Crary Unbinding Vision

Twa

Unbinding Vision: Manet and theAttentive Observer in the Late

Nineteenth Centuryjonathan Crary

One of the most important developments in the history of visuality in thenineteenth cen tury was the relatively sudden emergence of models of sub-jective vision in a wide range of disciplines during the period from 1810to 1840. Dominant discourses and practices of vision, within the space ofa few decades, effectively broke with a classical regime of visuality andgrounded the truth of vision in the density and materiality of the body.'One of the consequences of this shift was that the functioning of vision be-came dependent on the contingent physiological makeup of the observer,thus rendering vision faulty, unreliable, and even, it was argued, arbitrary.From the midcentury on, an extensive amount of work in science, phi-losophy, psychology, and art was coming to terms in various ways with theunderstanding that vision, or any of the senses, could no longer c1aim anessential objectivity or certainty. By the 1860s the work of Hermann Helm-holtz, Gustav Fechner, and many others had defined the contours of ageneral epistemological crisis in which perceptual experience had none ofthe primal guarantees that had once upheld its privileged relation to thefoundation of knowledge. And it was as one dimension of a widespread re-sponse to that crisis that, beginning in the 1870s, visual modernism tookshape.

The idea of subjective vision-the notion that the quality of our sensa-tions depends less on the nature of the stimulus and more on the makeupand functioning of our sensory apparatus-was one of the conditions forthe historical emergence of notions of autonomous vision, that is, for asevering (or liberation) ofperceptual experience from a necessary and de-terminate relation to an exterior world. Equally important, the rapid accu-mulation of knowledge about the workings of a fully embodied observermade vision open to procedures of normalization, of quantification, of

46

discipline. Once the empiricalbody, the senses-and vision in •controlled by external techniqueswas the epochal achievemem of~~-=nineteenth century-above all ,tav Fechner-which rendered ~man perception in the domain of ;mus became compatible withThe second half of the nineteenrold, during which any significarr

. and a mechanosphere began to ~me thickness of the body was a pIhuman vision into merely a com?OCll1This disintegration of an indispm;~;'~terior became a condition forcu1ture.

It may be unnecessary to empization" I mean a process complezeress or development, one which is tcreation of new needs, new p~modalities are thus in a constanzsaid, in a state of crisis. Paradoxicż:~~namic logic of capital began (O

during structure of perception t

empted to impose a disciplin2=---rhe late nineteenth century, wime nascent field of scientific psyc::.':.QJcame a fundamental issue. It was arelated to the emergence of a .:ocreasingly saturated with sensocontext of new forms of indus~danger and a serious problem,źzed arrangements of labor thar •one crucial aspect of modernisee the changing configuratiotraction to new limits and thresho&:s,.llproducts, new sources of stimularxc.,::esponding with new methods of

ince Kant, of course, pan oi: -has been about the human

~n and atomization of a cognirree.te in the second half of me

. rnent of various techniques -

anet and the'er in the LateCentury

[~=em:s in the history of visuality in theen emergence of models of sub-

li&:i;lillIes during the period from 1810.ces of vision, within the space ofclassical regime of visuality and.ty and materiaIity of the body.!

ras mat the functioning of vision be-iological makeup of the observer,

- and even, it was argued, arbitrary.amount of work in science, phi-[O terms in various ways with thesenses, could no longer claim an~ s the work of Hermann Helrn-

I«x:=ers bad defined the contours of a- ?Erceptual experience had none of

_ eld its privileged relation to thee dimension of a widespread re-e 187os, visual modernism took

ion that the quaIity of our sensa-- stimulus and more on the makeup

was one of the conditions forantonomous vision, that is, for a

esperience frorn a necessary and de-- ~y important, the rapid accu-r---- 2"S of a fully embodied observer~tion, of quantification, of

UNBINDING VISION 47

ipline. Once the empirical truth of vision was determined to lie in the.» the senses-and vision in particular-were able to be annexed andtrolled by external techniques of manipulation and stimulation, This

- the epochal achievement of the science of psychophysics in the mid-eteenth century-above aU the work of the scientist-philosopher Gus-Fechner-which ren dered sensation measurable and embedded hu-perception in the domain of the quantifiable and the abstract. Vision

. became compatible with many other processes of modernization.The second half of the nineteenth century was a critical historical thresh-

d, during which any significant qualitative difference between a biosphereand a mechanosphere began to evaporate. The relocation of perception into:he thickness of the body was a precondition for the instrumentalizing of. uman vision into merely a component of new mechanic arrangements.This disintegration of an indisputable distinction between interior and ex-terier became a condition for the emergence of spectacular modernizingculture.

It may be unnecessary to emphasize that when I use the word "modern-ization" I mean a process completely detached from any notions of prog-ress or development, one which is instead a ceaseless and self-perpetuatingcreation of new needs, new production, and new consumption. Perceptualmodalities are thus in a constant state of transformation or, it might besaid, in a state of crisis. ParadoxicaUy, it was at this moment when the dy-namic logic of capital began to undermine dramatically any stable or en-during structure of perception that this logic simultaneously imposed orattempted to impose a disciplinary regime of attentiveness. It was also inthe late nineteenth cen tury, within the human sciences and, particularly,the nascent field of scientific psychology, that the problem of attention be-came a fundamental issue. It was a problem whose centrality was directlyrelated to the emergence of a social, urban, psychic, industrial field in-creasingly saturated with sensory input. Inattention, especially within thecontext of new forms of industrialized production, began to be seen as adanger and a serious problem, even though it was often the very modern-ized arrangements of labor that produced inattention. It is possible to seeone crucial aspect of modernity as a continual crisis of attentiveness, tosee the changing configurations of capitalism pushing attention and dis-traction to new limits and thresholds, with unending introduction of newproducts, new sources of stimulation, and streams of information, and thenresponding with new methods of managing and regulating perception.

Since Kant, of course, part of the epistemological dilemma of moder-nity has been about the human capacity for synthesis amid the fragmenta-tion and atomization of a cognitive field. That dilemma became especiallacute in the second half of the nineteenth cen tury, along with the devel-opment of various techniques for imposing specific kinds of perceptual

48 BODIES AND SENSATION

synthesis, from the mass diffusion of the stereoscope in the 1850S to earlyforms of cinema in the 1890s. Once the philosophical guaran tees of anya priori cognitive unity collapsed, the problem of "reality maintenance"became a function of a contingent and merely psychological faculty ofsynthesis, whose failure or malfunction was linked in the late nineteenthcentury with psychosis and other mental pathologies. For institutional psy-chology in the 1880s and 1890s, part of psychic normality was the abilityto synthetically bind perceptions into a functional whole, thereby wardingoff the threat of dissociation. But what was often labeled as a regressive orpathological disintegration of perception was in fact evidence of a funda-mental shift in the relation of the subject to a visual field. In Bergson, forexample, new models of synthesis involved the binding of immediate sen-sory perceptions with the creative forces of memory, and for Nietzsche thewill to power was linked to a dynarnic mastering and synthesizing offorces.

These and other thinkers were adjacent to an emergent economic sys-tem that demanded attentiveness of a subject in terms of a wide range ofnew productive and spectacular tasks, but which was also a system whoseinternal movement was continually eroding the basis of any disciplinary at-tentiveness. Part of the culturallogic of capitalism demands that we acceptas natural the rapid switching of our attention from one thing to another.Capital, as accelerated exchange and circulation, necessarily produces thiskind of human perceptual adaptability and becomes a regime of reciprocalattentiveness and distraction.

The problem of attention is interwoven, although not coincident, withthe his tory of visuality in the late nineteenth century. In a wide range ofinstitutional discourses and practices, within the arts and human sciences,attention became part of a dense network of texts and techniques aroundwhich the truth of vision was organized and structured. It is through theframe of attentiveness, a kind of inversion of Foucault's panoptic model,that the seeing body is deployed and made productive, whether as stu-dents, workers, consumers, or patients. Beginning in the 1870S but fully inthe 1880s, there was an explosion of researchand reflection on this issue;it dominates the influential work of Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, EdwardBradford Titchner, Theodor Lipps, Carl Stumpf, Oswald Kńlpe, Ernst Mach,William James, and many others, with questions about the empirical andepistemological status of attentiveness. Also, the pathology of a supposedlynormative attentiveness was an important part of the inaugural work inFrance of such researchers as J.-M. Charcot, Alfred Binet, Pierre Janet,and Theodule Ribot. In the 1890s, attention became a major issue forFreud and was one of the problems at the heart of his abandonment ofThe ProjectJor a Scientific Psychology and his move to new psychical models.

Before the nineteenth cen tury, of course, attention can be said to havebe en atopic of philosophical reflection, and in discussions of the historical

li~BIX!n:sq

problem of attention we often encneJfIchological category of attention istion of apperception, important -Rant. But in fact what is crucial bity between the problem of anencen tury and its place in European -Bradford Titchner, who movedwas the premier importer of ~ica, asserted categorically in the 15g:l5. Isentially a modern problem," alth~lar perceiving subject he was hel -component of institutional moder.=....~.,.

