Countrywide Mortgage v. BERLIUK - Judge COSTELLO 1 3Mar2008

7/31/2019 Countrywide Mortgage v. BERLIUK - Judge COSTELLO 1 3Mar2008

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT VIRGINIA

Jeffrey Brown,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 10CV1427

File Stamped - 12/21/10

v.

HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA),

Defendant,

Debra Bassett,

Defendant,

Howard N. Bierman,

Defendant,

Jared Slater, Defendant


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COMPLAINT

AND

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown, Pro se, [for the present time] for a complaint

against the Defendants, and states as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction under the laws of the United States of

America, Article III 2, U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985 and 1986 (failure to

prevent) as conferred by the U.S. Constitution 28 USC 1331 and 1343and 2254 under the

1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 14thAmendments. This action involves constitutional charges,

grounds, questions, and jurisdiction is supplemented by 28 USC 1367(a) and challenges

the constitutional violations of state and federal law, procedure andpractice by state and

federal officials and officers of the court. Plaintiff also brings this main action through

civil RICO statute.


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2. This action is brought within the time constraints of 42 USC 1983 and

particularly under the continuing organizational complicity and fraud scope, central to

this complaint.

VENUE

3. Venue is proper because individual parties are (or were at the time) residents and

citizens of the State of Virginia and the United States.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff, Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown, is a citizen of the United States and resident of

Fairfax County, Virginia.

5. Defendants:

a. HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA),

b. Debra Bassett,

c. Howard N. Bierman,

d. Jared Slater


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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

6Plaintiff has a degree in dentistry (DDS), an MBA, and formerly a real estate sales

licensewith

extensive and advanced training in the field of computers, document recording, and data

entry. Plaintiff

had a well established business as a dentist with over 20 years of success in that field

where extensive

knowledge in managing files and records were a must. The training of the MBA made it

possible for

Plaintiff to easily understand and research both Virginia and Federal codes/statutes and

understand

their meaning readily.

7. The ability to perform exemplary research has made it possible for Plaintiff to


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come forward quite readily as a Pro Se litigator. Plaintiff has always believed in an

honorable existence

and in providing support for honorable causes. In all dealings Plaintiff has stood for the

side of honor

and righteousness with unfailing dedication to the truth.

BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

8. In late 2009, Plaintiff and his wife were performing a routine audit of their various

personal documents and discovered that they had never received a complete alleged loan

package after closing with HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA, in 2008. More

specifically, a copy of the original loan application, copy of the note itself, rescission

documents, and a complete Deed of Trust were either lacking or missing. In fact, all that

Plaintiff received at the so-called closing table was a six page copy of the alleged Note

and a five page copy of the Deed of Trust.

9. In response to Plaintiff's request for ALL documents related to the alleged loan

package, Plaintiff received a very incomplete response from HSBC Mortgage

Corporation, USA (herein called HSBC)only receiving a full sized copy of the alleged

adjustable rate note in violation of USC Title 18 > Part I> Chapter 25, 472, 473, 474,


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474A, and 475. Additionally, Plaintiff noticed that this alleged 'note' had an additional

page with an inverted notary impression and it appeared that something had been omitted

from this copy.(See Exhibit A- Loan Documents received from HSBC) The received

copy of the Deed of Trust (at the closing table) was only five pages long (see Exhibit

B)In addition, Plaintiff noticed that none of the loan application, rescission documents,

nor the Home Equity Brochure were included, thus making Plaintiff even more

concerned and suspicious. Plaintiff then called Premier Relationship Manager, Soraya

Teymourian, because of the improper response received in Exhibit A. In response to

phone call with Ms. Teymourian, Plaintiff wrote a lettersee Exhibit C - requesting

the opportunity to view the ORIGINAL complete set of alleged loan documents.

10. On January 29, 2010, Plaintiff went to Fairfax County Land Records to obtain a true

and certified copy of the Deed of TrustSee Exhibit D- a document which is 19 pages

long which in no way resembles Exhibit B which was received at closing.

11. On Feb 4, 2010, Plaintiff received phone callsee Affidavit Exhibit E. On

February 17, 2010, Plaintiff made the realization that there was no longer an alleged

Note, and hence there could no longer be a Debt or Obligation. By their own admission,

and on several occasions, HSBC no longer held an alleged Note or even a proper Deed of

Trust.

12. On Feb 17, Plaintiff NOTICED HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA, Debra Bassett

(Trustee), MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration System), and various government

agenciessee Exhibit Fwith a Qualified Written Request (QWR) as per TILA and

RESPA (and note that within Exhibit F are various references to sub-exhibits used on


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that day). Plaintiff did the Noticing out of the belief that a fraud was indeed committed

that there was most likely no longer a note, and thus there was no longer an obligation to

continue payments toward this alleged Note. This entire NOTICE package was recorded

in the public record of Jefferson County, WV.

13. On February 24, 2010,in response to RESPA/TILA QWR, Plaintiff received a letter

from HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA, with unsubstantiated claimssee Exhibit G.

HSBC claimed that Plaintiff had received the following: a copy of the Mortgage Note,

Deed of Trust, Truth in Lending Statement, HUD-1 Statement, and funding details from

the loan file. Plaintiff in truth received an edited version of the alleged Note, and an

incomplete version of the Deed of Trust at closing. .Defendant HSBC violated Section 6

of RESPA by their failure to acknowledge Plaintiff's request for information, and ALSO

by failure to resolve the issues within 60 business days.

14.Additionally, Plaintiff states that neither Debra Bassett, Trustee, nor HSBC made any

attempt to respond to Plaintiff's QWR. Hence, both of these Defendants are in direct

violation of Section 6 of RESPA.

15. Because of Defendants' Non Response to RESPA/TILA request, Plaintiff provided

Defendants HSBC and Bassett with Notice of Revocation of Power of Attorney and

Notice of Appointment of Successor Trusteesee Exhibit H - also on public record

with Jefferson County, WV.

16.Plaintiff states that Defendants HSBC and Bassett were given another opportunity to

cure the defects in their lack of response or non-responsessee Exhibit I This time


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Plaintiff used a Notary to Present the Notices in an effort to not be ignored by Defendants

HSBC and Bassett.

17.On or after May 20, 2010, Plaintiff received correspondence from HSBC -see Exhibit

J- a further example of HSBC's failure to properly respond and attempt to 'steamroll'

over Plaintiff without due cause.

18. On May 20, 2010, Plaintiff posted multiple Notices in the Fairfax Timessee Exhibit

K .

In response to correspondence from HSBC dated June 03, 2010 (see Exhibit L),

Plaintiff sent another request for debt validationthis time to HSBC Officer and

Director, Stephen Tich, and requested once again for someone to verify the alleged debt.

See Exhibit M.

