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https://www.homeworkping.com/G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled

by his mind. Law is designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by

disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he

committed.

Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG in an Information 1 which reads:

That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation and

treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his

legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1

3/4 inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in

length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of

the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.

Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial

court entered a "not guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the accused to the

stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the transfer of the accused to the

National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial.

The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from

a form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two

(2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him. 3

At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded

to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.

As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused

and Lilia Mirador were legally married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He was employed in a

United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse,

he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. 4

In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his

family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight child and was about to give birth. 5

On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The

accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her

untimely demise. 6

AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was

wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by Avelina, her

nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety. 7

She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house,

she did not notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the

accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any argument while they were living with her. 8

The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a

picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered

from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment. 9

DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health

(NCMH), declared that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of

the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first medical report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis,

classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired

cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or

have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from

wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already

suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. 1

By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia. After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric

evaluation of the accused, dated May 27, 1996, 14 showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial. 15

The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut

by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was suspended or abolished at

the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED. 16

Hence this appeal.

The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of

intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:

First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware

of his acts that fateful day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.

Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with

schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes — he may be violent and destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife and

Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone

and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would have appeared

remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.

Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on

September 3, 1993. 17 The defense posits that his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started through 16 years of

working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle.

The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly turned

violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the crime.

Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by

something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a

pregnant spouse.

We find these arguments without merit.

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal

law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence,

where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No

purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of

his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. 18

A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time

of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,

or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two

things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to moral

or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen 19 as follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human

race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely

to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the

effect or consequences of his actions. 20 M'Naghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect

the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient , including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does not solely determine man's conduct. 21

Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived

of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what he was

doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule

rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and wrong. 22 This

test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are

very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult to prove

whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. 2

Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." 24

Critics of this test argued that it gave too much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable doubt as

a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes

completely dependent on the testimonies of experts. 25

Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible

impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate

the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 26 Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial

capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient. 27 Objections were also made to the

exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of punishment. 28

In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation. It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten

as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited

the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of accused found to be insane. 29

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to

be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least

discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude

imputability. 30

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the

mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the

accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as

an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 31 The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with

which he is charged. 32

In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe

schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.

Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis. 3 Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature

and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations. In

the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in

which the usual social customs are disregarded. 34 During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness,

hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little

concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional

involvement with other people to protect himself from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity.

Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing

tension and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as

blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare,

as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. 36

None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous

with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day.

Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right

from wrong. 37 Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the appellant

was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight

only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time

preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 38

In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on

record to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has

absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the

sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.

Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition

take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a

pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest reason.

The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however,

purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and prior to

his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and

while he lived in her house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was suffering from any mental

illness.

An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time

of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As the appellant, in the case at bar,

failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime

of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest on People v Madarang Gr. No. 132319 May 12,2000

November 27, 2010

Appellant was convicted of parricide for stabbing his wife, causing her death. Appellant

alleges he was in a state of insanity and claims he had no recollection of the stabbing incident.He insists that he was deprived of intelligence , making his act involuntary.His

psychiatric evaluation revealed he was suffering from schizophrenia but after two years in the National Center for Mental Health his condition improved thus, he was released.

Held:

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to

be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least

discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of the will.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude

imputability.The issue of insanity is a question of fact.The state or condition of a man’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.Establishing one’s insanity

requires testimony of an expert witness, such as a psychiatrist.The proof must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commisssion of the offense with which he is charged.None of the witnesses declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms

associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing

incident.Also schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong.

G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006

NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.

On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old)

with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of age

and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment, by means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge

of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.3

The Case for the Prosecution

The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City.4 One of their

children, Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994.5 In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City6 and attended classes

from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.7

Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby church.8 Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who

would usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.9 Next to Teofisto’s residence was a vacant house.10

Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m.

She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mother’s store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the container with the unsold quail eggs.11 Debbielyn did as told

and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant

house. There was a little light from the lamp post.12 She resisted to no avail.13 Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts

and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of her.14 She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.15 She felt pain and cried.16 She was sure there

were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time.

It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girl’s cries. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto

shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened.17 She told her father about the incident.18 Her

parents later reported what happened to the police authorities.19 Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.20

Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of their

house to get his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house.21 He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her anus.22 The girl was crying. He

shouted at petitioner, "Hoy, bakit ginawa mo ’yan?"23 Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on and fled.24 Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting arrived.25 Later, Teofisto gave

a written statement to the police investigator regarding the incident.26

Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their house. His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the

vacant house by petitioner.27 He rushed to the place and found her daughter crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied that she had been abused. He brought

Debbielyn to their house and then left.28 He then looked for petitioner and found him at his grandmother’s house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay hall.29

On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the Phil ippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella S. Castillo.

Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she interviewed the victim who told her "Masakit ang pepe ko," "Ni-rape ako."30 Dr. Castillo

also conducted a genital examination on the child, and found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora.31 There

was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 o’clock position near the anal opening.32 She declared that the findings support the theory that blunt force or

penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign body33) was applied to the perineal area34 not more than six or seven days before.35 The abrasion

could have been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the external genitalia;36 neither did she find any other injury or abrasion on the other parts of the victim’s body.37 She concluded that her findings were

consistent with the victim’s claim that she was sexually abused by petitioner.

Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24, 2002, Marilou Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been

raped by petitioner who was then in his aunt’s house at Cadena de Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him and Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to

proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into custody, and they did as they were told.38

The Case for the Accused

Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared that the abrasions in the perineal area could have been caused while the offender was on top of the victim.39 She explained that the distance between the anus and the genital area is

between 2.5 to 3 centimeters.40 The abrasion was located at ¼ of an inch from the anal orifice.

Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South High

School.41 He had been one of the three outstanding students in grade school and received awards such as Best in Mathematics.42 He also finished a computer course and

received a Certificate of Completion from the Philippine Air Force Management Information Center.43 He denied having raped the private complainant. He declared that

at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was outside of their house to buy rice in the carinderia44 and he saw her on his way back.45 He also met his father, who asked him

what he had done to their neighbor. He was also told that the victim’s father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him.46 He did not ask his father for the name of the angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his

aunt’s house. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunt’s house.47 Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunt’s

house and brought him to the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape.48

Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.49 While confined at the

Pasay City Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on "Issa," a young female inmate. Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about half-an-inch long, he inscribed her name on

his right thigh, left leg and left arm.50

Nida Llave testified and identified her son’s Certificate of Live Birth, in which it appears that he was born on March 6, 1990.51 She declared that at about 6:30 p.m. on

September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had raped the private complainant. She went

to their house to look for her son and came across Domingo Santos who threatened to kill her son. She and her husband proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a while.52

At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt

of the xxx Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic).

Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be meted with the Death penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating

circumstance of minority, this Court hereby sentences him to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty

Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).53

The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused her, petitioner acted

with discernment. It also considered petitioner’s declaration that he had been a consistent honor student.54

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following in his Brief as

appellant therein:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT

OF THE MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

THE PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTER’S FAMILY/RELATIVES.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL

EVIDENCE.55

The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty meted on him.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the

accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one

(1) day of prision mayor medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness the amount of P50,000 by way of moral damages and P20,000 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.56

Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,57contending that the prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The

appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution58 dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:

As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment, his conduct during and after the "crime" betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-

appellant does not have the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of the act he made. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly

upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his grandmother’s house intimates that he knew that he did something that merits punishment.

Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant is a recipient

of several academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is] possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is thus poised to

distinguish, better at least than other minors his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.59

Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition before

this Court:

ISSUES

I

WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.

III

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

ARGUMENTS

I

THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.

II

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.

III

PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.

IV

THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.

V

THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.

VI

PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.60

The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows: (1)

whether he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant, and if in the affirmative, whether he acted

with discernment in perpetrating the crime; (3) whether the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable to pay moral damages to the

private complainant.

On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation before the Information against him was filed.

On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that her testimony is inconsistent on material points. He points out that she claimed to have felt

pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his penis to the point that she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillo’s report stating that there was no evidence of injury

on the victim’s external genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against the victim’s testimony and that of Dr. Castillo’s report, the latter should prevail.

According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as factual

basis of conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victim’s testimony lacks credibility in view of her admission that, while she was being allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the street. Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be

caused by an invasion of the body through the protective covering of the skin. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion.

Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on her

testimony before the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she interviewed Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that she did not understand the meaning of the

word "rape" and its Filipino translation, "hinalay," and that the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence of the latter’s parents.

Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucud’s testimony has no probative weight because and

had an ill-motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the house rented by Teofisto demolished. Petitioner avers that the

witness persuaded the victim’s parents to complain against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros Carroso.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected

to an inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the

Information. It avers that the absence of external injuries does not negate rape; neither

is it necessary that lacerations be found on the hymen of a victim. Rape is consummated if there is some degree of penetration within the vaginal surface. Corroborative evidence

is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of the victim is credible, such testimony will suffice for conviction of consummated rape. When the victim testified that

she was raped, she was, in effect, saying all that is necessary to prove that rape was consummated. Petitioner’s evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of Teofisto Bucud in

testifying against him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible that the victim and her parents would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofisto’s proddings.

The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during, and after the

rape based on the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG follows:

Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape incident, he is presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article

12 of the Revised Penal Code. Under said provision, the prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there

was no evidence presented by the prosecution to show that he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Petitioner’s arguments are bereft of merit.

Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows:

"the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited

by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong" (People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act

(Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989).

Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that "discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong.

Rather, it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act" (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G.

4062]). Hence, in judging whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, which may be known

and should be determined by considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only before

and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).

In the instant case, petitioner’s actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as

his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.

The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecution’s witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away.

Shortly thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges against him and that private complainant’s father was looking for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmother’s house that petitioner

came out in the open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his act of

going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed

innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences of his acts, he would have immediately confronted private complainant and her parents and denied having

sexually abused their daughter.

During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a consistent honor student and has, in fact, garnered several academic awards. This

allegation further bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of several academic awards and was

an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age

could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence, although appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the

difference between right and wrong. This is important in cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting

circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the accused. In expounding on

intelligence as the second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: "The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality

of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because … the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability" (Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).

The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the petitioner was being held for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with discernment before, during and after the rape incident. For a boy wanting in

discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep mum. In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his wrongful act. He should not, therefore,

be exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with discernment.61

In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was on the peri -

anal skin and not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there can be no consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the female organ. It was incumbent

on the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with discernment but failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student is not enough evidence to prove that he acted

with discernment.

The petition is not meritorious.

On the first issue, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his right to a regular preliminary investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record shows that

petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person is lawfully

arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary

investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing

rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis

of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the

provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must

be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing,

ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided for in this Rule.

As gleaned from the Certification62 of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in the

Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before the Information was filed. He was arraigned with the

assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002, and thereafter filed a petition for bai l.63 Petitioner’s failure to file a motion for a preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that an Information had been filed against him effectively operates as a

waiver of his right to such preliminary investigation.64

On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution adduced evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the

private complainant as charged in the Information. In People v. Morata65 the Court ruled that penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into

the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion

that the rape was consummated.66

From the victim’s testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioner’s penis touched the middle part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. She may not

have had knowledge of the extent of the penetration; however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape passed the stage of consummation.67 She testified that

petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house and ordered her to lie down. He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina:

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: From what time up to what time?

A: From 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.

Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did you go to school from 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?

A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.

Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?

A: I went home.

Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R. Higgins,

Maricaban, Pasay City?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And what did you do after you went home?

A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.

Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?

A: It is near our house, walking distance.

Q: What is your mother selling in that store?

A: She sells quail eggs.

Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she was selling quail eggs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is selling quail eggs past 6:00 p.m.?

A: My mother asked me to bring home something.

Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home?

A: The things she used in selling.

Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?

A: Totoy pulled me.

Q: Pulled you where?

A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.

Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house?

A: He told me to lie down on the cement.

Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement?

A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts.

Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts, what happened next?

A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina?

A: It was painful.

Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did you do to you?

A: He kissed me on my lips.

Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips, what did you do?

A: I cried.

Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your vagina

and kissed you on your lips. What happened next?

A: Somebody heard me crying.

Q: Who heard you crying?

A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.

Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?

A: Totoy ran away.

Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?

A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter to my parents.

Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?

A: Yes, Sir.68

On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:

ATTY. BALIAD:

Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he inserted his

penis inside your vagina?

A: I was lying down.

Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time?

A: He placed on top of me.

Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?

A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir.69

When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from an anus, the victim declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She reiterated

that the penis of petitioner penetrated her vagina, thus, consummating the crime charged:

Atty. Baliad:

Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or

"Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where is your "pepe"?

A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)

Q: Where is your anus?

A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)

Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated

only in your vagina and not in your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?

A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.70

While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private

complainant’s genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter’s testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not

disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl as in this case.71 According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and reverting

to its original form.72 The doctor testified that her report is compatible with the victim’s testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner:

Atty. Baliad:

Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or

"Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where is your "pepe"?

A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)

Q: Where is your anus?

A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)

Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated

only in your vagina and not in your anus?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?

A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.

x x x x

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination propounded on the report that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the

evening of September 24, 2002, she was sexually abused and that on the following day, September 25, you interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and

in binocular (sic) "masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako," would your findings as contained in this Exh. B and C be compatible with the allegation if the minor victim that she was

sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.?

Atty. Baliad:

Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother.

Court:

What is your objection?

Atty. Baliad:

The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the minor who

made the complaint regarding the allegation.

Fiscal Barrera:

The answer were provided…..

Court:

The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the complaint

of the minor. Overruled. Answer.

Witness:

A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.

Fiscal Barrera:

Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the Provincial and Final Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower portion of these two

exhibits there appears to be a signature above the typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D., whose signature is that doctor?

A Both are my signatures, Sir.73

Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainant’s anal orifice

could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged:

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the male person inserting his erect penis inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible that this

abrasion could have been caused while in the process of inserting the penis into the vagina touch the portion of the anus where you find the abrasion?

A: It is possible, Sir.

Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged perpetrator

is a 12-year-old minor?

A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.

Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection of his penis?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a male person can have erection?

A: Even infants have an erection.74

Petitioner’s contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents into

testifying is barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a straightforward and spontaneous manner and remained steadfast despite rigorous and

intensive cross-examination by the indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the perpetrator.

It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven- year old Grade II

pupil, could have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was true.75 The Presiding Judge of the trial court observed and monitored the private complainant at

close range as she testified and found her testimony credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on

said findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if

considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen,

courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they

would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true.76

Neither do we lend credence to petitioner’s claim that the charge against him is but a fabrication and concoction of the private complainant’s parents. Indeed, petitioner

admitted in no uncertain terms that the spouses had no ill-motive against him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:

Fiscal Barrera:

Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for sexual abuse?

