Countries with Rapid Population Growth and Resource Constraints

Countries with Rapid Population Growth and Resource Constraints: Issues of Food, Agriculture, and Development NIKOS ALEXANDRATOS This is an electronic version of an article published in Population and Development Review. Complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Population and Development Review, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal’s website at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/pdr or http://www.blackwell-synergy.com. The contents of this article draw largely on the work of the author commissioned by the Global Perspective Studies Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization for the updating and extending to 2050 of the FAO study World Agriculture: Towards 2015/2030, An FAO Perspective (Bruinsma, J. (ed.), 2003). http://www.fao.org/es/ESD/gstudies.htm The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of, and should not be attributed to, FAO. Useful comments by J. Bruinsma and J. Schmidhuber are gratefully acknowledged.

http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/pdr

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/

http://www.fao.org/es/ESD/gstudies.htm

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(2) : 237–258 ( JUNE 2005) 237

Countries with RapidPopulation Growth andResource Constraints:Issues of Food, Agriculture,and Development

NIKOS ALEXANDRATOS

THE LATEST UNITED NATIONS population projections to 2050 (UN 2005) indi-cate that the deceleration of world population growth may be even fasterthan thought only a few years earlier. The medium variant projection putsworld population for 2050 at 9.1 billion. By that time, the annual additionsto global population will be 34 million persons—down from the current 76million annually—and the growth rate will have fallen to 0.38 percent perannum, one-third of its present level. Longer-term projections to 2300 (UN2004) suggest that the peak of world population may be reached in 2075,at 9.2 billion, to be followed by a slight decline and then by slow growthagain to reach just under 9 billion by 2300 (medium variant projection).1

The authors of the probabilistic projections to 2100 of the International In-stitute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) state that “there is around an85 percent chance that the world’s population will stop growing before theend of the century” (Lutz et al. 2001: 543). The median of their projectionsreaches a peak of 9.0 billion around 2070, followed by a slow decrease lead-ing to a population of 8.4 billion in 2100. Their latest book on the subject issuggestively titled The End of World Population Growth in the 21st Century (Lutzet al. 2004a).

The realization that the world is probably on a fairly smooth path oftransition toward a near-stationary population in the not-too-distant fu-ture influences the debate on the interrelationships between population,development, and sustainability. The notion that the trend toward an ever-growing population, the so-called population explosion, threatens our wel-fare and the sustainability of our existence (or, at least, the prospect that allpeople can achieve “acceptable” living standards) seems to be losing cur-rency among the public. The focus of the debate has become the implica-

PDR 31.2 Alexandratos-dn-EPC-sp 6/2/05, 9:18 AM237

238 R A P I D P O P U L A T I O N G R O W T H A N D R E S O U R C E C O N S T R A I N T S

tions of demographic trends toward below-replacement fertility and popu-lation implosion. These implications are perceived as major emerging prob-lems in, mainly, the developed countries, some developing countries (in-cluding China), and eventually also everywhere (The Economist 2003;Longman 2004). Naturally, the demographic slowdown and the eventualpeak of 9 billion will not be of great comfort to those who hold that thecurrent world population is already unsustainably large, being grossly abovethe level of 2 to 3 billion considered to be in conformity with the require-ments for long-term sustainability (Pimentel et al. 1999).

Leaving this larger theme aside, we may ask whether these global dem-ographic prospects mean that the “population explosion”–related issues per-taining to food and agriculture are losing much of their relevance. In par-ticular, will the global demographic slowdown and the eventual attainmentof zero world population growth imply that the classical Malthusian con-cern (that population growth will outstrip the potential of agriculture toincrease food production, and its corollary—that food insecurity is causedpredominantly by production constraints) will no longer be relevant?

The short answer is that these issues retain their full relevance, andthis for a number of reasons. Of particular importance is the prospect thatseveral countries, many of them with inadequate food consumption levels,will continue for some time to have rapidly growing populations.2 A num-ber of these countries face the prospect that their present problems of lowfood consumption levels and significant incidence of undernourishment maypersist for a long time. For example, Niger, a country with scant agricul-tural resources barely sufficient to support its year 2000 population of 12million, but with high dependence on agriculture for its food supplies, em-ployment, and income, is projected to grow to 50 million in 2050.3 In likemanner, Ethiopia’s population is expected to grow from 69 million to 170million, Uganda’s from 24 million to 127 million, Yemen’s from 18 millionto 59 million, and so on for a number of other countries.

From the standpoint of global welfare, these problems related to popu-lation growth will continue to surpass those emanating from the fertilitydeclines to below replacement level in many developed countries. To copewith those declines is largely within the capabilities of the countries affected.And, of course, one must also consider the benefits accruing to the coun-tries experiencing these declines and to the world as a whole—for example,in the form of reduced environmental impact and less urban congestion(Sachs 2004).

It follows that in the debate on world food issues, the traditionalproductionist paradigm (how to promote further growth in production andthe associated focus on agricultural research and technology) will continueto reign supreme in a significant part of the world, even in the context ofthe decelerating rate of growth in the global demand for food projected in


N I K O S A L E X A N D R A T O S 239

several studies (Alexandratos 1999; Bruinsma 2003). This conclusion standsin contrast to the shift in paradigm in recent years that emphasizes foodquality, food safety, health and environmental impacts of food production,consumption, and trade (Lang 2003), while downplaying the traditional em-phasis on agricultural research and policies aimed at increasing productiv-ity and production. Perhaps a more apt shift in paradigm would be fromthe global to the local, a point not sufficiently emphasized in the literatureon the population–food–environment nexus, albeit with notable exceptions(e.g., Daily et al. 1998).

Several of the countries still experiencing rapid demographic growthhave poor agricultural resources or have resources that are difficult to ex-ploit, whether because of remoteness from population centers, lack of in-frastructure, high incidence of disease, or other circumstances. Their econo-mies are also highly dependent on agriculture, high percentages of theirgross domestic product and exports come from agriculture, and high pro-portions of their population depend on agriculture for a living. This combi-nation could condemn such countries to persistent poverty if future popu-lations were to become as large as projected and urbanization or emigrationto other countries were to provide outlets no larger than foreseen in thedemographic projections. Gallup and Sachs (2000) consider that countriesin the tropical zones have limited potential for productively absorbing morelabor in agriculture. There is a possibility, therefore, that in some of thesecountries the Malthusian specter could endure at the local level, no matterthat for the world as a whole population growth may fall to zero and sur-plus food production potential may exist in other parts of the world. Thesecountries have few alternatives but to continue to depend on further ex-ploitation of agricultural resources for their food security and survival aswell as for their overall development.4

There are 19 countries with “high” projected population growth ratesin the period 2000–2050. “High” is defined here as a growth rate of 1.8 per-cent per annum or higher, that is, at least twice that of the developing-coun-try average for the same 50-year period. Their main demographic variablesare shown in Table 1, and those pertaining to food security and other socio-economic characteristics are shown in Table 2. With the possible exception ofMauritania, they all have serious problems of food insecurity, as evidencedby their low per capita apparent food consumption and high prevalence ofundernourishment.5 Their rapid demographic growth can represent a seriousobstacle to improvements in food security. The historical experience of thepast four decades shows that 13 out of the 19 “high population growth” coun-tries never achieved a national average of apparent food consumption ex-ceeding 2,500 kcal/person/day, a level totally inadequate as a national aver-age.6 Eight of them never exceeded 2,200 kcal (see Table 2). In some of thesecountries the paucity of agricultural resources does not augur well for the


TA

BL

E 1

Dem

ogr

aph

ic c

har

acte

rist

ics

of

cou

ntr

ies

wit

h h

igh

po

pu

lati

on

gro

wth

rat

es i

n 2

000–

50

An

nu

alA

nn

ual

Net

An

nu

al

gro

wth

Pea

kgr

ow

thm

igra

-gr

owth

rate

po

pu

lati

on

rate

tio

nra

te

Po

pu

lati

on

(00

0)(%

)R

ura

lP

erce

nt

(%)

rate

bP

opu

lati

on (

000)

(%)

2000

–Y

ear

of

po

pu

lati

on

(00

0)ru

ral

2000

–20

45–

from

th

e 2004 R

evis

ion

20

00

–C

ou

ntr

ya

1950

2000

2050

50(0

00)

pea

k19

5020

0020

3020

0030

501

95

02

00

02

05

05

0

Afg

han

ista

n8

,15

12

1,3

91

69

,51

72

.36

90

,43

32

09

57

,67

91

7,0

03

30

,36

97

91

.93

–0.0

68,

151

23,7

3997

,324

2.82

Ben

in2,0

46

6,2

22

15

,60

21

.84

18

,78

52

09

51

,94

43

,62

15

,13

85

81

.17

–0.2

02,

005

7,19

822

,123

2.25

Bu

rkin

a F

aso

3,9

60

11

,90

54

2,3

73

2.5

46

6,2

21

21

15

3,8

08

9,6

30

19

,76

28

12

.40

–0.3

23,

861

11,2

8939

,093

2.48

Bu

run

di

2,4

56

6,2

67

19

,45

92

.27

27

,83

62

11

02

,40

65

,78

71

0,7

83

92

2.0

7–0

.21

2,45

66,

487

25,8

122.