For attention was notjust oneralły by late-nineteenth-cenrury Jb~notion of attention is in fact the -That is, most of the crucial areasof sensory and perceptual sensi -sponses-e-presupposed a subject

non, c1assification, and mea.~owledge of many kinds was ~

neutrał, timeless activity, suchergence of a specific model of

d was articulated in tenns of socirith the history of modern fh~

- me }'ear 187g-the year when .e University of Leipzig.3l.rres::Jeailectual project, this laborazl for the whole modern s. .

rarion around the studr_3ici:ally produced stimuIi To ~

practical and discursive ~~~"problematize what they are.>

- n the centrality of ~hasized that the 1880s an - -

.• :ory attempts to explain !:..~remained more or less \\i-~ -

sezrch, although, throughour ::rt--n.ophy and the cognirive sc:ie::x:a;i:::er"!ingful problern.ś More ~*l;.

c;;z5zcd disciplinary arranzem.ous classificarion

, p, tazeable schoolchild.ren Z:lC! cx:MIb

nrominence of arren -

- e -tereoscope in the 1850S to early- e philosophical guarantees of anye problem of "reality maintenance"

d merely psychological faculty ofvas linked in the late nineteenth

.-::&>.'-'''-' pathologies. For institutional psy-psychic normality was the ability

functional whole, thereby warding- as often labeled as a regressive or

" n was in fact evidence of a funda-"ecr to a visual field. In Bergson, forved the binding of immediate sen-

of memory, and for Nietzsche thesrering and synthesizing offorces.

ent to an emergent economic sys-- subject in terms of a wide range of

but which was also a system whoseIje;oc:!i"ngthe basis of any disciplinary at-

- capitalism demands that we accepr,-.,.,."•••.•tion from one thing to another.

circulation, necessarily produces thisd becom es a regime of reciprocal

n although not coincident, witbzeenth century. In a wide range ofirhin the arts and human sciences,

hin:l1x of texts and techniques around" and structured, It is through the" n of Foucault's panoptic model,made productive, whether as stu-Be.rinning in the 1870s but fully in

research and reflection on this issue;echner, Wilhelm Wundt, Edward

Smmpf, Oswald Kiilpe, Ernst Mach,questions about the empirical and

o, the pathology of a supposedlyrzant part of the inaugural work in

cot, Alfred Binet, Pierre Janet,ntion became a major issue for

- the heart of his abandonment of"-move to new psychical models.

e, attention can be said to haveand in discussions of the historical

UNBINDING VISlON 49

lem of attention we often encounter the claim that the modern psy-logical category of attention is really a more rigorously developed no-

of apperception, important in very different ways for Leibniz andL But in fact what is crucial is the unmistakable historical discontinu-

between the problem of attention in the second half of the nineteenthtury and its place in European thought in previous centuries. Edward

radford Titchner, who moved from Leipzig to Ithaca, New York, and whothe premier importer of German experimental psychology in~o ~er-asserted categorically in the 1890S that "the problem of attention IS.es-

senrially a modern problem," although he had no sense of how the partl~u-perceiving subject he was helping to delineate was to become a crucial

zomponent of institutional modernity. 2

For attention was not just one of the many topics examined experimen-:ally by late-nineteenth-century psychology. It can be argued that a certainnotion of attention is in fact the fundamental condition of its knowledge.That is, most of the crucial areas of research-whether of reaction times,of sensory and perceptual sensitivity, of reflex action, or of conditioned re-sponses-presupposed a subject whose attentiveness was .the site of ob~er-vation, classification, and measurement, and thus the pomt around whichknowledge of many kinds was accumulated. It was not a question, then, ofa neutral, timeless activity, such as breathing or sleeping, but rather of theemergence of a specific model of behavior which had a historical structu~eand was articulated in terms of socially determined norms. Anyone farnil-iar with the histol]' of modern. pS'fc.hology knows the svmbolic importanceof the year 1879-the yearwhen Wilhelm Wundt established his laboratoryat the University of Leipzig." Irrespective of the specific nature of Wundt'sintellectual project, this laboratory space and its practices became themodel for the whole modern social organization of psychological experi-mentation around the study of an observer attentive to a wide range ofartificially produced stimuli. To paraphrase Foucault, this has been one ofthe practical and discursive spaces within modernity in which human be-ings "problematize what they are."4

Given the centrality of attentiveness as a scientific object it must beemphasized that the 1880s and 1890S produced sprawling diversity of c?n-tradictory attempts to .explain it.5 Since then, the problem of attennonhas remained more or less within the center of institutional empirical re-search, although, throughout the twentieth century, minority positions inphifosophy and the cognitive sciences have rejected it as a relevant or evenmeaningful problem." More recent1y, we see its persistence within the gen-eralized disciplinary arrangements of the social and behavioral sciences inthe dubious classification of an "attention deficit disorder" as a label forunmanageable schoolchildren and others.?

The prominence of attention as a problem, beginning in the late 1870s,


is a sign of a generalized crisis in the status of the perceiving subject. Inthe aftermath of the collapse of elassical models of vision and of the sta-ble, punctual subject those models presupposed, attention became the ill-defined area in which to describe how a practical or effective world ofobjects could come into being for a perceiver. Initially armed with thequantitative and instrumental arsenal of psychophysics, the study of atten-tion purported to rationalize what it ultimately revealed to be unrational-izable. Clearly specific questions were asked-how do es attention screenout some sensations and not others, how many events or objects can oneattend to simultaneously and for how long (that is, what are attention'squantitative and physiologicallimits), to what extent is attention an auto-matic or voluntary act, to what extent does it involve motor effort or psy-chic energy? In early behaviorism, its importance diminished, and it be-came merely a quantity that could be measured externally. In most cases,though, attention implied some process of perceptual or men tal organiza-tion in which a limited number of objects or stimuli are isolated from alarger background of possibleattractions.

Wundt's postulation of an attention center located in the frontal cere-brallobes was particularly influential." His account thus posed attention asone of the highest integrating functions within an organism whose makeupwas empłfatically hierarchical, and (through the notion that "ontogeny re-peats phylogeny") work on attention became suffused with many of thesocial assumptions of evolutionary thought in the 1870S and 1880s. Per-haps more significantly, Wundt's model of attention, which he effectivelyequated with will, was founded on the idea that various sensory, motor,and mental processes were necessarily inhibited in order to achieve the re-stricted elarity and focus that characterized attention.? That inhibition (orrepression) is a constitutive part of perception is an indication of a dra-matic reordering of visuality, implying the new importance of models basedon an economy of forces rather than on an optics of representation. Thatis, a normative observer is conceptualized not only in terms of the objectsof attention but also in terms of what is not perceived, of the distractions,fringes, and peripheries that are exeluded or shut out of a perceptual field.

What became elear, though often evaded, in work of many differentkinds on attention was what a volatile concept it was. Attention always eon-tained within itself the conditions for its own disintegration; it was hauntedby the possibility of its own excess-which we all know so well whenever wetry to look at any one thing for too long. In one sense attentiveness wasa critical feature of a productive and socially adaptive subject, but theborder that separated a socially useful attentiveness and a dangerously ab-sorbed or diverted attention was profoundly nebulous and could be de-scribed only in terms of performative norms. Attention and distraction were

L"-'

not two essentially differentattention was thus, as most in~fying and diminishing, rising and ~an indeterminate set of variables..tion brief, I can only mentionsearch and discourse on attentioras the study of hypnosis. HIT>

an extreme model of a te~seemed to show, the borderlineand a hypnotic trance was indis .ous with each other, and hypnosis

nng and narrowing of attentioc,responses. Perhaps more impofT2~~1

oxical proximity of dreaming. ~Much of the discourse of ~r.l!!II\l

szable notion of consciousnrelation, but it tended rather to

subject effect and an ephemera,cohesive real world. Attention w~

perception from being a chaotic =. to be an undependable defens:x>rtance of attention in the O~I

. 'on and consumption, most ~ ~labile, that it was continualłv

::ntiye. Attention seemed to be. n of presence, but it was insreać.. ects and sensation had a mllT2~1

:!mately that which obliterated .ention depended both on the

--e same tirne that they soughr -socially manageable.

In terms of its historical posi -_ estion of the gaze, of looking.. In was merely one layer of a

rected by a range of external ~ry-motor system capable o.

I want now to continue rhis. e importance of attentiveness

~ugh the frame of a paintingernblematic figure supporting SO-:TIC ~

ernism than as one of a number -

- of the perceiving subject. Inodels of vision and of the sta-

IX'5Ir;J1:J05;ed,attention became the ill-practical or effective world of

_ oerceiver, Initially armed with the- _ . chophysics, the study of atten-:=:narely revealed to be unrational-~",~~how does attention screen

- man events or objects can one<T (that is, what are attention's

what extent is attention an auto-it involve motor effort or psy-

:;rr;:portance diminished, and it be-sured externally. In most cases,

- perceptual or mental organiza-d:~ClS or stimuli are isolated from a

center located in the frontal cere-- account thus posed attention as.:rtri:nan organism whose makeup

"~"""'><J_"me notion that "ontogeny re-~e suffused with many of the

'--'I.F";;:'~,ll~in the 1870S and 1880s. Per-anention, which he effectively

- ea that various sensory, motor,:!Iihiied. in order to achieve the re-

~~rzed attention.? That inhibition (or~tion is an indication of a dra-

~ :::re new importance of models based~ an optics of representation. That

'----""""---"not only in terms of the objectsot perceived, of the distractions,

~;J....C:U or shut out of a perceptual field.ed, in work of many different

cept it was. Attention always con-disintegration; it was haunted

~r:::::!-c-nwe all know so well whenever weec., In one sense attentiveness was

- sociall adaptive subject, but thezaenriveness and a dangerously ab-

fr.rnan,dly nebulous and could be de-~ •.••~u:-,.._"\ttention and distraction were

UNBINDING VISION 51

not two essentially different states but existed on a single continuum, andattention was thus, as most increasingly agreed, a dynami c process, intensi-fying and diminishing, rising and falling, ebbing and flowing according toan indeterminate set of variables. In the interes t of keeping this introduc-tion brief, I can only mention another major part of the inaugural re-search and discourse on attention in the late nineteenth cen tury-and thiswas the study of hypnosis. Hypnotism, for several decades, uneasily stoodas an extreme model of a technology of attention. As experimentationseemed to show, the borderline between a focused normative attentivenessand a hypnotic trance was indistinct; that is, they were essentially continu-ous with each other, and hypnosis was often described as an intense refo-cusing and narrowing of attention, accompanied by inhibition of motorresponses. Perhaps more importantly, research disclosed a seemingly para-doxical proximity of dreaming, sleep, and attention.

Much of the discourse of attention attempted to salvage some relativelystable notion of consciousness and some form of a distinct subject/objectrelation, but it tended rather to describe only a fleeting immobilization ofa subject effect and an ephemeral congealing of a sensory manifold intoa cohesive real world. Attention was described as that which prevents ourperception from be ing a chaotic flood of sensations, yet research showedit to be an undependable defense against such chaos. In spite of the im-portance of attention in the organization and modernization of produc-tion and consumption, most studies implied that perceptual experiencewas labile, that it was continually undergoing change and was, finally, dissi-pative. Attention seemed to be about perceptual fixity and the apprehen-sion of presence, but it was instead about duration and flux, within whichobjects and sensation had a mutating, provisional existence, and it was ul-timately that which obliterated its objects. The institutional discourses onattention depended both on the malleability and mobili ty of a perceiver atthe same time that they sought to make this flux useful, controllable, andsocially manageable.

