Courrent Catolic Trhouht in Liberty

Current Catholic Thought on

Religious Liberty

THOMAS T. LOVE

HE renewal of Roman Catholicism in the modern world is an as- tonishing reality that frustrates Catholics who have seldom attempted to question their faith, raises the suspicions of conservative-minded

Catholics and non-Catholics who are always uneasy when changes threaten

well-engrained attitudes and positions, and compels the admiration of non- Catholics who wish to encourage Catholics to draw upon their rich heritage and make it relevant to the present day. In point of fact, the renewal of Catholicism is understandable only in relation to several current considera- tions among Catholics: fundamental disagreement, lengthy and critical

dialogue, and careful argumentation. Various differences were dramatized

during the sessions of Vatican Council II, and many new developments in Catholic thought have appeared.

The notion of freedom is basic to the renewal of Catholicism.' A new

emphasis is being placed on the radical nature of man's freedom in relation to God's freeing grace, on the "risk" of evolutionary development, on the creativity of the human act, and on the layman's assumption of responsibility in the temporal order. Modern Catholicism has been awakened from a deep slumber by the rediscovery of the Bible, the liturgical revival, new approaches to moral theology, and revisions in theological methodology.2

The right to religious liberty is one important dimension involved in Catholicism's new emphasis on freedom.3 Western Catholic scholars are addressing themselves to the problem of religious freedom in an unprecedented

THOMAS T. LOVE (B.A., University of Oklahoma; B.D., Southern Methodist University; M.A., Ph.D., Princeton University) is Associate Professor of Theology and Christian Ethics at Cornell College. He is the author of John Courtney Murray: Contemporary Church-State Theory (Doubleday). His most recent article in JBR was "Theravada Buddhism: Ethical Theory and Practice" (October, 1965). This is Mr. Love's initial contribution as the Journal's Research Editor in Religion and Ethics.

1 See essays by Catholics from Germany, Belgium, France and the United States in Freedom and Man, ed. John Courtney Murray, New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1965.

2 See Donald J. Wolf and James V. Schall, eds., Current Trends in Theology, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1965; Hans Kiing, Freedom Today, trans. Cecily Hastings, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966.

8 See John Courtney Murray, ed., Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966.

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CURRENT CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 59

manner, exploring the problem in its theological, ethical, political, and juridical aspects. The document central to contemporary Catholic understanding of

religious liberty is the Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis Humanae) of Vatican Council II.4 This Declaration, which has captured the imagination of academic as well as non-academic communities, is sometimes referred to as the "American schema." The reference, of course, is misleading, even

though reasons may be given for it, namely, that the American Jesuit, John Courtney Murray, was the chief architect of the Declaration and that American

prelates strongly supported the document. It is also true that the schema's basic notion of man's civil right to religious liberty reflects the religiously pluralistic American experience; i. e., religious liberty, together with such other civil liberties as speech and the press, is constitutionally guaranteed in the United States. Even though Murray was chief drafter of the schema on religious freedom, numerous other Catholic scholars either made significant direct contributions to it or were influential indirectly (e. g., Pavan, Hamer, Congar, Beniot, Feiner, Medina, Becker, Dondeyne, Leclercq, de Broglie, Janssens, and Barbaini). Highly provocative Catholic works on religious liberty are appearing outside the United States - in Italy, France, Belgium, and Spain.

Louis Janssens of Belgium takes religious liberty to be a special case of the liberty of conscience.5 His point of departure is what might be called

John XXIII's interpretation of "natural law" as equivalent to the "dignity of man" or to the contemporary notion of the "person" that has emerged in Catholic scholarship. Janssens contends that one of the major theological tasks today is to elaborate fully Leo XIII's view of liberty which was truncated by the contextual conditions of doctrinal liberalism and rationalism in the nineteenth century. This Belgian thinker investigates the double tradition of Catholicism (apropos of St. Thomas and apropos of Duns Scotus and Francisco Suarez) in order to disengage Catholic thought on religious liberty from the vicissitudes of the nineteenth century and to make it consonant with the dignity of man as proclaimed by John XXIII.