19.In response to Exhibit M, once again Defendants sent a full sized copy of the

alleged Note (Exhibit N), violating USC Title 18 > Part I> Chapter 25, 472, 473, 474,

474A, and 475. Additionally, by THEIR OWN ADMISSION in this correspondence

dated June 25, 2010, they admit that Plaintiff saw the original signed loan documents

on February 17 of 2010. Plaintiff accepts their admission that they no longer have proper

documentation for the alleged loan and thus cannot enforce any Loan/Note/obligation

because they cannot produce such documents to verify the alleged note.

20. On June 12, 2010, Plaintiff moved the 'good faith' payments that would have been

sent to HSBC to an account for holding at Bank of America. See Exhibit O. Plaintiff


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took this action out of fear that HSBC would attempt to steal the funds from Plaintiff's

account at HSBC without cause.

21.After MANY attempts to validate any debt with HSBC, Plaintiff realized that no such

debt actually existed and as a courtesy sent Notice to Stephen Tich, Officer and Director

of HSBC - see Exhibit P.

22. On August 25, Plaintiff received correspondence -see Exhibit Q.

23.On or after September 08, 2010, Plaintiff received correspondence from the Bierman

law firm-see Exhibit R. (Let it be known that Howard Bierman also appears to be the

owner of Equity Trustees) As evidenced by already received correspondence, several

times over, HSBC ONLY has an incomplete alleged copy of the Note in their possession,

therefore the claim that the Bierman law firm has referenced a Deed of Trust, cannot be

true. Additionally, the Bierman group states that the Secured Party is HSBC. If indeed

they had seen the true Deed of Trust, as the Plaintiff has put into Exhibit D - then they

would clearly have seen that MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems) is the

beneficiary according to the Deed. Hence, this initial statement to Plaintiff is wrought

with fraud, ab initio. In addition, the Bierman/Equity Trustee firm confirms in Exhibit

Rthat the alleged Note cannot be produced. Additionally, Defendants Bierman and

Slater (the responsible party for Equity Trustees, according to Plaintiff's call in to Equity

Trustees of Arlington, Virginia) have referenced Section 55-59.1 (B) of the Code of

Virginia which they themselves are in direct violation of. At the top of the Bierman law

firm correspondence, it states they are a debt collector while at the bottom of the

correspondence they declare themselves to be Attorneys for the Secured Party. Who


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are these parties claiming to be debt collectors, trustees, and attorneys all at the same

time? And since they do not know who the secured party is, they have no standing to

attempt any foreclosure against Plaintiff.

24. Pursuant to being threatened with an attempted fraudulent foreclosure sale by either

the Bierman firm or Equity Trustees, Plaintiff felt it necessary to check the Land Records

for Fairfax County. As suspected, there was no transfer of trustee status as of 10/12/2010,

which was 2 daysprior to the attempted sale of Plaintiff's property. See Exhibit S- a

certified copy of Land Records documents showing NO ACTIVITY for the past two

years. This fraudulent activity is in direct violation of Virginia code 55-59.1 (Notices

required). In fact, according to Exhibit T, Defendants did not record their fraudulent

appointment (which they had conveniently backdated) of substitute trustee until

10/18/2010, nor did they bother to notify the Plaintiff of their fraudulent substitutionin

violation of VA Code 26-50, and 8.01-428(A)(i).

25.Plaintiff has done further research and has determined that the aforementioned fraud

committed by Bierman and/or Equity Trustees is NOT a singular incident. See Exhibit

U. In fact, because of the deceptive practices activity of the Bierman law firm, the

Court of Appeals in Maryland has changed how foreclosure cases will be handledsee

Exhibit V. Plaintiff believes the Bierman/Equity Trustees firms to be part of the

foreclosure mill industry which has done so much damage to so many peoples' lives.

Plaintiff appears to be only one of several THOUSAND people who deserve relief from

the fraud committed by the Bierman firm and Equity Trustees.


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26. In further support of the fraud allegations, Plaintiff has done extensive research.

Plaintiff believes that HSBC neverloaned any money at all. In fact it is believed they

credited/deposited the promissory note signed by Plaintiff, used that deposit to pay the

seller, and continued to use Plaintiff's good name and credit for their own profit and

criminal enterprise. Additionally, research by Plaintiff indicates that the original loan

application now has a CUSIP number attached to it. Plaintiff believes that if indeed

HSBC took the approach of obtaining a CUSIP number for the loan application, they

then illegally converted the application to an instrument to purchase a bond and used that

bond to obtain a loan from the government to pass through money to buy real property. If

such is the case, they can indeed make the case that there is a loan, but Plaintiff's name is

on it and that loan is with the government, not HSBC. Again, if true, HSBC only

committed a fraudulent conversion of an application to an instrument, and any

foreclosure action would be having the government force the bank to pay them back. It

would be very interesting to actually see the ORIGINAL documents and how they have

been manipulated AFTER signatures were put on to complete them. Such

manipulation/alteration of security instruments and using such securities for their own

gain is considered to be bank fraud18 USC 1343 -'Fraud by wire, radio, or TV', 18

USC 1344Bank fraud -'whoever knowingly executes a scheme to defraud a financial

institution', and 18 USC 1349 'Attempt and conspiracy'.

CONCLUSION


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27.Plaintiff strongly believes that HSBC, et al., have shown indications of criminal

activity and with no evidence to the contrary upon multiple attempts to acquire

documents and information to verify the alleged debt, that there is indeed reason to

believe there is no obligation by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff felt that any continued

involvement with HSBC, et al, might be construed as a violation of US Code, Title 18,

Part I, Chapter 1, 4 , therefore, Plaintiff has discontinued any financial connection to the

alleged loan. Plaintiff to this day has set alleged loan payments aside in a separate

account awaiting finalization of this action.

28. Plaintiff believes that Defendants have CLEARLY committed fraud by making a 1)

False representation of 2) a material fact which was made 3) knowingly with 4) an intent

to mislead 5) and reliance by the party misled and 6) resulting damage to the party misled

(State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Remley, 270 Va 209,218 618 S.E.2d 316, 321 (2005).

Plaintiff believes that Defendants have clearly used their superior knowledge of the

Federal Reserve Banking System Rules and legal system to commit the frauds they have

been accused of.

29. Plaintiff's belief that fraud has been perpetrated upon Plaintiff by Defendants is

further supported by Exhibit W - a certified copy of the Walker Todd expert testimony

affidavit. This affidavit leads one to believe that out of pure ignorance and having been

deceived into believing that payments were owed, the plaintiff began to render monthly

installments to their mortgage servicer in payment of a fictitious and imaginary loan.

Plaintiff also believes based on this (and other) testimony that the alleged Note,

Application, etc. were all fraudulently monetized without the knowledge of the Plaintiff.


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Because of the fraudulent nature of this action, Plaintiff is led to believe that he is still the

original and only holder in due course. Absent any proof or presentment of an

ORIGINAL WET INK SIGNATURE PROMISSORY NOTE OR LOAN CONTRACT,

Defendants have no right to attempt to foreclose upon the Title to the plaintiff's real

property, despite the fact that the plaintiff is a private Banker and the Holder in Due

Course.