In terms of its historical position, then, attention is much more than aquestion of the gaze, of looking, of opticality. Within modernity, rather, vi-sion was merely one layer of a body that could be captured, shaped, di-rected by a range of external techniques, a body that was also an evolvingsensory-motor system capable of creating and dissolving forms.

I want now to continue this discussion of the new practical and dis-cursive importance of attentiveness from a more localized point of view,through the frame of a painting by Manet. He is important here less as anemblematic figure supporting som e of the most dominant accounts of mo d-ernism than as one of a number of thinkers about vision in the late 1870S


working within a field whose discursive and material texture was, as I havesuggested elsewhere, already being reconfigured. I will, therefore, exam-ine certain features of the painting In the Conservatory (1879), in terms ofits position within a social space in which attention would increasinglybe set up as the guarantee of certain perceptual norms and in which at-tention, in a wide range of institutional discourses, would be posed as asynthetic activity,as a centripetal energy that would be the glue holding to-gether a "real world" against various kinds of sensory or cognitive break-down (fig. 2.1).

According to a number of critics, one of the crucial formal achieve-ments of Manet's work in the context of early modernism was his tentativesplitting apart of figural, representational facts on one hand from the factsof autonomous pietorial substance on the other, and his approaching, inhis advanced canvases, a breaking point of "formlessness."10 In 1878 and1879, for example, in Self-portrait with PaZette, Portrait oj George Moore, andThe Reader; he dance s near the edges of this possible rupture (fig. 2.2).Painted with an openness and looseness, a kind of manual velocity, butalso with a deeply confident inattention to the object and its coherence,such images present what Georges Bataille has called Manet's "supremeindifference."ll

However, I've chosen to look at a quite different kind of Manet paint-ing from the late 1870s, one that was then-and has continued to be-seen as a retreat from features of his more ambitious style. Exhibited atthe Salon of 1879, it provoked some telling responses by mainstream crit-ics. Jules-Antoine Castagnary, in the newspaper Le Siecle, wrote with a toneof mock surprise: "But what is this? Faces and hands more carefully drawnthan usual: is Manet making concessions to the public?"12 Other reviewsnoted the relative "care" or "ability" with which Manet had executed thiswork. And the avalanche of recent commentary on Manet over the last twodecades has afforded this painting relatively little notice, in a sense perpet-uating the evaluation of it as somehow conservative. It is usually classed asone of Manet's representations of fashionable contemporary life, of "la viemoderne," as an image with little of the inventiveness and formal audacityof A Bar at the Folies-Bergeres (1881). A leading Manet scholar insists that,unlike other advanced paintings of the late 1870s, the man and woman inIn the Conservatory do not for a moment "waver and disintegrate in the col-ored light." Others have pointed to "the more conservative technique,"and the "more contained outlines" of the figures in contrast to Manet'sother work of the same years.!"

I would like to pursue here some of the implications of the choicesManet has made in this particular image, ofwhat it might mean to suggestthat he is holding something together, working to "contain" things, or toward off experiences of disintegration. I do not think that it explains much

M'w ]

CXBrs~~~

Ikrr-.....:m.. and material texture was, as I have..::reconfigured. I will, therefore, exarn-

the Conservatory (1879), in terms of'hich attention would increasingly

lt--" ~~ perceptual norms and in which at-" nał discourses, would be posed as a

r."'r...r1"1ln". mat would be the glue holding to-- kinds of sensory or cognitive break-

one of the crucial formal achieve-of early modernism was his tentativenał facts on one hand from the factsme other, and his approaching, in

im of "formlessness."1OIn 1878 and- Palette, Portrait oj George Moore, and

of this possible rupture (fig. 2.2).!PD<:l5eneiS,a kind of manual velocity, but-=-t'r...;;1O" n to the object and its coherence,

Bataille has called Manet's "suprem e

- ::.quite different kind of Manet paint-- men-and has continued to be-

". more ambitious style. Exhibited attelling responses by mainstream crit-

. ewspaper Le Siecle, wrote with a tone~Fac and hands more carefully drawn

ions to the public?"12 Other reviews- im which Manet had executed this

entary on Manet over the last two1Ir,"P'~".n·'ely littIe notice, in a sense perpet-

- conservative. It is usually classed as." ionable contemporary life, of "la vie

o o e inventiveness and formal audacityA leading Manet scholar insists that,

- e Iate 187os, the man and woman int "waver and disintegrate in the col-

o "the more conservative technique,"the figures in contrasr to Manet's

e of the implications of the choicese, of what it might mean to suggest

"working to "contain" things, or toI do not think that it explains much

UNBINDING VISlON 53

Fig.2.l. Edouard Manet, In the Conservatory, 1879.

to say that the work is simply a shift back to a more conventional "natura~-ism," or that, stung by a string of Salon rejections in the 1870~' he modi-fied his style in the hope of wider critical acceptance, fo~ this does notaddress the very strangeness of this painting. Rather, I beheve ~at In t~eConservatory is, among many other things, an attempt to reconsohdate a VI-sual field that was in many ways being disassembled, an attempt to fastentogether symbolic contents that resisted immobilization. . .. .

I see the painting as a complex mapping out of the ambiguities OfVIS.ualattentiveness which Manet knew so deeply and intuitively, and as a playmgout of his own mixed and shifting relation to a visual field. Perhaps mostimportantIy, I see the painting as a figuration of an essential conflict .withinthe perceptual logic of modernity, in which two pow~rful ter:denCles areat work. One is a binding together of vision, an obsessive holdmg togetherof perception to maintain the viability of a functional real world, while ~eother, barely contained or sealed over, is a logic of psychi: and .econor~:llcexchange, of equivalence and substitution, of flux and dissolution whichthreatens to overwhelm the apparentIy stable positions and terms thatManet seems to have effortIessly arranged.


Fig. 2.2. Edouard Manet, TheReadet; 1879.

There are many signs of this binding energy in the painting, but per-haps the most striking is the carefully painted face of the woman. As eon-temporary critics noted, this face seemed to be an obvious indication of ashift in Manet's practice, and in fact part of the specific character of Manet'smodernism turns around the problem of what Gilles Deleuze has called"faciality."14 In much of Manet's work, the very imprecision and amor-phousness of the face become a surface that, alongside its casualness, no

longer discloses an inwardness onew, unsettling terrain that onezanne. But something quite diffiit is clearly more than just a tigh"messy broken touch," "his vaguetum to a more tightly bound orderrling and connection with an~ ..ocialized body. It is as if for ~lane:

fined (or approximated) a certainity, a eonformity that so much of

Supporting this relatively coh -me entire painting, is the woand beringed figure, marked by a!..'straint.l" Along with the coiled. irrri...-zIIIIIlions of bodies reined in stand .fth

constraint which go into the COIL~

corporality. We can also note mesrand as signs of a related end

ents of domestication, at least pa::=aIC- vegetation surrounding the ~~

aench are little echo es of the cin.e some malleable substance. is ~

. feature also suggests the m~_H__) Thus this image is a holding-

.ously scattered componen-:ty.The result, however, is a ~d. And the thematic of press

et's title for the work, Damrihouse," although it on, .

rm of the verb serret; which[en.

was around this time=-rheble overlapping of problems t;,-

= visual modernism and the empiric:Jllin the newly emergingespecially in France and Ge: ' !'IIO,t

,= empirical sciences aroundI decomposed into \o.r1.0US~~

of synthesis, contemporar~ disorders as hysteria,

Ccscribed various weakeningscollapse into dissoc:iared ~~

n • .:;lliLic disorders grouped

- "J energy in the painting, but per-. red face of the woman. As eon-

rs.:e;:;ed to be an obvious indication of athe specific character ofManet's

o what Gilles Deleuze has calledthe very imprecision and amor-

~rn!Ce at, alongside its casualness, no

- •• ----------_ttlllliU'II!IIiI!HJ f 11111I111I ••

UNBINDING VISlON 55

longer discloses an inwardness or a self-reflection, but rather becomes anew, unsettling terrain that one can trace into the late portraits of Ce-zanne. But something quite different is at work in In the Conservatory, andfi is clearly more than just a tightening up of what has been called Manet's"messy broken touch," "his vague and sloppy planes."15 It is, rather, a re-mm to a more tightly bound order of "faciality," one that resists disman-rling and connection with anything outside the articulated hierarchy of asocialized body. It is as if for Manet the relative integrity of the face de-fined (or approximated) a certain mo de of eonformity to a dominant real-ity, a eonformity that so much of his work evades or bypasses.

Supporting this relatively cohesive faciality, and central to the effect ofme entire painting, is me woman's corseted, belted, braceleted, gloved,and beringed figure, marked by all these points of compression and re-traint.ł" Along with the coiled, indrawn figure of the man, these indica-

tions of bodies reined in stand for many other kinds of subduing andconstraint which go into the construction of an organized and inhibitedcorporality. We can also note the way in which the flower pots and vasestand as signs of a related enclosure and "holding in," which, as instru-

ments of domestication, at least partially confine the proliferating growthof vegetation surrounding the figures. Even the lathed vertical posts of theben ch are little echoes of the cinched figure of the woman, as if the wood,like some malleable substance, is squeezed in the middle with a clamp.(This feature also suggests the mechanical repeatability of the seated fig-ure.) Thus this image is a holding action, a forcing back of circulating andpreviously scattered components into asemblance of cohesive pietorialunity. The result, however, is a disjunct, compressed, and space-drainedfield. And the thematic of pressure, of squeezing, is curiously suggested byManet's title for the work, Dans la serre. The word serre, of course, means"greenhouse," although it originally meant simply "a closed place." It is alsoa form of the verb serret;which means to grip, to hold tightly, to clench, totighten.