76C

had

2,6

58

7,8

61

25

,35

92

.34

34

,61

92

10

52

,55

56

,01

01

1,0

62

76

2.0

30

.00

2,65

88,

217

31,4

972.

69C

on

go D

R1

2,1

84

48

,57

11

51

,64

42

.28

20

3,3

41

21

00

9,8

57

35

,52

16

7,5

66

73

2.1

4–0

.10

12,1

8450

,056

177,

271

2.53

Eth

iop

ia1

8,4

34

65

,59

01

70

,98

71

.92

22

2,3

26

21

05

17

,58

65

3,1

46

87

,62

48

11

.67

–0.0

418

,434

68,5

3817

0,19

01.

82M

adag

asca

r4

,23

01

5,9

70

46

,29

22

.13

61

,68

92

10

53

,90

01

1,2

61

17

,42

57

11

.46

0.0

04,

230

16,1

9143

,508

1.98

Mal

i3

,52

01

1,9

04

45

,99

82

.70

70

,82

32

11

03

,22

17

,92

41

3,2

91

67

1.7

2–0

.66

3,44

911

,647

41,9

762.

56N

iger

2,5

00

10

,74

25

3,0

37

3.1

91

03

,24

12

12

02

,37

98

,60

41

8,4

08

80

2.5

40

.00

2,61

211

,781

50,1

562.

90Som

alia

2,2

64

8,7

20

39,6

69

3.0

36

7,6

90

21

15

1,9

76

6,3

65

13

,36

67

32

.47

–0.1

32,

264

7,01

121

,329

2.23

Uga

nd

a5

,21

02

3,4

87

10

3,2

48

2.9

61

70

,01

42

11

55

,05

02

0,0

01

44

,19

08

52

.64

–0.0

25,

054

24,3

1112

6,95

03.

31

An

gola

4,1

31

12

,38

64

3,1

31

2.5

06

3,2

27

21

05

3,8

18

8,6

42

15

,15

37

01

.87

–0.0

34,

148

13,8

3843

,501

2.29

Co

ngo

80

83

,44

71

0,6

43

2.2

51

4,5

90

21

05

55

81

,04

51

,60

33

01

.43

–0.0

280

83,

439

13,7

212.

77E

ritr

ea1,1

40

3,7

12

10

,53

92

.09

12

,92

72

09

51

,07

32

,97

34

,97

48

01

.72

0.0

01,

140

3,55

711

,229

2.30

Iraq

5,1

58

23

,22

45

7,9

32

1.8

36

8,3

65

20

90

3,3

47

7,4

53

11

,23

23

21

.37

–0.1

15,

340

25,0

6963

,693

1.86

Lib

eria

82

42

,94

39

,82

12

.41

13

,52

32

10

07

17

1,6

05

3,3

64

55

2.4

70

.00

824

3,06

610

,653

2.49

Mau

rita

nia

825

2,6

45

7,4

97

2.0

89

,75

42

10

08

05

1,1

26

1,1

81

43

0.1

60

.00

825

2,64

47,

497

2.08

Yem

en4

,31

61

8,0

17

84

,38

53

.09

14

7,2

17

21

15

4,0

66

13

,81

53

3,9

25

77

2.9

9–0

.25

4,31

617

,936

59,4

542.

40

NO

TE

: “H

igh

” is

def

ined

her

e as

a g

row

th r

ate

of

1.8

per

cen

t per

an

nu

m o

r h

igh

er, t

hat

is, a

t le

ast

twic

e th

at o

f th

e dev

elopin

g-co

un

try

aver

age

for

the

sam

e 5

0-y

ear

per

iod

.a C

ou

ntr

ies

are

list

ed in

tw

o b

lock

s. T

he

firs

t 12 c

ou

ntr

ies

hav

e a

larg

e sh

are

(ove

r 30 p

erce

nt)

of

GD

P o

rigi

nat

ing

in a

gric

ult

ure

. Th

e re

mai

nin

g 7

co

un

trie

s h

ave

less

th

an 3

0 p

erce

nt

of

thei

rG

DP f

rom

agr

icu

ltu

re (

see

text)

.b P

erso

ns

per

th

ou

san

d/y

ear.

SO

UR

CE

S: C

ols

. 1–4

, 12 (

UN

2003a)

; Cols

. 5–6

(U

N 2

004);

Cols

. 7–1

1 (

UN

2003b)

; Cols

. 13–1

6 (

UN

2005).


TA

BL

E 2

So

cio

eco

no

mic

ch

arac

teri

stic

s o

f co

un

trie

s w

ith

hig

h p

op

ula

tio

n g

row

th r

ates

in

200

0–50

Agr

ic.

Fo

od

co

nsu

mp

tio

n 1

961–

2002

Un

der

-C

erea

lssh

are

(kca

l/p

erso

n/d

ay)c

nu

trit

ion

dse

lf-s

uff

icie

ncy

e (%

)H

DI

2002

g

in G

DP

bA

vg.

(% o

f p

op

.)E

xte

rnal

Dev

elo

p.

Co

un

try

a(%

)L

ow

est

Hig

hes

t20

00/0

220

00/0

279

/81

89/9

199

/01

deb

tfV

alu

eR

ank

LD

Ch

po

ten

tial

i

Afg

han

ista

nn

a1,6

23

2,6

78

1,6

30

70

98

93

67

Sn

an

aye

sB

enin

37

1,7

17

2,5

48

2,5

20

15

81

74

89

S0.4

21

161

yes

CB

urk

ina

Fas

o40

1,5

28

2,4

62

2,4

10

19

94

87

89

S0.3

02

175

yes

LB

uru

ndi

51

1,6

29

2,1

81

1,6

40

68

88

91

84

S0.3

39

173

yes

LC

had

39

1,5

68

2,3

38

2,1

50

34

87

86

90

S0.3

79

167

yes

LC

on

go, D

R56

1,5

99

2,2

77

1,6

30

71

68

80

75

S0.3

65

168

yes

LE

thio

pia

52

1,5

10

1,9

17

1,8

40

46

na

na

85

S0

.35

91

70

yes

LM

adag

asca

r30

1,9

88

2,5

13

2,0

60

37

88

95

87

S0.4

69

150

yes

CM

ali

42

1,6

28

2,2

93

2,2

00

29

90

98

93

M0.3

26

174

yes

LN

iger

40

1,6

59

2,1

82

2,1

30

34

108

93

90

S0.2

92

176

yes

LSom

alia

na

1,4

89

2,0

10

1,6

00

71

53

68

59

Sn

an

aye

sC

Uga

nda

37

2,0

61

2,4

35

2,3

60

19

94

96

94

M0.4

93

146

yes

L

An

gola

71,7

26

2,1

63

2,0

40

40

52

49

50

S0.3

81

166

yes

RC

on

go7

1,7

82

2,1

62

2,0

90

37

17

83

S0.4

94

144

RE

ritr

ea19

1,4

83

1,5

85

1,5

20

73

na

na

40

L0.4

39

156

yes

CIr

aqn

a1,8

38

3,5

13

2,1

50

27

42

41

27

Sn

an

aLib

eria

na

1,9

00

2,6

00

1,9

90

46

61

48

35

Sn

an

aye

sC

Mau

rita

nia

22

1,7

70

2,7

75

2,7

80

10

22

31

28

S0.4

65

152

yes

RY

emen

16

1,7

45

2,2

10

2,0

40

36

63

32

21

L0.4

82

149

yes

na

= n

ot

avai

labl

e.N

OTE

: “H

igh

” is

def

ined

her

e as

a g

row

th r

ate

of

1.8

per

cen

t per

an

nu

m o

r h

igh

er, t

hat

is, a

t le

ast

twic

e th

at o

f th

e dev

elopin

g-co

un

try

aver

age

for

the

sam

e 5

0-y

ear

per

iod

.a C

ou

ntr

ies

are

list

ed in

tw

o b

lock

s. T

he

firs

t 12 c

ou

ntr

ies

hav

e a

larg

e sh

are

(ove

r 30 p

erce

nt)

of

GD

P o

rigi

nat

ing

in a

gric

ult

ure

. Th

e re

mai

nin

g 7

co

un

trie

s h

ave

less

th

an 3

0 p

erce

nt

of

thei

rG

DP f

rom

agr

icu

ltu

re (

see

text)

.b A

gric

ult

ura

l GD

P a

s %

of

tota

l GD

P, a

vera

ge 1

999–2

001. S

ou

rce:

Worl

d B

ank (

2003b)

.c S

ou

rce:

FA

O, F

AO

STA

T (

htt

p:/

/apps.

fao.o

rg)

Updat

ed 2

7 A

ugu

st 2

004. E

ritr

ea, p

erio

d 1

993–0

2, E

thio

pia

=E

thio

pia

+E

ritr

ea f

or

per

iod

bef

ore

19

93

. Dat

a fo

r A

fgh

anis

tan

, So

mal

ia, I

raq

: per

iod

1961–2

000 a

nd a

vera

ge 1

998–2

000 f

rom

ear

lier

FA

OSTA

T d

ata.

dSou

rce:

FA

O (

2004).