30. As a resident of the State of Virginia, Plaintiff believes that Defendants are in direct

violation of the following Virginia codes: 8.5A-109 , 13.1-502, 13.1-503, 55-59.1(B),

26-50, 8.01-428(A)(i), 8.01-32, 8.3A-203, 8.01-28, 6.2-406, 18.2-246.3 (A) and (B),

and 18.2-216. See the following References section for these Virginia codes.

31. By Virginia Code 8.1A-103, Plaintiff now brings forward various UCC violations

pertaining to mail fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, and RICO. In regard to RICO,

Defendants are in direct violation of Section 1962(c) prohibiting a pattern of racketeering

activity and since Plaintiff was indeed injured, Plaintiff has the right to treble damages

and attorney fees under section 1964(c). Defendants are in violation of RICO statutes

evidenced by perpetrating a continuity of schemes of fraud against the Plaintiff and

MANY others as evidenced by Exhibit U and US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District

of New York, Adv.Pro.No. 08-01789 SIPA v. Madoff. The Defendants scheme to

defraud violates mail and wire fraud statutes (18 USC Sections 1341 and 1343) by

mailing incomplete copies of loan documents and making fraudulent statements as to

who the Trustee is or was by making false reference to the Deed of Trust which they

apparently have never seen. In addition, the Hobbs Act applies wherein Defendants are


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using 'color of official right' to attempt to steal Plaintiff's property, and under 'color of

law' conspire to extort property from Plaintiff knowing full well that there is no Note, and

thus no obligation. Plaintiff has indeed lost substantial amounts of money in defense of

Plaintiff's property while Defendants continue their assault and attempt to extort what is

not theirs to begin with.

32. By their own admission, Defendants no longer have (or may have never had) a

complete set of alleged loan documents. See Exhibit R. Also, by their own admission,

(see Exhibit A) HSBC admits that they only have a copy of the alleged note and

nothing else in their own document package (And for the record, this copy is the one

which includes an additional page beyond what the Plaintiff was given originallya

copy which has apparently been altered, leading Plaintiff to believe that any allonges

have been removed prior to this copy being made). When Plaintiff requested ALL

original loan related documents, what should have been received at a minimum would

have been the following: 1) The original loan application with assigned CUSIP number

2) The alleged Note 3) The Deed of Trust 4) Rescission Documents (which were never

received - in violation of 15 USC 1602(u) and Reg Z226.23n48) 5) The required Home

Equity Brochure (also never received, thus violating 15 USC 1637A(e)), or similar and 6)

The GAAP bookkeeping entries showing transfer of funds (i.e. show the true creditor per

15 USC 1602(f) and 15 USC 1638(a)(1).

33. The failure by HSBC to honor this request for information is in direct of violation of

Section 2605(e)(2)(C) of RESPA (see REFERENCES). During the time of the QWR,


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Plaintiff remained in honor by continuing to make payments toward the alleged loan, thus

giving HSBC ample time to respond and correct any errors.

34.Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, before a Commercial Bank or Loan

Company can declare a breach, they must first make a presentment of the Promissory

Note (UCC 3-501) and the presentment must be dishonored (UCC3-502). Then the Bank

or Loan Company must mail a Notice of Dishonor (UCC3-503), however, if the maker of

the Promissory Note or Instrument claims to be the Holder in Due Course the debt is

discharged without recourse pursuant to section (UCC3-601). Tender of payments is

referred to under section (UCC3-603) and any and all alterations to the instrument void

the instrument and the obligation is discharged by cancellation or renunciation under

section (UCC3-604).

35. Pursuant to 15 USC > Chapter 41 >Subchapter I > Part B > 1635 (see

REFERENCES), Plaintiff gave multiple Notice of Rescission efforts during the time

payments were made to HSBC toward the alleged loan. Because the alleged creditor,

HSBC, did not respond within the required 20 days, HSBC now owes back to Plaintiff

ALL monies paid to date and return of property to Plaintiff. Because HSBC never

provided Plaintiff with Rescission documents, pursuant to 1635f, Plaintiff is within

proper time frame to demand enforcement of rescission.

36. Plaintiff believes it to be VERY clear that multiple portions of the alleged loan

documents were actually securitized. Securitization is defined as turning any document

into a financial transaction. Doing so without the document drafter's consent is

considered forgery, altering, obliterating and falsification of a document. It may also be


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considered falsifying evidence. This becomes Uttering Counterfeit Obligations when

transmitted, transferred, securitized or otherwise invested and is in violation of USC

TITLE 18 472;473;474. As the Plaintiff is the creator of ANY of the alleged loan

documents, the Plaintiff, not the Bank, nor the servicers should be making the huge

profits attested to by such experts as Neil Garfield in his well known affidavit regarding

banking activities. In a public document, see Exhibit X, Westpac openly ADMITS that

they have securitized residential mortgages and offer these Special Investment

Vehicles to investors! Their correspondence openly and directly links this Australian

banker to JP Morgan of New York. Plaintiff wonders when the US banks will openly

admit they have securitized loan documents and will try to just as eloquently explain to

the uneducated masses that their actions are legal and acceptable means of doing

business? Will they admit the loans have been long since paid off and that the customers'

signatures and good credit are being used illegally and criminally? Highly unlikely. At

this point in time, Plaintiff will continue research into these and other matters, including

an understanding of how the banks violate IRS regulations as they steal from the people.

37. Plaintiff further believes that Defendants commission of fraud should be investigated

by proper authorities with respect to violation of 15 USC>Chapter 2B>78ff (See

REFERENCES). This code specifically states the penalties for false and misleading

statements along with the failure to file information accordingly. Penalties for Defendants

range from $5,000,000 per individual defendant to $25,000,000 for HSBC Mortgage

Corporation, along with imprisonment for all involved for defrauding Plaintiff and

attempting to steal Plaintiff's house which has long since been paid for and now they


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continue to use Plaintiff's good name and credit to continue making profits for their

criminal enterprises.

REFERENCES

Under Virginia code

8.5A-109. Fraud and forgery.

(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditionsof the letter of credit, but a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the

presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:

(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is demanded by (i) a nominated person who hasgiven value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud, (ii) a confirmer who hashonored its confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter ocredit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of theissuer's or nominated person's deferred obligation that was taken for value and without notice offorgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated person; and

(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presentation in any other case.

(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially fraudulent or that honor ofthe presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a courof competent jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring apresentation or grant similar relief against the issuer or other persons only if the court finds that:

(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft or deferred obligationincurred by the issuer;

(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely affected is adequately protectedagainst loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted;

(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this Commonwealth have bemet; and

(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more likely than not tosucceed under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the person demanding honor does not qualiffor protection under subsection (a) (1).