It was around this time-the late 1870S and early 1880s-that a re-markable overlapping of problems became evident both in some practicesof visual modernism and the empirical study of perception and cognitionand in the newly emerging study of pathologies of language and percep-tion, especially in France and Germany. If certain areas of modernism andthe empirical sciences around 1880 were both exploring a perceptual fieldnewly decomposed into various abstract units of sensation and new possi-bilities of synthesis, contemporary research on such newly identified ner-vous disorders as hysteria, abulia, psychasthenia, and neurasthenia alldescribed various weakenings and failures of the integrity of perceptionand its collapse into dissociated fragments. Alongside the discovery of thelinguistic disorders grouped under the category aphasia, a set of related


visual disruptions was described by the resonant term agnosiaś? Agnosiawas one of the prim ary asymbolias, or impairments, of a hypothetical sym-bolic function. Essentially, it described a purely visual awareness of an ob-ject, that is, an inability to make any conceptual or symbolic identificationof an object, a failure of recognition, a condition in which visual informa-tion was experienced with a kind of primal strangeness. Using the frameof the c1inical work conducted by Kurt Goldstein in the 1920S, we coulddefine agnosia as a state in which objects within a perceptual field cease tobe integrated into a practical or pragmatic plasticity with intentional orlived coordinates.

If the study of aphasia was bound up in a specifically modem reconfigu-ration of language, the study of agnosia and other visual disruptions pro-duced a range of new paradigms for the explanation of human percep-tion. For c1assical thought, the perceiver was generally a passive receiverof stimuli from exterior objects which formed perceptions that mirroredthis exterior world. The last two decades of the nineteenth cen tury, how-ever, gave rise to notions of perception in which the subject, as a dynarnicpsycho-physical organism, actively constructed the world around it througha layered complex of sensory and cognitive processes of higher and lowercerebral centers. Beginning in the 1880s and continuing through the1890s, various models of holistic and in tegrating neural processes wereproposed, especially in the work of John Hughlings:Jackson and CharlesSherrington, which challenged localizing and associationist models.

As a result of his work in the 1880s, Pierre Janet postulated the existenceof what he called the "reality function." He repeatedly saw patients withwhat seemed to be fragmented systems of sensory response which he de-scribed as a reduced capacity to adapt to re ality. One of the key symptomsof this loss of a so-called reality function was a failure of a capacity for nor-mative attentive behavior. But this failure could either be the weakeningof attentiveness found in psychasthenia and abulias or its intensificationnoted in fixed ideas and monomanias.

Janet's work, no matter how much it has been disparaged for its "incor-rectness" in relation to hysteria, is particularly valuable for its formal de-scription of different kinds of perceptual dissociation. What is important isnot Janet's often exorbitant c1assification of various neuroses but ratherhis account of common symptoms that traversed so many different kindsof patients: various forms of splitting and fragmentation of cognitionand perception, what he called dćsagregation, widely varying capacities forachieving perceptual synthesis, disjunctions between or isolation of differ-ent forms of sensory response.l" He repeatedly recorded constellations ofsymptoms involving perceptual and sensory derangements in which au-tonomous sensations and perceptions, by virtue of their dissociation andfragmented character, acquired a new level of intensity. But if I single out

Janet, it is simply because he washow volatile the perceptual fieldperceptual awareness and mild foconsidered normative behavior.

Implicit within such dynamie ~the notion that subjectivity is a p~ble components. Even more expsynthesis of a "real world" was,tation to a social environment, Tithere was a consistent but never r

forms of attentiveness. The firstwas usually task-oriented and was -behavior. The second was autorific psychology inc1uded the areaserie, and other absorbed or mildłv srhich any of these states could -' --

ness was never c1early definedelear failure of social performance.

ow to go back to the Maner:cant features of the painting is ~••p 0;;;:::111

one begin to characterize it or .rork there are many figures au . -

merely another instance of Manet'semptiness, or disengagement- Pbe specified and pushed furthenHaroche, in their book Histoar

, a new regime of facialityzae meanings of the human face

guage, the face in the nine- position by belonging to a h

and as a privatized, socializedsee Charles Darwin's Expressio.Q 1872, as belonging to a worl~ Brun. Darwin's work is indic:!.....~crrired=-the face has become ~l

ornical and physiological fr .- I_the mark of the success or,l implicit in the social consrr~ I. it is within the field of menza_ .es of hysterias, obsessions, :::::

""'"-its intrinsic motility, becemes - -somatic and the social,lth the idea of that coruin::::;::a I

- e resonant term agnosia.t? Agnosiar impairmenrs, of a hypothetical sym-

~ribed a purely visual awareness of an ob-conceptual or symbolic identificationa condition in which visual informa-

- primal strangeness. Using the frameGoldstein in the 1920S, we could

,,",U'-a::;lS within a perceptual field cease tol;X:~natic plasticity with intentional or

o in a specifically modern reconfigu-~~5ia and other visual disruptions pro-

e explanation of human percep-lP::=t:rn:er was generally a passive receiver

ormed perceptions that mirroredcfecaies of the nineteenth cen tury, how-

in which the subject, as a dynarnico o cted the world around it through

c::>:miiIITeprocesses of higher and lowerand continuing through the

. integrating neural processes were- r~~o ~ Hughlings-:Jackson and Charles

!rc<S:ii-~~and associationisr models.- Pierre Janet postulared the existence

~-'-"-'-- He repeatedly saw patients with~- of sensory response which he de-__- ID reality. One of the key symptoms

was a failure of a capacity for nor-could either be the weakening

!Ić:iC:l::ria and abulias or its intensification

been disparaged for its "incor-_ '-":icularlyvaluable for its formaI de-

dissociation. What is important is~~-";'-U1.ł of various neuroses but rather

- rra.ersed so many different kinds::: and fragmentation of cognition~ o n, widely varying capacities for-o between or isolation of differ-

~y recorded constellations of- TY derangements in which au-_ virtue of their dissociation and

~ of intensity. But if I single out

UNBINDING VISION 57

-anet, it is simply because he was one of many researchers who discoveredaow volatile the perceptual field can be, and how dynarnic oscillations ofperceptual awareness and mild forms of dissociation were part of what wasconsidered normative behavior,

Implicit within such dynami c theories of cognition and perception waszhe notion that subjectivity is a provisional assembly of mobile and muta-ble components. Even more explicit, perhaps, was the idea that effectivesvnthesis of a "real world" was, to a large extent, synonymous with adap-tatum to a social environment. Thus, within various studies on attentionthere was a consistent but never fully successful attempt to distinguish twoorms of attentiveness. The first was conscious or voluntary attention, which

was usually task-oriented and was often associated with higher, more evolvedbehavior. The second was automatic or passive attention, which for scien-tific psychology included the areas of habitual activity, daydreaming, rev-erie, and other absorbed or mildly somnambulant states. The threshold atwhich any of these states could shift into a socially pathological obsessive-ness was never clearly defined and could only become evident with someelear failure of social performance.

Now to go back to the Manet: One of the most ambivalent but signifi-cant features of the painting is the state of the seated woman. How do esone begin to characterize it or situate it historically? Clearly, within Manet'swork there are many figures and faces we can affiliate with this one. Is shemerely another instance of Manet's often-cited blankness, psychologicalemptiness, or disengagement? Perhaps. But I believe such a reading canbe specified and pushed further. Jean-:Jacques Courtine and ClaudineHaroche, in their book Histoire du visage, insist that in the nineteenth cen-tury a new'regime of faciality takes shape.t? After three centuries in whichthe meanings of the human face were explained in terms of rhetoric orlanguage, the face in the nineteenth century comes to occupy a precari-ous position by belonging to a human being both as a physiological organ-ism and as a privatized, socialized.individual subject. Courtine and Harochesee Charles Darwin's Expression oj Emotions in Man and Animals, publishedin 1872, as belonging to a world no longer in communication with that ofLe Brun. Darwin's work is indicative of the split status the face has ac-quired-the face has become simultaneously a symptom of an organism'sanatomical and physiological functioning and, in its relative impenetrabil-ity, the mark of the success or failure of a process of self-mastery and eon-troI implicit in the social construction of a normative individual. In partie-ular, it is within the field of mental pathology, with its specifically modernanalyses of hysterias, obsessions, manias, and anxieties, that the face, withall its intrinsic mo tility, becomes a sign of a disquieting continuum betweenthe somatic and the social.

With the idea of that continuum in mind, it is possible to see the

•. 44 • a

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• IMI 111 ~_llI1N 11III!1!lMlłllIllIlIl~iIIIIlllIll!IIIlIl


woman, with face and eyes as a special key, on one level as a straightfor-ward image of a public presentation of an impassive mastery of self (per-haps a self-mastery in response to some verbal remark or proposal by theman), which, however, coexists with being in the grip of some thoroughlyordinary involuntary or automatic behavior. And again we are allowed byManet, who painted the face with uncharacteristic definition, to ask suchspecific questions.w Is she engaged in thought, or in vacuous absorption,or in that form of arrested attentiveness that borders on a trance?

It's hard to think of another Manet figure with this kind of inert wax-work quality. In a sense, we are shown a body whose eyes are open but donot see-that is, do not arrest, do not fix, do not in a practical way appro-priate the world around them, eyes that even denote a momentary statecomparable to agnosia (fig. 2.3). I would restate that it is not so much aquestion of vision, of a gaze, as of a broader perceptual and corporal en-gagement (or perhaps disengagement) with a sensory manifold. If it ispossible to see the suggestion of somnambulance here, it is simply as a for-getfulness in the midst of being wakeful, the indefinite persistence of atransient daydreaming. Research in the early 18808 made elear that seem-ingly inconsequential and everyday states of reverie could transform them-selves into autohypnosis. William James, himself a painter for a time, in hisPrinciples oj Psychology; which he began writing in 1878, describes how suchstates are inseparable from attentive behavior:

This curious state of inhibition can at least for a few moments be producedat will by fixing the eye on vacancy ... monotonous mechanical activitiesthat end by be ing automatically carried on tend to produce it ... the eyesare fixed on vacancy, the sounds of the world melt into confused unity, theattention becom es dispersed so that the whole body is felt, as it were, atonce, and the foreground of consciousness is filled, if by anything, by a sortof solemn sense of surrender to the empty passing of time. In the dim back-ground of our mind we know what we ought to be doing: getting up, dress-ing ourselves, answering the person who has spoken to us .... But somehowwe cannot start. Every moment we expect the spell to break, for we know noreason why it should continue. But it does continue, pulse after pulse, andwe float with it.21