Afg

han

ista

n, S

om

alia

, Ira

q d

ata

(un

der

nou

rish

men

t an

d c

alori

e av

erag

es)

are

for

1998–2

000 f

rom

FA

O (

2002).

e Th

e per

cen

tage

of

tota

l con

sum

pti

on

cove

red b

y dom

esti

c pro

du

ctio

n.

f S =

sev

erel

y in

deb

ted, M

= m

oder

atel

y in

deb

ted

, L =

less

indeb

ted. S

ou

rce:

Worl

d B

ank (

2003c)

.g H

um

an D

evel

opm

ent

Index

(H

DI)

fro

m U

ND

P (

2004)—

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

of

177 c

ou

ntr

ies

ran

gin

g fr

om

bes

t (H

DI=

0.9

56—

Norw

ay)

to w

ors

t (H

DI=

0.2

73

—S

ierr

a L

eon

e).

hLea

st D

evel

oped

Cou

ntr

y, S

ou

rce:

UN

CTA

D (

20

04).

i UN

IDO

(2004, T

ab. 1

.1)

clas

sifi

cati

on

of

Afr

ican

cou

ntr

ies

by d

om

inan

t ch

arac

teri

stic

in t

erm

s of

pote

nti

al o

pport

un

itie

s in

th

e m

ediu

m t

erm

. R =

res

ou

rce-

rich

(co

un

trie

s re

ceiv

ing

larg

e re

nts

from

ex

port

of

ore

s, m

iner

als,

an

d f

uel

s; a

gric

ult

ura

l res

ou

rces

not

con

sider

ed),

C =

coas

tal,

L =

lan

dlo

cked

.



prospect that agriculture can play the role expected of it and that even thepresent inadequate levels of nutrition can be maintained. For example, in astudy of Ethiopia with projections to 2030, Lutz et al. (2004b: 208) concludethat, even under their optimistic assumptions, the food security situation isbound to deteriorate further, and “it seems that the population–environment–agriculture nexus in Ethiopia has fallen below the threshold of sustainability.”

One may be justified in doubting whether the very large populationincreases and ever-growing rural populations projected for these countriescan be sustained. This suggests that the assumptions underlying the popu-lation projections (rates of change in fertility, mortality, and, particularly,migration—both rural-to-urban and external) may have to be revisited.7

There is a clear need for integrating the analytical assumptions underlyingthe demographic projections with further variables reflecting the constraintsfaced by many of these countries in supporting populations that are mul-tiples of their present population size. As a first step in this direction, I singleout the countries with high population growth rates and examine their ag-ricultural resources and other socioeconomic characteristics. The focus ison signaling prima facie incompatibilities between the demographic projec-tions and agricultural resource potentials, where the latter are consideredto be of paramount importance for development.

Characteristics of agriculture-dependent countrieswith high rates of population growth

The populations of the 19 countries in Table 1 are projected to increase by afactor of at least 2.5 (Ethiopia, Iraq) and up to just over fivefold (Uganda)in the five decades to 2050. Naturally, not all of them face the prospect ofhaving to depend predominantly on their own agriculture for developmentand improving food security. Scarcity of agricultural resources does not byitself prejudge a country’s potential to make progress. Examples abound ofcountries with limited agricultural resources and satisfactory food consump-tion and nutrition levels—notably Japan,8 but also many developing coun-tries with mineral wealth. The latter include several countries in the NearEast and North Africa, where oil has provided the basis for much of thegrowth in incomes that stimulated the demand for food while also provid-ing the means for financing quantum jumps in food imports to meet thatdemand. Yemen, another country with scarce agricultural resources andpopulation growth rates among the highest in the world, relied in goodmeasure on emigrant remittances (16.1 percent of GDP in 2001: World Bank2003c) to finance massive increases of food imports.

For the 12 of these 19 countries shown in the upper part of Table 1,however, a prima facie case can be made that, at this stage in their develop-ment, they have few options but to continue depending predominantly on



their own agriculture for increasing incomes and food supplies and creatinga basis for their wider economic development. The criterion for separatingthem from the rest is that their economic dependence on agriculture ex-ceeds 30 percent of GDP. The other seven countries have much lower de-pendence on agriculture, in most cases because they are rich in other natu-ral resources.

These 12 countries exhibit the following characteristics:1. They have low or very low food consumption per capita and high

incidence of undernourishment.2. They depend predominantly on domestic production to satisfy their

food consumption,9 and this is likely to continue as most of them have highexternal debt burdens and high dependence on foreign aid for financing theirimports. These factors would seem to preclude easy access to commerciallyimported food in the foreseeable future.

3. They all rank low on the Human Development Index (HDI) classifi-cation, a composite index combining levels of income, life expectancy, andliteracy.

4. They do not derive significant rents from nonagricultural natural re-sources such as ores, minerals, and fuels.10

5. Most of them are landlocked—an important handicap when assess-ing development prospects and potentials (UNIDO 2004).

6. All of them are in the Least Developed Country category as definedby the United Nations.

7. They have shares of agriculture in gross domestic product in the rangefrom 30 to 56 percent.

8. High proportions of their population (58–91 percent) are classified asrural. Moreover, their rural populations are projected to continue growing,more than doubling in several countries between 2000 and 2030 (rural–urbanprojections beyond 2030 not available).11

These two last factors suggest that, barring unforeseen developments(e.g., discovery of valuable mineral resources and/or successful exploitationof existing ones), the countries’ overall development and poverty reductionwill depend predominantly on their rural—mainly agricultural—develop-ment. Therefore I next address the question whether their agricultural re-sources are sufficient to underpin production growth rates that would beconsonant with improvements in food security in the light of projected rapidpopulation growth.

Agriculture-related constraints to attainingfood security

A first glimpse can be obtained by examining the countries’ land and waterresources that have potential for producing crops, including under both



rainfed and irrigated conditions. The estimates of such resources come fromthe Agroecological Zones study of FAO and IIASA (Fischer et al. 2002) and,for the irrigation potentials, from FAO (Bruinsma 2003: chapter 4). Therelevant data for these 12 countries are given in Table 3. Most of the coun-tries are far from having reached their agricultural frontiers, at least whenthese are viewed at the national level. It is, however, important to notethat national-level estimates indicating no significant resource scarcities cancoexist with severe scarcities at the local level that act as effective constraintsto development. Such local scarcities are not easily overcome by the avail-ability of resources in other parts of the country.

Among the countries with plentiful land resources in relation to theirpresent and projected populations are Chad and the Democratic Republicof Congo (Congo DR). The latter country has some 190 million ha (or 81percent of its land area) classified as suitable in varying degrees for growingrainfed crops, although a good part of this area is under forest (closed for-ests cover 50 percent of the country’s total land area12). But even if we ex-cluded land under closed forest as well as land located in protected areas,the country still has some 58 million ha of land suitable for rainfed cere-als—mainly rice and maize—at intermediate technology and even more forroots and tubers.13 Of this land apparently only some 6 million ha is pres-ently used in crop production, of which some 2 million ha is used for cas-sava and other roots, some 1.5 million ha for maize, and some 0.5 millionha each for rice and groundnuts. These findings suggest that the solution toCongo DR’s severe food security problems is not likely to be limited by agri-cultural resource constraints, even as its population more than triples to177 million by 2050. In time-honored fashion, population growth, if per-sistently accompanied by poor opportunities for alternative avenues of de-velopment, will result in agricultural expansion where the opportunity fordoing so exists. Needless to say, the country’s considerable mineral resourcesoffer alternative development opportunities that would lessen overwhelm-ing dependence on agriculture.14 Chad is in a similar class from the stand-point of its land/inhabitant ratio,15 while its oil resources offer significantalternative development opportunities (Republic of Chad 2003).