A: I don’t know of any reason, Sir.

Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn’s parents, spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think of any

reason as to why they would file a complaint against you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter?

A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.

Fiscal Barrera:

That would be all, Your Honor.77

There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their daughter

before she testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic

experience would damage their daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.78

On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been assaulted by

petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he failed, he and his wife reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This manifested their ardent desire to

have petitioner indicted and punished for his delictual acts.

That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time

and place. The crime may be committed by the roadside and even in occupied premises.79 The presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing the

odious act.80 In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by, impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed in their midst.

Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of

conviction if such testimony is credible. Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.81 Thus, even without the testimony of Teofisto

Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.

Teofisto’s testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle caused the demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. It bears stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police investigator on the very day

that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and narrated how he witnessed the crime being committed by the petitioner.82 In the absence of proof of improper motive, the

presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.83

The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had

carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial court’s ruling.1âwphi1

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years

of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence

of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the

morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.84 On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment

by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.85 The surrounding

circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s

cunning and shrewdness.

In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would

not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon

the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmother’s house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.

The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest.86 At his the age of 12, he

finished a computer course.

In People v. Doqueña,87 the Court held that the accused-appellant therein acted with discernment in raping the victim under the following facts:

Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said

school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time

he was studying therein he always obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the

nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.88

The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as

exemplary damages. There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if the

crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information and proved by the People;

hence, the award must be deleted.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that

the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially

under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del

Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of

Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda

on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their

marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,

solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under

the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the

effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.

However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with

Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”

HELD:

The petition is DENIED.

G.R. Nos. 106210-11 January 30, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROBERTO "RAMBO" LISING, RODOLFO MANALILI, FELIMON GARCIA, ENRICO DIZON, and ROBIN MANGA, accused-appellants.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The parents of Cochise and Beebom must have lifted their sorrowful faces

heavenward and blurted out an anguished cry: "Oh God! Why must it be they, so young, so loving, so beautiful and so promising, to be brutally snatched from our

embrace and never to be seen again?"

Cochise, whose full name was Ernesto Bernabe II, was 26 years old on the fateful day of April 26, 1990 and Ana Lourdes Castaños, or Beebom to her family friends,

was 22. Cochise had just graduated from the University of the Philippines with a degree of Bachelor of Laws and was reviewing for the bar examinations, while

Beebom was a graduating student at the College of Mass Communications from the same university. Both excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities.

The senseless and gruesome killing of the young man and woman, both full of promise, horrifies us. But what makes this crime more despicable in our eyes is

the involvement of people sworn to uphold the law.

For the crimes for which they were charged and sentenced, appellants now come to this Court asking us to give their case a second look, insisting on their

innocence.

Sometime in March, 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman asked Felimon Garcia, his townmate, if he knew somebody who could allegedly effect the arrest of one

Robert Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili.

Felimon Garcia said he knew one and arranged a meeting with him.

On April 21, 1990, Felimon Garcia called up Manalili and informed him that he

already contacted a policeman to help him and said that the policeman wanted to talk to him. So an appointment was set at 12:00 p.m. of April 22, 1990 at Dau Exit, North Expressway, Mabalacat, Pampanga.

On said date Manalili, together with his son Richard, arrived at the Dau Exit at about 12:30 p.m. of April 22, 1990. Felimon Garcia was already there waiting for Manalili.

They proceeded to the Golden Palace Chinese Restaurant where they would meet Roberto Lising. They, however, had to change venue because Roberto Lising's live-in-partner, Ligaya Fausto and other companions were in the restaurant. So they

went instead to a nearby carinderia and instructed Felimon Garcia to follow them there.

Shortly, Felimon Garcia arrived and introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and

another man armed with a service pistol to Manalili. During the meeting, Manalili offered to pay them P50,000.00 for the job. Initially, Manalili gave them P2,000.00

and instructed them to go and see Vic Nabua,* his employee who will point them the person to be arrested.

On April 23-24, Lising's group went to Quezon City and met with Vic Lisboa. They

conducted a surveillance on the Castaños residence in the hope of seeing Herrera. Failing to do so, the group was asked to come back the next day.

On April 25, the same group arrived at the vicinity of the Castaños residence at

around 5:00 p.m. to resume their surveillance. Two hours later, Lisboa alerted the group after allegedly spotting Herrera entering the Castaños residence.

Later, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise and

Beebom leave to the Castaños residence in a green box type Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car

and Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle.

The Lancer car went to Dayrit's Ham and Burger House on Timog Circle, Quezon City where the couple intended to have dinner. Alighting from the car, they were

accosted by Dizon and Manga who were both carrying firearms. Amidst protestations, Dizon poked his gun at Cochise, handcuffed him, and shoved him

into the car. Beebom protested loudly at the arrest and was also shoved into the back of the car.

The young couple's failure to go home that night and the next day alarmed their

parents, so a search was then initiated by close friends and relatives — inquiring from hospitals, restaurants, friends' houses and possible places where the couple

would go.

One group chanced upon Dayrit's Ham and Burger House where they were told that a couple who fitted their descriptions were taken by three (3) men believed to

be from the military in the evening of April 25, 1990.

The abduction of Cochise and Beebom hit the front pages. Appeals by the parents to locate them reached the authorities where all possible angles of their

disappearance were explored but there were no significant leads. After about two (2) months of futile search for their whereabouts, a break came on June 21, 1990

when two (2) security guards working in a Shellane Warehouse in San Fernando, Pampanga went to see Ms. Rosie Bernabe at her Pasay City Hall office and had information concerning her son, Cochise. Mrs. Bernabe referred the two guards to

the CAPCOM who interviewed them.

The two guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano, both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them that Lising killed a mestisuhin

man and a woman in their warehouse.

On June 23, 1990, Raul Morales was picked up and told his story. In a sworn statement executed on even date, he stated that he was a pahinante residing in

the warehouse where LPG cylinders are stored, located near Valle Verde Drive-In Lodge in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned by Ligaya Fausto, common-law wife of

Roberto Lising alias "Rambo." In the main, he said:

21. T: — Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito, maaari bang isalaysay mo ang sinasabi mong hindi

pangkaraniwang pangyayari?

S: — Nangyari yan alas 2:00 ng madaling araw ng 26 April 1990 natutulog ako, nang mayron kumatok

sa pinto ng bodega at nagising ako. Tinawag ko si Aida Morales para buksan ang gate tapos sabi ni Aida

"Ikaw na lang ang magbukas" pagkatapos kinuha ko yung susi sa kanya para buksan yong gate. Noong

binubuksan ko yong gate sabi sa akin ni Roberto Lising, "Bakit ang tagal mo" tapos pakabukas ko ng gate pumasok yong dalawang kotse, una yong itim

pagkatapos yong green na kotse na Lancer, tapos

unang bumaba sa kotse na itim si Rambo, pangalawa si Felimon bumaba sa kotse na Lancer may dala na

pala. Pagkatapos lumabas ng gate si Felimon may dala na pala. Si Rambo naman binuksan yong

dalawang pinto ng kotseng itim bumaba yong babae at saka yong lalaki hinila palabas ni Rambo.

Pagkatapos tinalian niya ng alambre bukod pa sa pagtali ng alambre pati pa yong mukha tinalian ng

damit. Pagkatapos pagtali ni Rambo, biglang dumating si Felimon dala pa yong pala pagkatapos sininyasan si Rambo na ilabas na iyong lalaki. Dinala

ulit ni Rambo ang pala noong palabas na sila noong lalaki. Pagkatapos ayaw nga lumabas ng lalaki,

itinulak ni Rambo papunta sa labas, sabi naman ng babae maawa naman po kayo sa amin dahil wala

kaming kasalanan" pagkatapos tinutukan ni Rambo yong babae at sabi "Putang ina mo, wag kang

maingay, papatayin rin kita". Noong dinala na ni Rambo, umiiyak na lang yong babae. Mga kalahating oras bago bumalik si Rambo sa bodega na hindi na

kasama yong lalaki. Nakahubad siya at pinapawisan, bukod pa yan, naghugas pa ng kamay siya.

Pagkatapos nag-usap-usap silang tatlo, si Rambo, si Felimon at yong kasama ni Rambo. Pagkatapos

nagsabi si Rambo sa akin na buksan na ang gate at aalis na sila. Binuksan ko ang gate at nagsakayan

sila sa kotse, si Rambo sa itim at saka yong babae, sa Lancer naman ang nakasakay yong kasama niya at si Felimon, at pagkatapos lumabas na sila, tuloy

tuloy na umalis. 1

On June 25, 1990, the body of Cochise was exhumed. An autopsy was conducted where the finding was: Cause of Death: "Multiple Stab Wounds"

The next day, Beebom's body, which was in an advanced decomposing stage was exhumed from a shallow grave, two (2) kilometers from where Cochise's body was found.

After evading arrest the previous days, Roberto Lising was finally apprehended on June 30, 1990. In a Sworn Statement executed on the same day at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, he implicated Felimon Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili. According to

him, this is what happened:

. . . at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of April 25, 1990, he received a telephone call from FELIMON GARCIA informing that he and his companions

were at Valle Verde Lodge at San Fernando, Pampanga and that they have a problem. He immediately went to that place and saw FELIMON GARCIA who

introduced to him RUDY MANALILI who was then accompanied by six (6) other men; that he saw a yellow Mercedez Benz, a black Torana and a green

Lancer; that on board the Lancer were a man and a woman who were blindfolded and were introduced to him by RUDY MANALILI as ROBERTO

HERRERA and JOY MANALILI; that they proceeded to one of the rooms of the motel where MANALILI told him that the two persons should die because

they killed his brother DELFIN MANALILI; that afterwards RUDY MANALILI paid the chit and they proceeded to the warehouse at Villa Victoria, San

Fernando, Pampanga, owned by LIGAYA FAUSTO where he bound COCHISE and led him to the back of the warehouse; that MANALILI stabbed COCHISE

and he acted only as a look-out; that FELIMON GARCIA and another person brought the blindfolded woman to Brgy. San Agustin where she was killed; that before he, FELIMON GARCIA and RUDY MANALILI parted ways,

MANALILI told him to take care of the Lancer, change its color and later he will get it and after that he was given P40,000.00 in check which he

encashed at the UCPB Diliman Branch, Quezon City on April 26, 1990; that he gave P15,000.00 to FELIMON GARCIA and kept the rest; that he had the

Lancer repainted and used it. 2

Thereafter, the manhunt for Felimon Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili began. One by one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise and Beebom fell into the hands

of the authorities.

On January 4, 1991, Garcia surrendered and was brought to the NBI. He named Pat. Enrico Dizon as the companion of Lising when Cochise and Beebom were

kidnapped and brought to Valle Verde Lodge. He refused to make a statement or give further information until Rodolfo Manalili was arrested.

On January 16, 1991, Enrico Dizon was turned over by his superiors to the NBI.

He named a certain CIC Robin Manga as one of their companions and owner of the car they used when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped. Thus, Manga was also

picked up.

Meanwhile, Rodolfo Manalili, who was in Australia at that time was fetched by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim and Atty. Diego Gutierrez after proper representations

were made with the Australian police.

On January 17, 1991 Felimon Garcia, with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Redemberto Villanueva, executed a statement revealing that:

. . . he met RODOLFO MANALILI sometime in April 1987 in his office at No.

71 Mapang-akit Street corner V. Luna, Quezon City while soliciting contribution for the Barangay fiesta of San Isidro, Minalin. The relationship

continued until he was requested by MANALILI to look for persons who could help in arresting ROBERTO HERRERA, the suspect in the killing of his brother DELFIN MANALILI. He contacted ROBERTO LISING alias RAMBO, a policemen

assigned with Pampanga PC Intelligence Unit, thru LIGAYA FAUSTO, his relative and live-in-partner of LISING, to help in the arrest of HERRERA, and

on April 21, 1990, while in the residence of LISING, he placed a long-distance call to MANALILI to inform him that LISING is willing to help. They

talked over the phone and agreed to meet the following day in Dao.

He met MANALILI at the Dao-Mabalacat exit and accompanied the latter to LISING, ENRICO DIZON AND ANOTHER MAN ARMED WITH SERVICE PISTOL

(.45 CALIBER) AND Armalite. MANALILI, during the meeting, said that VIC NABUA, his employee, will act as pointer of the persons to be arrested and

LISING agreed and asked from MANALILI P50,000.00 for the job to which MANALILI agreed. Initially MANALILI gave P2,000.00 to LISING as expenses.

He together with LISING, ENRICO DIZON and the driver of a Tamaraw went

to Quezon City on April 23 and 24, 1990, but VIC NABUA failed to spot HERRERA. On April 25, 1990, LISING and DIZON returned on board a black

car, Colt Galant (sic) driven by ROBIN MANGA and NABUA finally told them that HERRERA was at a house near the Camelot. After a few minutes of

surveillance NABUA approached them and told them to follow the car driven by a man with a woman companion. Said car proceeded to Timog Circle and parked in front of Dayrit Hamburger House, followed by the Colt Galant

which they likewise followed on board a motor and handcuffed the man and the woman. Then LISING instructed him to contact MANALILI and to follow

them to Pampanga. He, MANALILI and VIC NABUA proceeded to Pampanga PC where they were instructed by the military on duty to proceed to Valle

Verde Lodge, San Fernando, Pampanga. There they saw LISING and ERNESTO COCHISE BERNABE and BEEBOM CASTAÑOS. MANALILI identified

them and instructed him and LISING to release COCHISE and BEEBOM and assured that whatever MANALILI promised to LISING WILL BE PAID. Lising AGREED. However, after MANALILI left, LISING told him to bring COCHISE

and BEEBOM to a warehouse owned by LIGAYA FAUSTO where COCHISE was killed by LISING. Thereafter BEEBOM was forced by ENRICO DIZON and

ROBIN MANGA top board the Galant car which left the warehouse towards Barangay San Agustin.

He and LISING were left in the warehouse and proceeded to the house of

LIGAYA FAUSTO at MALIGAYA Village in San Fernando. At about 9:00 a.m. he and LISING went to the warehouse of MANALILI at Xavierville

Subdivision, Quezon City and there a check of P40,000.00 was given to LISING who encashed it with Fareast Bank and went to Pampanga. He

alighted at Sto. Domingo, Minalin, Pampanga after LISING gave him P500.00. 3

Rodolfo Manalili, on the other hand, with the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez

manifested on January 18, 1991:

that he met LISING through FELIMON GARCIA whom he requested to look for some police officers who could help in the arrest of ROBERTO HERRERA,

the accused in the killing of his brother DELFIN MANALILI.