13.1-502. Unlawful offers and sales.
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It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities, directly or

indirectly,

(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or

(2) To obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or

any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in

the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(3) To engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would

operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

13.1-503. Unlawful advice.

A. It shall be unlawful for any person who receives directly or indirectly anyconsideration from another person primarily for advising such other person as to thevalue of securities or their purchase or sale, whether through the issuance of analyses orreports or otherwise,

1. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud such other person,

2. To engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or wouldoperate as a fraud or deceit upon such other person,

3. Acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or purchaseany security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than such client,knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account of such client,without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of such transaction thecapacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction.The prohibitions of this subdivision shall not apply to any transaction with a customer ofa broker-dealer if such broker-dealer is not acting as an investment advisor in relation to

such transaction, or

4. To engage in dishonest or unethical practices as the Commission may define by rule.

B. In the solicitation of advisory clients, it shall be unlawful for any person to make anyuntrue statement of a material fact, or omit to state a material fact necessary in order tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not


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misleading.

C. Except as may be permitted by rule or order of the Commission, it shall be unlawfulfor any investment advisor to enter into, extend, or renew any investment advisorycontract unless it provides in writing:

1. That the investment advisor shall not be compensated on the basis of a share of capitalgains upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds of the client;

2. That no assignment of the contract may be made by the investment advisor without theconsent of the other party to the contract; and

3. That the investment advisor, if a partnership, shall notify the other party to the contractof any change in the membership of the partnership within a reasonable time after thechange.

D. Subdivision 1 of subsection C of this section shall not prohibit an investment advisorycontract which provides for compensation based upon the total value of a fund averagedover a definite period, or as of definite dates or taken as of a definite date.

E. "Assignment" as used in subdivision 2 of subsection C of this section includes anydirect or indirect transfer or hypothecation of an investment advisory contract by theassignor or of a controlling block of the assignor's outstanding voting securities by asecurity holder of the assignor. If the investment advisory is a partnership, no assignmentof an investment advisory contract is considered to result from the death of withdrawal ofa minority of the members of the investment advisor having only a minority interest inthe business of the investment advisor, or from the admission to the investment advisor of

one or more members who, after admission, will be only a minority of the members andwill have only a minority interest in the business.

F. The Commission may by rule or order adopt exemptions from subdivision 3 ofsubsection A and subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of subsection C of this section where suchexemptions are consistent with the public interest and within the purposes fairly intendedby the policy and provisions of this chapter.

55-59.1. Notices required before sale by trustee to owners, lienors, etc.; if note lost.

A. In addition to the advertisement required by55-59.2the trustee or the party secured

shall give written notice of the time, date and place of any proposed sale in execution of a

deed of trust, which notice shall include either (i) the instrument number or deed book
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and page numbers of the instrument of appointment filed pursuant to55-59, or (ii) said

notice shall include a copy of the executed and notarized appointment of substitute

trustee by personal delivery or by mail to (i) the present owner of the property to be sold

at his last known address as such owner and address appear in the records of the party

secured, (ii) any subordinate lienholder who holds a note against the property secured by

a deed of trust recorded at least 30 days prior to the proposed sale and whose address is

recorded with the deed of trust, (iii) any assignee of such a note secured by a deed of trust

provided the assignment and address of assignee are likewise recorded at least 30 days

prior to the proposed sale, (iv) any condominium unit owners' association which has filed

a lien pursuant to55-79.84, (v) any property owners' association which has filed a lien

pursuant to55-516, and (vi) any proprietary lessees' association which has filed a lien

pursuant to55-472. Written notice shall be given pursuant to clauses (iv), (v) and (vi),

only if the lien is recorded at least 30 days prior to the proposed sale. Mailing of a copy

of the advertisement or a notice containing the same information to the owner by certified

or registered mail no less than 14 days prior to such sale and to lienholders, the property

owners' association or proprietary lessees' association, their assigns and the condominium

unit owners' association, at the address noted in the memorandum of lien, by ordinary

mail no less than 14 days prior to such sale shall be a sufficient compliance with the

requirement of notice. The written notice of proposed sale when given as provided herein

shall be deemed an effective exercise of any right of acceleration contained in such deed

of trust or otherwise possessed by the party secured relative to the indebtedness secured.

The inadvertent failure to give notice as required by this subsection shall not impose

liability on either the trustee or the secured party.
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B. If a note or other evidence of indebtedness secured by a deed of trust is lost or for any

reason cannot be produced and the beneficiary submits to the trustee an affidavit to that

effect, the trustee may nonetheless proceed to sale, provided the beneficiary has given

written notice to the person required to pay the instrument that the instrument is

unavailable and a request for sale will be made of the trustee upon expiration of 14 days

from the date of mailing of the notice. The notice shall be sent by certified mail, return

receipt requested, to the last known address of the person required to pay the instrument

as reflected in the records of the beneficiary and shall include the name and mailing

address of the trustee. The notice shall further advise the person required to pay the

instrument that if he believes he may be subject to a claim by a person other than the

beneficiary to enforce the instrument, he may petition the circuit court of the county or

city where the property or some part thereof lies for an order requiring the beneficiary to

provide adequate protection against any such claim. If deemed appropriate by the court,

the court may condition the sale on a finding that the person required to pay the

instrument is adequately protected against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by

another person to enforce the instrument. Adequate protection may be provided by any

reasonable means. If the trustee proceeds to sale, the fact that the instrument is lost or

cannot be produced shall not affect the authority of the trustee to sell or the validity of the

sale.

C. Failure to comply with the requirements of notice contained in this section shall not

affect the validity of the sale, and a purchaser for value at such sale shall be under no

duty to ascertain whether such notice was validly given.


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D. In the event of postponement of sale, which may be done in the discretion of the

trustee, no new or additional notice need be given pursuant to this section.

8.01-428. Setting aside default judgments; clerical mistakes; independent actions to

relieve party from judgment or proceedings; grounds and time limitations.

A. Default judgments and decrees pro confesso; summary procedure. - Upon motion of

the plaintiff or judgment debtor and after reasonable notice to the opposite party, his

attorney of record or other agent, the court may set aside a judgment by default or a

decree pro confesso upon the following grounds: (i) fraud on the court, (ii) a void

judgment, (iii) on proof of an accord and satisfaction, or (iv) on proof that the defendant

was, at the time of service of process or entry of judgment, a person in the military

service of the United States for purposes of 50 U.S.C. app.502. Such motion on the

ground of fraud on the court shall be made within two years from the date of the

judgment or decree.

B. Clerical mistakes. - Clerical mistakes in all judgments or other parts of the record and

errors therein arising from oversight or from an inadvertent omission may be corrected by

the court at any time on its own initiative or upon the motion of any party and after such

notice, as the court may order. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be

corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the

appeal is pending such mistakes may be corrected with leave of the appellate court.