The outlook is different for other countries with high population growthrates and high dependence on agriculture. Burundi ranks lowest in termsof the land/inhabitant ratio. Niger also has very low potential for agricul-tural expansion, a situation that will rapidly deteriorate if the projected in-crease of its population by 2050 were to materialize and alternative outletsto lessening demographic pressure on agriculture (e.g., emigration) werenot found. The country has a land area suitable for rainfed farming of onlysome 12 million ha (10 percent of its total land area), of which some 40percent is classified as marginally suitable.16 The statistics on Niger’s land incrop production indicate that nearly all of this area is currently farmed—indeed overexploited, with consequent increased risk of degradation.


TA

BL

E 3

Lan

d/w

ater

res

ou

rces

in

12

agri

cult

ure

-dep

end

ent

cou

ntr

ies

wit

h h

igh

po

pu

lati

on

gro

wth

rat

es i

n 2

000–

50

Are

a w

ith

cro

p p

rod

uct

ion

po

ten

tial

(00

0 h

a)b

Pre

sen

t u

se(h

arv

este

dL

and

wit

hT

ota

l ra

infe

dar

ea),

all

Rai

nfe

dc

irri

gati

on

po

ten

tial

dp

lus

irri

gati

on

cro

ps,

av

erag

eV

ery

Med

ium

Mar

gin

ally

Of

wh

ich

Pre

sen

tly

Ha/

inh

abit

ante

1999

/200

1C

ou

ntr

ya

To

tal

suit

able

Su

itab

lesu

itab

lesu

itab

leT

ota

lin

des

ert

irri

gate

d00

0 h

a20

0020

50(0

00 h

a)

Afg

han

ista

n3,6

02

26

213

979

2,3

84

3,3

00

3,0

00

2,3

86

6,6

02

0.2

80.0

73,0

62

f

Ben

in9,9

18

5,6

07

3,5

36

650

125

300

012

9,9

18

1.3

80.4

52,2

55

Bu

rkin

a Fas

o20,6

21

8,3

39

7,1

88

3,7

44

1,3

50

164

025

20,6

21

1.8

30.5

33,7

07

Bu

run

di

1,2

17

217

251

271

478

185

074

1,2

17

0.1

90.0

51,0

92

Ch

ad35,8

90

19,5

83

6,8

95

5,4

66

3,9

46

835

020

35,8

90

4.3

71.1

43,0

50

Con

go D

R187,9

34

68,3

35

58,8

47

45,4

03

15,3

49

4,0

00

011

187,9

34

3.7

51.0

66,0

98

Eth

iopia

40,4

87

11,8

14

12,4

90

10,4

31

5,7

52

3,6

37

19

190

40,5

06

0.5

90.2

49,4

83

Mad

agas

car

33,7

02

12,0

08

9,8

24

7,5

55

4,3

15

1,5

00

01,0

90

33,7

02

2.0

80.7

72,7

78

Mal

i27,3

28

9,6

24

8,4

42

4,8

43

4,4

19

560

0250

27,3

28

2.3

50.6

53,6

22

Nig

er11,5

57

893

2,3

29

3,9

81

4,3

54

270

40

66

11,5

97

0.9

80.2

311,1

06

Som

alia

3,9

91

16

296

1,0

78

2,6

01

240

30

200

4,0

21

0.5

70.1

9703

f

Uga

nda

13,9

35

5,2

90

4,5

90

2,7

95

1,2

60

202

09

13,9

35

0.5

70.1

16,2

94

NO

TE

: “H

igh

” is

def

ined

her

e as

a g

row

th r

ate

of

1.8

per

cen

t per

an

nu

m o

r h

igh

er, t

hat

is, a

t le

ast

twic

e th

at o

f th

e dev

elopin

g-co

un

try

aver

age

for

the

sam

e 5

0-y

ear

per

iod

.a C

ou

ntr

ies

list

ed h

ave

a la

rge

shar

e (o

ver

30 p

erce

nt)

of

GD

P o

rigi

nat

ing

in a

gric

ult

ure

(se

e te

xt)

.b P

ote

nti

al a

rea

suit

able

for

any

crop, i

ncl

udin

g la

nd u

nder

clo

sed f

ore

st a

nd/o

r in

pro

tect

ed a

reas

.c S

ou

rce:

Fis

cher

et

al. (

2002),

det

aile

d t

able

s.dSou

rce:

Bru

insm

a (2

003),

det

aile

d w

ork

shee

ts.

e Com

pu

ted u

sin

g popu

lati

on

fro

m U

N (

2005).

f Dat

a fo

r 1997/9

9; d

ata

for

late

r ye

ars

not

avai

labl

e.



Niger’s scarce and dwindling agricultural resources and harsh agro-ecological environment suggest that it will be extremely difficult for localagriculture to provide food, employment, and incomes for such a large popu-lation and also stimulate overall development. Yet alternative developmentoptions that would significantly reduce dependence on agriculture are noteasily available, a situation aptly recognized in the country’s poverty-re-duction strategy.17 Niger’s uranium-producing sector played a role in rais-ing the pace of development in the 1970s, but then export prices collapsedand, with agriculture shocked by recurrent droughts, development wentinto reverse.18 Niger is classified by the World Bank in the category of “Low-Income, Severely Indebted” countries (World Bank 2003d: 298). It is amongthe ten poorest countries in the world in terms of per capita income in pur-chasing power parity dollars (World Bank 2003b), and it is classified next-to-last out of 177 countries included in the Human Development Index(UNDP 2004). The country’s dependence on foreign aid is high: such aidaccounts for 13 percent of its gross national income and finances some 50percent of its imports (World Bank 2003b).

The indicator of agricultural land per inhabitant in Table 3 is far froma satisfactory measure of agricultural potential and can distort countryrankings. This is because land (accompanied by climatic attributes) is a het-erogeneous resource: a hectare of land in one country is not the same as ahectare in another country in terms of production potential. This holds evenfor lands classified under the same denomination used in Table 3 as con-cerns suitability for growing rainfed crops. For example, what is suitableland for rainfed maize in Ethiopia (4.5 million ha at a potential yield of 4.7tons/ha under intermediate technology) is not as productive as the suitablemaize land in Mali (7 million ha, potential yield 5.6 tons/ha under the sametechnology). This is the case for two reasons: (a) the FAO/IIASA study evalu-ates land suitability in any given country in relation to that country’s cli-matic characteristics, with the consequence that identical land qualities (soil,terrain) can have widely differing production potentials depending on cli-matic conditions (thermal regimes, daylight length, rainfall); and (b) con-solidation of the results of the land suitability evaluations into four suitabil-ity classes is too coarse to permit comparability even among countries havingidentical climates.

A more apt indicator is needed if we are to use agricultural resourcepotentials as a proximate yardstick for assessing the compatibility betweenthe demographic projections for the countries in question and the produc-tion potential of their agricultural resources. The closest we can come tosuch an estimate is to express the land and water endowments of each coun-try as potential production of the major food crops at some future date. Thecereals group (wheat, coarse grains, and rice in milled form), comprisingfairly homogeneous food crops (grains), lends itself to this role of yardstick.



Cereals are by far the most important source of food in most of these coun-tries (e.g., Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), though by nomeans in all (e.g., in Benin, Burundi, and Uganda the group roots/tubers/plantains/bananas predominates). Table 4 shows the resulting estimates ofpotential cereals production in 2050 (total and per capita) on two assump-tions: (a) the proportion of total land suitable for crop production (Table 4,col. 1) that is devoted to cereals will be the same as currently, and (b) aver-age yields in 2050 will be double those of today.

To ascertain how credible these assumptions may be, Table 4 also showsthe evolution of these three variables (cereals area, yield, per capita pro-duction) over the last four decades (ten-year averages are used to smooththe wide annual fluctuations typical in countries with predominantly rainfedfarming and high rainfall variability). In the ten countries with data, yieldsnearly doubled in only two of them (Benin, Burkina Faso), while they grewlittle or stagnated in seven others and declined in Niger. Therefore, an as-sumed doubling over the next 50 years is a fairly optimistic assumption,although well within the realm of technical feasibility on the basis of pres-ently known technology (see below). With respect to land that could beused for cereal production, the theoretical potential appears to be large insome countries (Congo DR, Mali, Madagascar, and Chad), fairly substantialin others (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ethiopia), and virtually nonexistent inothers (Niger and Burundi).