It was learned that in both somnambulant and hypnotic states, sen-sations, perceptions, and subconscious elements could loosen themselvesfrom a binding synthesis and become floating, detached elements, free tomake new connections. And with the spatial relation between the two fig-ures in this painting, there is a curious similarity to one of the early formsof therapeutic practice which came out of the work of Charcot, Janet, andothers in the early 1880s at the hospital of Salpetriere: a method of stand-ing behind so-called hysteric patients and whispering to them while theyappeared to be preoccupied and inattentive to their surroundings which

"e , on one level as a straightfor-o an impassive mastery of self (per-

me verbal remark or proposal by theo in the grip of some thoroughly"ar. And again we are allowed by

c:rrlrara<cteristic definition, to ask such- ought, or in vacuous absorption,

1JR:::;e--ss rhar borders on a trance?fizure with this kind of inert wax-bod whose eyes are open but do

- fix, do not in a practical way appro-even denote a momentary staterestate that it is not so much aer perceptual and corporal en-

rith a sensory manifold. If it is1)x:::::J<!.::Ilbulancehere, it is simply as a for-1,...;:di=Eu1. me indefinite persistence of a

eariv 18805 made elear that seem-,•. ·""c ••..•.of reverie could transform them-

- himself a painter for a time, in his-~. (T in 1878, describes how such

or:

fur a few moments be produced__ - nOlOnous mechanicał activities

tend to produce it ... the eyesrld mełt into confused unity, the

ole body is felt, as it were, atfilled, if by anything, by a sort

• CT of time. In the dim back-w be doing: getting up, dress-

- spoken to us .... But somehow-" e spell to break, for we know no

rontinue, pułse after pułse, and

~::::!::::::i:JUlantand hypnotic states, sen-ements could loosen themselves

tiolating, detached elements, free torelation between the two fig-

st::;:tilari'ty to one of the early forms••••••••.•• S~ rhe work of Charcot, Janet, and

pćrriere: a method of stand-:hispering to them while they

,.....u..;:::~"c to their surroundings which

Fig. 2.3. Detaił from In the Conseroatory.


made it seem possible actually to communicate with a dissociated elementof a fragmented subjectivity.22

Manet's painting is about a more generalized experience of dissocia-tion, even while he maintains a superficially unified surface, even while heasserts the efficacy of a "reality function." Consider how Manet has paintedthe man's eyes (or, more accurately, how he has only alluded to them).Manet suggests here an even more equivocal attentiveness and/or distrac-tion, in which the punctuality of vision is disrupted. There is no visualmas tery, no ocular potency here. His two eyes are shown as split, a literatdissociation--one eye, seemingly open, looking beyond and perhaps slightlyabove the woman beneath him. Of his other eye, all we see is the loweredeyelid and eyelash. Perhaps it is looking at the woman's umbrella, hergloved hand and the loose glove it holds, the pleats of her dress, perhapseven at the ring on her finger. But whatever he sees, it is as a disunifiedfield, with two disparate optical axes, and he sees it with an attentivenessthat is continually deflected and misaligned within the compressed in-door/outdoor worId of the greenhouse.23

So within a work depicting two apparently attentive figures, Manet dis-closes an attentiveness that has actually been folded into two differentstates of distraction within which the stability and unity of the paintingbegin to corrode. That surpassing or breakdown of normative attentive-ness, whether as autohypnosis or some other mild, trancelike state, pro-vides conditions for new mobile and transient syntheses, and we see in thispainting a whole set of associative chains which are part of a libidinaleconomy that exceeds the binding logic of the work. Freud, in particular,linked an involuntary mobile attention with hypnosis and with the statethat immediately precedes sleep.> There are the obvious and not so obvi-ous metaphoric displacements and slippage between the cigar, the fingers,the rings on the fingers, the closed umbrella, the braceleted wrist, and therebuslike chain of flowers that become ear, eyes, and then flowers again.ar the way the man's fingertip is curiously attenuated to a point like thehuge spiky green leaves behind him, or the play between the leaves of theengulfing plant to the right of the man and the pleats of the woman'sskirt. We can look at the odd displacement of the man's lower legs by thetwo pots of a similar color to the lower right. One could go on, but theseare some of the ways in which attention, as a selective or, some might say,repressive function, drifts away from itself, scattering the cohesion of thework. And this happens amid the overall compression of the space, whichseems to buckle and ripple at certain points, especially in the odd push-pull of the two vases at the lower left, with their disordered figure/ groundrelation. At the same time, it's possible to map out a larger trajectory inwhich the breakdown of a normative attention into a dispersed distraction

the very condition for its reasserr:..,l\4li1vs of the unconscious.In addition to what I have sugges:....~

binding energy of the work is ofeach other near the very center~ t exhibited, there has been~et intended to show a marriedrork were married) or an illicie ~

married to other partners. I worial part of the work. It bespeaks -"ect-it is simultaneously an .redding bands and the alliance i.

sirions, of limits, of desire contaraeme couple is a binding stasisme German word bindung was me

unicate with a dissociated element

c generalized experience of dissocia--" . unified surface, even while he

~d!,,:a.-Consider how Manet has painted-" "he has only alluded to them).

-. ocal attentiveness and/or distrac-- " t: disrupted. There is no visual

- ro eves are shown as split, a literaI200king beyond and perhaps slightly

" other eye, all we see is the lowered:ioc:łl:iTIj! at the woman's umbrella, her

, the pleats of her dress, perhapsrhatever he sees, it is as a disunifiedand he sees it with an attentiveness

igned within the compressed in-- n

ently attentive figures, Manet dis-lilciU:i:tlly. been folded into two differeht

tability and unity of the painting:- breakdown of normative attentive-zne other mild, trancelike state, pro-

ient syntheses, and we see in thiswhich are part of a libidinal

.c of the work. Freud, in particular,OD with hypnosis and with the state

aaere are the obvious and not so obvi-- page between the cigar, the fingers,

rella, the braceleted wrist, and thee ear, eyes, and then flowers again.

"ouslyattenuated to a point like theor the play between the leaves of thernan and the pleats of the woman's

ent of the man's lower legs by theright. One could go on, but these

:!oD, as a selective or, some might say," elf, scattering the cohesion of the

compression of the space, whichpoints, especially in the odd push-ith their disordered figurej grounde to map out a larger trajectory inention into a dispersed distraction

UNBINDING VISION 61

Fig. 2.4. Detail from In the Conservatory .

" the very condition for its reassemblage and rebinding into the repetitivelawsof the unconscious.

In addition to what I have suggested so far, another obvious sign of thebinding energy of the work is of course the two wedding rings, adjacent toeach other near the very center of the painting.w Sińce the painting wasfirst exhibited, there has been considerable speculation about whetherManet intended to show a married couple (and in fact his models for this.ork were married) or an illicit rendezvous between a man and a woman

married to other partners. I would insist that this indeterminacy is a cru-cial part of the work. It bespeaks the split relation of Manet to his sub-ject-it is simultaneously an image of conjugality and adultery. That is, thecedding bands and the alliance thus implied are about a field of fixed po-sitions, of limits, of desire contained and channeled, a system in whichthe couple is a binding stasis (fig. 2.4). One of the original meanings ofthe German word bindung was the hooping of a cask of liquid, that is, a


containing of flux, like the hooped, corseted torso of the woman which ispart of this obsessive "holding-in." And one might even suggest that thestructure of the work, in which the male and female are kept apart by thegrid of the bench and differentiated by their two noncommunicating fieldsof vision, is a "blossoming" bride and bachelor enmeshed in a verdant ma-chin e of perpetual nonfulfillmen t.

But curiously, the French translation of Freud's bindung is liaison.26 Thatis, if the liaison is what holds things together psychically, the figuration ofan adulterous liaison in this painting is also what undermines that verybinding. Adultery, in the context of modernization, no longer has a trans-gressive status but is what Tony Tanner calls "a cynicism of forms," merelyanother effect of a dominant system of exchange, circulation, and equiva-lence which Manet can only indirectly confront."?

The fingers that almost but do not touch is a central nonevent. Theysuggest a tactility that has become anesthetized or even paralyzed. It is animage of attentiveness in which there is a drift and gap between differentsystems of sensory response, a lessening of the mutual awareness of the dif-ferent senses, say, between sight and smell.28 It would be hard to rule outhere the suggestion of an olfactory attentiveness of the kind Freud de-scribed in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, in which he stressed that the smell offlowers is the disintegrated produet of their sexual metabolism.t? We alsohave the split between the woman's one gloved hand and the other, barehand, ready to receive or initiate a caress. But the man's hand seemsshaped into a pointing finger, as if to indicate a focus of attention whichdiverges from his already ambivalent glance, and in a direction oppositefrom where the umbrella directs our eye. Could he be pointing at thewoman's strangely disembodied hand and overly bent wrist? A bend that isanatomicallyas extreme as many images of hysterical contracture? (AlfredBinet, Richard Krafft-Ebing, and others in the 1880s noted the preva-lence, especially in male subjects, of a hand fetishism.) In any case, thefrozen character of the scene, or what we could call its powerful system offixations and inhibitions, coexists with another logic of errance, with thewandering of a sensory body that seeks pathways out of binding arrange-ments of all kinds. It is an unfixed eye that is always at the fold betweenattentiveness and distraction.

That very fold, where attentiveness produces its own dissolution, takeson concrete form in the pleats of the woman's underskirt, almost like thelegless end of a mermaid beached on the greenhouse bench, and it opensonto a whole new organization of distraction, with which so much of Ma-net's late work is intertwined. He shows us here a rather detailed imageof what is c1early a fashion of 1879, the so-called princess-style walking-out dress, with its c1ose-fitting, hip-length jacket bodice and double skirt

U:\ JH:\""D D'G

and tight sleeves with cuffs slighthe emerging commodity world of ~tiveness comes into play as a pr~jdisplay here, in which the bodymodity, is a momentary congealing -.ithin a permanently installed ecors

Manet in 1879 stands close [O

hion commodity-a year or sotone printing process, allowing phoz~e as typography and settin

e "commodity as image" and esmich will increasingly become a ::ion, In this painting, we have _

3enjamin was to articulate so blunf -prcviding an image of what Bel:!:t~ I

dise," the painting illustratesfashion "resides in its conflicr, to the inorganic world .. -\g .