C. Failure to notify party or counsel of final order. - If counsel, or a party not represented

by counsel, who is not in default in a circuit court is not notified by any means of the


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entry of a final order and the circuit court is satisfied that such lack of notice (i) did not

result from a failure to exercise due diligence on the part of that party and (ii) denied that

party an opportunity to pursue post-trial relief in the circuit court or to file an appeal

therefrom, the circuit court may, within 60 days of the entry of such order, modify,

vacate, or suspend the order or grant the party leave to appeal. Where the circuit court

grants the party leave to appeal, the computation of time for noting and perfecting an

appeal shall run from the entry of such order, and such order shall have no other effect.

D. Other judgments or proceedings. - This section does not limit the power of the court to

entertain at any time an independent action to relieve a party from any judgment or

proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not served with process as provided in

8.01-322, or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.

E. Nothing in this section shall constitute grounds to set aside an otherwise valid default

judgment against a defendant who was not, at the time of service of process or entry of

judgment, a servicemember for purposes of 50 U.S.C. app.502.

8.01-32. Action on lost evidences of debt.

A. A civil action may be maintained on any past-due lost bond, note, contract, openaccount agreement, or other written evidence of debt, provided the plaintiff verifies underoath either in open court or by affidavit that said bond, note, contract, open account

agreement, or other written evidence of debt has been lost or destroyed.

B. Where a true and accurate copy of the written evidence of debt exists, which copy wasproduced in the normal course of business, the court shall accept such copy into evidenceand shall give effect to its terms as if the original had been placed into evidence.

C. In the event of any inconsistency between this section and any applicable provisions of 8.3A-309, the provisions of that section shall control.
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8.3A-203. Transfer of instrument; rights acquired by transfer.

(a) An instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for

the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.

(b) Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in thetransferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as aholder in due course, but the transferee cannot acquire rights of a holder in due course bya transfer, directly or indirectly, from a holder in due course if the transferee engaged infraud or illegality affecting the instrument.

(c) Unless otherwise agreed, if an instrument is transferred for value and the transfereedoes not become a holder because of lack of endorsement by the transferor, the transfereehas a specifically enforceable right to the unqualified endorsement of the transferor, but

negotiation of the instrument does not occur until the endorsement is made.

(d) If a transferor purports to transfer less than the entire instrument, negotiation of theinstrument does not occur. The transferee obtains no rights under this title and has onlythe rights of a partial assignee.

8.01-28. When judgment to be given in action upon contract or note unless defendant

appears and denies claim under oath.

In any action at law on a note or contract, express or implied, for the payment of money,

or unlawful detainer pursuant to55-225or55-248.31for the payment of money or

possession of the premises, or both, if (i) the plaintiff files with his motion for judgment

or civil warrant an affidavit made by himself or his agent, stating therein to the best of the

affiant's belief the amount of the plaintiff's claim, that such amount is justly due, and the

time from which plaintiff claims interest, and (ii) a copy of the affidavit together with a

copy of any account filed with the motion for judgment or warrant and, in actions

pursuant to55-225or55-248.31, proof of required notices is served on the
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defendant as provided in8.01-296at the time a copy of the motion for judgment or

warrant is so served, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a judgment on the affidavit and

statement of account without further evidence unless the defendant either appears and

pleads under oath or files with the court before the return date an affidavit or responsive

pleading denying that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant on the claim.

A denial by the defendant in general district court need not be in writing. The plaintiff or

defendant shall, on motion, be granted a continuance whenever the defendant appears and

pleads. If the defendant's pleading or affidavit admits that the plaintiff is entitled to

recover from the defendant a sum certain less than that stated in the affidavit filed by the

plaintiff, judgment may be taken by the plaintiff for the sum so admitted to be due, and

the case will be tried as to the residue.

6.2-406. (Effective October 1, 2010) Disclosure of terms of mortgage application.

A. Any lender making, or broker arranging, loans secured by a first mortgage or firstdeed of trust on owner occupied residential real estate consisting of one- to four-familydwelling units shall provide, at the time an application for such a loan is submitted by a

loan applicant, to the loan applicant a written statement that:

1. Describes when, if ever, the interest, points, and fees quoted will be locked in;

2. States that all the loan terms not legally locked in are subject to change untilsettlement, which shall be initialed by the loan applicant and lender or broker; and

3. Provides a good faith estimate of the processing time required for the loan. Theestimate shall take into account the time needed for the performance of any localgovernment inspections or other functions necessary to close the loan.

B. The requirements of subsection A shall not apply to any lender making 10 or fewerloans secured by a first mortgage or first deed of trust on such owner occupied residentialreal estate in any 12-month period.


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18.2-246.3. Money laundering; penalties.

A. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to conduct a financial transaction wherethe person knows the property involved in the transaction represents the proceeds of anactivity which is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, another

state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States. Aviolation of this section is punishable by imprisonment of not more than forty years or afine of not more than $500,000 or by both imprisonment and a fine.

B. Any person who, for compensation, converts cash into negotiable instruments orelectronic funds for another, knowing the cash is the proceeds of some form of activitywhich is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, another state orterritory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States, shall beguilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Any second or subsequent violation of this subsectionshall be punishable as a Class 6 felony.

18.2-246.3. Money laundering; penalties.

A. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to conduct a financial transaction wherethe person knows the property involved in the transaction represents the proceeds of anactivity which is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, anotherstate or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States. Aviolation of this section is punishable by imprisonment of not more than forty years or afine of not more than $500,000 or by both imprisonment and a fine.

B. Any person who, for compensation, converts cash into negotiable instruments orelectronic funds for another, knowing the cash is the proceeds of some form of activitywhich is punishable as a felony under the laws of the Commonwealth, another state orterritory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the United States, shall beguilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Any second or subsequent violation of this subsectionshall be punishable as a Class 6 felony.

18.2-216. Untrue, deceptive or misleading advertising, inducements, writings or

documents.


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Any person, firm, corporation or association who, with intent to sell or in anywise

dispose of merchandise, securities, service or anything offered by such person, firm,

corporation or association, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or distribution or

with intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the public in any manner to

enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to acquire title thereto, or any interest

therein, makes, publishes, disseminates, circulates or places before the public, or causes,

directly or indirectly to be made, published, disseminated, circulated or placed before the

public, in a newspaper or other publications, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill,

poster, blueprint, map, bill, tag, label, circular, pamphlet or letter or in any other way, an

advertisement of any sort regarding merchandise, securities, service, land, lot or anything

so offered to the public, which advertisement contains any promise, assertion,

representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, or uses any

other method, device or practice which is fraudulent, deceptive or misleading to induce

the public to enter into any obligation, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

The actions prohibited in this section, shall be construed as including (i) the advertising

in any manner by any person of any goods, wares or merchandise as a bankrupt stock,

receiver's stock or trustee's stock, if such stock contains any goods, wares or merchandise

put therein subsequent to the date of the purchase by such advertiser of such stock, and if

such advertisement of any such stock fail to set forth the fact that such stock contains

other goods, wares or merchandise put therein, subsequent to the date of the purchase by

such advertiser of such stock in type as large as the type used in any other part of such

advertisement, including the caption of the same, it shall be a violation of this section;

and (ii) the use of any writing or document which appears to be, but is not in fact a


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negotiable check, negotiable draft or other negotiable instrument unless the writing

clearly and conspicuously, in at least 14-point bold type, bears the phrase "THIS IS NOT

A CHECK" printed on its face.