The end result is that even under the optimistic assumptions usedhere, four countries would be unable to maintain in 2050 the per capitaproduction they achieve today (Afghanistan, Burundi, Niger, and Uganda).For Afghanistan and Niger this inability represents a serious threat to foodsecurity given the prominence of cereals in their diets (70–75 percent ofcalories). It could be of less importance in Burundi and Uganda, wherecereals account for only 20–25 percent of calories, with much of the restcoming from cassava, sweet potatoes, plantains, and bananas. In contrast,the other eight countries have potential for increased per capita produc-tion, which in some cases (Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Madagascar) iswell above any conceivable per capita consumption they may have in 2050.The significant production potential presumably existing in countries withendemic food insecurity and with largely semi-arid agriculture subject tothe vagaries of weather (e.g., Ethiopia) comes as a surprise. This outcomejustifies a closer look at the data and assumptions being used to evaluateproduction potentials.

Concerning yields, the “optimistic” levels we assume for 2050 are wellwithin the realm of those “achievable” with presently known technologiesand crop varieties. The achievable yields are those generated by the cropproduction models used to evaluate the land suitability potentials in theFAO/IIASA study, taking into account all the agroecological parameters and



alternative input and land management practices. For example, the study’sachievable rainfed cereal yields in Chad range from 2.2 t/ha on 24 millionha (low technology variant) to 7.6 t/ha on 30 million ha (high technologyvariant). These figures are well above my “optimistic” assumptions in Table4 (yield of 1.2 t/ha on 21 million ha). For Ethiopia, the range is from 1.7 t/ha on 32 million ha to 5.6 t/ha on 24 million ha. In this case the figure of2.3 t/ha on 31 million ha I use in Table 4 is within the range.

Naturally, the fact that several countries have failed in the past to raiseland productivity does not imply that they cannot do so in the future. Yieldgrowth has been the mainstay of agricultural progress, resulting in improvedfood security in most countries that have made such progress, particularlyin those that operated under significant land constraints (e.g., India). How-ever, supportive policies, particularly those that promoted the generationand diffusion of improved technologies (e.g., modern varieties) and policiesor other conditions (e.g., well-functioning markets) that provided economicincentives for their adoption seem to have been at the root of such achieve-ments. And, of course, a key prerequisite was the prevalence of agroecologi-cal conditions (e.g., potential for expanding irrigation) that permitted theexploitation of the genetic potential of improved varieties resulting from ag-ricultural research.

In the absence of strong proactive policies and agroecological potentials,it is uncertain whether some form of spontaneous or endogenous “Boserupeffect” of sustainable intensification19 would play a major role in raising landproductivity at rates commensurate with the challenge posed by fast-grow-ing populations. The evidence, particularly from the literature concerned withresource degradation effects and loss of soil fertility associated with growingpopulation pressure in rural areas, is mixed. Empirical research suggests moreoften than not that a host of other factors—including infrastructure develop-ment, market access conditions, and supportive policies—are instrumental indetermining the extent to which growing population pressure will be associ-ated with progress or failure in the quest for sustainable increases in landproductivity (Pender 1999; Zaal and Oostendorp 2002).

Johnson (2000) spoke of a “political Boserup effect” that provides abridge between the notions of endogenous intensification and policy-sup-ported intensification. He suggested that increases in population densitiesinduce governments to give higher priority to agricultural research, the re-sults of which then lead to improved agricultural productivity. Evenson(2004) has attempted to test this hypothesis and found generally positivecorrelations between rural population densities and investments in plantbreeding in national agricultural research systems. His reported findings forsub-Saharan Africa refer to the region as a whole, however. It is difficult,therefore, to surmise whether they would apply equally, or at all, to theagroecological conditions of most countries examined here, given the con-siderable obstacles faced in generating yield-raising genetic improvements


TA

BL

E 4

Cer

eals

pro

du

ctio

n p

ote

nti

al i

n 2

050

in 1

2 ag

ricu

ltu

re-d

epen

den

t co

un

trie

s w

ith

hig

h p

op

ula

tio

n g

row

th r

ates

in

2000

–50

Po

ten

tial

are

aP

ote

nti

al c

erea

l p

rod

uct

ion

His

tori

cal

dat

a (t

en-y

ear

aver

ages

, ric

e in

mil

led

fo

rm)f

(000

ha)

2050

(ri

ce i

n m

ille

d f

orm

)C

erea

l p

rod

uct

ion

Are

a h

arv

este

d i

n

To

tal

% i

nP

rod

uct

ion

per

cap

ita

(kg)

Cer

eal

yie

lds

(kg/

ha)

cere

als

(000

ha)

(ad

-ce

re-

Are

aY

ield

eM

illi

on

Kg/

61–

70–

80–

93–

61–

70–

80–

93–

61–

70–

80–

93–

just

ed)b

alsc

(000

ha)

kg/

ha

ton

sh

ead

7080

9002

7080

9002

7080

9002

Co

un

try

a[1

][2

][3

]=[1

]*[2

]d[4

]=2*

[14]

[5]=

[3]*

[4]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

Afg

han

ista

n6,5

96

0.8

84,8

68

2,6

14

12.7

131

275

260

190

169

1,3

07

2,6

86

Ben

in8

,13

60

.39

3,1

53

2,0

62

6.5

29

41

16

10

41

13

14

05

42

68

17

66

1,0

31

52

84

72

60

37

95

Bu

rkin

a Fas

o20,3

46

0.7

916,1

58

1,7

37

28.1

718

194

167

193

226

487

509

631

869

1,9

73

2,0

27

2,4

16

2,8

94

Bu

run

di

1,2

17

0.1

82

25

2,5

00

0.6

22

46

48

51

41

99

81

,08

11

,15

31

,25

01

48

16

72

17

20

3C

had

33,6

77

0.6

22

0,9

79

1,2

11

25.4

807

215

137

105

140

637

530

585

606

1,1

41

1,0

65

921

1,6

90

Con

go D

R116,8

31

0.3

439,7

55

1,4

53

57.8

326

27

29

33

32

657

684

741

727

744

1,0

18

1,4

54

2,0

51

Eth

iopia

39,1

30

0.8

031,1

12

2,2

88

71.2

418

166

135

124

128

732

933

1,1

49

1,1

44

6,2

62

5,1

02

4,8

75

7,0

11

Mad

agas

car

32,5

30

0.5

116,4

87

2,6

93

44.4

1,0

21

200

180

151

125

1,2

01

1,1

94

1,2

26

1,3

47

1,0

36

1,2

12

1,3

05

1,3

81

Mal

i26,1

25

0.7

720,0

38

1,7

33

34.7

827

200

158

192

197

720

727

855

867

1,4

04

1,3

85

1,8

20

2,5

34

Nig

er10,6

98

0.6

87,2

90

677

4.9

98

329

265

262

249

496

413

372

338

2,4

38

3,1

33

4,7

03

7,2

98

So

mal

ia3

,84

20

.73

2,8

08

93

62

.61

23

65

47

74

38

46

85

13

Uga

nda

13,8

29

0.2

23,0

12

2,9

66

8.9

70

139

133

84

90

1,0

06

1,2

35

1,3

97

1,4

83

1,1

33

1,1

84

901

1,3

36

NO

TE

: “H

igh

” is

def

ined

her

e as

a g

row

th r

ate

of

1.8

per

cen

t per

an

nu

m o

r h

igh

er, t

hat

is, a

t le

ast

twic

e th

at o

f th

e dev

elopin

g-co

un

try

aver

age

for

the

sam

e 5

0-y

ear

per

iod

.a C

ou

ntr

ies

list

ed h

ave

a la

rge

shar

e (o

ver

30 p

erce

nt)

of

GD

P o

rigi

nat

ing

in a

gric

ult

ure

(se

e te

xt)

.b A

rea

of

Tab

le 3

(C

ol. 9

) ad

just

ed (

on

th

e ba

sis

of

dat

a fr

om

Fis

cher

et

al. 2

002)

to e

xcl

ude

lan

d s

uit

able

for

rain

fed c

rops

that

is u

nd

er c

lose

d f

ore

st a

nd

in n

on

–fo

rest

-pro

tect

ed a

reas

.A

dju

stm

ent

affe

cts

sign

ific

antl

y on

ly t

he

dat

a fo

r C

on

go D

R (

–38%

) an

d B

enin

(–1

8%

).c P

roport

ion

of

tota

l har

vest

ed la

nd c

urr

entl

y dev

ote

d t

o c

erea

ls (

aver

. 2000–0

3),

ass

um

ed t

o h

old

als

o in

2050.

dSu

bjec

t to

con

stra

int:

Cer

eals

are

a in

2050 £

are

a w

ith

pote

nti

al f

or

cere

als

pro

du

ctio

n u

nder

inte

rmed

iate

tec

hn

olo

gy p

lus

irri

gabl

e d

eser

t la

nd

. Co

nst

rain

t bi

nd

ing

on

ly in

Afg

han

ista

n. A

ll t

he

irri

gabl

e des

ert

area

is a

ssu

med

to b

e su

itab

le f

or

cere

als.