,: me corpse and the sex appea;er's play here with the image of

. or of fashion as a blossominz ~ew, the commodity is pan of

~ inting. Fashion works to bind ~zae same time it is the intrinsic ~

dermines Manet's attempt to inrezpictorial space and that conrrib

tion mapped out across its surface.~lallarme's La Derniere mode; _.e of the earliest and most penehobjects and events. La Demied displacement of the very Q,

tion in Mallarrnć, as Leo Be.ects, undermining any possibi-~erging world of fashion com~ption, at least for several monre a present impossible [O -

ed aligned with his own SUDl~

_.1anet in one sense gives a -~·!aDarrneremained evanescen

rit as a kind of vacanc)', haitable displacement from thetial poverty.-" Within this fli

" ted torso of the woman which is- -.:: one might even suggest that the

e and female are kept apart by theeir twa noncommunicating fieldseIor enmeshed in a verdant ma-

ch is a central nonevent. They2Ieózed ar even paralyzed. It is an

:::;a drift and gap between different:: ~me mutual awareness of the dif-

~ It would be hard to rule outriveness of the kind Freud de-

- .ch he stressed that the smell of.: -' eir exual metabolism. 29We also

_ oved hand and the other, bareBut the man's hand seems

'Gile a focus of attention whichce, and in a direction opposite

eve, Could he be pointing at the~- .:<.a •••• overl ben t wrist? A bend that is

- -h. terical contracture? (Alfredme 1880s noted the preva-

d fetishism.) In any case, thecould call its powerful system ofother logic of errance, with the

ways out of binding arrange-'. always at the fold between

ces its own dissolution, takesIle· ••.•omans underskirt, almost like the

- = greenbouse bench, and it opens1iS:w:IGi-on, with which sa much of Ma-

- here a rather detailed image- = so-called princess-style walking-.:.:..jadet bodice and double skirt

UNBINDING VISlON 63

and tight sleeves with cuffs slightly flaring at the wrists. It is especially withme emerging commodity world of fashion that the ephemerality of atten-tiveness comes into play as a productive component of modernization. Thedisplay here, in which the body merely serves as an armature for the com-modity, is a momentary congealing of vision, a temparary immobilizationi .ithin a permanently installed economy of flux and distraction.

Manet in 1879 stands close to a turning point in the visual status of thefashion commodity-a year ar sa later is when Fredric Ives patents his half-tone printing process, allowing photographs to be reproduced on the samepage as typography and setting up, on a mass scale, a new virtual field ofme "commodity as image" and establishing new rhythms of attentivenesswhich will increasingly become a form of wark: wark as visual consump-tion. In this painting, we have Manet elegantly disclosing what WalterBenjamin was to articulate sa bluntly in the Arcades Project; in addition toproviding an image of what Benjamin called "the enthronment of mer-chandise," the painting illustrates Benjamin's observation that the essenceof fashion "resides in its conflict with the organic. It couples the livingbody to the inorganic world. Against the living, fashion asserts the rightsof the corpse and the sex appeal of the inorganic."30 Thus, despite Ma-net's play here with the image of adorned women as a flower among flow-ers, ar of fashion as a blossoming forth into a luminous apparition of thenew, the commodity is part of the large suffocating organization of thepainting. Fashion works to bind attention anto its own pseudounity, but atthe same time it is the intrinsic mobility and transience of this form thatundermines Manet's attempt to integrate it into the semblance of a cohe-sive pietorial space and that contributes to the derangement of visual at-tention mapped out across its surface.

Mallarmć's La Derniere mode, the magazine he produced in 1874, wasone of the earliest and most penetrating explorations of this new terrainof objects and events. La Derniere mode is a kaleidoscopic decompositionand displacement of the very objects that are evoked sa glitteringly. ~t-tention in Mallarmć, as Leo Bersani has noted, always moves away from itsobjects, undermining any possibility of a fully realized presence.s- Theemerging world of fashion commodities and of life structured as eon-sumption, at least for several months in the fall of 1874, revealed to Mal-larmć a present impossible to seize hold of, an insubstantial world thatseemed aligned with his own sublime disavowal of the immediate.

Manet in one sense gives a solidity and palpable presence to what forMallarmć remained evanescent, but even here the fashion commodity ispresent as a kind ofvacancy, haunted by what Guy Debord descri~es as ~tsinevitable displacement from the center of acclaim and the revelation of rtsessential poverty.32Within this new system of objects, which was founded


on the continual production of the new, attention, as researchers learned,was sustained and enhaneed by the regular introduetion of novelty. His-torically, this regime of attentiveness coincides with what Nietzsche de-scribed as modern nihilism: an exhaustion of meaning, a deterioration ofsigns. Attention, as part of a normative aecount of subjeetivity, com es intobeing only when experienees of singularity and identity are overwhelmedby equivalence and universal exchange.

Part of the preeariousness of In the Conservatory is how it figures atten-tiveness not only as something eonstitutive of a subjeet within modernitybut also as that whieh dissolves the stability and coherenee of a subject po-sition. And in a crucial sense the work, in its use of the two figures, ispoised at a threshold beyond which an attentive vision would break downin a loosening of coherenee and organization. Manet perhaps knew intu-itively that the eye is not a fixed organ, that it is marked by polyvalenee, byshifting intensities, by an indeterminate organization, and that sustainedattentiveness to anything will relieve vision of its fixed eharacter. GillesDeleuze, writing about what he ealls "the special relation between paint-ing and hysteria," suggests that for the hysterie, objeets are ton present,that an exeess of presenee makes representation impossible, and that thepainter, if not restrained, has the eapaeity to extrieate presenees from rep-resentation.ś'' For Deleuze, the c1assieal model of painting is about ward-ing off the hysteria that is so close to its heart.

In the Conservatory, in the ways I have indicated, thus reveals Manet (fora number of possible reasons) attempting ambivalently to rec1aim some ofthe terms of that c1assicalsuppression and restraint. But the result is some-thing quite different from a return to an earlier model, and I have tried tosuggest the range of disjunctions within Manet's synthetic activity in thiswork. Perhaps the painting's most notable feature to evade the state ofenc1osure, of being "in the grip" or "dans la serre," is the tangled meshof green behind the figures. 34 Is this what also fills the other side of theroom, a possible object of the woman's attention or distraction? Manet hasapplied the paint of the vegetation so thickly around the figures that itrises up in an eneroaehing ridge around them; the green is thus physicallycłoser to our view than the figures themselves. This turbulent zone ofcolor and proliferation exceeds its symbolic domestieation and ceases tofunction as part of a figure/ ground relationship. It beeomes the sign of apereeptual order alien to the relations Manet has sought to freeze or stabi-lize around the two figures. It is a site on whieh attention is enfolded intoits own dissolution, in whieh it ean pass from a bound to a mobile state. Itis amid the continuity between these states that vision ean become un-hinged from the eoordinates of its social determinants. And this is whatManet's grip can only imperfectly keep in eheek-an attentiveness thatwould lose itself outside those distinetions.

UNBI~1)

In terms of the larger projecrhaps important to suggest someness, other networks of pereeptualshape around this time. In Max Eli .•--in the late 1870s, the perceptual fiekind of libidinal setup and a very ~figs. 2.5, 2.6).35 The glove and o

Conseroatory have none of the o,erl0aC.e4Klinger, where attentiveness oveITUIl5exc1usivelydetermined by a singuJarer 's cyele is the way vision, althoche same time dispersed into serialnon, even as it is ostensibly tied tonamie and productive process. Itimage to image, adjaeent to that emerzdesire and the cireulation of comm

In a brief historical aside in hischat the crisis of perception in cheche moment at whieh it was no longand he indicates the wide rangemore movement into psyehic life.3C .-

rwo images in the Glove cyele arenewly kinetic seeing body set in mo..-v.....,jIand durational trajectories. Also, botawere two of what Benjamin calledup newarenas of visual eonsumptio:viously unknown libidinal encoun

The future tasks of an attentive ~when Eadweard Muybridge built hiscreating moving images whieh opera:esbinding-together of visual sensatio1881 for some celebrated demoIL~=-1entists.ś? It is one of many elemenme machine synthesis of so-called ~Inineteenth century and which conri=:xlDespite their dissimilarities, ~f~ri _lated in terms of their temporal u:rr:wUa!1as a metric and inflexible redundanmadic system of psyehic transform2~tury, these two poles will beeomeized organization of speetaele.

Even before the actual inventioelear that the conditions of h

t: arrention, as researchers learned,reaular introduction of novelty. His-

coincides with what Nietzsche de-[ll!z::s<:i- on of meaning, a deterioration of

account of subjectivity, comes intoII..:.. '_-=-ry and identity are overwhelmed

Conservatory is how it figures atten-!Dl:S::illIIve of a subject within modernity

S<2bil~r>and coherence of a subject po-in its use of the two figures, is

arrentive vision would break downion, Manet perhaps knew intu-it is marked by polyvalence, by

11II==i!j-:eorganization, and that sustained- ion of its fixed character. Gilles

-~- e special relation between paint-- _ teric, objects are too present,

[recresentation impossible, and that thelz:l2l{:ID- to extricate presences from rep-

odel of painting is about ward-eart,

- dicated, thus reveals Manet (for1ł-::7~Qambivalently to reclaim some ofl..:ll:: znd restraint. But the result is sorne-

earlier model, and I have tried toIt.-:~n -fanet's synthetic activity in this

e feature to evade the state ofla serre," is the tangled meshalso fills the other side of the

ntion or distraction? Manet has- -ckl around the figures that it- em; the green is thus physically

mE'ITI5-.elves.This turbulent zone oflic domestication and ceases to

-onship. It becomes the sign of a11-._ li Iznet has sought to freeze or stabi-

fuch attention is enfolded into- m a bound to a mobile state. It

that vision can become un-determinants. And this is what

in check-an attentiveness that

UNBINDING VISION 65

In terms of the larger project of which this paper is a part, it's per-ps important to suggest some other organizations of vi~ual atten~ve-

_ ,other networks of perceptual binding and synthesis which are takingshape around this time. In Max KIinger's Glove cycle, which he wo~ked on:n the late 1870s, the perceptual field is held together by a very differentłind of libidinal setup and a very different experience of visual ambiguityfigs. 2.5, 2.6).35 The glove and other potential sites of fixation in In t~e

Eonsercatory have none of the overloaded investment that the glove has mIilinger, where attentiveness overruns any normativ~ syn~esis to bec~meexclusively determined by a singular content. What IS crucial about KI.mg-er s cycle is the way vision, although obsessively bound and focused, IS atme same time dispersed into serial and metamorphic movements. Atten-non, even as it is ostensibly tied to the glove, deliriously opens out as a dy-namic and productive process. It traces a mobile and shifting path fromimage to image, adjacent to that emerging social terrain on which flows ofdesire and the circulation of commodities will ceaselessly overlap.