8.3A-309. Enforcement of lost, destroyed, or stolen instrument.

(a) A person not in possession of an instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument if (i)

the person was in possession of the instrument and entitled to enforce it when loss of

possession occurred, (ii) the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by the

person or a lawful seizure, and (iii) the person cannot reasonably obtain possession of the

instrument because the instrument was destroyed, its whereabouts cannot be determined,

or it is in the wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person that cannot be found

or is not amenable to service of process.

(b) A person seeking enforcement of an instrument under subsection (a) must prove the

terms of the instrument and the person's right to enforce the instrument. If that proof is

made,8.3A-308 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced

the instrument. The court may not enter judgment in favor of the person seeking

enforcement unless it finds that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately

protected against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce

the instrument. Adequate protection may be provided by any reasonable means.

2605(e)(2)(C) of RESPA states:

(C) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrowerwith a written explanation or clarification that includes--(i) information requested by the borrower or anexplanation of why the information requested is unavailableor cannot be obtained by the servicer; and


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(ii) the name and telephone number of an individualemployed by, or the office or department of, the servicerwho can provide assistance to the borrower.

1635. Right of rescission as to certain transactions

(a) Disclosure of obligors right to rescind

Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit

transaction (including opening or increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan)

in which a security interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is or

will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the

person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the

transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the

transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this

section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this

subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations

of the Board, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously

disclose, in accordance with regulations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction

subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also

provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, appropriate forms for the obligor to

exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.

(b) Return of money or property following rescission

When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this section, he is

not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor,


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including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a

rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return

to the boligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or

otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of

any security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any

property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of

the creditors obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the

creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or

inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the

location of the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If

the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the

obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to

pay for it. The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when

otherwise ordered by a court.

(c) Rebuttable presumption of delivery of required disclosures

Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any

disclosures required under this subchapter by a person to whom information, forms, and a

statement is required to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a

rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.

(d) Modification and waiver of rights


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The Board may, if it finds that such action is necessary in order to permit homeowners to

meet bona fide personal financial emergencies, prescribe regulations authorizing the

modification or waiver of any rights created under this section to the extent and under the

circumstances set forth in those regulations.

(e) Exempted transactions; reapplication of provisions

This section does not apply to

(1) a residential mortgage transaction as defined in section1602(w)of this title;

(2) a transaction which constitutes a refinancing or consolidation (with no new advances)

of the principal balance then due and any accrued and unpaid finance charges of an

existing extension of credit by the same creditor secured by an interest in the same

property;

(3) a transaction in which an agency of a State is the creditor; or

(4) advances under a preexisting open end credit plan if a security interest has already

been retained or acquired and such advances are in accordance with a previously

established credit limit for such plan.

(f) Time limit for exercise of right

An obligors right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of

the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding
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the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other

disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor, except that if

(1) any agency empowered to enforce the provisions of this subchapter institutes a

proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section within three years after the date of

consummation of the transaction,

(2) such agency finds a violation of this section, and

(3) the obligors right to rescind is based in whole or in part on any matter involved in

such proceeding, then the obligors right of rescission shall expire three years after the

date of consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the property, or upon

the expiration of one year following the conclusion of the proceeding, or any judicial

review or period for judicial review thereof, whichever is later.

(g) Additional relief

In any action in which it is determined that a creditor has violated this section, in addition

to rescission the court may award relief under section1640of this title for violations of

this subchapter not relating to the right to rescind.

(h) Limitation on rescission

An obligor shall have no rescission rights arising solely from the form of written notice

used by the creditor to inform the obligor of the rights of the obligor under this section, if

the creditor provided the obligor the appropriate form of written notice published and

adopted by the Board, or a comparable written notice of the rights of the obligor, that was
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properly completed by the creditor, and otherwise complied with all other requirements

of this section regarding notice.

18.2-246.5. Forfeiture of business license or registration upon conviction of sale or

distribution of imitation controlled substance; money laundering.

Any person, firm or corporation holding a license or registration to operate any businessas required by either state or local law shall forfeit such license or registration uponconviction of a violation of (i) 18.2-248relating to an imitation controlled substance or(ii) 18.2-246.3relating to money laundering. Upon a conviction under this section theattorney for the Commonwealth shall notify any appropriate agency.

18.2-172. Forging, uttering, etc., other writings.

If any person forge any writing, other than such as is mentioned in18.2-168and

18.2-170, to the prejudice of another's right, or utter, or attempt to employ as true, such

forged writing, knowing it to be forged, he shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony. Any person

who shall obtain, by any false pretense or token, the signature of another person, to any

such writing, with intent to defraud any other person, shall be deemed guilty of the

forgery thereof, and shall be subject to like punishment.

18.2-178. Obtaining money or signature, etc., by false pretense.

A. If any person obtain, by any false pretense or token, from any person, with intent to

defraud, money, a gift certificate or other property that may be the subject of larceny, he

shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof; or if he obtain, by any false pretense or token,

with such intent, the signature of any person to a writing, the false making whereof would

be forgery, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
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B. Venue for the trial of any person charged with an offense under this section may be in

the county or city in which (i) any act was performed in furtherance of the offense, or (ii)

the person charged with the offense resided at the time of the offense.

6.2-1418. (Effective October 1, 2010) Suspension or revocation of authority.

A. The Commission may suspend or revoke the authority of an association to do business

upon any of the following grounds:

1. Any violation of the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by the

Commission pursuant thereto, or a violation of any other law or regulation applicable to

the conduct of its business;

2. A course of conduct consisting of failure to perform written agreements with

borrowers;

3. Failure to account for funds received or disbursed to the satisfaction of the person

supplying or receiving such funds;

4. Failure to disburse funds in accordance with any agreement connected with, and

promptly upon closing of, a mortgage loan, taking into account any applicable right of

rescission;

5. Conviction of any felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation, or

deceit;


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6. Entry of judgment against such association involving fraud, misrepresentation, or

deceit;

7. Entry of a federal or state administrative order against such association for violation of

any law or regulation applicable to the conduct of its business;

8. Refusal to permit an investigation or examination by the Commission;

9. Failure to pay any fee or assessment imposed by this chapter; or

10. Failure to comply with any order of the Commission.

B. For the purposes of this section, acts of any officer, director, or principal stockholder

shall be deemed acts of the association.