Janssens' major contribution to the contemporary Catholic dialogue on

religious liberty is his twofold emphasis on man as a moral subject who must assume personal responsibility for his own free actions and on man as

fundamentally a social being. Man is morally obliged to act in conformity with the judgment of his conscience, and, since man is a social being, his moral obligation is illusory unless the social milieu guarantees him the right

4 See The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, New York: Guild Press, 1966, pp. 672-96; Thomas T. Love, "De Libertate Religiosa: An Interpretive Analysis," A Journal of Church and State, VIII (Winter, 1966), 30-48; John Courtney Murray, "The Declaration on Religious Freedom: Its Deeper Significance," America, CXIV (April 23, 1966), 592-93.

6 Louis Janssens, Liberti de conscience et liberti religieuse, Paris: Descl6e de Brouwer, 1964. Janssens' book is now available in English: Freedom of Conscience and Religious Freedom, New York: Alba House, 1966.



60 THOMAS T. LOVE

to act. Hence, man's liberty of conscience is held to require a guaranteed freedom to act in the socio-political order. Immediately, however, a dilemma may be posed: If what is held to be obligatory by the moral subject is in conflict with what is disallowed by the socio-political order, then man in his conscience is at odds with himself as a participant in the social order. How is the conflict to be overcome if both requirements are legitimate? In response to this very difficult question, Janssens somewhat unrealistically suggests that education may close the "gap" between personal conscience and the social dimension. If education fails, then legal restraint may be necessary for the sake of the socio-political common good. Hence, we are told, one should be allowed as much liberty as possible, yet liberty may not be permitted to destroy the common good. The restrictions on religious liberty are, therefore, the exigencies of the common good, i. e. - in traditional terms - morality, public order, and general social well-being, or --as reinterpreted with a personalistic emphasis on human dignity by Janssens - "coexistence," "collaboration," and "coparticipation." The position of the Catholic Church, declares Janssens, confirms the view that the state should juridically guarantee the religious liberty of all persons and groups within due limits.6

In Le Droit naturel a la libertM religieuse, the French Jesuit, Guy de Broglie, argues for man's natural right to religious freedom, a right that he takes to be a form of the general human right to liberty of action in a political society.7 Hence, as is now commonly asserted in Catholic thought, it is man's natural human dignity that is understood to be the basis of his civil religious liberty. No "supernatural" right is evoked. What Catholics formerly called "natural law," i. e., man's reasonable nature, is presumed to be the same as what they now call the human dignity of the person. Out of respect for the dignity of man, de Broglie argues, a wide range of possible evil acts must be allowed in order that man may be properly free to choose and perform good acts. According to de Broglie, the same logic is involved in the choice of, and adherence to, religious truth, i. e., man must be free to choose to be non- religious or anti-religious because otherwise he would not be free to choose the true religion.

A second interesting aspect of de Broglie's work is his rejection of the notion that the state is radically incompetent in religious matters. Linking the modern notion of the state's neutrality toward religions to the in- differentism of the nineteenth century and to outmoded fears based on past abuses such as the Inquisition, de Broglie argues that the notion of the so-called neutral state is inadequately founded and hence indefensible. He asserts that Leo XIII certainly believed in confessional states, and he main- tains that the notion of the state's absolute incompetence in religious matters

6 See also Albert Dondeyne, Le Foi ecoute le monde, 2d ed., Paris: E"ditions Universitaires, 1964; Jacques Leclercq, La Liberti d'opinion et les catholiques, Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1963.

1 See Guy de Broglie, Le Droit naturel la liberte' religieuse, Paris: Beauchesne, 1964; also Problimes chritiens sur la liberte religieuse, Paris: Beauchesne, 1965, especially pp. 129-38.