He met LISING together with a certain Pat. ENRICO DIZON of the Guagua police and another police officer in Dau, Pampanga on April 22, 1990, and

gave them a sketch of HERRERA. On April 24, 1990, he told GARCIA to postpone their plan against HERRERA due to his forthcoming travel to Germany on April 25. However, at about 10:00 p.m. of April 25, GARCIA

came to his office at No. 71 Mapangakit, Diliman, Quezon City and informed that they have already arrested HERRERA with a lady companion and that he

was instructed to go to Pampanga, which he did. He was accompanied in his car by GARCIA and VICTOR LISBOA. They proceeded to Valle Verde Hotel in

San Fernando, Pampanga, and brought him to Room 213 where he saw a man slumped on the floor with his eyes and mouth covered with tape. The

lady companions sitting on the bed had her eyes also taped. He told LISING that the man is not HERRERA. He was forced to peek (sic) inside the room

anew, and this time recognized the woman to be BEEBOM CASTAÑOS. He pleaded LISING and his companions to release them and would give them whatever amount he promised them.

After he was told that BEEBOM and COCHISE would be released he instructed GARCIA to stay behind and see to it that his instructions were complied with. Then, he returned with VICTOR LISBOA. The following day, at

about 8:00 a.m., LISING and GARCIA came to his house and told him that the man and BEEBOM were already released and in turn gave them a Far

East Bank check in the amount of P40,000.00.

On April 26, he left for Germany and returned on May 28, 1990. While still in Germany his wife and househelps have been receiving threatening telephone

calls and on the first week of June he received a call from GARCIA who gave the telephone to LISING who asked for P60,000.00, otherwise he will kill him

or implicate him in the crime.

On June 21, 1990 he left for Hongkong then to Melbourne for fear of his life and that of his family.

He claimed that the police officers he saw in Valle Verde Hotel were

Pampanga policemen and not Quezon City policemen. 4

Consequently, two (2) Amended Informations were filed in court against Roberto "Rambo" Lising, Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga, and

Ligaya Fausto.

Criminal Case No. Q-90-15239

For Carnapping (Violation of Republic Act No. 6539) 5

That on or about the 25th day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, P/Pfc. Roberto Lising y Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga y Quimzon, being then members of the Integrated National Police with Presidential waiver, and

Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia and Ligaya Fausto, private individuals and several Does, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping

one another, with intent to gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, by means of violence and intimidation against persons,

did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away one G.T. Lancer, with Plate No. PER 942 in an undetermined value and

belonging to Ernesto Bernabe II, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of

the Civil Code. 6

Criminal Case No. Q-90-15240

For: Kidnapping with Double Murder 7

That on or about the 25th day of April, 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, P/Pcf. Roberto "Rambo" Lising y Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Roberto (sic) Manga y

Quimzon, being then members of the Integrated National Police with Presidential waiver, and Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia, both private individuals, and several Does, conspiring together, confederating with and

mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and for the purpose of detaining Ernesto Bernabe II y Blanco @

"Cochise" and Ana Lourdes Castaños y Jis de Ortega @ "Beebom," kidnap or in any manner deprive them of their liberty and thereafter, pursuant to their

conspiracy, took them to San Fernando, Pampanga, and with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and cruelty, did, then and there stab

them several times in the chest and slit open their necks, augmenting their sufferings which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths and thereafter burying them to prevent discovery, and Ligaya Fausto, also a

private individual, knowing the criminal intent of the above-named principal accused cooperated in the execution of the crime by supplying material

and/or moral aid, to the damage and prejudice of the Heirs of said victims in such amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the New

Civil Code. 8

Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.

In building up their case, the prosecution presented two vital witnesses: Froilan Olimpia, who witnessed the abduction of the young couple at Dayrit's Ham and

Burger House; and Raul Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of Cochise.

On May 27, 1991, Froilan Olimpia testified in court and stated that he was 31

years old and was formerly a security guard of Nationwide Security and Investigation Agency. He was assigned at the Rotonda Wine Station, the

establishment beside Dayrit's Ham and Burger House along Timog Circle, Quezon City. His tour of duty on April 25, 1990 was from 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight.

At about 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening, Olimpia was at his post in front of the Wine

Station. There was a green box type Lancer car which parked in front of the Dayrit's Ham and Burger House carrying a man and a woman. Then a black car

with no license plate parked behind the green car and two men alighted from it carrying guns. They announced that they were policemen, one was carrying a .45 caliber firearm in his holster and the other was carrying a long firearm. These men

went towards the green box type Lancer car and handcuffed its driver. He only

heard the man being handcuffed retort "Bakit?" When asked about the female companion, he said that his attention was more focused on the handcuffing

incident and just later noticed that the woman was already seated at the back of the car. He did not even see the other man driving the black car.

Olimpia further explained that the security guard of Dayrit's Ham and Burger

House, Anastacio dela Cruz, was not really able to witness the whole incident since he was busy buying a cigarette stick from a nearby vendor. Just when the latter

was returning to his post, the cars were already backing up ready to leave.

He did not tell anyone about the incident nor bothered to report to the authorities since he was aware that the perpetrators were policemen. He came to know about

the identities of the man and woman and their disappearance when two female persons were making inquiries about them on April 27, 1990. The next time,

another group of people asked him about what he witnessed until he was picked up by the NBI for further questioning about the whole incident.

Raul Morales was presented in court on April 17, 1991. He stated that since March

1988, he had been working for Ligaya Fausto and Roberto Lising as a pahinante or truck helper of Crown Gas Commercial, a dealer of LPG, located in Valle Victoria

Village, San Fernando, Pampanga. He knew Roberto Lising to be a policeman and is known by the name "Rambo" Lising. He works as a policeman in the morning and when he returns home after work, helps in delivering gas. During his

testimony, Morales was given a clean sheet of paper and a pen where he was asked to make a sketch of his place of work.

At about 2:00 in the morning of April 26, 1990, he was awakened by a knock at

the gate of the warehouse. When he opened the gate, two cars came in: a green box-type Lancer car driven by Lising, with Felimon Garcia seated in front, a man

and a woman at the back seat of the car; and a black car with Dizon and Manga. After the two cars entered the premises, he saw Lising go behind their sleeping

quarters and get a wire. Lising and Dizon then brought Cochise to an area in the middle of the warehouse while Manga led Beebom to another end. After alighting

from the car, Felimon Garcia got a spade from the back compartment of the car and went out of the warehouse. Lising and Dizon then removed the handcuffs of Cochise, tied his hands with the wire and blindfolded him with a tape and torn

cloth.

Morales further testified that it was Lising who closed the gate but left it ajar. In a little while, he noticed another man enter the gate and walked towards Beebom.

He heard the woman plead: "Uncle, maawa po kayo sa amin," while Manga was tying Beebom's hands with the wire. Garcia, after going inside the warehouse, was

handed a knife by Lising which he used to stab Cochise on the chest. Lising then retrieved his knife from Garcia and continued to stab Cochise. When Cochise was

already dead, the four men, namely Lising, Garcia, Dizon and Manga carried Cochise out of the warehouse. They were away for about half an hour and when

they came back, the four men directly went to the well and washed their hands. The four walked towards Manalili and talked with each other. He could not hear the conversation but saw that they grouped themselves together.

Before leaving, Lising called on Morales and told him to close the gate and keep the shoes of Cochise. Lising boarded the green box type Lancer car with Garcia

and the woman. He noticed Rudy Manalili walk out of the gate.

On April 26, 1991, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime. Witness Morales pointed to the court how the events transpired from where

he was seated.

On the basis of the testimonies of the above witnesses, plus the confessions made in the extrajudicial statements executed by Roberto Lising, Felimon Garcia, and

Rodolfo Manalili, the prosecution presented their version of the incident as quoted from the trial court's decision, to wit:

1. The conspiracy to abduct and subsequently kill Ernesto "Cochise" Bernabe

II and Ana Lourdes "Beebom" Castaños was hatched sometime in March 1990 when accused Rodolfo Manalili secured the services of accused Felimon

Garcia to look for men who would be willing to commit the dastardly deed for a fee. (Exhibits "HH" and "MM")

2. Accused Garcia then set about on his task and contacted accused Roberto

Lising and Enrico Dizon for the "job." (Ibid.)

3. At a meeting arranged by Garcia on 22 April 1990, accused Manalili talked with Lising and Dizon at Mabalacat, Pampanga about the details of the

conspiracy. (Ibid.)

4. Accused Manalili promised Lising, Dizon and their companions the amount of P50,000.00 for the "job." (Ibid.)

5. Lising and Dizon readily accepted Manalili's using a total of P10,000.00 as

downpayment, the balance of P40,000.00 payable after the victims have been kidnapped and killed. (Ibid.)

6. Accused Lising and Dizon then recruited accused Robin Manga to help

implement the orders of Manalili. (Ibid.)

7. On 25 April 1990, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga, on board Manga's black car, went to the vicinity of

the Camelot Hotel at Quezon City. They positioned themselves about 60 meters away from the Castaños residence and waited for the victims.

(Exhibit "MM")

8. At around 6:30 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cochise and Beebom went out of the Castaños residence, boarded Cochise's green

colored 1985 Lancer car with plate No. PER 942. (Ibid.) This Lancer car is owned by, and registered under the name of Cochise's father, Fiscal Ernesto

Bernabe. (Exhibit "DD")

9. Cochise and Beebom then proceeded toward Dayrit's Ham & Burger House at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. (Ibid.)

10. Accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga immediately boarded Manga's black car and tailed the green Lancer. (Ibid.)

11. Upon reaching Dayrit's Hamburger House, Cochise parked the green

Lancer in front of the restaurant. (T.S.N, 7 May 1991, p. 6)

12. Immediately thereafter, Manga's black car was parked behind the green Lancer. (Ibid.)

13. Accused Dizon, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, and accused Manga,

carrying a long firearm, alighted from the black car, proceeded towards the green Lancer and announced that they are policemen. (Id., at 7)

14. While Cochise and Beebom were alighting from the green Lancer, Dizon

approached, pointed the .45 caliber pistol at Cochise and handcuffed Cochise's hands behind his back. (Id., at 8)

15. Cochise, visibly surprised and confused, asked Dizon, "Bakit?" (Id., at

14)

16. Accused Dizon ignored the question and rudely pushed Cochise into the back seat of the green Lancer. (Id., at 7-9)

17. Similarly, accused Manga approached Beebom at the other side of the

green Lancer, and pushed her into the other back seat of the green Lancer. (Ibid.)

18. Accused Dizon and Manga then boarded the front of the green Lancer,

backed the car out of the parking area of Dayrit's Ham & Burger House and drove away towards EDSA. (Id., at 11)

19. Accused Lising and Garcia, on board Manga's black car, immediately

followed. (Ibid.)

20. After the forcible abduction of Cochise and Beebom, Garcia informed Manalili of the success of the operation. Garcia further told Manalili to go to a

designated place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where Cochise and Beebom will be taken. (Exhibit "MM")

21. Manalili then proceeded to San Fernando, Pampanga on board his gray

Mercedes Benz. (Ibid)

22. At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of 26 April 1990, accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought Cochise and Beebom to a bodega in San

Fernando, Pampanga owned by accused Ligaya Fausto. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 6)

23. At this time, Lising was driving the green Lancer with Garcia at the front seat. At the rear of the car were Cochise and Beebom. (Id., at 8).

24. Manga, on the other hand, was driving the black car, with Dizon beside him. (Id., at 8).

25. After the green Lancer and the black car were parked inside the bodega,

Cochise, blind-folded, handcuffed and gagged with several strips of masking tape, was dragged out of the green Lancer by Lising and Dizon towards an area near the toilet. (Id., at 9-10; T.S.N., 26 April 1991, p. 3).

26. Beebom, on the other hand, was taken by Manga to another area of the bodega where she could not see Cochise or hear what was being done to him. (Ibid.)

27. At this point in time, Manalili arrived, parked the car on the road outside the bodega and walked inside towards Beebom. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 11).

28. Beebom, seeing Manalili, pleaded, "Uncle, parang awa mo na. Wala kaming kasalanan." (Ibid)

29. Manalili simply ignored Beebom's plea for mercy. (Ibid)

30. Meanwhile, Garcia went to the back of the green Lancer, got a spade

from the truck compartment, and went out of the bodega (Ibid.). Garcia walked towards the back of the bodega and there, dug a shallow grave.

(Exhibit "HH")

31. Lising went to the clothesline area of the bodega, got a length of a laundry wire and some clothes which he tore apart and made into makeshift

ropes. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 12)

33. Garcia then returned to the bodega with the spade still in his hands and approached Cochise. (Id., at 14)

34. Lising handed a knife to Garcia, who then stabbed Cochise in the chest.

(Ibid.)

35. Lising, appearing dissatisfied, grabbed the knife from Garcia and stabbed Cochise several times in the chest and stomach area, as if telling Garcia how

to do it. All this time; Dizon was holding Cochise. (Id., at 14-15)

36. Cochise then fell to the ground, mortally wounded. (Ibid)

37. Thereupon, Dizon motioned to Manga to help carry the body of Cochise. Manalili then was left to keep watch over Beebom. (Id., at 16)

38. Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought to the back of the bodega, into the shallow grave dug by Garcia. The four then covered Cochise with soil.

(T.S.N., 26 April 1991, p. 6; Exhibit "MM")

39. They then reported to Manalili for final instructions. The order was for all of them to leave. (T.S.N., 26 April 1991, p.18)

40. Beebom inquired about Cochise, Lising and Dizon answered that they had released Cochise, and that they would likewise release her. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 18; Exhibit "MM")

41. Thus, the five accused left the bodega, Dizon and Manga on board the black car, Manalili in his own car, and Lising, Garcia and Beebom in the green Lancer. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 18)

42. Later, upon the instructions of Lising, Dizon and Manga took Beebom with them on the black car. (Exhibit "MM") This was the last time that Beebom was seen alive.

43. At around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Fausto arrived at her bodega and waited for Lising to arrive. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, p. 20)

44. About an hour later, Lising arrived on board the Lancer car taken from

Cochise. Lising alighted from the Lancer car, proceeded to one of the huts in the bodega where Fausto was staying, and informed Fausto about the taking of the Lancer car. (Id., at 21).