Pro

du

ctio

n/c

apit

a fo

r 2050 c

om

pu

ted u

sin

g th

e pro

ject

ed p

opu

lati

on

s fr

om

UN

(2

00

5).

e 2050 y

ield

is a

ssu

med

to b

e dou

ble

the

aver

age

of

the

dec

ade

1993–2

002 (

ten

-yea

r av

erag

es u

sed t

o s

mooth

wid

e an

nu

al f

luct

uat

ion

s).

f For

Afg

han

ista

n a

nd S

om

alia

his

tori

cal c

erea

ls a

rea,

yie

lds,

an

d %

of

tota

l are

a in

cer

eals

are

for

97/9

9; p

er c

apit

a pro

du

ctio

n o

f ce

real

s is

fo

r 6

9/7

1, 7

9/8

1, 8

9/9

1, 9

7/9

9.



appropriate for dryland farming in areas of often low and erratic rainfall.No wonder that crops suitable for these areas are often termed “orphancrops” to denote the neglect they have received from agricultural researchsystems. This is not to deny that properly focused investments in plant breed-ing have the potential of underpinning significant improvements in foodsecurity even in disadvantaged areas. The experience of Nigeria and Ghanain raising food consumption levels following the diffusion of improved high-yielding cassava cultivars is instructive (FAO 2000). In parallel, the poten-tial of modern biotechnology to overcome agroecological constraints is wellrecognized (e.g., Lipton 1999).

Concerning land, serious reservations have been expressed that theland area classified in the FAO/IIASA study as having rainfed crop produc-tion potential (even after subtracting areas under forest and human settle-ments) is overestimated and/or that it may not be capable of being put incultivation in the foreseeable future. Young (1999) considers that there issystematic overestimation of land with agricultural potential but not yetunder cultivation. Perhaps more serious factors are land accessibility (lackof infrastructure, etc.), incidence of disease, and socio-political factors, asthe great difficulties with settlement and transmigration schemes have dem-onstrated in Ethiopia (The Economist 2004) and elsewhere (e.g., in Indone-sia: Cohen 2000). In Ethiopia, the widespread cultivation of marginally suit-able and drought-prone areas and the recurrent food shortages even inbumper crop years20 would lead one to attribute the shortage principally tosevere land shortages at the national level. Yet, “In the lowlands, there arelarge unsettled tracts of land that can be developed.… These are regionsthat lack basic infrastructural facilities and pose serious health hazards” (Fed-eral Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2002). As already noted, severe landscarcities at the local level are not easily overcome by the availability ofresources in other parts of the country.

Discussion

Demographic projections for some of the countries examined here presagegrowing difficulties in combating poverty and food insecurity because ofthe limited development potential offered by their agricultural resource en-dowments. Underlying the presumed incompatibility between demographicdestiny and agricultural resources is the notion that, for low-income coun-tries with high dependence on agriculture, it is a sine qua non that agricul-ture be a prime mover in their overall development. How valid is this no-tion? I have noted that a good deal of consensus in the developmentliterature lends broad support to it. It has been reaffirmed most recently inthe United Nations report on the Millennium Development Goals: “Almostevery successful development experience has been based on a Green Revo-



lution at an early stage” (UN Millennium Project 2005: 32).21 However, theissue of the agricultural resource potentials that would underpin such a rolefor agriculture is not always treated as an integral part of the underlyinganalyses. I concluded that, at least in some countries with high demographicgrowth, there is a prima facie case for thinking that resource scarcities couldwell represent serious obstacles to agriculture’s playing such a role.

We must also consider the possibility that the paradigm of the role ofagriculture as a prime mover in development may not be universally appli-cable. Sachs (1997) considers that the paradigm applies predominantly totemperate zone countries and that agriculture-led growth is a rarity in thetropics. This seems to contradict the earlier statement of the MillenniumProject quoted in the previous paragraph. Moreover, there are several ex-amples of agricultural sectors being dynamic components of successful de-velopment in countries located partly or wholly in the tropics: for example,palm oil and rubber in Malaysia; or coffee, sugarcane, soybeans, and live-stock in Brazil—or, in any case, being dynamic components of agriculture:for example, coffee in Vietnam or cotton in Mali. In a later article, Gallupand Sachs (2000: 735) elaborate on the geographical disadvantages of thetropics in relation to agriculture: soil limitations in the humid tropics, mois-ture limitations in the arid ones, climatic disadvantages for photosynthesisand heavy disease and pest loads in general. The authors recognize the suit-ability of the tropics for perennials and tree crops, but do not consider theseto be food staples, with the possible exception of bananas. However, sev-eral tropical perennial oil crops are important food staples, for example oilpalm and coconut palm.22 Gallup and Sachs refer to the development oflowland high-yielding varieties of rice in Asia as a major exception. I wouldadd that some tropical root crops—for example, cassava—are certainly staplesand have benefited from genetic improvements (see Nweke et al. 2002).

In any case, agriculture’s role in development depends on its potentialto produce incomes rather than only food staples. Some tree cash crops canfill that role. The problem with some of these tropical cash-cum-export cropsis that they have limited market expansion potential: for example, coffee andcocoa are mostly consumed in the industrial countries with limited growthpotential because of their nearly stagnant population and the relatively highconsumption levels already attained. In contrast, palm oil has become a starperformer in world markets (and in the agriculture of countries like Malaysiaand Indonesia) precisely because of the rapidly growing demand in other de-veloping countries. Roughly the same applies to the sharp growth of soybeanexports from Brazil, though in this case the demand for protein-rich animalfeeds (soybean meal) has also been a prime mover. But for the commoditieswith limited expansion potential, the developing exporting countries vie formarket share, with the more efficient ones (e.g., Brazil for sugar; Brazil andVietnam for coffee) elbowing out the less efficient and generally poorer ones.



In the process, oversupply and catastrophic price declines in world marketsoften occur, aided, in the case of sugar, by heavy protectionism in the indus-trial countries.

Location in the tropics is only one of several factors associated withadverse geographical circumstances that are increasingly cited as handicapsto development (see Sachs et al. 2004). Being landlocked is another factorrecently used by UNIDO to rank African countries according to develop-ment potential (see Table 2). Another location-specific factor of particularrelevance to many of the countries examined here is the expectation that“the frequency of drought is likely to continue increasing in tropical Af-rica’’ (UN Millennium Project 2005: 262). And some countries in sub-Sa-haran Africa, though not generally the ones examined here, are underpopu-lated in the sense that population is too thinly spread throughout rural areasto permit efficient infrastructure development.

If for some of the countries identified here one sees little promise foran agriculture-led development strategy (without implying that agricultureshould in any way be neglected), the natural question to ask is what onecan say about their development prospects. The interested reader will findthe latest thinking on development strategies in the recent reports of theUN Millennium Project (2005). Such thinking applies, of course, to all coun-tries that have failed to embark on a sustained development path, what-ever their demographic outlook and resource constraints. It is well acceptedthat the dominant obstacles to development are embedded in the socioeco-nomic, political, and policy spheres as well as in the initial conditions ofabject poverty, rather than in scarcities of natural resources. Nevertheless,the few countries identified here as having high dependence on agricultureand rapidly mounting population pressure on scarce agricultural resourcesface additional constraints. The growing attention given to socioeconomicand related factors does not make the resource-related constraints any lessimportant, at least not at this stage of development of the countries we ex-amined here.

It is possible that future changes in key demographic variables—fertil-ity, life expectancy, and international migration—may deviate from the as-sumed paths. The least desirable outcome would be for the assumed im-provements in life expectancy not to be fully realized if economicdevelopment were further impeded. Rather more certain is that pressuresfavoring international migration will mount, including for cross-border mi-gration or the wider case of the temporary movement of people to supplylabor services. This could justify upward revision of the net migration ratesin the projections (Table 1).

It is also possible that rural-to-urban migration pressures will be muchstronger than visualized in the urbanization projections. Rural poverty tendsto be transformed massively into urban poverty when circumstances dete-



riorate in rural areas. This could be the case under the relentless demo-graphic pressure that would be expected to build in the rural areas of someof the countries examined. And, as a result, the poverty and food insecurityproblem would become much more visible. The need for remedial actionwould correspondingly grow more urgent and be moved up on the agendain the international development effort. At the same time, the concentra-tion of people in urban areas would make interventions more feasible com-pared with steps required if the populations in need were to be dispersedwidely over large areas lacking infrastructure.