is a betrayal of Catholic tradition. Admitting past injustices of "Christian states," he contends that a confessional state is quite acceptable in the present day, especially since there has arisen a heightened appreciation of man's dignity. Despite de Broglie's intriguing argument apropos of "degrees of neutrality" of states, he needs to make a sharper distinction between the socio-civil society and the "state" as a power within the society. The issue of the state's (not the society's) neutrality could then be analyzed more

adequately without confusion with nineteenth-century absolutistic views. In an article in America, John Courtney Murray states that the first two

drafts of Dignitatis Humanae "followed a line of argument common among French-speaking theologians."s We have illustrated this approach above. It has been the dominant view in progressive Catholic thought, especially in French and Belgian sources.' But religious liberty is no longer formally conceived as an ethical and theological notion and then extended by inference (based on man's being-with-others) to the juridical order. A different approach and argument were developed in the third and subsequent drafts of the Declaration, which, in Murray's words, "addresses the problem where it

concretely exists- in the legal and political order." Religious freedom, therefore, is considered in the first instance to be a juridical notion, the civil

right of man in society. This latter approach and the supporting arguments, as Murray says, are "more common among English- and Italian-speaking theorists."

One of the most remarkable books on the problem of religious liberty is Libertd religiosa e pubblici poteri by an Italian theorist, Pietro Pavan.'o This author documents the truth that the civil right to religious freedom is

recognized in the constitutions of more than one hundred contemporary political entities. He meticulously analyzes what may be called the "signs of the times," the growth in an awareness of human dignity in diverse societies, including Communist regimes, African and Asiatic countries, the Americas, and Europe. He demonstrates through citations and commentary that the right of persons to liberty in religious matters is supported by a correlative fact: the declaration by various societies (laicist, lay, confessional) that the public power is incompetent in religious matters. On the basis of a profound analysis of the teachings of Leo XIII, Pius XII, John XXIII, and Paul VI, Pavan argues that there has been a progressive doctrinal clarifica- tion in the awareness of human dignity. Papal teaching, according to Pavan, unambiguously declares that full religious freedom in the temporal order is a fundamental right of persons and that the public power is completely incompetent in religious matters.

8 John Courtney Murray, "This Matter of Religious Freedom," America, CXIII (January 9, 1965), 40-43.

9 See A. F. Carrillo de Albornoz, Roman Catholicism and Religious Liberty, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1959.

10 Pietro Pavan, Libert? religiosa e pubblici poteri, Milano: Editrice Ancora, 1965.



62 THOMAS T. LOVE

Pavan insists that religious liberty is neither deduced from an abstract notion of an individual's adherence to truth nor extrapolated from a notion of one's freedom of conscience. The person is always concrete, is always socio-juridical in his essentially intersubjective nature as a member of a

socio-political order. To argue from man's inner act of freedom of conscience to man's civil right to religious liberty is illicit. Man is social before any presumed internal act of conscience arises. The truth or untruth of one's inner convictions is politically and juridically irrelevant. Abstract notions of truth, of rights, and of freedom of conscience are not immediately relevant to the concrete civil right to religious liberty. From this perspective, such

conceptualistic approaches as those of Janssens and de Broglie fail to establish the civil right to religious liberty. Janssens' and de Broglie's arguments are not useless when one wishes to maintain that a person may not be coerced

by the state to believe what he does not believe; however, the argument from conscience, for example, does not establish any juridical conclusion with

regard to the restraint of one's action in relation to others in a civil society. Pavan and Murray begin with a more complex notion at the outset: the

human person is always a member of a concrete political society, which

juridically recognizes the immunity of persons from coercion in religious matters and allows actions in religious matters that do not disrupt the public order."1 It seems that the "conclusion" of Belgian, French, Italian, and American theorists is identical; the arguments for the case, however, are different in the initial insight, in approach, and in elaboration. Whereas Janssens and de Broglie begin with a simple and rather abstract insight (for Janssens, one's freedom of conscience; for de Broglie, man's natural right to liberty of action) and attempt to establish juridical conclusions, Pavan and Murray begin with a complex and concrete insight (man's religious freedom constitutionally guaranteed, or the constitutional recognition of man's religious freedom in a society wherein the public power of the society also recognizes its juridical incompetence, and hence its radical neutrality, in religious matters). The differences of approach reflect the two kinds of initial insight.

Rafael Lopez Jordan of Argentina has collected an important set of essays that further illustrate the vitality of contemporary Catholic thought on the problem of religious freedom. The collection is available in Italian and, supplemented by five further essays, in Spanish."1 The subtitle of the Spanish edition -- "a solution for everyone" -- accurately indicates the diversity of views among Catholics from Italy, Spain, Belgium, Germany, France, Africa, South America, and the United States.