45. After a few minutes, Fausto emerged from the hut and instructed a certain Jun Medrano, one of Fausto's helpers in the bodega, to drive the Lancer car to her house in Maligaya Village, San Fernando, Pampanga, and

hide it there. (Id., at 22)

46. Pursuant to Fausto's instruction, Jun Medrano, together with two other helpers of Fausto, Raul Morales, and a certain Nonoy, drove the Lancer car

to Fausto's house and hid it in the "barbelan" area of the house. (Id., at 23-24; Exhibit "Y")

47. Meanwhile, satisfied that his orders had been fully implemented, Manalili

paid Lising the P40,000.00 balance of the "contract", by issuing a Far East Bank check for the said amount to Lising at around 8:00 o'clock in the

morning of 26 April 1990. (Exhibits "K" and "HH")

48. Lising immediately encashed the check and distributed the proceeds among himself and the other accused, Exhibits "K-2" and "MM")

49. The Lancer car taken from Cochise, on the other hand, remained hidden

for sometime at the residence of Fausto in Maligaya Village where it was repainted to a light gray color upon the instruction of Fausto. (T.S.N., 18

April 1991, pp. 26-27; Exhibits "CC", "CC-1" to "CC-6")

50. After the Lancer car was repainted to light gray, Fausto's helpers in the bodega, namely, Jun Medrano, Raul Morales, Rudy, Bebot and Arnold, upon

Fausto's instructions, pushed the Lancer car for about fifteen minutes to have its engine started. Thereafter, the Lancer car was driven to Fausto's

bodega. (T.S.N., 18 April 1991, pp. 28-29)

51. Lising and Fausto thereafter started using the Lancer car in going to the bank and other places in San Fernando, Pampanga. (Ibid.)

52. The Lancer car was subsequently recovered by the PC/CAPCOM and

turned over to the custody of Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe. (Exhibits "CC", "CC-1" to "CC-6" and "EE")

53. On 25 June 1990, after two months of frantic and exhaustive search

made by the Bernabe family, the body of Cochise was found and exhumed from the grave where Cochise was buried by Lising, Garcia, Dizon and

Manga at the back of Fausto's bodega in San Fernando, Pampanga. It was determined during an autopsy that Cochise died to multiple stab wounds in

his chest and upper stomach. (T.S.N., 10 April 1991, p. 33; Exhibits "D", "D-1", "E" and "E-1")

54. The next day, also after two months of frantic and exhaustive search

made by the Castaños family, the body of Beebom was found and exhumed from a shallow grave about two kilometers from the bodega of Fausto. It

was determined during the autopsy that Beebom died of severe hemorrhage, secondary to two stab wounds in the chest. (T.S.N., 10 April 1991, p. 40; Exhibits "1" and "J")

55. Cochise was 26 years old and Beebom was 22 years old when their lives were untimely ended by the accused. Cochise had just finished his Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of the Philippines and was then reviewing

for his bar examinations when he was abducted on 25 April 1990. Beebom, on the other hand, was a graduating Mass Communication student of the

University of the Philippines when she was abducted on 25 April 1990. Both Cochise and Beebom excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities,

their written works having been published in periodicals and other publications. Cochise and Beebom were in the best of their youth and health

at the time of their untimely death. (T.S.N., 9 August 1991, pp. 4-7; T.S.N., 23 July 1991, pp. 24-26; Exhibit "II")

56. The Bernabe family, in their attempt to locate Cochise spent a total of

P380,000.00. In laying Cochise to his final rest, the Bernabe family spent a total of P632,222.00 for funeral and other expenses. (T.S.N., 9 August 1991, p. 12; Exhibits "LL", "LL-1 to "LL-3")

57. The Castaños family, on the other hand, spent a total of P350,000.00 for the funeral services for Beebom. (T.S.N., 23 July 1991, p. 39) 9

In their defense, the accused policemen claimed that there was insufficient evidence to sustain their conviction. At the same time, each one had an alibi.

Roberto Lising asserted that on April 25, 1990, he took a leave of absence from the office to be able to celebrate his father's birthday in Arayat, Pampanga and stayed there for the night. His father was presented to corroborate his assertion.

Enrico Dizon testified that April 25, 1990 was an ordinary working day for him. He left the office at 5:00 p.m. and headed for home at No. 107 Kamia St., Bgy. Sindalen, San Fernando, Pampanga. In fact, two of his neighbors recounted in

court the verbal exchange they had when they saw each other in their neighborhood.

Roberto Manga, meanwhile, averred that it was impossible for him to participate in

the commission of the crime since he was still nursing his gunshot wounds sustained in an encounter with lawless elements for about a year already.

Garcia and Manalili did not take the witness stand. They opted to rely on their

extrajudicial statements executed the previous days manifesting the absence of criminal intent.

On July 1, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive

portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused RODOLFO MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING y CANLAS, FELIMON GARCIA, ROBIN MANGA y

QUIMZON and ENRICO DIZON y ESCARIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by

evidence premeditation and abuse of public position by Lising, Manga and Dizon, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer a penalty of double

Reclusion Perpetua with all its accessory penalties provided by law (the death penalty having been abolished by the 1987 Constitution); to pay

jointly and severally the heirs of Ernesto Bernabe II;

(a) P1,000,000.00 as funeral and other expenses;

(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;

(c) P500,000.00 as moral damages;

(d) P2,000,000.00 for Cochise's loss of earning capacity;

the heirs of Ana Lourdes Castaños:

(a) P350,000.00 for funeral and other expenses;

(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;

(c) P500,000.00 as moral damages;

The Court also finds accused Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and Robin Manga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Illegal Detention

aggravated by use of a motor vehicle and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of Reclusion Temporal with

imprisonment from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and one (1) day to Twenty years, and to pay the cost.

Accused LIGAYA FAUSTO who is charged as an accessory after the fact (not

accomplice as alleged by the Prosecution), is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

Accused RODOLFO MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING, ENRICO DIZON, ROBIN

MANGA and FELIMON GARCIA are given full credit of their respective periods of detention in the service of their respective sentences in this case.

With respect to Criminal Case No. Q-15239 for carnapping, all the accused

are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, it appearing that the use of the car was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of Slight

Illegal Detention. 10

In this appeal, the following assignment of errors were made:

Roberto Lising contends that:

I. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND CONSIDERING THE STATEMENTS OF RODOLFO MANALILI (EXHS. "HH", "HH-

1" TO HH-25") AND THAT OF FELIMON GARCIA ("MM", "MM-1" TO "MM-14") ADMISSIBLE AS AGAINST ROBERTO "RAMBO" LISING;

II. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING RAUL

MORALES AS A CREDIBLE WITNESS, ALSO AS AGAINST ROBERTO "RAMBO" LISING;

III. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED, LIKEWISE, IN STATING THAT

HEREIN APPELLANT IMMEDIATELY ENCASHED THE CHECK AND DISTRIBUTED THE PROCEEDS AMONG HIMSELF AND THE OTHER (EXHS. "K-

2" AND "MM");

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE STATEMENT OF THE HEREIN APPELLANT AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS AGAINST HIM;

V. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT HEREIN APPELLANT

(LISING IS EQUALLY LIABLE FOR KIDNAPPING — THUS, JIVING (SIC) THE PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF JURISDICTION; AND

VI. THAT THE HON. COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE HEREIN APPELLANT

(ROBERTO LISING) AS ONE OF ALL THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES OF DOUBLE MURDER AND WITH ENRICO DIZON AND ROBIN MANGA FOR

SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 11

Enrico Dizon argues that:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DROP THE

NAMES OF ROLANDO KHO, ROLANDO FERNANDEZ, NOEMI PANGAN AND JESUS REMOLACIO FROM THE INFORMATION AND ADMIT AMENDED INFORMATION IMPLICATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ENRICO DIZON DESPITE

CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF KHO, FERNANDEZ, PANGAN AND REMOLACIO;

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION

OF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MISLEADING STATEMENTS AS PROVED BY THEIR CONTRADICTIONS TO THE

TRANSCRIPTS OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES, AND AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED;

3. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FOR IT RELIED IN THE WEAKNESS OF THE

DEFENSE OF ALIBI, WITHOUT REGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES RAUL, MORALES AND FROILAN

OLIMPIA;

4. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE AFFIDAVITS EXECUTED BY LISING, MANALILI AND GARCIA DESPITE

THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT PRESENTED AS WITNESSES BEFORE THE LOWER COURT;

5. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADJUDGING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTS BASED ON THE DECLARATION OF FELIMON GARCIA'S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

WITHOUT ESTABLISHING FIRST THE CONSPIRACY TO WHICH ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIZON WAS A PART. 12

Robin Manga asserts that:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT ON THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF CO-ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI AND FELIMON GARCIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO DID NOT TAKE THE

WITNESS STAND NOR THEIR STATEMENTS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF RODOLFO MANALILI AND FELIMON GARCIA "AFFIRMED

CONSPIRACY" AMONG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE ITS UTTER LACK OF EVIDENTIARY VALUE;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT ON

THE TESTIMONIES OF RAUL MORALES AND FROILAN OLIMPIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENTS OF THE TWO ARE REPLETE WITH INCONSISTENCIES, SELF-CONTRADICTIONS AND ARE HIGHLY

IMPROBABLE;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FELIMON GARCIA'S NARRATION OF THE ABDUCTION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE TESTIMONY

OF FROILAN OLIMPIA WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROBIN MANGA DESPITE STATEMENTS BY OLIMPIA THAT HE

SAW QUEZON CITY POLICEMEN ROLANDO KHO AND ROLANDO FERNANDEZ AS THE PERSONS WHO ABDUCTED "COCHISE" AND "BEEBOM" IN THE

EARLY EVENING OF APRIL 25, 1990 AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF FELIMON GARCIA WAS NOT EVEN

IDENTIFIED BY THE LATTER DURING THE TRIAL OF THESE CASES;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE MATTERS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA BEING INVOLVED IN THE

OFFENSES CHARGED;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA. 13

Rodolfo Manalili avers that:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING TOTAL CREDIBILITY TO

RAUL MORALES AND IN NOT FINDING THAT RAUL MORALES WAS A REHEARSED AND PERJURED WITNESS INSOFAR AS IMPLICATING ACCUSED

RODOLFO MANALILI IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER IS CONCERNED;

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED

RODOLFO MANALILI DID NOT HAVE ANY CRIMINAL INTENT OF DOING AWAY WITH THE LIVES OF ERNESTO BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAÑOS

AND THAT HE LIKEWISE DID NOT HAVE ANY MOTIVE WHATSOEVER IN CONSPIRING TO DO SO;

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT

ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI NEVER ENTERED INTO A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER NOR DID HE COMMIT ANY ACT/S ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE INFERRED THAT HE ENTERED INTO

SUCH A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THE CRIME IMPUTED TO HIM;

IV. SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIAL OF THE SEVERAL ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE LAWYERS AND

CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN MANALILI AND HIS CO-ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY ACT OR DECLARATION DURING

ITS EXISTENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SWORN STATEMENT OF ROBERTO LISING AS EVIDENCE

AGAINST RODOLFO MANALILI TO THE EXTENT THAT IT PURPORTS TO ATTEST TO MANALILI'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIME;

V. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE

INFERRED THAT ANOTHER PARTY WHO WOULD BE MOST BENEFITED BY DOING AWAY WITH THE LIVES OF THE VICTIMS, WAS BEHIND THE

COMMISSION OF DOUBLE MURDER;

VI. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW THAT WHEN THE FACTS AND

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TWO REASONABLE INTERPRETATIONS: ONE REASONABLE INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A

DECISION OF CONVICTION, AND, THE OTHER REASONABLE INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A FINDING OF ACQUITTAL, THEN THE

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT FULFILLED THE STRINGENT REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW OF PROVING THE GUILT OF ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI BEYOND DOUBT AND THEREFORE SAID ACCUSED MANALILI IS

ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL; AND

VII. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING INFLATED, UNSUBSTANTIATED, AND SPECULATIVE DAMAGES WHICH ARE NOT

RECOVERABLE UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE. 14

Felimon Garcia contends that:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RAUL

MORALES WAS A REHEARSED AND PERJURED WITNESS TO MAKE FALSE ASSERTIONS IMPLICATING APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER;

II. SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIALS OF THE SEVERAL ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE LAWYERS AND CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA

AND HIS CO-ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY ACT OR DECLARATION DURING ITS EXPERIENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

ERRED IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SWORN STATEMENT OF ROBERTO LISING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA;

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANT

FELIMON GARCIA DID NOT HAVE ANY CRIMINAL INTENT NOR MOTIVE WHATSOEVER TO CONSPIRE WITH APPELLANT LISING ET AL TO KILL

ERNESTO BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAÑOS BOTH OF WHOM APPELLANT GARCIA HAS NEVER KNOWN OR MET BEFORE APRIL 25, 1990;

IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT

APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA PERFORMED THE ACTS ADMITTED BY HIM UNDER THE COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND/OR UNDER THE

IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY AND THEREFORE EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY; AND

V. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA IS NOT EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

NOT FINDING HIM GUILTY MERELY AS AN ACCOMPLICE OF THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A LOWER PENALTY IN

VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, OBFUSCATION, AND LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG, AS MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES. 15

Basically the present appeal is anchored on three issues: (a) the admissibility of the extrajudicial statements of appellants Manalili, Garcia and Lising; (b) the

credibility of prosecution witnesses Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales and the (c) finding of conspiracy among the appellants.

Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective

declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based upon the

presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true. A man's act, conduct and declarations wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is

fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are not. 16

There is no question that their respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and

Garcia were executed voluntarily. They were assisted by their counsel and properly sworn to before a duly authorized officer. They merely relied on their extra-judicial

statements and did not take the witness stand during the trial.

Lising, on the other hand, claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing the extrajudicial statement but nothing appears on record that such extrajudicial

statement was made under compulsion, duress or violence on his person. Lising did not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative

charges against his alleged tormentors which would necessarily buttress the claim of torture in the absence of such evidence. There are in fact indicia of

voluntariness in the execution of his extra-judicial statements, to wit: (a) it contains many details and facts which the investigating officer could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information given

by Lising himself; (b) it bears corrections duly initialed by him; (c) it tends to explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused Manalili.

Moreover, the claim that Lising was not assisted by counsel is belied by the fact that the signature of his counsel Atty. Yabut appears in all the pages of his

extrajudicial statements.

The rule that an extrajudicial statement is evidence only against the person making it, also recognizes various exceptions. One such exception worth noting is

the rule that where several extrajudicial statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with

reference to said several confessions, the facts that the statements are in all material respects identical, is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein. 17 They are also

admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the

crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of

the crime charged and proved. 18 These are known as "interlocking confessions."

No doubt that the statements were independently executed and rather identical with each other in their material details. There are also distinct similarities in the

narration of events leading to the killings of Cochise and Beebom.