In a brief historical aside in his book on cinema, Gilles Deleuze insiststhat the crisis of perception in the late nineteenth century coincides withme moment at which it was no longer possible to hold a certain position,and he indicates the wide range of factors which introduced more andmore movement into psychic life.36It is especially significant that the firstl\VO images in the Glove cyele are about roIler-skating: the obser:ver as. anewly kinetic seeing body set in motion, to glide along uncertaI~ sO~IaIand durational trajectories. Also, both the greenhouse and the skating rinkwere two of what Benjamin called public "dream spaces," which openedup newarenas of visual consumption and provided the possibility for pre-viously unknown libidinal encounters and itineraries. .

The future tasks of an attentive subject were also foreshadowed m 1879,when Eadweard Muybridge built his zoopraxiscope, a projection device forcreating moving images which operates through a technologi~aIly ind~c~dbinding-together of visual sensations (fig. 2.7). He brought lt. to Pans 1':1881 for some celebrated demonstrations before groups of artists and SCl-

entists.ś? It is one of many elements in the automation of perception andthe machine synthesis of so-called objective reality which began ~n the mid-nineteenth century and which continues unabated on other lmes today.Despite their dissimilarities, Muybridge and KIinger are reciprocaIly re-lated in terms of their temporal unfoldings of attentiveness: the formeras a metric and inflexible redundancy of position, and the latter as a no-madic system of psychic transformations. But early in the twentieth cen-tury, these two poles will become overlapping elements within a general-ized organization of spectaele. . .

Even before the actual invention of cinema in the 1890s, though, it IS

elear that the conditions of human perception were being reassembled

· -- -----~--

_1. Głoue:Action, 1881.

Fig. 2.6. Max Klinger, A Glove: Anxieties, 1881.

Fig. 2.7. Zoopraxiscope disc.


into new eomponents. Vision, in a wide range of loeations, was refiguredas dynamie, temporaI, and synthetie. The demise of the punetual or an-ehored classieal observer began in the early nineteenth eentury, increas-ingly displaeed by the unstable attentive subjeet, whose varied eontours Ihave tried to sketeh out here. It is a subjeet eompetent both to be a eon-sumer of and an agent in the synthesis of a proliferating diversity of "real-ity effeets," a subjeet who will beeome the objeet of all the industries of theimage and speetacle in the twentieth eentury. But if the standardizationand regulation of attention eonstitute a path into the video and eybernetiespaees of our own present, the dynamie disorder inherent in attentiveness,whieh Manet's work begins to disclose, embodies another path of inven-tion, dissolution, and ereative syntheses whieh exeeeds the possibility ofrationalization and eontrol.

NOTES

l. See my Techniques oj the Obseroer: On Vision and Modernity in the NineteenthCentury (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).

2. ExperimentalPsychology (New York: Macmillan, 1901), 1:186.3. On Wundt and the beginnings of the psychology laboratory, see Kurt Dan-

ziger, Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins oj Psychological Research (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 17-33. See also Didier Deleule, "The Liv-ing Machine: Psychology as Organology," in Incorporations, ed. Jonathan Crary andSanford Kwinter (New York: Zone, 1992), pp. 2°3-233.

4. Michel Foucault, The Use oj Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Ran-dom House, 1985), p. 10.

5. A few of the very large number of works on this subject during this periodare William James, The Principles oj Psychology, vol. I (1890; reprint, New York:Dover Publications, 1950), pp. 4°2-458; Theodule Ribot, La Psychologie de l'atten-tion (Paris: F. Alcan, 1889); Edward Bradford Titchner, Experimental Psychology: AManual oj Laboratory Practice (New York: Macmillan, 1901), pp. 186-328; HenryMaudsley, The Physiology oj Mind (New York: Appleton, 1893), pp. 308-321; OswaldKńlpe, Outlines oj Psychology (orig. pub. 1893), trans. E. B. Titchner (London: Son-nenschein, 1895), pp. 423-454; Carl Stumpf, Tonspsychologie, vol. 2 (Leipzig: S. Hir-zel, 1890), pp. 276-317; F. H. Bradley, "Is There Any Special Activity of Attention,"Mind 11 (1886): 305-323; Angelo Mosso, Fatigue (orig. pub. 1891), trans. Mar-garet Drummond (New York: G. P. Putman), pp. 177-208; Lemon Uhl, Attention(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1890); George Trumbull Ladd, Ele-ments oj Physiological Psychology (New York: Scribners, 1887), pp. 480-497, 537-547; Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophy oj the Unconscious (orig. pub. 1868), trans.William C. Coupland (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 105-108; G. StanleyHall, "Reaction Time and Attention in the Hypnotic State," Mind 8 (April 1883):170-182; Georg Elias Muller, Zur Theorie der sinnlichen AuJmerksamkeit (orig. pub.1873) (Leipzig: A. Adelmann, n.d.);James Sully, "The Psycho-Physical Processesin Attention," Brain 13 (1890): 145-164; John Dewey, Psychology (New York: Har-

per, 1886), pp. 132-155; Henri Bergstrans, W. S. Palmer and N. M. Paul ~Theodor Lipps, Grundtatsachen des~j139; L. Marillier, "Remarques sur le - -27 (1889): 566-587; Charlton Bastiaz, ~et la volition," Revue philosophique 3"Mental Tests and Their Measuremeaz,"Kreibig, Die Aufmerksamkeit als ~H. Obersteiner, "Experimental R~Pierre Janet, "Etude sur un cas d'aboc-=-1891): 258-287,382-407; Sigmund Fre

The Origins oj Psycho-analysis, trans.Basic Books, 1954), pp. 415-445; Eć~To~. Findlay (1899-1900; reprint, ~i

6. See, for example, the devalnaziJerleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology oj P. _

ge, 1962), pp. 26-31. Many srudiesirh notions of cognitive processing

zion theory. One influential modern"filter theory" in his Perceptura and UJExamples of recent research include c

oj Cognitive Science, ed. Michael1-682, and Gerald Edelrnan, B o

: Basic Books, 1992), pp. 137-1+;-'o One of the first explicitły ~l·L Psychologie de l'atlention (1il:}',and class are central to his e<"2

ient capacity for attention inuth Americans. Ribot's boo

ns on attention in D~-:lI'

S_ WOllhelrnWundt, Grundzii.ge drr pLeipzig: Engelmann, 190810 3=Psychology, trans. Edward BraC.5ein, 1910), 1:315-320.

For a detaiIed overview of this ~~Inhibition: History and MeaTfncg :

~ London: University of Califorzcae, for example,Jean Cłav; ~

3): 3-44·o Georges Bataille, Mana; rrans

ort: Skira, n.d.), p. 82.Jules-Antoine Castagnary; u

r:a:='ron, Manet and His Critics (Xe~'---Hamilton, op. cit., p. 2120Gilles Deleuze A Thousand Pr-~- ,

~~ of Minnesota Press, l

range of lacatians, was refigurede demise of the punctual ar an-

- earły nineteenth cen tury, increas-1JIe~~ subject, whase varied cantaurs I

iect competent bath to be a eon-- a proliferating diversity of "real-

- ::"e object of all the industries of themry. But if the standardizatian

- parh into the video and cybemetic- --- mer inherent in attentivenessse, embodies anather path of inven-

~:.es,;;:s rhich exceeds the passibility of

and Modernity in the Nineteenth

IFJ~=:!la!l,1901), 1:186.ology laboratory, see Kurt Dan-

PsycJwlogical Research (Cambridge:See also Didier Deleule, "The Liv-_ ations, ed. Jonathan Crary and

20;;-233.- Robert Hurley (New York: Ran-

on this subject during this periodP"!~"':~"I:. 'OL I (1890; reprint, New York:

e Ribot, La Psychologie de l'atten-tchner, Experimental Psychology: A

.H::;:c::r::.!ll;an, 1901), pp. 186-328; Henryton, 1893), pp. 308-321; Oswald- E. B. Titchner (London: Son-

_- - _ _cJwlogze,vol. 2 (Leipzig: S. Hir-- _-\nrSpecial Activity of Attention,"

(orig. pub. 1891), trans. Mar-7:>- 1-7-208; Lemon Uhl, Attention- ); George Trumbull Ladd, Ele-_ ers, 1887), pp. 480-497, 537-'łCUTI.SCiaus(orig. pub. 1868), trans.~=-~931), pp. 105-108; G. Stanley

__ o~c State," Mind 8 (Aprii 1883):'chen AuJmerksamkeit (orig. pub.

o "The Psycho-Physical Processes--='.s--~-Dewey, Psychology (New York: Har-

UNBINDING VISlON 69

?<!r, 1886), pp. 132-155; Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (orig. pub. 1896),zrans. W. S. Palmer and N. M. Paul (New York: Zone Books, 1988), pp. 98-107;Theodor Lipps, Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens (Bonn: M. Cohen, 1883), pp. 128-139; L. Marillier, "Remarques sur le mćcanisme de l'attention," Reoue philosophique27 (1889): 566-587; Charlton Bastian, "Les Processus nerveux dans l'attentionet la volition," Reoue philosophique 33 (1892): 353-384; James McKeen Cattell,"Mental Tests and Their Measurement," Mind 15 (1890): 373-380; Josef ClemensKreibig, Die Aufmerksamkeit als Willenserscheinung (Vienna: Alfred Hólder, 1897);H. Obersteiner, "Experimental Researches on Attention," Brain 1 (1879): 439-453;Pierre Janet, "Etude sur un cas d'aboulie et d'idees fixes," Retnie philosophique 31(1891): 258-287,382-407; Sigmund Freud, "Project for Scientific Psychology," inThe Origins oJPsycho-analysis, trans. Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey (New York:Basic Books, 1954), pp. 415-445; Edmund Husserl, Logicallnvestigations, trans.J. . Findlay (1899-1900; reprint, New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 1:374-386.