The growing agricultural resource scarcities in a number of the coun-tries with high population growth are only one of many factors contribut-ing to the persistence of food insecurity. Of greater importance is the pros-pect that a continued slow pace of development and/or occasional reverseswill continue to affect countries with high rates of poverty. Suffice it to notethe very low growth rate in per capita income (1.6 percent per annum)foreseen at least through 2015 in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (WorldBank 2005: Table 1.3). Although this growth rate would be an improve-ment over the dismal record of falling incomes in the past, it would still befar from sufficient to substantially reduce rates of poverty. Even when na-tional income growth is fairly high, there is no guarantee that it will trans-late, at least not in the short to medium term, into improved food consump-tion for the poor. The failure thus far of rapid economic growth in India(home to a quarter of the world’s undernourished) to be associated withany significant improvements in per capita food consumption is instructivein this regard (Shariff and Malik 1999; Meenakshi and Vishwanathan 2003).

The possible adverse prospects for development and food security, as-sociated with the massive increases projected for the populations of someof the countries examined here, will probably continue to unfold in thecontext of an ever-improving global food security situation. Rising propor-tions of the world’s population will have incomes sufficient to fully satisfytheir nutritional needs (with consequent growing prevalence of diet-relatedhealth problems, e.g. those related to obesity). The classic food insecurityproblem will become smaller (including, eventually, slowly falling absolutenumbers undernourished) and sharply more local—hence, in principle, alsoeasier to address.



The contents of this article draw largely on thework of the author commissioned by the Glo-bal Perspective Studies Unit of the Food andAgriculture Organization for the updating andextending to 2050 of the FAO study World Ag-riculture: Towards 2015/30, an FAO Perspective(Bruinsma 2003). The views expressed are theauthor’s and do not necessarily reflect thoseof, and should not be attributed to, FAO. Use-ful comments by J. Bruinsma and J. Schmid-huber are gratefully acknowledged. Food andagriculture data used are from FAO’s Faostat«http://apps.fao.org/», except when otherwiseindicated.

1 World population data for 2000 and2050 and derived growth rates used in this ar-ticle are from the just-released (in summaryform) 2004 Revision of the United NationsPopulation Prospects (UN 2005). They are shownin the last four columns of Table 1. However,the projections to 2300 are an extension of the2050 projections from the 2002 Revision of theUN Population Prospects (UN 2003a). Therefore,the peak population values shown in Table 1(Col. 5) are compatible with those for 2050 ofthe 2002 Revision (Col. 3) but may or maynot be compatible with the latest ones of the2004 Revision shown in Col. 15. Other pos-sible incompatibilities between the latest sum-mary population projections and other vari-ables used in this article are signaled insubsequent endnotes.

2 Other reasons include the likely con-tinuation of shifts in the structure of consump-tion toward more livestock products follow-ing growth in incomes and urbanization. Suchstructural change will continue to influence thetotal volume of demand, even if per capitacalorie intakes from all foods remain more orless constant. For example, substituting in foodconsumption any given amount of calories de-rived from the direct consumption of grain byan equal amount of calories from chicken meatwould reduce direct food grain consumptionby one unit and increase indirect—feed—con-sumption of grain by 4 to 6 units. Several low-income countries are far from having begunthis process of structural change. However, sev-eral formerly low-income countries have doneso, foremost among them China, and their de-

mand for meat, coarse grains, and protein feeds(e.g., soybeans) is becoming a major drivingforce of world agriculture (Bruinsma 2003:chapter 3; Alexandratos et al. 2000).

3 It would be interesting to know whatthe growth rates of the different countrieswould be at the time world population is ex-pected to peak around 2075. However, thedemographic projections to 2300 (UN 2004)show country-level populations beyond 2050only for 2100, 2150, 2200, 2250, and 2300.

4 See ILO (2004: chapter 3) for the pri-mary role of agriculture in the developmentof such countries. According to the WorldBank, “In poor developing countries with largeagricultural sectors, growth led by the agricul-tural sector has a powerful effect in pullingpeople out of poverty, especially when the in-comes and assets of the rural sector are some-what equal” (i.e., somewhat equally distrib-uted—World Bank 2003a: 105). Also, “Atpresent, the development consensus is that astrong performing agricultural sector is funda-mental for overall economic growth” (Stringerand Pingali 2004: 2).

5 The historical data on food consumptionper capita and undernourishment shown inTable 2 reflect, inter alia, the data from the 2002UN Revision. The 2004 Revision changed notonly the projections but also the historical popu-lation estimates in some countries (e.g., Niger’spopulation for 2000 was 10,742 thousand inthe 2002 Revision but is 11,781 thousand inthe 2004 Revision). This could imply that,ceteris paribus, Niger’s per capita food consump-tion was lower and the incidence of undernour-ishment higher than shown in Table 2.

6 I use the qualifier “apparent” to indicatethat the data do not come from dietary sur-veys or from household budget surveys butrather from FAO’s Food Balance Sheet methodfor the measurement of human consumptionof food commodities at the retail level: i.e.,Apparent food consumption = production +imports + beginning stocks – exports – non-food industrial uses – feed – seed – waste (post-harvest to retail) – ending stocks. As such thedata may overestimate food actually ingested,e.g., because they are inclusive of post-retail

Notes



and household waste. They may also under-state actual consumption when they do notaccount for foods not often found in nationalstatistics (e.g., wild meat, honey, etc.).

7 In the 2004 Revision the projected 2050populations of Yemen and Somalia are sub-stantially below those of the 2002 Revision.However, the opposite is the case for othercountries in Table 1, e.g. Afghanistan, Burundi,and Uganda.

8 Japan imports 77 percent of the cerealsit consumes; it would be importing even morebut for the high protection of its rice-produc-ing sector.

9 Their cereals self-sufficiency ratios (thepercentage of total consumption covered bydomestic production) are in the range of 75–94 percent, except for Afghanistan and Soma-lia. In contrast, the other seven countries inTable 2 (those with less than 30 percent of GDPfrom agriculture) rely heavily on imported ce-reals (cereals self-sufficiency ratios range from3 percent to 50 percent).

10 UNIDO (2004) classification. Perhapscountries such as Congo DR and Chad shouldnot be in that class, at least in terms of poten-tial significant rents from nonagricultural natu-ral resources (see below).

11 The rural population figures are com-patible with the total population figures in theUN’s 2002 Revision.

12 Closed forests are forested areas thatare more than 40 percent covered with treesexceeding 5 meters in height (definition from:«http://www.unep.org/geo/geo3/english/185.htm»).

13 The areas suitable for individual cropsare, of course, overlapping—so the total areacannot be obtained by simply adding the ar-eas suitable for different crops. The method forgenerating estimates for the total area is ex-plained in Fischer et al. (2002) and Bruinsma(2003: box 4.1).

14 “The Democratic Republic of the Congocan be primarily defined by its virtually land-locked status, rather than by its potential natu-ral-resource wealth, the justification for this be-ing that that wealth has never been realized”(UNIDO 2004: 8). Congo DR’s plentiful land re-sources, a good part of which are suitable forsugarcane, could play a major developmental

role if sugarcane were to become a major bio-mass feedstock for producing ethanol for homeuse and for export as an alternative to fossil-based liquid fuels for automobiles. This is alreadybeing done in Brazil, where ethanol productionfrom sugarcane tends to become economicallyremunerative for oil prices exceeding US$35–$40/barrel (Lebre la Rovere 2004). Environ-mental considerations also favor this option, ascredits for reducing greenhouse gas emissionsunder the Kyoto Protocol may eventually trans-late to monetary incentives for sugarcane-basedbiofuel production.

15 “Almost one third (30 percent) ofChad, 39 million ha, could be used to growcrops. However, each year, only approximately2.2 million ha (5.6 percent) are used for thatpurpose. Some 5.6 million ha could be irrigatedbut today only 7,000 ha are. In other words,the country’s farmland resources are hugelyunderexploited” (Republic of Chad 2003: chap-ter 3).

16 Niger’s national data give potential ar-able land as 15 million ha (Government ofNiger 2002: 77). “As a result of drastic climaticconstraints, intense population pressures, re-duced soil fertility, and difficult access to in-puts and farming equipment, today the acre-age under cultivation has doubled, farminghas shifted toward ‘marginal’ lands in theNorth, and pasturelands have shrunk. Deg-radation of natural resources such as water,farmland, pastureland and forests has alsogone a long way toward making populationsmore vulnerable. All these factors have ledto the near-pervasive impoverishment of landcapital, the dwindling or disappearance of fal-low land, overexploitation of wood resourcesand overgrazing, which have accelerated theprocess of desertification” (Government ofNiger 2002: 36).