Manalili and Garcia's statements reveal that Manalili wanted to effect the arrest of Robert Herrera; that he asked help from Garcia if the latter knew of policemen

who could do the job; that Garcia arranged the meeting with Lising who volunteered to take the job for the promised consideration of P50,000.00; that a

downpayment of P2,000.00 was made; that Manalili was informed that Robert Herrera and Joy Ortega were arrested; that Manalili together with Garcia and

Nabua proceeded to the PC-INP Headquarters in Pampanga where they were told to proceed to Valle Verde Motel; that they were met by Dizon and Manga at the motel and were told that Herrera was inside the room; that upon discovery that

Lising's group had taken the wrong person and recognized Beebom's voice, Manalili pleaded to the group that the victim be released, assuring Lising that the

balance P40,000.00 would still be paid; that Lising and his group refused but relented upon Manalili's persistence; that Manalili left for Manila but instructed

Garcia to stay behind and ensure the release of the victims; and that the next day Lising went to his office and claimed the balance to which Manalili issued the

corresponding check.

Garcia added that after Manalili had left, Lising told him to bring Cochise and Beebom to the warehouse owned by Ligaya where Cochise was killed. Thereafter,

they forcibly took Beebom into the car and proceeded to Brgy. San Agustin.

Likewise, we find Lising's statement as corroborative evidence against the others. Except as to that portion where he exculpates himself from any liability stating

that it was Manalili and Garcia who actually stabbed Cochise in the warehouse and that he was merely a lookout, Lising's statement is identical as to the other material facts, namely, that Cochise and Beebom were brought to the Valle Verde

Motel, blindfolded where he met Manalili and Garcia; that they were brought to the warehouse on board a green box type Lancer car, where Cochise was killed; that

Beebom was brought to Brgy. San Agustin where she was eventually killed; that he should take care of the green box type Lancer car and was given P40,000.00 in

check.

Nonetheless, the trial court's decision, in convicting all the accused was based not on the aforesaid extrajudicial statements of the accused alone but mainly on the

eyewitness account of the two witnesses, Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales, which the trial court gave weight and credence as bearing the "chime of truth and

honesty." Well-established is the rule that the trial court's evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the testimony given before it by witnesses should be accorded great respect. 19 Froilan Olimpia, a security guard of the Rotonda Wine Station, an

establishment adjacent to the Dayrit's Ham and Burger House witnessed the abduction of Cochise and Beebom in front of the said restaurant.

He testified that he saw three men in a black car without a license plate drive to Dayrit's Ham and Burger House and park behind the green Lancer car. When the two men alighted from the car, they introduced themselves as policemen to the

by-standers, one carrying a .45 caliber firearm in his holster and the other carrying a long firearm. The two men approached the green Lancer car and

handcuffed its driver. Olimpia only heard the man say: "Bakit"? He later noticed that the woman was already seated at the back of the car. These two men drove

the green Lancer car which was followed by the black car When asked to identify the three me, Olimpia unhesitatingly identified Dizon and Manga.

Q Mr. Witness, on April 25, 1990, where were you employed?

A Security Guard of Nationwide Security & Investigation Agency.

Q You said you were employed with Nationwide Security &

Investigation Agency, as Security Guard on said date where, were you assigned as security guard?

A At Rotonda Wine Station, sir.

Q Where is this Rotonda Wine Station located?

A At Timog Ave., sir.

Q What city?

A Quezon City, sir.

Q You said you were employed as security guard of Rotonda Wine Station, Timog Ave., Quezon City, do you have proof to

show that you were a security guard of said Rotonda Wine Station on April 25, 1990?

A I have, sir, but it is filed with the agency.

Q This Rotonda Wine Station, what establishments are beside this establishment, and let us talk first on the left and then right?

A The left side of Rotonda Wine Station is the Dayrit Hamburger house and the right is a drugstore.

Q What was your tour of duty on April 25, 1990?

A 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight, sir:

Q And did you report for duty on said date?

A Yes, sir.

Q On or about 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock in the evening of April 25,

1990, what particular portion or Rotonda Wine Station were you posted?

A I was at the door, sir.

Q Door of what, front or back?

A Front door of the Rotonda Wine Station, sir.

Q When you said you were at the front door, inside the building

or outside?

A Outside of the door, sir.

Q You mentioned a while ago that on the left side of the Rotonda

Wine Station where were posted is the Dayrit Hamburger House, was there a security guard there?

A Yes, sir.

Q And do you know him?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is his name?

A Anastacio dela Cruz, sir.

Q You stated that at 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening of April 25, 1990, you positioned yourself in front or outside the door of

Rotonda Wine Station, did you notice anything unusual while you were posting there?

A Yes, sir, there was.

Q What was that unusual incident that took place, if any?

A There was a vehicle parking in front of Dayrit Hamburger

house.

Q What kind of a vehicle parked there?

A Green Lancer, car, box type.

Q Where was it parked particularly?

A In front of Dayrit Hamburger house, at the side of the street.

Q Did you notice the passenger of that green Lancer car?

A No, I did not know them, sir.

Q But did you have the occasion to look and see them?

A Yes, sir.

Q How many were they?

A Two, sir.

Q Were they male and female?

A Yes, sir, one man and one woman.

Q You said you noticed the car with two persons boarding it, what happened after the vehicle parked on the side of the street

in front of the Dayrit Hamburger house?

A After they had parked their vehicle, I noticed that another car parked behind that green Lancer car without any plate number.

Q Did you notice what kind of a car was that which parked

behind the seen Lancer car?

A I noticed it was a black car without plate number but I did not notice the make.

Q What happened after the black car parked behind the green Lancer car?

A Two men from the black car alighted.

Q What did the two men do after they alighted?

A After they alighted they announced and introduced themselves

that they were policemen and they went towards the green Lancer car.

Q You said they introduced themselves as policemen, to whom?

A To the people around the vicinity, to the by-standers.

Q When the two men who introduced themselves as policemen, did you notice if they were armed?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please tell us what arm or weapon did they carry?

A The other one was carrying a 45 firearm on his holster and the other one was carrying a long firearm, I do not know what kind

of firearm that long firearm was.

Q This person carrying 45 firearm, could you still recall him or his figure or feature?

A If I see him again, I could recognize him.

Q But can you describe him before this Court?

A Yes, sir, he is tall, a little bit dark complexion and with a little mustache.

Q You said that if you see that person again, you can recognize

him. Will you please look around the courtroom and point to him if he is now inside?

A Yes, he is here, sir.

Q If he is here, will you please point to him?

A Yes, I can point to him.

Q Will you please go down from the witness stand, go to him and tap him on his shoulder?

A (Witness went down from the witness stand, went to the

person and tap the shoulder, who when asked of his name answered as ENRICO DIZON).

Q Go back to the witness stand.

ATTY. CRESCINI:

May we make it of record, Your Honor, that at the time the

witness was asked to identify Enrico Dizon, there are many people, at least one hundred in number, standing inside the

courtroom closely to each other.

FISCAL:

I would like to adopt the same manifestation, Your Honor.

Q You have identified the person with 45 caliber firearm, the

person who was carrying a long firearm, can you still recognize him or can you remember his feature?

A If I could see him again, I can recognize him.

Q You said that you can see that person with long firearm again, you can recognize him, will you look around the courtroom and

tell us if that person you are referring to is here?

A Yes, he is here.

Q Will you please point to him?

A (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when

asked of his name answered as ROBIN MANGA).

Q Now, that you identified the two armed men who alighted from the black car and introduced themselves as policemen, what did

these two men do after that?

A They went towards the parked green Lancer car.

Q And what did they do when they went towards the green Lancer car?

A They immediately handcuffed the man driving the green

Lancer car.

Q This person who was handcuffed, were you able to look and see him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you still recognize him if you see him again?

A Yes, sir, I can recognize him if I see him again.

Q What about a picture, if you are shown a picture of that man who was handcuffed, could you still be able to identify him?

A Yes, sir, I can.

Q I am showing to you a picture marked as Exh. "X-4" please look at this picture and tell us if you could recognize this picture?

A Yes, sir, I know this person.

Q Who is this person?

A He is Ernesto Bernabe II, sir.

Q What relation has this person in this picture and the person

who was handcuffed in the evening of April 25, 1990 at the time you saw him?

A I know, sir, this person in the picture and the one who was handcuffed refer to one and the same person.

Q You said that Ernesto Bernabe was handcuffed, you know where was his companion at the time, who was a woman?

A I noticed she was already inside the car.

Q What car are you referring, the green Lancer car or the black

car without plate number?

A The green Lancer car, sir.

Q You said you saw the woman, were you able to look and see her that evening?

A Yes, sir.

Q Would you still be able to identify her if you see her again?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to Exh. "X-4" will you look at this picture, and tell us what relation has this person in this picture to the one

who was together with the man who was handcuffed?

A She is the woman I am referring to, sir, whom I saw inside the green Lancer, they are one and the same.

Q You said you saw the man whom you identified as Ernesto

Bernabe being handcuffed by the two policeman, how far were you from them?

A Five armslength (sic), sir.

Q By the way, this front of Dayrit Hamburger house and this

Rotonda Wine Store, are they lighted at night?

A Yes, sir.

Q What kind of light illuminates the area?

A Mercury lamp, sir.

Q How many lights are there?

A Many, sir.

Q You said there were lights, in the area during nighttime, can you describe to us from your point of comparison in daytime

whether it is bright or not more particularly at the time of the incident in question?

A It was bright just like daytime, sir. 20

As to the killing of the two victims, Raul Morales' testimony about what transpired in the warehouse in the morning of April 26, 1990 satisfied the trial court beyond

reasonable doubt, as being consistent and credible, sufficient to convict all the accused for the crime of murder. He testified positively, that on that fateful morning, two cars entered the warehouse after he opened the gate. Lising and

Garcia alighted from the green Lancer car and brought out from the backseat Cochise and Beebom. The other black car carried Dizon and Manga. Soon after,

Manalili entered the gate which was left open by Lising, and stood beside Beebom. Cochise, whose hands were tied with a wire was brought to an area far from

Beebom's view. He was stabbed by Garcia, and then by Lising. After killing Cochise, the four men carried him out of the warehouse while Manalili stayed with

Beebom.

The trial court was even more convinced about the witnesses' credibility after conducting an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime.

ATTY. LLORENTE:

Q Now, Mr. Morales, from yesterday's hearing, you mentioned

that at about 2:090, April 26, you were awakened by a sound of a motor vehicle and somebody was knocking. Do you recall

having stated that yesterday?

A Yes, I remember that, sir.

Q Now, apart from the sound of the motor vehicle and the knock at the door, what else do you recall?

A Somebody called for Aida, Sir.

Q What else?

A I heard somebody said "Aida you open the door" and she told me "just open the door, Sir.

Q And what did you do?

A I opened the door, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After the gate was opened, what happened?

A Two (2) cars got inside, Sir.

Q Can you describe the first car that entered the gate.

A The first one that got inside was colored green, Sir.

Q Do you know the make model or kind of vehicle that is colored

green?

A It was a Lancer car, Sir.

Q Did you notice also who was driving?

A Yes, I saw, Sir.

Q Who?

A It was Roberto Lising, Sir.

Q Was there anybody else inside the car?

A There was, Sir.

Q Who were inside that car?

A One was in front and two were at the back seat, Sir.

Q The one in front, do you know who was that?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Who?

A Felimon Garcia, Sir.

Q Was that the first time that you met this person?

A Felimon Garcia?

ATTY. LLORENTE:

Yes.

A That was the third time, Sir.

Q Why do you know Felimon Garcia?

A Because he is a cousin of Ligaya Fausto, Sir.

Q Can you please look around the Courtroom and tell us if you can point to this Felimon Garcia and if you can, please do.

That man, Sir.

(Witness pointing to a man in white t-shirt who when asked

answered by the name of Felimon Garcia).

Q What about the two (2) passengers at the back of the Lancer car, who were they?

A There was one woman and one man but I don't know their

names, Sir.

Q Let's go to the man. Did you see his condition? Physical condition, his appearance?

A Tall, medium built, good-looking and hairy on the arms. He

was wearing white t-shirt and was in shorts, Sir.

Q What about the condition under which this person was seated at the back of the car, can you describe that?

A I was not able to observe how he was seated, all I know is that

I saw him when he went out of the car, Sir.

Q What about the other passengers, the woman passenger. Can you describe her.

A She was medium built, she was beautiful and fair-complexioned "puti".

Q Now, let's go to the second car. Did you notice the driver of

the second car?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Did you recognize this person?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Would you be able to identify, him?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Can you please look around if this person driving the second

car is in this Courtroom and if so, please point to him.

(witness pointing to a man in white shirt who when asked answered by the name of Robin Manga).

Q Was there anybody else inside the second car aside from the

driver?

A There was, Sir.

Q Would you be able to identify that person?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Can you again look around the Courtroom and tell us if that

person is present and if so, please point to him.

A (witness pointing to a man in stripe shirt who when asked answered by the name of Enrico Dizon).

Q Now, the two (2) cars having entered the premises, could you

please tell us what happened with these two (2) cars after entering the premises?

A I saw Roberto Lising went behind the place of our sleeping

quarters and got a wire, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How did that woman reach that portion of the Lancer car? Can

you describe that?

A She was brought to that portion by the companion of Rambo, Sir.

Q Who in particular?

A That man, Sir, (witness pointing to accused Robin Manga).

Q What about the man, how was he brought to that portion

which you have identified from the Lancer car?

A It was Roberto Lising who brought him there, Sir.

Q All by himself?

A They were two (2), Sir.

Q Who's the second aside from Mr. Lising?

A (witness pointing to accused Enrico Dizon).

Q After the man and the woman were placed in that position as you described, what happened?

A Felimon Garcia came out and he was bringing with him a

spade (pala), Sir.

Q Did you notice where Felimon Garcia got that spade or pala?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where?

A They got it from the Lancer car, Sir.

Q In what particular portion of the Lancer car?

A At the back compartment of the car, Sir.

Q Incidentally, Mr. Morales, what happened to the gate?

Who closed the gate?

A It was they who closed the gate, Sir.

Q Did anybody else arrive?

A Yes, there were, Sir.

Q Who?

(witness pointing to accused Rodolfo Manalili) witness pointed to

a man in eyeglasses who when asked answered by the name of Rodolfo Manalili.

Q Now, this person that you said arrived, how did he arrive?

A When he arrive, he went direct to the woman and talked with

the woman, Sir.

Q Did you hear any conversation between that man as you identified as accused Manalili to the woman that you pointed to

here in the sketch?

A I only heard "Don't harm us. We have done no wrong".

COURT:

Who said that?

A It was the woman, Your Honor.

Q Did you hear how the woman address this man that you have

identified as accused Manalili?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How?

A Uncle, please pity us. We have done no wrong.

ATTY. LLORENTE:

Your Honor please, we heard the witness stating this time in

tagalog and could be corrected by the counsels for the accused. May we respectfully request, Your Honor, that that particular

portion stated by the witness in tagalog be placed on record also in tagalog.

COURT: Place that on record.

A Uncle, parang awa mo naman, wala naman kaming kasalanan.

Q Did you hear Mr. Manalili say anything when you heard this

plea by the woman?

A I heard nothing, Sir.