1' See John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, Westminster, Mary-

land: The Newman Press, 1965. 12 Rafael Lopez Jordan, ed., Problematica della libertd religiosa, Milano: Editrice Xncora,

1964; Libertad religiosa, una solucion para todos, Madrid: Ediciones Stvdivm, 1964.




The views of the Italian theorists included in Jordan's volume are similar to the view shared by Pavan and Murray. These authors emphasize the person's concrete right to freedom from coercion in religious matters in modern juridical societies. Furthermore, persons are not to be restrained from actions rooted in their religious convictions, to the extent that such actions are in accord with the public ordering of society. The civil govern- ment has no competence with regard to the truth or lack of truth of religion; it has competence only in matters of justice and order among its citizens. Particular conflicts that may arise - e. g., blood transfusions for a Jehovah's Witness, polygamy for a Mormon, education for the Amish in the United States - must be considered in terms of jurisprudence. These conflicts are not resolved on grounds of abstract ideals or a priori judgments.1"

Essays by Spanish Catholics in Jordan's volume reflect awareness of new international conditions that require a reconsideration of the problem of religious liberty in Spain. Despite his obvious nationalistic feelings, Arch- bishop Cantero of Zaragoza believes that the Catholic Church in Spain must become aware of the world situation and international affairs. The modern world is pluralistic, and the problem of coexistence between Catholic and non-Catholic communities within the international community is a practical one. In the face of the "lamentable sociological phenomenon of religious pluralism," which Catholics must recognize in the present day, it is necessary, says Cantero, for Catholics to adopt a practical attitude of justice, love, and liberty toward all persons for the sake of the "international common good." To defend religious liberty is not to accept non-Catholic religions as true; it is simply to recognize that every citizen has socio-juridical rights despite his religious claims. Interestingly, Cantero declares that one must think not only of the rights that truth should have over error but also of the rights of persons to think and act as their consciences direct them. Nevertheless, the Archbishop defends the privileged juridical position of Catholicism in Spain as properly reflecting analogically the individual and social character of the people. Cantero's essay illustrates one kind of Catholic position that will continue to be put forth in Spain for many years.

A challenge to Cantero's position is found in an essay by Eduardo Garcia de Enteria of the Law Faculty, Madrid. According to Garcia, John XXIII's Pacem in terris with its section on man's private and public right to religious liberty was in fact interpreted in such a way as to necessitate no change in the Spanish tradition. Garcia believes, however, that the events of Vatican II have caused Spanish Catholics to become aware of an actual alteration in the attitude of the Catholic Church. Hence, he asserts, Spanish Catholics can no longer justify any special position for the Church in Spain on the grounds of the nation's so-called religious unity. The Catholic Church cannot properly have two positions on religious liberty, one favoring and

13 See also P. Barbaini, La libert religiosa, Roma: Studium, 1964.



64 THOMAS T. LOVE

one not favoring the Spanish arrangement. In point of fact, Garcia argues, the position on religious unity long esteemed by Spanish Catholics is passe. Spain has many non-Catholics. Furthermore, the juridical status of the Catholic Church in Spain has produced many "marginal" Catholics, i. e., Catholics who display the outward signs of Catholicism but are not faithful believers. The old medieval notion of a religious state is incongruous with the properly secular world and political societies of today. Garcia asserts that those who deny the application of the new principles of religious liberty to Spain not only reject an essential Christian teaching of our time, but also manifest a lack of confidence in the apostolic mission of the Catholic Church.

Current works on religious liberty by Roman Catholics clearly exhibit a genuine renewal in Catholic thought. This renewal is further encouraged by Protestant studies that critically analyze aspects of modern Catholic thought.14 One may hope that the renewal of thought will find authentic expression in attitudes and practices.

14 See, for example, G. C. Berkouwer, The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholi- cism, trans. Lewis B. Smedes, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1965; Thomas T. Love, John Courtney Murray: Contemporary Church-State Theory, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1965.