17 “The high concentration of the popu-lation of Niger in the rural areas (85 percentof the population lives in the rural areas, andat least 80 percent of that number is involvedin agriculture) shows clearly that the rural sec-tor must constitute the main growth enginein the short and medium term. Indeed, the ag-ricultural sector alone accounts for 40 percentof the GDP of Niger. Agriculture must there-fore serve as a springboard for economicgrowth in the rural areas” (Government ofNiger 2002: 60).



18 “The well-being of the people of Nigeris dependent upon several external factors—the world uranium market, rainfall, Nigeria’seconomy, and donor financing.… There arestrong economic links—especially in the ruralsector—with Nigeria, whose 100 millionpeople are a vital market for Niger’s products.Much of Niger’s male rural population migrateseach year to Nigeria to complement incomefrom cropping and livestock activities” (WorldBank 1996: 20).

19 Boserup (1965) held that increasingdemographic pressure on land is a prime fac-tor driving agricultural intensification, e.g., byreducing fallow periods in shifting agriculture.In a sense, in this view technological changeis endogenous, triggered by increasing popu-lation/resource ratios (Turner and Shajaat Ali1996).

20 The latest (December 2004) FAO/World Food Programme Food Supply Assess-

ment Mission to Ethiopia estimates emergencyfood aid will be required in 2005 for 2.2 mil-lion “acutely food-insecure people” despite abumper crop of cereals and pulses (the high-est ever) estimated for 2004/05 (FAO 2005).

21 The primacy of agriculture is increas-ingly recognized in the development strategiesof several low-income countries. For example,Ethiopia’s most recent Sustainable Develop-ment and Poverty Reduction Program submit-ted to the IMF makes “agricultural develop-ment led industrialization” a cornerstone of itsstrategy (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethio-pia 2002).

22 Vegetable oils are a prime factor in theimprovement of per capita food (kcal) consump-tion in the developing countries (Bruinsma2003: chapter 3).

References

Alexandratos, N. 1999. “World food and agriculture: The outlook for the medium and longerterm,” Proceedings of the US National Academy of Sciences 96 (May): 5908–5914.

Alexandratos, N., J. Bruinsma, and J. Schmidhuber. 2000. “China’s food and the world,”Agrarwirtschaft, (Special Issue on Meeting the Food Challenge of the 21st Century) No. 9/10: 327–335.

Atkinson, G. and K. Hamilton. 2003. “Savings, growth and the resource curse hypothesis,”World Development 31(11): 1793–1807.

Boserup, E. 1965. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change underPopulation Pressure. London: Allen & Unwin.

Bruinsma, J. (ed.). 2003. World Agriculture: Towards 2015/30, an FAO Perspective. London: Earthscan;Rome: FAO.

Cohen, M. 2000. “Losing ground,” Far Eastern Economic Review 163(13): 36–38.Daily, G., P. Dasgupta, B. Bolin, P. Crosson et al. 1998. “Food production, population growth,

and the environment,” Science 281(5381).Economist. 2003. “Europe’s population implosion,” 19 July.———. 2004. “People aren’t cattle,” 17 July.Evenson, R. 2004. “Food and population: D. Gale Johnson and the Green Revolution,” Eco-

nomic Development and Cultural Change 52(3): 543–570..FAO. 2000. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2000. Rome: FAO.———. 2002. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2002. Rome: FAO.———. 2004. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2004. Rome: FAO.———. 2005. FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Ethiopia. Rome: FAO.Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 2002. Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Re-

duction Program. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.Fischer, G., H. van Velthuizen, M. Shah, and F. Nachtergaele. 2002. Global Agro-Ecological Zones

Assessment for Agriculture in the 21st Century: Methodology and Results, Report IR-02-02.Laxenburg: IIASA; Rome: FAO.



Gallup, J. and J. Sachs. 2000. “Agriculture, climate and technology: Why are the tropics fallingbehind?,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82: 731–737.

Government of Niger. 2002. Poverty Reduction Strategy. Niamey: Office of the Prime Minister,Permanent Secretariat of the PRSP.

ILO. 2004. World Employment Report 2005–5, Chapter 3: Why Agriculture Still Matters. Geneva: In-ternational Labour Organization.

Johnson, D. Gale. 2000. “Population, food and knowledge,” American Economic Review 90(1): 1–14.

Lang, T. 2003. “Food policy and markets: Structural challenges and options,” paper presentedat the OECD Conference on Changing Dimensions of the Food Economy: Exploring thePolicy Issues, The Hague, Netherlands, 6–7 February.

Lebre la Rovere, E. 2004. “The Brazilian ethanol program: Biofuels for transport,” paper pre-sented at the International Conference for Renewable Energy, Bonn.

Lipton, M. 1999. “Reviving global poverty reduction, what role for genetically engineered plants,”1999 Crawford Memorial Lecture, CGIAR Secretariat (World Bank), Washington, DC, 28October

Longman, P. 2004. “The global baby bust,” Foreign Affairs 83(3): 64–79.Lutz, W., W. Sanderson, and S. Scherbov. 2001. “The end of world population growth,” Nature

412: 543–546.——— (eds.). 2004a., The End of World Population Growth in the 21st Century: New Challenges for

Human Capital Formation and Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan.Lutz, W., S. Scherbov, P. K. Makinawa-Adebusoye, and G. Reniers. 2004b. “Population–envi-

ronment–development–agriculture interactions in Africa: A case study on Ethiopia,” inLutz et al. 2004a.

Mansoob Murshed, S. 2002. “On natural resource abundance and underdevelopment,” back-ground paper for World Development Report 2003. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Meenakshi, J. V. and B. Vishwanathan. 2003. “Calorie deprivation in rural India, 1983–1999/2000,” Economic and Political Weekly, 25 January.

Nweke, F., D. Spencer, and J. Lyman. 2002. The Cassava Transformation: Africa’s Best-kept Secret.East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Pender, J. 1999. “Rural population growth, agricultural change and natural resource manage-ment in developing countries: A review of hypotheses and some evidence from Hondu-ras,” IFPRI, EPTD Discussion Paper No. 48.

Pimentel, D. et al. 1999. “Will limits of the Earth’s resources control human numbers?,” Envi-ronment, Development and Sustainability 1(1).

Republic of Chad. 2003. “National poverty reduction strategy paper.” N’Djamena: Ministry ofPlanning, Development and Cooperation.

Sachs, J. 1997. “Nature, nurture and growth,” The Economist, 14 June.———. 2004. The Case for Slowing Population Growth. Project Syndicate, October «http://www.

project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4?id=1731 &lang=1».Sachs, J. et al. 2004. “Ending Africa’s poverty trap,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2004(1):

117–216.Shariff, A. and A. C. Mallick. 1999. “Dynamics of food intake and nutrition by expenditure

class in India,” Economic and Political Weekly, 3–9 July.Stringer, R and P. Pingali. 2004. “Agriculture’s contributions to economic and social develop-

ment,” Electronic Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics 1(1) «www.fao.org/es/esa/eJADE».

Turner, B. L and A. M. Shajaat Ali. 1996. “Induced intensification: Agricultural change inBangladesh with implications for Malthus and Boserup,” Proceedings of the US National Acad-emy of Sciences, 93 (December): 14984–14991.

UN. 2003a. World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision. New York.———. 2003b. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision. New York.———. 2004. World Population to 2300. New York.



———. 2005. World Population Prospects, the 2004 Revision: Highlights. New York.UN Millennium Project. 2005. Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium

Development Goals. New York.UNCTAD. 2004. The Least Developed Countries Report, 2004. Geneva.UNDP. 2004. Human Development Report 2004. New York.UNIDO. 2004. Industrial Development Report 2004. Vienna.World Bank. 1996. Niger Poverty Assessment, a Resilient People in a Harsh Environment (Report No.

15344-NIR). Washington, DC.———. 2003a. World Development Report, 2003. Washington, DC.———. 2003b. World Development Indicators, 2003—CD ROM. Washington, DC.———. 2003c. Global Development Finance, 2003. Washington, DC.———. 2003d. Global Economic Prospects, 2004. Washington, DC.———. 2005. Global Economic Prospects, 2005. Washington, DC.Young, A. 1999. “Is there really spare land? A critique of estimates of available cultivable land

in developing countries,” Environment, Development and Sustainability 1: 3–18.Zaal, F. and R. Oostendorp. 2002. “Explaining a miracle: Intensification and the transition to-

wards sustainable small-scale agriculture in Dryland Machakos and Kitui Districts, Kenya”World Development 30(7): 1271–1287.


Documents

Countries with Rapid Population Growth and Resource Constraints