Q At that time when this plea was being made, what happened

to the person beside the woman? I am referring to the accused that you have identified as Manga. What happened to him?

A He was tying her with a wire, Sir.

Q Now, let's go back to the man. What happened to him?

A Also, he was tied with a wire, Sir.

Q Let's talk about accused Lising. Before, this man that you have

identified was being tied with the wire, what did Mr. Lising do?

A He got wire, Sir.

Q Where?

A From here, Sir.

ATTY. LLORENTE:

For the record, Your Honor, witness pointed to the clothesline

wire that he previously drew that were attached to hut no. 1.

Q What else did Mr. Lising do apart from getting . . . securing those laundry wires?

A They got the handcuff and then tied them with the wire, Sir.

Q From this area where Mr. Lising got these laundry wires, where did he go?

A He went towards the man, Sir.

Q And when he was beside the man, what did he do?

A He took off the handcuff of the man and tied the man with the wire, Sir.

Q Did he remove the handcuff, tied the man with the wire all by

himself?

A They were two (2), Sir.

Q Who is the other person helping Lising?

A (witness pointed to Enrico Dizon)

Q Could you demonstrate to us how were the hands of this man

tied with the laundry wire?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Please show us, Mr. Morales.

(witness placing his two arms behind his waist with crossed wrists)

Q Mr. Morales, for clarification. In the event that you know subsequently, much, much later, did you ever come to know who was that man tied with his hands at the back that you have

just demonstrated? Did you ever come to know his name later?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Who?

A Cochise and Beebom, Sir.

Q What about Beebom? You mentioned Beebom. Who is this

Beebom? Who is that Beebom in relation to the person that you have described in that area present at that time?

A They were sweethearts, Sir.

Q Let me just refer you to the woman that was brought out of

the green car, Lancer car. Did you ever come to know his name later on?

A When I read it from the newspaper, Sir.

Q And what was the name that you were able to read from the

paper that made you identified that woman from the Lancer car?

A Beebom, Sir.

Q What is the complete name?

A Beebom Castaños, Sir.

Q What about the man. Did you also get her complete name?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What is his complete name?

A Cochise Bernabe, Sir.

Q Now, after this man that you have just identified as Cochise

Bernabe, after his hands were tied at the back, what else did Mr. Lising and Mr. Dizon do with this man?

A Felimon went inside the bodega, Sir.

Q And what did Felimon do?

A After that, he went towards Lising, Sir.

Q And when Felimon approached Lising, what happened?

A Felimon was given a knife, Sir. (witness in the vernacular said "kutsilyo").

Q What did Felimon do with the knife?

A They went towards the man, Sir.

Q And what happened?

A Then he stabbed the man once, Sir.

Q How? Can you demonstrate?

A Yes, Sir.

ATTY. LLORENTE:

Please do.

(witness demonstrating by placing his left hand on the height of his shoulder and making a thrust by his left hand forward).

Q What else happened after what you had demonstrated happened?

A Rambo grabbed and took the knife from Felimon, Sir.

Q And what did Rambo do with the knife?

A He also stabbed the man, Sir.

ATTY. LLORENTE:

Can you demonstrate to us how did he do this?

A Yes, Sir. (witness demonstrating by putting his left hand forward at the height of his shoulder and making a forward

thrust by his right hand several times).

Q Did you notice what portion of Cochise was stabbed when Lising was doing this?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where?

A Inside the bodega, Sir. "Sa may bodega".

xxx xxx xxx 21

The defense, however, would discredit the testimony of Raul Morales alleging that he was not a credible witness considering that there were inconsistencies and

improbabilities in his testimony. To them, he was a rehearsed witness, since he was taken from the NBI to the residence of Governor Remulla's son, a good friend of Cochise, as sanctuary during the trial of this case.

Some of the inconsistencies pointed out are as follows: (1) in the sworn statement, Morales claimed that the black car driven by Lising entered the compound ahead followed by the green Lancer car driven by Garcia while he

stated in his testimony in court that the green Lancer car was first to enter, driven by Lising with Garcia in the passenger seat followed by the black car with Manga

and Dizon on board; (2) in his statement, Morales indicated that he did not see the actual killing of Cochise since the victim was brought out, while he testified in

court that Garcia and Lising stabbed the victim inside the compound; (3) Morales made mention of a total of five persons, including the two victims, in the early

morning of April 26, while in court, he identified the five accused seen with the two victims.

It has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the

witnesses' credibility. 22 These inconsistencies even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a

rehearsed testimony. 23

The defense finds it also improbable for Morales to have witnessed the events at such a vantage point from the steps of the hut, since the perpetrators of a crime

would not unnecessarily expose themselves in committing the act to prevent possible identification.

Obviously, it never occurred to Lising at the time that Morales, who was under his

control and who was afraid of him, would ever testify against him.

Manalili makes capital of the fact that Morales did not mention him at all in his prior sworn statement as being present at the scene of the crime. For Manalili, the

omission of his name was a significant development as it appeared improbable that a vital witness will miss out an alleged perpetrator if indeed he was present at

the scene of the crime.

Raul Morales himself admitted later on that there were omissions in his sworn statement made before the CAPCOM because he was afraid of his employer Lising

and his companions. Understandably, he was reluctant to volunteer all the information about the killing for fear that he would suffer the same fate of Cochise

and Beebom. The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in the criminal investigation is of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect

credibility. 24 Besides, at that time, Raul Morales was merely concerned with bringing out his story without really paying particular attention to the details. He

related the his employer Lising and companions brought a man and a woman to their warehouse and killed them both. He saw Cochise's face on the papers and

recognized him to be the man whom Lising's group killed. Morales only mentioned Lising and Garcia's names in his sworn statement because they were the only ones

known to him. Such omission and discrepancies should not be taken against him. It bears emphasis that a sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to be a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. 25 It is a

matter of judicial experience that a sworn statement being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate. Thus, discrepancies between the

statements of the affiant in his sworn statement and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him. 26 There is no rule of evidence to the effect

that omission of certain particulars in an affidavit or sworn statement would estop an affiant in making an elaboration thereof during the trial. 27 Whenever there is

an inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of the witness, the latter commands greater weight. 28

Roberto Lising discredits Raul Morales as having a motive in implicating him to the

crime since "he quelled a rally staged by Morales who was the most arrogant and stubborn of Fausto's employees, seeking an increase in pay". As pahinante in their

LPG business, Morales, according to Lising, was oftentimes reprimanded for not doing his job well and held responsible for lost gas tanks.

The motive imputed to Morales is as far-fetched as it is unsubstantiated. It is highly unlikely that Morales, a mere pahinante, if he were arrogant and stubborn, would be tolerated by Lising, the live-in partner of Fausto.

By and large, the defenses raised by the accused do not persuade us. When it comes to the issue of credibility of the witnesses, appellate courts give much weight and respect to the findings of the trial court since the trial court is in the

better position to examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of the witnesses. 29 With the eyewitnesses' account of Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales,

the culpability of the accused for the crimes charged have been established.

This brings us to the third issue of whether or not there was conspiracy.

Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. 30 Where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of

a felony and decide to commit it then conspiracy exists. While direct evidence is not necessary, conspiracy may be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused

themselves when during and after said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 31

Undoubtedly, the trial court did not err in finding the existence of conspiracy in

this case. With the interlocking confessions of Manalili, Garcia and Lising, the group came to an agreement to effect the arrest of Robert Herrera for a

considerable sum of P50,000.00. The stake-out at the Castaños residence, the tailing of the car, the abduction at Dayrit's Ham and Burger Restaurant and the

detention in the Valle Verde Motel and the subsequent killing of the two victims all show that all the accused acted in unison and cooperated with each other towards the accomplishment of a common criminal design. Where conspiracy is

established, the act of one is the act of all.

Garcia, for his part, prays that his liability be mitigated on grounds of lack of intent or motive, acts made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, and voluntary

surrender, which if considered would make him merely an accomplice to the crime. Unfortunately, these defenses are unavailing.

To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or

uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. 32 That

compulsion must be of some character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for escape. 33

Garcia's participation and presence from the time the abduction was hatched, up

to the killing of the victims is undisputed. He was very well aware of Manalili's plans. He was instrumental in introducing Lising to Manalili. Likewise, Lising's

intentions to silence both Cochise and Beebom at the end upon realizing an alleged mistake was known to him. He did not do anything to deter the

commission or to report the crimes immediately thereafter. In fact, he stated that he and Lising saw each other after the incident but never mentioned anything

about it, which only goes to show their intention of concealing the crime. Only after several months of being hunted, did he send feelers for his surrender.

Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of

each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all. 34 The degree of actual participation in the commission of crime is immaterial.

In People v. Degoma, the Court explained:

. . . One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common

felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his

chances that things may go awry and that the offended party may resist or third persons may get killed in the course of implementing the basic criminal

design. To free himself from such criminal liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the

conspiracy to commit the initial felony. (People v. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574, 580-582 [1988]; People vs. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 [1988]; People v.

Escober, 157 SCRA 541, 567 [1988]; People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, 159-160 [1967] (Emphasis supplied). 35

For the same reasons, Manalili can not likewise be exonerated from the crime. We

have examined carefully the arguments of the Solicitor General in urging Manalili's acquittal, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the case do not support his

stand.

We find it difficult to accept Manalili's contention that he had contracted the services of policemen to effect the "legal arrest" of Robert Herrera, the main

suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili. Equally preposterous is his assertion that upon arriving at the Valle Verde Hotel in San Fernando, Pampanga,

he realized there was a mistake in the identities of the persons arrested, so he insisted that they be released. Neither is there factual basis to his claim that he had every reason to protect the life of Beebom, in particular, since the latter is a

principal witness against Robert Herrera, the suspect in the shooting of his brother.

In the first place, why did he take it upon himself to employ persons unknown to

him to effect the "arrest" of Herrera? The warrant of arrest of Herrera, if one was really issued, was never presented in evidence. In the second place, the

surreptitious meeting of Manalili with Lising arranged by Garcia, the surveillance or stake out of the Castaños' residence, the manner of abduction where the victims

were blindfolded, handcuffed and gagged at Valle Verde Motel, cannot certainly be considered as acts in the regular performance of their duties as policemen. Thirdly,

if it was true that Manalili just wanted the arrest of Robert Herrera, why did he have to seek the assistance of Pampanga policemen? It would have been more logical and expedient to have utilized the NBI or Quezon City Police especially

when the alleged warrant of arrest was issued by a Quezon City court. After all, it was not difficult to locate Robert Herrera as he was reportedly frequenting the

Castaños' residence in Quezon City. Fourthly, it does not stand to reason why the victims were taken to Pampanga after allegedly being arrested in Quezon City. It

would have been more cogent for the appellants to have delivered the victims to the nearest station of the Quezon City Police Department considering that the

warrant of arrest was allegedly issued by a Quezon City court. If arrest was really in the minds of the accused, why did they hole-up with the victims in a motel

when they arrived in Pampanga? Finally, if they were bent on legally arresting one Roberto Herrera, it was not necessary for them to also take into custody the woman companion of the person they mistook as Herrera.

All these only show that Manalili has premeditated in his mind a more s inister plot than merely effecting a "legal arrest."

It is an unmitigated absurdity for Manalili to pretend that upon his realization of

the mistake in their "arrest," he insisted upon the release of the victims since he had every reason to keep Beebom alive. If he had just a bit of concern for Beebom's safety, why did Manalili leave for Manila without bringing her and

Cochise with him to make sure that no harm would befall them, knowing fully well of Lising's resolve just revealed to him to silence both victims? What should be

nearer the truth is that Beebom and Cochise became aware of Manalili's presence at the motel together with the other accused and this was the added reason why

the two had to be eliminated, to do away with having to explain why he was at the scene. His pretension that he wanted to keep Beebom from harm's way because

she was to have testified in the prosecution of his brother rings hollow. It cannot be assumed that had she lived she would have testified in court and pointed to Robert Herrera as the killer of Manalili's brother.

In any case, assuming the remote possibility, the mistake in the identity of the victims does not exonerate Manalili pursuant to the rule that one who performs a criminal act should be held liable for the act and for all its consequences although

the victim was not the person whom the fellow intended to injure. 36

We are reminded of the rule that the conviction must not rest on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. In the instant case,

apart from its interlocking sworn statements of appellants, Raul Morales' positive testimony that he saw Manalili enter the bodega, and stand beside Beebom, while

Cochise was being killed, convinces us with moral certainty that Manalili is equal ly guilty of the crimes charged. His presence in the warehouse clearly belies his claim

that from the motel, he left for Manila already. As against the positive testimony and identification, mere denials of the accused cannot prevail to overcome

conviction by the court. 37 The inaction of Manalili where he could have prevented the killings only reveal his complicity to the crime. Manalili is certainly part of a complete whole without whom there would be no Cochise-Beebom double murder

case.

Furthermore, the decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the crime of Kidnapping and finding the rest of the accused guilty for the crime of

Slight Illegal Detention only does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all the accused should be equally guilty for the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, we can

no longer convict Manalili and Garcia for Kidnapping in consonance with the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand to suffer the

penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight Illegal Detention should be qualified to Serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the

Revised Penal Code considering that a female victim was involved.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. The decision of the lower court finding accused Rodolfo Manalili, Roberto "Rambo" Lising, Felimon Garcia, Robin Q. Manga and Enrico Dizon guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder, including their civil liability is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, and

2. The decision of the lower court finding accused Roberto "Rambo" Lising, Enrico

Dizon, and Robin Manga guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention aggravated by the use of motor vehicle is hereby MODIFIED, in that the said accused are

hereby declared guilty of the crime of Kidnapping under Article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. LISING [285 SCRA 595 (1998)]

November 10, 2010

Facts: In March 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman, asked Felimon Garcia, his

townmate, if he knew somebody who could allegedly affect the arrest of Robert Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili. On April 21, 1990, Garcia called

up Manalili and informed him that he already contracted a policeman to help him. On April 22, Garcia introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and another man to Manalili.

During the meeting, Manalili offered to pay them P50K for the job. On April 23-24, Lising’s group met with Vic Lisboa and conducted a surveillance on the Castaños residence in the hope of seeing Herrera. Failing to do so, the group was asked to return

the next day.

On April 25, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise Bernabe,

26 years old and a new graduate of the UP College of Law, and Beebom Castaños, 22 -years old and a graduating student of the UP College of Mass Communication, leave the

Castaños residence in a green box type Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle.

The Lancer car stopped at Dayrit’s Ham and Burger House on Timog Circle. Alighting from the car, they were accosted by Dizon and Manga.

On June 21, two security guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano, both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them that Lising killed a man and a woman in their warehouse. On June 23, Raul Morales was picked up and told his

story. On June 25, the body of Cochise was exhumed. The cause of his death was multiple stab wounds. The next day, Beebom’s body was exhumed from a shallow grave,

2 kilometers from where Cochise’s body was found.