6. See, for example, the devaluation of attention as a problem in MauriceMerleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology oj Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Rout-ledge, 1962), pp. 26-31. Many studies since the mid-twentieth century have workedwith notions of cognitive processing and channel capacity borrowed from informa-rion theory. One influenrial modern account of attention is Donald Broadbent's"filter theory" in his Perception and Communication (New York: Pergamon, 1958).Examples of recent research include Alan Allport, "Visual Attenrion," in Founda-tions oj Cognitive Science, ed. Michael Posner (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), pp.631-682, and Gerald Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter oj Mind (NewYork: Basic Books, 1992), pp. 137-144.

7. One of the first explicitly sociological accounts of attention is ThćoduleRibot, Psychologie de l'attention (188g), in which determinations ofrace, gender, na-rionality, and class are central to his evaluarions. For Ribot, those characterized bydeficient capacity for attention include children, prostitutes, savages, vagabonds,and South Americans. Ribot's book was one of the sources for Max Nordau's re-flections on attention in Degeneration (New York: Appleton, [1892] 1895), pp.52-57·

8. Wilhelm Wundt, Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie, 6th ed. (1874; re-print, Leipzig: Engelmann, 1908), 3:306-364; in English as Principles oj Physio-logical Psychology, trans. Edward Bradford Titchner (1874; reprint, London: Son-nenschein, 1910), 1:315-320.

g. For a detailed overview of this problem in the nineteenth cen tury, see RogerSmith, lnhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences oj Mind and Brain (Berkeley, LosAngeles, London: University of California Press, 1992).

10. See, for example, Jean Clay, "Ointments, Makeup, Pollen," October 27 (win-ter 1983): 3-44.

II. Georges Bataille, Manet, trans. Austryn Wainhouse and James Emmons(New York: Skira, n.d.), p. 82.

12. Jules-Antoine Castagnary, Le Siecle, 28 June 1879. Cited in George HeardHamilton, Manet and His Critics (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 215.

13. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 212.14. Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis:

University ofMinnesota Press, 1987), pp. 167-191.


15. Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 165, 198.16. See David Kunzle, Fashion and Fetishism (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman and Little-

field, 1982), p. 31: "The lacing and uniacing of me corset were rituals which re-tained ancient levels of symbolism and me magicał associations of me conceptsof 'binding' and 'Ioosing.' In folk language, to be delivered of achiId or to bedeflowered, was to be 'unbound': to unbind was to release speciał forms of en-ergy.... The state of being tightly corsetted is a form of erotic tension and consti-tutes ipso facto a demand for erotic release, which may be deliberately controlled,prolonged, and postponed."

17. The landmark inaugural work on aphasia is Carl Wernicke, Der aphasischeSymptomencomplex (Breslau: Cohn and Weigert, 1874). One of me first fuli dinicalaccounts of agnosia is Hermann Lissauer, "Ein Fali von Seelenblindheit nebsteinem Beitrage zur Theorie derselben,' Archiv Jur Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten21 (1890): 222-270. For a recent dinical and historical review of me problem, seeMartha ]. Farah, VisualAgnosia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).

18. For Janet's early work on perceptuał disorders and his account of "ladćsagrćgation psychologique," see L'Automatisme psychologique (Paris: Fćlix Alcan,1889).

19. Jean-:Jacques Courtine and Claudine Haroche, Histoire du visage (Paris: Riv-ages, 1988), pp. 269-285.

20. Anomer approach to mis work is suggested by T.]. Clark's discussion of so-cial dass and me "face of fashion" in his chapter on Manet's 1882 painting A Barat the Folies-Bergere, in The Painting oj Modern Life (Prince ton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1984), pp. 253-254: "Fashion and reserve would keep one 's face from anyidentity, from identity in generał. The look which results is a speciał one: public,outward, 'blasć' in Simmel's sense, impassive, not bored, not tired, not disdainful,not quite focused on anything."

21. James, op. cit., p. 444.22. Pierre Janet, The Mental State oj Hystericals (orig. pub. 1893), trans. Caroline

Corson (New York: Putnam, 1902), pp. 252-253. This translation should be usedwith caution.

23. On me organization of the gaze in Manet's multifigure paintings, seeMichael Fried, "Manet in His Generation: The Face of Painting in the 1860s,"GriticalInquiry 19 (autumn 1992): 59-61.

24. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation oj Dreams, trans. James Strachey (NewYork: Avon, 1965), p. 134.

25. Manet's ambivalence about mis criticał area of me painting is revealed, inpart, by me anatomically anomalous form of me woman's left hand. It appears tohave a thumb and only three fingers, mus putting in question me exact location(and significance) of her rings.

26. See ]. Laplanche and ].-B. Pontalis, The Language oj Psycho-Analysis, trans.Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Norton, 1973), pp. 50--52.

27. Tony Tanner, Adultery in the Nouel: Gontract and Transgression (Bałtimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

28. Within discussions of attention, there was considerable debate over whetherone could attend to more than one sense simultaneously. See, for example, me

negative argument in Ernst Mach, Cc=~pub. 1885), trans. C. M. Williams (~--r:::

29. Sigmund Freud, The Origins -and Notes, I887-I902, trans. Eric ~f~Books, 1954), pp. 144-145.

30. Walter Benjamin, Rejlections,Brace, 1978), pp. 152-153.

31. Leo Bersani, The Death oj Stą.c::rl ~Iity Press, 1982), pp. 74-75.

32. Guy Debord, The Society oJthL s..~iork: Zone Books, 1994), p. 45.

33· Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon:erence, 1981), pp. 36-38. The ~

nce in painting is a major theme ~-resentation is to be exceeded, M~

be achieved: "The eye shouldlesson before it. It should ab

:noks upon, and mat as for thenał abstraction guided onły

~hane Mallarmć, "The Impressiocćss. J1allarmi, Manet, and Redan [~

11-18).On me structurał importance

Hopp, Edouard Manet: F~.,H-58, 116-137.5. The first etched edition of _1-:_

.-ingswere exhibited in 1878.Klinger's Paraphrase oj the Fm ..in 74 (March 1992): 91-11+

~0_ Gilles Deleuze, Ginema: ThL _'h~niversity of Minnesota Press,

-. Muybridge spent nearly six r:cor:~1882. His first European d~:mijl

at the home of Jules-Etienne ~otographer Nadar, amon,

Haas, Muybridge: Man in _- Californią Press, 1976), pp. 1~--

Xew York: Basic Books, 199O).?:--

1W~:±o.-..(Totowa, NJ.: Rowman and Little-1JZ:~c·~_of the corset were rituals which re-

zical associations of the concepts?- to be delivered of a child or to be

• was to release special forms of en-1!D~~i:;·- a form of erotic tension and consti-

'ch may be deliberately controlled,

. is Carl Wernicke, Der aphasische1 74). One of the first full clinical

"Ein Fall von Seelenblindheit nebst- Psychiatrie und Neruenkrankheiten

IfIIL2dC- .cisrorical review of the problem, seePress, 1990).

disorders and his account of "la~~a:;:"~PSYchologique (Paris: Felix Alcan,

- aa.'"UChe, Histoire du visage (Paris: Riv-

~ by T.J. Clark's discussion of so-on Manet's 1882 paintingA Bar

..Ji Princeton: Princeton University- zeserre would keep one's face from any

. results is a special one: public,bored, not tired, not disdainful,

mig. pub. 1893), trans. Caroline-53· Ibis translation should be used

Aanet's multifigure paintings, see-=-- e Face of Painting in the 1860s,"

trans. James Strachey (New

- area of the painting is revealed, in- e .omari's left hand. It appears to

. a in question the exact location

-:-- lLJng;uage oj Psycho-Analysis, trans._-3 .pp. 50-52.

and Transgression (Baltimore:

considerable debate over whetherraneously. See, for example, the

UNBINDING VISlON 71

tive argument in Ernst Mach, Contributions to the Analysis oj Sensations (orig..1885), trans. C. M. Williams (Chicago: Open Court, 1897), p. 112.

29. Sigmund Freud, The Origins oj Psycho-Analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Draftsd Notes, 1887-19°2, trans. Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey (New York: Basic

3cxJks, 1954), pp. 144-145 .30. Walter Benjamin, Reflections, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Harcourtce, 1978), pp. 152-153.31. Leo Bersani, The Death oj Stephane Mallarme (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-ity Press, 1982), pp. 74-75.

32. Guy Debord, The Society oJthe Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Newiork: Zon e Books, 1994), p. 45.

33. Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation (Paris: Editions de la5fference, 1981), pp. 36-38. The paradoxical relation between representation andnresence in painting is a major theme of Mallarmć's 1876 essay on Manet. If rep-. entation is to be exceeded, Mallarmć suggests, a particular kind of attentiveness

t be achieved: "The eye should forget alI else it has seen, and learn anew from- e lesson before it. It should abstract itself from memory, seeing only that which

looks upon, and that as for the first time; and the hand should become an im-personal abstraction guided only by the will, oblivious of all previous cunning"

tephane Mallarme, "The Impressionists and Edouard Manet," in Penny Flor-ence, Mallarme, Manet, and Redan [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986],pp. 11-18) .

34. On the structural importance of the color green in Manet's work, seeG ela Hopp, Edouard Manet: Farbe und Bildgestalt (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), 1968,pp. 54-58, 116-137.

35. The first etched edition of this cycle appeared in 1881, although the inkdrawings were exhibited in 1878. See Christiane Herte!, "Irony, Dream, and Kitsch:~ax Klinger's Paraphrase oj the Finding oj a Glove and German Modernism," ArtBulletin 74 (March 1992): 91-114.

36. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (Min-neapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1986), p. 56.

37. Muybridge spent nearly six months in Paris between September 1881 andMarch 1882. His first European demonstration of the zoopraxiscope was during asoirće at the home of Jules-Etienne Marey which was attended by Helmholtz andthe photographer Nadar, among others. For discussions of this visit, see RobertBartlett Haas, Muybridge: Man in Motion (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: Univer-sity of California Press, 1976), pp. 127-132, and Anson Rabinbach, The Human_Wotor(New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 100-102.

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