6.2-1624. (Effective October 1, 2010) Civil penalties.

In addition to the authority conferred under 6.2-1619and6.2-1622, the Commissionmay impose a civil penalty not exceeding $2,500 upon any mortgage lender or mortgage

broker required to be licensed under this chapter who it determines, in proceedingscommenced in accordance with the Commission's Rules, has violated any of theprovisions of this chapter or any other law or regulation applicable to the conduct of themortgage lender's or mortgage broker's business. For the purposes of this section, eachseparate violation shall be subject to the civil penalty herein prescribed, and each dayafter the date of notification, excluding Sundays and holidays, as prescribed in 2.2-3300, that an unlicensed person engages in the business or holds himself out to thegeneral public as a mortgage lender or mortgage broker shall constitute a separateviolation.

6.2-1619. (Effective October 1, 2010) Suspension or revocation of license.

A. The Commission may suspend or revoke any license issued under this chapter to a

mortgage lender or mortgage broker upon any of the following grounds:

1. Any ground for denial of a license under this chapter;
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2. Any violation of the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by the

Commission pursuant thereto, or a violation of any other law or regulation applicable to

the conduct of the mortgage lender's or mortgage broker's business;

3. A course of conduct consisting of the failure to perform written agreements with

borrowers;

4. Failure to account for funds received or disbursed to the satisfaction of the person

supplying or receiving such funds;

5. Failure to pay when due reasonable fees to a licensed appraiser for appraisal services

that are (i) requested from the appraiser in writing by the mortgage broker or mortgage

lender or an employee of the mortgage broker or mortgage lender and (ii) performed, in

accordance with the terms of the contract with the appraiser and all regulatory

requirements related to such appraiser and appraisal, by the appraiser in connection with

the origination or closing of a mortgage loan for a customer of the mortgage broker or

mortgage lender;

6. Failure to disburse funds in accordance with any agreement connected with, and

promptly upon closing of, a mortgage loan, taking into account any applicable right of

rescission;

7. Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation or deceit;

8. Entry of a judgment against the licensee involving fraud, misrepresentation or deceit;


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9. Entry of a federal or state administrative order against the licensee for violation of any

law or any regulation applicable to the conduct of his business;


11. Failure to pay any fee or assessment imposed by this chapter; or

12. Failure to comply with any order of the Commission.

B. For the purposes of this section, acts of any officer, director, member, partner, or

principal shall be deemed acts of the licensee.

6.2-1707. (Effective October 1, 2010) Other conditions for mortgage loan originatorlicensing.

In addition to the findings required by 6.2-1706, the Commission shall not issue amortgage loan originator license unless it finds that:

1. The applicant has never had a mortgage loan originator license revoked by anygovernmental authority;

2. The applicant has not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a felonyin a domestic, foreign, or military court (i) during the seven-year period preceding theapplication for licensing and registration; or (ii) at any time preceding such date ofapplication if such felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, breach of trust, or moneylaundering;

3. The applicant has completed the pre-licensing education requirement described in 6.2-1708;

4. The applicant has passed a written test that meets the test requirement described in 6.2-1709; and

5. The applicant has become registered through, and obtained a unique identifier from,the Registry.
http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1706http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1706http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1706http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1708http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1708http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1709http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1709http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1709http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1708http://cgi-bin/legp504.exe%3f000+cod+6.2-1706


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6.2-1716. (Effective October 1, 2010) Suspension or revocation of license.

The Commission may suspend or revoke any license issued under this chapter basedupon:

1. Any ground sufficient for denial of the issuance of a license under this chapter;

2. Any violation of the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by theCommission pursuant thereto, or a violation of any other law or regulation applicable tothe conduct of the licensee's licensed activities;

3. Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit;

4. Entry of a judgment against a licensee involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit;

5. Entry of a federal or state administrative order against a licensee for violation of any

law or any regulation applicable to the conduct of his licensed activities;


7. Failure to pay any fee or assessment imposed by this chapter;

8. Failure to comply with any order of the Commission; or

9. Failure to maintain registration with, or a unique identifier from, the Registry.

Note: Remainder of this page is blank

6.2-1719. (Effective October 1, 2010) Civil penalties.

The Commission may impose a civil penalty not exceeding $2,500 upon any individualrequired to be licensed under this chapter who it determines, in proceedings commencedin accordance with the Commission's Rules, has violated any of the provisions of thischapter or any other law or regulation applicable to the licensee's activities. For thepurposes of this section, each separate violation shall be subject to the civil penalty hereinprescribed, and each day that an unlicensed individual acts as or holds himself out to thegeneral public as, a mortgage loan originator shall constitute a separate violation.

US Code Title 15>Chapter 2B>78ff

(a) Willful violations; false and misleading statements

Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section78dd1of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made
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unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter, or anyperson who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in anyapplication, report, or document required to be filed under this chapter or any rule orregulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement asprovided in subsection (d) of section78oof this title, or by any self-regulatory

organization in connection with an application for membership or participation therein orto become associated with a member thereof which statement was false or misleadingwith respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than$5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except that when such personis a person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may beimposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for theviolation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule orregulation.

(b) Failure to file information, documents, or reports

Any issuer which fails to file information, documents, or reports required to be filedunder subsection (d) of section78oof this title or any rule or regulation thereunder shallforfeit to the United States the sum of $100 for each and every day such failure to fileshall continue. Such forfeiture, which shall be in lieu of any criminal penalty for suchfailure to file which might be deemed to arise under subsection (a) of this section, shallbe payable into the Treasury of the United States and shall be recoverable in a civil suit inthe name of the United States.

(c) Violations by issuers, officers, directors, stockholders, employees, or agents ofissuers

(1)

(A) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section78dd1of this title shall befined not more than $2,000,000.

(B) Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section78dd1of this title shall besubject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by theCommission.