One by one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise & Beebom fell into the hands of the authorities. Lising, Garcia & Manalili executed extrajudicial statements. Upon

arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 2 vital witnesses: Froilan Olimpia, who witnessed the abduction of the young couple at Dayrit’s

Ham and Burger House; & Raul Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of Cochise. In their defense, the accused policemen allege that there was insufficient

evidence to sustain their conviction. Each one also presented an alibi.

On July 1, 1992, the Court held Manalili, Lising, Garcia, Manga and Dizon guilty of the crime of double murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by premeditation and

abuse of public position by Lising, Manga and Dizon. The Court also held Lising, Dizon and Manga guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention aggravated by use of a motor

vehicle. The accused were acquitted of the crime of kidnapping, since the use of the car was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of slight illegal detention

Issues, Held and Ratio:

1. WON the extrajudicial statements of appellants Manalili, Garcia and Lising were admissible.

Yes. Extrajudicial statements are, as a rule, admissible as against their respective

declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

? Based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true.

? The respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and Garcia were executed voluntarily. They were assisted by a counsel and properly sworn to before a duly

authorized officer. They merely relied on their extrajudicial statements and did not take the witness stand.

? Lising claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing the extrajudicial

statement. However, he did not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative charges against his alleged tormentors.

? The following are indicators of the voluntariness in the execution of Lising’s

extrajudicial statement:

- It contains many details and facts which the investigating officer could not have known without the information given by Lising.

- It bears corrections duly initialed by Lising.

- It tends to explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused Manalili.

Extrajudicial statements can also be used as evidence against several persons charged with the same offense when the statements are in all material respects identical and there could have been no collusion among the parties.

? “interlocking confessions”

? In this case, the statements were independently executed and rather identical with each other in their material details.

The trial court’s decision in convicting all the accused was based not merely on the

extrajudicial statements of the accused alone but mainly on the eyewitness account of the two witnesses, which the trial court gave weight and credence as true.

2. WON the prosecution witnesses Froilan, Olimpia and Raul Morales were credible.

Yes. The testimony of Raul Morales satisfied the trial court beyond reasonable doubt, as

being consistent and credible, sufficient to convict all the accused for the crime of murder.

? He testified positively.

? The ocular inspection conducted by the trial court supported Morales’ narration of the events.

The inconsistencies & discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not

upon the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the witness’ credibility. These consistencies even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of the

witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

The initial reluctance of the witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in the criminal investigation is of common knowledge

and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility.

A sworn statement or an affidavit doesn’t indicate the complete details of the event. It is

a matter of judicial experience that a sworn statement being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete & often inaccurate. Discrepancies between the sworn statement & the testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness. In case of discrepancy, the latter

prevails over the former.

When it comes to the issue of credibility of the witnesses, the appellate courts give much weight to the findings of the trial court since the latter had the capacity to examine and

observe the witnesses.

3. WON the finding of conspiracy among the appellants was sufficiently proven.

Yes. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.

Conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While direct evidence is not necessary,

conspiracy may be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused when during and after said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of

interest

TC didn’t err in finding the existence of conspiracy in this case given the interlocking confessions of Manalili, Garcia & Lising.

Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. The precise modality or

extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary. The degree of actual participation in the commission of crime is immaterial.

4. WON Garcia’s liability is mitigated by (1) his lack of intent or motive, (2) his acts were made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, & (3) his voluntary surrender, w/c would make him merely an accomplice to the crime

No. To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a

mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. Such compulsion must be of some character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for escape. Garcia’s participation and presence from the time the

abduction was hatched, up to the killing of the victims is undisputed.

G.R. No. L-32265 May 16, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ERNESTO RAMOS y ANTONIO, ELADIO CALUYA y BINUYA, SIXTO GABORNE y LLUADER and EDUARDO SUBLECHERO y GABUAT, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Amado Sison for E. Sublechero.

Ernesto C S. Sibal for E. Ramos, defendants-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:

Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIV at Caloocan City, for robbery with homicide, sentencing Ernesto Ramos, Eladio Caluya, Eduardo Sublechero, and Sixto Gaborne "to suffer the supreme penalty of death by

electrocution, and to indemnify the heirs of Dr. Mariano Gana jointly and severally the sum of P12,200.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay

the costs."

With respect to the accused Sixto Gaborne who, upon arraignment, pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced accordingly, this Court on July 25, 1974 set aside the

decision of the lower court of March 5, 1970 and granted him a new trial "to enable him to be afforded the opportunity to be heard in accordance with the guidelines set forth by

this Court from Apduhan and the subsequent cases." Thus, this appeal concerns the accused Ernesto Ramos y Antonio, Eladio Caluya y Binuya and Eduardo Sublechero y

Gabuat only.

Evidence shows that about nine o'clock in the evening of December 8, 1967, Vilma Pitelo and Milagros Bural, housemaids of Dr. and Mrs. Mariano Gana whose residence is at 139

Tirad Pass, Balintawak, Caloocan City were in the kitchen of the said Gana residence. Vilma was scrubbing the kitchen floor while Milagros was putting water in bottles near the kitchen sink. Suddenly, appellant Ernesto Ramos came from behind Milagros Bural,

held her left shoulder and tied a handkerchief over her mouth. A companion of Ernesto Ramos helped in tying her hands behind her back, following which Vilma Pitelo was also

tied, her mouth with a twisted shirt and her hands and feet tied with a rope. Upon hearing the footsteps from the other side of the kitchen, Milagros Bural, and Vilma Pitelo

saw Ernesto Ramos and the other appellants who had entered the kitchen door, hide behind the door near the refrigerator. Dr. Gana entered the kitchen and got a bottle of

water inside the refrigerator. He then went back to the sala and listened to the radio.

Appellants entered the sala, except Ernesto Ramos who stayed and stood guard in the kitchen. Suddenly, Mrs. Rosario Bella-Gana who at the time was resting in her bedroom

at the ground floor of their residence heard a groan and thinking that her husband, Dr. Gana, might be suffering from "bangungot", shouted: "Manoy, Manoy, may sakit ka ba? Ano ang nangyari?" and immediately rushed to leave her room to give her husband a

glass of water. As she opened the door, she met appellants Caluya, Sublechero, Gaborne and another one she described as tag and thin. These four men led her back to her room

and demanded money. Mrs. Gana told them they can get every thing and pleaded not to hurt her. Appellant Sublechero asked for the key to the aparador while the tan one took

the money which is a little over P200.00.

Thereafter, the four men led Mrs. Gana to the kitchen where they tied her hands behind her back with a rope. She was made to join her two maids who were tied to the rice

sack near the cupboard. The five men including Ernesto Ramos fled from the house.

Mrs. Gana managed to go up to the second floor of the house where she called her daughter-in-law, Sarah Florentino Gana, who untied her. They went down the ground

floor where they saw Dr. Gana slumped at the foot of the stairs, soaked with blood. Sarah went to the kitchen and untied the maids, following which, they returned to the

sala and found Dr. Gana already dead.

The matter was reported to the police who came to investigate and ordered the members of the household not to touch anything. Vilma then and there told the police

that she knew one of the five men, Eduardo Sublechero, because the latter used to play basketball in their yard.

After the statements of the other witnesses had been taken, appellants Ernesto Ramos,

Eladio Caluya and Eduardo Sublechero were investigated by the police of Caloocan City before whom they gave their respective statements which were subscribed and sworn to

before the inquest fiscal. Sixto Gaborne refused to give a statement.

Dr. Plaridel Vidal of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted the examination on the body of the deceased Dr. Mariano Gana. Necropsy report shows that the victim died

of "[h]emorrhage, meningeal, subdural, subarachnoidal extensive and generalized, traumatic." (Exhibit "F")

In his defense, Ernesto Ramos professed innocence of the crime charged due to the

exempting circumstance of irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. His evidence tends to show that:

[O]n December 8, 1967, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, accused

appellant Ernesto Ramos was fetched from his house at 109 G. de Jesus, Caloocan City by co-accused Eduardo Sublechero and brought to the house

of the latter at General Tirona, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City to fill out application forms for overseas employment. While thus preparing their application forms, two other co-accused, Sixto Gaborne and Boy Andy came

and invited them to eat in a restaurant for they won in gambling, (t.s.n., p. 3, March 19, 1969). Thereafter, they proceeded to a store at Bagong Barrio

where Boy Andy bought a rope. Upon seeing the rope, accused-appellant Ernesto Ramos became curious and asked Boy Andy what he will do with the

rope and he was told to keep quiet but after about two minutes Ernesto Ramos insisted in knowing what the rope was for. Finally Boy Andy told

them if they really want to have money, Ernesto Ramos protested and said what they were thinking was not good and that he wanted to go home. Boy Andy prevented him from leaving for he had already known of their evil

scheme and was afraid he might tell the police. When Ernesto Ramos refused to join them, and was insisting to go home. Boy Andy held him by

the collar of his shirt at the same time pulling out a dagger which he pointed to Ramos and told him if Ramos will not go with him he will kill him. For

fear, Ramos went with them to Samson Road where they waited for Jojo.

From there, they proceeded to the house of Dr. Mariano Gana. After cutting the wire fence, Boy Andy pushed Eduardo Sublechero inside. When they

were all inside, Ramos was forced by Andy to go inside too. Ramos' knees were trembling, (t.s.n. p. 4, March 19, 1969) Ramos saw the two

housemaids hogtied but he could not see clearly who hogtied them for it was dark inside-the lights were off. Boy Andy ordered Ramos to stand guard and

threatened him not to leave or he will kill him. After a while he heard banging noises inside and then saw all the others running towards the

kitchen so all of them ran outside of the house and proceeded to Boy Andy's house where the loot of P200.00 was divided. At first Ramos refused to accept his share of P40.00 by saying they could keep it and he will just go

home. When Boy Andy suspected that Ramos might tell the police of the incident, the latter got nervous and afraid so for fear of his life, he accepted

the money and went home. The following day, they were arrested by the police and investigated at the police headquarters. (pp. 3 & 4, Appellant

Ernesto Ramos' Brief)

The defense of Eduardo Sublechero is as follows: On December 8,1967, he and Ernesto Ramos were preparing their applications for overseas employment. Boy Andy arrived

and invited them to go to Bagong Barrio. On the way, and in front of the house of Dr. Mariano Gana, Boy Andy held Sublechero by the collar of his shirt, poked a three-bladed

instrument at him and ordered him to enter the residence of Dr. Mariano Gana. While inside the residence of the victim, Sublechero did riot have the chance to go out of the house because Boy Andy was always beside him. In short, this appellant claims

exemption from any criminal liability because his acts and/or participation in the criminal design of Boy Andy, who up to then remains at large, was under compulsion of an

irresistible force and under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

Likewise, Eladio Caluya claims that on December 8,1967, at about 8:00 in the evening

he was on his way to his residence at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, from work at the Asiatic Shoe Factory and met Boy Andy, Gaborne, Sublechero and Ramos waiting for

him at Samson Road. He claimed no conversation took place among them and they walked towards Bagong Barrio until they reached the residence of Dr. Mariano Gana.

They stopped in front of said house and he claimed he was surprised when Boy Andy told them that they would enter the said house to rob. He remonstrated but Boy Andy threatened to kill him if he would not join. His testimony follows.

Q When he told you would rob said house, what did you do, you particularly?

A I told him that I would not go with him.

Q When you told him you would not go with him, what

happened?

A He threatened me if I would not go with them, he would kill me.

Q When he threatened you, did he have any weapon with him then?

A He had.

Q What was with him?

A A knife this long (Witness demonstrating a foot long).

ATTY. BALGONA:

Q Did he threatened you with that knife?

A Yes, sir, by poking the same at my side.

Q Did you finally enter the premises of the house of Doctor

Gana?

A Yes, sir." (tsn. p. 2 1, March 19, 1969 hearing)

He claimed, however, that he did not do anything while inside the house of Dr. Gana.

Q What did you do when you were already at the premises of the

house of Doctor Gana?

A None, sir. (tsn. p. 21, March 19, 1969 hearing)

On December 9, 1967, at about 3:00 in the morning, he was apprehended at his

residence by policemen and brought to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters for investigation.

The trial court, with valid reason, refused to accept the alleged threat employed by Boy

Andy to kill them if they would not join him and considered the same as flimsy and inadequate so as to strike fear in their hearts and compel them to obey and commit the heinous crime. "Even if Boy Andy was armed with a knife, he was alone and the three

accused could manage to overpower him if not escape from the scene of the crime. It is evident that accused Ramos, Sublechero and Caluya were willing participants in the

pursuit of their criminal design to rob and kill. The excuses of the defendants cannot prevail over the clear, conclusive and positive evidence of the prosecution. Moreover,

the crime committed was proven independently of the extra-judicial confessions of the accuse thru the testimonies of the pro petition witnesses beyond reasonable doubt. It is

proceedings. observed by the Court that the evidence on record offers sufficient and ample ground to conclude that the accused committed the crime of robbery with homicide pursuant to a conspiracy. The circumstance of their meeting together one night

in one place from which they proceeded to the scene of the crime; the taking along with them a newly bought rope; their separate, individual and assigned tasks in the

commission of the crime; the almost militant dispatch and precision in the perpetration of the crime; and their departure together from the scene of the crime and meeting in

one place to divide the loot- all these facts and circumstances taken together clearly manifest a pre-conceived, well-planned and concerted action on the part of the accused

in pursuance of their common and evil design to rob and kill. (Decision, pp. 27-28)

We find no reason to differ from the conclusions reached by the trial court in finding herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The defense

invoked by the appellants that they acted in view of the irresistible force and uncontrollable fear of Boy Andy in the unfortunate incident which resulted in the death

of Dr. Mariano Gana is devoid of merit. Basis of these two exempting circumstances is the complete absence of freedom. In the case at bar, appellants Ramos, Sublechero and

Caluya failed to show that they resisted the threats of Boy Andy and that in spite of their resistance they were still forced to act in accordance with his wishes. Their fear of Boy

Andy was merely speculative and there was complete absence of real or reasonable fear for one's life. Had appellants wanted to, they would have easily overpowered Boy Andy who was alone.

On the other hand, the manner in which the crime was executed shows that appellants had community of design and that they cooperated and helped each other in the commission thereof. They met in Samson Road, Caloocan City and from there proceeded

to the scene of the crime. In the presence of the appellants, Boy Andy bought a rope from a store. Upon entering the house, each one performed his assigned task and after

the commission of the crime, they left the scene of the crime and met in the place of Boy Andy to get their respective shares.

By and large, the people's evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment appealed from.

