.
II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT IS BEYOND ITS COMPENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA HAS IN FACT NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE FILED AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MCTC, WHILE HAVING AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, IS NOT THE "PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY " CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND, HENCE, THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT BEFORE IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DID NOT INTERRUPT THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY ART. 125.
IV.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLIDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS.
V.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE DUTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN COURT WAS FULFILLED WHEN THEY FILED A FORMAL COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1997 WITH THE 7TH MCTC OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to the civilian character of the Philippine National Police, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, by virtue of the description of the Office, has no competence or jurisdiction to act on his complaint against private respondents who are members of the PNP. Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 14 insofar as it purports to vest the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases against personnel of the Philippine National Police. 1âwphi1.nêt
There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our police force. The 1987 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XVI, has mandated the establishment of "one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian character(emphasis supplied)." Likewise, R.A. 6975 13 is categorical in describing the civilian character of the police force. 14 The only question now is whether Memorandum Circular No. 14, in vesting the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military with jurisdiction to investigate complaints against members of the PNP, violates the latter's civilian character.
As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 7 December 1998 15, the issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the authority to investigate civilian personnel of the government was resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman. 16 In that case, the petitioners, who were members of the Philippine National Police questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Ombudsman to investigate the alleged shootout of certain suspected members of the "Kuratong Baleleng" robbery gang; this Court held that:
The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional provisions reveal otherwise.
As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe through legisiation. Therefore, nothing can prevent Congress from giving the Ombudsman supervision
and control over the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for the military establishment. In this light, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said Office.
While Section 31 thereof declares:
Sec. 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein shall be under his supervision and control.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no irregularity attended the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the Kurutong Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a panel of investigators. 17
The cited case is determinative of the issue. However, petitioner, in his Reply to Comment dated February 1, 1999, argues that the ruling in the Acop case is not on all fours with the case at bar 18. Petitioner states that the doctrine laid down in the said case is simply that "the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. This doctrine, petitioner argues, "applies only to isolated or individual cases involving non-military personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the Deputy for Military Affairs" and does not apply when, as in this case, there is a wholesale or indiscriminate referral of such cases to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular.
Petitioner's arguments do not convince as there is no basis for the distinction.
There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the referral of cases involving non-military personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs to isolated or individual cases. The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply exercising the power vested in the Ombudsman "to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or the or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases." This Court, absent any grave abuse of discretion, may not enterfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his power of supervision and control over the said Office.
Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular No. 14 violates the clear intent and policy of the Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to maintain the civilian character of the police force and "would render nugatory and meaningless the distinction between cases involving civilian and military personnel and the creation of separate divisions of the Ombudsman." 19
Said contentions are misplaced.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, despite his designation as such, is by no means a member of the military establishment. The said Office was established "to extend the Office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment just as it champions the common people against
bureaucratic indifference". The Office was intended to help the "ordinary foot soldiers" to obtain redress for their grievances against higher authorities and the drafters of the Constitution were aware that the creation of the Office, which is seemingly independent of the President, to perform functions which constitutionally should be performed by the President, might be in derogation of the powers of the President as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces 20.
It must be borne in mind that the Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the framers of the 1987 Constitution as the "eyes and ears of the people" 21 and "a champion of the citizen. 22" Sec. 12, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his deputies as "protectors of the people." Thus, first and foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies, including the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military owe their allegiance to the people and ordinary citizens, it is clearly not a part of the military. We fail to see how the assumption of jurisdiction by the said office over the investigation of cases involving the PNP would detract from or violate the civilian character of the police force when precisely the Office of the Ombudsman is a civilian office.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the application of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person for the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six hours (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station on 7 September 1997 for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, specifically section 5 (b) thereof 23. This crime carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty. Under these circumstances, a criminal complaint or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours of his arrest.
As borne by the records before us the mother of private complainant, Joan Gicaraya, filed a complaint on 8 September 1997 against petitioner for violation of R.A. 7610 before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu.
Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the offense. This act of private complainant petitioner argues, was unnecessary, a surplusage which did not interrupt the period prescribed by Art. 125 24considering that under the Rules it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction to try the case against him. As such, upon the lapse of the thirty-six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his delivery to the proper Regional Trial Court, private respondents were already guilty of violating Art. 125. Thus, petitioner argues, when the Judge-Designate of the 7th MCTC issued a Commitment Order on September 12, 1997, he was acting contrary to law since by then there was no basis for the continued detention of petitioner. 25
In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military in its 13 April 1998 Order, stated that the duty of filing the corresponding complaint in court was "fulfille by respondent when the formal complaint was filed on September 8, 1997 with the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, barely 20 hours after the arrest of herein complainant of September 7, 1997." 26 The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that while a municipal court judge may conduct preliminary investigations as an exception to his normal judicial duties, he still retains the authority to issue an order of release or commitment. As such, upon the filing of the complaint with the MCTC, there was already compliance with the very purpose and intent of Art. 125 27.
The core issue is whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes to a "proper judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail 28. More specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities29.
The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by law. 30"
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a municipal trial court judge, as in the instant case, conducts a preliminary investigation, he is not acting as a judge but as a fiscal. In support, petitioner cites the cases ofSangguniang Bayan ng Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561, and Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39, where it was held that "when a preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties." Thus, petitioner opines, the ruling in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 862, that the city fiscal is not the proper judicial authority referred to in Art. 125 is applicable.
Petitioner's reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. The cited cases of Sangguniang Bayan and Castillo dealt with the issue of whether or not the findings of the Municipal Court Judge in a preliminary investigation are subject to review by provincial and city fiscals. There was no pronoucement in these cases as to whether or not a municipal trial court, in the exercise of its power to conduct preliminary investigations, is a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125.
Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine enunciated in Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra, since the facts of this case are different. In Sayo, the complainant was filed with the city fiscal of Manila who could not issue an order of release or commitment while in the instant case, the complaint was filed with a judge who had the power to issue such an order. Furthermore, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Sayo case 31, this Court even made a pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person "is a legal one and consists in making a charge or filing a complaint against the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces, and in filing by the city fiscal of an information with the corresponding city courts after an investigation if the evidence against said person warrants."
The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative of the issue. In contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment 32. Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail 33. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail 34. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the postion of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
Finally, we note that it was the mother of private complainant who filed the complaint against petitioner with the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu. If tere was any error in this procedure, private respondents should not be held liable. In the same manner, petitioner's argument that the controversial orders issued by the MCTC are contrary' to law does not give rise to criminal liability on the part of the respondents. Respondent police officers may have rendered themselves open to sanctions if they had released petitioners without the order of the court, knowing fully well that a complainant was a already filed with it.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed January 19, 1998 Resolution and the April 13, 1998 Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., abroad on official business leave.