(2)

(A) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stockholder acting on behalfof such issuer, who willfully violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 78dd1of this titleshall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

(B) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stockholder acting on behalfof such issuer, who violates subsection (a) or (g) of section78dd1of this title shall besubject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by theCommission.
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(3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) upon any officer, director, employee,agent, or stockholder of an issuer, such fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, bysuch issuer.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE MATERIAL:

FORECLOSURE ACTIONS AND CASES LAWFULLY DISMISSED (NOT

LETTING BANK FORECLOSE WITHOUT LAWFUL VALIDATION AND

PRODUCTION) BY THE COURTS DUE TO BANK'S FAILURE TO VALIDATE

& PRODUCE AS STIPULATED BY LAW AND COMMITTED BANK FRAUD

AGAINST THE BORROWER

FROM THE BAR ASSOCIATION'S OFFICIAL WEB SITE :... this Court has the

responsibility to assure itself that the foreclosure plaintiffs have standing and that subject

matter jurisdiction requirements are met at the time the complaint is filed. Even without

the concerns raised by the documents the plaintiffs have filed, there is reason to question

the existence of standing and the jurisdictional amount. Over 30 cases are covered by

the BAR at: http://www.abanet.org/rpte/publications/ereport/2008/3/Ohioforeclosures.pdf


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A national bank has no power to lend its credit to any person or corporation . . . Bowen

v. Needles Nat. Bank, 94 F 925 36 CCA 553, certiorari denied in 20 S.Ct 1024, 176 US

682, 44 LED 637.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Taylor - Mayer, J., Supreme Court, Suffolk County /

9/07

American Brokers Conduit v. ZAMALLOA - Judge SCHACK 28Jan2008

Aurora Loan Services v. MACPHERSON - Judge FARNETI 1 1Mar2008

A bank may not lend its credit to another even though such a transaction turns out to

have been of benefit to the bank, and in support of this a list of cases might be cited,

which-would look like a catalog of ships. [Emphasis added] Norton Grocery Co. v.

Peoples Nat. Bank, 144 SE 505. 151 Va 195.


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In the federal courts, it is well established that a national bank has not powerto lend its

credit to another by becoming surety, indorser, or guarantor for him.' Farmers and

Miners Bank v. Bluefield Nat 'l Bank, 11 F 2d 83, 271 U.S. 669.

Bank of New York v. SINGH - Judge KURTZ 14Dec2007

Bank of New York v. TORRES - Judge COSTELLO 11Mar2008

Bank of New York v. OROSCO - Judge SCHACK 19Nov2007

Citi Mortgage Inc. v. BROWN - Judge FARNETI 13Mar2008

The doctrine of ultra vires is a most powerful weapon to keep private corporations

within their legitimate spheres and to punish them for violations of their corporate

charters, and it probably is not invoked too often. Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National

Bank, 103 Wis 125, 79 NW 229. American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW

430.


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"It has been settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under federal Law being

limited in its powers and capacity, cannot lend its credit by guaranteeing the debts of

another. All such contracts entered into by its officers are ultra vires . . ." Howard &

Foster Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Union, 133 SC 202, 130 SE 759(1926).

. . . checks, drafts, money orders, and bank notes are not lawful money of the United

States ... State v. Neilon, 73 Pac 324, 43 Ore 168.

American Brokers Conduit v. ZAMALLOA - Judge SCHACK 11 Sep2007

Countrywide Mortgage v. BERLIUK - Judge COSTELLO 1 3Mar2008

Deutsche Bank v. Barnes-Judgment Entry

Deutsche Bank v. Barnes-Withdrawal of Objections and Motion to Dismiss

Deutsche Bank v. ALEMANY Judge COSTELLO 07Jan2008

Deutsche Bank v. Benjamin CRUZJudge KURTZ 21May2008


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Deutsche Bank v. Yobanna CRUZ - Judge KURTZ 21May2008

Deutsche Bank v. CABAROY - Judge COSTELLO 02Apr2008

Deutsche Bank v. CASTELLANOS / 2007NYSlipOp50978U/- Judge SCHACK

11May2007

Deutsche Bank v. CASTELLANOS/ 2008NYSlipOp50033U/ - Judge SCHACK 14Jan

2008

HSBC v. Valentin - Judge SCHACK calls them liars and dismisses WITH prejudice **

Deutsche Bank v. CLOUDEN / 2007NYSlipOp5 1 767U/ Judge SCHACK 1 8Sep2007

Deutsche Bank v. EZAGUI - Judge SCHACK 21Dec2007

Deutsche Bank v. GRANT - Judge SCHACK 25Apr2008

Deutsche Bank v. HARRIS - Judge SCHACK 05Feb2008


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Deutsche Bank v. LaCrosse, Cede, DTC Complaint

Deutsche Bank v. NICHOLLS - Judge KURTZ 21May2008

Deutsche Bank v. RYAN - Judge KURTZ 29Jan2008

Deutsche Bank v. SAMPSON - Judge KURTZ 16Jan2008

Deutsche v. Marche - Order to Show Cause to VACATE Judgment of Foreclosure11

June2009

GMAC Mortgage LLC v. MATTHEWS - Judge KURTZ 10Jan2008

GMAC Mortgage LLC v. SERAFINE - Judge COSTELLO 08Jan2008

HSBC Bank USA NA v. CIPRIANI Judge COSTELLO 08Jan2008

HSBC Bank USA NA v. JACK - Judge COSTELLO 02Apr2008


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IndyMac Bank FSB v. RODNEY-ROSS - Judge KURTZ 15Jan2008

LaSalleBank NA v. CHARLEUS - Judge KURTZ 03Jan2008

LaSalleBank NA v. SMALLS - Judge KURTZ 03Jan2008

PHH Mortgage Corp v. BARBER - Judge KURTZ 15Jan2008

Property Asset Management v. HUAYTA 05Dec2007

Rivera, In Re Services LLC v. SATTAR / 2007NYSlipOp5 1 895U/ - Judge SCHACK

09Oct2007

USBank NA v. AUGUSTE - Judge KURTZ 27Nov2007

USBank NA v. GRANT - Judge KURTZ 14Dec2007

USBank NA v. ROUNDTREE - Judge BURKE 11Oct2007

USBank NA v. VILLARUEL - Judge KURTZ 01Feb2008

Wells Fargo Bank NA v. HAMPTON - Judge KURTZ 03 Jan2008


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Wells Fargo, Litton Loan v. Farmer WITH PREJUDICE Judge Schack June2008

Wells Fargo v. Reyes WITH PREJUDICE, Fraud on Court & Sanctions Judge Schack

June2008

Deutsche Bank v. Peabody Judge Nolan (Regulation Z)

Indymac Bank,FSB v. Boyd - Schack J. January 2009

Indymac Bank, FSB v. Bethley - Schack, J. February 2009 ( The tale of many hats)

LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn. v Ahearn - Appellate Division, Third Department (Pro Se)

NEW JERSEY COURT DISMISSES FORECLOSURE FILED BY DEUTSCHE BANK

FOR FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE NOTE

Whittiker v. Deutsche (MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS

MOTIONS TO DISMISS) Whittiker (PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND


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RECOMMENDATION) Whittiker (DEFENDANT WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS

CO., LPAS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION) Whittiker (RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEARSONS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT ITS MOTION TO DISMISS)

Novastar v. Snyder * (lack of standing) Snyder (motion to amend w/prejudice) Snyder

(response to amend)

Washington Mutual v. City of Cleveland (WAMU's motion to dismiss)

2008-Ohio-1177; DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Parsons (SJ Reversed for lack of standing)

Everhome v. Rowland

Deutsche - Class Action (RICO) Bank of New York v. TORRES - Judge


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COSTELLO 1 1Mar2008

37.

Deutsche Bank Answe