However, in the absence of the necessary votes, We have to impose the penalty lower than death which is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, as modified in the sense that the penalty imposed on herein appellants

Ernesto Ramos y Antonio, Eladio Caluya y Binuya and Eduardo Sublechero y Gabuat is reduced to reclusion perpetua, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. RAMOS [296 SCRA 589 (1998)]

November 10, 2010

Nature: Automatic Review of a decision of the RTC of Pangasinan

? October 16, 1995 – Elizabeth T. Ramos filed a criminal complaint for rape against Feliciano M. Ramos. It was alleged that the appellant was able to perpetrate the

felony against the minor through the use of force and intimidation in its execution

? Elizabeth Ramos, a minor of 14 years old, was raped by her father while her

brothers and sisters were sleeping nearby. She was warned not to report the matter to anyone or else he would kill her. The rape was discovered only when she suffered an abortion of the fetus that she was carrying in her womb.

? Upon filing of the charges in the RTC Feliciano changed his residence to Tuai, Cagayan and an alias warrant of arrest was issued. March 26, 1996 Feliciano was

arrested in Tuao, Cagayan while he was feeding the ducks.

? After the prosecution has presented their evidence Feliciano wanted to change his plea to guilty and he was allowed by the court to do so. Feliciano Ramos was

sentenced to death by the RTC of Pangasinan.

Issues:

1. WON he can claim the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

? NO. There was no voluntary surrender because he arrested by police Aban.

According to Aban Feliciano “went with him” when he showed the warrant of arrest. The execution of warrant of arrest against Feliciano entailed expenses of about P2,500

? Surrender is voluntary when it is done by an accused spontaneously and made

in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the

trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.

? Feliciano tried to evade arrest by changing his residence. The appellant was arrested and he was actually taken and held in custody under the authority of the law.

2. WON his plea of guilty can be taken as a mitigating circumstance

? NO. His plea of guilty was made after the evidence against him was presented.

It was made out of fear of conviction & not based on his conscience. A plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused.

? A plea of guilty made after the arraignment and after the trial had begun does

not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance

3. WON the 7 new attendant circumstances instituted by RA 7659 can be considered as aggravating circumstance

? NO. RA 7659 in A335 in the RPC provided for the 7 new attendant circumstances. People vs. Garcia – attendant circumstance partake the nature of

qualifying circumstances and not merely aggravating circumstance, since they increase the penalties by the degrees. Aggravating circumstance affect only the period of the penalty and does not increase it to a higher degree.

? People vs. Bayot – qualifying circumstance or an inherent aggravating circumstance should not be mistaken for a generic aggravating circumstance in the

crime of robbery. Generic aggravating circumstance, not offset by mitigating circumstance, increases the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the maximum period, but without exceeding the limit prescribed by law. A qualifying

circumstance – gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also imposes on the author thereof no other penalty but that specially prescribed by law for said crimes.

? Rape with the concurrence of minority of the victim and her relationship with the aggressor gives a different character of rape which raised the imposable penalty from reclusion perpertua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Result: minority of the

offended party and relationship to the offender ? special qualifying circumstance.

4. WON the accused can be convicted for qualified rape

? NO. Cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he wasn’t properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape

? Every element which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information.

? Person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that which he is charged in

the complaint or information on which he is tried.

? In Garcia it was held that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is

charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital

punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned

? The general principles of criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the information, may be proven during the trial over objection of

the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such evidence merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the offense and its consideration by

the courts do not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.

Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion

perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:

I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr.

Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and

II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.

The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house,

apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering

and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to

her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very

dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take

bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before.

Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers

or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.

Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to

the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon

said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it

for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he

testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.

The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno

whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they

were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary,

he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted

in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.

By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of

the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or

omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of

his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in

one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her

affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him her

husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her

womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to

Kirol.

If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to

the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was

helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact

that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had

upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the

inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is

uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware

of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child

from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket,

according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of

giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and

extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances

(art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she

later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to

the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her

favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is

ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.

People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936)

FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged

from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her

aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few

moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary,

conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so

willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second

lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as he considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been

eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable

to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger

of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence

or any other reason than that she

was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law

exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her

favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of.

G.R. No. 173485 November 23, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

NENITA LEGASPI y LUCAS, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Challenged in this appeal is the January 16, 2006 Decision1 promulgated by the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01209, which affirmed in toto the Judgment2 of conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 rendered by the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 12351-D.

On April 23, 2003, accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi y Lucas (Legaspi), also known as "Nita," was charged before the RTC for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Nenita Legaspi y Lucas a.k.a. "Nita" with the crime of violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, committed as follows:

On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and

give away to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing sixteen

(16) decigrams (0.16 grams), which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.3

Upon arraignment4 on July 14, 2003, Legaspi pleaded not guilty to the charge against

her. After the pre-trial conference5 held on the same day, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution evidence, upon which the RTC anchored its finding of guilt, consisted of the testimonies of two of the operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, Police

Officer (PO) 2 Arturo San Andres and PO1 Janet A. Sabo.6 Their version of the incident leading to Legaspi’s arrest is summarized as follows:

San Andres and Sabo were assigned to the Mayor Special Action Team (MSAT), Pasig City Police Station. On April 22, 2003, at around 4:00 p.m., a certain informant, whose identity remained confidential, approached San Andres to report about the rampant

incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City and about the drug pusher who was identified as Legaspi. After gathering all the necessary details, San

Andres immediately informed his superior, Police Inspector Villaruel, who instructed him, Sabo, PO1 Aldrin Mariano, and PO1 Roland Panis to conduct a buy-bust operation.

Villaruel designated San Andres to act as the poseur-buyer and gave him two pieces of one hundred-peso (P 100.00) bills to be used as buy-bust money. Mariano was tasked to

be the team leader, and he, along with the rest of the team, served as San Andres’s backup. At around 5:15 p.m., the team reached Centennial Village, where after a briefing on their operations, San Andres, together with the informant, proceeded to

Legaspi’s house, while the others strategically placed themselves in the entrapment area, keeping San Andres within their view. Upon seeing Legaspi, who was just outside

her house, the informant introduced San Andres to her as a "scorer."7 Legaspi asked them how much they wanted to "score," to which San Andres replied "P 200.00

panggamit lang."8 After San Andres gave Legaspi the buy-bust money, which he had previously marked with his initials "ABS," Legaspi reached into her pocket and gave him

one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing the suspected shabu. As soon as San Andres got the sachet, he scratched his head, to signal to his team that the transaction was over. He thereafter introduced himself as a police officer, informed Legaspi of her rights,

and marked the sachet he had received from her with his initials. The team then brought Legaspi to Rizal Medical Center for a check-up, and then to the police station wherein

they filed the appropriate charges against her. Meanwhile, San Andres sent the sachet to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and requested for an examination

to determine the nature of its contents.9

Annalee R. Forro, a PNP forensic chemist at the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory, examined the "heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings ‘EXH A ABS

04/22/03’ containing 0.16 gram white crystalline substance"10 on the same day. In her Chemistry Report No. D-727-03E, she stated the following:

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result

to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

x x x x

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.11

This report, along with the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance bought from

Legaspi, and the two P 100.00 bills used as marked money,12 were presented in court.

After the prosecution had rested its case, Legaspi was called to the witness stand to relay her version of the events. Legaspi primarily denied the charges against her. She

testified that on April 22, 2003, while she was inside her house taking care of her grandson, San Andres and Mariano peeked through her window and asked her if she was

"Nita." Legaspi alleged that after she answered in the affirmative, the two police officers pushed the door open and told her to go with them. She claimed that because of the

shock the events had caused her, she was not able to ask the police officers why they were taking her with them. Legaspi said that she was brought to the police precinct in

Pasig City where she was asked about her shabu source. Legaspi averred that she told the police officers that she did not know what they were talking about. She asseverated that she had never been arrested before and that she had never been involved in any

illegal drugs case.13

On December 12, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused NENITA LEGASPI Y LUCAS a.k.a. "Nita" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand

pesos (P 500,000.00), with the accessory penalties provided under Section 35 thereof.

Moreover, the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.16 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (Exhibit "E-1") is hereby confiscated in favor

of the government and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in accordance with law.

With Costs.14

In convicting Legaspi, the RTC stated that it was more convinced with the version of the prosecution. The RTC held that the positive testimonies of the two police officers were stronger than Legaspi’s negative testimony. The RTC added that aside from the

presumption that the two police officers performed their duties in a regular manner, there was no showing that they had any ill motive in arresting Legaspi.

Aggrieved, Legaspi appealed15 her case to this Court. However, conformably with this

Court’s Decision in People v. Mateo,16 which modified certain rules on direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death,

reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, Legaspi’s case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.17

Legaspi anchored her appeal on the lone error as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE POLICE INSTIGATED THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST TRANSACTION.18

On January 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, affirming the RTC’s

judgment of conviction, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 12, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation

of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED en toto.19

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals explained the difference between instigation, which is deemed contrary to public policy, and entrapment, a valid means of arresting violators

of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It then held that the buy-bust operation that led to Legaspi’s arrest was an entrapment, and that Legaspi miserably failed to substantiate

her allegation of instigation, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals also said that contrary to Legaspi’s assertions, neither prior

surveillance nor the presentation of the informant in court was an indispensable requirement to the successful prosecution of a drug case.20

Undaunted, Legaspi is once again before this Court, assigning the same error she

assigned before the Court of Appeals.21

The Ruling of this Court

Legaspi was charged and convicted for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or

the Dangerous Drugs Law, which provides:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential

Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P 10,000,000.00) shall be

imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any

dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty

(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,

distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation

of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpi res within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be

imposed in every case.

For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous

drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any

offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person

who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment

and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a

"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

Defense of Instigation

Legaspi contends that she was instigated to commit the crime, as she was not the one who sought out San Andres to sell him shabu. She avers that San Andres’s own

testimony clearly shows that he had suggested the commission of the crime by offering her P 200.00 for the purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that this is supported by her

testimony wherein she denied selling shabu to San Andres or to anyone for that matter. This, she says, is confirmed by the fact that she has no police or criminal record.22

Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we shall first distinguish between entrapment

and instigation. Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution

of their criminal plan. Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such a case, the instigators

become co-principals themselves.23

Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him,

there is instigation and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an

opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him,

there is no instigation and the accused must be convicted. The law in fact tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.24

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very relevant in

anti-narcotics operations. It has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in

apprehending drug offenders.25 This Court, elaborating on the concept of a buy-bust operation within the context of entrapment and instigation, has said:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted

as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act

of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its

opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to

public policy and considered an absolutory cause. x x x.26

Instigation is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this as a defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the

government induced him to commit the offense.27 Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing the crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San Andres,

who was then looking to buy shabu.

We find, however, that Legaspi’s defense of instigation must fail. It is an established rule that when an accused is charged with the sale of i llicit drugs, the following defenses

cannot be set up:

(1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or

(2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer

seeking to expose his criminal act; or

(3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its commission. 28

The foregoing are especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that

is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the

offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the police officer.29

In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of drug trafficking from

their confidential informant, immediately set-up a buy-bust operation to test the veracity of the report and to arrest the malefactor if the report proved to be true. The

prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell P 200.00 worth of shabu to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced,

coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed that he was also a "scorer"; and as soon as she learned that he was looking to buy, she

immediately asked him how much he needed. Under the circumstances, the police officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to arrest Legaspi even

without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.30

The RTC was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the police officers,

especially since Legaspi failed to impute on them any motive to falsely testify against her.31 Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust

operation team were inspired by improper motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.32

Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not instigation.1awp++i1 While instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of

a confession and avoidance.33 In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer.34 Thus, it is

incompatible with the defense of denial, where the theory is that the accused did not commit the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present

concurrently. Besides, this Court has consistently held that:

[B]are denials are weak forms of defenses, especially in this case where the accused-appellant’s testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The

uncorroborated denial by the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the testimonies of the arresting officer and the poseur-buyer, who both testified on affirmative matters.

Furthermore, there is no indication that the arresting team and the other prosecution

witnesses were actuated by improper motives, prevaricating just to cause damnation to him. Thus, their affirmative statements proving accused-appellant’s culpability must be

respected and must perforce prevail.35

No Prior Surveillance

Legaspi also argues that the veracity of the buy-bust operation is suspect as it was conducted without prior surveillance.36

This Court has many times discussed the dispensability of prior surveillance in buy-bust

operations, as it is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or such buy-bust operation. In People v. Eugenio,37 we held that the conduct of surveillance prior to a

buy-bust operation is not required especially when the police officers are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant. This is so because there is no rigid or textbook

method in conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work, and the need for prior surveillance may be dispensed with when time is of the essence.38 In People v. Gonzales,39 we said:

The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. Thus, we have refused to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts the police authorities might credibly undertake in their entrapment

operations.40

Non-presentation of Informant

Legaspi further contends that the failure to present the informant as a witness in court is

very material and relevant in the case at bar, inasmuch as she had denied having sold shabu to anyone. She also claims that since the identity of the informant was known to her from the beginning, there was no reason for the prosecution to not present him in

court as a witness, especially since he is in the best position to establish that she had indeed been engaged in the sale of shabu prior to the buy-bust operation against her.41

We do not agree. The presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the successful

prosecution of drug cases. Informants are almost always never presented in court

because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. 42 In People v. Ho Chua,43 we held:

[P]olice authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon

squealers and informants. It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities are kept secret. In any event, the testimony of the informant would be merely

corroborative.44

Legaspi argues that it was the civilian informant who reported on her alleged drug-pushing; hence, only he had personal knowledge of such activities, subject of this case.

Contrary to Legaspi’s claims, the subject matter of this case is her sale of shabu to San Andres on April 22, 2003. She was not charged and convicted for her activities prior to

such sale. Since San Andres, who was the poseur-buyer himself, already testified to the events, which he had personal knowledge of, the testimony of the informant would be

merely corroborative, and can thus be dispensed with. 45

Only two elements are to be proven for the prosecution of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

The prosecution had presented evidence that established both elements by the required

quantum of proof, i.e., guilt beyond reasonable doubt.46

Legaspi was positively identified by the prosecution’s eyewitnesses as the person who sold to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline

substance. Her identity as the culprit cannot be doubted, having been caught in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation conducted by the MSAT of Pasig City. Such

positive identification prevails over Legaspi’s uncorroborated and weak defense of denial, and unsubstantiated and contradictory defense of instigation.47

The prosecution also succeeded in establishing with certainty and conclusiveness the

corpus delicti of the crime. After Legaspi received the P 200.00 from San Andres, the poseur-buyer, she reached into her pocket and handed him one heat-sealed plastic

sachet containing shabu. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust

transaction between the entrapping officers and Legaspi.48

As the prosecution ably established Legaspi’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting her for violation of Section 5,

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01209.

SO ORDERED.